Reinvesting in the Art of NATO the President’S Best Strategic Option David Abshire and S

Reinvesting in the Art of NATO The President’s Best Strategic Option David Abshire and S. Wesley Cross

International discourse about the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- David Abshire is President and CEO of nization (NATO) has overlooked the organization’s real the Center for the Study potential and capability to tackle security challenges that the of the Presidency. He served as U.S. Ambas United States and Europe face today. Respected writers and sador to NATO under publications have repeatedly misunderstood or misrepresent- President Ronald Rea- ed the United States’s most valuable foreign policy instrument: gan. the roundtable of its closest allies. NATO critics from the left S. Wesley Cross is Special Assistant and and right on both sides of the Atlantic have declared NATO a Advisor to the President Cold War dinosaur, chided it as a lackey of U.S. policy, or of the Center for the deemed it multilateral quicksand. E. Wayne Merry, a former Study of the Presidency. U.S. diplomat and Soviet expert, blames NATO for transatlantic squabbling: “NATO is not the solution to this split; it is at the heart of the problem.”1 Joseph Jaffe, editor of the Ger man weekly Die Zeit, issued an even harsher condemnation of NATO: “The Atlantic Alliance has been dying a slow death ever since Christmas Day 1991, when the Soviet Union com mitted suicide by dissolution. Having won the Cold War, the alliance lost its central purpose and began to crumble like a bridge no longer in use—slowly, almost invisibly.”2 Similar beliefs have gained currency in some circles. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted this trend during his first visit to the United States in January 2004: “Over the past few months and years, some pernicious myths have

Summer/Fall 2004 [81] REINVESTING IN THE ART OF NATO started to become a little too popular. bines the strengths of multilateral legiti- Myths that are undermining the founda- macy and collaboration with the plan- tion of our cooperation-trust.”3 Ironical ning, capabilities, and operational effec- ly, this comes at a time when NATO has tiveness of unilateral action. No other the opportunity to become the West’s first option—neither unilateralism, nor the line of collective defense against terror UN, nor even ad-hoc coalitions of the ism, a common threat tragically under- willing—is both viable over the long term lined on 11 March 2004 in Madrid. and effective over the short term. This rising challenge to NATO comes at a critical moment for world history, The Misunderstood Alliance. Two U.S. foreign policy, and transatlantic main myths dominate NATO discourse. relationships. The United States now The first myth portrays NATO as useful faces a moment of both extreme risk and only in a Cold War context. In this view, opportunity. Over the next four years, the Soviet threat was the impetus and the the success or failure of U.S. foreign pol- main justification for the alliance. This icy will likely set the course for the next myth upholds the second myth: NATO is fifty years. In an increasingly disordered unable to adapt to new challenges and international context of nuclear prolif lacks the capacity for perpetual and agile eration, terrorism, failed and rogue transformation. Yet NATO has repeat- states, and fighting in Iraq and edly proven that it does have this capabil Afghanistan, the U.S. military is ity. It remains without parallel among stretched thin. Also, anti-Americanism multilateral institutions, and this capa- is rising. The much-needed debate over bility spans the history of the alliance. U.S. foreign policy is complicated by a These myths obscure the larger picture polarized domestic political culture and and overlook NATO’s history, successes, an election year that threatens to be par- and potential. First, they misjudge the ticularly bruising. factors underlying the NATO mission If, at the Cold War’s end, NATO and the depth of the alliance. NATO’s looked like an alliance in need of a mis- creation was motivated by multiple fac- sion, the United States’s challenges tors, not by a defensive reaction to the today—from fighting terrorism and communist threat. One significant moti- nuclear proliferation to Middle East sta- vating factor was creating a security bility—now need an alliance. NATO alliance of countries who shared com- should be that alliance. With skillful mon ideals. NATO countries share ideals American leadership based on trust, of “freedom, common heritage, and civ- consultation, and cooperation, NATO ilization of their peoples, founded on the could regain its preeminent role in tack- principles of democracy, individual lib- ling transatlantic security problems. erty, and the rule of law.”5 These values Recent events have begun persuading a granted NATO a political raison d’être for Hobbesian United States and a Kantian European and transatlantic unity. Europe that when “facing long-term, Although unity guaranteed each mem- strategic challenges, there can be no sub- ber’s security, the alliance’s first mission stitute for long-term, strategic partners: was political. Europeans had waged partners you can trust. Partners who trust countless internal wars culminating in you.”4 NATO is the tool that best com- two world wars that required American

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intervention and an enormous loss of alliance, aspiring countries were life. NATO constitutes a strategic required to: settle internal or external response to this unstable reality. By mar- territorial disputes peacefully; demon shalling member resources and acting in strate a commitment to the rule of law concert, NATO gained power and influ- and human rights; establish democratic ence for the purpose of maintaining control of armed forces; and promote peace and protecting freedom. It united stability and well-being through eco the former warring powers of Europe nomic liberty, social justice, and envi and moored them to North America. ronmental responsibility. Second, the myths underrate the While geographic transformation organization’s successes. After ideologi- resulted from geopolitical shifts, func- cal unity, NATO’s second mission was tional transformation has resulted from defense. Transatlantic ideological unity internal examination and outside cri created a formidable foundation for tique. In some instances, the alliance employing defense resources against the outpaced its own members. As Chairman Warsaw Pact and Soviet aggression. By of the Armed Services Committee in maintaining unity and adapting to meet 1987, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn asserted new threats, NATO was vital to winning that NATO’s strategic transformation the Cold War. It was one of the great was ahead of the Department of Defense accomplishments in political history: in developing an integrated threat assess- NATO prevailed without armed conflict. ment, a conceptual framework, and a By averting another major European— defense resources investment strategy. and possibly world—war, NATO achieved Throughout its history, the alliance has what the ancient Chinese military strate- undergone many transformations revi- gist Sun Tzu described as perfect victory. talizing its strength and purpose. The Finally, the myths discount NATO’s most successful of these include the potential for future success. NATO pos- Three Wise Men, the Harmel Report, sesses remarkable capacities for both geo- CCMS Harmel II, the 1986 Conceptual graphical and functional transformation. Framework and Resources Strategy, the NATO’s geographic expansion illustrates Partnership for Peace, the 1999 Strategic this. Compare its founding members to Concept, and U.S. Defense Secretary its membership today: from the original Donald Rumsfeld’s NATO Response

Neither unilateralism, nor the UN, nor coalitions of the willing are viable options.

twelve members, the alliance grew to Force and the Allied Command Trans- fourteen in 1952, fifteen in 1955, sixteen formation. Each functional shift in 1982, and nineteen members in 1999. reshaped NATO to confront new securi- It welcomed seven more in 2004. With ty challenges and strengthened the each new member, NATO has not only alliance’s political foundation and cohe added new arrows to its quiver but also sion. NATO’s political foundation and spread democratic values. To enter the transformational capacity transcend the

