Published in Tbilisi 24 Saati March 17, 2008

2+2+2 = Progress on

David J. Smith*

In the Caucasus, 2+2+2 often does not equal 6. However, 2+2+2, Tbilisi’s recent proposal to revamp the diplomatic structure that discusses the conflict over the Georgian territory of South Ossetia, could add up to progress. It is the most sensible idea for South Ossetia in years, but it will only have a chance to work if key western nations support it.

Temur Iakobashvili, ’s new State Minister for Reintegration, unveiled the 2+2+2 idea at a February 29 Parliamentary hearing. The proposal would bring together the 2 interested nation-states— Georgia and Russia—plus the 2 administrations in South Ossetia—those of Moscow-backed and Tbilisi-backed Dmitry Sanakoyev—plus the 2 most involved and respected international institutions—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the (EU).

2+2+2 would replace the Joint Control Commission (JCC) established by the 1992 Sochi Agreement (sometimes known as the Dagomys Agreement) for a ceasefire in South Ossetia. After fifteen years, it is reasonable to say that the JCC was, at best, part of the conflict or, worse, designed to perpetuate the conflict. It could not have been otherwise in a diplomatic structure that pitted Russia, the Russian Republic of North Ossetia and the Russian-backed de facto authority in South Ossetia against Georgia— without international participation, without representation for the many South Ossetians who do not support Kokoity.

“Lightweight and superficial,” said Yuri Popov, Russia’s chief negotiator for South Ossetia, of Iakobashvili’s proposal. “We think that the JCC should continue working,” Popov said on March 6. Then he resorted to the kind of hyper-legalism Moscow typically uses to adumbrate its resistance to a good idea. The only way to change the diplomatic formula, Popov said, is for Georgia to quit the Sochi Agreement and then—guess what?—negotiate with Russia.

“We are not pulling out from any agreement and we are not talking about repudiating any agreements,” Iakobashvili told online magazine Civil.Ge.

If Russia is committed to resolving the conflict in South Ossetia, Moscow’s opposition to 2+2+2 is difficult to understand. Although the discussion is about a piece of Georgian territory, Tbilisi accepts Russia as the other nation-state with a valid interest in South Ossetia. It also accepts Kokoity as a valid interlocutor, representing the views of some South Ossetians.

On the other hand, Tbilisi asks Moscow to drop the pretense that North Ossetia is a separate actor with a legitimate interest in South Ossetia. And it proposes to bring Sanakoyev’s Provisional Administration to the table.

There is the rub, of course. “If Sanakoyev gets involved in the negotiating process,” said Popov, “the South Ossetian side will automatically quit the negotiations and then all efforts will be pointless.”

Equally pointless, however, is a negotiation without Sanakoyev. It is unnecessary to engage in polemics about whether Tbilisi backs Sanakoyev, how many people he represents and how much territory his government controls. Sanakoyev represents some South Ossetians. On November 13, 2006, they elected him President in Georgian controlled portions of South Ossetia. His government administers those areas and some people prefer to live there than in Kokoity’s bit of South Ossetia.

It is not a perfect solution, but Sanakoyev’s representatives at the negotiating table would maximize representation of the South Ossetian people. It is time for Moscow to tell just that.

Thus invigorated, negotiations could proceed with the hope and light that international participation will bring. The OSCE is the world’s foremost security and stability-building organization. Its experience in South Ossetia dates to 1992. Ambassador Terhi Hakala and her team would bring invaluable experience and expertise to the table. Moreover, any agreements that result from the 2+2+2 negotiations will no doubt designate the OSCE as monitor. As an OSCE member, Russia should readily agree.

Russia also understands that economic development will be then linchpin of any peaceful settlement in South Ossetia. Consequently, the EU, largest donor to the region, should also participate in the negotiations. Indeed, the EU’s European Neighbourhood, of which Georgia is part, aims at “strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all concerned.” That means not only benefits for EU countries and their neighbourhood partners, but in cases of conflict resolution, benefits for all concerned. This EU approach is the only hope for success in South Ossetia.

However, that hope depends on whether 2+2+2 can get underway. Let us hope that Popov’s words reflect only Russia’s visceral reaction and that Moscow can be convinced. Progress toward resolution of the South Ossetian conflict would be in Russia’s interest. Nonetheless, objections from Kokoity and diplomatic inertia—reinforced by Moscow’s grievance over Kosovo—may be difficult to overcome.

That means that the best chance for 2+2+2 is for key western countries in the OSCE and the EU to nudge Moscow toward a new, hexagonal negotiating table. Then 2+2+2 could add up to progress for all the people of South Ossetia.

*David J. Smith is Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Tbilisi, and senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington.