In the ’s final hours, Iraq’s Republican Guard slipped the noose and lived to fight another day. The Great Escape

By Rebecca Grant

T was on Feb. 28, 1991, at exactly job. Saddam Hussein’s Republican Iraqi armed forces parade through 8 a.m. local time, that the Gulf War Guard escaped the clutches of their Victory Square, Baghdad, in Decem- Iwas brought to an abrupt end. Army adversaries, fled to Baghdad, re- ber 2000. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf had grouped, and lived to fight another led a masterful 43-day air campaign. day—soon. With Iraqi forces badly battered by How did this happen? On the war’s airpower, coalition land forces needed last full day, Feb. 27, Schwarzkopf only 100 hours to push the occupiers allowed his judgment to be clouded out of Kuwait and take thousands of by confusion about the position of prisoners. his forces and the nature of the Re- The public thought the coalition publican Guard escape plan. He an- had completed its job. In reality, it nounced “the gate is closed” on the had not yet neutralized Iraq’s Re- Guard, stoking pressure for a cease- publican Guard, and, so, in Schwarz- fire. President Bush acceded, the kopf’s words, “Our job was only shooting stopped, and the Iraqis half done.” slipped the noose. As things turned out, of course, Col. Douglas A. MacGregor, who coalition forces never completed the fought with the US Army’s 2nd Ar-

38 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2003 © Corbis photo/Karim Sahib

mored Regiment and wrote adnezzar, al Faw, and Adnan. Three on hitting the three armored divi- an influential book, Breaking the of the divisions had spearheaded the sions. By the time Schwarzkopf Phalanx, compared the result of the invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, launched the ground offensive, the Gulf battle to that of the 1863 Con- but they had redeployed to interior Tawakalna was judged to be at 58 federate maneuver victory at Chan- positions and were replaced at the percent of prewar strength, the Medina cellorsville. Both, he said, “bore no front by . at 54 percent, and the Hammurabi at abiding fruits.” The replacement divisions, infe- 77 percent. The Guard motorized The land offensive began on Feb. rior in quality, had been arrayed along infantry divisions did not suffer such 24. It was Phase 4 of Schwarzkopf’s the Saudi border with Kuwait and heavy attacks. Coalition planners war plan. Phase 4 called for two US– Iraq. estimated the Nebuchadnezzar at 88 led land corps to drive north through In the war’s first 38 days (the percent of prewar strength, al Faw at breached Iraqi infantry positions, turn airpower-only phase), coalition air 100 percent, and Adnan at 83 per- east, and trap the Republican Guard. attacks reduced Iraqi front-line units cent. The Republican Guard Forces Com- to one-half of prewar strength. Air The Nebuchadnezzar and al Faw mand fielded six full divisions. There strikes had also weakened the Re- divisions were positioned along High- were three of armor—the Tawakalna, publican Guard but not to the same way 8, an east–west artery running Medina, and Hammurabi—and three extent. along the Euphrates River. The Adnan of motorized infantry—the Nebuch- Coalition air forces focused first Continued on p. 42

AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2003 39 40 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2003 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2003 41 Continued from p. 39 was positioned east of the junction of that road and Highway 6, another artery running north–south between Kuwait and Basra. Against this Iraqi force, the coali- tion deployed two corps, each well- suited to its task. In the east, VII Corps, commanded © Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis by Lt. Gen. Frederick M. Franks Jr., was formed of heavy forces. Its pow- erful spearhead comprised the 1st Armored , 3rd Armored Di- vision, and 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Plans called for it to charge north and destroy the three Republi- can Guard armored divisions. In the west, XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Gary E. Luck, blended medium and heavy forces, giving it speed and agility. The spearhead of its northward charge Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf met on March 3, 1991, with Iraqi Lt. Gen. Khalid would be the 24th Mechanized In- Sultan Ahmed (second from right) to set conditions for ending the war. By fantry, 101st Air Assault, and 82nd that time, many Republican Guard forces were streaming back to Baghdad. Airborne Divisions, working with France’s 6th Light Armored Divi- the Guard. Coalition battles with line crossing XVIII Airborne Corps’ sion. The XVIII Airborne Corps was Tawakalna forces served as a screen advance. What’s more, two Guard to drive north as fast as possible, for the withdrawing Medina and armored brigades moved up in sup- then wheel east along Highway 8 Hammurabi. These brigade-sized port. and capture Basra. By doing this, it actions allowed Iraq to organize “a The coalition leaders knew that a would cut off the retreat of the three classic battlefield retreat,” Schwarz- screening operation was under way. Guard infantry divisions. kopf later acknowledged. However, at this critical point, they With VII Corps and XVIII Air- According to a declassified CIA lost track of the extent to which the borne Corps closing with the enemy, study, Iraqi forces had as early as Guard and other Iraqi forces were US Marines and other forces would Feb. 25 detected that coalition move- jammed up south of Basra. move to liberate Kuwait. ments were far more rapid than an- Coalition leaders thought the Guard As planned, the ground operation ticipated. While coalition dominance had redeployed north of the Eu- opened on Feb. 24, at precisely 4 of the air and the stranglehold on phrates. They had not. They were, in a.m. The breaching operations went communications obscured much of fact, herded together in a 1,700- so well that the main attack began the offensive’s intent, the collapse square-mile area south of the river. several hours ahead of schedule. The of the Iraqi front line was clear Five Republican Guard divisions battered Iraqi front-line divisions enough. were hemmed in, with river cross- collapsed soon after the coalition High-flying U-2s detected that Iraq ings to their north and east and coa- attack had pierced the defensive line. had built a defensive line south of lition forces advancing from the west. Fighting swirled during the pe- the Hawr al Hammar causeway that They’d set themselves up to be riod Feb. 24–26. The two coalition crossed the Euphrates River marsh- destroyed in detail by either air or corps surged forward and met resis- lands. From this position 29 miles ground forces. tance, which led to some tactical east of Basra, the Nebuchadnezzar, Franks’s spearhead had achieved victories such as the Battle of 73 Adnan, and al Faw divisions had a 109 miles of advance just before Easting (against Tawakalna units) chance to protect Highway 8 and the midnight on Feb. 26. Luck’s forces and Battle of Medina Ridge (against causeway escape route. had plunged northward and wheeled Medina units). In the XVIII Airborne Corps op- to the east in a giant enveloping move. The Republican Guard in contact erating area to the west, Iraqi moves To the south, Marines and other with coalition forces weren’t fight- also were well-staged. “Apparently forces had taken major objectives ing to hold ground but merely to buy calculating that the coalition planned around Kuwait City. time and cover a withdrawal. The to cut Highway 8 and drive toward Speedy success caused two twists Guard heavy forces were no match Al-Basra,” the CIA report noted, in the tactical situation. for US forces. The skirmishes pitted “the Iraqis began a major redeploy- First, very early on Feb. 27 (1:35 brigade-size Guard units against ment of Guard forces to block the a.m.), a Radio Baghdad broadcast American divisions with far supe- coalition’s advance.” ordered Iraqi forces to withdraw from rior soldiers, training, and weapons. On Feb. 26, the 24th Mechanized Kuwait. They fled along Highway 6, In these skirmishes, however, VII Infantry took Talil Airfield and seized bringing more Iraqis into the con- Corps won only tactical successes. Al Jalibah Air Base. Meanwhile, el- gested area south of the city of Basra. It had not yet closed the road leading ements of Republican Guard infan- Second, the two US–led corps began north, which thus remained open to try moved west, toward a defensive to outrun their supply lines and wear

42 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2003 out their troops, who had been in Poor placement of the FSCLs car- Guard units. The ground forces were action 48 hours. Soon, they would ried a high cost. Two Guard divi- moving fast but still not fast enough need to pause. sions, the Nebuchadnezzar and Adnan, to cover all of the ground they’d The first hours of Feb. 27 saw a were completely inside the XVIII staked out. resumption of rapid combat opera- Airborne Corps FSCL. Likewise, the When XVIII Airborne Corps be- tions. In the west, XVIII Airborne VII Corps FSCL sheltered the Medina gan its Feb. 27 operations, its FSCL Corps launched a fresh series of at- and the main body of the Hammurabi. for that day was 54 miles to the east. tacks and pushed within 62 miles of Only the al Faw division was com- At the end of the day, it was still 30 Basra and Highway 6. In the east, pletely outside any FSCL on Feb. 27. miles from its fire-control line. VII Corps pressed northward until The overextended FSCL bound- Late in the day, Horner got the early evening. aries meant airpower could only at- Army commanders to move back the No one knew it at the time, but tack under the guidance of a For- FSCLs. Still, the new “Horner line” Feb. 27 was a day in which the coa- ward Air Controller. The catch was only opened up the area north of the lition missed a golden opportunity that FACs operating with Army units Euphrates, an area known to be tar- to destroy the Guard. were not in contact with the main get-poor. At 1 a.m. that day, Franks and body of the escaping Republican Data from the postwar Gulf War Luck each activated a Fire Support Coordination Line that effectively gave the Iraqi forces a sanctuary from The Situation at the Time of the Feb. 28 Cease-Fire air interdiction and blocked coali- tion air from bringing its full weight to bear. Baghdad The FSCL was a vital safety mea- sure marking off a special protected area (inside the FSCL, where Close Iran Air Support strikes were to be car- ried out under the control of forward Tigris observers) from regular areas (be- River yond the FSCL, where interdiction could take place). The Joint Force Air Component Euphrates Commander, USAF Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, allocated 1,200 sorties a Highway 8 day for what he called “push CAS,” in which two-ship and four-ship for- River mations would cross the battlefield every few minutes. Strikes inside the FSCL had to be controlled by a Forward Air Controller. Hawr al Hammar However, if the flight got no im- Iraq Causeway Al Jalibah Talil mediate tasking from a FAC, it could Air Base Basra fly beyond the FSCL and strike tar- Airfield gets under direction of an F-16 or XVIII A-10 “Killer Scout.” If the Killer Airborne Highway 6 Scout had no targets, the flight con- tinued to predesignated bomb dump Corps sites. The effect was to increase the num- ber of strikes beyond the FSCL, and, so, those targets were the ones where VII Corps airpower had its best shot at the Re- publican Guard forces. In the early phase of the land of- Kuwait City fensive—that is, in the period Feb. 24–26—the air and ground compo- Kuwait nents placed FSCLs in locations that had been worked out before the war. Then, on Feb. 27, things changed. Saudi Arabia The leaders of VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps, perhaps anticipat- ing rapid and dramatic maneuvering Line of Coalition Advance Feb. 27 Republican Guard Divisions on that day, set the FSCLs in their corps areas well beyond the actual lines of advance achieved that day. XVIII Airborne and VII Corps Advance Direction of Republican Guard

AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2003 43 might be getting away, the bulk of the Republican Guard was trapped.

USAF photo Powell, watching the performance in Washington, seized the opportu- nity to tell Bush the coalition was “within the window of success” and that he should stop the attack, which now would be perceived as “killing for the sake of killing.” Evidently, Bush agreed. He soon announced that a cease-fire would take effect at 5 a.m. local time on Feb. 28. Informed of this move, Schwarzkopf said, “I don’t have any problem with it.” It was now 11 p.m., local time. With the cease-fire six hours away, US commanders concentrated on dis- engaging their troops from the en- emy. However, around midnight, F-16s and A-10s served as “Killer Scouts.” If a two- or four-ship flight got no Schwarzkopf appeared to waver and tasking from a Forward Air Controller, the Killer Scouts could direct them to took a last stab at the Republican targets outside the Fire Support Coordination Line. Guard. The cease-fire slipped to 8 a.m. With the time left, Schwarzkopf Air Power Survey showed how the moved his command post forward, said, Luck and Franks should destroy FSCL problem affected the volume gave the 24th extra , and as much of the enemy as possible. of daily air strikes. Five kill boxes approved an air assault to seal off At 6 a.m., Franks launched a last- (AE7, AF7, AF8, AG7, and AG8) Basra. gasp VII Corps attack. The 1st Ar- contained most of the Republican Schwarzkopf spoke on the tele- mored Division destroyed 100 Guard units. On Feb. 25, while these phone with Gen. Colin Powell, Chair- and armored personnel carriers, ac- kill boxes were outside the FSCL, man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “I cording to Army historians. Mean- the coalition flew 161 strike sorties. want to continue the ground attack while, XVIII Airborne Corps wasn’t The FSCL moved east on Feb. 26, tomorrow, drive to the sea, and to- able to engage before the cease-fire but still 111 strike sorties were flown tally destroy everything in our path,” took effect. in those kill boxes. But on Feb. 27, said the commander. At 8 a.m., the coalition halted of- when the ground advance and their This war-winning attack was to fensive operations. own maneuver scheme had boxed in begin within hours—that is, early on The cease-fire didn’t affect the the Republican Guard, the overex- Feb. 28. It was not to be. Republican Guard at all. They kept tended FSCL kept coalition air from “Instead of a final, climactic battle going north. On March 1, Guard ar- striking with its full force. The tally on 28 February,” wrote Army histo- mored and mechanized forces were for the five prime kill boxes was just rian Richard Swain, “offensive mili- 60 miles north of Basra. On March 2, 54 strike sorties, and 28 of those tary operations came unraveled in some were 124 miles north. On that were flown in AG7, much of which the early morning hours.” day, the 24th was beyond the FSCL that day. What happened? The plans of Franks Division spotted Iraqi tanks and ve- Clearly, the mishandling of air– and Luck were done in by Schwarz- hicles moving north. It attacked and ground coordination cost the coali- kopf himself at an unusual press brief- destroyed 185 of them, but it was too tion a chance to destroy the Guard ing in Riyadh. late. from the air. It was 9 p.m., local time, when Most of the Republican Guard units In any event, the two corps com- Schwarzkopf opened his briefing. made it back safely to Baghdad. Within manders, Luck and Franks, at the It was televised live in Washington, weeks, these forces had brutally sup- end of Feb. 27, paused to regroup for D.C., where it was 1 p.m. “We’ve pressed Kurd and Shiite rebellions what they envisioned as the final, accomplished our mission,” Schwarz- against Saddam. They continue to sup- concerted land attack on the Repub- kopf said. He assured listeners that port his grip on power today. lican Guard. his forces had slammed shut all Such was the price of the rush The day’s events had left coali- routes out of southern Iraq. He sug- decision to halt the Gulf War off- tion forces poised for total victory. gested that, while scattered units ensives. ■ Under orders from Franks, US com- manders stopped their forces at 6 p.m., fixed positions, and prepared Rebecca Grant is a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine. She is presi- for resumption of the offensive. dent of IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for RAND, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Luck’s XVIII Airborne Corps was Grant is a fellow of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the public set to roll through the rest of the policy and research arm of the Air Force Association’s Aerospace Education Nebuchadnezzar and Adnan’s west- Foundation. Her most recent article, “In Search of Lawful Targets,” appeared ern defenses and cut them off. He in the February issue.

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