Summer/Fall 2004 [83] REINVESTING IN THE ART OF NATO end of the Cold War and the onset of the cence is often to their own detriment; it war on terrorism. In times of division erodes their long-term influence. When and controversy, NATO’s extensive France pulled out of the integrated com- machinery—negatively connoted a mand in 1966, NATO headquarters left bureaucracy—is one that deft U.S. lead- Paris, making Brussels the security capital ership can employ effectively to engage of Europe. More recently, France led the member nations. This is a forum where a European protest against the U.S.-led U.S. representative can successfully move invasion of Iraq; by doing so, France an agenda both bilaterally and multilat- divided Europe. In terms of French erally by lobbying positions, obtaining strategic influence, both policies seem information, and building trust. Pyrrhic victories at best. More often than not, whether it is the United States or NATO As Consultative Body. France, any member country that funda- NATO is the ideal forum for U.S. lead- mentally violates the political will of the ership, particularly in today’s troubled alliance decreases its own power and times. Unilateralism breeds mistrust over diminishes its own influence. time, lacks the benefits of financial bur As majority shareholder in a consulta- den-sharing, and profits from none of tive process, the United States should the complementary capabilities that recognize that its own long-term inter- NATO allies offer. NATO also comes ests call for taking into account the opin with benefits not available at the UN ions and concerns of its closest allies, Security Council. The Security Council even if consultation ultimately serves only lacks a consensus on values and has no to better explore the United States’s own intricate consultative mechanisms to policies. At NATO, such consultations adjust positions on contentious issues. are not a drive to the lowest common Although it is not a panacea, NATO can denominator, nor a prescription for be a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy. debate without deadlines. They are an The NATO framework enables the opportunity to seize the higher ground United States to consult intimately through powers of persuasion and create among allies and communicate its for unity of effort and concert of action. eign policy in a multilateral forum. This kind of leadership, not unilateral- Although each NATO country has veto ism, will ultimately build enduring pow power, the United States is “first among er and influence. equals.” The United States wields enor mous political, military, economic, and NATO’s Unique Structure. technological power that can be used to NATO’s structure allows allies to consult leverage the U.S. position. In many in a way unmatched in other interna major challenges that confront the Unit tional organizations. Nowhere else can ed States and its allies, the United States the United States meet tête-à-tête with should better articulate how its own twenty-six of its closest allies on the national interests are often congruent ambassadorial level twice weekly, once at with those of its allies. the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Nonetheless, on especially divisive once at an intimate weekly lunch. Perma- issues, individual member countries can nent representatives, on call twenty-four prove difficult to persuade. Yet this reti- hours a day, enjoy the support of their

[84] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ABSHIRE AND CROSS Politics & Diplomacy country’s best military and diplomatic communications and weapons interop staff. The NAC brings together heads of erability. The Committee of National government and foreign and defense Armaments Directors, which during the ministers. At NAC meetings and the late 1980s included Deputy Defense bilateral talks that surround it, formality Ministers, meets to muster political

With skillful U.S. leadership based on trust and consultation, NATO could regain its role in tackling transatlantic security problems. is minimal and conversation is frank and influence in armaments strategy cooper- direct. Issues discussed are not limited to ation. In the 1970s, U.S. Undersecretary immediate Euro-Atlantic concerns but of Defense Bill Perry and General can range the world over. For example, Bernard Rogers, who later became in the 1980s, the U.S. permanent repre- SACEUR, developed the follow-on sentative shared American analyses of the forces weapons systems that brilliantly Iraq-Iran War with the NAC. won the Gulf War in 1991. NATO enables top defense officials to NATO’s international staff, led by the meet regularly through the Defense secretary general, is invaluable. Numer- Planning Committee and the Nuclear ous NATO secretaries general—notably Planning Committee. Attended by top Hastings Ismay, Joseph Luns, Peter Car- military leaders, these high-level meet rington, Manfred Woerner, and George ings have made NATO a training ground Robertson—have been sympathetic to for practicing allied military leadership U.S. policy and remained close to U.S. of joint commands. Decisions by the two ambassadors and ministers. This con Supreme Allied Commanders of Europe trasts with the positions taken by UN sec- and the Atlantic, known respectively as retaries general, who are often less sym- SACEUR and SACLANT, give the Unit- pathetic to American goals. ed States opportunities for leadership on operational and political fronts. Starting NATO’s Record of Success. Expe with the first SACEUR, General Dwight rience suggests that when American lead Eisenhower, the position is often held by ership creatively and skillfully employed American officers who develop influence NATO instruments of power and per- with allied leaders. The Kosovo opera- suasion, the alliance has proven both tion proved the effectiveness of the agile and creative. NATO Supreme Allied Commander The 1984-85 crisis over missile leadership. In this case, the greatest ten- counter-deployment illustrates the sions existed not within the alliance but alliance’s potential under balanced between the SACEUR and the Defense American leadership. In 1979, the Sovi Department about use of ground forces. et Union began to deploy intermediate NATO military planning staffs maxi- range SS-20 missiles in an effort to mize defense capabilities by fostering conquer the alliance by shattering the

