POST-CONFLICT INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION by Alexander Hans Hay a Thesis Submitted in Conformity with the Requirements for Th

POST-CONFLICT INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION

Alexander Hans Hay

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Civil Engineering University of Toronto

POST-CONFLICT INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION

Alexander Hans Hay

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Civil Engineering │ University of Toronto

2019

Abstract The International Community’s rehabilitation paradigm for post-conflict regions has persisted since its inception for post-World War II Europe, though has yet to repeat that initial success. The nature of the post-conflict environment is different, challenging the assumptions upon which the paradigm rests. The Paris Declaration 2005 called for greater alignment of reconstruction projects with local needs, and more recent demands for greater accountability of humanitarian agencies working in post-conflict areas reflects increased frustration with this lack of success. However, the consistent challenge for all stakeholders has been a lack of common reference and the projection of assumed essential services models that can rarely adapt to local nuances. This thesis represents an investigation of the rehabilitation paradigm, explores what successful delivery looks like and how to inform its practicable attainment. Above all, any change to the existing paradigm must be readily adoptable by practitioners and this largely defines the scope of this conceptual work. It frames the nature of the rehabilitation requirements and the role of infrastructure, proposing an outcomes-based system of project measurement and a Common Operating Picture (COP) that are built on a near-real time stand-off recognition of the existing natural, built and human situation.

The COP is dynamic, responsive to change, providing an auditable evidence-based common reference for all stakeholders to understand the existing situation and evaluate proposed policies and projects effects. This includes the re-discovery of long-established practices such as intelligent resourcing, as well as proposing Beneficial Capability and a unifying purpose for post-conflict

infrastructure around the physical, mental and social wellbeing of the local population. Five critical components of a post-conflict rehabilitation implementation framework are proposed for improved alignment and outcomes: common reference for all stakeholders, a unifying purpose of local population health, intelligent resourcing, beneficial capability, and a system of systems view of the relationship between infrastructure and society. These will assist the infrastructure engineer in the planning and delivery of infrastructure projects, concluding that the process of project implementation is as important as its substance.

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Acknowledgements I have many people to acknowledge in the creation and development of this thesis. Though a cliché these days, it has been a genuine journey. Aside from learning for various professional certificates and accreditations, my last formal post-graduate education was at the Royal School of Military Engineering, from which I graduated in 1995 adequately equipped for a career in fortifications and infrastructure development anywhere in the world that the Crown might choose to send me. Over the years that followed, I learned by formation from one supervising engineer or superior officer after another. This formation very much established my practical understanding of engineering in society and as a deliverable of policy. They are: Major General Jeff Mason MBE (late Royal Marines), Major General Carew Wilks CB CBE CEng FIET FInstRE (late Royal Engineers) and Brigadier Nick Baveystock CEng FICE FInstRE (late Royal Engineers). I was also privileged to be mentored over many years by John Haddon until his death in 2016. As Arup’s director for Resilience, Security and Risk he developed in me a sense of systems and risk as a way of understanding many of the complexities that various projects would throw at me. He also guided my move to commercial practice and setting up my own consulting business. Throughout this professional formation that established the basis of my heuristic experience and the foundation of this thesis, I lacked a formal academic understanding to rationalise what I understood in practice.

Over the last five years, my academic understanding has been guided greatly by Prof. Bryan Karney, who provided me with the framework to explore my heuristic experience and investigate why some things worked and others didn’t. I still leave each discussion with an ever-expanding reading list and ideas for further study/research. Where this framework reinforced my engineering understanding, Prof. Adonis Yatchew has provided me with a far deeper and more nuanced understanding of the socio-economic context in which infrastructure exists. His guidance was instrumental in exploring post-conflict poverty, institutional behaviour and the nature of economic measurement of infrastructure effect. It is a direct result of this work that I was able to propose a new method of infrastructure measurement based on the indicators of anticipated outcome. I have enjoyed many discussions around sustainable infrastructure with Prof. Heather MacLean and particularly around the prioritisation of reconstruction and development in the post-conflict environment and infrastructure carrying capacity to enabling resilient and sustained progress. I would also like to acknowledge the influence of Prof. Brenda McCabe who guided my initial exploration into the practical application of stand-off recognition to civilian practice and later the

investigation into modeling project outcomes. It is entirely my deficiency that I was unable to make Bayesian Belief Networks work for this application.

I would like to acknowledge my work colleagues, Rory Kilburn and Nick Martyn, who were sufficiently patient with me as I diverted from the scope of various contracts to investigate one aspect or other pertinent to this thesis. They may also have been infected with an academic interest as they collaborated on three of the papers published arising from this work.

I wish to acknowledge the Water & Habitat Unit of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who not only provided first-rate critiques of my investigations and thinking as they progressed, but crucially provided the vehicle for the field investigation at the heart of this thesis. Through a consulting contract with my firm to explore essential services resilience, I was afforded extraordinary access in the Gaza Strip. My investigations were conducted in parallel to this and the findings from both used to inform and test the other, but otherwise kept distinct and separate.

Lastly, I’d like to acknowledge my wife and children. Taking time out of normal career and family life is a challenge at any life stage, but with middle-school aged children it is they who most keenly feel the impact. Without their support, this would simply have not been possible. Thank you.

I acknowledge the kind permission given by RiskLogik Inc. and Southern Harbour Ltd in reproducing images and tables used in this thesis.

NOTICE

This work solely reflects the views and findings of the author and not the International Committee of the Red Cross with any exceptions clearly stated.

Table of Contents Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iv List of Tables ...... viii List of Figures ...... ix List of Acronyms ...... x Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1. Scope: the questions this work addresses ...... 1 1.2. Thesis Structure ...... 6 1.3. The Use of Data...... 8 Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living ...... 11 2.1. ‘Ek’s Story...... 11 2.2. War is Local ...... 14 2.3. Definitions of Conflict ...... 15 2.4. Current Practice ...... 17 2.5. Literature Review ...... 21 2.6. Comment ...... 24 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation ...... 25 3.1. Infrastructure Rehabilitation Requirement ...... 25 3.2. Infrastructure Value...... 28 3.3. Perspective and Bias...... 32 3.4. Measuring Infrastructure Development ...... 44 3.5. Summary of Requirement ...... 59 3.6. Issues Arising ...... 60 3.7. Comment ...... 61 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure ...... 64 4.1. Defining Infrastructure ...... 64 4.2. Purpose and Value ...... 65 4.3. Equilibrium...... 71 4.4. Vitae System of Systems ...... 76 4.5. Sustainability and Resilience ...... 79 4.6. A Unifying Concept of Infrastructure ...... 83 4.7. Comment...... 90

Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture ...... 93 5.1. Tableau(x) based COP ...... 93 5.2. Components of a COP ...... 98 5.3. COP Component Data ...... 107 5.4. Stand-off Recognition ...... 109 5.5. A Step Change in Stand-off Recognition ...... 115 5.6. Comment ...... 118 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning ...... 122 6.1. Framework Requirement ...... 122 6.2. Accountability ...... 123 6.3. Stimulating Adoption ...... 126 6.4. Capacity-Benefit Relationship ...... 131 6.5. Intelligent Resourcing ...... 133 6.6. Planning Protocol ...... 135 6.7. Professional Practice ...... 138 6.8. Infrastructure Delivery ...... 141 6.9. MS BNx & RiskLogik ...... 142 6.10. Implementation Approach ...... 149 6.11. Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework ...... 150 6.12. Comment ...... 153 Chapter 7: Conclusion ...... 156 7.1. Application ...... 156 7.2. Infrastructure as Context ...... 157 7.3. Adjustment vice Change ...... 160 7.4. Successful Generalism ...... 162 7.5. The Role of Self-Interest ...... 164 7.6. Conclusion ...... 164 Glossary ...... 166 Bibliography ...... 170

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List of Tables 1. Comparison of tradition and stand-off recognition approaches to tableau development . 114

2. Table of results for first run Monte Carlo analysis …..………………………….……… 145

3. Table of results for second run Monte Carlo analysis .……………………….………… 146

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List of Figures 1. Prioritised Risk Chart ..…………………………………………………………………… 50

2. Rehabilitation of CI Upstream and Downstream Dependencies ………………………… 52

3. Rehabilitation of CI to Routine Efficiencies – Strongest Path ………………..…………. 53

4. Rehabilitation of CI to Routine Efficiencies – Longest Path ………………..…………... 55

5. Rehabilitation of CI to Routine Efficiencies – Longest Path (in context) …..…………… 57

6. The four urban domains of the vitae system of systems ..……………………….……….. 65

7. The Incident sequence showing resource burden against performance threshold .………. 70

8. Equilibrium Theory depicting the relationship between community and infrastructure … 72

9. Carrying Capacity ..………………………………………………………………………. 74

10. Incident Sequence profiles depicting different whole cost of risk profiles by refrigerant .. 81

11. Schematic of the data process flow to build the Common Operating Picture …………… 99

12. NIR1 spectrum image of the sewage treatment plant at the Wadi Gaza estuary ……….. 102

13. Schematic of the Common Operating Picture …..…………………………………….... 106

14. Illustration of how COP continues through the infrastructure rehabilitation program …. 137

15. A network map of the collected influences on post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction ………………………………………………………………………….... 143

16. Conceptual illustration of the Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework …..…..……….. 153

17. Application of the Common Operating Picture in the Rehabilitation Paradigm ……….. 157

List of Acronyms AI Artificial Intelligence CI Critical Infrastructure CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection COP Common Operating Picture ESDA Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis FAM Fighting Aged Males ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IC International Community IMF International Monetary Fund IO International Organisation LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging MDG [UN] Millennium Development Goals NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Non-Government Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development SAR Synthetic-Aperture Radar SDG [UN] Sustainable Development Goals UN United Nations WB World Bank WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WHO World Health Organisation

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Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1. Scope: the questions this work addresses It is certainly unfortunate that few post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction aid projects result in successful community rehabilitation. Infrastructure is a critical enabler of civilisation, allowing communities to trade, communicate and live in close proximity. The determinant of what is successful is the dominant perspective, whether it’s the donor or agency that identifies a need. Some donor countries will provide funding conditional on the contracts being awarded to their own nationals to satisfy a domestic political agenda. This in turn colours their identification of need. Others will promote projects that create a new market or strategic position, while still others may have a more values-based focus. In each case, the donor or their agent is responding to their perception of need. Each perceived need is the result of a situation being studied from a limited perspective, creating a cognitive bias that says how something should be within their own domestic constraints. Therefore, two different agencies could perceive entirely different needs from the same observation of a given situation. While the cognitive bias, informed by the dominant perspective, will selectively draw out supporting data from the situation to reinforce that perspective and so define what is needed, it remains based on what is seen and understood of the situation.

For example, in observing a deficiency in a wastewater system, the need will be defined by the perspective of how it should work. In doing this, the wider system of systems context is often ignored and the [unintended] systems-wide impacts of the work, both positive and negative, are experienced by the local community. In the absence of a common understanding of the existing situation, it is unlikely that different observers will have a sense of the wider impact that their projects will have. A limited perspective will define what success looks like and the measurable indicators of that success. All too often it is accompanied by the underlying assumption that the post-conflict communities want to be like the donor nation, that they aspire to the same life style and community structures. In practice, few are willing to surrender their culture for a foreign ideal that challenges much of the normal cadence of their lives. Thus, the first question this thesis seeks to address is this:

1. How can one determine a rehabilitation requirement that better reflects a beneficial outcome for the local community; and how should the rehabilitation paradigm reflect that? Chapter 1: Introduction

Infrastructure projects, defined by this perceived need, are almost invariably executed by engineers. Engineers are required, professionally, to consider all stakeholder requirements in the development of the project design brief, especially that of the end-user. However, without a common understanding of the current infrastructure laydown and condition, over-arching requirement, and the role and relationship of the infrastructure in the community, it is virtually impossible to balance the often-conflicting perspectives and develop a clear project plan. It is also difficult to inform the definition of need in context. This gives rise to the second key question:

2. How can one inform a common understanding of what exists, and so inform the development of implementable infrastructure reconstruction needs?

The aim of this thesis is to provide the infrastructure engineer with an evidence-based approach to understanding the existing situation, defining the planning constraints and developing an implementable post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation plan that exposes the systems’ impact on community rehabilitation. In effect, the overall goal is to better leverage international engagement to sustainably benefit local communities recovering from conflict.

In approaching this thesis, I must recognise my own cognitive bias. Over a thirty-year career in infrastructure planning and fortifications, I spent over ten years practising in conflict and post- conflict areas. To begin with, I would be informed of the need and told to devise an implementation plan. Through experience, I saw the immediate impacts and longer-term outcomes of this work. The outcomes were very mixed, while the output-measurement of the projects themselves almost always seemed to demonstrate that they had been considered successful. The disparity between a successful project and an undesirable outcome could only be explained by the use of incorrect metrics and an incomplete understanding of the situation. Thus, a 3rd question arises:

3. How can one measure community outcome of infrastructure projects during their reconstruction?

As a practising engineer I had not explicitly assumed that I knew better than the locals or that they wished to assume a Westminster parliamentary democracy or adopt Anglo-Saxon culture, but I had not challenged the interpretation of need from an observed deficiency. In effect, I was focused on solving the received problem without better understanding the socio-economic context in which the infrastructure was situated and that it enables. It occurred to me that my colleagues and I

2 Chapter 1: Introduction required a clearer conceptual understanding of the infrastructure systems and their role in the broader socio-economic “system of systems” if we were to better deliver desired outcomes. Nevertheless, I am an engineer by both education and formation. Where there are assumptions, they are made from an engineering perspective in which both client and end-user are served. It is therefore important to establish what the overarching requirement is that the engineer needs to inform, and therefore how to understand the infrastructure systems of systems in context. There is no transparent link between systems deficiency and rehabilitation need. Translating one into the other is as much about understanding the post-conflict vitae system of systems, as it is about stakeholder interest and perspective. The professional engineer has a clear and important role in informing the connection of systems deficiency with rehabilitation need, and the subsequent project brief. This leads to perhaps the biggest and crucial question that informs this work:

4. How should one deliver post-conflict rehabilitation?

These four questions define this thesis scope and what it seeks to deliver. Developing a conceptual model of the post-conflict infrastructure system of systems in its socio-economic context is a multi-disciplinary exercise and far beyond the scope of this or any single PhD. However, this is necessarily an engineering model with the emphasis on the infrastructure systems as components in a vitae system of systems. This conceptual model is developed into an implementation framework that can be adapted and applied to any post-conflict infrastructure situation for a rehabilitation program or project. There are related post-conflict issues from the dynamics of combatant rehabilitation and reconciliation to the development of credit rating criteria for projects prior to economic stability and financial normalcy. These are exposed through causal chain analysis of the inter-systems and contextual relationships. This thesis does not address international development, poverty reduction or the politics of humanitarian intervention and aid; it is an engineer’s conceptual model for post-conflict rehabilitation and its associated implementation framework.

My approach to this thesis is to first explore how the rehabilitation paradigm is deficient and define the core requirement for post-conflict rehabilitation. Recognising the inherent bias in establishing the essential aspects of this requirement, it is investigated from multiple stakeholder perspectives to establish what is essential. This leads into the question of measurement and specifically how it can be contextually relevant and outcome based, as free from bias as

3 Chapter 1: Introduction practicable. The post-conflict condition is dramatically different to that found in stable countries, yet the fundamentals of infrastructure will be common, influencing every aspect of life.

The infrastructure is formed and used by the same community whose behaviour it influences and the commodities it carries. The critical foundation of the thesis is therefore the unifying concept of infrastructure, as a basis for understanding what is (i.e. what exists and its condition) and its socio- economic role and influence in context. Understanding the post-conflict infrastructure systems arises from the unifying concept, as it is applied to what can be observed and recognised. Once there is understanding, actual deficiencies can be exposed and the direct and indirect consequences of options in addressing these deficiencies assessed. This requires an implementation framework.

At each definite stage in the thesis development, technical papers are published in peer-reviewed professional journals. The closely related set of papers, and their publishing status, are summarised in chapter sequence as follows:

1. Hay AH (2017a) Post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation requirements. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Infrastructure Asset Management (4)4:109-114. This paper analyses the existing rehabilitation paradigm and proposes an updated requirement that aligns with both international declarations and leading infrastructure engineering practice. These revised requirements and supporting concepts are discussed in Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation. This paper was written to frame the requirements to address Question 1 How can one determine a rehabilitation requirement that better reflects a beneficial outcome for the local community; and how should the rehabilitation paradigm reflect that? 2. Hay AH, Gómez-Palacio A & Martyn NQJ (2017b) Chapter 11: Planning Resilient Communities. Risk & Resilience: Methods and Application in Environment, Cyber and Social Domains. (Eds. Linkov I & Palma-Oliveira JM) NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – C: Environmental Security. Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. pp 313-326. This chapter was written in collaboration with Antonio Gómez-Palacio and Nick Martyn as an extension of the concepts being explored in Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation. The aim was to extrapolate the findings to what “right looks like” under normal conditions, which gave rise to a whole-of-community planning framework that aligns the stakeholder engagement with planning vision and strategy. I am the principal author, providing a comprehensive model that could be adapted to the

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consulting context defined by Antonio Gómez-Palacio and using spatial tools developed with Nick Martyn. 3. Hay AH & Kilburn RG (2018a) Measuring success in post-conflict infrastructure development. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Municipal Engineer Journal Online publication ahead of print https://doi.org/10.1680/jmuen.17.00040. Dated 23 July 2018. Arising out of the investigation into how one might measure outcome during the construction process, I collaborated with Rory Kilburn to develop the alignment of indicators of anticipated outcome as a confidence measure of the construction project being in alignment with the desired outcome. The advantage of this approach is that the metrics would be appropriate to the local context and derived from the same common reference used for all stakeholder understanding. I am the principal author, providing the concept and definition. Rory Kilburn built the models using existing commercial tools available to infrastructure planners and developers to demonstrate practicable proof of concept. This is described in detail in Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation, and directly addresses Question 3 How can one measure community outcome of infrastructure projects during their reconstruction? 4. Hay AH (2016) The incident sequence as resilience planning framework. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Infrastructure Asset Management (3)2:55-60. This paper proposes using the incident sequence, denoting the failure sequence of an operation, as the common reference for response and recovery planning and estimation of associated resources and costs. Arising from gaps identified when deconstructing heuristic practice in infrastructure planning practice, it describes the relationship between operational performance and recovery thresholds, and is presented as a resilience planning framework. These concepts are discussed in Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure. 5. Hay AH, Karney B & Martyn NQJ (2018b) Reconstruction of Infrastructure for Resilient Essential Services During and Following Protracted Conflict – a Conceptual Framework. International Review of the Red Cross. This paper has completed peer review and been accepted for publication in the special edition on Protracted Armed Conflicts, scheduled for publication 2019. This paper addresses directly Questions 1 through 4, albeit in brief and referencing the preceding papers. It draws out the importance of stand-off recognition in developing and supporting the Common Operating Picture, as common reference, and the potential to develop near real-time understanding. Once more, I am the principal author.

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Bryan Karney helped refine the paper, while Nick Martyn contributed current and emerging spatial data practice.

There were two further peer-reviewed papers that have been published in professional journals, based on work arising from this thesis. I collaborated with Jennie Phillips, a PhD candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs, to investigate the application of projection to virtual networks. Not directly related to this thesis, these investigations demonstrate an applicability of concept and application beyond its defined scope. My contribution was to provide the infrastructure concepts and models arising from this work in support of her concept of application in virtual systems. These papers are as follows:

6. Phillips J, Hay AH (2017) Building resilience in virtual and physical networked operations. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Journal of Infrastructure Asset Management 4(2):50-67. 7. Phillips J, Hay AH (2018) Building resilience in virtual digital response networks. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Journal of Infrastructure Asset Management. Online publication ahead of print https://doi.org/10.1680/jinam.17.00001. Dated 10 July 2018.

