Marine Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

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Marine Policy

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Social networks, collective action and the evolution of governance for sustainable tourism on the , ⁎ Stefan Partelowa,b, , Katherine Nelsona,b a Leibniz Centre for Tropical Marine Research (ZMT), Bremen, Germany b Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany

ABSTRACT

This article examines how social networks among actors in the tourism sector have facilitated the evolution of self-organized institutions for governance on the island of Gili Trawangan, Indonesia. Increasing tourism for and nightlife is driving rapid social-ecological change and challenges for sustainability in relation to waste management, social-political cohesion and conservation. While strong social networks were a sufficient means to initiate governance among the island's few early businesses in the 1990's and early 2000's, an increasing number of actors (i.e., new SCUBA businesses and hotels) and more tourists are challenging the ability of social networks to be the foundation of effective governance, where there is now an evident need for the evolution of governance to more effectively address sustainability challenges. This article combines quantitative social network analysis with the qualitative analysis of interview data, participant observations and an ethnographic examination of the island's changing social-political sphere of cooperation to examine the evolution of governance. Our results can be separated into two parts. (1) From past to present, examining how governance institutions and collective action have emerged from strong social networks. (2) From present to future, how these social networks are being undermined as the foundation for the island's governance institutions that they created, due to growth and changing social-ecological conditions. This article draws on Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) as an overarching frame to examine the linkages between social networks and collective action, looking specifically at the role of multi-level governance, institutional change, path dependencies and discourse analysis.

1. Introduction economic growth can bring new actors and larger groups into an ex- isting governance system. Governance will be forced to evolve, to adapt Structuring how and why people cooperate to use shared resources institutions to new social (and often ecological) conditions and goals. is the central task of environmental governance, to guide cooperation The process of how groups of actors establish cooperation and en- towards common goals [1,2]. Some communities are more successful at vironmental governance, and how this process evolves, is the focus of cooperating than others, and understanding the processes that lead to this research, particularly as groups of actors face new environmental different cooperation outcomes is a central question to governance. This challenges. is a challenging task, because governance is not a simple and generic The situation above describes the growth and changes on the island process; it is social, political and often contentious as multiple actors of Gili Trawangan, Indonesia since the 1990's. A small group of like- may have conflicting interests and preferences [3,4]. Diverse groups of minded European travelers saw potential in the island destination near people, often of different sizes, locations and organizational levels ofa to be developed as a dive destination. The first dive shop was social system need to work together [2,5,6]. Quite often there are di- opened in the early 1990's, followed soon after by many others. The vergent goals for governance, and disagreement over what social and initial small group of owners shared similar characteristics and had like- political processes should be enacted to achieve them, both within and minded goals about conserving the surrounding coral reefs from de- between groups. structive fishing in order to build a world-class dive tourism Small groups with similar interests may find the process of devel- destination. They worked together, and with the traditional head of the oping environmental governance (i.e., institutions for cooperation to- island, agreed on rules and guidelines which developed into informal wards group goals) relatively easy. Homogenous interests within a institutions for cooperation and environmental governance. These in- small group, low transaction costs, local enforcement and close in- cluded both social norms for life on the island and rules for economic formal relationships between individuals may enable productive col- and environmental development. Everyone on the island knew each laboration [7–10]. Cooperation within a small group may be simple other, they had close relationships, the conservation programs took compared to governing multiple larger groups, which likely have more effect and the island grew into a global tourism destination. Thein- diverse interests and preferences [11]. However, development and formal governance structures proved successful for many years, but

