The TerritorialIntegrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force Mark W.Zacher

Cursedbe he that removeth his neighbor’ s landmark. —Deuteronomy27:17

Goodfences make good neighbors. —RobertFrost, MendingWall

Inthe late twentieth century many international relations scholars and observers havecommented on thedeclining importance of interstateterritorial boundaries for avarietyof national and transnational activities. 1 Concurrently,something very signiŽcant has been happening in international relations that raises questions concerningjudgments of the decreasing importance of boundaries: the growing respectfor theproscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries—what is referred tohere as the territorial integrity norm. 2 The devel- opmentof a normconcerning respect for states’territoriality is particularlyimpor- tantbecause scholars have established that territorial disputes have been the major

Iam gratefulto the Institute of InternationalRelations at theUniversity of BritishColumbia and the SocialSciences andHumanities Research Councilof Canada forŽ nancialassistance. Iparticularlythank RobertJackson for many stimulating discussions and insightful comments concerningthe stabilization of boundaries.I alsothank the following for their comments onearlier drafts:Kai Alderson,David Armstrong,William Bain, Michael Barnett, Barry Buzan, Ron Deibert, Raymond Duvall, Paul Evans, Kal Holsti,Brian Job, Robert Keohane, Barbara Koremenos,David Long, John Ruggie, John Owen, AllenSens, Sasson Sofer, George Thomas, Monica Toft, John Vasquez, MichaelWebb, Robert Wolfe, theco-editors of IO,andthree anonymousreviewers. IbeneŽted from discussions of earlier draftsof this article withcolleagues at theUniversity of British Columbia, University of Chicago, Hebrew University, McGillUniversity/ Universityof Montreal, Panteios University, University of California Los Angeles, andUniversity of California Berkeley. I am gratefulto CraigMurley for his research assistance. 1.See Ohmae 1990and 1995; Rosecrance 1986and 1996; Ruggie 1993; Rosenau 1990; Elkins 1994; andHirst andThompson 1996. 2.A normis generally deŽ ned as “astandardof appropriatebehavior for actors ofagivenidentity” (Finnemoreand Sikkink 1999, 251) and an international regulatory norm is strongwhen it isrespected andviewed as legallybinding by thegreat majorityof states.

InternationalOrganization 55,2, Spring 2001, pp. 215– 250 © 2001by TheIO Foundationand the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology 216 InternationalOrganization causeof enduringinterstate rivalries, the frequency of war, andthe intensity of war. 3 After reviewingstudies on interstate wars, JohnVasquez wrote that “ Of allthe issuesover which wars couldlogically be fought, territorial issues seem to be the onesmost often associated with wars. Few interstatewars arefought without any territorialissue being involved in one way or another.” 4 Inthis article I tracethe dramatic change in attitudes and practices of statesin the Westphalianinternational order concerning the use of force to alter interstate boundaries.I alsoexplore the factors that have shaped this historical change. Of course,the Western state system did not expand to most of Asia and Africa untilthe twentiethcentury, and even the Latin American states were marginalto thesystem inthe nineteenth century. In the Ž rst sectionI briey outlinethe attitudes and practicesof statesregarding territorial boundaries from theseventeenth century until WorldWar II. Inthe second section I focuson theremarkable changes in beliefsand practicesfrom WorldWar IIuntilthe present. In the third section I explorethe roots ofthe territorial integrity norm. States’ motivations for acceptingthe territorial integritynorm have been both instrumental and ideational, and the importance of differentmotivations has varied among groups of states.Also, the coincidence of a numberof conditionshas been crucial for thegrowing strength of the norm.

International Boundaries fromthe Seventeenthto the Early Twentieth Century

Politicallife has not always disclosed a clearlydeŽ ned system of international boundaries.The medieval world did not have international boundaries as we understandthem today; 5 authorityover territorial spaces was overlappingand shifting.The political change from themedieval to themodern world involved the constructionof the delimited territorial state with exclusive authority over its domain.Even at that, precisely surveyed national borders only came into clear view inthe eighteenth century. 6 Inthe words of HedleyBull, the practice of establishing internationalboundaries emerged in the eighteenth century as “ abasicrule of co-existence.” 7 Thebirth of the modern interstate system is often dated at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia,although key features of the system emerged gradually and  uctuated instrength before and after 1648. Initially, the legitimacy of interstateborders was deŽned in dynastic terms: state territory was theexclusive property of ruling families,and they had an absoluteright to ruletheir territories. But this international orderdid not re ect any absolute right to particular territorythat could legitimately

3.See Holsti1991; Goertz andDiehl 1992; Vasquez 1993,123– 52; Huth 1996; Hensel 1999;and Vasquez andHenehan 2001. 4.Vasquez 1993,151. 5.Clark 1961, chap. 10. 6.Clark 1972, 144. 7.Bull 1977, 34 –37. TerritorialIntegrity 217 changehands by inheritance,marriage, war, compensation,and purchase. 8 In these earlycenturies of the Westphalian order territory was themain factor that deter- minedthe security and wealth of states,and thus the protection and acquisition of territorywere primemotivations of foreignpolicy. Most wars, infact,concerned the acquisitionof territory, and most of these wars ledto exchanges of territory; this practicecontinued until the middle of the twentieth century (see Table1). These practiceswere reected in thelegal norm concerning the legitimacy of conquest. To quotethe eminent international legal scholar Lassa Oppenheim writing in 1905,“ As longas aLaw ofNationshas beenin existence,the states as well as thevast majority ofwriters haverecognized subjugation as a modeof acquiringterritory.” 9 Inthe early centuries of the Westphalian system the populations of the early modernstates were oftenculturally diverse and politically disorganized. Many peoplewere notcollectively identiŽ ed by state borders that moved back and forth withoutmuch regard for them. 10 Thepractice of drawing boundaries in disregardof thepeople living in the territories was extendedfrom Europeto the rest of theworld duringthe age of Western colonialism from thesixteenth through the nineteenth centuries.This was oftencarried out with little attention to the cultural and ethnic characterof the indigenous peoples of the non-European world. Yet it was the bordersthat were initiallydrawn and imposed by Western imperialists that later becamethe acceptable reference for articulatinganticolonial demands for self- determinationand independent statehood. 11 Thenineteenth century was, ofcourse,the age of nationalism,which was spurred bythe French Revolution and Napoleon’ s supportfor popularsovereignty and nationalself-determination. These intellectual currents began to alterpeoples’ views concerningthe legitimacy of territorial conquests. “ From themiddle of the nine- teenthcentury the current of opinion, in uenced by the growing belief in national self-determination,was movingagainst the legitimacy of annexation outside the colonialsphere, when effected without the consent of the inhabitants.” 12 Sharon Kormanreferred tothischange in attitudesas thebeginning of an“importantchange in the moralclimate ofinternationalrelations.” 13 Thismoral climate, with its clear democraticthrust, however, had con icting implications for thestability of bound- aries.On the one hand, nationalism supported the precept that a territorybelonged toa nationalgrouping and it was wrongto takethe land from anation.On the other hand,nationalism provided grounds for anationalgrouping in one state trying to secedeto form anindependentstate or tounitewith its ethnic compatriots living in otherstates. In fact, nationalism had a moredisruptive than pacifying effect on internationalrelations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as was

8.Holsti 1991. 9.Quoted in Korman 1996, 7. Juxtaposethis with the statement ofProfessor Lauterpacht in the 1955 editionof Oppenheim’s InternationalLaw inKorman 1996, 179. 10.Clark 1972, 143. 11.See Jacksonand Rosberg 1982; and Korman 1996, 41– 66. 12.Korman 1996, 93. 13.Ibid., 39 (italics added).Malcolm Anderson has spokenof “thesacralization ofhomelands”as a resultof thegrowth of nationalism.Anderson 1996, 3. 218 InternationalOrganization

TABLE 1. Interstateterritorial wars, 1648 – 2000

a.Wars by historicalera

Conicts resulting Conicts inwhich Territorial Territorial inredistribution territory was redistributions Period con icts ofterritory redistributed per year

1648–1712 19 15 79% 0.23 1713–1814 30 24 80% 0.24 1815–1917 25 20 80% 0.19 1918–1945 18 16 88% 0.59 1946–2000 40 12 30% 0.22

b.Wars by half century

Conicts resulting Conicts inwhich Territorial Territorial inredistribution territory was redistributions Period con icts ofterritory redistributed per year

1651–1700 14 11 79% 0.22 1701–1750 16 14 88% 0.28 1751–1800 12 8 67% 0.16 1801–1850 13 11 85% 0.22 1851–1900 14 10 71% 0.20 1901–1950 26 23 89% 0.46 1951–2000 37 10 27% 0.20

Sources: Data usedto identify territorial wars between 1648and 1945 is from Holsti 1991. Holsti classiŽes wars accordingto twenty-two issues. Six of these are clearly concernedwith control over territory:territory, strategic territory,colonial competition, empire creation,maintaining integrity of empire, andnational uniŽ cation. Additional information on these conicts was derivedfrom a number ofsecondary sources, including Goertz andDiehl 1992; Goldstein 1992; McKay andScott 1983; and Taylor1954. Wars are classiŽed by their beginning date. Informationon territorial wars between 1946and 2000 was alsoobtained from a large numberof secondarysources, including Bercovitch and Jackson 1997; Goertz andDiehl 1992; Kacowicz 1994; Huth1996; and Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998. Goertz andDiehl focus on territorialcon icts where there were exchangesof territory; Kacowicz examines cases ofpeaceful territorialchange; and Huthincludes territorial disputes that involved and did not involve international violence. The Corre- lates ofWar listof conicts was alsoconsulted. It includes territorial wars withover one thousand deaths.Singer and Small 1982. There were Žveconicts between 1946and 2000 that led to minor borderalterations and are notincluded under “ Conicts resultingin redistributionof territory.”For descriptionsof theterritorial aggressions between 1946and 2000, see Table2.

witnessedin the wars surroundingthe uniŽ cation of theGerman and Italian peoples andin the division of the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires into numerousnational states. 14

14.See Cobban1969; and Mayall 1990. TerritorialIntegrity 219

Threeinterrelated territorial issues during and at the end of World War Iwere whetherthe victorious states should be able to take territory from thedefeated, whetherstates should commit themselves to respectthe territorial integrity of other states,and whether national self-determination should take precedence over respect for existingstate boundaries in shaping the territorial order. On the Ž rst issue,in the earlyyears of World War Ithemajor states still supported the right of victorious statesto realize territorial gains, and this was reected in their secret treaties concerningterritorial exchanges at theend of thewar. Thisperspective was altered signiŽcantly following the United States’ entry into the war, theRussian revolution in1917, and popular pressure against territorial annexation in somecountries. 15 In the1919 Versailles settlement the victorious states only obtained small territorial concessionsin Europe,although they realized some signiŽ cant gains by dividingup thecolonies of the defeated powers. Still, these colonies were declaredLeague Mandates,and the new colonial powers were implicitlyobligated to prepare the colonialpeoples for self-governance—especially in thecase of theformer Turkish territories. 16 As Kormanhas noted, while “ Itcannot be concluded . ..thatthe distinguishingfeature of theterritorial settlement of 1919was theabandonment of thelegal doctrine of the right of avictorto disposeof theterritory of thevanquished byright of conquest . ..from theperspective of theevolution of attitudestowards theright of statesto acquire territory by conquestor militaryvictory, the First World War undoubtedlymarked a moralturning point.” 17 Onthe second issue, the obligation to upholdthe territorial integrity of allstates, PresidentWoodrow Wilson was thestrongest protagonist. His famous“ Fourteenth Point”spoke of “speciŽc covenantsfor thepurpose of affording mutual guarantees ofpoliticalindependence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” 18 Sucha revolutionaryproposal took the form ofArticle10 of the League of Nations Covenant,whose approval really constituted the beginning of states’formal support for theterritorial integrity norm. It read: “ Themembers of the League undertake to respectand preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existingpolitical independence of all Members of the League.” Onthe third question of theweight that should be given to the right of national self-determinationin redrawing international boundaries, there was clearlytension withindemocratic governments between protagonists of nationalself-determination andrespect for existingboundaries; and the former generallylost. Even President Wilson,who was viewedas the leader of the national self-determination cause, cameout fundamentally on the side of respect for territorialintegrity. National self-determinationfor ethnicnations was notmentioned in thecovenant, and at the Versaillesconference self-determination for ethnicnations was onlyapplied to some oftheterritories of thedefeated states in World War I. 19 Overall,recognition of the