Capability defining stages, recognition and implementation framework, are validated by direct field trial in conjunction with the research partners. The partners represent both a client/user and commercial component capability suppliers, as well as other contributors and observers. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Water & Habitat Unit (WatHab) has provided field support and independent field validation in conflict/post-conflict areas. Southern Harbour Ltd. and Deep Logic Solutions Inc. have provided continuing support in established heuristic practice and provided access to current and emerging industry capabilities that define what is technically and reasonably achievable today. Independent observations, perspectives, experiences and commentary were provided by individuals from across academia, government and industry. The field trial area was the Gaza Strip, selected due to the artificially arrested rehabilitation and cyclic nature of the conflict since 1967.

1.2. Thesis Structure The structure of the thesis broadly follows the method and flow of the investigation. However, to provide a sense of what a post-conflict environment is like, I lead off in Chapter 2: Post-Conflict

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Living with a short thematic vignette. This provides a local perspective and reflects the lives of those most affected by conflict, its aftermath and international efforts at rehabilitation. It belongs to no particular conflict, but rather a blending of personal observations and experiences of the local plight in many conflicts. It also provides context for a brief discussion on the focus and definition of conflict used in this thesis, as well as current practice.

The first stage in developing this thesis was to define the problem. In Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation, I explore the purpose and origins of the rehabilitation paradigm and how its application today differs to when it was first devised. The intent in this is to identify what “right looks like,” to set the requirement for the rehabilitation paradigm in a present-day context. In doing so, I explore the different stakeholder perspectives in recognising what infrastructure restoration and reconstruction needs to be done and how to measure success, around the commonly recognised goal of alignment between international engagement and local needs. This exploration raises three issues, which define the subsequent investigation and concept development.

The second stage in developing this work was to establish a way of interpreting the purpose and contextual relationships for infrastructure systems. In effect, this would be infrastructure planning in reverse, determining the systems interconnectivity from what is physically identified. In Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Purpose of Infrastructure, I explore the fundamental concepts of infrastructure systems from first principles around function and context. In the process, I identify a unifying purpose, Health, which I subsequently apply and test in the Gaza Strip. Armed with this Rosetta Stone for interpreting infrastructure, I seek to establish what can be reliably deduced and inferred from our observation of the infrastructure laydown in its current context.

The third stage is to investigate what can be known about a post-conflict area, leading to what the unifying concept of infrastructure enables us to understand about it. In Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture (COP), I explore what can be known about a post- conflict area using only existing means of remote sensing. I investigate how reliable the resultant understanding is, by applying the unifying concept, and exploring what this means practically. The ultimate purpose of understanding is to provide a shared or common reference, or as common as possible, for all stakeholders that is informed by evidence. This broadens the perspective introduced by [subjective] expert opinions and should inform a more aligned approach.

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The fourth stage is to act on this understanding. In Chapter 6: A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning, I explore how this enhanced evidential understanding can be practicably used in several ways:

a. to inform integrated multi-disciplinary humanitarian intervention strategy development, b. to inform infrastructure development priorities, c. to enhance alignment of donor interest with local needs, and d. to plan the whole-of-project implementation of infrastructure reconstruction for rehabilitation.

How different agencies act on this understanding will be defined by their role at different times in the rehabilitation process, post-conflict. Post-conflict engagement is not neatly compartmentalised, as the technical skills of different groups are called upon earlier or later in the process. During the relief, humanitarian agencies will predominate, but as the period of relative calm endures more technical skills from the development agencies are included in the planning of reconstruction works. Reconstruction will typically be conducted by development agencies, albeit using donor funds and not under normal development conditions or practices. Suffice to say that each post- conflict situation will be different and involve a different blend of humanitarian relief and development organisations. The Framework must be adaptable to this variable application and local situation.

I conclude by drawing together the various research themes to provide a summary perspective of the thesis and its value. I offer observations of issues arising and outline areas for further research.

1.3. The Use of Data My use of data has been dictated as much by its availability as by the intent for this work. My desired outcome is that the proposal be adoptable by practitioners, offering tangible benefit and above all be practicable. In examining existing practice, I have sought to expose failings and inconsistencies and to refine practice in an achievable bound rather than wholesale change. I seek to nudge the direction and conduct of current practice to be better. Therefore, a purely theoretical construct that is then field tested or a field study that is then theorised will not yield the desired outcome. My approach is consequently something of a blend, where the use of data is a tangible demonstration that practice can be better informed, close to real-time. Of course, this recognises

8 Chapter 1: Introduction that in seeking to change practice incrementally by nudging it, some findings will be seen to work in practice if not in theory.

By its nature, infrastructure engineering is an holistic system of systems practice within a societal context. To me, it is the epitome of Engineering in Society rather than a pure specialisation, as they are currently defined. It is an interstitial [civil engineering] pursuit that resides between engineering specialisations and political science, social sciences, anthropology, architecture, international humanitarian law, international development, and public health, and yet is none of these while necessarily drawing on them all. To quote Prof. Bill Vanderburg “… if we are to understand our lives and our world, we have no choice but to interpolate and extrapolate the findings of a great many disciplines and to connect these to our experiences in order to create a narrative.”1

Consequently, my use of data in this research has been to provide an anchor in current practice and inform the nature and direction of amendments to practice rather than spur a line of investigation leading to a new paradigm. For example, during the initial desk top study of the field study area (the Gaza Strip), we observed high coastal water total dissolved solids spectral signatures that were similar to the adjacent sewage lagoons. This raised the possibility of high coastal sewage contamination and associated contamination of the local [fish] protein chain. It does not represent conclusive proof but informs a line of investigation. While in this case there was indeed high contamination of the coastal water by untreated sewage, the investigation that this observation spurred highlighted the nature of the sewage system planning, development and function within a public health context. Observing the extent of sewage contamination, we can expect to find increased levels of stunting and other non-communicable diseases associated with infrastructure function and condition. This in turn exposed the data used to inform the [waste water] infrastructure project definition and planning, or lack thereof. It also means that the method of analysing the data collected is defined by its availability. Earth Observation data, which I am using as my baseline, provided at certain resolution and in limited spectral bands, limits what can be inferred while other data collected under privilege cannot always be used or attributed.

As stated, I seek an holistic work and framework proposal to nudge the supertanker that is international post-conflict rehabilitation practice. This extends to the many discussions held with

1 Professor Emeritus Willem (Bill) Vanderburg of the University of Toronto. Quote is taken from the Preface to his book “Living in the Labyrinth of Technology,” page xiv (Vanderburg 2005).

9 Chapter 1: Introduction aid workers, international organisation officers, civil servants, professionals and politicians, all of whom are in leadership positions within their respective disciplines and departments. The outputs of these discussions provided thematic context and opened further lines of investigation rather than forming the basis or justification of the core proposal presented in this work.

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Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living War is a deeply human experience. Dehumanising and humanising at once. While the international focus is at the regional and national level, it is felt at the local level. The most vulnerable are local and depend upon their family/clan/community group to survive. If any form of rehabilitation is to be effective, it must “make sense” at the local level. The health of individuals and communities is local. It can be easy to overlook the local level, as one scrambles to address the crisis that appears unfolding post-hostilities. In fact, the crisis was happening during the fighting. It was just sanitised and ordered by battle lines. When the fighting ends, these restrained crises and dramas are let loose, while all coordinated action and self-control ceases.

2.1. ‘Ek’s Story “I draw back the curtain and look outside. The dark outside reflects the dark inside. Ice has formed on the inside of the glass overnight, giving a distorted view of the world beyond my house. My son is still asleep. That’s good. He needs his sleep. Just when I thought I was alone, he came back from the war. He is a shadow of his former self, his body broken and malnourished, but he is home. I wept all that day for relief that he was alive. Even as I remember that day, I fight back the tears. My neighbours and our whole community carry such extremes of emotion that we scarcely dare share our feelings for fear that we will lose control. When the Red Cross brought my daughter back to us, I couldn’t even speak. No tears, no sound, only a long hug. She barely knew me and has hardly spoken a word. I still remember when the militia took her. She screamed for help, but I was paralysed with fear, seeing my neighbours being beaten with rifle butts for trying to protect their daughters. Better to live with Boz’s broken jaw than the shame I feel today at not protecting my own flesh and blood. Today, I must care for my children, as if they are in kindergarten again. My priorities are fuel and water. It won’t restore my son’s foot or my daughter’s senses, but it will keep them alive and buy perhaps enough time and a chance to heal their wounds and, I pray, my shame.

“We forage for wood and draw well water from the old farm up the street before going to work. We used to be so fearful of the mines and booby traps that had been set around the village outskirts. Today, not so much. It is a consequence of living here. It is our punishment for taking our lives for granted. We could have voted against these thugs when they were spouting their hatred and we were still able to vote, but we were too busy or were attracted by one or more prejudice that resonated with our own. Then it was too late, and words of hatred turned to violence Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living and the militias formed. The international community turned a blind eye until the first atrocities were reported and some international celebrity tweeted their horror. It was too late. My son was conscripted into the government forces and when they were losing, a militia came in and took my daughter. It makes little sense to me how it all unfolded, but right now I find myself in a frosted minefield picking up broken tree branches. Boz and I always meet at the mine marker at the end of our street to gather wood together. We say that it’s so that one of us can rescue the other if a mine goes off. In truth, misery loves company. We console each other by saying that if the mines are going to go off, they would have already. In practice, we are foraging ever deeper into the woods and so into more mined areas. God is caring for us now.

“I have set a small fire for my son in the bedroom. I carry in my daughter and lay her by my side. They are still asleep, and I cover them again with the blankets. I put a pail of water in the kitchen and one in the bedroom so that it can warm up a little. I empty the chamber pots on what was a compost heap and is now a soil heap. I don’t even notice the smell anymore. Our world is defined by the smells of diesel and wood smoke intermingled with cordite and rotting bodies when the wind blows across the mined corn fields. I wash once a week now, but don’t notice my own smell. I was once so fastidious, taking so much of my life for granted that I failed to understand what it would really mean when we first lost electricity supply, then sewerage, then diesel and finally town water. Boz tells me that we have passed through the inferno and now stand on the threshold of the 9th circle of Hell, staring at eternal cold. I fear that I will be buried in ice. When we commuted each morning to work by train together, he would carry a copy of Dante’s Inferno. He taught literature and had always said that one day we’d live the story ourselves. I ignored his ramblings. I fear today that his was an understatement.

“I see the Red Cross lady talking to our foreman. She is always looking for people and has probably reunited someone in most of the families in our community. My neighbours always praise her and profess that they would do anything to help her. I wish I could be sure that if I’m tested again, I can do the same. We are sifting through ruins of houses to recover bricks and timbers, appliances and fixtures. These were the houses of friends. Friends driven out by the various militia groups that passed through with some anti-ethnic agenda. More often than not it came down to old family feuds being settled with a gun. I used to rail at the waste and hatred. Now, I resent being alive and intact, if 10 kg thinner. I probably needed to lose that weight, but I’d

12 Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living rather not have gathered my on-going ailments. Since the food aid began, we are not starving and yet we aren’t healthy either.

“Our employer is a foreign development agency. They see the world in such simple terms. Our world isn’t simple. The building materials that we recover will be used to rebuild homes in our community and we are told that when the wastewater treatment plant is rebuilt, we will again have sewerage. The electricity supply comes from across the mountains, from the communities who sent the militia to take our daughters and mine our crops. Who believes that they will help us with electricity? We can’t run that plant, influence or pay those who do. We don’t have the engineers or the economy. Anyone with money, who could see the writing on the wall, left and won’t come back. We could have, but my wife always said that it is our responsibility to stay with the community, to stand with neighbours. By the time the first artillery strikes hit the clinic and killed the local nursing staff, including her, it was too late. The battle lines had been drawn and there was no way out. Soon after, my daughter was taken.

“Boz says that I should work for the development agency or one of these relief organisations, because I’m educated and can speak English. He’s a fool and only speaks like that because he has no technical bone in his body. They only tell us what is wrong. Even their local staff tell us what is missing and how to rectify it; they always know better. No-one ever asks or listens to what the local population says, only the reflected wisdom of those who will financially benefit from the proposed grand scheme. We don’t need grand schemes, we need local essential services. We need to be able to care for our families and neighbours.

“Maybe once upon a time I thought I cared about the next village or town or the country as a whole. My focus has changed, and my life has changed. I used to be a professor of civil engineering at the state university. I had a good life and what seemed important then is irrelevant now. My life inverted. I would teach and research in my discipline and while I had heard of critical infrastructure, I certainly didn’t understand it. My appreciation of value and what is needed was changed fundamentally when I lost it. I had barely recognised just how much functional sewerage affects my life and the health of the community. I would have said electricity is most crucial, as everything else functions because of it. Perhaps that is true, but without sewerage the incidents of disease increase and the vulnerable get sick and often die. Without sewerage, we have become completely dependent on these international donors with their agendas and grandiose schemes. I can cope without electricity. As long as I have access to potable water, I can make do. However,

13 Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living we live too closely together to cope for long without sewerage. Our sewerage solution must be local and immediate. The ground is still frozen and so none of us have dug latrines and have these festering soil heaps instead. I have no idea how those in the apartments and tenements cope. No- one listens to us, and why should they? Look at the mess that we’ve made of our lives.

“Boz is unusually happy today. He has found a kettle that can be used on a stove top and possibly over an open fire. I suggest that we pool our rations today and eat at my place. He’s alone; his daughter never returned and we think she’s dead. He lives on soups, because his jaw never healed properly. In fact, we eat together every day, but he likes to be invited each time. It feels like there are other choices. He agrees and grins. He has a strange relationship with my daughter. She lets him feed her and they live on the same diet. My children will be getting up now and begin boiling water for our family meal. It is almost noon and I feel the sun warming my back. My muscles ache and I don’t have the energy to continue much longer. Our shift ends at noon, when we collect our rations and go home. I volunteered for this work because they give us extra rations due to the manual labour. It means that I have more to give my son. He was studying to be an engineer and perhaps he can finish his studies one day. We live in hope.”

2.2. War is Local Ek’s story is a composite of many stories that I have encountered over the past 30 years in conflict and post-conflict areas, and, indeed, could be generally applied to virtually any of those conflicts from the Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, each conflict and area will be different with different social, mental and physical health impacts upon the population. It is impossible to truly capture and explain what the feel of war is like to an audience unfamiliar with war in any of its forms. As Long as Sarajevo Exists (Kurspahić 1997) is compelling and comes closest, in my experience, to giving a sense of what it is like locally. Even then, the author, a local journalist, writes from a local perspective that has adjusted to his current realities and bypasses senses that would overwhelm the uninitiated. The solution to any rehabilitation scheme must be founded in local benefit and ownership, if it is to be sustainable. That means that planners and designers, programme directors and financiers, diplomats and political advisors need to recognise the locality of each conflict and invest in understanding local dynamics and needs before pronouncing on schemes and solutions.

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2.3. Definitions of Conflict As primarily an infrastructure engineering thesis, the operational meanings of words are used. To clarify, a glossary of terms is included at Annex A. However, it should be noted that Conflict also has a legal definition, which is distinct from the operational definition. The legal definition of [Armed] Conflict is developed through case law and centres on the application of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. Drawing on the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s definition of [Armed] Conflict, the ICRC operates with the following definitions that also reflect “strong prevailing legal opinion.” (ICRC 2008)

“International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States; and

“Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation.”

It therefore follows that, legally, post-conflict is the period following the legal cessation of the conflict. Conversely, in an operational sense, conflict is the engagement of hostilities and the real harm that it causes to communities and infrastructure systems. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, post-conflict refers precisely to the period following a cessation of hostilities and violence in the area of interest, whether for tactical reasons, temporary or prolonged. It is entirely independent of whether there has been a legal cessation of the conflict, in whatever form that might take. In 2008, there were some 36 countries that enjoyed a continued cessation of active intra-state hostilities since the end of the Cold War.2

In the case of the Gaza Strip, which is used as the primary field of study in support of this thesis, there legally remains a state of conflict and it is typically referred to as a state of protracted armed conflict. Direct hostilities and harm to the infrastructure have occurred in brief sharp actions since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six Day War, in which the Gaza Strip was occupied, and later partitioned by the Israeli State in 1996. The Second, or al-Aqsa, Intifada spanned 2000 to

2 Table 1.2 List of post-conflict countries. Ohiorhenuen JFE & Stewart F (2008) Crisis Prevention & Recovery Report 2008. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). New York, US.

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2007. When Hamas,3 considered a terrorist organisation by many countries, took power in the Gaza Strip in 2006, the hostilities intensified and culminated in the 2007 Battle for Gaza, which saw the compromise of several critical infrastructure systems. Israel had disengaged completely from the Gaza Strip in 2005, establishing a containment barrier around the province and controlling the import of all materiel based on the Wassenaar Arrangement,4 finally sealing the border completely in 2008.

Internally, the conflict between Hamas and Fatah5 continued6. Initially through armed conflict and later through control of resources and revenues. Israel attacked Gaza in 2008/2009, known as the 2008 Gaza War, to stop the continued Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli towns from inside the Gaza Strip. This similarly caused damage to critical infrastructure. There were border skirmishes in 2010, 2011 and 2012, culminating in a direct attack by Israel in late 2012. The 2014 Gaza War probably caused the most significant damage to critical infrastructure. Between each period of direct hostilities, there have been periods of relative calm in which some reconstruction has been possible. This reconstruction has been based on a build-back ante bellum policy, rather than acknowledging that the socio-economic dynamics and demand density distributions across the province have altered. There is also no convincing evidence of what condition the infrastructure was in ante bellum. The Gaza Strip remains in a protracted armed-conflict, though there have been significant periods of reconstruction between the fighting.

3 Founded in 1987 by Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organisation, comprising political/social (Dawah) and military (Izz ad-Din al Qassam) structures. It won the popular Palestinian vote in 2006 and has had administrative control over the Gaza Strip ever since. Led by Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas does not recognise the existence of the State of Israel and seeks the right of return of all Palestinians to their former homes prior to 1967 and other conflicts since. 4 Established in 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangement concerns Export Controls on Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. It is not legally binding and open to interpretation on what is covered and what is not. 5 Founded in 1959 by Yasser Arafat, Fatah is the dominant part of the confederated Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It is a secular and moderately socialist party, led by Mahmoud Abbas. It has been the de facto lead of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) since the PNA was established in 1994, pursuant to the Oslo Accords of 1993. 6 Frustrated by allegations of corruption in Fatah, the popular Palestinian vote elected Hamas in 2006 to lead the PNA. This precipitated the Palestinian Civil War that saw the PNA split in 2007 between the Gaza Strip (Hamas) and the West Bank (Fatah). As Hamas is classified as a terrorist organisation by some of the primary donors (particularly the US, which until 2019 was the primary donor to UNWRA) international dealings with the PNA are typically handled by Fatah, including contracts for the provision of potable water and electricity from Israel. This gives Fatah resource- control over the Gaza Strip additional to the [Wassenaar Arrangement] import restrictions controlled by Israel. A reconciliation process was initiated in 2015 and while it has made some progress with greater Fatah engagement in the Gaza Strip, including the return in 2017 of PNA policemen alongside the Hamas militia, it had not concluded at the time of writing.