⁎ Corresponding author at: Leibniz Centre for Tropical Marine Research (ZMT), Bremen, Germany. E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Partelow). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.08.004 Received 15 December 2017; Received in revised form 2 August 2018; Accepted 2 August 2018 0308-597X/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Stefan Partelow and Katherine Nelson, Marine Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.08.004 S. Partelow and K. Nelson Marine Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx continued growth has increased the pressure on the existing social, knowledge for sustainability [24]. Within EGT, there is recognition that environmental, and governance systems, demanding a change. institutional diversity often relates to different discourses (i.e., sets of This article provides an empirical analysis for how informal social concepts and ideas about reality) [17,25]. In coastal space, different networks provided the foundation for collective action and the emer- realities for different people and groups may exist, influencing pre- gence of environmental governance on Gili Trawangan. However, the ferences for how and why governance should work. For example, on rapidly growing and changing island is stressing existing institutions for Gili Trawangan, tourists, business owners and local Indonesians may cooperation to evolve, indicating a move from informality to formal each have different discursive realities in how they talk about, experi- governance arrangements, involving actors at multiple levels of gov- ence and use coastal resources. Perhaps tourists view the coast as an ernment. A larger group of business owners and tourists with more item of social capital and enjoyment, business owners as a source of diverse interests and preferences now occupy the island, including in- income and local Indonesians as a source of cultural identity. Discursive creasing interest from the Indonesian state. While the initially estab- realities can shape our preferences for the types of institutions we prefer lished informal mechanisms for cooperation still exist, i.e., those that and beliefs about who has the right to enact those preferences through evolved from the island's social networks of dive shop owners, they are governance (e.g., power hierarchies). no longer sufficient to address the island's myriad of sustainability Similarly, EGT also recognizes the role of path dependencies and challenges. The remaining introduction outlines how Evolutionary systems theory. These concepts are rooted in the idea that institutions Governance Theory (EGT) can help to examine the complexities of how and discursive realities for governance emerge from what came before coastal governance evolves and changes, and further outlines how so- and that the parts of an enclosed system create the building blocks for cial networks and collective action theory provide useful tools for what evolves next. For example, as examined further below, the Gili analysis. A more in-depth description of the case study on Gili EcoTrust – a community-based conservation organization, is the only Trawangan is provided, followed by our empirical results and discus- organization with the appropriate social and political connections, fi- sion. nances and influence on the island to deal with environmental chal- lenges. When waste management became the primary issue, it was the 1.1. Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) and coastal governance most institutionally capable organization to deal with the problem. It is evident that the evolution of governance is dependent on existing fea- Governance can be viewed as a constantly changing and evolu- tures in a system, of which change builds on. tionary process of social institutions that structure human behavior and This article empirically analyzes the emergence of collective action cooperation towards normative goals. Institutions are the formal rules with social network analysis, and then use EGT to discuss our results (e.g., typically written and enforced such as laws and legislation) and linking the development and change of institutions, path dependencies informal rules (e.g., typically unwritten but socially mainstreamed and different discursive realities on Gili Trawangan. As a whole, the norms) in society. It is increasingly recognized that many different island faces multiple collective action problems. Local businesses and types of institutions exist [12], and that whether they hinder or enable residents need to sustain the island's economy, waste management successful governance outcomes is influenced by both social and bio- system, beaches and coral reefs despite increasing numbers of tourists physical features of a system. and competing businesses. However, few incentives exist for any in- In this article we examine the development and change of institu- dividual businesses to contribute to finding collective . Thus, tions in the context of environmental governance, which is becoming examining why individual businesses cooperate to find collective so- increasingly collaborative worldwide [1]. Further, we position en- lutions is of considerable interest for understanding how and why vironmental governance within the discourse on social-ecological sys- governance emerges and evolves. tems (SES) [1,13,14]. The SES concept, as well as EGT, emphasizes two This analysis is presented over time. First, showing how informal aspects important for analyzing governance. First, the importance of social networks have been instrumental in fostering informal collective context, and second, recognition that social and ecological features in a governance efforts. Second, showing how changing social-ecological system have interdependent relationships [13–15]. A significant por- conditions are forcing governance institutions to evolve towards for- tion of the SES literature aims to link SES processes to the development malization. Using EGT, numerous discursive realities are unpacked and change of institutions for collaborative environmental governance within the island's social-political sphere of cooperation, including [13,16]. power hierarchies between the local and state government institutions EGT [16,17] provides a useful frame to view coastal environmental about who should be responsible for development on the island and governance, combining aspects of institutional economics [12,18], so- who should benefit. Similarly, the role of social-political relationships is cial systems theory, path dependency and evolutionary biology [19,20] examined between a core group of mostly foreign (non-Indonesian) as well as discourse theory [16,17]. While each are extensive pursuits influential business owners, new business investors, and local on their own, EGT aims to link them, providing an overarching frame Indonesians. These dynamics strain the island's informal social net- for understanding the complex realities of governance, particularly works, the foundation of governance. Overall, this article aims useful for coastal systems. In the following analysis and discussion, we to show how social network analysis can inform collective action the- draw on EGT to examine the evolution of coastal governance on Gili ories, while simultaneously unpacking the complexities of coastal Trawangan. governance. EGT is a useful tool for analyzing coastal governance because coastal governance theories are largely in their infancy [21]. Few 1.2. Social networks and collective action governance theories and frameworks comprehensively explore the complex overlaps and interactions between different institutions, bio- Social networks refer to the structures and types of interactions physical features and resource uses in coastal systems. Existing coastal between actors in a group [26]. Thus, social network analysis is a useful governance approaches often mirror terrestrial ones, which are rarely tool to examine how and why actors cooperate through their connec- or poorly adapted to coastal complexities (i.e., the materiality and in- tions to each other, and by examining the organizational patterns of terconnectivity of land, air, and water) [22,23]. those connections in a group. Social networks often reflect whether the Coastal systems have many natural resources, generating a wide cooperative behavior between actors is structured in a way that best variety of values and institutions within and between the social-cultural enables or fits the context to sufficiently achieve governance goals. The groups which use them. Biophysically, coasts have high boundary concept of fit is often used to describe this phenomena, to assess whe- fluidity and numerous overlapping ecosystem types, representing the ther institutions for governance such as social networks are adapted or link between land and sea [21,22], requiring interdisciplinary not (e.g., spatially, structurally or to scale) to govern the intended

2 S. Partelow and K. Nelson Marine Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx environmental resource effectively [1,27,28]. Linking social network biodiverse but threatened tropical coral reefs in the world [42,43]. The analysis and collective action research is a promising approach for Indonesian ‘Throughflow’ current, passing between Bali and , better understanding how cooperation is structured and responds to connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans, mixing the marine species di- change [29–31]. versity between regions [42]. However, this also mixes marine pollu- Collective action and social network theories can inform each other. tion across regions and between localities [44], creating challenges for Social network theory can explain the structures and types of connec- governance to adapt and respond to rapid changes in the region [45]. tions among actors, and reciprocally, collective action theories can Gili Trawangan is the largest and most frequently visited of the explain the social and ecological conditions which influence the three Gili Islands, known worldwide as a destination for SCUBA emergence of self-organization and social networks. In addition, both tourism. The island is less than 6 square kilometers, hosts more than bodies of literature draw on the SES concept [13,32]. Collective action 750 businesses, has more than 2000 permanent residents and averages research has focused on the types of institutional arrangements that approximately 2000 new tourists per day during the high season and lead to long-term success in environmental governance [2,33,34], and approximately 1 million tourists per year [46]. However, the island is the influential variables that determine success, as well as, defining the fairly underdeveloped by global tourism standards with minimal public barriers to success. Many social and ecological variables have shown to infrastructure [47]. In addition, the island faces numerous challenges be influential, with empirically supported hypotheses on their im- for its sustainability including coral degradation, poor waste portance [8,13,35]. Socially, variables such as group size, commu- management, plastic pollution, beach erosion caused by coastal devel- nication, transaction costs, socio-economic heterogeneity as well as opment, unauthorized and illegal infrastructure development, illegal operational and collective choice rule arrangements have repeatedly fishing and anchoring, as well as tension between long-term business proven to be influential [8,11,36]. Ecologically, variables such as owners and residents (both Indonesian and foreign), short-sighted system size, system boundaries, the predictability of ecosystem dy- business investors, and the state [47,48]. In addition, the island is namics and resource regeneration rates, among others, have shown to threatened by many of the same broad spanning challenges facing be influential [13,36]. In the analysis below, many of these variables coasts worldwide. Climate change induced sea level rise, ocean acid- influence the formation of social networks, and the ability of social ification and increased mean sea surface are threatening networks to be the foundation for governance on Gili Trawangan due to the island's low lying coastal developments and coral reefs, which are a its distinct features as a small island. main source of economic capital, and have recently faced erosion and major bleaching events [49].