Summer/Fall 2004 [85] REINVESTING IN THE ART OF NATO credibility of the transatlantic nuclear NATO’s success in fighting today’s great- deterrent. Three NATO nations, influ- est threat: terrorism. In the 1980s, ter- enced by the so-called “peace factions,” rorism struck at the heart of the alliance. did not support the allied strategy to Terrorists bombed the NATO Support counter-deploy Pershing and cruise Center and the North Atlantic Assembly missiles. They argued that counter- Headquarters, assassinated a NATO deployments would provoke the Soviets three-star general on the Champs Elysées, and make them back away from arms bombed a bar in Greece where seventy

NATO’s success in fighting the Cold War is unquestionable, but few realize NATO’s success in fighting today’s greatest threat: terrorism. control negotiations. The crisis was U.S. servicemen were wounded, and resolved under skillful American leader- bombed a West German bar where fifty ship, aided by the powerful U.S. Infor Americans were wounded. When the mation Agency and a Special Consulta United States concluded from intelli tive Group of political directors from gence that Libya, not the Soviet Union, member nations. This special group was was the source of this new threat, U.S. a masterpiece of the consultative art in leadership engaged NATO to shore up NATO. Under the chairmanship of weaker members who had unwittingly U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard given terrorists free passage, naively Burt, off-the-record sessions were con- believing those terrorist would never vened out of the public limelight. Dif turn on them. ferent positions were tested, trial bal- In January 1986, the United States loons were launched, and the politics of broke all economic relations with Libya, deployment in each country were taken evacuated American citizens from the into consideration. country, and froze Libyan assets in the In a victory for both U.S. and NATO United States. President Ronald Reagan member national interests, the allies launched a diplomatic campaign for united to support counter-deployment. allies to do the same. Deputy Secretary of The Soviet Union initially broke off State John Whitehead was dispatched to nuclear arms control negotiations, but the NAC to share intelligence and muster quickly back-pedaled. Through consul support. The head of the FBI came to tation, persuasion, and unified effort, Brussels for extended counterpart con NATO turned a strategic corner in the sultations, a first in NATO history. Cold War, setting a course toward victory European Community (EC) foreign without a fight. NATO achieved a Cold ministers passed a halfhearted resolution War victory not by force of arms but by that lacked enforcement powers. When a carefully orchestrating its collective will. bomb exploded onboard a TWA flight to NATO’s success in fighting the Cold Rome, U.S. officials cited convincing War is unquestionable, but few realize evidence of Libyan involvement to skep-

[86] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ABSHIRE AND CROSS Politics & Diplomacy tical European ministers. A day after al Qaeda’s attacks in New In cooperation with the United King- York and Washington, European allies dom, the United States struck Libya on invoked Article V—in which any attack on 15 April 1986. The U.S. response ini- one NATO member is viewed by all tially excluded NATO, and U.S. officials members as an attack on them—for the said this strike had to be undertaken first time in NATO’s history. This sent a unilaterally to preserve agility in a region remarkable political signal to the world. that was beyond NATO’s traditional Unfortunately, the potential for Ameri geographic focus.6 After the strike, the can leadership to rally members behind U.S. permanent representative U.S. interests dissipated through a U.S. explained this independent action, the response that unduly stressed “coalitions evidence against Libya, and how this of the willing,” leaving the impression related to NATO’s counter-terrorism that the United States was downgrading efforts in Europe to the full NATO NATO’s importance. This approach Council. When some allies remained stood in stark contrast to that adopted in critical of the military action, the ambas the 1986 strike on Libya. After 9/11, bet- sador responded that U.S. military per- ter-honed U.S. leadership would have sonnel were in Europe to maintain a stressed the centrality of a concerted collective commitment against common NATO effort to fight terrorism. The threats, and that terrorism now United States could, of course, continue belonged in that category. An intense resorting to coalitions of the willing period of diplomatic activity ensued. inside or outside the alliance as new sce Soon afterwards EC foreign ministers narios arose. Unfortunately, allies per agreed to limit their diplomatic missions ceived a shift in American political and to Libya. President Reagan praised the military priorities away from NATO. EC ministers, and both sides began to The United States missed an opportuni heal political wounds. The NAC had ty to mobilize the alliance with real lead- illustrated a remarkable capacity to ership and keep France and Germany address differences and galvanize mem- more positively engaged. bers to take action. The United States Today, the opportunity for American was able to effectively use NATO as a outreach and coalition-building in conduit to the EC, and a seemingly uni NATO extends far beyond member lateral action evolved into a broadly- states. NATO has moved into an impres- supported one. sive stage of political dynamism; it is fea sible to address threats beyond NATO’s NATO’s Value Added Today. The traditional geographical area. For 1986 U.S. strike on Libya is one example instance, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership of a coalition of the willing that main Council brings together forty-six NATO tained American freedom of action with- members and partners to consider coop out eroding NATO’s unity of effort. eration and current political and securi- While the situation required a unilateral ty questions. The NATO Russia Council strike, unilateralism itself was not pre- encourages dialogue, deepens trust, and sented as a doctrine. The alliance suc enables former enemies to explore where cessfully responded to a terrorist threat interests converge in a new spirit of that foreshadowed the perils of today. cooperation. The Mediterranean Dia-