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The reason that the distinction is made, and the operational meaning used in the thesis, is that irrespective of whether there is legally a conflict, there can be local violence or hostilities that cause damage to critical infrastructure and affect the local community’s health and wellbeing. Similarly, even during a protracted conflict, there can be periods of reconstruction and recovery. I reiterate that the operational meaning of conflict and post-conflict are used in this thesis.

2.4. Current Practice There are many stakeholders engaged in post-conflict rehabilitation, from relief through reconstruction to development. Each have their own motivations, influences and perspectives. It is difficult to capture fully the characteristics of each, as they adjust and adapt to each conflict area. I have identified five generic categories, recognising that this is by no means exhaustive. However, from an engineer’s perspective these categories are typically representative of the broad groups engaged in post-conflict reconstruction.

a. Local Population. Arguably, the most important is the local population, who are often not as involved as they would wish or need to be. In many ways, they are tuned to represent a continued crisis in order to attract and justify continued aid. While they have the primary deep understanding of local needs, they typically lack a systems-level perspective simply because those previously working at that level will generally have left for new opportunities elsewhere. Under-represented in the reconstruction planning process, they are also often under-represented in the reconstruction workforce depending on the donor nation contracting conditions. Consequently, the brightest and best with fluency in English will end up working as local employed staff for one of the humanitarian agencies, rather than contributing directly to societal reintegration. b. Local Authorities. The local authorities can either function through internationally recognisable institutions or as local warlords. Either way, they are always present and the post-conflict area is rarely ungoverned (Clunan & Trinkunas 2010), even if it is not a Westphalian7 form of government that the IC would wish to see. They typically control the release and coordination of aid funds and prioritisation of resources. In some extreme examples, these are all funnelled off to support various factions as bribes to keep the current government in power. In other situations, they are well-intention but

7 The Peace of Westphalia (1648) concluded the Thirty Years War and established the legal principle of state sovereignty. In establishing legal equality between states and applied principles of non-intervention in internal state matters, it makes recognition of non-state authorities challenging despite their prevalence in modern conflict areas.

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bureaucratically inept and become paralysed by the administrative burden. In Gaza, for example, the local authority, Hamas, was considered a terrorist organisation by several countries and does not enjoy consistent normal international professional and financial relations.8 Consequently, they instituted an extractive system of government that enabled their survival at the expense of the common good. The sale of water licenses to bottled water providers was expensive, but no controls on water quality. The result was noticeable e-coli contamination of bottled water without any local authority response. c. Humanitarian Agencies. The humanitarian agencies of one form or another can be NGOs, national groups or International Organisations (IO). They will have the foreign field officers, including the infrastructure engineers and planners. They are the agents of understanding, producing assessments of the current situation and identifying and prioritising needs and deficiencies. Representing the International Community (IC) and donors to the local population and the local situation to the IC, they are often controlled by the messaging that the audience finds acceptable. For example, the received wisdom among the engaged IC is that one should build back as before, despite not knowing what the infrastructure laydown and condition was prior to the conflict or whether it would be appropriate now. This perspective is fuelled by a superficial impression of the existing situation, defined by assets. To secure donor funding in the absence of evidence to support an appropriate course of action, the foreign officers9 represent the local situation to justify a specific asset-based project.10 In the absence of an evidential understanding, the infrastructure engineer will plug the gap with professional opinion, bias or may simply tell the donor what they want to hear to secure the funds. A distinct and separate humanitarian agency is the International Committee of the Red Cross with a clear mandate to protect and

8 Hamas is classified as a terrorist organisation by the US, EU, Israel, Japan, Canada, Jordan and Egypt (though in the case of Egypt this has been challenged in the courts). Other countries (including UK, Australia and New Zealand), make a distinction between the political and military wings of Hamas, considering the military wing only as a terrorist organisation. Given that the countries considering Hamas a terrorist organisation are among the primary international donors through the UN and in national aid, this has resulted in constraints on the release of aid funding through the local authorities in Gaza. Further, since the international trading currency remains the US$, banks risk forfeiting their licence to operate in and with the US if they hold or manage funds for Hamas. This does not prevent Hamas functioning as a local authority, but severely impedes its financial security. 9 Also known as “expats” or ”delegates” in the different humanitarian agencies. Foreign officer is used here as a generic designation for non-locally employed agency staff. 10 The build-back-as-before idea is also reflected in local authorities, though it is unclear if this is a reflection of the IC or whether it is a local aspiration. It was not possible to unravel why local authorities appear to share this view.

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assist victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence.11 This means that they typically remain in a conflict area, even when other humanitarian agencies have withdrawn. d. International Community.12 The IC will be represented by the various engaged national governments and the IOs, usually aligned loosely behind a UN declared intent or mandate of some form. National self-interest drives the perspectives of many national donors, the most extreme being China and US who require their funds be spent on their own companies. Others are present for strategic interests or simply to be seen to be among those contributing for diplomatic capital elsewhere. A significant part of the IC includes development agencies, development banks and other international financing agencies, as well as diplomatic channels. They will have representatives in the field looking for situations that comply with their interest criteria. The IOs in this group will often avoid challenging any donor views and contort their messaging to a compromise that many individuals acknowledge is incorrect, but justified to meet the immediate aid relief requirements. For example, WHO has remained fixed on emergency medicine and care of refugees to align with the political imperative to see Gaza as a refugee camp under siege, avoiding epidemiological studies into increasing non-communicable diseases that are largely associated with expedient interventions. The WHO officers may see it, but can’t act. The World Bank officers are generally blind to ground truth and are compelled to operate with local authorities and draw on the foreign officers’ reports from the field. Therefore, while the World Bank has exceptional analytical capacities and its investigations are exemplary, the direct reconstruction requirements definition is only marginally more aligned to local need than the received wisdom. The International Community comprises the full spectrum of relief aid through to development organisations and national interests. Following World War II, there was little if any distinction between these actors, though over time relief, reconstruction and development became sequential. Today, there is again a significant degree of overlap as the technical expertise of the development organisations is increasingly needed earlier in the rehabilitation period, mainly in reconstruction and some in relief. The sequential nature of

11 https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm. (accessed 5 Feb 2019) 12 It would be wrong to think of the IC as pursuing a coherent and contiguous policy in conflict and post-conflict areas, or indeed enjoying a consensus of opinion. The IC views of post-conflict areas reflected in this work are predominantly those of the G7 countries and some others, who are typically the core donor countries. Reference to the IC is a nuanced generalisation that I have used in this work and should not be seen as an international consensus view.

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engagement is blurring within the IC group, and a broad spectrum of specialist technical skills is being increasingly drawn upon by the Humanitarian Agencies. e. Observers. The final group are the Observers. In some cases, the UN and/or other IO will appoint observers of a ceasefire, but they are not always effective and not permitted any comment unless expressing a direct violation of a treaty or other agreement. Their role and success depend on the conflict parties agreeing to and respecting the observer mission.

In the reconstruction sphere, the distortions created by this complex opinion-based planning around crises is recognised. The OECD orchestrated an international agreement to align reconstruction and development aid with local needs, which is almost universally agreed by all countries (Paris Declaration 2005 and Accra Plan of Action 2008). The core interpretation remains asset based and separate from the systems in which these assets function. This can and does result in improved assets that are locally unsustainable and results in unintended health consequences. The dynamics of this impact are explored in this work. Some countries and organisations have taken a systems-view, most notably the Scandinavian countries and the Republic of Ireland,13 and are delivering projects with genuine successes. However, given this broad variance in application, there is also a broad difference in the role and practice of the infrastructure engineers that they employ. The former will look specifically at the development of a specific asset as an engineering design project, while the others will be collaborating with their economic development, health, [humanitarian] protection and governance counterparts in other agencies to develop a coordinated systems-oriented infrastructure reconstruction project.14 Both operate in the field with varying success. In fact, it is such a small community that one can see the conduct of the same professional change when they move from one employer to another. The one challenge common to all infrastructure engineers and each group engaged in the region is the need for an evidential common reference. Common reference is widely agreed to be the enabler of alignment but does

13 I refer to Irish Aid (Republic of Ireland), NORAD (Norway), SIDA (Sweden) and DANIDA (Denmark) specifically. They are not large donors, which may be why they maximise their effectiveness through a systems approach. They have pooled resources and have partnered with IOs, such as the World Bank, to deliver critical projects, but by force of scale are more often seen providing in-fiscal-year emergency relief. 14 Inter-agency cooperation of this kind is challenging under any circumstances, more so when a national interest arises. However, it is notable how successful this cooperation can be when founded on a common reference. The ICRC has these groups represented within its field delegations, providing a capacity for coherence in outreach and coordination that is effective, even if it may still be slow and at times frustrating to implement on the ground. The advantage of representing these disciplines within a single agency is that there can be a shared vision and understanding between them, which is reflected in the subsequent coordinated outreach.

20 Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living not yet exist in a repeatable format. I think that the proposed COP and framework can deliver that requirement.

2.5. Literature Review There is a wealth of published work on related subjects, but little specific to this one. I was necessarily selective in drawing on this related literature, because the conditions defining the application that they investigate and discuss are not directly comparable to post-conflict. Post- disaster (aka post cladis) reconstruction is not the same as post-conflict reconstruction, not least due to the nature of loss, societal injury and the residual threat of a return to violence. However, key markers in that extensive body of post-disaster literature are indeed directly relevant, such as the role of social capital and decision-making under stress in community response and recovery. In his Preface to the “Labyrinth of Technology,” page xv, Prof. Bill Vanderburg explains my approach rather better than I (Vanderburg 2000). “Reflective research requires a different approach to referencing. Many subjects covered in this work are treated differently than they would be from the vantage points of particular disciplines. Wherever possible, I rely on landmark works dealing with particular subjects that provide excellent entry points into the literature.” I have drawn on principal texts in a subject or topic and built my investigation from there, rather than conducting an exhaustive exploration of each related subject area. This approach is reflected in how far I have pursued any component part, electing instead to identify it for further research and focus instead on its role in the overall concept.

As my investigation is as much a response to my own experiences in post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation, I sought a text that could provide a strategic view of events that I had directly experienced the consequences of on the ground. The aim was to help calibrate my own experiences and expose any bias I held arising from those experiences. I read Bob Woodward’s “State of Denial” about US President Bush’s administration following the 2003 Iraq War (Woodward 2006). It exposes the considerations and decision-making process, what was considered and more critically what the expected outcomes would be. Key among these were the consequences of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Executive Orders 1 and 2, de-Ba’athification and disbanding the military and security establishment. The domestic agenda and personal beliefs played a far greater role than I had expected, opening two avenues of study: crisis decision-making and strategic interest in state-building and reconstruction.

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I found stark parallels between crisis and war decision-making, particularly arising from the required scale of comprehension and time imperative (Boin et al. 2006), compared to a more deliberate view (Snowdon & Boone 2007). This in turn informs the implementation of state- building post-conflict (Lake 2016), irrespective of how well reasoned a founding strategy might be. These challenges are not new, which brought me back to the concept of the rehabilitation paradigm and exploring how practice has changed as staff experiences have changed with the extended period of world peace, if not locally (World Bank 1998, Pugh 1998). National self- interest heavily influences IC engagement and the corresponding successful rehabilitation of the post-conflict country (Girod 2015). The apparent disparity between the reconstruction and development assistance given by the IC is not aligned with what is needed, which clarified for me why our projects were successful, but the local benefit remained muted. The OECD had galvanised international recognition of this misalignment and the resolution to ensure better alignment in Paris (OECD 2005, OECD-DAC 2005) and followed with a Plan of Action (OECD 2008), but little changed in practice (Knack et al 2010, Kharas 2011, Killen 2011, Anderson 2015). Common themes arising were self-interest, perception bias and an enduring focus on crisis to stimulate funding. However, it also illustrates the holistic nature of the challenge of rehabilitation, that it is more than the assets, infrastructure or the institutions, it is about the community and its individual households. The whole is inseparable, but rarely treated as such. Each aspect of the post-conflict situation can be explored in a peacetime or disaster context, which is then verified and reassembled in the post-conflict context. Through this process, I’m following an association of concepts from across multiple disciplines to build a patchwork understanding of the post-conflict context.

I needed to understand the role of social capital, most clearly studied in natural disasters and their aftermath. The post-disaster literature is extensive, so I began with an academic study of social capital (Aldrich 2012) in disasters, which led to a study into the dynamics that define the components of social capital. My previous work on the characteristics common to communities that had proved to be resilient resonated (Hay 2013), focusing my reading into what stimulates these characteristics, from community focus and identity (Anholt 2011, Jacobs 1961 & 2000) to the nature of what is a healthy community (WHO 1948) and how to enable it (Aicher 1998), and the role and characteristics of the infrastructure context (WHO 2006, Boin & McConnell 2007) and governance that frame it. When applying this back to the post-conflict situation, I sought to understand how community structure differs from the norm and the effect upon households, as these are the end beneficiaries of rehabilitation. John McKnight’s work on how communities are

22 Chapter 2: Post-Conflict Living professionalising traditional functions and losing their cohesion as a result (McKnight 1995, McKnight & Block 2010) reflected similar outcomes to the behaviours observed in post-conflict communities. It highlighted the issue of post-conflict loss of community capacity [or function] and poverty, which includes causes (Brück & Schindler 2012) characteristics (Orwell 1937) and challenges in addressing, once established (Easterly 2006, Sachs 2005 & 2015, Munk 2013, Banerjee & Duflo 2011). This exposes the idea that the likelihood and severity of post-conflict poverty is determined by the pre-existing local institutions (Diamond 2005, Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). There are supplementary effects of the combination of conflict trauma (Perry 1997, Sokolowski et al 2013) and subsequent poverty that prevent effective and inclusive rehabilitation unless addressed (ICRC 2015).

Stand-off recognition using Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis of satellite imagery informs our initial understanding of the area (Good 1983, Goodchild 1987, Murray et al 2001, Bivand 2010) against what it means geographically (Barras et al 2006, US DoD 2014) and to human beings (Mohanty et al 2016) for any planned post-conflict intervention at both operational and strategic levels (OECD 2012). Many lines of investigation returned to the need for better understanding, for both project planning and measuring its effectiveness (Mosel 1986). This issue of understanding brings the investigation back to both bias and how we communicate. This is a diplomatic challenge at the best of times (Huntington 1996, Allison 2017), much less when there is internal and external pressure to be seen to do something. In the field, this can be acutely felt, forcing an assumption of requirement based on a cognitive bias despite long-established recognition of the need for informed local engagement (Arnstein 1969, Chambers 1997). Underlying this review process is the exploration of what infrastructure is and how it must be delivered to support these multiple technical, social and economic demands in the post-conflict environment. Above all else is the need for the infrastructure to absorb and adapt to stresses and brief returns to violence, while remaining within the capacity of the local community to operate, maintain and repair. This demands a sustainable and resilient infrastructure approach. Building on what it is and how it functions (Ainger & Fenner 2014), its frailties (MacAulay 2009) and the role it plays (EU 2016) in rehabilitation, we can understand better what is required of the engineers who plan and deliver it, and how that is then communicated to all stakeholders with its associated risks (Morgan et al 2001, Fischhoff 2011).

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While this exploration of the literature defines the core thrust of my reading, I also explored around each aspect to better understand the principles and concepts at play. Here, again, I based my reading around the established authors and texts in these areas, such as Charles Handy on organisational behaviour (Handy 1993), Abraham Maslow on human motivation (Maslow 1943 & 1954), Daniel Kahneman on how we think about problems (Kahneman 2013), MacDonald Steels on engineer competency development (Steels 2001), and the international situation reports from the ICRC, OECD, UNDP and World Bank. This has in turn led to broader reading in topics that relate this core understanding with the post-conflict context. It has been a fascinating journey.

2.6. Comment In this chapter, I have set out the framework for my investigation, defining the operational period in which this investigation is focused, as well as providing a thematic and characterised stakeholder context for post-conflict areas. I move next to define the requirement for post-conflict rehabilitation; what does right look like and how do I know that I’m achieving it?

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Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation This chapter explores the requirement for infrastructure rehabilitation post-conflict, the origins of the rehabilitation paradigm that is used today, and the value that infrastructure represents in the rehabilitation process. Through this exploration, I discuss why the rehabilitation paradigm appears so unsuccessful now when it was so successful when first devised. I explore the perspectives of the primary stakeholders in delivering the rehabilitation paradigm to establish the need for a common understanding founded on evidence of what infrastructure systems exist and their condition relative to current local socio-economic dynamics. I then explore how the requirement for infrastructure rehabilitation can be satisfied, proposing an approach to measurement that indicates anticipated outcome rather than production. My goal is to identify what issues need to be addressed to make the rehabilitation paradigm effective again. These issues are used to define the core achievements of this thesis.

3.1. Infrastructure Rehabilitation Requirement The imperative to rehabilitate post-conflict infrastructure is based on the role of infrastructure in enabling healthy communities and their economic development. However, the over-riding imperative is to rehabilitate the communities, to alleviate suffering, promote health and facilitate a return to financial normalcy. Infrastructure has a secondary role in those also, since the very process of implementing infrastructure projects draws in a workforce and encourages the development of skills, restoring supply chains and working for a communal benefit. However, it also presents the question of whose financial normalcy and how we define socio-economic stability.

In the first of these, financial normalcy in World Bank terms is the ability to secure loans on the open markets with a reasonable expectation of reliable repayments. While this implies economic stability, it really only requires stability in that particular project’s financing. The second part of this question can be addressed more through the planning of the project than by making it a development or recovery issue. Intelligent Resourcing has been around for centuries. Vitruvius wrote 2,000 years ago about it as a sensible approach to building (Vitruvius 2001). When the plans and designs are developed to local requirements, using local skills, materials and supply chains, the local economy will restore and/or develop the necessary systems to support the task, have ownership of the result and ensure that the infrastructure is operable and repairable over its life Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation using local capacity. The question of what socio-economic stability might therefore look like becomes irrelevant because it is locally achieved within local cultural and societal constraints.

The myriad socio-economic complexities arising from war are rarely reflected in the International Community (IC)’s desire to simplify the conflict and the situation in the region. There are many reasons to simplify the situation, not least to afford some sense of understanding among the donors’ domestic audiences and as a basis for diplomatic collaboration. All too often, this simplified understanding does not recognise the profound changes that have occurred in the local population, spatially and socially. Forcing an agenda of infrastructure restoration to the situation ante bellum can reinforce injustices during the conflict arising from forced displacement of the civilian population, such as through ethnic cleansing. The net beneficiaries of such infrastructure restoration are typically the local aggressors. Similarly, forcible return of displaced communities can create new tensions and increases the risk of a return to violence.

The infrastructure enables and defines the local population. It enables communication, shelter, close habitation, sanitation and healthy communities. In so doing, it attracts other people, businesses and interests to the area, which grow and develop the community and economy. The lack of infrastructure or a failure of the infrastructure systems can encourage people to leave. Recognising that the simplification of post-conflict situations is counterproductive (World Bank 1998), the IC has variously tried to change their approach (Paris Declaration 2005), seeking greater alignment with local needs. These culminated in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) brokered Accra Action Plan 2008 setting out commonly recognised principles. Nonetheless, studies conducted in 2010, 2012, 201515 consistently show little change in the approach. It is worth considering why.

The rehabilitation paradigm was developed post-World War Two for the rehabilitation of Germany and Japan. Known commonly as the Marshall Plan,16 it sequenced a system of aid and reconstruction to development and financial normalcy. The rehabilitation paradigm was well integrated with infrastructure reconstruction and an integral component in an overall socio- economic rehabilitation process. It was also based on certain situational conditions that can be viewed as fundamental assumptions. The local populations were ethnically homogenous and many

15 (Knack et al 2010, OECD 2012, Anderson 2015) 16 Strictly speaking, the Marshall Plan referred solely to the 1948 European Recovery Program, which was passed by US Congress as the Foreign Assistance Act 1948 for the rehabilitation of the economies of Western Europe over four years.