1.3. Coastal tourism on the Gili Islands, Indonesia 1.3.1. SCUBA tourism and funding conservation Small tropical islands can be defined as coastal social-ecological SCUBA diving is the foundation of tourism on Gili Trawangan. The systems [22,37], with many of them containing some of the highest dive industry started with simple bungalows established by foreign overlapping of people and biodiversity in the world travelers in the early 1990's. Only a few businesses existed with very [24,38]. The societies, cultures, and economies of small island com- minimal additional services. The island has not been historically oc- munities often evolve around a high dependence on local natural re- cupied by Indonesians; only permanently settled in the 1970's. The is- sources and move towards a heavy reliance on imported goods as the land now has more than 30 SCUBA diving businesses, with more island's economic growth develops, characterizing the challenges they planned to open, and nearly the same number of SCUBA shops on the face for sustainable development [39], particularly when those re- neighboring islands of Gili Meno and Gili Air collectively. Most dive sources are shared between increasing numbers of actors with hetero- shops are located on the main beachfront road on the eastern shore, gonous economic interests over time. Challenges on small islands can where most of the island's businesses and tourism activities are located, escalate due to spatial limitations and a lack of connectivity to infra- i.e., Fig. 1. structure and public services which mainland areas typically have. This Tourists face the choice between many similar dive shops who at- often creates the need for the self-organized provision of public ser- tempt to diversify themselves by catering to the many languages of vices. Small isolated islands provide useful examples of how govern- travelers, providing accommodation on-site, restaurants and bars as ance emerges and evolves to provide needed services, particularly in well as other outdoor, lifestyle, and nightlife activities. Diving sites are the tropics where multiple anthropogenic from land and sea located within a few minutes boat ride in the nearshore waters, creating are impacting coastal systems [24], necessitating adaptive governance easy access for all, i.e., Fig. 2. Dive sites named after popular marine to change [38,40,41]. megafauna, such as Shark Point and Turtle Heaven, receive consider- Gili Trawangan is one of the three small Gili Islands located off the able dive and boat traffic, creating concerns for the health of the coral northwest coast of Lombok, West Nusa Tengarra, Indonesia i.e., Fig. 1. reef and dive safety due to overcrowding, in addition to the tension The waters surrounding the Gili Islands contain some of the most between businesses competing for use of the common marine space.

Fig. 1. (A) Map of Indonesia with the location of Lombok and Bali circled. (B) Gili Islands (circled) off the coast of northwest Lombok. (C) Satellite photo oftheGili Islands. From left to right, Gili Trawangan, Gili Meno, Gili Air. Source: Google Earth 2017.

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Fig. 2. (A) Divers in the waters off Gili Trawangan. (B) Turtle laying on , a frequent attraction for divers. (C) BioRock ar- tificial reef structures for coral restoration and erosion control implemented by Gili EcoTrust. (D) Aerial photo of the northeast side of Gili Trawangan. (E) The island's uncontrolled landfill, overflowing into pasture area. (F) Beachfront with SCUBA dive boats parked di- rectly on the beach. Photos A–D and F pro- vided by The Jetlagged. Photo E provided by the authors.

The original group of dive shops on the island started a local non- year of establishment, size, nationality of owner, memberships to governmental organization called the Gili EcoTrust (www.giliecotrust. community organizations, services provided, their most frequently com) to focus on marine conservation and coral reef restoration activ- visited dive locations and their most frequent collaborations with other ities. To fund this organization, shops agreed to charge a voluntary ‘eco- businesses. In addition, data was collected on perceptions of challenges fee’ to each dive customer of 50,000 Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) (~ $3.75 on the island as well as statements regarding cooperative activities and USD). This donation would go directly to the Gili EcoTrust. In addition, potential solutions. Participant observations played a large role in un- to mitigate price competition the dive shops established a minimum derstanding social dynamics, politics, and on-going efforts for con- price agreement for the cost of dive courses and . servation and waste management on the islands. In a parallel study, The cost of one open-water SCUBA dive on Gili Trawangan (as of 2017) additional data was collected and analyzed on the willingness of tour- is typically 490,000 IDR (~ $37 USD). The establishment of these ists to pay for bundled environmental management efforts implemented agreements and the evolving informal regulations are explored below. by the Gili EcoTrust [53].

2. Methods 2.2. Data analysis 2.1. Data collection Survey data was cleaned and structured into two edge1 list data sets for social network analysis, represented in Figs. 3 and 4, coupled with a The data collection for this study was conducted by the authors on third data set with attribute information. Nodes2 in both data sets were Gili Trawangan and Gili Air during March–April 2017. More than 50 individual businesses. Edge connections in Fig. 3 are guided by the semi-structured interviews were conducted as well as opportunistic question ‘Did the owner or manager work at or get a diving certification open-ended interviews with key informants, owners and managers of with any of the other dive businesses on the island in the past?’ Edge SCUBA dive businesses, leaders of local non-governmental organiza- connections in Fig. 4 are guided by the question, ‘If this business col- tions (NGOs) and local government officials on the island. Interview laborates with other dive shops, please list up to 5 dive shops you questions aimed to provide data saturation on social, political, eco- collaborate with the most?’ Analysis of the social network data was nomic and environmental topics on the island through a diagnostic conducted in Gephi, a software and interface for network analysis [54]. approach [50–52]. Initial rounds of interviews aimed to accumulate a Neighbors in Fig. 4 are either the first or second closest dive business. comprehensive list of the island's most pressing challenges, and sub- The second closest business may be less than 50 m away in most cases sequent interviews aimed to provide more detail into the drivers and due to the density of the island. potential solutions to challenges from all interviewees. Due to inter- Qualitative interview data was systematically analyzed from notes viewee preferences, audio recording was not possible in many cases. taken directly during or immediately after interviews. The diagnostic For consistency, all interviews were conducted in the same format when approach allowed for the aggregation of interview statements into core possible. Interviewees gave verbal consent and were aware of the re- topics, to then compile and contrast the conflicting perspectives related search purpose. However, anonymity of individuals and businesses is to each topic. Much of this process was done while in the field, with the maintained. To our knowledge, all but one of the dive businesses on the island were interviewed, along with all available local officials and NGOs who were willing to participate. 1 Edges in network analysis are defined as social relationships, connections or Thirty commercially operating recreational SCUBA dive centers interactions. were given self-completion surveys regarding their attributes including 2 Nodes represent the actors (i.e., businesses) within the network.

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Fig. 3. Social network analysis of the ‘family tree’ of dive shops on Gili Trawangan. Nodes are businesses and con- nections between them represent managers or owners who used to work at or were certified at a different shop. Each business is labelled with the year of establishment. The size of each node is the ‘degree’, i.e. the sum total of the number of connections going in and out of the node. Only five shops are not connected in the network (bottom left).

Fig. 4. Social network of self-stated collaborations be- tween SCUBA dive businesses. Node size equals the in- degree, i.e. the number of connections coming into each node. The color of each node is the self-stated size of each business on a categorical scale (small, medium, large). The year of establishment is labelled on each node, re- presenting a unique business. Red edges (connections) indicate that the businesses are neighbors, i.e. physically located next to each other on the island. Black edges are non-neighbors. Collaborations can include the exchange or borrowing of gear, sending customers when they are overbooked, sharing boats, exchanging employees or staff when needed, or communicating on dive locations and conditions.

aim of the diagnostic process to develop continually refined research professional dive certifications and worked in an older shop, and have questions for each proceeding round of interviews, to follow-up on close informal relationships with the owners and managers of those previous responses. When a diversity of actors were interviewed re- shops. garding any topic, and the responses were saturated through repetitive The network analysis also provides insight into business exchanges. answers, the data regarding this topic was considered to be sufficient Shops hire employees between each other including dive masters, for analysis. SCUBA instructors and general staff. Trust and social capital when hiring or training employees is a liability for SCUBA shops which often have a high turnover rate of seasonal and short-term employees. 3. Results Knowing that employees are reliable during hiring processes is valu- able, and this informal information is exchanged if the managers have 3.1. From past to present: social networks lead to cooperation worked or were trained on the island previously. This additionally highlights the career progression of individuals who were trained at an The social network analysis in Fig. 3 visualizes how the develop- older established business and then took the opportunity to become a ment of institutions for cooperation evolved on Gili Trawangan as a manager of a more recent business or to start their own. type of ‘family tree’ over time i.e., Section 3.2. Informal relationships Many more network exchanges occur, particularly among dive between SCUBA businesses are very strong, as nearly all dive shops are masters and instructors, who often work seasonally, and frequently connected through previous employer/employee relationships. Older move between businesses based on availability and demand. The strong businesses have more overall connections and more links to recent degree of business relationships is mirrored and reinforced by a net- businesses, as employees from the older shops have branched off to work of informal relationships between shops that have generated trust start their own shop. Nearly all owners or managers have earned

5 S. Partelow and K. Nelson Marine Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx and social capital amongst themselves to collectively deal with chal- shops made it more difficult for informal social networks to bethe lenges facing the island. Both formal exchanges (e.g., written formal foundation for effective governance (i.e., keeping the price agreement, agreements) and informal (e.g., unwritten or social norms) relation- the dive fee, and the progression of conservation efforts to reflect the ships exist, reinforcing each other and enabling cooperation i.e., Fig. 4. pressing environmental issues). GIDA made the first attempt to for- malize aspects of governance in the island's SCUBA industry through 3.1.1. The development of institutions for cooperation creating a written charter that established operational rules for the Initial SCUBA businesses valued institutionalizing economic stabi- sector and collective choice rules for decision making [12]. Although lity and environmental safeguards, and made early efforts to cooperate the rules were not legally enforced, the charter initiated a process of on the development and implementation of governance initiatives formalizing established social norms. Operational rules aimed to ad- during the late 1990's and early 2000's. Growing concerns about illegal dress safety and environmental standards for diving and the joint use of fishing and coral reef degradation motivated the establishment ofthe marine space, as well as procedures for island politics and business Gili EcoTrust in 2001, supported by all dive shop owners at the time development. Participating GIDA members are asked to pay a i.e., Fig. 3. The original purpose of the Gili EcoTrust was to raise funds 1,000,000 IDR (~ $75 USD) yearly membership fee and to attend through establishing a voluntary ‘eco-fee’ on diving. Divers are charged monthly meetings hosted at rotating locations between the partici- (an opt-out donation request that is strongly suggested) a one-time fee pating members. Specific rules include protocols suchas of 50,000 IDR (~ $3.75 USD) when they go diving at a participating the number of staff required on a , guide to diver ratios, speed dive shop on the island. A majority of dive businesses supported the limits, safe distances from divers in the water, boat maneuvering reg- formation of the Gili EcoTrust and collectively established the goals and ulations for controlling boats around dive sites, mandatory spotters on purpose of the organization. This collaboration was straightforward as the front of the boat, and rules about anchoring. In addition, the GIDA there were few dive shops (less than 10) on the island at the time. The charter attempts to formalize cooperation, stating that GIDA members Gili EcoTrust was initially managed through one of the core SCUBA will lend needed equipment such as SCUBA gear, pool space for shops, but this has since evolved into a distinct organization with sev- teaching, or tank air-fills to other GIDA members, and that allGIDA eral full time staff and a well-established volunteer internship program. members agree to not lend anything to non-members. The charter also Initially, funds raised for the Gili EcoTrust were used to buy a patrol includes formalized cooperative emergency response protocols between boat and pay fishers to fish further away from the island toavoid all dives shops, regardless of membership, to ensure general safety for conflict with dive boats and marine habitat destruction [47]. Today the all divers and to ensure the island's safety reputation. If a diver goes Gili EcoTrust deals with a wide variety of sustainable development is- missing or assistance is needed in the water during an emergency, all sues including waste management programs (i.e., collecting, sorting, GIDA members have pledged to respond immediately by deploying all recycling, and composting waste, and offering training to businesses on boats until is found or the situation is deemed safe. If the these activities), BioRock coral reef restoration and training courses, response is to assist a non-GIDA member, this shop is charged for the beach clean-ups, animal welfare, outreach programs on good environ- incurred costs. GIDA members do not have to pay. Collective choice mental practices, fundraising, environmental research, and political rules include majority voting procedures on all rules, attendance re- lobbying. The BioRock concept builds artificial metal structures con- quirements, membership fees, and elected positions in the association. nected to a low voltage electric grid, derived from the hypothesis that This written charter, agreed on by a majority of dive shops, formalizes electric current enhances the growth of naturally dislocated and the conditions for cooperation on the island to incentivize all SCUBA transplanted coral fragments into new reef structures i.e., Fig. 2C. The operators to join the association. Gili EcoTrust and cooperating businesses on the island have sponsored The most established and more politically influential dive shop and installed more than 120 BioRock structures on the Gili Islands for owners, those with the most experience dealing with issues on the is- coral and habitat restoration, to mitigate coastal erosion, and to create land, are also the owners who have been there the longest and have new . In combination, the Gili Trawangan witnessed drastic social and ecological changes. These well-established BioRock reefs are among the largest coral reef restoration projects in owners and managers are central actors in the social networks. The the world. establishment of GIDA, Gili EcoTrust, the dive fee, and price agreement As the number of dive shops grew, a minimum price agreement was emerged into social norms based on the leadership roles and connec- agreed upon between cooperating shops, placing lower limits on the tions of these owners, which largely convinced new shops to cooperate prices for SCUBA certification courses and the prices of recreational informally. Living on a small island, it is easy to observe what new dives. The agreement aimed to eliminate price competition. The es- shops are doing, and being welcomed into social-political life on the tablishment of the Gili EcoTrust and the price agreement shows the island is difficult for non-cooperators and can affect the reputation ofa ability of the businesses to self-organize in the collective interest of the new business. This narrative has been effective in maintaining co- group. Social networks i.e., Fig. 3, largely enabled this, in part through operation, but as more businesses emerge, social-political norms for a sense of collective identity among the owners, described by many cooperation via informal networks have become less influential without interviewees as playing a central role in the ability of owners to realize formal mechanisms for enforcement. their joint interests and create a sense of community. This collective identity enabled communication and trust building, leading to mutual 3.2. From present to future: growth, change, and the evolution of understandings of their collective interests in sustaining the island's governance economy, lifestyle, and ecosystems. The small size of the island also enabled closer relationships to form (discussed further below). How- The social network in Fig. 4 shows current collaborations between ever, while SCUBA businesses play a large role in driving the tourist SCUBA businesses. Strong interconnected relationships exist showing economy, overtime they have become a smaller minority of the total the close-knit nature of the industry, mirroring Fig. 3 with key central number of businesses (i.e., hotels, restaurants, bars, hostels). In addi- roles for older and larger businesses that have more extensive colla- tion, the discursive power hierarchies between expatriate owners and boration networks. Neighboring businesses cooperate substantially, Indonesians, as well as, short-sighted investors and long-term residents often stated in interviews due to the close proximity and ease of sharing often manifests into social-political tension over who is responsible for quickly needed gear, staff or boats. Only a few business are not colla- organizing and financing infrastructure and conservation. borating, the reason for this was explained in numerous interviews as The Gili Island Dive Association (GIDA) was self-organized by those businesses who have either created tensions by actively under- SCUBA shops in 2010, partly in response to more than 15 new SCUBA mining cooperative efforts or those who are not integrated well enough shops that opened between 2007 and 2012 i.e., Fig. 3. The influx of new into the social-political networks of the island to feel obligated to