Summer/Fall 2004 [87] REINVESTING IN THE ART OF NATO logue convenes seven non-NATO influence, NATO’s consultative process- Mediterranean countries to examine es could become more powerful than the regional security and stability, achieve sum of their parts. mutual understanding, and dispel mis conceptions about NATO among those Reinvesting in the Art of NATO countries.7 These should be key multilat- Leadership. The United States must eral complements to U.S. diplomacy as it dispel myths and reaffirm trust among addresses military and political chal- allies by reinvesting in the consultative lenges in the Caucuses, Central Asia, arts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- North Africa, and the Middle East. zation. It must lead allies to do the same. The political will and creativity of Together, NATO allies must pave new NATO’s leaders will determine the avenues for meaningful, concrete con- organization’s future influence. NATO sultation. These instruments will only be already plays an important role in worth as much as members invest in Afghanistan, where it is led by France them. Each member country must heed and Germany, and it should play a role the words that grace the walls of the NAC, in Iraq as security conditions improve. animus in consulendo liber: in consultation, a NATO could certainly play a role in an free mind. Arab-Israeli settlement, as Senate The United States must beware of Armed Services Committee Chairman consistently appearing to go it alone. John Warner suggested. Meanwhile, Such an attitude can be ammunition for other major democratic powers, notably U.S. enemies, such as al Qaeda, who seek Japan and Australia, could appoint an to divide the United States and its allies. ambassador to the organization just as A style that emphasizes consultation in the United States appointed an ambas good faith will improve perceptions of sador to the EU. As a new NATO initia- the United States abroad. In an election tive in the war on terror, the United year, the United States should seize the States should build connections between opportunity to set a new course by the NAC and its Secretary of Homeland approaching new challenges from a posi Security, and directors of FBI and CIA tion of principled, realistic strength, and to further common standards and com- using consultative fora to unite efforts pare best practices. The NAC could and marshall resources. With proper energize issues that have been stymied in leadership, NATO is the only tool that negotiations with the EU. NATO is fer- combines the political foundation, oper tile ground for imaginative solutions. ational capability, and transformational In the U.S. pursuit for sustainable creativity to do precisely that.

NOTES

1 E. Wayne Merry, “Therapy's End - Thinking NATO's Door by Ronald Asmus (New York: Columbia Beyond NATO,” The National Interest no. 74 University Press, 2002). (2003/2004). 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North 2 Josef Joffe, “Continental Divides,” The National Atlantic Treaty (Washington, D.C., 1949). Interest no. 71 (2003). 6 David Abshire, Preventing World War III (New York: 3 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, speech given at National Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), 84. Defense University, 29 January 2004. 7 The non-NATO countries are: Algeria, Egypt, 4 Lord George Robertson, foreword to Opening Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

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