26 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation of the professional, trade and social institutions remained intact. Returning combatants resumed their pre-war roles as tradesmen and professionals. While there were reconciliation processes that accompanied the dismantling of the wartime political structure and the nations being forced to acknowledge and recognise war crimes, it was largely collective reconciliation with their own past rather than between individuals, families and communities in the same area. Wars since have not supported these assumptions (World Bank 1998, Girod 2015).

Professionals and those with easily realised assets will typically flee to more stable countries and rebuild their lives, rarely returning to their origins. Sometimes, professional and managerial advancement requires national political party membership, such as with the Ba’ath Party in Iraq and Syria or the Nazi Party in 1930s Germany. However, following the Second Gulf War (2003),17 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1 (16 May 2003) directed the de-Ba’athification of the Iraq establishment and society. It was closely followed by Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 “Dissolution of Entities” (23 May 2003) that disbanded all the existing organs of state from the intelligence services to the armed forces. Aside from destroying Iraq’s ability to protect itself and become dependent on external state protection, it meant that many of those vital for the rebuilding of Iraq after the war were unemployable, disenfranchised (Woodward 2006) and forced to find alternative employment. Such people swelled the ranks of insurgents and expanded the black market and criminality.

This loss of professional and technical capacity, individuals and institutions, severely limits the local capacity to restore and rebuild infrastructure, or indeed recognise what needs to be done. Most of the conflicts since World War Two have been civil wars, increasing the intimacy of reconciliation between combatants, civilians and communities (Girod 2015). There is little in modern post-conflict regions that reflects post-World War Two Germany and Japan. The planners and officers of development banks and agencies who recognised these issues have typically been replaced over time by those more familiar with a sequential aid-reconstruction-development process, and little inherent recognition of the need to adapt the rehabilitation paradigm to the local situation (World Bank 1998). While that may explain an IC frame of reference, it does not necessarily explain why the reconstruction is unsuccessful or consistently gives rise to unforeseen consequences.

17 The Second Gulf War was the US-led Coalition invasion of Iraq 20 March to 1 May 2003. More accurately described as the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, it precipitated a protracted conflict in Iraq that continues to this day.

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Each professional has a cognitive bias, developed over years of experience associating the system deficiency of one thing with the need for another. The biases of development professionals are well recognised (World Bank 2015). Engineers are not immune from this cognitive bias, typically drawing upon their own experiences as the reference for what an effective infrastructure system looks like. In a stable economy and society, the changes in demand adjust gradually, as populations shift and businesses relocate and evolve. Engineers are employed to balance the requirements of sponsor and end user in identifying the deficiency and defining the need and project brief. However, where that baseline frame of reference does not align with the received recognition of what is present, the requirement defaults back to the stated requirement, which is based on a simplified understanding of the post-conflict situation.

As human beings, it is possible that professional arrogance and cultural bias further distort this interpretation of what is. When the local professionals are no longer available and there is a local capacity gap in the understanding of infrastructure systems in context, the recognition of what is and where the deficiencies lay falls to the development engineer and planner, who will project their perspective of what right looks like.

This raises two critical issues. The first is how to make this recognition of what is common to local, sponsor and planner. The second is how to link project delivery back to the system deficiencies identified. These are both explored in greater detail in this thesis. This idea of perspective in determining what is needed is necessarily constrained by the over-arching requirement. If the rehabilitation paradigm that defines this over-arching requirement, or unifying purpose, is flawed in a modern post-conflict context, there needs to be a clear set of limitations and constraints that inform infrastructure rehabilitation planning. To answer this, it is necessary to explore the practice of infrastructure project delivery and its effect on community rehabilitation. What is required of the infrastructure?

3.2. Infrastructure Value It is the nature of infrastructure that by its presence it changes its context and therefore its purpose. This can be seen with highways, railways and other transportation hubs, new utilities and other capital projects. The new infrastructure attracts a new secondary economy around it and gradually the secondary uses that are supported begin to exceed in value of operation the original purpose of the infrastructure. For example, when the Trans-Canada Highway was completed, the Route 7 served the stretch between Ottawa and Orillia. Communities developed around the road, attracting

28 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation other industry. Farming oriented towards the road for the connection to their markets, as well as equipment support. When the 400 series highways were built, bypassing all towns and reducing the travel time significantly, it relocated the primary purpose of the Route 7. Several amenities catering specifically to through traffic died off. Nonetheless, the secondary purpose that had developed around the road continued to grow, justifying further upgrades to the Route 7. Its secondary use had evolved into its new primary purpose. This can be engineered, such as the conversion of the Torpedo Factory in Alexandria, Virginia, into an artists’ market when it closed. It is today one of the principal tourist-draws into Alexandria. However, it also happens naturally as communities seek new space to support new and growing activities.

The value of the infrastructure is defined by its use, irrespective of what it costs to build; it only has value if it is used. That is because infrastructure enables functions and the movement of resources, it isn’t the resource itself. Water infrastructure is little more than a mess of pipes unless water is flowing. If water is flowing, the infrastructure is being used and it has value. Some infrastructure, such as storm spillways have value by their potential use, which is defined as a capability. A particular storm water system, for example, is capable of handling so much flow in the event of a storm with a certain level of precipitation. The value is therefore the capability to remove the water so that it does not cause flooding and damage to life, property or economy. Infrastructure also has value in its creation. The construction process provides a community focus around a common purpose for common benefit and can act as vector for former-combatant reintegration when there may be no experience of pre-conflict working, and as a means to facilitate initial stages of reconciliation. Infrastructure projects represent change; they are a clear statement of future capability. When that statement is a local one the value is local and that value can be significant. Infrastructure planners and post-conflict development engineers need to recognise the greater value of the infrastructure beyond its monetary cost and accept the dynamic nature of the context in which the infrastructure is developed. It cannot just be about the projection of donor capability.

The value of the infrastructure during its delivery can include alleviating post-conflict poverty. It is necessary to explore the nature of post-conflict poverty in order to expose the nature of this value requirement. Many households will be affected by the loss or severe impairment of one or more members. When this extends to the primary earner in a young family, this can and does impede the ability of the remaining adults to earn while caring for young children. The normal community

29 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation support structures of schools and extended family are typically fragmented by conflict, particularly prolonged conflict. Yet the rehabilitation of communities requires the contribution of all households (Pugh 1998). Large infrastructure construction projects have the capacity to employ many more than are locally available and it is important that the local workforce is used to its fullest, if they are to generate local income and slowly rebuild their economy. Balancing the needs for care with the need to earn is sometimes addressed on projects by the provision of child-care cum schooling, including vaccination clinics and a balanced nutritious meal each day (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). Building a healthy next generation while the current working generation rebuilds the infrastructure is part of that statement of future capability, and can break trans-generational prejudice and trauma arising from the conflict (Perry 1995). It is powerful and extends far beyond the single parent and orphaned households (Brück & Schindler 2012). Post-conflict, few if any have any possessions and are initially preoccupied with the fundamentals of subsistence – shelter, food and water. Increasingly, this will include access to cash and telecommunications. Infrastructure projects provide a means of addressing this in the short term without allowing aid to become a dependency. However, it does mean that the infrastructure cannot be contracted by the donor to other external organisations. The delivery is necessarily local. Intelligent resourcing and its implications remain the most manageable means of meeting this whole community infrastructure requirement, rather than something narrowly defined as an engineering solution.

The application of intelligent resourcing in any project will depend upon the local functional capacity of the community; intelligent resourcing reinforces skills, roles and responsibilities within the local community (McKnight & Block 2010). The trade, managerial and technological skills and governance processes, both commercial and domestic, are restored and developed and the solution becomes a local one (Schumacher 1973). There have been multiple efforts to build capacity that again projects an external perspective of what capacity is needed. Often the perspective is defined by qualifications rather than competencies. The need for competencies is locally defined, whether that need is for subsistence farming skills, steel fixing or operating Geospatial Information Systems (GIS). The point is that the competency requirements are defined once again by the purpose and community vision of what the future looks like for them. Training a local workforce for qualifications does not necessarily meet the local competency requirements, but does create a more mobile workforce that can easily leave for apparently more stable and economically attractive regions. Ill-defined capacity building is often associated with the unintended consequence of reducing the community pool of talent. Yet capacity building remains

30 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation necessary to expand intelligent resourcing and promote economic development. It must be defined by local competency requirements over time, which the infrastructure planning process can help inform and provide means for engagement.

Throughout, the emphasis of the infrastructure requirement has been around the need for local definition of requirement and means for delivery and operation. This supports both local and international confidence, the basis of financial normalcy (World Bank 998). When the local population has been regenerated after a conflict and is proceeding to development without aid dependencies or capacity deficiencies, international finance will have greater confidence that the local community will keep the situation stable and repay the loans. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean that what the local community’s sense of what is socio-economic stability is the same as a donor-country’s. For example, the fundamental difference in a western understanding of freedom is typically centred around the individual, whereas an Asian understanding is more collective (Huntington 1996). An oriental ideal of harmony, may seem abusive or exploitative in the occident. This difference in cultural perspective is often at the root of the donor assuming that the recipient aspires to be like them, that by western intervention “showing them the way” or “liberating” them, liberal democracy will naturally take root. Despite very few examples of this being successful since World War Two, the presumption persists. Active intervention in post- conflict regions, building infrastructure for the local community using western or international contractors, can typically undermine the desired outcome that is financial normalcy. Aside from the inevitable clash of perspectives, international confidence comes down to how the local population behaves and their demonstrated confidence in running their infrastructure systems and economy. That local confidence is based on ownership. That’s not to say that each member of the community owns equal shares in the infrastructure. Rather, it’s more about the sense of collective ownership that a community has for its own built environment, using and developing it further as confidence in the future grows. When the infrastructure is intelligently resourced, infrastructure and capacity development happen in step with one another.

The rehabilitation of infrastructure is a vehicle for sustainable community rehabilitation post conflict, enabling economic development and the reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants, and with it a gradual restoration of confidence in public institutions. However, the rehabilitation paradigm must be able to tolerate coincident relief, reconstruction and development (World Bank 1998). They are not strictly sequential. There also needs to be a systematic

31 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation understanding of what exists and how life has changed in the post-conflict community. This encompasses social capital and capacity, as well as an understanding of how today differs from the situation ante bellum. Reconstruction needs to be seen to be permanent, if the local population is to believe that there is confidence in their future. Above all, it must support their “new normal” and not one that may be externally projected upon them.18 In devising post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation it is necessary to achieve specific requirements:

a. Recognise and build on the post-conflict geographic distribution of demand and economic activity; b. Provide transparent governance of the infrastructure system/s that is supportable in the local culture and social capacity; c. Intelligently resource within the technological and logistical capacity of the population; d. Provide ostensibly permanent solutions that are measured by outcomes; and e. Enable community-wide reconstruction and ownership, including widowed households, in [competency] capacity building.

The investigation into the infrastructure rehabilitation requirement is published under peer review: Hay AH (2017) “Post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation requirements” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers Journal of Infrastructure Asset Management 4(4):109-114.

3.3. Perspective and Bias The question of perspective is a recurring theme in how the existing infrastructure is recognised, deficiencies identified and needs determined. Perspective is a powerful tool in developing a robust and resilient infrastructure system that meets the needs of the community today and into the future. It can also be divisive and cause chronic misalignment between what is actually needed and what is delivered (World Bank 2015, Riddell 2008). The perspectives of the principal stakeholders are explored to identify where divergences in perspective lead to misalignment. The most immediate of these is the perspective of development professionals.

The simplest recourse for any professional confronted with a new and complex problem is to find aspects that match previous experience, as an aid to understanding what is being observed. While

18 Recognising the scale and extent of reconstruction is proportional to the period of calm/non-violence during a protracted conflict or following a full cessation of hostilities, this is necessarily conducted by development agencies. However, it needs to be blended with the humanitarian agencies efforts to prevent post-conflict poverty. Similarly, early reconstruction by humanitarian agencies should include the development agencies from the beginning.

32 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation this provides a readily adaptive model that can be used to identify problems and offer an indication of what a solution might look like, it carries two considerable risks. The first is that it can often blur recognition of the facts as seen on the ground and in some cases lead to dissonance where ground truth is disregarded when it doesn’t concur with this experienced case history.19 The second is that the contextual characteristics are rarely the same and so importing this understanding from a previous case history is to import with it a series of assumptions that are unlikely to be either supported or validated in the new situation. Being able to draw upon an objective auditable evidence-based common reference allows the professional to calibrate past experiences to more intelligently apply the associated learning to the new situation. That calibration is necessary. When it is not possible to calibrate professional expertise to the current situation, it depends solely upon individual professionalism.

The concept of a common reference is rational, providing an authoritative evidential knowledge base that all stakeholders can accept. That does not mean that a common reference will be universally accepted. There can be myriad reasons for not accepting evidence, whether due to a cognitive dissonance because the presented evidence contradicts a firmly held world view or simply that it is politically inconvenient. Therefore, a universally accepted common reference is an ideal that is gradually achieved over time. To be practicable, the common reference must be more than simply a statement of what exists, it must say what it means. I propose that the common reference appropriate for this application is the Common Operating Picture (COP). The COP is a geospatially correct representation of an operation, its dependencies and context that can be commonly recognised by all stakeholders and used as a common reference to identify how a change to one or more components manifests through the operation. The COP develops and evolves as it is used and so becomes the reference common to progressively more stakeholders.

Some professionals will approach each new situation with a sense of humility,20 open to learning and recognising that they need to understand the situation to intelligently apply their expertise.

19 Cognitive Dissonance is the psychological stress experienced by an individual whose real world experiences are inconsistent with their world view beliefs, ideals and values. Festinger L (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press. Palo Alto, California, US 20 Humility is widely recognized as a leadership quality that professionals require. The Ivey School of Business and the Harvard Business School see it as an essential leadership characteristic. Richard & Daniel Susskind write about it in their exploration of how the professions will develop over the coming decade. Susskind R & Susskind D (2015) The Future of the Professions: How Technology will Transform the Work of Human Experts. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. The World Bank discussion of professional biases is interestingly mute on this aspect (World Bank 2015).

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These can be considered servant professionals. They recognise that their professional role is service to the client and beneficiary. It is the foundational concept of military leadership, for example; to serve those one leads (Churchill et al, 2012). Such professional humility requires justified confidence in one’s own professional competencies, as well as a recognition of limitations. The others can be considered directing professionals. They see what they recognise and infer a deficiency and need without internalising the complexities of the situation before them. Those less confident in their professional competencies may cover this with arrogance, which is rarely well received. Nonetheless, the directing professional will impose their view of what right looks like on the situation. Where they have considerable local experience, this may lead to rapid successes. However, more often than not, infrastructure and development professionals will move from conflict area to conflict area and it is unlikely that they will have such in-depth local or regional experience. Irrespective, these professional perspectives are framed by the client.21 The client’s perspective will inform what the professional is looking for in their initial assessment and the constraints on the design brief. The client is the tasking authority in the professional’s mission analysis. It is rare for the client to be a unitary authority with both tasking and contracting, and financial authorities rolled into one. More commonly, the finance will be raised from one or more sources and the tasking authority will be operating within a higher intent.

Mission analysis is a common enough deductive tool, used in business and government alike. The military version is the simplest version and used here to draw out the various influences on the professional’s assessment of what they are to achieve (British Army 1995, para. 0811). Mission analysis asks four simple questions:

a. What is the higher intent? b. What is my part? c. What are my constraints and limitations? d. What has changed?

The higher intent is typically something drawn from a UN resolution or other mandate. Written in sweeping generalities, it could reasonably be expected to include the alleviation of human suffering and to attempt/facilitate a speedy resumption of the economy to financial normalcy.

21 An agency operating to the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence in an atmosphere of transparency should have predominantly servant professionals, who have been instinctively drawn to the principles and actions of their employer because they largely reflect their own. This may not be the case with supplementary expertise brought in from other agencies.

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Where this is part of a campaign plan it will include the restoration of security and freedom of movement. Most importantly, it will include an insight into what the IC collectively sees as the desired outcome. This may be oriented around the return or progression of the region into a full member of the IC, which may not be where the region sees its own future. Generally, human beings simply want to get on with their lives, defined by what is familiar and stable. Change is quite often what precipitated the conflict in the first place and so further change is not necessarily something that is commonly aspired to. The designated agency will be leading the post-conflict rehabilitation effort, whether a country or International Organisation (IO). That agency would typically be the tasking authority and have interpreted the higher intent with their own campaign plan. How this campaign plan is formulated will directly influence how the regional situation is understood.

When the coordinating department within the agency invests and holds the common reference, the tasked departments will be informed what to do in context and better able to integrate their efforts into other department tasks. However, where responsibility is tasked to individual departments, they will seek to understand their own systems in isolation or at best with some limited context. One can see this in many governments where cylinders-of-excellence lead to coordinating inefficiencies, particularly in the sequencing of infrastructure works.22 This higher intent is easily confused, and the resources allocated by the agency to understand the individual task context will be limited by its own perception of what needs to be understood.

When the professional considers their own task and part in this higher authority scheme, it needs to be in the form of a task or tasks and a purpose. Without the purpose there is no coordination with other department tasks and measure of progress towards the desired outcome. When the tasks are defined not by a purpose but by an output, such as delivering improved water supply to a certain percentage of households by 2015, per the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one sees tasks oriented to that goal without a beneficial outcome. In this case, it would be possible that 50% of households are connected to an improved water supply, but not necessarily to a source of potable water, and so there would be no net beneficial health outcome of potable water being

22 This has been acknowledged by many governments internationally, giving rise to ministries of infrastructure to strategize, coordinate and provide a common policy for all government departments to follow. The only one so far found to have the authority to force other department compliance is the UK’s Infrastructure Projects Authority, which is under direct control of the Cabinet Office. A similar centralization of infrastructure authority has not yet been found in an IO.

35 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation provided in homes, only that water pipes are connected to homes. The definition of purpose raises the question of measurement and the determination of success criteria. Most importantly, a task with a purpose tells the professional what the end capability must be.

In considering the constraints and limitations, the professional will largely depend upon received wisdom, unless there is a reliable Common Operating Picture (COP) that identifies the inter- community dynamics and governance issues, the division of communities and the areas by conflict alliances and the need for reconciliation. Most importantly, it spurs an understanding of what can and can’t be locally resourced from labour and trades to materiel. The converse to that will be the constraints placed by the donors, who may or may not require certain types of contract or fund release conditional on specified social programs. These can and often do run counter to local culture and social norms. It is important for the professional to recognise these potential points of stress and incompatibility; they can obstruct the higher intent of building social licence and local confidence and engagement. This can be seen in the divergence of indicators of anticipated outcome. This concept is explored later in this chapter.

When one considers whether anything has changed, it is almost inevitable that it has. Post-conflict areas will have sporadic spates of unrest and security lapses that shift community boundaries. The informal economy will be establishing itself and changing the local economy dynamics even as large military and development agents place an urgent demand for specific commodities, which chronically destabilises the market and makes many commodities inaccessible locally. This can be seen in every post-conflict region where a large military organisation requires massive quantities of plywood, cement, reinforcing steel and aggregate, often forcing up prices by orders of magnitude. Local reconstruction is then delayed indefinitely in favour of garrison troops who provide the security and stability force for the area. Also, the received reference is typically a derivation of the de jure ante bellum laydown and rarely reflects either the de facto post conflict infrastructure condition or the new demographic distribution and socio-economic situation. At best, one is dealing with assumptions that cannot be validated. Known as noise, it is the one aspect that prevents any judgement-based decision making23 as to what is needed.

23 Judgement-based decision making is the deliberate and objective consideration of the available evidence to make a decision, as opposed to one based on opinion. See Slovic P, Fischoff B & Lichtenstein S (1981) Facts & Fears: Societal Perceptions of Risk. Advances in Consumer Research 8:497-502. Understanding the expert/professional’s decision process through mental modeling may provide further insight to how evidence is considered. (Morgan et al 2001)

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In the absence of an informed task and informed analysis, professional opinion can determine the final recognition of deficiency and assessment of need. The pressure to get results and provide quick assessments and plans for funding approval drives the tendency towards professional assumption and the projection of past experience onto the current situation, irrespective of cultural or social compatibility. In the absence of evidence, the dominant influence on the mission analysis are the IC perspective and donor bias.

Like approaches to poverty, international development falls in and out of fashion. Currently, there are multiple perspectives on what is needed. While different, poverty and international development are related in post-conflict rehabilitation, largely because the post-conflict environment polarises communities by their access to the basic commodities necessary for domestic recovery. These include the ability to work, which is a chronic issue for widowed households. It also includes access to and the prioritisation of vaccinations and micronutrients. While few have directly opined about post-conflict rehabilitation, poverty and development opinions greatly influence thinking beyond relief aid. This falls roughly into two camps. On the one hand, sustainability economist Jeffrey Sachs and the singer-celebrity Bono advocate through the UN for significantly increased spending to help impoverished communities establish sustainable existences (Sachs 2005, Sachs 2015). Despite several high-profile projects and significant spending there remains little evidence that this works (Munk 2013). Conversely, it is also too early to say whether this massively increased investment results in dependency cultures, as claimed by Sachs’ critics.

The other camp, defined predominantly by Bill Easterly, who was reputedly ejected from the World Bank for publishing his views, believes that international aid is causing much of the corruption and stagnant development (Easterly 2006). While both camps offer their opinions reinforced by carefully selected statistics, it is difficult to see a justified argument in either opinion. In contrast, the work of Banerjee & Duflo (Banerjee & Duflo 2011) and some commentary by Acemoglu (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), Deaton (Deaton 2013) and others point to a more locally defined relationship with the institutions (inclusive vice extractive) and equity of access to opportunity and advancement through education (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). The locally defined approach to development is well established in scientific literature, most notably with Chambers’ Participatory Learning & Action (PLA) (Chambers 1997) and similar approaches.

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The OECD and the World Bank have identified the need for alignment between the development agency and the local community in defining the needs. This is particularly acute in post-conflict areas, because a restoration of infrastructure to its [assumed] laydown ante bellum does not reflect the post-conflict situation. This has been clearly identified at the Paris Declaration 2005, specifically how the IC should approach development and post-conflict. It was subsequently developed as an Action Plan in Accra in 2008. Nevertheless, the complexities of post-conflict areas make an assumption of rebuild to an ante bellum laydown the easiest way to rationalise in the absence of an informed and current common reference. The associated lack of alignment has been consistently reported since the Accord in 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015.24 In 2014, the Cairo International Conference on Palestine: Reconstructing Gaza (concluded 12 October) again resolved to build back de jure ante bellum, despite the recognition by all that this does not reflect the current de facto realities in the Gaza Strip. Informed largely by opinion, international action is therefore dominated by the donor perspective of what ought to be rather than what is.

The donor perspective has arguably been investigated the most in recently years, reflecting the dominant influence that it has. Most notable among these studies is that by Desha Girod (2015), in which she investigated why so few post-civil war countries recover. She identified two primary interests that drive donor perspectives and actions. The first is a strategic interest in which the post- conflict region provides a strategic position for the donor and the second is an interest in natural resources. This means that the donor countries are disinterested in the alignment and the use of aid funds by the local government, as long as their own greater [donor] interest is secure. Post-conflict and particularly following a civil war, it is common for a barely-stable local tussle for power. The threat of a return to violence remains ever present and those in power seek to buy the loyalty of their own side and potential challengers, using the development aid payments and resource rents. While there are a few Phoenix states that successfully rehabilitate, such as Oman, this pattern is very common. The institutions created are extractive, as defined by Acemoglu, and there is little real economic recovery or development. However, the measure of what recovery actually looks like can be very different locally. As discussed, the international donor who seeks real post- conflict rehabilitation will have a perception of normality defined by their own situation and standards. They will also attach conditions defined by their domestic politics.

24 (Knack et al 2010, OECD 2012, Anderson 2015)

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This projection of the donor’s normal onto the beneficiary can have perverse effects. Efforts at capacity building in the Gaza Strip by USAid saw a cadre of young professionals gain internationally recognised qualifications. They soon left the Gaza Strip in search of better opportunities, including with USAid elsewhere. Qualifications provide an indicator of capability, but do not mean competence. The requirement for competency is defined by its application. A competent production engineer is not necessarily competent at fixing agricultural machinery. Qualifications, by virtue of being internationally recognised do not translate to the locally defined competency requirements, which may be altogether more subsistence in nature. This projection of what is competent, based upon an unseen assumption of need, is often informed purely by domestic experience and not reflective of actual capabilities and needs. The Roman architect, Vitruvius, wrote consistently about the need for what is built to be of the local area (Vitruvius 2001).

Today, this concept is more typically known as intelligent resourcing and is every bit as relevant as it was 2,000 years ago. The provision of ever greater transportation capacities allows donors the illusion that by projecting what works at home, it can be locally built and sustained. It is no truer today than it was when the Roman legions conquered most of their known world. Prefabricated timber structures flown from North America to South West Afghanistan at significant expense were structurally compromised by termites within 18 months; surveillance systems that worked in Saskatchewan were installed around Kandahar Airfield yet failed within six months due to the haematite dust from the adjacent Red Desert. The assumption of what is appropriate locally based upon domestic experience occurs at every level, technically, socially and economically. One can only deduce that it arises out of a combination of a cognitive bias and a lack of situational understanding.

Similarly, projecting expectations of individual liberty and access to choice do not often cross cultural boundaries. In comparing China and the US, Allison (2017) and Huntington (1996), individually, provide the starkest examples of how a receiving culture can find a projected perception of normality completely alien. It would appear that few countries are immune to this projection of normality. Canada attaches the requirement for girls’ education to the funding of school projects, despite it meaning significantly increased danger for the girls in the more traditional Afghan villages. Such conditions satisfy a domestic political agenda and a belief that this could not possibly be offensive. Yet it assumes a cultural and social alignment that rarely

39 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation exists. Of the international donors, the Republic of Ireland, World Bank and Scandinavian countries are regularly identified as the most successful (if imperfect) in aligning their development with local interests (Anderson 2015, Riddell 2008, Knack 2010). It is noticeable that their approach is strongly defined from the field as opposed to being projected national bias. Perhaps, a bottom up approach is the answer. However, while the extended engagement periods may be feasible in stable development situations, the immediate demands of post conflict areas suggest not. Recognising that there often needs to be concurrent relief aid, reconstruction and development in post-conflict areas, it is also important that each doesn’t impede the efficacy of the others. The governing Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) principle, no measure may impede the operating efficiency of another measure or of the operation as a whole, could be applied in this case. It is used for infrastructure resilience and protection planning and in design integration.

Any communication disconnect, whether technical or social, requires two interlocutors. There can be many impediments to the donor’s and development agency’s ability to comprehend local requirements and the complex post-conflict situation. There are also local impediments to understanding their own situation. Post-conflict, the social networks that are organic to communities become fractured and typically disaggregate into smaller units. A clear understanding of what is happening where and who is involved is at best sketchy. The governing authorities barely know where the population is dispersed, let alone the condition of the infrastructure networks. It therefore becomes difficult to gain a clear situational understanding, with little evidence to argue for anything beyond a build back ante bellum. This gross over-simplification of the requirement seemingly becomes the only practicable default. The absence of situational awareness creates a vacuum, jurisdictionally and socially.

The jurisdictional vacuum is frequently filled by local strongmen, warlords and others who happened to be dominant at the local cessation of hostilities. They tend to impose their order and, with it, stability in their area. This does not mean that there will be stability between areas, as there is the constant tussle for dominance. Nevertheless, there will be a type of stability that allows communities to recover capacity and function. This stability is often not recognised as such from the outside. The local stability may mean that the forcible eviction of a minority ethnic group continues or that local trade is not open and fair, being determined by the warlord in his own fiefdom. This is not what the IC would consider stability and can sometimes be referred to as ungoverned space. The challenge of the very concept of ungoverned space, particularly in an age

40 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation of increasingly blurred discharge of sovereignty, is that it is essentially based on a Westphalian concept of state-based sovereignty and fails to recognise that different aspects of governance, such as control of violence, rulemaking and resources, may be effectively discharged by different entities in a post-conflict area, including non-state entities (Clunan & Trinkunas 2010). However, it remains important to ask who’s perspective, and why.

Political perspective is often a matter of opinion bounded by judgment. The judgement-based understanding is reasoned, deliberate and informed by evidence. Opinion is more visceral and needn’t be informed by evidence, only perception and bias. For example, when the perennial discussions over downtown densification occur, they are usefully bounded by an understanding of the maximum and minimum viable densities. The maximum density is defined by what the enabling infrastructure can support, known as the carrying capacity. If the city over-densifies, the infrastructure cannot support regular operations and there is an associated loss in confidence and value. Conversely, if there is insufficient density the tax receipts will not cover the costs of infrastructure and other municipal corporation functions, and it is therefore financially unsustainable. The maximum and minimum densities are defined, and it becomes a matter for political decision on how the community wishes to live in the range between these limits. Understanding such limits is necessarily multidisciplinary and does not lend itself easily to bureaucratic cylinders-of-excellence in government. While informed political debate can be challenging in G7 countries, it is even more so in post-conflict countries where there is no common understanding of the current laydown and condition, let alone carrying capacity. That necessary overview is simply missing. Consequently, situational understanding is highly localised with scant appreciation of the neighbours’ situation.

The social vacuum is dominated by Social Capital. In post-disaster situations, social capital frequently proves to be the key determinant in whether and how the community survives, responds and eventually recovers. Aldrich’s investigation into the role of social capital during natural disasters (Aldrich 2012) and Boin’s analysis of crisis decision making (Boin et al 2006) point to a collective situational understanding and the cohesion dynamics of the community. Social capital can work for or against the reconstruction effort and here it is essential that there is an alignment of desired outcomes, limitations and constraints. Communities with high social capital will have robust lines of influence and trusted communication networks. They can operate as a single corporate entity, bringing resources and effect as decided. There will be key influencers and

41 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation opinion formers, and connection to and through these individuals is essential. This is recognised as the essential aspect of military psychological operations (US DoD 2010), and marketing (Fischhoff et al 2011).

In tapping into the trusted communication structure of a social group, one informs the collective understanding. However, this must be factual and true information. Any suggestion that there is disinformation or manipulation and the acceptance is compromised, which inevitably results in an adverse reaction where no further communication is trusted. The key is understanding the culture and perceptions of the social group and the influencers/opinion-formers so that accurate situational awareness can be effectively imparted. While this approach is recorded in the military psychological operations manuals and training, often it is limited to the war-fighting or campaign part of the operation and not continued during the post-conflict rehabilitation. It may be a tool worth considering in future campaign transitions post-conflict. Nonetheless, informing social capital depends upon two components: a clear situational understanding and an accurate current social profile of each post-conflict community.

It is useful to compare this discussion with others conducted in various post-conflict areas. The two most consistent themes that arise are local confidence in the rule of law and perceived international confidence in their future. The first is particularly difficult to analyse, being so situation specific. It is also outside the scope of this infrastructure thesis. However, the second is often most tangible in the choices the development agency makes in reconstruction and development. During discussions with Gazan engineers and administrators in January and again in November 2017, the frustrations centred on the perpetual use of expedient solutions for housing and infrastructure. These engineers perceived any international interest in the future of the Gaza Strip to be crisis-centric and limited to the short life of temporary works and relief work.25 The immediate focus disregards the future and underlying community concerns for the next generation. They reason that if the IC has no faith in their future, why should they? Interestingly, there was similar frustration at the construction of white elephants such as a large wastewater treatment plant in Northern Gaza that can’t be operated because there is insufficient power supply.26 In this case,

25 While there will always be a need for expedient measures to address immediate [humanitarian] crisis needs, it suggests that expediency influences reconstruction and development efforts alike. This would be more noticeable in a region like the Gaza Strip where the conflict has been protracted through cycles of violence and relative calm. 26 The Northern Gaza Emergency Sewage Treatment (NGEST) plant was built recently by the World Bank with co- funding from Belgium, Sweden, France and the EU, to address an imminent failure of the Beit-Lahia sewage lagoons, built in 1974. One of the smaller lagoons had already failed and, given similar structural issues with the larger lagoons,

42 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation money was thrown at an immediate need without fully considering the context or through-life operation.

These capital projects introduce single points of failure that would have a far greater impact across the Gaza Strip in a return to violence or full armed conflict. These frustrations were asset focused and seem to generally reflect an asset-focused approach to reconstruction and development needs, rather than the outcome of the service that those assets enable. The interesting thing about both of these frustrations is that they concern significantly more expensive infrastructure solutions than are arguably required. One can only deduce that this perception in the Gaza Strip is not born out of a lack of funds or the restrictions arising from the Wassenaar Arrangement controlling imports of dual-use materiel. That is not to say that the Wassenaar Arrangement isn’t limiting recovery, being cited as the primary reason why very few fully-funded Gaza reconstruction projects are realised (Barakat 2017, gisha 2017, Shapira 2017).

It is also useful to note that while the majority of those I spoke with were interested in practicing like their international professional peers, few aspired to be like them. The desire was for an equity of access to opportunities rather than to adopt the culture and practices of the donors and G7- dominated development agencies. The new World Bank-coached PWA27 corporate restructuring that introduced equality and diversity criteria into the management structure were simply seen as the window-dressing irrelevancies of a western liberal agenda, rather than any concerted interest in making the local economy work. This is consistent with discussions that I’ve had over the years with local professional engineers in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.

There is little that currently aligns international perspective with local perspective in post-conflict areas. There is a natural alignment of interest in post-conflict recovery, yet what a successful recovery looks like will depend on which lens it is viewed through. At the centre of this misalignment is the professional engineer/planner who must reconcile the client and end-user needs and interests around an infrastructure solution. The solution is necessarily set within a socio- economic context and typically less about what is built than how and where. The commonly missing component in each perspective is the common understanding of the current situation, both

the concern was that their failure would cause an extensive health crisis, both in the direct flooding of homes and businesses with sewage and the contamination of the aquifer. In this haste to draw down the lagoons, adequate power supply (specifically a new 161kV line from Israel) had not been secured. The wider lack of energy in all forms in the Gaza Strip also effects the function of the 1978 Sheikh Ajleen Wastewater Treatment Plant in Gaza City. 27 Palestinian Water Authority

43 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation physically and socially. There is also a mismatch in what is practicable and what the future looks like. This is less about an alignment of desired outcome, as it is about what the local community can achieve. There has been discussion around the adaptive capacity of a population. Such concerns led to the USAid initiative to train Gazans in the various trades and professions they felt were needed to rebuild the Gaza Strip, under their Human Capital and Social Impact program. This again is a projection of assumptions around how things should work, based on the cognitive bias of the donor/development agency.

Adaptive capacity is the ability of an entity to accept and adopt new technologies and adapt them to their own needs going forward. Discussion of adaptive capacity is a failure to recognise and accept what the local community is and their established socio-economic fabric. While there remains an argument for capacity building to reinforce capabilities that have been eroded by conflict, intelligent resourcing addresses the local need by intelligently adapting the designs and plans to what can be locally resourced. This is no different to the world that Vitruvius inhabited. The fundamentals are unchanged and have remained valid through the intervening millennia. As a symptom of donor bias rather than a component of the post-conflict rehabilitation requirement, adaptive capacity is not discussed further in this thesis.

3.4. Measuring Infrastructure Development The World Bank identifies the desired outcome of infrastructure reconstruction to be restored socio-economic capability and capacity with a continuing transition toward financial normalcy (World Bank 1998). As discussed, donors and development agencies may project their own expectations of what that outcome may look like, resulting in conditions being attached to funding that are not necessarily compatible with local culture, institutions or social dynamics, or needs (Paris Declaration 2005). Few donor expectations are aligned with local needs (Anderson 2015, Girod 2015). It is unsurprising, therefore, that there are so few post-conflict countries with a successful rehabilitation experience. There is a need for long-term engagement and an outcome focused investment (Kharas 2011, Killen 2011). While this is internationally recognized, with the essential correlation between outputs and outcomes28 agreed at the Paris Declaration 2005 and

28 Outputs are the product of a discrete process, whereas outcomes are the effect that the process has. In the case of infrastructure, an output may be the kilometers of highway constructed, whereas the outcome is the increase in trade resulting from the access that the highway provides.

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Accra Agenda for Action 2008, it is not widely practiced. The recent EPAR study for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation shows this exactly (Anderson 2015).

A key point from this study is that the causal relationship from outputs to outcomes and then to effectiveness is not immediately apparent. This is a characteristic of complex adaptive systems (Page 1998). The system (in this case being a post-conflict local economy) reacts to the influx of spending and activities by producing outputs that are easily quantified, but the consequences of these outputs do not necessarily result in the planned outcomes. In the dynamic post-conflict environment, the need for outcome metrics is more pressing than in normal development settings. All regional stakeholders need confidence in what the metrics indicate in local benefit and socio- economic progress. As aid for relief and reconstruction are necessarily concurrent and will likely continue even as development begins, the outcomes to be measured will also change with the contextual influences. There is a sense of this is Thomas Schelling’s observation of micromotivations leading to macrobehavioural changes.29 As the context changes with each benefit experienced by the local population, so will individual’s actions. This attracts and influences others actions and gradually the context changes, which influences the path to the desired outcome. At a conceptual level, Schelling’s ideas align with field observations of shifting local behaviours during reconstruction, but it remains unclear whether this might be applied predictively in a post-conflict environment.

The metrics must provide a local demonstration of progress in a post-conflict region, providing some tangible evidence of progress using reintegrating combatants and reconciliation around a common infrastructure focus. This means that the metrics are more than an indicator of aid effectiveness, they are a regional/national indicator of recovery and progress; they are necessarily an expression of national and international confidence, reflecting progress in the rehabilitation of both infrastructure and society. Their value far exceeds international donor/aid efficiency.

In complex adaptive systems, one can plan for achieving targeted outcomes, but planning how to achieve the targeted outcomes is rather more challenging. It is better to facilitate the conditions, and enable the actors or agents in the system to move toward the targeted outcomes themselves

29 Thomas Schelling, 2005 Nobel Laureate economist, wrote “Micromotives and Macrobehavior” in 1978. In the book, he describes the influence that an individual’s actions, however innocently motivated, can influence the actions of others and eventually lead to a fundamental change. Very much a product of its time, he illustrates this with the idea of how students fill up a lecture theatre and what that then means for the final distribution of seats, as well as the examples of a white homogenous neighbourhood that quickly changes ethnicity when individual moves reach a tipping point. Schelling TC (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehaviors. WW Norton & Co. New York, New York. US.

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(Page 1998). This means that there is no one universal measure of success, as each situation will be fundamentally different. No two countries or even communities are alike, particularly post- conflict. Economies are complex adaptive systems that demonstrate traits of self-organization; they organize themselves in an organic fashion, rather than by conscious plan, with actors often self- selecting into market niches in order to survive and thrive in the system (Jacobs 2000). A successful outcome in post-conflict rehabilitation is necessarily an integrated effort and cannot be a single-issue activity. Irrespective of how that outcome is defined, its realisation will require the generation of ideas, goods and services at the micro, meso and macro levels, facilitated through the rehabilitation of the critical infrastructure systems. This enables the transition to normalcy in a well-functioning society. The challenge for infrastructure engineers and planners in addressing this layered complexity is to understand how the infrastructure will be used and what it must do. Measurement of outcome gives context to the infrastructure purpose.

Measurement is generally a relative concept, comparing an object against a common reference standard or another object. Metrics can be established by international standard, such as by the International Standards Organization, or by common agreement around locally-accessible statistical guidance. One such development metric is the World Health Organization’s Girl’s Weight-for-Age charts. Commonly referenced as an indicator of the level of disease/diarrhoea in the female population and associated with the provision of potable water through an improved supply, they weren’t constructed for that purpose (Borghi 2006) and can be manipulated. The UN Millennium Development Goals used metrics that focused on relative measures of improvement. For example, Target 7c was to halve the number of people without access to an improved or piped water source. This was largely achieved by 2015 and has since been superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015), but does not necessarily mean that there was any improvement in potable water access. Each commonly used metric is open to misapplication and/or manipulation. This places greater emphasis on the donors and agents to scrutinise expenditure against the intended use, but not often delivered. This is either because the donor is distracted by some other strategic interest (Girod 2015), or simply that very few metrics actually link outputs to outcomes.

An outcomes focus with guidelines on implementation was agreed in Paris in 2005 and set to a Plan of Action in Accra in 2008, but again is not widely implemented (Anderson 2015). I did not find any convincing output-outcome metric associations from a regression analysis of the common metrics. I therefore felt it necessary to build a clearer understanding of the causal relationship

46 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation between output and outcome. The various stakeholders, influences and interests need to be taken into account in this complex adaptive system. This suggests that each post-conflict situation will be different and will change over time. This systems approach must distil the core deliverables into a tangible metric for the donor and/or development agency; it must be transparent, evidence-based, objective and auditable. It is possible to leverage social media and crowd reporting of the realised benefits, in the same way that Ushahidi30 provides crowd sourced information on access to resources for local communities in a disaster. This supports good governance and donor confidence of a beneficial outcome that is linked to a verifiable output for a given input. One must be able to test and prove the input-output-outcome relationship model to build the necessary confidence that the metrics aren’t falsifiable.

Post-conflict poverty consistently complicates the association of output to outcome. Post-conflict populations typically have few or no financial resources, existing on relief aid and/or the informal economy. In focusing reconstruction on the enabling value of the infrastructure, it is important to make that value accessible to the population. The nature of poverty is not explored in this thesis. However, the policy perspective on post-conflict poverty brought by the aid donors and facilitators significantly influences the output–outcome relationship. The different international perspectives have been discussed. Investigations by Banerjee (Banerjee & Duflo 2011) remain consistent with Orwell’s observations in the 1930s (Orwell 1937). There is a more complex relationship that has much to do with governance and the degree of responsibility that the poor carry. Similarly, democratic institutions are vital if the governance is to be aligned with the needs of the community (Acemoglu 2012) and enable social capital (Aldrich 2012).

The fact of the matter is that in wealthier and stable countries, vaccinations programs, nutrient enrichment of foodstuffs and access to education are routinely provided by the state and there is no need for the poor to prioritise these components out of meagre resources. When children can be basically provided for and prepared for a productive adulthood, households are better able to contribute time and effort to the attainment of wealth and the collective development of the community. When the benefits of reliable potable water supply within easy access, and effective sanitation and hygiene are part of the municipal provision underlying the community, impediments to resource capacity are eroded. Post-conflict poverty of widowed households and households

30 Ushahidi, testimony or witness in Swahili, is a non-profit situation mapping internet company that crowd sources real-time reports of events during a crisis. Developed in the violent aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 presidential election, it has been used in many crises, including Mogadishu 2009, Haiti 2010 and Libya 2012. www.ushahidi.com.

47 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation without work-capable adults can be addressed by enabling all generations for the future as a community (Brück 2012). The realisation of this potential in the social capital of a community or region around infrastructure reconstruction provides a metric relationship of contextual influences that nuance the causal relationships between input, output and outcome. Some multi-year and capital infrastructure projects recognise this and incorporate early-years and primary school age day camps with schooling, clinics and nutritious meals. Vulnerable households can be productive and their children are fed, cared for and educated through the working day. This enabling of all households in the community, alleviates the negative pressures on vulnerable households, while improving the local labour pool. The challenge is to capture these post-conflict realities within the common understanding of the current situation.

Unlike in a natural disaster, the combined effects of diminished professional capacity and institutions, the need to reintegrate combatants and reconcile communities, and the need to restore/maintain social licence will have a greater influence on whether outputs translate into the desired outcomes. These would ideally occur with reconstruction, the output of each contributing to the outcome of the other. Vocational education for Fighting Aged Males (FAMs) and/or child soldiers (Dennis 2007) can provide young adults who have experienced neither formal schooling nor a normal working life the skills necessary to become valued contributors to society. However, if the training is measured by qualification output, in isolation or unaligned with local capacity building, it can easily mask and encourage the subsequent departure of newly qualified individuals to more attractive economies. The skills training output should be defined by the local need to restore community function. Being able to operate and maintain what has been reconstructed is the desired outcome.

The local community metrics of sustainability of infrastructure are the energy consumed in service delivery, frequency and duration of critical infrastructure unavailability, as well as percentages of local people conducting maintenance and operations. These local sustainability metrics are not unique to a specific post-conflict area, they are defined by the evolving need of the community as it transitions to normalcy. It places a focus on functional education as well as basic literacy and numeracy, prioritising relevant competencies over qualifications. For example, animal husbandry, health and sanitation using locally sourced materials and methods is an education process far removed from the science classes taught in Western societies, but often necessary in recovering post-conflict societies. Applying the principle of intelligent resourcing to the restored

48 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation infrastructure function, the use of locally sustainable methods supported by appropriate education and opportunity frees family units from a subsistence existence.

It is therefore reasonable to expect the measure of outcome to be informed by multiple output indicators, each varying according to the contextual influences and changes to the whole community system of systems. The systems model that relates input-output-outcome to changing community needs must be dynamic with clear definitions of relationships and performance thresholds. The relationships and dependencies within the model will change as the community and its supporting economy change, and so the demands on the critical infrastructure. The relationship between output metrics and outcome metrics will need to remain constant to draw time comparisons and so correctly represent overall progress. These relationships can be represented as a causal chain model, built using directed graphs. The approach is similar to the complex systems dependency mapping for risk analysis. To investigate the development of a causal chain input-output-outcome relationship, I worked with Rory Kilburn of RiskLogik using the RiskOutLook software made available to the University of Toronto’s Centre for Resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Working in partnership with industry provides a demonstration of how to use what is currently available commercially, and therefore accessible to infrastructure planning teams operating in post-conflict areas.

In constructing the model, nodes are given a numerical value for the impact of typical node failure on the system, the likelihood of failure, and identified dependency relationships are also given a numerical value. At this stage, the values assigned are for demonstration purposes only, but have proven useful for depicting the relative strengths and risks in a system. For greater fidelity and validation, a case study using an actual occurrence – with impact, failure and dependency values that reflected the existing situation – was conducted during the field validation in the Gaza Strip. Our initial modeling was based upon our personal experiences working in post-conflict societies in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, as well as a literature review. This initial model was constructed around a notional small industrial town in a post-conflict environment. It has a significant diaspora and there is significant interest from international donors and agencies in its rehabilitation, but little has yet begun. Although drawing on personal experiences is necessarily situation-specific, we kept the system generic so that influences and contextual pressures could be amended or switched off according to the situation.

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Figure 1. Prioritised Risk Chart

Figure 1 shows the prioritized risk in the system immediately post-conflict, and pre-rehabilitation. The initial priorities are presented as the product of the cumulative impact and cumulative failure of each of the entities in the model. This chart shows that Coaching & Mentoring Programs and Locally Sustainable Practices are the two entities with the highest risk indices. While it would therefore seem appropriate to address the risk in those two entities directly, without a proper causal analysis one cannot be certain that there are no other indirect ways of influencing the operation enabled by those nodes, and which may be both more effective and less costly.

The dependency model depicts how things are related and how they are connected in the system of systems that make up a post-conflict region. Using the model to identify the dependency relationships, the main influencers, and the feedback loops, one knows which failures cause other subsequent failures, carefully isolating what is relevant from the circumstantial/situational, and therefore determine which factors can accurately measure outcomes-based progress. This causal

50 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation chain approach is compatible with the principles for OECD indicators (OECD 2005). Local relevance is added through locally sustainable practices, which is important because the true measure of value is in the eyes of the recovering communities. It is they who must adopt the infrastructure, and be capable of adapting31 and developing it to meet their evolving needs. Intelligent resourcing can only make it possible; it cannot deliver local adoption of the infrastructure. The metric of routine efficiencies is a strong indicator of progress, or lack thereof. Energy (type and quantity) consumed in obtaining food, water and heating/cooking fuel are important indicators in the growth of economic systems. When a family unit is constantly occupied gathering water, food and fuel, there is little time for working at anything else. Therefore, development of stable, long-term provision of these staples through a proper delivery infrastructure is a necessary precursor for progress, and therefore growth (Sachs 2005, Banerjee 2011, Acemoglu 2012, Deaton 2013).

Examining what depends on Rehabilitation of Critical Infrastructure (CI) indicates that the successful rehabilitation of CI is a direct requirement for four processes in a recovering society: water treatment; the maintenance of the CI; urban governance; and the establishment of a manufacturing sector. (Figure 2 refers) These are shown in dark orange, meaning that if the rehabilitation of the critical infrastructure fails, those four processes will also fail. Another 14 entities are shown with lighter orange boxes beside them; although also dependent on the successful rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, there are normally workarounds that allow these entities to attain an acceptable capacity of operation. For example, sewage treatment and collection can be done using manual methods (disinfectants and pails to a central collection point) without having functional sewerage in the community.

Such a situation would be compensated by an emphasis on hygiene and a potable water distribution system until the reconstruction priorities could catch up. More importantly, those resources and processes upon which Rehabilitation of CI depends are shown in the smaller inset box near the right edge of Figure 2. The upstream dependencies tell us that a failure of practical experience will cause the rehabilitation process to fail. While the other seven resources are important, there are normally short-term workarounds available that will allow the rehabilitation process to move forward.

31 Senge (2006) writes that “…sensing and acting locally is exactly how complex living systems work…” p. 365

51 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation

Figure 2. Rehabilitation of Critical Infrastructure (CI) Upstream and Downstream Dependencies

The depicted dependencies are direct dependencies—the first order consequences of a failure. In any complex system, failures will cause second and third order effects. Similarly, the upstream dependents of the Rehabilitation of CI will themselves be dependent on other resources and/or processes, and those resources and processes will be dependent on other inputs. The existence of these cumulative vulnerabilities is one of the reasons for the conclusions drawn in the EPAR paper “that causal factors are rarely immediately apparent” (Anderson 2015). Planners seldom map the dependencies beyond second or third order due to a lack of time and/or appreciation of the complexity of the post-conflict situation. In our field validation, the relief coordinators spoke of an inability to comprehend and track the sheer number of relationships in the system, and so segmented the system into smaller subsystems. Once segmented, planning was focused on the subsystem without necessarily understanding the relationships between the subsystems.

Figure 3 shows, at a high level, the relationship between the Rehabilitation of CI and Routine Efficiencies. Looking at this small section of the system in isolation, one gets the impression that if we get the Rehabilitation of CI and Water Treatment right (which are on the strongest path as shown by the darker orange arrows from Practical Experience to Rehabilitation of CI to

Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation

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53 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation

Water Treatment), then Routine Efficiencies will be successful. However, Practical Experience also influences Skills & Knowledge and Promote Economic Adjustment and Recovery, which in turn affects Routine Efficiencies. Nothing goes beyond Routine Efficiencies in this small sector, which begs the question: “so what?” Does getting Routine Efficiencies to a certain state mean that the society will indeed be on its way to rehabilitation? Or will society remain stuck in a form of survival mode?

Figure 4 shows the same part of the system, but in a larger context that encompasses Wastewater Treatment and Garbage Disposal and their relationships to Human Health and Sanitation. Also, of note are the two nodes Pedestrian and Roads. These show the dependency chain from Practical Experience to Rehabilitation of CI and then through to Locally Available Raw Materials to Routine Efficiencies. This chain highlights the importance of a very short supply chain (walking distance for pedestrians) to enable the realization of routine efficiencies.

The availability of safe drinking water within relatively close proximity to family units is extremely important to keeping Routine Efficiencies at a manageable level. The model shows a dependency path from Rehabilitation of CI and the Maintenance of CI, showing that once the critical infrastructure is rehabilitated, it must be maintained at an appropriate level of service. Both nodes also have Water Treatment as a dependent, which then leads to the Water Distribution Network, to Drinking Water and then to Routine Efficiencies. The only high dependency in this chain is Rehabilitation of CI to Water Treatment, the rest are all low or medium, which means that as long as the critical infrastructure that enables water treatment is rehabilitated, the rest of the network should perform as expected. But the demands on the critical infrastructure will depend on the scale of the water treatment required, whether it is for a village or for a larger urban centre, and the demand will grow as the community and its supporting economy grows.

As with Figure 3, what can be noted in Figure 4 is that there is no feedback loop. There is no way of knowing whether or not the critical infrastructure is meeting the demand of the community. Despite investigating a larger sector of the system, it is still not a good indicator of the requirements of the critical infrastructure.

Figure 5 depicts a much larger subsection within an even larger context. Within this context, one can see that five of the eight upstream dependencies for Rehabilitation of CI that were noted in Figure 2 earlier are present. More importantly, however, is the existence of loops within the

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55 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation subsector, offering us feedback in the performance of the system. Examining the model indicates that Civil Society Organizations are a key enabler in the feedback loops, as they are connected to the Diaspora and to Technical Training Programs. The Diaspora will have political influence in their host nations, influencing international aid and development agendas, as well as sending money back to their families and community associations in the post-conflict area. Routine Efficiencies have an influence on Education, as it promotes more time in the day for Literacy, Numeracy and Technical Training programmes as opposed to subsistence foraging. With this larger slice of the model, one can begin to see better the interconnectedness of the complexities present in the rehabilitation of post-conflict areas, and so understand where efforts or influence can be best directed.

People may be resilient; infrastructure assets are not resilient, because they are not self-healing. Therefore, it is the people that must remain at the centre of rehabilitation efforts, defining what is required of the infrastructure to support community and individual resilience. People rehabilitate, maintain and grow the critical infrastructure needed to enable the rehabilitation of an economy and its society. These causal chain models are therefore not simple linear models, but rather, an interdependent web of activities that reflect the move of a post-conflict society towards a set of targeted outcomes. A model such as described would ideally be constructed during the watching brief phase (World Bank 1998), and then modified throughout subsequent phases as the situation evolved. A post-conflict society is a complex adaptive system; it will be in a constant state of flux as the stakeholders in the system react to actions by other stakeholders. In this ever-changing situation, because it is almost impossible to ensure that any one action will result in the desired outcome, it is best to probe the system with several actions, sense the patterns that are emerging, and respond with actions designed to facilitate the emergence of the desired patterns (Snowden & Boone 2007).

As the society grows larger and more productive, it will attract more stakeholders that will increase the demand, which in turn will require more robust infrastructure systems to support the added demand. Too little supporting infrastructure will limit development, whereas too much can lead to rapid growth which can quickly become unsustainable (boom and bust cycle). Thus, an economic system on a trajectory to reach a Minimum Sustainable Capability (MSC) (Hay 2016a), or better, can easily slip back to Minimum Operating Capability (MOC) due to unsustainably rapid population growth, particularly if the locals do not have the skills, knowledge and available

56 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation

Longest Path (in context) (in Path Longest

–

I to Routine Efficiencies Efficiencies Ito Routine

of C of

Rehabilitation

. .

5 Figure Figure

57 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation materials to maintain and then grow the enabling infrastructure themselves. Thus, it comes back to training (Alternative Basic Education and Vocational Training), practical experience (Mentoring programmes), opportunities for locals (including former combatants), and the time required for infrastructure systems to be brought back to a state of equilibrium that reflects current demand, often referred to as the new normal.

Conducting this investigation into the causal relationships from input to outcome demonstrated that it is not only feasible to identify what will lead to an outcome, but that it is practicable to identify the indicators of likely outcome. The coincidence of indicators increases the likelihood of that outcome being realised, whereas a divergence suggests some other outcome and unintended consequence. This means that it is possible to measure likely outcome during the conduct of relief, reconstruction and development. This investigation into the outcomes-based measurement of post- conflict infrastructure reconstruction is published under peer review. Hay AH & Kilburn RG (2018) “Measuring success in post-conflict infrastructure development” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers Municipal Engineer Journal. Online publication ahead of print https://doi.org/10.1680/jmuen.17.00040. Dated 23 July 2018.

The core building block of the causal chain analysis is an evidential common understanding of the current situation, not simply a common reference. It is a consistent requirement to deliver this common understanding. That means not only recognising what is, but correctly interpreting what it means and the associated relationships with and within the socio-economic context.

It is also useful to note how the modeling is conducted. The role of the modeller and analyst in these situations is to:

a. ensure that the model reflects the current situation; b. run what-if scenarios based on the probable actions of local actors in response to changes to the critical infrastructure; and c. advise decision-makers on the most influential nodes or actors in the system, the desired outcomes of decisions, and on the most dangerous outcomes that may arise from proposed decisions.

The analyst describes the patterns that may manifest from the evolution of the society, and to highlight the conditions that will facilitate the desired scenarios while discouraging or halting the undesirable patterns. These identified enabling conditions define what is needed of the

58 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation infrastructure, during completion and following commissioning. It should also be noted that all these tasks will be conducted in an atmosphere of little to no control over timings to achieve those desired outcomes.

3.5. Summary of Requirement This exploration of the rehabilitation requirement, the reconstruction and development of post- conflict infrastructure, and the role they play in the rehabilitation paradigm brings some clarity to the description of the requirement. The driving interest is to make the rehabilitation paradigm implementable and successful, reflecting what the IC knows to be a successful outcome in today’s conflict areas. This can be summarised as understanding the de facto laydown of infrastructure systems and socio-economic dynamics post-conflict, and using the infrastructure reconstruction to intelligently enable community rehabilitation rather than as exclusive projects. It demands a revised approach to measurement of success, and a reorientation of planning around local need, rather than perceived deficiency. The requirement to understand brings us back to the need for a common understanding that is current and evidence-based, and develops with the stakeholder acceptance of a common reference. However, it also means that the baseline requirements that will be used to inform the mission analysis are:

a. Recognise the population’s current resource demand density distribution (how much resource is needed where, when and why); b. Recognise the current infrastructure systems laydown, inter-connectivity and patterns of use; c. Recognise the population’s patterns of movement (using Emergence, for example); d. Incorporate transparent governance of the infrastructure systems, which are locally defined and developed within local culture and social capacity; e. Intelligent resourcing; f. Demonstrably build for the future, not the current crisis; g. Maximum community engagement possible in the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort (particularly including the most vulnerable); h. Plan and build in balance (not develop one infrastructure system ahead of other systems) so that the essential synergy within the vitae system of systems may be maintained through the process; and i. Use indicators of anticipated outcome rather than output metrics.

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3.6. Issues Arising Exploring the rehabilitation paradigm, perspective and mensuration issues affecting post-conflict rehabilitation raises several consistent issues that present as challenges. The driving need for a codified simplicity in applying the rehabilitation paradigm gives rise to a situational blindness that fails to recognise what has happened during and immediately following the conflict. This failure to recognise and therefore understand the situation feeds the development professional’s dependency on past and foreign examples that may or may not be relevant, and therefore subject to greater donor influence that can distort any alignment of requirements with local needs. Linked to this is a focus on the identified asset need that can be objectified and funded, blinding all to the socio- economic context in which it is to operate. This focus on assets and immediate tangible goals encourages measurement of project output, despite the socio-economic outcomes reflecting the purpose of the project.32 This questions our very understanding of infrastructure and how that understanding is practically applied in post-conflict situations. To understand de facto post-conflict infrastructure in its socio-economic context, one must be able to recognise what infrastructure exists and its relationship to a changed socio-economic dynamic, and the roles that infrastructure plays in defining the socio-economic context and as the enabler of socio-economic purpose. In effect, one needs a method of recognising what infrastructure systems currently exist and to understand how they enable the current socio-economic dynamics. This understanding needs to be evidence-based and common to all stakeholders. I propose that this understanding will be provided through a Common Operating Picture (COP), which is described fully in Chapter 5.

Once armed with a COP, and common understanding and reference that it affords, it is for the local community to identify their requirements and needs, usefully facilitated and not directed by the development professionals and international donors. This same common understanding informs the selection of metrics, affording a consistency in infrastructure project planning and controls. Simply, it informs the community to realise how they envision their future; it enables real place branding, as Simon Anholt described it (Anholt 2011). This represents a transition from an opinion-based identification of deficiencies and hence projects, to a judgement based one. That is not to say there won’t still be the influence of bias, but at least it will be informed, suggesting

32 This situational blindness appears to arise from the development agencies seeking a cost-recovery from utilities and local authorities. The associated socioeconomic analysis can be limited to an assessment of affordability and willingness to pay. So much of this will depend on how the context will change over the life of the asset(s), suggesting that a systems development initiative would be more effective than an asset-based project.

60 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation closer alignment. The implementation of these infrastructure works will similarly be socio- economic in scope and planning, rather than something defined by engineering disciplines. Effective implementation requires an application of the concept of what infrastructure is during planning, construction and operation. To address these challenges, we need a clear concept of infrastructure, high-confidence recognition of actual infrastructure systems in context and an implementation framework. The next step in this journey is therefore to explore what infrastructure is in the post-conflict context.

Building on this idea of an evidence-based definition of the infrastructure development requirement to realise a locally-defined vision, I collaborated with a former urban design colleague, Antonio Gómez-Palacio, and a geospatial analyst, Nick Martyn, to build a model framework for resilient community development. This is published under peer review. Hay AH, Gómez-Palacio A & Martyn NQJ (2017) Chapter 11: Planning Resilient Communities. Risk & Resilience: Methods and Application in Environment, Cyber and Social Domains. (Eds. Linkov I & Palma-Oliveira JM) NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – C: Environmental Security. Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. pp313-326. It also drew on some earlier work that I presented to The Infrastructure Security Partnership in April 2014.

3.7. Comment The goal of this chapter is to answer Question 1. How can one determine a rehabilitation requirement that better reflects a beneficial outcome for the local community; and how should the rehabilitation paradigm reflect that? In addressing this goal, it also provided an answer to Question 3. How can one measure community outcome of infrastructure projects during their reconstruction? I have explored the rehabilitation paradigm, its purpose, concepts and the deficiencies in its application. Through alignment of infrastructure requirement with local need, based on actual evidence of what the current infrastructure laydown is in its socio-economic context, I investigated the use of indicators of anticipated outcome as a more representative metric for success during and following project implementation. These concepts were supported during the 2017 field studies in the Gaza Strip, providing confidence that the direction and findings of the research are sound. Furthermore, the component parts of requirement identification and outcome mensuration were published as peer-reviewed papers, as was a more general adaptation of the findings to resilient community planning. The goal is achieved. However, it has also raised questions that, while beyond the scope of this thesis, merit further attention:

61 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation a. It is not clear how infrastructure influences individual and collective human behaviour. At a macro level, we understand the patterns of influence that infrastructure has on a community and its economy. At a micro level, we have observed that different colours influence human moods differently, according to culture. We don’t appear to have that meso level of understanding of how a new infrastructure project influences public perceptions before during and after implementation. Our lack of understanding was clearly demonstrated in the construction of Ontario Highway 407 and how public perception has changed about both the highway and its method of implementation through each stage of development. This goes beyond stakeholder engagement and mental modeling. It will be relevant in post-conflict areas, because it can inform which projects are prioritised and how they are planned, operated and maintained. There is current industry research into autonomous simulant behaviour, which is similar to agent modeling, using Artificial Intelligence that may incorporate these influence questions. b. The intergenerational nature of trauma is ever-present in post-conflict areas. Work by Dr. Bruce Perry and others has shown that infants carry this trauma through their lives and their productivity as citizens is socially and economically limited. This can go on for generations, as demonstrated in the DRC and other sub-Saharan countries. We have long known the positive benefits of providing a social structure to enable local participation in infrastructure reconstruction and development, in community engagement and poverty reduction. However, the broader health effects are potentially more relevant in post-conflict rehabilitation of communities, and reducing the likelihood of a return to violence. It is coincidentally an issue that is being investigated by the Martin Family Foundation with aboriginal communities in Canada. c. The professional competencies required of infrastructure engineers and development planners are more multi-disciplinary than today’s strict academic specialisations recognise. A general observation of my peer group and their colleagues would suggest the practicing group is typically mid-50s, without obvious succession. There has been a broad recognition internationally that more inter-disciplinary education and training is needed in the engineering professions, with a gradual trend towards the “generalist” thinking of Buckminster Fuller. However, I do not believe that it is as simple as that. I conducted research for the Institution of Civil Engineers, 2007-2009, looking at the competencies that will make Chartered Civil Engineers internationally competitive in 2025 and beyond, and other mentoring and

62 Chapter 3: The Challenges to Infrastructure Rehabilitation professional development work. Tomorrow’s infrastructure planners will require a different skill-set to their predecessors, capable of functioning in the professional space between the current engineering specialisations and with a broader interdisciplinary understanding. We need to properly investigate how to develop the next generation of infrastructure engineers.

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Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure Infrastructure does not fit neatly in any one discipline. Generally considered Civil Engineering, it is more than structures, municipal engineering, environmental and so on. It falls between these specialisations and calls on other disciplines. These include, but not limited to, geospatial analytics, urban planning, anthropology, political science, economics, stakeholder engagement, project finance, emergency management, and municipal governance. My focus in this thesis is the infrastructure engineer, who must interact with myriad experts, and build a clear understanding of what exists, how it works and what different proposed courses of action might mean. The infrastructure situation in any post-conflict area will be confused, and not every asset will be familiar and its associations understood. The infrastructure engineer working in post-conflict areas needs a frame of reference against which to interpret what is observed. That frame of reference allows the infrastructure engineer to intelligently apply past experiences to new and unfamiliar situations; the frame of reference must be a simple unifying concept of infrastructure.

This chapter explores the nature of infrastructure, its roles and functions, to develop a unifying concept that will allow infrastructure engineers to consistently interpret what they see in the field, to develop an understanding of what it means and draw out further areas for investigation. This will form the basis for common understanding, and so inform the development of the COP. My approach is to deconstruct heuristic practice and reassemble what works to a common first- principles framework. Along the way, I explore ways of addressing the gaps. My goal in this chapter is to build a unifying concept of infrastructure that allows the infrastructure engineer to reasonably interpret what is observed.

4.1. Defining Infrastructure Infrastructure means different things to different people. Sometimes, there is an inherent understanding across disciplines or organisational departments of others’ definitions, but generally infrastructure is defined by the user. For computer engineers and technicians, infrastructure refers to the built systems that enable processing and data management. Similarly defined around purpose, the recovery parameters are defined by the data resource that the infrastructure enables. For example, the cause of a failure or corruption in data must be rectified within a Recovery Time Objective and the data set restored as at a specified time prior to the failure-causing event known as the Recovery Point Objective. These are defined by the purpose of the infrastructure as it relates to the operation in question, specifically the management and handling of electronic/digital data. Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure

The infrastructure that enables a hospital or simply the operating room of a hospital is similarly defined by the function or purpose that it enables. In this case, there will be multiple infrastructure systems that enable the hospital operating room and they must function in concert if the operation is to be efficiently enabled. This directly relates purpose to use and hence to value. The value being defined by the operation that the infrastructure enables. In the operating room case, the enabling infrastructure must be at a minimum performance within a certain time tolerance for the functions in the operating room to be unimpeded, Recovery Performance Objective within a Recovery Time Objective. The fundamental relationship that infrastructure has with the functions and operations that it enables is inherent to all infrastructure systems, even if the functions, context and application will be different in every case. It is this that gives rise to the concept that the value of infrastructure is determined by its use and/or response capability rather than the cost of construction/creation. It also raises several questions. Not least of which are how one can protect that value; how one infrastructure system relates to another; and how the role and functions of an infrastructure system change in a post-conflict context. To tackle these questions, it is important to first investigate the purpose of infrastructure and how it relates to value.

4.2. Purpose and Value Human endeavour is supported by three domains of infrastructure. The natural infrastructure existed before humanity’s arrival and will exist after humanity’s extinction. Over the years of human existence, it has been harnessed to support various human activities. This ranges from farming to mineral exploitation, and water extraction to the provision of navigations for transportation. Each use involves something built that allows its potential to be harnessed and a system of procedures that identifies how. These are represented by the other domains. The built domain is everything that is physically built to enable an operation, a purpose. This can be a road or port facility that enhances the capability that the natural domain provides, or the Internet, or a fire hall that enables other reserve capabilities. The virtual domain of infrastructure is all that is imagined, enabling humans to commonly use the other domains. Each virtual infrastructure exists because it is imagined and commonly recognised as a

65 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure shared concept. For example, money is an imagined concept with the value of a coin or promissory note determined by common agreement and confidence that the issuing institution will pay the bearer that value. The coins and notes have no intrinsic value, only the value that is commonly ascribed to them. The laws and regulations, organisational culture, codes of practice and other agreements governing behaviour are similarly imagined and adhered to by common consent. Infrastructure enables a purpose through the balance of these three domains between each other and with the actor of that purpose, humans. When one looks at any vitae system of systems used to define the dynamics of a city (Bristow 2015), it can be defined by the relationship between these three infrastructure domains and the human domain. Together, they determine the value of the infrastructure by the purpose that they together enable.

There are also six dimensions to infrastructure, comprising the three spatial dimensions, time, a control one and a functional/human one. The first three are simply the Cartesian dimensions that define the infrastructure in space. The temporal defines the infrastructure in time. For example, a level crossing cannot simultaneously be both road and railway track at the same time. If it were, there would be frequent accidents as trains destroy automobiles in their way. The role of the infrastructure is therefore defined temporally. The temporal dimension also influences the condition and value of the infrastructure over time, as use and context change. The example of the Trans-Canada Highway illustrates this well, how despite the construction of the higher capacity and faster Ontario 400 series roads, the value of the Route 7 has changed but continues and grows. The level crossing also illustrates the control dimension. In order for users to know what purpose the infrastructure enables at that time, warning lights and barriers provide controls for users and other stakeholders. It then becomes a question of how the infrastructure is operated by humans. Are the controls adhered to and the infrastructure operated accident free, and is the infrastructure properly maintained so that all aspects of its function remain serviceable?

When one reduces infrastructure assets dimensionally, it is possible to see the functional connections between assets that make up the infrastructure systems. These in turn are related by function to enable a common purpose that is supported by a system of systems. Each one is defined dimensionally, but exists as a balance of the four domains that define its value. There is a clear link between the value represented by an infrastructure system of systems enabling a purpose and all of its component assets and functions in context. The functional dimension of the infrastructure also links the services that enable the functionality of the infrastructure, which

66 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure allows one to define the function of a specified asset by the infrastructure and services that support it. Where there is a deficiency in the supporting infrastructure or service, there is a consequence for the function. This causal relationship allows one to map infrastructure functionally, as well as spatially. The City of Toronto Infrastructure Resilience Study in 2012 (Bristow 2015) demonstrated that there is no practicable limit to the causal relationships between infrastructures and services. In the study, essential city functions were defined and the enabling infrastructures and services for each determined and those for each in turn. The study was manually conducted using directed graph analysis and a prioritisation system developed by the Visual Understanding Environment (VUE) project at Tufts University.

Today, through applying commercial graphic interfaces,33 one is able to build causal chain models with n orders of separation, exposing whole supply chain influences on city functions, contextual influences and hazards, and social behaviours. However, these relationships are not binary. There are real thresholds of performance, where a degradation in one enabling infrastructure or service does not necessarily cause a failure in the function that it enables, up to a point. These functional thresholds need to be defined to be analysed. Relating the thresholds to functional consequence allows one to transfer [asset] financial cost of loss and functional impact across the dependency relationships. In heuristic practice, consequence is therefore defined by operation (also known as mission), direct financial cost of loss, and political/social influence. This breakdown is entirely compatible with the directed path algorithm that builds the causal chain and has been adopted into commercial software applications. [Current commercial development work is applying hypergraphing to the infrastructure dependency models so that one can capture effect and influence across all four domains of the vitae system of systems, discussed later in this chapter. This promises a significant advancement in our understanding of the socioeconomic influence of infrastructure systems over their life]. The concept of “consequence” has three related dimensions:

a. Operational Consequence is the impact on the operating/functional performance of the next dependent asset. For example, a failure of Activity A will have an effect on Activity B, which depends upon Activity A. The level of stress that Activity A can be subjected to before it fails is the functional threshold. Therefore, a system can carry significant stress before there is any sign of failure. This will manifest as a loss of operating efficiency or erosion of response

33 The directed graphing application used in this work is RiskOutLook, produced by Deep Logic Solutions Inc. It uses a Tom Sawyer graphic interface.

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capability and/or capacity. The performance and capability impact can be financially measured according to the conventions of the operating organisation or regulatory authority. b. Financial Consequence is the direct and immediate cost of loss of a specific asset. This can be calculated as the cost of restoration/replacement, or as the current market value in a financial transfer of risk calculation. c. Political Consequence is the change in social license within and outwith the organisation arising from the failure of an activity. This is typically a qualitative assessment, but can be quantitatively assessed when a comprehensive mental modeling exercise has been conducted. Social licence is represented in each self-identifying stakeholder, rather than those directly affected by the operation. This can manifest as market good will and brand value, or influence the development of new government policies and regulations.

Each operation comprises enabling functions. These are all the activities that define the operation. Each function will in turn depend upon other functions and infrastructure, which in turn depend upon others. It is useful to understand how these inter-dependent functions and infrastructure components combine to deliver the performance of the whole operation relative to whole-of- operation thresholds. There are two critical thresholds to apply. The first is the Minimum Sustainable Capacity/Capability (MSC). This is the point at which the operation as a whole is stable and self-sustaining. It is not failing, but neither is it developing. In financial terms, it is the point at which the operation is self-supporting, neither losing nor making money. The other is the Minimum Operating Capability/Capacity (MOC). This is the point that defines essential function. Below this point the operation fails. Should performance fall below MOC, there will be a period that if MOC is not restored within the operation becomes unrecoverable.

Similarly, when performance drops below MSC, there will be a period before all available resources are consumed and sustainable operations are no longer attainable. This is known as the Planning Point (PP) and can be defined in terms of market good will or contract tolerance. For a spark plug manufacturer supporting an automotive manufacturer with a just-in-time supply, say, the PP will be the customer’s tolerance of delay, irrespective of the situation. These thresholds can be likened to a trauma victim. MOC would be heart function. If the heart stops, there is a short time before which it must have restarted if the patient is to survive and fully recover. MSC would be bleeding. The bleeding must be stopped for the patient to be stable and so begin recovery. Once again, there is a defined length of time in which the bleeding must be stopped before the patient

68 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure becomes irrecoverable. These relationships are most usefully represented using the Incident Sequence. My exploration of performance and time tolerances of an operation in an incident exposed, in the literature, the association of resource use and component function with operational performance through an incident. I proposed a graphic Incident Sequence analytical approach to calculating this relationship for risk management and resilience planning purposes. Because it ascribes value of an operation through an incident it is possible to calculate the Whole Cost of Risk for one risk mitigation process and compare with another. This investigation into operational performance and recovery thresholds and proposed methodology is published under peer review. Hay AH (2016) “The Incident Sequence as Resilience Planning Framework” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers Journal of Infrastructure Asset Management 3(2):55-60.

Once the Incident Sequence has been laid out, one can ascribe resource types and quantities against each enabling function at each stage of the incident. For example, an operation will have a clearly defined resource requirement at a routine level of performance. During an incident that may involve the loss of a critical resource supply, such as grid electrical power, the Reaction stage to attain MOC will need to compensate for that lost critical resource, in this case a stand-by generator using gasoline. Gasoline is a resource required solely for the Reaction stage and not normally accounted for under routine resource demand. One can therefore calculate how much gasoline and what generator capacity is required to effect MOC. It also allows one to lay out deliberately how to recover full operations through a deliberate sequence of function restoration. This means that one can determine maximum cost of recovery, maximum duration of impaired performance and so maximum loss exposure and Value at Risk (VaR).34 Similarly, the whole cost of risk can be derived for each incident stage and used as a reference for risk treatment strategies and infrastructure development plans. The whole cost of the proposal is the cost of the residual risk and the cost of proposed works. If this is lower than the existing inherent whole cost of risk, it is

34 Value at Risk (VaR) is “a threshold value such that the probability of loss on the portfolio over the given time horizon exceeds this value, assuming normal markets and no trading in the portfolio.” Risk Management Principles and Practices 1st Edition (Ed. Elliott MW) 2012, The Institutes on behalf of the Global Risk Management Institute (GRMI). This is the risk and finance industry definition of VaR and used here to ensure alignment between engineering projects and their financiers. For engineering project purposes, this means the likelihood of losing more than a defined maximum value at any stage of a project or program over the duration of that stage/project/program. Therefore $300M @ 5% over 3 months means that there is a 5% chance that more than $300M will be lost over the 3 months in question. It is used for sequencing capital projects in high risk areas or where the consequence of loss is significant, i.e. risk balancing rather than resource balancing projects. It can also be used to set a maximum exposure to loss at any stage of the project to maintain credit-worthiness through a project.

Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure

Time

Minimum Operating Capability Operating Minimum

Minimum Sustainable Capability Sustainable Minimum

RECOVERY

Planning Point Planning

INCIDENT SEQUENCEINCIDENT

RESPONSE

REACTION

Routine

MSC MOC

Performance

Sustainable Resource Demand Resource Sustainable

Demand Resource Routine

the same as used at Routine at used as same the

Reaction Reaction Resource Demand The resources required for the Reaction are not necessary necessary not are Reaction the for required resources The

70 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure viable. The Incident Sequence is a powerful tool that is today employed in leading commercial practice.

4.3. Equilibrium In “Governing the Commons” the Nobel Laureate, Elinor Ostrom, described multiple users self- managing a common resource in a closed system. Each was motivated by self-interest that the use of that common resource would be sustainable (Ostrom 1990). In “Collapse” Jared Diamond provides examples of civilisations that expended their entire resource, often realising that they were compromising any sustainability for future generations (Diamond 2005). These two points of view are not incompatible, since the collapsing civilisations were largely isolated from any peer objective influence. Drawing multiple municipalities into a cooperation around a common resource is not unusual and when it matters, the issue tends to become more administrative than political.