15.Korman 1996, 132– 36. 16.See Article 22of the League Covenant; Claude 1964, 322– 28; and Korman 1996, 141– 42. 17.Korman 1996, 161, 132– 78. 18.See Zimmern 1939,199; Egerton 1978; and Knock 1992. 19.Franck 1990, 154 – 62. 220 InternationalOrganization territorialboundaries of juridical states gained signiŽ cant support in post– World War Isettlements. Followingthe World War Ipeacesettlements, the territorial integrity norm was supportedin severalmultilateral declarations and treaties. The 1928 General Treaty for theRenunciation of War (betterknown as the Kellogg-Briand Pact) certainly includedsupport for theprohibition against territorial aggressions, although it did notexplicitly focus on territorial aggrandizement. 20 Thenorm was thendirectly supportedby the League’ s backingfor theStimson Doctrine in 1931,which denied thelegitimacy of territorial changes obtained by force. 21 Despitebroad backing for thenorm in these multilateral declarations, the supportivepolitical conditions for maintainingthe territorial status quo during the interwardecades were notas strongas many leaders hoped. First of all,there was theproblem of inconsistency and inequity in some of the 1919 settlements that evokeddissatisfaction in a numberof countries.For example,for enteringthe war ontheside of thealliesthe Italians were givena pieceof formerly Austro-Hungarian territorywhere few Italianslived. This was anobvious throwback to apastera when territorieswere exchangedwith little attention to the local populations. Far more signiŽcant was thedivision of the German nation, leaving millions of Germans residingin thenew or rebornstates of Czechoslovakia and Poland. 22 Second,by the 1930sthe great powers were dividedin theircommitment to theterritorial integrity norm,and the supporters lacked the commitment to use force to uphold states’ territorialboundaries. In particular, Britain, France, and the United States stood by andtolerated the territorial expansionism of Japan,Germany, and Italy before they Žnallymet these aggressive powers with military force. At theend of World War IItheWestern Allied Powers exhibitedvery strong supportfor theintegrity of interstate boundaries. With one exception they did not requestor obtain sovereignty over any territories that belonged to the defeated powers,although they did obtain some UN TrustTerritories that were formerly coloniesof Japanand Italy and that they were obligedto bringto independence.The exceptionwas theright of the United States to maintain control over some of the PaciŽc islandsthat formerly belonged to Japan. 23 Thesame approach toward territorialgains, however, was nottrue for theSoviet Union, which continued to operatewith a classicalview of boundaries,namely, that the victors in wars could claimterritorial spoils. The Baltic states were integratedinto the Soviet Union by Stalinagainst the wishes of theirpopulations and without the recognition of major Westernpowers. The Soviet Union also absorbed parts of Poland, Germany, Finland,Rumania, the southern half of Japan’s SakhalinIsland, and Japan’ s Kurile Islands.In addition, the territory of postwar Germany was realignedand reduced. Thesechanges were clearlyreminiscent of theoutcomes of wars inearliercenturies, butthey were thelast major diplomatic developments in Europethat blatantly deŽ ed

20.Korman 1996, 192– 99. 21.Stimson and Bundy 1948, 227– 60. 22.Franck 1990, 154 – 59. 23.See Korman1996, 176; and Claude 1964, 339 –40. TerritorialIntegrity 221 theconsent principle in the determination of international boundaries. 24 Finally, despitemost countries’ accession to the territorial gains of the Soviet Union, all countriesat the1945 San Francisco conference acceded to the obligation to respect existingboundaries in theUN Charter:“ AllMembers shall refrain in their interna- tionalrelations from thethreat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politicalindependence of any state.” 25

The Evolutionof the Territorial Integrity NormSince 1945 GeneralLegal and Declaratory Developments TheUN Charterof 1945, as noted, afŽ rmed states’ obligation not to use force to alterstates’ boundaries. This same respect for theborders of juridical entities inuenced the UN’ s approachto de-colonization.The colonial territory, which was oftenartiŽ cial in terms of delimitingethnic nations, became the frame ofreference for makingand responding to claims for self-determinationand political indepen- dence.26 The1960 UN Declarationon GrantingIndependence to ColonialCountries andPeoples made clear that it was existingcolonies, and not ethnic groups, that were eligiblefor independence.Concerning “ dependentpeoples,” it stated that “ the integrityof theirnational territory shall be respected.”It then proclaimed that “ any attemptaimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrityof a countryis incompatible with the purposes and principles of theCharter oftheUnited Nations.” 27 In1970 the UN GeneralAssembly approved a comparable normativestatement in the Declaration of Principlesof InternationalLaw Concern- ingFriendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. 28 Thereis clearly no ambiguityas to whether these major UN declarationssupported respect for the territorialintegrity of juridical states and existing colonies. To quote Michael Barnettand Martha Finnemore, “ TheUN encouragedthe acceptance of the norm of sovereignty-as-territorial-integrity throughresolutions, monitoring devices, com- missions,and one famous peacekeeping episode in the Congo in the 1960s.” 29 Apartfrom reviewingUN normativestatements, it is important to look at developmentsrelating to respect for internationalboundaries in several regional organizations.The charters of the Arab Leagueand Organization of American States,which were approvedin 1945 and 1948, respectively, contained provisions supportiveof the territorial integrity of member states, but the issue was not

24.Korman 1996, 161– 78. The new German-Polishborder subsequently acquired legitimacy. The needto recognize this border was made abundantlyclear toChancellor Helmut Kohlby Germany’ s Western allies in1990 when he voiceda desire torelocate theborder. Fritsch-Bournazel 1992, 102– 11. 25.Article 2(4).On debates overwhether the UN prohibitionallows any exceptions, see Korman 1996,199 – 229. 26.Jackson 1993. 27.Declaration onGranting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA res. 1514, 1960. 28.Declaration ofPrinciples of International Law ConcerningFriendly Relations and Cooperation AmongStates, UNGA res. 2625,1970. 29.Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 713 (italics inoriginal). 222 InternationalOrganization highlightedby the founding member states. 30 Severaldecades afterwards, however, theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) andthe Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE) adoptedstrong and well-publicized stands in favor ofthesanctity of existing state boundaries. The 1963 OAU Chartercontains a strong articlein support of territorial integrity (Article 3), but a muchmore speciŽ c statementwas adoptedby theAssembly of Heads of State and Government in 1964 afterboth Morocco and Somalia had launched wars ofterritorial revisionism against neighboringstates. All member states except Morocco and Somalia approved a resolutioncalling on members “ torespect the borders existing on the achievement ofnationalindependence.” 31 In1975 the CSCE reiterated the same principle in the Helsinki Final Act: “Frontierscan [only] be changed,in accordance with international law, by peaceful meansand by agreement.”Separate bilateral treaties between West Germany and its majorCommunist neighbors (East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union) that precededand anticipated the Helsinki agreements committed the parties to “respect withoutrestriction the territorial integrity” of each state and “ reafŽrm[ed] the inviolabilityof existingboundaries.” 32 At theend of theCold War the1990 Charter ofParis for aNew Europereiterated exactly the same principle, as have all subsequentconferences concerning international boundaries, including the 1995 Daytonpeace treaty that settled the wars inCroatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 33 Oneother development should be noted with regard to attitudes and practices withinEurope and the Western community more generally. In the 1990s both the EuropeanUnion (EU) andNATO proclaimedthat all new members must have accordswith contiguous states as totheir borders. This has necessitated that the East Europeancountries aspiring to membership sign boundary treaties with their neighboringstates— sometimes at the cost of sacriŽ cing long-held dreams of absorbingparts of theseneighboring countries. 34 In1999 EU leadersagreed that all candidatesshould submit outstanding territorial disputes to the International Court ofJustice “ ina reasonableperiod of time” and that the leaders would review outstandingdisputes by 2004at thelatest. 35 Overall,these policies have added to the stabilityand legitimacy of theEuropean territorial order. TheŽ fteensuccessor states of the Soviet Union have also followed the Western countriesin supporting their existing boundaries. The Commonwealth of Indepen- dentStates (CIS) hassupported the principle of territorial integrity in their main constitutionaldocuments. In part their support for theterritorial integrity norm is attributableto pressure from theWestern countries, especially through the Organi- zationfor Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), butthe great majority of

30.Zacher 1979,189, 165. 31.Ibid., 129. 32.Maresca 1985,86 –87. 33.See Ullman 1996;and Holbrooke 1998. The Dayton Agreement can befound at 7 http:// www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton 8 .See particularlyArticles 1and10. 34.Donald M. Blinkenand Alfred H. Moses,Hungary-Romania Pact: Historicbut Ignored, The Daily Yomuri (Tokyo),21 September 1996, 11. 35. FinancialTimes (London),15 December 1999,3. TerritorialIntegrity 223 thesecountries have recognized that respect for inheritedboundaries (the principle of utipossidetis) isin their mutual interest. 36

TerritorialAggressions Since 1946: International Responsesand Outcomes Prior todiscussing the patterns of territorial wars inthe post-1945 period I review somedata on territorial wars sincethe seventeenth century because they highlight themarked changes in internationalpractices in the late twentieth century. Table 1 containsdata on internationalterritorial wars for Žvehistoricaleras ininternational relationsover the past three and a halfcenturies and seven half-century periods. The Žvehistoricaleras arefrequently used in historical analyses of theinterstate system. Theyare also employed by KaleviHolsti from whosebook this article has drawnthe listof wars for theperiod 1648 – 1945.The wars listedby Holstiare major military conicts in “theEuropean and global states system.” 37 He includessome civil wars, butthey are excluded from thecon icts examined here. Of the119 interstate wars between1648 and 1945, 93 were judgedto beterritorial wars inthatHolsti classiŽ ed themas being concerned with six issues that clearly involve state control over territory.38 Thelist is not exhaustive of allterritorial aggressions or wars, butit is extensiveenough to reveal important patterns. Thelist of forty territorial aggressions for theperiod 1946 –2000is drawn from extensiveresearch in secondary materials. The deŽnition of territorial aggressions or wars for thisperiod encompasses a largergroup of con icts because the manage- mentand outcomes of small as well as largemilitary encounters reveal a greatdeal aboutthe development of the territorial integrity norm. Territorial aggressions or wars includeinterstate armed con icts where a clearpurpose of themilitary attack was thechange of boundariesof astateor its colonies; the invading state sought to capturesome territory from theattached state— not merely to punish it (China’ s 1979invasion of Vietnam,for example);attacking states were widelyrecognized as sovereignstates; and the invasion or occupation lasted at least a week.Using this deŽnition clearly reduces the value of comparisons with the pre-1946 territorial wars, butthe value of usinga largergroup of territorialaggressions for therecent periodgreatly assists our understanding of recent changes. 39 Severalkey patterns emerge from thedata in Table1. First,and most importantly, whileapproximately 80 percentof territorialwars ledto re-distributionsof territory for allperiods prior to 1945, this Ž guredropped to 30 percent after 1945. Second, thenumber of territorialredistributions per year (given our list of wars) hasvaried bytime period. It was about0.24 from 1648to 1814; it dropped to 0.19 between