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Table 1 Survey responses from the statement: “Please rank the top 3 issues in terms of current importance for the Gili Islands.” Respondents were given issues to select from and an option to add a response if necessary.

Percentages of issues ranked 1st Percentages of issues ranked 2nd Percentages of issues ranked 3rd

50% Waste collection 36% – Waste sorting/recycling 39% Monitoring & enforcement 25% Waste sorting/recycling 25% – Marine conservation 14% Security/safety 11% Animal welfarea 11% – Waste collection 11% Beach erosion 7% Marine conservation 11% – Pollution 11% Marine conservation 7% Pollution 11% – Government involvement 7% Infrastructure 4% – Corruption/transparency 7% Pollution 4% – Infrastructure 4% Government 4% Corruption transparency 4% Waste sorting/recycling

a Note: There are no motorized vehicles allowed on the island and the primary method of transportation is by traditional horse-carts, hence the concern for animal welfare. participate in voluntary governance arrangements such as GIDA, the the island's early days. However, initial success is now challenged by price agreement, or collecting the dive fee to support the Gili EcoTrust. change. Growth has led to new environmental challenges with either no However, non-cooperative owners stated similar concerns in regards to previous governance solutions or failed attempts at governance. their perceptions of sustainable development challenges in the survey. Governance is needed to address new problems, and many social and Growth has brought substantial challenges for sustainable devel- ecological factors are influencing this evolution. opment on the island. Table 1 shows the responses from SCUBA busi- Collective action theories suggest many variables that may influence ness owners or managers who were asked to rank the top 3 issues cooperation [2,35,55]. Table 3 summarizes our findings in relation to currently facing the island. Waste collection, sorting, and recycling are different hypotheses of variables within collective action theory and the top ranked issues. While marine conservation and monitoring and presents our analysis of how they influence cooperation on the island. enforcement were the dominant issues in the past that motivated co- Both social and ecological characteristics play a role, and they affect operation, growth is creating new waste management challenges. each other interdependently. For example, the size of the island, its Table 2 shows survey responses regarding the perceptions of current distance to Lombok and Bali, and social-political relationships between challenges. A large majority of SCUBA businesses believe that waste investors and residents all affect collaboration. The island must import and the marine environment are not being well managed, and this is all goods and develop its own public services, making the cost of living consistent with tourist perceptions [53]. While respondents stated that relatively high. Many businesses provide private daily transport for cooperating with other businesses is easy, a majority also stated that Indonesian employees on and off the island to Lombok where living is more cooperation is needed, but that cooperation will become more cheaper. Municipal waste, including septic tank waste, is often trans- difficult with the establishment of more businesses. While a largema- ported privately off the island to Lombok. Waste accumulation and jority agree on the issues facing the island and agree that more co- human health problems are exacerbated by the pace of change on the operation is needed, 31% of businesses are not part of GIDA, the pri- island and its small size, leading businesses to turn to convenient in- mary organization attempting to mobilize collective efforts within the dividual solutions rather than invest the time into establishing collec- SCUBA industry. tive arrangements. These quick solutions may serve the immediate challenge but they do not address the underlying problems which are only growing in magnitude. Gili Trawangan is approximately a 30 min 3.2.1. As the island changes, governance evolves boat ride to Lombok, which makes individual solutions for transporting Informal social networks are a distinct feature of life on Gili employees and goods/waste to and from the island feasible for the Trawangan. Small physical space (i.e., size of the system), common larger affluent businesses, rather than dealing with the transaction costs identities of the initial owners (i.e., relative cultural homogeneity), si- of finding collective solutions locally. However, individual solutions milar reasons for being there (i.e., economic interest homogeneity), and often drive prices up given that the activities are not organized or scaled a strong sense of community (i.e., social capital) enabled cooperation in and not all businesses can afford individual solutions, providing an incentive for businesses to find collective arrangements. Table 2 Although individual solutions are costly, they are reliable. Business or manager responses to survey statements, showing emerging dis- Collective solutions to build a better land fill and recycling center are agreement concerning collective action problems facing the island. Consensus not guaranteed to be successful or less costly, at least initially. on the problems and solutions facing the island in the 1990's and 2000's was a Collective solutions are nonetheless needed, as the majority of small key driver for cooperation through strong social networks that led to estab- businesses and residents face a waste management crisis. The Gili lishment of the Gili EcoTrust, the price agreements, and GIDA. EcoTrust has absorbed much of the responsibility for dealing with the Statements Agree Disagree , as the only existing organization with institutional capacity (i.e., networks, staff, and political influence) to deal with challenges. Issues concerning marine ecosystem conservation/ 34% 66% restoration/pollution are currently being effectively This is not only a dive shop problem, but due to the well-established managed on the island. social-political relations between the dive shops, particularly with the Issues concerning waste collection, sorting and recycling are 21% 79% Gili EcoTrust, their motivation and support for collective solutions is currently being effectively managed on the island. necessary. However, because dive shops are really the only businesses Pollution is increasing on the Gili islands, and it is negatively 59% 41% affecting your business. funding the Gili EcoTrust, resentment is building up among some dive Cooperating with other businesses on the island is easy. 66% 34% shop owners and managers because they seem to be the only ones in- More cooperation is needed between dive shops and 76% 24% vesting in collective solutions that address everyone's problems. businesses on the island. The more businesses on the island, the more difficult it is to 62% 38% 3.2.2. Waste management: congruence of local governance with outside cooperate and solve problems. This business is a member of GIDA. 69% 31% authorities Waste management issues provide a useful example of how

