7/31/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2019 | OSCE
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2019 KYIV 31 July 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer cease re violations in Donetsk region and more cease re violations in Luhansk region. An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted the return of anti-tank mines inside the disengagement area near Zolote. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the cease re to facilitate repairs of critical civilian infrastructure, including power lines, water pipelines, and the drilling of water wells. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Veselohorivka, Verkhnoshyrokivske, and Yuzhna Lomuvatka.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer cease re violations, including eight explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (23 explosions). The majority of cease re violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and north-east of Svitlodarsk (government- controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded cease re violations, including 26 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no cease re violations). The majority of cease re violations were recorded in areas east of Dmytrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Luhansk), assessed as a live- re exercise outside the security zone, as well as north and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On 30 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a white armoured vehicle, belonging to the State Emergency Services, passing the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and driving into the disengagement area. Inside the disengagement area, the SMM also saw seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) [2] between the southern part of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations further south.
Other disengagement areas[3] https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/427004 1/6 7/31/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2019 | OSCE On 24 July, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted that seven anti-tank mines (TM-62) previously observed under a camou aged net across road T-1316 about 1km south of the area’s northern edge were no longer present. On 28 July, an SMM mini- UAV spotted three anti-tank mines (TM-62) in the same location.
On 28 July, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2). On 29 July, also inside the disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP) (Varta). Both vehicles were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On 30 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
30 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (9K22, Tunguska) at a compound near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
30 July
The SMM noted that:
six tanks (T-72) and seven self-propelled mortars (2S9) were present; and one self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona, 120mm) was missing for the rst time. 58 tanks (52 T-64 and six T-72), three self-propelled mortars (2S9), and 22 self- propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.
Weapons permanent storage sites
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region
30 July
The SMM noted that two mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing for the rst time and that four mortars (2B9) remained missing.
At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/427004 2/6 7/31/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2019 | OSCE 30 July
The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and eight towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.
Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
28 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
an infantry ghting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk); and for the rst time, a 200m-long trench and three bunkers (two under construction, one completed), about 30m north of a residential building near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), outside the disengagement area.
29 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2U), and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk); and three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk).
30 July
The SMM saw:
an IFV (BMP-2) and an APC (MT-LB) near Popasna; and an IFV (BTR-4) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
28 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable ACV near Petrivske, about 110m north of the disengagement area’s northern edge.
29 July
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
an IFV (BMP variant) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk); a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk); and
https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/427004 3/6 7/31/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2019 | OSCE two ACVs and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).
30 July
The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Metalist (7km north of Luhansk).
Presence of anti-tank mines near Bohdanivka and Nyzhnie Lozove
On 29 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 24 anti-tank mines (TM-62M) laid out in four rows across the road between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as 11 anti-tank mines (ten TM-62M and one TM-62P3) laid out in two rows about 140m further east across the same road and ve anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in an adjacent eld south of the road. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted seven probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road M-03 about 2.5km west of Nyzhnie Lozove.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the cease re to enable repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to enable repairs and the inspection of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), Popasna and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and Holmivskyi (non- government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
SMM monitored security situation south-east of Kherson region
On 29 July, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.
The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/427004 4/6 7/31/2019 y p LatestJ fromy the OSCE Special Monitoring Missionp to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as ofg 19:30, 30 July 2019 | OSCE restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
At a checkpoint east of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Veselohorivka. At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non- government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “engineering activities in the area.”
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identi ed as important for e ective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
At a checkpoint in Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations only allowed the SMM to proceed after 35 minutes of waiting.
Other impediments:
On ve occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming: once while ying over areas near Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), twice over Fedorivka (government-controlled, 32km north-east of Mariupol), and twice over Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol).[7]
[1] For a complete breakdown of cease re violations, please see the annexed table.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a sta of o cers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in de ned sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces o cers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[5] The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be veri ed as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 noti cation from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on e ective monitoring and veri cation of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/427004 5/6 7/31/2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 July 2019 | OSCE [6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s positions.
See the table of ceasefire violations
Contacts Dragana Nikolic-Solomon Chief of Press and Public Information Unit OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine O ce: +380 44 392 08 55 Mobile: +380 95 291 99 18 [email protected] [email protected]
Iryna Korobko National Media O cer OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 26 Turhenievska Street 01054 Kyiv Ukraine O ce: +380 44 392 09 84 Mobile: +380 67 235 38 16 [email protected] [email protected]
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