36.See MacFarlane 1999,4; andWebber 1997. 37.Holsti 1991, 20. 38.See noteto Table 1. 39.The term “aggression”is more accurate than“ war”for some ofthecon icts since ina few cases theattacked state didnot resist militarilyand in some cases thenumber of deathswas small. However, suchterritorial occupations are oftenreferred toas “wars”and therefore the terms “war”and “ aggression” are usedinterchangeably. 224 InternationalOrganization

1815and 1917; it rose dramatically to 0.59 between 1918 and 1945; and then it droppedback to 0.22 in the post-1945 period. Inlooking at the average territorial redistributions per year, it isvaluable to take intoconsideration that a largerpopulation of territorialcon icts is included in the 1946– 2000period than in other periods and, more importantly, that the number of stateshas increased dramatically over recent centuries— especially since 1945. A recentstudy provides data on the number of states (with certain characteristics) between1816 and 1998, and it allows us to control for thenumber of statesin the internationalsystem by calculating the number of territorial redistributions per country-yearfor particularperiods of time. The Ž gurefor 1816–50is 0.0032; for 1851–1900, 0.0035; for 1901–50, 0.0073; and 1951– 98, 0.0015. 40 TheseŽ gures indicate,of course, that the number of territorial redistributions per country-year was morethan twice as highin thenineteenth century than it was inthe last half of thetwentieth century. Also, it was almostŽ vetimes higher in the Ž rst halfof the twentiethcentury than in the second half. These Ž gureshave to be interpreted in lightof the fact that the criteria for theinclusion of wars differs for thepre- and post-1945years, and there is no claim of statistical signiŽ cance. Thepreceding Ž guresdo pointto importantchanges in somepatterns of territorial armedcon ict. However, it is also crucial to look at post-1945 territorial wars (summarizedin Table 2) in some detail since the development and management of thesecon icts reveal a greatdeal about the strengthening of thenorm. This section startswith territorial wars inEurope and then moves to the Americas, Africa, the MiddleEast, and Asia.

Europe. Itis Ž ttingto consider territorial aggressions in Europe Ž rst,not only becausethe modern territorial order Ž rst developedthere, but also because that continenthas witnessed some of themost destructive territorial con icts in modern history.In the late 1940s Europeans were certainlynot conŽ dent that the era of violentterritorial revisionism was atan end. However, only four interstate territorial wars haveoccurred in Europesince 1945; only one of them(Turkey-Cyprus) led to aterritorialchange, and it could be reversed. Regardingthe three wars amongthe states that emerged from thedissolution of Yugoslaviain 1991and 1992, the European states and the United States supported theterritorial boundaries that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia possessed when they declaredtheir independence in 1991and 1992, and all the warring parties accepted themat the 1995 Dayton peace conference. Finally, in 1996 Yugoslavia, under considerableU.S. andEuropean pressure, signed bilateral accords with Croatia and

40.Gleditsch and Ward 1999. The authors include states thatmeet thefollowing criteria: (1)they possessedautonomous administration over some territory;(2) they were regardedas distinctentities by localactors; and(3) they had a populationover 250,000. The average numberof states peryear between 1816and 1850 was 53.05;between 1851and 1900, 56.70; between 1901and 1950, 63.42; and between 1951and 1998, 134.58. The total number of territorial redistributions for these fourperiods was 6,10, 23,and 10, respectively. To determine thenumber of territorial redistributions per country-year for a particularperiod it is necessary tomultiply the total number of years bythe average numberof countries peryear andto divide this sum intothe total number of redistributions for the period. TerritorialIntegrity 225

TABLE 2. Interstateterritorial aggressions, 1946 – 2000

Statesinvolved Issue Outcome Change

Europe Turkey-Cyprus, Turkeyinvaded Cyprus to protect the TheUN andNATO opposedthe Major change 1974–present TurkishCypriot community. It gathered invasionand recognition of the all TurkishCypriots into the northern TRNC.Western and UN 40percentof theisland. In 1983 attemptsto negotiate a Turkeysupported the creation of the settlementbased on afederation TurkishRepublic of NorthernCyprus ofthetwo sections of the island (TRNC). Turkishtroops remain inthe havefailed. Only Turkey TRNC. recognizesthe TRNC. Yugoslavia- Yugoslavia’s armed forces attackedto try Yugoslaviaceased its attack after No change Slovenia,1991 toreverse Slovenia’s departurefrom eightdays of Ž ghtingand thefederation after Sloveniadeclared withdrewfrom Slovenia. independenceon 25June1991. Yugoslavia- Croatiadeclared independence in 1991. UNcalledfor withdrawalof No change Croatia, Yugoslavia(Serbia-Montenegro) sent foreigntroops and a cease-Žre. 1991–95 troopsto assist Serbs in Croatia(12 Fightingkilled 15,000. Main percentof pop.) who wanted to attach Serbforce wasdefeated in theirareas toYugoslavia. Most Serb 1995.Dayton accord in 1995 troopsdefending Serb enclaves came recognizedformer boundary. from Croatia,but some came from Yugoslaviaand Croatia Yugoslavia. recognizedboundary in bilateral treatyin August1996. Yugoslavia- Bosniadeclared independence in 1992. UNcalledfor withdrawalof non- No change Bosnia, Serbpopulation of Bosnia (assisted by Bosniantroops and cease-Ž re. 1992–95 Yugoslavmilitary) foughtagainst an TheŽ ghtingkilled 200,000. The allianceof BosnianMuslims and 1995Dayton accord created a BosnianCroats. The Serb forces multiethnicgovernment and wantedto unite parts of Bosnia with recognizedthe original Yugoslavia.The Croatian army boundariesof Bosnia- intervenedat times,and in a few Herzegovina.Yugoslavia and instancesit fought Muslim forces. Bosniarecognized boundary in bilateral treatyin October 1996. TheAmericas Nicaragua- Nicaraguaoccupied a partof Honduras.Nicaragua withdrew and accepted No change Honduras,1957 ICJarbitration because of OAS pressure.ICJ awardedterritory toHonduras in 1959. Argentina-Britain, Argentinaoccupied Malvinas/ Falkland UN calledfor Argentina’s No change 1982 islands. withdrawal.Britain reoccupied islands. Ecuador-Peru, Ecuadorsent troops into an area itlostin Fourguarantor powers of 1942 No change 1995 peace treatyat endof 1942 war. treatypromoted withdrawal. Thetwo states signed a border treatyin 1998. Africa Egypt-Sudan, Egyptoccupied a small area ofSudanese Arab Leaguepressured Egypt to No change 1958 territory. withdraw. Ghana–Upper Ghanaoccupied a small borderarea of In1965 OAU supportedoriginal No change Volta,1963– 65 UpperVolta in 1963. boundary.Ghana withdrew. Algeria-Morocco, Moroccooccupied a partof Algeria.Arab Leagueand OAU calledfor No change 1963 withdrawal.OAU established mediators.Morocco withdrew. Somalia-Ethiopia Somaliaprovided troops to Somali rebels OAU supportedoriginal No change and Kenya, ineastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya boundariesand established 1964 seekingunion with Somalia. mediator.Somalia withdrew. Libya-Chad, In1973 Libya secretly occupied a border OAU triedto secure Libyan No change 1973–87 area ofChadcalled the Aouzou Strip. withdrawalin 1980s. Libya was drivenout by Chad in 1987. ICJ arbitrationwas accepted in 1990. ICJruled in Chad’ s favorin 1994. 226 InternationalOrganization

TABLE 2. continued

Statesinvolved Issue Outcome Change

Mali–Burkina Mali claimed asmall area ofBurkina OAU mediateda cease-Žre and No change Faso, 1975 Fasoin 1960. Mali occupiedthe area in withdrawalby Mali. 1975. Somalia-Ethiopia, Somaliaoccupied most of theOgaden AnOAU committee calledfor No change 1976–80 regionof Ethiopia.Ethiopia received respectfor former boundary. military forces from Cuba. Somaliawithdrew all forces by 1980. Uganda-Tanzania, Ugandaoccupied a small partof Withinseveral weeks of Tanzanian No change 1978 Tanzania. military action,Uganda withdrew. Morocco–Spanish Moroccoclaimed SpanishSahara priorto TheOAU andthe UN havecalled Major change Sahara,1975– independenceand sent in military for Moroccanwithdrawal and a 2000 contingentsin 1975. Under pressure referendum. TheUN triedto Spainagreed to cedethe colony. Since organizea referendum during 1976Morocco and the independence the1990s. (Mauritania occupied movementPolisario have conducted a partof SpanishSahara from continuouswar. 1976to 1978.) Libya-Chad, Libyapressured Chad to accept a political OAU opposedunion and provided No change 1981–82 unionin exchange for military sometroops. Chad ended assistancein its civil war. politicalunion and Libya withdrewtroops. Mali–Burkina Disputeover a small stripexisted from In1985 they accepted ICJ Minorchange Faso, 1985 time ofindependenceand led to arbitrationas a resultof OAU violenceagain. mediation.In 1986 ICJ divided thearea equallybetween the two states. Eritrea-Ethiopia, Eritrea andEthiopia dispute sovereignty TheOAU andthe Western powers No change 1998–2000 overseveral small borderregions. promoteda cease-Žre, a Eritrea occupiedsome areas in1998. In withdrawalto the pre-1998 1999and 2000 Ethiopia regained boundary,and arbitration based controlof all areas. oncolonialtreaties. Thesewere acceptedin June 2000. Middle East Arab states–Israel, Britainaccepted a UNrecommendationto Israel gainedterritory in each Major change 1948 dividePalestine into Israeli andArab stageof the war. At endof 1948 states.Neighboring Arab statesattacked bothsides accepted armistice Israel at time ofindependence in May lines.Arab Palestiniansretained 1948to support Palestinian Arabs’ controlof theWest Bank and claim toentire area. Gaza Strip(administered by Jordanand Egypt). Israel–Arab states, Israel occupiedthe West Bank, Gaza UNSecurityCouncil in November Major change 1967 Strip,Sinai, and Golan Heights. It later 1967called for withdrawalof annexedEast Jerusalem andapplied Israel to1948 armistice linesin Israeli law toGolan Heights. exchangefor recognitionby Arab statesof Israel. In1978 Israel agreedto return the Sinai; in1993 Israel acceptedstaged implementationof self-rule for WestBank and Gaza. Egyptand Syria– Egyptand Syria sought to recapture the UNSecurityCouncil called for Minorchange Israel, 1973 Sinaiand Golan Heights. cease-Žre. Fightingended after twoweeks. Egypt was allowed tokeep a small enclavein the Sinai. Iraq-Kuwait, Iraq invadedKuwait and annexed it. Most UN members calledfor No change 1990–91 Iraq’s withdrawal.Iraq was expelledby a UN-sanctioned force. TerritorialIntegrity 227

TABLE 2.

Statesinvolved Issue Outcome Change

Asia Pakistan-India, BritishIndia was partitioned and India Pakistansecured control over a Major change 1947–48 andPakistan became independentin sparselypopulated third of 1947.Pakistan army joinedMuslim Kashmir byendof war. UN rebelsin Kashmir whowere seeking SecurityCouncil supported unionof Kashmir withPakistan. plebisciteduring war, butIndia didnot accept it. Post-1948 borderis the Line of Control. NorthKorea– NorthKorea attemptedto absorb South Armistice linere ects very minor Minorchange SouthKorea, Korea. changesin former boundary. 1950–53 China-Burma, Chinamoved into a small borderarea of Thetwo states negotiated a new Minorchange 1956 Burma. borderthat gave China a partof thearea itoccupied. Afghanistan- Afghanistansent irregular Afghanforces Afghanincursions were defeated No change Pakistan,1961 intothe Pathanistan region of Pakistan byPakistan. tosupport local forces favoringunion withAfghanistan. India-Portugal, Indiainvaded and absorbed the Moststates accepted the Major change 1961 Portuguese-controlledcolony of Goa. legitimacyof India’s action. Indonesia- Indonesiaclaimed WestNew Guinea In1962 Indonesia and the Major change Netherlands, (WestIrian) overwhich the Netherlandsagreed to a 1961–62 Netherlandshad colonial control. plebisciteafter oneyear ofUN Indonesiainvaded in 1961. administration.The plebiscite favoredintegration with Indonesia. China-India,1962 China occupied Aksai Chin and part of Chinastill occupies the areas. Major change NortheastFrontier Agency that it claimed. NorthVietnam– France administeredthe northern and In1975 North Vietnamese and Major change SouthVietnam, southernparts of Vietnam separately Viet Congforces defeatedthe 1962–75 priorto 1954. After independencein SouthVietnamese army, andthe 1954South Vietnam didnot allow a twoareas were reuniŽed. referendum onuniŽcation as provided inthe Paris peace accord.By 1962 NorthVietnamese forces were Žghting withthe Viet Congto promote uniŽcation. Indonesia- Indonesiaclaimed theMalaysian territory Britainand Australia sent troops to No change Malaysia, ofNorth Borneo, and it introduced helpMalaysia. Indonesia was 1963–65 military contingentsto expel Malaysian unsuccessful. authorities. Pakistan-India, Pakistansent a force intothe Rann of Britainnegotiated a cease-Žre and Minorchange April 1965 Kutch. theparties agreed to an arbitrationthat awarded 10 percentof the area toPakistan in 1968. Pakistan-India, Pakistanattacked India to secure control Pakistanwas defeated. USSR and No change August 1965 ofthe Indian-controlled part of Westernpowers backed the Kashmir. 1948Line of Control. India-Pakistan TheBengali population in East Pakistan TheUN General Assemblycalled Major change (creationof soughtto secede from Pakistan.Indian for Indianwithdrawal; India did Bangladesh), troopsintervened in the civil war to notwithdraw, and it facilitated 1971 securethe creation of Bangladesh. thecreation of Bangladesh. Iran–United Arab UponBritain’ s grantingof independence Iran maintainscontrol of the Major change Emirates, 1971 tothe UAE Iran occupiedsome of the islands. islandsin the Straits of Hormuz that belongedto theUAE.

(continued) 228 InternationalOrganization

TABLE 2. continued

Statesinvolved Issue Outcome Change

China–South Chinaexpelled South Vietnam from the Chinamaintains control of the Major change Vietnam,1974 westernParacel Islandsthat it claimed. islands. Indonesia- Indonesiainvaded East Timor several UNdemandedIndonesian No change Portugal(East monthsbefore it was to achieve withdrawaland self- Timor), independencefrom Portugal.It made it determinationthrough 1982. In 1975–99 aprovinceof Indonesia. 1999Indonesia relented to internationalpressure and alloweda referendum thatled to independence. Cambodia- Cambodiaattacked Vietnam toestablish Cambodianforces were defeated. No change Vietnam, controlover a small borderregion. War wasthe result mainly of 1977–78 politicalcon icts. Iraq-Iran, Iraq invadedIran toseize controlof the UNSecurityCouncil backed No change 1980–88 Shattal-Arab waterway andsome other acceptanceof former boundary areas. in1987. The two states accepted acease-Žre in1988and the former boundaryin 1990.

Note: Of theforty interstate territorialcon icts listedhere, twelve involvedmajor redistributionsof territory,and Ž veinvolvedminor alterations of borders.A “minorchange” refers tosmall borderad- justments.Any change apart froma minorborder alteration is regardedas a“major change.”The conict overthe Spratly Islands, which involves China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines,Malaysia, and Brunei,is notincluded because there has neverbeen any local or internationalconsensus on jurisdic- tions.See Haller-Trost1990; and Lo 1989.

Bosniaaccepting those boundaries. The basic position of most of the Western powerswas enunciatedin astatementby U.S. Secretaryof StateJames Baker in a meetingwith President Milosevic in 1991: “ TheUnited States and the rest of the internationalcommunity will reject any Serbian claims to territory beyond its borders.”41 Subsequently,the chief U.S. negotiatorat Dayton,Ambassador Richard Holbrooke,substantiated Baker’ s judgment:“ Therewas amoralissue: the United Statesand its European allies could not be party to . ..legitimizingthe Serb aggression.”42 Theone territorial aggression in Europe that has succeeded is Turkey’ s invasion ofCyprus in 1974 following a coup d’etat inCyprus that brought to power a governmentcommitted to amalgamating Cyprus with Greece. After itsinvasion, Turkeybrought together the Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of Cyprus, expelledthe Greek Cypriots from thearea, and maintained a militarypresence in thisnorthern region. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots, with Turkey’ s backing,created anindependent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that de facto constituted a changeof stateboundaries by the use of force.Both the Western countries and the UNhavesteadfastly refused to recognize the Turkish Republic of NorthernCyprus.

41.See Baker 1995,481; and Ullman 1996. 42.Holbrooke 1998, 363. TerritorialIntegrity 229

Infact, only Turkey has recognized the secessionist state. The eventual outcome of theinternational opposition to the creation of the secessionist state could be a reuniŽcation of theTurkish and Greek parts of theisland and hence a nulliŽcation ofacoerciveterritorial change. 43

TheAmericas. InLatin America the principle of utipossidetis ,orthe obligation ofstates to respect the boundaries inherited from theprevious governing power, originatedin the 1820s following the Latin American states’ achievement of independencefrom Spainand Portugal. While the principle was notrespected by all countriesin the region throughout the nineteenth century, it had some impact in promotinggreater order in the region. 44 After WorldWar IIthemembers of the Organizationof American States (OAS) declaredtheir opposition to coercive territorialrevisionism, 45 andvery few militarychallenges to territorial boundaries havebeen made by states in the Western Hemisphere. Also, all attempts to alter boundariesby force have failed. In1957 Nicaragua sought to absorb a regionof Honduras; the OAS pressured Nicaraguato withdraw and persuaded the two states to submit their dispute to the InternationalCourt of Justice, which rejected the Nicaraguan claim. 46 In 1995 a smallwar brokeout between Ecuador and Peru over Ecuador’ s claimto a border regionthat was awardedto Peru in the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro. The four guarantorpowers of the 1942 protocol (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States)secured a restorationof the status quo ante. 47 Finally,there was the Malvinas/Falklandswar betweenArgentina and Britain in 1982 that eventuated in Britain’s reoccupationof theislands. 48 MostUN memberstates called for Argentina towithdraw; most Latin American states, however, supported Argentina because theyregarded the Malvinas as aBritishcolony that should be cededto Argentina. 49 Overallthe Latin American countries have been strong opponents of coercive territorialaggrandizement, and the United States, of course, has exerted a strong inuence in favor of the territorial integrity norm in the region.

Africa. MostAfrican states are composed of avarietyof ethnicgroups, and often thesegroups straddle boundaries with neighboring states. Consequently, there are sociologicalpressures for territorialrevisionism in many parts of thecontinent. This conditionas well as the military weakness of theAfrican states are key reasons why theyhave supported the principle of utipossidetis.

43.See McDonald1989; and Necatigil 1989. 44.Parkinson 1993, 140 – 46. 45.Shaw 1986, 180. 46.Zacher 1979,232. 47.See Day 1987,424 – 25;and Fighting on Peru-Ecuador Border, Keesing’s ContemporaryArchives 41(January 1995), 40356. 48.See Kacowicz 1994,150 – 51;and Korman 1996, 275– 80. 49.During the late 1970sand the early 1980sthere was alsothe possibility of aterritorialwar between Chileand Argentina over islands in the Beagle Channel.In 1984, the dispute was settledby arbitration bythe Vatican. Day 1987,385. 230 InternationalOrganization

We nowturn to unsuccessful wars ofterritorial aggrandizement. One war occurredbefore the founding of the OAU in1963: Egypt’ s occupationof a small areain the Sudan in 1958.The Arab Leaguewas responsiblefor pressuringEgypt towithdraw. 50 TheŽ rst challengeto the territorial integrity norm in Africa afterthe creationof the OAU was Morocco’s occupationof a partof Algeria in October 1963.Within several months Morocco was pressuredto withdraw by theOAU and theArab League. 51 Asimilardevelopment occurred in 1964 when Somalia sent troopsinto areas of Ethiopiaand Kenya inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Somalia was subsequentlypressured by the OAU towithdraw. On each occasion the OAU insistedthat the con ict be settled in keeping with the OAU principleof state territorialintegrity, and the super powers backed con ict resolution by theOAU. 52 In1965 the OAU alsosuccessfully pressured Ghana to withdrawfrom asmallarea ofneighboringUpper Volta. 53 Withinits Ž rst threeyears (1963– 65), the OAU was remarkablysuccessful in upholding the territorial integrity norm, or what James Mayallhas called the OAU’ s “unnegotiableacceptance of thestatus quo.” 54 Since1973 the norm has been tested by eight territorial aggressions, and most OAU membershave consistently upheld it; in one case, however, the aggression has notbeen reversed. 55 Oneof thesewars involvedlarge-scale Ž ghtingover four years andwas politicallyvery important. From 1976to 1980Somalia unsuccessfully tried toabsorb the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the OAU, theformer SovietUnion, andthe Western powers all opposed the Somali military action. The African and Westernopposition to the Somali action is quite signiŽ cant since the Ethiopian governmentwas Marxistand relied on Cuban troops. 56 Theone successful violation of theterritorial integrity norm in Africa isMoroc- co’s absorptionof the former SpanishSahara (Western Sahara) in 1975. It is includedas a caseof territorial aggression because Morocco pressured Spain into cedingthe area prior to itsscheduled independence in 1976 by sending in military contingentsand mobilizing its troops and its civilian population at the border. Morocco’s absorptionof the area was supportedby France and the United States becausethey preferred that pro-Western Morocco, and not the radical Polisario independencemovement, control the region. The majority of OAU andUN membershave periodically called for areferendumfor theinhabitants of theformer SpanishSahara. During the 1990s a UNmissionsought regularly, though unsuc- cessfully,to organize a referendumin the Western Sahara. 57

50.Zacher 1979,199 – 200,233. 51.See Goldstein1992, 173– 74; and Wild 1966. 52.See Wild1966; Touval 1972; and Day 1987,129 – 31. 53.Zacher 1979,246 – 47. 54.Mayall 1990, 56. 55.Libya-Chad, 1973– 87; Mali– Burkina Faso, 1975; Somalia-Ethiopia, 1976 – 80;Morocco–Spanish Sahara,1975– present; Uganda-Tanzania, 1979; Libya-Chad, 1981– 82; Mali– Burkina Faso, 1985; and Eritrea-Ethiopia,1998 – 2000.The only con ict theOAU didnot get involved in was Uganda-Tanzania because itended very quickly. The agreement ofJune 2000 ending the Eritrea-Ethiopia war isavailable at < www.bbc.co.uk/hi/world/africa > . 56.Day 1987,129 – 31. 57.See Layachi1994; and Von Hippel 1995, 72– 79. TerritorialIntegrity 231

Innine of the eleven African territorial wars since1963, the OAU hasbeen a majorin uence in securingtroop withdrawals, and it could succeed eventually in the Morocco–Western Sahara con ict. When the OAU was foundedin 1963, few thoughtthat the society of African states would be such an important force in securingthe stability of African boundaries. The OAU membershave exerted signiŽcant diplomatic pressure on aggressing states, and they have in uenced outsidepowers to back OAU positionsagainst territorial aggressions.

TheMiddle East. Table2 listsfour territorial wars intheMiddle East, excluding Arab NorthAfrica. Twowars betweenNorth African Arab statesare listed under “Africa.”In these two North African con icts the Arab Leagueopposed Egypt’ s occupationof asmallregion of Sudan in 1958and Morocco’ s occupationof an area ofAlgeriain 1963. Among the four territorial wars inthe Arabian Peninsula only onewas betweenArab states—namely, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitin 1990–91.In thatwar onlythree of themore than two dozen members of theArab Leaguefailed tooppose Iraq’ s militaryabsorption of Kuwait within the context of the UN deliberations. 58 Withinthe Arabian Peninsula, three major territorial wars haveconcerned Israel andits Arab neighbors.The 1948 and 1967 wars ledto signiŽcant redistributions of territoryin favor of Israel, and the 1973 war saw thereturn of a smallpiece of territoryfrom Israelto Egypt. In May 1948 the armies of the neighboring Arab states,which rejected the UN partitionplan to createseparate Jewish and Arab states inPalestine, attacked Israel. These Arab armiessubsequently lost ground during eachphase of Žghtingduring 1948, and at theend of thehostilities the Arab armies controlledonly the West Bank and the Gaza Strip where most of the Arab Palestinianshad gathered. No international attempts were madeto reversethe Israeli expansionsince both super powers favored Israel, the Arab stateshad initiated the Žghting,and the prohibition against coercive territorial revisionism was certainly notas strong as it later became. 59 Inthe Six Day War inJune1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Desert,and the Golan Heights following bellicose statements and actions by the Arab states.A veryimportant development in thewake of this war was theSecurity Council’s passageof Resolution 242 in November 1967. It stated, in essence, that Israelshould return the Arab landsthat it occupied in exchange for diplomatic recognitionfrom theArab states.In 1980 the UN SecurityCouncil opposed Israel’ s makingEast Jerusalem part of thecapital of Israel and extending Israeli law to the

58.In 1990Yemen, Libya,and Jordan parted company with the other Arab states bysupportingIraq. See Friedmanand Karsh 1993;and Johnstone 1994. Note that in 1961 Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait, andall ofthe Arab Leaguecountries opposed it. In fact, mostsent troops to defend Kuwait. Zacher 1979, 199, 341. 59.See Hurewitz 1950;and Day 1987,204 –207.In 1949 King Abdullah of Transjordan(now Jordan) indicatedTransjordan’ s intentionto absorbthe West Bank,which was occupiedby theTransjordanian army,but after strongprotestations by other Arab states heagreed thatTransjordanian administration wouldlast onlyuntil the Palestinians were able toestablish a unitedPalestinian state. 232 InternationalOrganization

GolanHeights. 60 TheWestern powers have, for themost part, strongly supported thereturn of the occupied territories. In 1978, the United States mediated the Camp Davidagreement between Israel and Egypt that restored the Sinai Desert toEgypt, andin 1993 the Western powers were activein promoting the Oslo accord, which anticipateseventual Israeli withdrawal from theWest Bank and Gaza. In December 1999,Israeli-Syrian negotiations concerning the return of the Golan Heights Ž nally commenced.The territorial integrity norm continues to havean importantimpact on thecon ict, since withdrawal from theoccupied areas (or mostof the areas) isa standardthat the Western powers feel obligated to support and that the con icting stateswill probably accept as atolerableoutcome. 61 The1948 armistice lines have takenon a legitimatestatus for manystates, and it islikelythat future Arab-Israeli accordswill make only modest alterations in these borders.

Asia. Asiahas witnessed twice as many territorial redistributions as all other regionscombined, although Asia is the one region without the outbreak of a new territorialwar since1976. Most wars originatedwith states’ dissatisfaction with boundariesthat were inheritedfrom thecolonial era, and increasingly these territorialdisputes have been resolved. Of theseventeen territorial wars inAsia, six wars didnot lead to anyexchange of territory; three led to minorborder alterations; andeight eventuated in major territorial changes. Insix Asian wars thatled to a restorationof thestatus quo ante, the attacked states were oftensupported by agreatpower ally, and most had local military superiority todefeat the invasion. 62 Intwo of thesewars theUN passedresolutions calling for withdrawals,which were eventuallyaccepted. In the Iraq-Iran war of1980 – 88, outsidepowers were generallynoncommittal on the merits of thecon ict for most ofthewar. Inthe Ž nalstage of the war in1987 the UN SecurityCouncil passed a resolutioncalling on theparties to accept the prewar boundary,and they eventually did.63 Inthe case of Indonesia’ s invasionof East Timor in 1975, the UN General Assemblyregularly called for Indonesia’s withdrawaland the holding of a refer- endumbetween 1975 and 1982, but Indonesia did not relent because it had the de factobacking of theUnited States and some other Western powers who feared that anEast Timor government controlled by thepro-independenceparty, Fretilin, would establishclose ties with communist China after independence. With the end of the ColdWar, foreignpublic opinion and some governments began to push for a referendumconcerning East Timorese independence. This pressure eventually led to adecisionby Indonesiato allowa referendumon independence in 1999after having

60.Korman 1996, 250 – 60. 61.See Kacowicz 1994,129; Makovsky 1996, 205– 10; Newman 1999;and Whetten 1974. 62.Afghanistan-Pakistan, 1961; Indonesia-Malaysia, 1963– 65; Pakistan-India, April 1965; Indone- sia-Portugal(East Timor),1975– 99; Kampuchea-Vietnam, 1977;Iraq-Iran, 1980 –88. 63.See MacDonald1990, 214 – 215,218; and Dramatic Acceptance byIraqof Peace Offer, Keesing’s ContemporaryArchives 36(August1990), 37667. TerritorialIntegrity 233 controlledEast Timor for twenty-fouryears. This important development strength- enedthe territorial integrity norm. 64 Amongthe three Asian wars whereminor territorial changes occurred, in only one(the Korean War, 1950–53)did the UN takea standagainst the aggressor. SigniŽcantly, the armistice line is very close to the pre-1950 boundary. In the other two(China-Burma, 1956; and Pakistan-India, April 1965) diplomacy soon brought aboutaccords to implement minor border adjustments. Whenone looks at the eight cases of successful territorial revisionism in Asia, it becomesclear that there has not been as much territorial turbulence as the number of casesimplies. 65 Chinaabsorbed remote and sparsely populated areas of two neighboring states—namely, India’ s AksaiChina and Northwest Frontier Agency in 1962 66 and SouthVietnam’ s ParacellIslands in 1974. 67 Inthe 1990s China has actually been very activein signing legal accords to stabilize its boundaries— speciŽ cally, agreements with Russia,Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 68 Indiaabsorbed the small Portuguese colonialenclave of Goain 1961 69 andassisted a popularsecessionist movement in EastPakistan to create the state of Bangladesh. 70 Pakistanin 1948 established controlover a thirdof the area of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir whose accessionto Indiawas certainlychallenged by manyobservers. 71 Indonesiain 1962 absorbedthe sparsely populated Dutch colony of West Irian that it had long claimed.72 In1971 Iran occupied some small but strategic islands belonging to the UnitedArab Emiratessoon after the latter’ s independence. 73 Finally,North Vietnam unitedthe two parts of Vietnam by force, but uniŽ cation would probably have resultedfrom anelection in the mid-1950s if SouthVietnam had permitted it. 74 In evaluatingthe history of territorial aggrandizement in Asia it is noteworthy that therehave been no new territorial wars inAsia since 1976.

64.See Carey andBentley 1995; Day 1987,332– 33; Korman 1996, 181– 92; and 7 http://www. nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/East_Timor/index.html 8 . 65.Pakistan-India, 1948; India-Portugal, 1961; Indonesia-Netherlands, 1961– 62; North Vietnam– SouthVietnam, 1962–75; China-India, 1962; Iran– United Arab Emirates, 1971;India-Pakistan, 1971; andChina– South Vietnam, 1974.On Asian territorialwars, see Anderson1996, 93– 104. 66.See Liu1994; and Foot 1996. 67. Lo 1989. 68.Wang 2000. 69.Korman 1996, 267– 75. Most developing states supportedIndia, and the West didnot exert strong pressure topromote its withdrawal. 70.Sisson and Rose 1990.Most states votedfor Indian withdrawal in theUN since theydid not want toset aprecedentof approvingforeign military assistance toa secessionist group;but there was broad publicsupport for India’ s assistance totheBengalis. 71.See Brecher 1953;and Korbel 1966. The Hindu princely ruler acceded toIndia while the majority Muslimpopulation strongly supported union with Pakistan. The UN SecurityCouncil called fora referendum,but India rejected it. 72.Van derVeur 1964.The developing countries overwhelmingly supported the Indonesian claim. 73.Day 1987,242– 44. The failure of the United States andthe United Kingdom to exert strong pressure againstIran to secure itswithdrawal evidently stemmed fromIran’ s strongpro-Western stance at thattime. 74.Turley 1986. South Vietnam rejected theprovisions of the 1954 Paris agreements callingfor a referendum. 234 InternationalOrganization

Itis clear that there have been very few casesof coerciveboundary change in the lasthalf century during which UN membershiphas grownfrom 50to190. No longer isterritorial aggrandizement the dominant motif of interstatepolitics; whereas in the threecenturies leading up to 1946,about 80 percentof allinterstate territorial wars ledto territorial redistributions, for theperiod 1946 –2000,the Ž gureis 30percent (twelveout of forty)(Table 1a). Given the huge increase in the number of statesin theinternational system in the past half century and our deŽ nition of territorialwars for theperiod, the absolute numbers of forty territorial wars andtwelve cases of majorboundary change are not very large by historical standards. Two of the successfuluses of force involved turbulent decolonization processes in 1947 and 1948in the Indian subcontinent and former BritishPalestine, and the other ten occurredbetween 1961 and 1975. Of theseten wars, theUN passedresolutions callingfor withdrawalin fourof them(Israel-Arab statesin 1967, India-Pakistan in 1971,Turkey-Cyprus in 1974,and Morocco-Spanish Sahara in 1975).Another three ofthe ten (India-Portugal in 1961, Indonesia-Netherlands in 1961– 62, and North Vietnam-SouthVietnam from 1962to 1975) were viewedby many countries as stagesof thedecolonization process. The remaining two involved China’ s occupa- tionof remoteareas— parts of northernIndia in 1962 and South Vietnam’ s Paracel Islandsin 1974. Aninterest ingcharacter isticof territori alwars concernsthe role of interna- tionalorganiza tionsin bringing them to an end, since multilat eralresponse s oftenre ect broad internat ionalbacking for thenorm. In the four territoria lwars inEurope (except for thequick war betweenYugoslav iaandSlovenia in 1991) theNATO statesand the UN were activein promotin grespectfor boundaries. Inthe Western Hemisphe re theOAS oran importan tgroupof OAS members was activein promotin gawithdrawalofforces in two con icts, and the UN backedwithdrawa lintheother. In Africa theOAU was veryactive in tenof the twelveterritori alwars (onebeing prior to the OAU’ screation),andthe UN playeda rolein several con icts as well. In the Middle East the UN playeda signiŽcant role in promotin gareturnto the status quo ante in three territori al wars (notthe Arab-Israel iwar of1948).In Asiainternat ionalorganiza tionshave notbeen active in mostof theseventee nterritorialwars. However,the UN had amajorlong-term role in promotin gIndonesia’s recentwithdrawa lfrom East Timor.

TheBoundaries of Successor States

Indiscussing the post-1945 stabilization of boundaries another pattern of interna- tionalbehavior should be noted, since it is closely related to support for the prohibitionof theuse of forceto alter boundaries. During the postwar period, all of thesuccessor states that emerged from thenine breakups of existingstates have kept theirformer internaladministrative boundaries as their new international bound- TerritorialIntegrity 235 aries.75 Infact, in cases where some doubt existed as to whether the successor states wouldaccept these boundaries, outside countries pressured the successor states to adopttheir former administrativeboundaries as their new interstate borders. This indicatesthat states generally desire predictability regarding the international territorialorder. They do not like secessions, but if they are going to occur, they do notwant the successor states Ž ghtingover what their boundaries should be. Someof the best examples of international policy on this issue concern the breakupsof the former Yugoslaviaand the former SovietUnion. The United States andthe European powers went to tremendouslengths to preservethe former internal administrativeboundaries of Croatia and Bosnia as their new international bound- aries.These boundaries were legitimatedin the Western countries’ recognition of thesestates in 1992, the 1995 Dayton accord, and the 1996 accords between Yugoslavia(Serbia), on the one hand, and Croatia and Bosnia, on the other. 76 The Westerncountries have also been active in promoting respect among the Soviet successorstates for theboundaries they originally possessed as Soviet republics. Concerningwhy the former internalboundaries have been maintained as interstate borders,Neil MacFarlane has remarked:

MostsigniŽ cant . ..arethe norms of sovereignty and non-intervention and the principleof territorial integrity. The 15 republics of the former Sovietspace existin the territorial boundaries deŽ ned under Soviet rule, whether or not theymake sense in ethno-geographical terms, or correspond to the aspirations ofthe people living within them. They do so in part because Western states andinternational organizations . ..haveself-consciously promoted these norms.. ..For betteror worse, the West is committed to the attempt to ad- dressproblems relating to minority rights within the context of acceptance of thesovereignty and territorial integrity of thenew states. 77

Westernefforts atpromoting the territorial integrity of the successor states (often throughthe OSCE) havefocused on keeping Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian enclave)within Azerbaijan and keeping Abkahzia and Ossetia within Georgia, but Westernpolicy has had a broaderimpact as wellin strengthening the international territorialorder among the Soviet successor states. 78

75.Syria’ s secession fromthe UAR in1961, Singapore’ s secession fromMalaysia in1965, Bangladesh’s secession fromPakistan in 1971, Gambia’ s secession fromSenegambia in 1989, Namibia’ s secession fromSouth Africa in1990, Eritrea’ s secession fromEthiopia in 1993, the breakup of theformer SovietUnion into Ž fteen states in1991, Yugoslavia’ s breakupinto Ž vestates in1991– 92, andSlovakia’ s secession fromCzechoslovakia in 1992. In the case ofEritrea-Ethiopia, they maintained the former internaladministrative boundary from 1993 to 1998. In 1998 Eritrea occupiedseveral small borderareas, andin 1999and 2000 Ethiopia regained the lost territories. In 2000 the OAU backedwithdrawal of all forces behindthe pre-1998 boundary and the establishment of an arbitral body to settle thedispute. 76.See Weller 1992,587, 602; and Ullman 1996. 77.MacFarlane 1999,4, 16. 78.See Baranovsky1966, 267– 78; Webber 1997; MacFarlane andMinnear 1997; and Menon 1998. Armenia’s supportfor the Armenian populationin Azerbaijan isnot regarded as aninterstate territorial war because Armenia (some ofwhose army foughtfor Nagorno-Karabakh) has notexplicitly backed secession byNagorno-Karabakh. 236 InternationalOrganization

Itis impossible to declare that the acceptance of internal administrative bound- ariesas interstate boundaries for secessioniststates is now an authoritative rule of internationalpractice. Quite possibly, however, this norm will become entrenched asa partof the new territorial order that  owsfrom states’concern for reducingthe incidenceof destructivewars andwars’ impact on commercialrelations. States and internationalcommercial interests increasingly abhor violence and uncertainty over whatpolitical entities have jurisdiction over particular geographical spaces.

Overviewof Stages in the Development of the Norm Inconcluding the discussion of the evolution of normative declarations and state practicesconcerning coercive territorial revisionism, it is valuable to look at past developmentsas fallinginto a numberof stages.Two scholars have identiŽ ed three stagesof norm development as emergence, acceptance, and institutionalizati on. 79 Theemergence stage is marked by a growingadvocacy of the new norm by importantcountries and nongovernmental groups and some multilateral declara- tions.The acceptance stage is characterizedby growingsupport for thenorm and its integrationinto treaties to that point where it isviewedas legally binding by most countries.The institutionalizat ionstage includes the integration of the norm in additionalinternational accords and more effective multilateral efforts topromote statecompliance. Beforemoving to ananalysis of thethree stages of normdevelopment during the twentiethcentury, I offer someobservations about the nineteenth century. The magnitudeof international violence declined from 1815to 1913 as a resultof regularconsultations within the framework oftheConcert of Europe,but the great powerswere involvedperiodically in territorialaggrandizement within the Western statesystem as well as in colonial expansion in the Southern Hemisphere. In fact, territorialadjustments in Europe and in the colonial world were centralto main- taininga balanceof power. The emergencestage ofnorm development started with the end of WorldWar I andmore particularly Article 10 of the League Covenant, and it lasted through the endof World War II. Themajor proponents of the norm were theWestern democraticstates. During this period major multilateral treaties and declarations for theŽ rst timeupheld the territorial integrity norm— particularly the 1919 League Covenant,the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League’ s approvalof theStimson Doctrinein 1931.At thesame time the great powers tolerated a numberof territorial aggressions,and Germany, Italy, and Japan became increasingly committed to territorialexpansion in the1930s. The emergence stage was verybloody, but it was states’experience with this era of destructive territorial aggrandizement that increasedsupport for thenorm after World War II. The acceptancestage ofnorm development began with the adoption of Article 2(4)in the UN Charterin June 1945, and it lasted until the mid-1970s. It was not

79.Finnemore and Sikkink 1999, 254 – 61. TerritorialIntegrity 237 untilthe 1960s and early 1970s that broad and strong backing for thenorm became palpable.The key post-1945 multilateral accords were the1960 UN declarationthat upheldthe territorial integrity of states and pronounced that existing colonies (not ethnicgroups) were eligiblefor self-determination;the OAU’ s 1963charter provi- sionand 1964 resolution supporting respect for inheritedboundaries; and the 1975 CSCE’s HelsinkiFinal Act with its proscription that boundaries could only be alteredby consent. In 1975 the last case of signiŽ cant territorial revisionism occurred—Morocco’ s absorptionof the Spanish Sahara. The institutionalization (strengthening) stage ofnormdevelopment encompassed theperiod from 1976to the present; no major cases of successful territorial aggrandizementhave occurred during this period. The key events that strengthened thenorm were states’responses to individual con icts. Particularly noteworthy caseswere Somalia’s war againstEthiopia, 1976 – 80;Iraq’ s occupationof Kuwait, 1990– 91;and Yugoslavia’ s attemptsto absorb parts of Croatia and Bosnia, 1992–95. Also important was thedecision by Indonesia in 1999 to allow a referendumin East Timor. Another noteworthy development during this period was theInternational Court of Justice’ s adjudicationof several territorial con icts; the courtbased its decisions on the principle of utipossidetis, whichmeans that states haverights to those territories that were legallyceded to them by prior governing statesand, of course,that other states do nothave the right to takethese territories by force.80

Rootsof the NewTerritorial Order

Internationalpractices regarding the use of forceto alter boundaries have changed markedlyin recent years, and in this section I analyzethe reason for thistransfor- mationin the international order. At theheart of this analysis are several general assertions.First, states have backed the norm for bothinstrumental and ideational reasons,though the former havedominated. Instrumental reasons are rooted in perceptionsof how a normand congruent practices beneŽ t theself-interests of countries.Ideational reasons are rooted in changing views of ethical behavior towardother peoples and states. A numberof scholars have recognized that both instrumentaland ideational factors in uence the evolution of norms and that applyingan “ either/or”approach concerning their in uence is wrong. 81 Second,the reasons for sucha changein beliefsand practices have varied among countries,and no singlefactor explains the support for thenorm among a particular groupingof states. 82 Thesefactors include the perceived relationship between territorialaggrandizement and major international wars, thepower relations be-

80.Prescott 1998, 241– 52. 81.See Nadelmann1990; Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1999; Jackson 1993; and Ruggie 1999. 82.The Soviet bloc is notspeciŽ cally discussed in thissection. It was generallysupportive of existing boundariesbecause itwanted to legitimize theEastern Europeanboundaries that were establishedin 238 InternationalOrganization tweenpossible territorial aggressors and the major powers supporting the norm, the costsand beneŽ ts ofterritorialaggrandizement, and moral predispositions concern- ingterritorial aggression. Although we canspeculate about the relative importance ofspeciŽ c factors,providing deŽ nitive conclusions about the weight of each is difŽcult when the factors have generally pressured states in the same direction. It appearsthat the coincidence of severalfactors has been crucial for boththe Western andthe developing states’ backing of thenorm. Among the Westernindustrialized states, the association of territorial revision- ism withmajor wars was thecentral driving force that led these states after World Wars IandII toadvocate a prohibitionof coerciveterritorial revisionism. The key internationalafŽ rmations of thenorm were afterthe world wars in1919 and 1945 andat the 1975 Helsinki conference whose central purpose was theprevention of a majorwar betweenthe Western and Soviet alliances. Territorial aggrandizement was notthe central motivation of thekey antagonists in World War I,butit played apartin states’ participation and the postwar settlements. Also, attempts to promote nationalself-determination and hence border changes exacerbated feelings of internationalhostility after World War I,andthis made many states wary ofthis justiŽcation for territorialrevisionism. To quote Michael Howard, “ TheMazzinian doctrine,that peace could result only from nationalself-determination, had left its followersin disarray.It had caused chaos at the Paris peaceconference, and it was increasinglyclear that this mode of thoughtlent itself far morereadily to right-wing authoritarianism. ..thanit did to any form ofparliamentarydemocracy.” 83 Thefear ofterritorialaggrandizement as acauseof majorwar was exacerbatedby WorldWar IIbecausethe origins of the war laysigniŽ cantly in German and Japaneseterritorial ambitions. The Western states came to fear theright of national self-determination,and particularly the right to unite national compatriots in differentstates, since it encouraged territorial irredentism and xenophobic nation- alism.84 Then,after World War IItheintroduction of nuclear weapons increased theirfear ofmajorwar andenhanced support for thenorm. Western nations’ concern was instrumentalat its heart, since states were concernedŽ rst andforemost with preventingthe destruction of their own societies, though governments did share a certainmoral concern for othersocieties as well. 85 BecauseWestern countries’ support for democraticpolitical institutions grew duringthe development of the norm, 86 itis important to ask whether their liberal democraticethos inuenced their acceptance of the territorial integrity norm. This