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Table 3 Alignment of case study conditions with theories of collective action (CA). A summary description of the CA hypothesis is provided for each variable. The case values of the variables on Gili Trawangan are shown with their current trend, with the stated values being relative to other variables in the case study context. A brief case explanation is provided.

Variable and collective action (CA) hypothesis Case explanation Case value Trend

Accountable leadership better motivates groups for CA Gili EcoTrust, GIDA and influential businesses lead decision making onthe Medium Decreasing island in relation to the SCUBA industry, primarily through informal leadership roles often driven by power linked to business size. Local non-SCUBA businesses have an association for decision making but exclude foreign managers and owners. Local government exists but unstable at the time of this research. Clear physical boundaries increase likelihood of CA Very small island surrounded by coral reefs, making it clear who is in or out of High Stable the area and using the shared resource. High predictability of system dynamics increases likelihood of CA as In relation to how seasonality (ecosystem fluctuation) drives tourism (social High Decreasing actors can prepare and adapt to fluctuations or changes predictability), there is more tourism during the dry season due to better weather and diving conditions. However, predictability of optimal ecosystem conditions is decreasing due to increasing pollution brought by regional currents to the beaches and coral bleaching events from climate change. Social trends in regards to island popularity are less certain as the island continues to gain global recognition while at the same time other areas are rapidly developing in the region for tourism. Low resource unit value may not motivate CA but high resource value Coral reefs are highly valued around the Gili Islands, they drive the tourism High Increasing may lead to rapid exploitation before CA can occur. industry. This is in part motivating CA due to the joint interests of businesses on the island to conserve them. However, with a highly valued resource being overburdened without formal governance, a gilded trap of exploitation has potential to develop [56]. Communication increases likelihood of CA GIDA members attend monthly meetings and communicate informally as well. Low Unsure Otherwise communication between non-GIDA members and other businesses on the island is informal and infrequent. Having low cost mechanisms for conflict resolution increase likelihood Very low formal government or police presence; rare marine regulation Medium Unsure of CA. enforcement. GIDA is only informal place for participating dive shops to resolve conflicts, with low monetary costs but higher social costs, as getting people to commit to meetings and finding solutions is difficult. Crowding out from external sanctioning causes less other regarding No regular external sanctioning from the regional/national government exists. A Low Stable behavior in order to ensure individual compliance, decreasing recent enforcement of beach development regulations was enforced, clearing all likelihood of CA. beach infrastructure which nearly every business had; property ownership disputes are common. Rare marine regulation enforcement exists mostly pertaining to boat licensing. Cultural heterogeneity decreases likelihood of CA, due to increased Clear divide between Western owned and Indonesian businesses as well as short- High Stable transaction costs sighted investors vs. long-term residents and business owners. Tourists come from all over the world, but primarily from Australia, European countries and East Asia with different norms on purchasing, disposing of waste, and recycling behavior. Economic heterogeneity increases likelihood of CA. Wealthy actors Clear divide between large upscale resorts, large dive businesses and local and High Increasing can offset costs or invest for group. smaller businesses. However, the large businesses donate a lot of money to the Gili EcoTrust and worthy causes around the island. This is needed but also causes power asymmetry. Small group sizes increase likelihood of CA, as transaction costs Gili Trawangan now has more than 30 dive shops and more than 750 businesses. High Increasing increase with group size. More than 15 other dive shops exist on Gili Meno and Gili Air, sharing the same marine area. Interest homogeneity, if actors have common interests, CA is more All businesses and residents have interest in sustaining tourism and maintaining High Stable likely. a healthy marine and coastal environment as a public good. If dependence on a resource is high, motivations for CA are higher. Everyone on the island is dependent on the islands marine and coastal resources High Increasing to be healthy. Larger businesses with investments in other locations may be less dependent than smaller ones, who may only have one location. If past collaboration and social capital exists the likelihood of CA is Past collaborations allowed cooperation to form on the island, however, social High Decreasing higher. capital is decreasing with increasing island growth and amounts of new businesses and local residents. If the proportionality of costs and benefits are equal, CA is more likely. A few large powerful businesses, mostly the original SCUBA businesses with a Low Increasing few large resorts, are funding a considerable portion of conservation and waste management efforts. Non-proportional benefits for the contributing actors may dis-incentivize them to continue collective efforts as the benefits are distributed to all but they are the only ones bearing the costs. As transaction costs increase, the efficiency and likelihood of Informal social networks facilitated collaboration on the island for years, High Increasing collective action decrease however, as increasing numbers of businesses are established it makes social transactions, such as communication, difficult. Clear user group boundaries Difficult to exclude fishers and any business from using marine area. Difficultto Low Stable increase excludability, increasing likelihood of CA. exclude new businesses from opening on the island. Also difficult to exclude any boat from anchoring and destroying the reef, and convince businesses with boats to conform to informal agreements due to low social capital among many owners. Graduated sanctions increase compliance and trust in institutions for GIDA charges non-GIDA members if they require services from GIDA i.e. Low Stable CA emergency diver rescues. However no sanctions exist for services provided by the Gili EcoTrust, non-compliance with waste management, littering or illegal infrastructure development. Collective choice rules for decision making increase likelihood of CA GIDA has developed collective choice for decision making, but only applicable Low Unclear to members in the SCUBA industry. No collective choice rules for waste management or development among all actors on the island. (continued on next page)