1945.Like the Western powersit occasionally supported territorial revisionism for Cold War reasons,for example,Afghanistan-Pakistan, 1961; and Indonesia-Malaysia, 1963– 65. 83.Howard 1978, 95. 84.See Cobban1969; Mayall 1990; and Franck 1990, 155– 74. The destructiveness of pastterritorial wars alsoencouraged Latin American states toopposeterritorial revisionism. Holsti 1996, 150 – 84. 85.In partthe movement to abolishterritorial revisionism was anaspect ofthe movement to abolish war inthe industrialized world. See Mueller1989; and Luttwak 1996. 86.Michael Doyle has notedthat the number of liberal states grew fromthree in1800; to eight in 1850;thirteen in 1900; twenty-nine in 1945; and forty-nine in 1980.Doyle 1996, 56. Withrecent changes inEastern Europe,Latin America, andAsia thenumber is nowconsiderably higher. TerritorialIntegrity 239 questioninvolves considering the reasons why democratic states might eschew wars ofterritorialaggrandizement, the views of democraticleaders, and democratic and nondemocraticstates’ patterns of territorialaggrandizement. The key factor that has probablyin uenced democratic states’ opposition to territorial aggrandizement is touchedon in John Owen’ s studyconcerning the democratic peace in which he notesthat “ liberalismas a systemof thought” is particularly attached to “self-legislationor self-government” and “ self-determination.”87 Itis these values thathave shaped the policies of democratic leaders toward coercive territorial revisionism. Inthe late stages of World War IPresidentWilson commented that “ noright existsanywhere to hand peoples about from sovereigntyto sovereigntywithout their consent,”88 andPrime MinisterDavid Lloyd remarked that any territorial changes hadto be based on “ theconsent of the governed.” 89 If thecitizens of liberalstates adheredto thisprinciple of notimposing a newgovernmenton peopleby force,they woulddeŽ nitely be opposedto using force to changeinterstate boundaries— unless possiblya liberalstate sought to assist the secession of a nationalminority in a foreigncountry. However, the dangers of supporting national secessionist groups havebeen clearly recognized by liberaldemocratic states. While self-determination for ethnicgroups is at times viewed sympathetically by liberals,it is“ trumped”by theirrecognition that the logical outcome of allowingself-determination for every nationalgroup would be continual warfare. Self-determinationhas had to be compromisedin the pursuit of physical security, which is itself necessary for individuals’realization of liberty.Hence, democratic states’ fear ofmajorwar and theirrespect for self-determinationby juridicalstates areinextricably interrelated in theirsupport for theterritorial integrity norm. 90 Thisperspective was recognizedby mostof thestatesmen involved in the peace settlements at the end of thetwo world wars, includingPresident Wilson. 91 InisClaude has remarked that President Wilson “createdhis League to makethe world safe by democracy,”92 andabsolutely central tohis conception of democracy was acommitmentto preventthe imposition of rule byone juridical state on another juridical state or apartof that state. Theproclivity of democratic states to eschew territorial aggrandizement is reected in theirevolving practices regarding territorial annexations at theend of the worldwars andin their colonial policies. At theend of World War I,theTriple Ententestates and their democratic allies gained little territory. Britain and the UnitedStates, whose President Wilson led the Ž ghtfor “noannexations,” did not

87.Owen 1997,32. Malcom Andersonhas identiŽed another in uence onliberaldemocrats’ support forthe sanctity of boundaries— namely, that established boundaries are “essential forordered constitu- tionalpolitics.” Anderson 1996, 8. For a discussionof institutional and cultural factors thathave inuenced the democratic zoneof peace, see Russettet al.1993. 88.Korman 1996, 136. 89.Lloyd George 1936, 1524 – 26. 90.Related tothis argument, the international protection of minority rights during the twentieth centuryhas beenconcerned primarily with promoting international peace ororder.Preece 1998. 91.See Mayall1990; and Knock 1992. 92.Claude 1964, 47. 240 InternationalOrganization establishsovereignty over any new territories, and France only reestablished sovereigntyover Alsace-Lorraine. Among the smaller allies, Belgium obtained a smallborder area from Germany;Denmark secured two-thirds of Scheswig- Holsteinfrom Germanyas aresultof a referendum;and Italy and Greece obtained small,but strategic, territories from Austriaand Bulgaria. The Italian and Greek gainsmight be explained by the relatively new and unstable character of their democraticregimes, which collapsed in the interwar period. 93 France,Britain, Australia,and New Zealand(as wellas Japan and South Africa) securedLeague mandatesthat previously belonged to the defeated powers, and while there was no obligationto bring them to independence, there was animplicit responsibility to movein this direction for theA mandatesand to alesserextent the B mandatesas well.94 Somesigns of anewnormative orientation on territorialissues were present inthe policies of thevictorious democratic states at theend of WorldWar I, butthe oldorder that sanctioned annexations and colonialism still had a signiŽcant in u- ence.As happenedwith the expansion of the voting franchise in the Western states, progressin promoting liberal democratic values about territorial revisionism oc- curredin stages. Inthe case of the settlements at the end of World War II, noWestern power achievedterritorial control over new areas (except UN trusteeshipsthat they were to preparefor independence), 95 whereasthe authoritarian Soviet Union obtained sovereigncontrol over signiŽ cant areas in easternEurope as wellas someof Japan’s northernislands. The democratic Western European states still clung to the legiti- macyof colonial empires through the immediate post– World War IIyears,but by the1950s they had all committed themselves to decolonization. However, the authoritarianregimes in Portugaland Spain resisted granting independence to their coloniesuntil their democratic transformations in 1974. Granting the right of self-determinationto colonies  owedfrom thevery same ideational source as did oppositionto violent territorial revisionism— namely, a liberaldemocratic belief thatit is wrong to impose rule on the people of another juridical state or a part thereof.Decolonization resulted signiŽ cantly because the Western colonial powers “lostconŽ dence in theirnormative right to rule.”96 Of course,in theCold War era theWestern states fashioned themselves into an alliance that self-consciously identiŽed itself as anupholder of democratic values, 97 andhence it would have been verydifŽ cult to absorb foreign territories against the wishes of their citizens and governments. Thereluctance of democraticstates to engagein territorialaggrandizement is also seenin their infrequent territorial aggressions since World War I.Between1919 and 1945there were twentyterritorial wars; theonly democratic state to achieve

93.Gleditsch and Ward 2000. 94.See Howard1978, 83– 84; and Lyons 2000, 302– 12. One clearly authoritarianally of theTriple Ententewas Romania,and it gained considerable territory. 95.Claude 1964, 285– 302. 96.See Russettet al.1993, 35; and Jackson 1993. 97.Risse-Kappen 1995. TerritorialIntegrity 241 territorialgains was Polandin 1922, and its democratic government did not have deepsocial roots, as the 1926 coup d’etat indicated.98 Since1945 the only territorial wars thathave been initiated by democratic states have been India’ s absorptionof thePortuguese colony of Goain 1961,Israel’ s invasionof threeArab neighborsin 1967following Arab sabrerattling, and Ecuador’ s invasionof Peruin 1995. 99 The otherthirty-seven territorial aggressions have been by nondemocratic states. Indwelling on whetherthe association of territorialrevisionism and major war or aliberalrespect for otherstates is the crucial factor that shaped Western states’ supportfor theterritorial integrity norm, it is interesting to ask what might have happenedif the other factor had not been present. First, if democracy had not grown steadilyin the Western world during the twentieth century, would the Western states haveopted for thesanctity of states’ borders because of the linking of territorial revisionismand major war? Theymight have adopted this strategy after the carnage ofthetwo world wars, butit isproblematic whether the policy would have endured withouta moralbelief that other juridical states deserved their respect. After all,the Westernstates did not support the territorial integrity norm following major wars priorto the twentieth century (for example,the Thirty Years’ War andthe NapoleonicWars). Second,if territorialrevisionism had not been a veryimportant causeof major wars, wouldthe democratic states have come down strongly for a prohibitionagainst coercive territorial revisionism? Again, it isdoubtful(probably moredoubtful) because without a fear thatterritorial revisionism could lead to regionalor world wars, theyprobably would have opted for theright of self- determinationfor allethnic or nationalgroups. Liberal states were clearlyin uenced tosupport the right of self-determination forjuridical states ,andhence the territorial integritynorm, because warfare was sohorriŽ c inthe twentieth century. Indicative ofthis perspective is a provisionin President Wilson’ s Žrst draftof the League Covenant:“ Theparties accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the worldis superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.”100 Afear ofa majorwar anda liberaldemocratic respect for other juridicalstates clearly have a symbioticrelationship that has motivated these countriesto support the territorial integrity norm, and it is highly problematic whetherthe norm would have achieved the strength it has if both factors had not beenpresent. Inconsidering the support for theterritorial integrity norm by non-Westernor developingstates ,we mustŽ rst recognizethat most of themhave not experienced verydestructive territorial wars inrecent centuries and have not had liberal democraticgovernments in the postwar era. Their backing of the norm generally

98.See Table1a; and Holsti 1991, 213– 42. On the war pronenessof new andunstable democratic states, see Gleditschand Ward 2000. 99.Huth found that of forty-oneterritorial disputes occurring between 1950and 1990, the only one where astate withŽ fteen years ofdemocratic rulewas thechallenger was theIndian invasion of Goa. Huth1996, 136 – 37.Mitchell and Prins found that of the ninety-seven territorial “ militarized disputes” occurringbetween 1815and 1992, only two were between well-establisheddemocracies; andthese two occurredbetween 1945and 1992. Mitchell and Prins 1999. 100.Miller 1928, 23 (Art. 3). 242 InternationalOrganization stemsfrom theexistence of ethnicgroups that overlap borders and can provoke territorialirredentism, the military weakness of many developing states vis-a `-vis theirneighbors, and their weakness vis-a `-visWestern supporters of the norm. However,changing economic costs and beneŽ ts ofterritorial aggrandizement have undoubtedlyhad an in uence in recent decades. Amongdeveloping states, many (especially in Africa) havefeared territorial aggressionsbecause of the likelihood of irredentist claims resulting from ethnic groups’overlapping borders and their own military weakness. 101 Thesedeveloping statesmade sure that the 1960 UN Declarationon Granting Independence to ColonialTerritories and Countries established that the peoples of existing colonial territories,not ethnic groups, are eligible for self-determinationand that the territorialintegrity of allstates should be respected. 102 Throughregional organiza- tionsand the UN, theAfrican, Middle Eastern, and Latin American states have also beenvery active in opposingterritorial aggrandizement and secessionist movements (for example,Biafra) and in securing great power backing through concerted diplomaticadvocacy. Anotherconcern that has been (and still is) veryimportant in promotingsupport ofthe territorial integrity norm among developing states is their recognition that theywill probably meet strong Western opposition if they embark on territorial aggression.In the Cold War theWestern states provided assistance to their many alliesin the developing world if they were subjectto territorialrevisionist threats or attacks.Good examples are South Korea in 1950, Kuwait in 1961 (a threatof invasionfrom Iraq), andMalaysia in 1963. In addition, the Western states generally opposedtheir allies when they pursued territorial expansionism. 103 Insome areas theWestern powers sought to promote military balances between states where territorialrevisionist wars couldoccur. 104 Ina few cases,such as South Korea in 1950and Kuwait in 1990, the Western powers actually sent signiŽ cant military forcesto repel invasions. And in EasternEurope the NATO countriesbombed Serb forcesas partof theirattempt to promote respect for theboundaries of Bosniaand Croatia.If ithad not been for theWestern democratic powers’ (and especially the UnitedStates’ ) willingnessto employ their military and economic leverage in many territorialwars overthe entire post-1945 era, the norm against coercive territorial revisionismwould not have been sustained. However, the Western powers could not haveenforced the norm in the developing world without the backing of the great majorityof non-Western states. A crucialfactor in the strength of the territorial integritynorm in thedeveloping world is the coincidence of mostdeveloping states’