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Table 3 (continued)

Variable and collective action (CA) hypothesis Case explanation Case value Trend

Congruence of rules with outside authorities increases likelihood of CA. Outside authorities and regulations exist but rarely enforced. Enforcement of Low Unclear national regulations would likely benefit the island, but businesses are forced to develop own rules. If governance fits the social-ecological conditions the likelihood of The self-organized governance of the island fit well in the late 1990's and early Medium Decreasing (continued) CA increases. 2000's allowing the island's economy to grow substantially. However, increasing tourism and businesses are changing the social-ecological conditions, creating a mis-fit of existing institutions to address new challenges such as wasteand infrastructure development. Nested enterprises of governance increases likelihood of continued CA. Only local governance institutions exist, however there is potential that local Low Stable institutions will evolve into nested institutions of governance and that regional or federal governance will become actively involved. Cooperating with government is likely to occur in the future, as the islands have recently changed jurisdiction into the north Lombok region focusing on the islands as a substantial financial asset. conflicting multi-level governance arrangements can create chaos, but forward to address the islands new realities such as the need to for- ultimately drive the evolution of governance. The concept of devel- malize the social-political norms for island governance and to work oping institutions congruent with outside authorities is useful for un- with authorities at the regional and national level. derstanding the role of institutional fit to the island's changing condi- Waste is only one example of numerous problems that have led to tions. On the island, a lack of formal regional and national government similar conclusions. Further instances of multi-level conflict with the involvement has left an operational void for the management of waste. state include bringing motorized vehicles to the island despite a locally The head of the island's local government, in agreement with businesses imposed ban on vehicles, bringing national police guards to control and the Gili EcoTrust, developed a voluntary fee to be collected from security (although typically there is a local security and no state businesses willing to participate in a waste collection program. In an police), temporarily shutting down the privately owned desalinization attempt to establish legitimacy and for ease of collection, the fee was plant, and suddenly demolishing the beachfront structures of local bundled with tax collection for security and schools by the local gov- restaurants, hotels, and bars. In addition, oversight of property rights on ernment. This was an agreed up on solution among many businesses the island has been organized locally in the absence of state involve- and organizations, perceived as an informal solution to increase col- ment in most cases. However, the national government sporadically lection efficiency. However, due to the fact that the fee wasnotan claims property rights and it is speculated that they allocate land to officially recognized and government imposed ‘tax’, its collection was businesses willing to pay high fees for access to the island. The lessons considered extortion, a form of corruption, and the head of the island are largely the same. Multi-level conflicts are causing chaos, but chaos was subsequently accused of the fraudulent use of public funds by na- is leading to institutional change and the evolution of governance. tional authorities and jailed. The collection system was subsequently undermined and no longer functional, placing the island in a waste 3.2.3. Trust, social capital and funding governance management crisis. The Gili EcoTrust necessarily took over the collec- While trust and social capital have been built through strong social tion of voluntary funds from willing businesses, an act of social-political relationships in the late 1990's and early 2000's, growth and actor triage to maintain any collective organization of waste. However, heterogeneity are increasing the transaction costs of maintaining those evolving skepticism of the Gili EcoTrust (discussed below) in relation to relationships. Growing skepticism of the Gili EcoTrust is manifesting seemingly non-transparent collection and spending of funds (because its due to its informality of financing and political motivations, in part due focus is supposed to be marine related, and its culture of financial and to the need to diversify the problems it now manages. Some of this social-political informality) made the continued development of waste skepticism comes from dive shops who are discontent that they are the programs difficult without formalization, as far fewer businesses par- only businesses regularly charging their customers the fee which funds ticipated after the Gili EcoTrust took over waste management. all activities of the Gili EcoTrust. Many SCUBA shops are requesting The natural response to the waste crisis was for the Gili EcoTrust to more transparency on how the Gili EcoTrust is spending the funds as take control given their involvement in waste recycling initiatives by they believe the costs and benefits are unequal. Dive shop motivations using the island's strong social networks. However, the financial and to fund the Gili EcoTrust are centered on the idea that funds are re- political culture of informality, which led to the Gili EcoTrust's early invested into dive-related marine conservation activities. Many believe success, now undermines its own efforts due to the high transaction that if it finances general problems on the island, all businesses should costs incurred when trying to manage and motivate a larger number of be collecting an eco-fee, or that a centralized fee should be collected businesses with a large degree of economic and interest heterogeneity. from tourists in a different way. Research on the preferences for alter- A significant majority of businesses were not part of the Gili EcoTrust's native funding schemes was conducted in parallel with this study [53]. original social network, which has created difficulties for motivating collective financing for waste collection due to a lack of formal trans- 3.2.4. Rivalry on the reef and competition between businesses parency in how the Gili EcoTrust does businesses, creating a sense of Coral reefs surrounding Gili Trawangan are faced with rivalry in use skepticism and mistrust as the starting point for collaboration with new (i.e., consumption) issues and difficulties with excluding users. businesses. Although there are numerous reefs in the area, the popularity of a few We can see that the previous financing scheme with the local gov- charismatically named reefs (i.e., Shark Point, Turtle Heaven, Manta ernment worked well, but it was not congruent with national regula- Point) absorb much of the pressure as nearly every shop takes divers to tions. Local businesses and the Gili EcoTrust are hesitant to establish a these few popular sites at least once per day. Due to the limited space formal tax with regional or national authorities with skepticism that the and the increasing amount of SCUBA businesses, rivalry in the ‘con- revenue would not be invested back into the island, at least at the same sumption’ of the reef space becomes a water safety at times and rate that it would be if it were collected locally. This multi-level conflict a point of contention which undermines trust between businesses who created chaos, but chaos forced institutional change. Gili EcoTrust, believe that others do not follow the informal norms (or formal GIDA political leaders, and businesses were forced to reflect on how to move rules) of respect for sharing the reef. It is also impossible to exclude

9 S. Partelow and K. Nelson Marine Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx businesses from accessing the reef, there are no legal barriers and This phenomenon in EGT is called the path dependency of social sys- compliance with GIDA standards is voluntary, with about 30% of tems, drawing on the idea from evolutionary biology that enclosed SCUBA businesses not being members (Table 2). systems can only evolve from the components contained within them Clear inequities in the gains from accessing a reef are evident as [16,20]. For example, GIDA only evolved from the cooperating dive some larger SCUBA businesses take boats with up to 25 divers multiple shops participating in the dive fee, price agreements, and supporting times per day to popular locations, while smaller businesses may take the Gili EcoTrust. This was the only way to build on something that 4–6 divers on a similar sized boat. Only a limited number of boats can already existed, through the social networks, to create something new safely access a reef at a time. Tourists often shop around for an operator that actually works well and incorporates existing institutions by to dive with, often making a choice to go with an operator that will go adapting them to a changing context. to the sites they are interested in, and thereby creating competition Moreover, the Indonesian state has been increasingly involved in between businesses for access to reefs throughout the day. island politics, creating often contentious multi-level governance in- The ability of previously strong social networks to manage the riv- teractions. EGT recognizes that governance can evolve due to conflicts alry and excludability challenges of reef access through GIDA, as well as or mis-fit institutions that result from multi-level arrangements enforce the minimum price agreement to level competition, is under- [6,59,60]. The Indonesian regional and national governments were not mined through non-compliance to informal rules. Informal agreements involved in the development of the island's institutions. However, they are only functional when trust and social capital are maintained have become increasingly interested in being a present authority and through social networks. Increasing group size and heterogeneity of collecting more speculated tax revenue from the island's businesses and dive shops is eroding trust and social capital, leading to more frequent tourists, much of which never makes it back to benefit the infra- instances of non-compliance. It is evident that a core group of original structure of the island. Certainly the state has the ultimate right to dive shops still support voluntary GIDA rules, but largely on their govern the island, but due to its previous absence, the island has largely goodwill and experience with previous cooperative success. self-organized. Thus, the presence of the state is partly undermining the island's own efforts to find governances solutions in its absence. 4. Discussion While multi-level governance interactions have caused conflict, and often social-political chaos, they have been catalysts for the evolution of Gili Trawangan presents a case study of evolving and adaptive governance. Gili EcoTrust is adjusting to the presence of the state to governance of a coastal social-ecological system. As the state of the find more formalized and transparent financing solutions for waste, coastal ecosystem has changed from pristine to environmentally including private international investors. Tax amnesty interventions threatened, businesses on the island have evolved and adapted their from the state have in part seemed to shift the mentality of businesses local governance arrangements (i.e., institutions) to deal with them, towards recognizing that formalizing institutions such as GIDA, prop- often amidst contention and chaos. The selective nature of adaptation, erty rights, and marine governance is probably for the betterment of in the sense that business actors are choosing the response that best fits everyone, although this process will take time and bring contention. their needs and surrounding ecological system, has made the self-or- Social networks were the original driver of evolving governance, but it ganization of governance fit well to the island's needs. This was cer- is now largely a result of interactions of multi-level governance with the tainly the case in the early years. The Gili EcoTrust, dive fee, and price state. Path dependency from the existing institutions and networks re- agreement were institutions that fit the island's problems. As the island main as the building blocks for change, but the drivers of change are changed with growth, GIDA was a selected adaptation to the new now a more complex system. changing context of more actors, which attempted to formalize the In EGT, discourse plays a substantial role in how governance cooperation between a larger and more heterogeneous group of dive evolves through the sets of ideas and concepts which structure how businesses. Similarly, the Gili EcoTrust adapted its focus to waste actors act and make decisions about reality. On Gili Trawangan, two management, as the islands environmental needs shifted from marine prominent governance discourses are evident, both of which have issues to terrestrial ones. This adaptive approach to governance is manifested contention between different actors. One relates to the re- functional because it adapts to the context of the island when it lationship between the Indonesian state and local institutions. Second, changes. the relationship between non-Indonesian business owners, which are Our analysis shows how strong social networks allowed these self- fewer but more politically influential, and local Indonesian businesses, organized adaptations of governance. Overall, we can see that the social which are smaller, more numerous, but have less power in island pol- system responds to the ecological context, and the characteristic fea- itics. tures of the ecosystem partly dictate which institutions will work and Numerous non-Indonesian owners have stated the value of having a why. Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) recognizes that systems stronger state presence, particularly in relation to providing public in- thinking is a critical feature of how governance evolves and can be frastructure for waste management. These are desired and needed ser- adaptive, and in the case of Gili Trawangan we can see how both social vices on the island, which require considerable investment. and ecological characteristics influence adaptation to context, such as Simultaneously, a more formal system of taxation and state oversight the islands small size and its proximity to Lombok and Bali i.e., Table 3. on the island would likely not bring further investments back to the The adaptive nature of social-ecological systems governance de- island from the state, drawing money away from the island that could scribed above shows how self-organized governance can respond to otherwise be utilized. However, many also capitalize on the lack of change and fit well to a context [28,57,58]. However, the story above is formal enforcement in relation to illegal infrastructure development for simplified to provide a general sense of what we mean by adaptive their businesses, the provision of legitimate visas for non-Indonesian governance by giving an empirical example. In reality, the story is more employees and/or the evasion of taxes. This dichotomy has created a complex, and EGT provides a useful lens to explore the more complex discourse on the role of government, and how it should be dealt with realities of how governance adapts and evolves in the coastal context. politically among the island's network of powerful foreign business From an EGT perspective, we can see that the presence of strong owners. This has manifested conflict regarding the development of informal social networks can be an explanatory factor for why collec- tourism and who it is benefitting, considering the different interests and tive action emerges in some cases and not others. We can see that social inherent rights to benefits between the Indonesian state, local networks can enable self-organized governance to emerge, but that Indonesian employees and the smaller, less politically influential networks also create path dependencies in its evolution; governance Indonesian owned businesses. As the island has grown, separate asso- must evolve from networks and institutions that already exist. Thus, ciations for smaller Indonesian owned businesses have formed which future governance arrangements must build on existing social systems. are not participating in the initially developed cooperative efforts such

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