101.See Jackson1990; and Touval 1972. 102.Declaration onthe Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA res. 1514, 1960. 103.In a few cases theWestern powersbacked territorial revisionism for strategic reasons related to theCold War. They favored the absorption of theSpanish Sahara byMorocco and Mauritania and East Timorby Indonesia in 1975 prior to their independence because ofthe political orientation of their independencemovements during the Cold War. 104.Holsti 1996, 162– 63. TerritorialIntegrity 243 oppositionto coercive territorial revisionism and the willingness of the Western statesto use their power to reverse territorial aggressions. Inaddition to the aforementioned international conditions and beliefs sustaining theprohibition against coercive territorial change, scholars have observed that a number of economictrends reduce the beneŽ ts and increase the costs of coercive territorialrevisionism .Thesetrends have undoubtedly had an important impact on strengtheningsupport for thenorm in recentdecades, but it is doubtfulwhether they couldbe regarded as important factors in securing its diplomatic acceptance betweenWorld War Iandthe 1960s. These economic trends in uence why states areless motivated to pursue territorial aggrandizement themselves, not why they wouldoppose such actions by other states. First,the declining value of landas afactorof productionin modern economies meansthat the conquest of foreignterritory no longerbrings the same beneŽ ts that itdid in the pre-industrial era. Robert Gilpin has observed that a statecan now gain more“ throughspecialization and international trade” than it can“ throughterritorial expansionand conquests.” 105 Thisis clearlytrue, but land has been viewed by some countriesin the twentieth century as quite valuable. It was certainlyviewed as valuableby Germanyand Japan in the1930s and 1940s— atime when the territorial integritynorm was beginningto attractstrong support. Today the accomplishments ofcountries such as South Korea and Singapore are leading to a recognitionthat economicdevelopment depends Ž rst andforemost on human skills and not on controlof territory;but this recognition has not been strong enough, and it didnot comesoon enough in this century, to be seen as a crucialfactor in driving broad acceptanceof the territorial integrity norm. Second,some scholars argue that the occupation of foreign territory is more difŽcult and costly in aneraof nationalconsciousness, and therefore states are less pronetoward territorial expansionism. 106 Thisview is truein manycircumstances, butas Peter Lieberman’ s studyhas pointed out, the occupation of foreignterritories canbe beneŽ cial as long as the occupying states do not meet large-scale military resistanceand are willing to use considerable force to suppresslocal populations. 107 InWorld War II foreignoccupiers were certainlywilling to adopt such policies of suppression.We shouldalso recognize that quite a few casesof potentialterritorial revisionismtoday concern a desireto unite ethnic brethren in different countries, andin this case the problem of needing to suppress local populations would not exist. Finally,some political observers adopt a traditionalliberal stance that war generally,and territorial wars inparticular, are increasingly being rejected in this centurybecause they disrupt valuable economic interdependencies. 108 Thishypoth- esisis true to a degree.However, such interdependencies were notadequate to deter majorwars throughoutmost of this century. In fact, such interdependencies were

105.See Gilpin1981, 125, 132; and Kaysen 1990,54. 106.See Deutsch1953; Kaysen 1990,53; and Lieberman 1996. 107.Lieberman 1996. 108.See Rosecrance 1986and 1996; and Zacher andMatthew 1995, 124 – 26. 244 InternationalOrganization quitestrong in 1914. 109 Theirimpacts are certainly stronger at the end of the twentiethcentury as a resultof the recent growth of international economic transactions,but they are unlikely to assure a rejectionof coercive territorial revisionismby the majority of countries. For onething, many states are highly interdependentwith a relativelysmall number of other states (often not including contiguousstates), and wars withmost countries would not have major impacts on theircommercial interactions. Anotherway to re ect on the roots of theterritorial integrity norm is to look at whathas happened to the major incentives for territorialaggrandizement: the search for economicgains, the search for strategicgains, and the protection of national brethren.In the case of a strivingfor economicgain ,thebeneŽ ts of territorial aggressionare much lower now since land alone does not provide the resources it onceprovided when agricultural production was acentralsource of wealth. Also, theeconomic costs of occupyingland inhabited by a differentethnic group can be very high. Theuse of territorial aggrandizement to achieve strategicgain ,oran improve- mentin a state’s relativepower, has concerned the occupation of territories well situatedfor launchingmilitary operations, the exploitation of captured land as a sourceof national wealth, and the uniŽ cation of ethnicbrethren in other countries soas toincrease the state’ s populationbase. Having strategically located territory is lessimportant now than it once was becauseof themobility of planes,missiles, and ships—in ourtechnologically advanced era, land provides less power potential than itonce did. Finally, increasing the population base of loyal nationals still gives a statemore power, but in thiscase an expansionist state would have to meet the costs ofinternationalopposition. TheŽ nalmotivation for territorialaggrandizement, protectingfellow nationals, hasconcerned the protection of ethniccompatriots who are being mistreated in other statesand the uniŽ cation of nationals in a singlestate. This motivation cannot be squelched,but it is much more difŽ cult now for statesto embark on attempts to protectand absorb fellow nationals in foreign states when their civil rights are respected.A centralreason why the Western states have been so active in promoting minorityrights (particularly through the OSCE) isthat they want to remove any justiŽcation for foreignintervention and territorial aggrandizement.

Conclusion

Thedecline of successful wars ofterritorial aggrandizement during the last half centuryis palpable. In fact, there has not been a caseof successful territorial aggrandizementsince 1976. Furthermore, there have been important multilateral

109.Thompson and Krasner 1989.Ethan Nadelmann has made aninteresting comment aboutthe demise ofpiracyand privateering in the seventeenth century that is relevantto the gradual strengthening ofthe territorial integrity norm: “ Theadvantage to be derivedfrom stealing from one anotherwas giving way tothegreater advantageof stable commercial relations.”Nadelmann 1990, 487. TerritorialIntegrity 245 accordsin support of the norm and frequent interventions by international organi- zationsto force states to withdraw from foreigncountries. Clearly,a centralsource of the norm has been the industrialized world’ s fear that territorialrevisionism could ignite a majorwar thatwould cause great human suffering.Several scholars have observed that this revulsion against the imposition ofphysical pain has been central to the strengthening of a varietyof security and humanrights regimes. 110 Theexperiences of the two world wars, ageneral understandingof territorialrevisionism’ s encouragementof majorwars, anda fear ofnuclear weapons drove the development of the territorial integrity norm at key pointsin its multilateral legitimization. But one cannot dismiss the ideational elementof democratic values among Western, and an increasing number of non-Western,countries. The Western democratic states were thedriving force behindthe norm in 1919, 1945, and 1975. A recentstudy on the CSCE highlights theimpacts of democratic values on respect for interstateborders. According to GregoryFlynn and Henry Farrell, these values orient states to the peaceful settlementof disputes and respect for theterritory and institutions of other coun- tries.111 Theyalso stress that democratic countries place respect for states’territorial integritybefore self-determination for ethniccommunities because this strategy best realizestheir two values of self-governanceand freedom from violence—or liberty andorder. They note that “ thenorm of [national] self-determination was notonly subordinatedto thenorm of inviolabilityof borders;it was alsoeffectively removed asan independent principle of internationalrelations in Europe separable from the normof democracy.”112 Inother words, for mostWestern liberals, self-determina- tionmeans self-governance for thepeoples of juridical territorial states. Wars ofterritorialaggrandizement since 1945 have, for themost part, concerned developingstates’ dissatisfaction with the boundaries they inherited from the colonialpowers; but these quarrels are largely coming to an end. On thewhole, what isremarkable is the degree of support for theterritorial order by developing countries.At theheart of their support have been their fear ofterritorial aggran- dizementbased on conicting treaties, overlapping ethnic groups, and their military weakness;but the leverage of the Western states has also had a majorimpact in assuringrespect for thenorm. If theWestern states had not backed the territorial statusquo in the developing world, a goodnumber of territorialaggressions would havesucceeded, and the commitment of the developing states to the territorial integritynorm would have probably declined markedly. Oneshould not discount the contribution of economic trends in the strengthening oftheterritorial integrity norm, especially in recent decades. Of greatimport is the signiŽcance of a stableterritorial order to the operation of the increasingly inter- dependentinternational economy: “ Theglobalizing economy requires the backing

110.Finnemore and Sikkink 1999, 267– 68. 111.Flynn and Farrell 1999. 112.Flynn and Farrell 1999,527 and passim. Onthe change in Western internationalpractices that owfromthe application of liberaldemocratic values,see alsoAdler 1998. 246 InternationalOrganization ofterritoriallybased state power to enforce its rules.” 113 At thesame time there is noindication that economic discourses and economic motivations sustained the emergenceof the norm— especially in the wake of the two world wars. Infact, whilethese economic trends have reduced states’ perceptions of beneŽ ts and increasedstates’ perceptions of costs of territorial aggrandizement, they do not accountfor whystates are so strongly opposed to territorial aggressions by other states. Thereis not a simpleanswer to why the territorial integrity norm has emerged as acentralpillar of theinternational order. Different reasons were keyfor twomajor groupingsof states, and the coincidence of several factors seems to have been crucialto their backing. These key factors have wrought a majorchange in the internationalterritorial order. Boundaries have not been frozen, but states have been effectivelyproscribed from alteringthem by force. The multistate political and securityorder is clearly stronger than many political observers think in that the societyof states has largely eliminated what scholars have identiŽ ed as the major sourceof enduring rivalries and the frequency and intensity of warfare. 114 Itis valuable at this point to address brie y themeaning of the emergence of a strongterritorial integrity norm for theinternational order. On the one hand, the Žndingspresented here support Stephen Krasner’ s judgmentthat the archetypal featuresof the Westphalian system, such as effective internal control and respect for stateterritoriality, have varied considerably over recent centuries. 115 On the other hand,certain changes have taken place in thetwentieth century that demarcate our presentera from pasteras, and they should not be viewedas mere stagesof acycle. Inparticular, a changein the normative status of state territoriality constitutes a basictransformation in the global political order. As Vasquezhas remarked, “Territorialissues are so fundamental that the behavior associated with their settlementliterally constructs a worldorder.” 116 Itis likely that the world is “witnessingemerging fragments of internationalsecurity communities alongside the traditionalwar systemthat continues elsewhere.” 117 Contraryto what one might initiallythink, the underlying premise of the territorial integrity norm is not a commitmentto separatenessbut a commitmentto a globalpolitical order in which peoplehave excised a majorsource of internationalviolence. In this sense mutually recognizedand respected boundaries are not what separate peoples but what binds themtogether.

References

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