Resources common to multiple municipalities and/or communities include water, electricity, natural gas, transportation and data, among others. Infrastructure provides the means for distributing these resources, and by definition is bounded or closed. Natural and built infrastructure is generally fixed and slow to respond to shifting demand densities and locations. However, the virtual domain can be more responsive, often codifying the nature of that relationship between communities, the resource and the infrastructure that carries it, and the higher authority. This relationship is in the form of a strategic framework that reflects Equilibrium. The concept of Equilibrium is simply an adaptation of Elinor Ostrom’s thesis, reflected in each public utility. It is tolerant of stresses and shocks, continually changing the dynamics of access. Where there is equity of access to the resource, there is greater efficiency of operation and the capacity to adapt to stresses. It should be noted that the infrastructure carries the resource. It is not the resource. The resource is the intrinsic value of electrons, water and ideas. When the demand for that resource moves, the infrastructure can’t just move to suit, but instead must be redeveloped to support the changed demand profile and location. It is impractical to rebuild an improved balanced infrastructure system, so only the immediately affected areas are developed. Consequently, changes in demand will place stresses on the infrastructure system as a whole. Through its successful ability to support a dynamic community and hence evolving demand profiles, the infrastructure systems delivering the necessary resource become less efficient.

Equilibrium was the basis for the CRCI workshop at Smart Geometry in 2014 using dyed water under varying pressures in different complex pipework configurations to represent multiple users

71 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure and supplies around a common infrastructure.35 A natural balance was reached for each configuration. It suggests that equity of access to the resource offers the means to achieve a natural balance, whereas equality needs to be imposed and continually curated.

Figure 8. Equilibrium Theory depicting the relationship between community and infrastructure

The infrastructure system will have a finite carrying capacity that defines the upper bound of supportable demand density at a given location, given everything else that the infrastructure systems enable. Conversely the lower bound for demand density at that location is defined by the net revenues from that development to maintain the infrastructure service. Logically, the choice of how much to densify demand at a given location necessarily falls within those two limits. When it doesn’t, the community imposes a significant stress on the infrastructure. The infrastructure can’t move or upgrade quickly to meet the changed demand and so there will be adaptations and extensions built, ultimately leading to a greater maintenance burden and reduced efficiency.

35 Resilient Networks was a workshop collaboration between the Centre for Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and the Fields Institute, both University of Toronto, at Smart Geometry in Hong Kong, 2014, applying “the knowledge and digital tools of network resilience to dense urban infrastructure, informing the design and fabrication of physical models.” The results eventually led to developments in our understanding of infrastructure carrying capacity and informed the requirement for controls systems in the 2017 UN study into Connectivity for Resilient SMART Sustainable Cities.

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Infrastructure enables communities, socially and economically. It allows populations to densify and live in closer proximity, enhancing the exchange of goods, services and ideas. It has a value that goes beyond any effective form of measurement (Muller 2018), simply because it defines so much of how a community functions and the behaviours of its residents (MacAulay 2009). However, measuring an output on the assumption that it relates to an outcome will distort the balance of the operation and its conduct, making the desired outcome less likely (Muller 2018). We require a system of measurement of infrastructure value and performance to inform design parameters of success. As already discussed, socio-economic value of changes in the infrastructure can be measured. The coincidence of indicators of likely outcome provide confidence that the project will lead to the desired outcome. This concept is explored further in Chapter 5 and was field tested in the Gaza Strip November 2017 through June 2018, as part of the development of an implementation framework discussed in Chapter 6. The outcome value of socio-economic change arising from an infrastructure project provides a clearer planning and design parameter than any output metric. Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 3, being able to understand the influence that infrastructure projects have on the community is not necessarily reflected in the community perception of the infrastructure that is there.

All infrastructure, whether natural, built or virtual, has a carrying capacity. That carrying capacity is defined by how much demand it can support under different conditions. Ostensibly, it is possible to develop a new consumer base in a particular location that draws on the maximum capacity of the infrastructure. However, when there is a reduction in supply due to a component or sub-system failure, operations at the consumer base will be significantly impaired and may be irrecoverable. Therefore, carrying capacity is defined as three measures. The peak carrying capacity is how much can be provided for limited periods of time, is not continuous, and is unsustainable. The sustainable carrying capacity is the serviceable level of supply, represented by the range between the upper and lower limits shown in Figure 9.

The essential carrying capacity is the level of supply that remains possible when there is a system failure. For example, when electric pumps are used to maintain water supply at pressure to a community, the essential carrying capacity is the water supply available when the electricity supply fails. These three levels of infrastructure carrying capacity are used in resilience planning and provide planning limits for normal and essential functions in buildings and other facility operations (Figure 7 refers). Luo showed that the metrics for carrying capacity could be

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standardised (Luo 2016), rather than the multitude of site-specific heuristic practices. This allows comparison between sites and better system-wide assessment.

Figure 9. Graph illustrating the relationship between demand density for a specific resource and the carrying capacity of the infrastructure to provide that resource. The greatest development efficiency is at a point between the upper and lower limits of the infrastructure carrying capacity and is unique to that community and its situation The demand density is the need for a resource over a given area. Again, it is represented in the same three thresholds of peak demand, sustainable/serviceable demand and essential demand, which also relate to the resilience planning practices for facilities. Demand density is calculated as an aggregate of component operations within that space. For example, a multi-use commercial development will have many different operations, each with a peak, serviceable and essential demand. Aggregating the essential demands for a specific area is compared directly with the essential carrying capacity.36 Where the essential demand exceeds the essential carrying capacity, alternative stand-by or base supplies can be incorporated into the facilities planning and design to ensure that essential functionality may continue even if the enabling infrastructure system is compromised. Ideally, the serviceability demand will be as close to but more than net-zero carrying capacity. The peak capacity is a time sensitive aggregate, capturing when peak demand can coincide. When compared with the infrastructure peak carrying capacity, one either adjusts the

36 Using MSExcel2016, one can collate georeferenced resource consumption data and represent as heat maps for quick comparison against the infrastructure laydown and capacities. It is an effective tool and commonly used for preliminary assessment of service area coverage in utilities infrastructure planning.

74 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure sequencing of operations at the facility or introduces supplementary baseline supply so that the resource draw on the infrastructure at peak times is within its peak carrying capacity. This reflects the nature of the demand profile, which is rarely a constant demand round the clock.

Each operation will need the resource for different purposes and at different times in different quantities. This information is known as the demand profile for an operation and includes the thresholds of essential, serviceable/sustainable and peak. When these are aggregated for all the operations at a given site over each time increment, it is possible to directly relate the site demand profile to the carrying capacity of the enabling infrastructure system at that site. As Marshall noted (Marshall 1890), multiple sites or groups of operations with a common relationship or interest will often cluster together for shared benefit. Most typically, this is in the form of shared assurance, whether around security or a critical resource.

Clustering of demand groups is commonly observed around energy where each group in the cluster produces and shares electrical power from a distinct source. A failure in source supply to any one group, is compensated by the difference between serviceable and peak capacity of the other groups. In resilience planning, as applied to capability-based planning of infrastructure, this compensating provision can be leveraged so that it at least meets the essential demand of the failing group and ideally its serviceable demand. As each cluster will be composed of groups of demand profiles, each cluster will have a distinct demand signature that shifts over time within the cluster area. This offers a possible way to capture demand cluster performance, recognised from its patterns of demand and operation. The necessities of post-conflict existence mean that there will be expedient work-arounds that can expose the nature of the demand cluster, its operations and scale.

The relationship that the community has with its enabling infrastructure is almost parasitic. It stresses and consumes the very host that enables and nourishes it. This community-infrastructure relationship reaches a balance that may or may not be sustainable, but suffices for the planning horizon of that community. This community-infrastructure balance will be very different if the community is fighting for existence and future planning is virtually non-existent, to when life is stable and the community begins to think of the world that their children will inherit. The relationship between community and infrastructure is unique to each community situation, being defined by community composition and functions, as well as hazard profiles, location and neighbours. In fact, every community will have such a relationship with its enabling infrastructure. In a region, the infrastructure spine will be common to all those communities. Multiple

75 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure communities with their unique infrastructure relationships will be drawing on a common resource from a common infrastructure. This will reach a dynamic self-governing structure that adjusts with each change in a community, defining a shift in the demand profile of that community. It then falls to the higher authority to recognise and codify the critical components of that self-governance without imposing constraints that then upset the dynamic balance, as observed by Ostrom over the regulation of forestry quotas (Ostrom 1990).

These infrastructure relationships and the ways of matching demand to carrying capacity remain common to both the natural and built domains of infrastructure and to a lesser extent the virtual domain. However, actual balance between the domains is necessarily defined by how the infrastructure systems are used, and the decision making that manages their use. This is defined by the human domain. These four domains classify the component systems in an urban vitae system of systems. When there is balance, synergy, between the domains, there is an inherent robustness to the vitae system of systems and it can better absorb shocks and stresses, as each domain compensates for transitory deficiencies in another. This is similar to the self-interest relationship that supports clustering (Marshall 1890).

4.4. Vitae System of Systems To paraphrase Bristow’s definition (Bristow 2015) from Okada (Okada 2006), a vitae system of systems is a complex concentration of dynamic and diverse operationally and managerially independent systems, distributed geographically, which as a whole and by component parts evolves, adapts, self-organises and produces emergent behaviours that enable the survivability, conviviality and vitality of [human] communities. It is in all respects a complex adaptive system that describes how cities function. While the value of the system as a whole is represented by the synergy between the domains, it is also necessary to have a certain frisson that keeps the whole vital and exciting to its occupants, acting as that stimulus for creativity. Speaking in 2015 while at the Harvard Kennedy School, Juliette Kayyem37 spoke of the need to maintain a perception balance between security and danger. This reflects a positive benefit to stress on the system and the capacity inherent in the community systems to respond and adapt to the stress. This adaptability is

37 The 2013 Pulitzer Prize for Commentary finalist and assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security 2009-2010, Juliette Kayyem JD is the Belfer Lecturer in International Security at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She was interviewed by Genetec as part of the Citywise 2015 project, during which she explained that “stuff happens” and ultimately the value of the city is determined by how it deals with it and informs public perception. (Genetec 2015)

76 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure important. A defining characteristic of complex adaptive systems, the ability to adapt to a stress and achieve a new synergy explains how many post-conflict communities are functioning in a stable way well below their MSC. The international crisis relief effort addresses the critical resource demands of food and fuel, allowing the community systems to adapt to this new normal. The resulting stability is sustainable as long as the resource flow of essential aid is maintained.

We tested this aspect of the vitae system of systems on our field validation survey in the Gaza Strip, November 2017. Economically, the Gaza Strip is significantly below MSC, yet has socio- economic stability. The significant diesel imports from Bahrain and Qatar, and the micronutrient- enriched food aid provided through the World Food Programme (WFP) ensure that the functional necessities are addressed and the community adapts everything else to suit. However, when I investigated the inherent capacity to respond to a new crisis, I found little to none. In effect, in adapting to the continued stress the community had expended its capacity to respond and self- recover in the next crisis. This realisation provoked a debate with our hosts around whether the continued international relief aid in fuel and food was preventing the regeneration of response capacity in the communities. The econo-politics of international relief aid is outside the scope of this thesis, though would make a very interesting study. However, what was apparent from this field study was the mismatch between crisis relief aid and the state of the Gaza Strip population. If the population has attained stability, the continuation of a crisis relief effort effectively prevents the normal self-recovery and regeneration of capability. There needs to be a provision to adjust the relief aid in alignment with the dynamics of the population. As stability is achieved, the vitae system of systems has no external stimuli to change. That means that changes to component systems need to be made, maintaining balance between the domains and stimulating the population to adapt to a lesser state of internally applied stress. However, simply withdrawing the crisis food and fuel aid will inevitably lead to community collapse and in all likelihood precipitate an irrecoverable crisis.

For example, expanding on the Gaza Strip field study, the population has adapted to a new normal enabled by the international relief aid. This is unsustainable. Stress to cause a change in the overall level of performance by the local economy needs to be generated from within. This stress is focused on regenerating inherent capacity to respond to the next crisis, a return to violence. Therefore, the internal stimuli in the vitae system of systems must be sustainable once implemented and accepted by the population. That means that the stimulating project must be

77 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure intelligently resourced, maintain a balance between domains and demonstrate immediate tangible benefit to the population. One such project is to develop a local sewerage system that provides sewage pre-treatment before discharge into the main sewerage network and assured functional sanitation for the local community. This pre-treatment is ideally conducted as a handprint project, i.e. net energy positive, operating from photovoltaic energy and capturing the gas produced from the pre-treatment process for some modest communal electricity generation during the hours of darkness. The project is small, self-contained and locally supportable and stimulates local ownership by the community of their local sanitation. It also reduces the burden on the centralised sewerage grid that does not have the electrical supply to operate the principal wastewater treatment plant at capacity. Critically, it reduces the susceptibility of the local community to a failure in the grid sewerage system under a return to violence.

As this example illustrates, the stimulus need not induce harm. Instead, it needs to force a stress on the existing stability to encourage a change and the attainment of a new stable relationship. The key is therefore to find stimuli that encourage enhanced capacity to respond to crises and attain a higher level of community stability. The challenge in the example presented, lies in the IC’s endorsement and pursuit of a centralised wastewater grid system, under the Wastewater Master Plan for Gaza, rather than the incremental development of inherent capacity to meet the challenges of the inevitable crises that will occur before full financial normalcy is restored.

One of the questions that I put to locals during the Gaza Strip visit was “What will the Gaza Strip look like when your children are doing your job?” Without exception, the local engineers and administrators were surprised that anyone should ask the question, let alone a foreigner. The visions were all variations on a theme of a better world where the infrastructure systems and services worked. However, it was made clear by each person that the driver was always to represent the current situation as a crisis so that they could raise funds from international donors. This was reinforced by the international agencies operating in the Gaza Strip, such that they look for crises and only collect crisis data. This would include trauma and acute disease statistics rather than on the non-communicable diseases arising from infrastructure function, or lack thereof.

This reinforced my identified requirement to manage relief, reconstruction and development as inter-related concurrent portfolios, work within the vitae system of systems, and recognise project outcomes. Once again, the issue returns to the need for a common understanding, a COP. There is also a consistent theme in rehabilitation for the restored infrastructure and services it enables to be

78 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure sustainable by the local economy and to provide the basis for further development by the population. This means that the vitae system of systems must be capable of adapting to a rapidly changing context and demand, as well as facilitating the response to crises and rapid self-recovery of the community. In effect, infrastructure systems rehabilitation must be sustainable and resilient.

4.5. Sustainability and Resilience Core concepts in infrastructure planning, resilience and sustainability are especially relevant in post-conflict rehabilitation. It is therefore important to first establish what they mean in infrastructure terms and then investigate their application. Sustainability was described by the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development) as an organising principle for life on a finite planet, with sustainable development being a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987). More specifically, as applied to infrastructure systems and the vitae system of systems, it is about being able to continue indefinitely without compromising the availability of enabling resources (Ainger & Fenner 2014). This is typically taken in planning to mean that the enabling resources are renewable and not finite. It does not mean self-sufficiency, though this can be the conclusion of resilience analysis. Coined by Holling in the 1970s, resilience is a term taken from ecology to describe the property of a system to adapt to a changing environment, respond to stresses and self-recover (Holling 1973).

Resilience has been a well-established concept in infrastructure planning for centuries, most notably during the Cold Wars when the existential threat from nuclear war led to resilience planning for critical systems. The first recorded examples of the principles would appear to be in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, describing how Cyrus the Great laid out the Persian Empire 3,000 years ago (Xenophon 1914). More correctly, one would today refer to operational resilience, which is defined by the University of Toronto Centre for Resilience of Critical Infrastructure as the essential ability of an operation to respond to and absorb the effects of shocks and stresses and to recover as rapidly as possible normal capacity and efficiency.38 Resilience is an active property of a system to respond and recover, and is distinct from other infrastructure properties. Robustness is a passive property and describes a threshold of stress that a system can tolerate before failure and does not include adaptation or the deliberate restoration of function. In current practice, technology

38 This definition of operational resilience is regularly used by the International Committee of the Red Cross Water & Habitat Unit in January 2018. It can be found on the CRCI website, http://www.crci.utoronto.ca/about/faqs. (accessed 11 May 2018).

79 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure has not yet enabled autonomous infrastructure systems and so one must infer that human function and control is inherently necessary for the built system to be resilient. This means that resilience requires all enabling domains of the vitae system of systems to exist. This reflects heuristic practice in high-value and disaster designated infrastructure systems planning and development.

Practically speaking, sustainability and resilience are two faces of the same coin, each enabling the other. UNISDR identified resilience as the critical enabler of sustainable development in 2013, expressing the common observation that one must survive changes of risk context, stresses and shocks if one is to develop sustainably (UNISDR 2013). One can’t be sustainable if one fails at the first stress or shock. Similarly, there needs to be a balance between resilience and infrastructure hardening so that each stress and minor shock does not cause any real disruption to performance. When one reviews this against the vitae system of systems, it becomes as much about the confidence that the population has in the community surviving a shock and returning to normalcy again as quickly as possible, as for the systems to actually be capable supporting that. How this is represented, is a reflection of culture. In North America, crisis leadership is valued above crisis avoidance. Much of resilience practice is seen as the preserve of Emergency Management.

Emergency Management is about the preservation of life, property and economy (FEMA 2007, GoC 2017). It is fundamentally a planning approach to preparing for and preventing crises as much as how to recover, yet it is controlled by the Fire Marshal’s offices throughout Canada. This places the emphasis on response to the emergency rather than on planning preparations and prevention. Conversely, in Europe the emphasis is on the assurance that essential services can continue through a crisis so that community performance does not fall as far as MOC and MSC is quickly attained even if the crisis continues (Cabinet Office 2011). For the developing world, catastrophic events can be existential for the economy and forces a perspective more akin to the UK’s, even if not always reflected in development project funding. However, for communities emerging from conflict and seeking as rapid a return to normality as possible, the threat of a flare up in violence or an extreme weather event can shatter the fragile progress made in rehabilitating infrastructure and economy.

Heuristically, the technique used for resilience planning is demand & dependency management. Each function of the subject operation is analysed for its dependencies and the vulnerabilities inherent in the supply of essential resources. The operation is then evaluated to reduce the requirement for specific resources, most notably energy and water, and production processes are

80 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure made more efficient. This reduced resource requirement can make alternative sources of resource supply more viable. Iteratively, one might go from a classic dairy production facility running on an

NH3 refrigeration system and dependent on a grid supply for energy to an insulated one with CO2 refrigeration system and off-grid capable with a diverse range of electricity supplies from photovoltaic and wind, to biomass generators.

In this particular dairy case, illustrated at Figure 10, the reduction in inherent risk was significant enough that production liability became fully insurable and the savings in liability coverage exceeded the capital cost of the necessary upgrades. The liability issue centred on a catastrophic release of NH3 in an urban area, forcing the evacuation of a significant part of the population and total cessation of production. Such liability is uninsurable and, in this case, would have put the dairy out of business. Instead, the dairy is able to function off-grid during an extended power

81 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure interruption without any change in productivity. This would not have been practicable just using stand-by diesel or natural gas generators.

Our world is changing, trending even. The evolution in Information & Communications Technology (ICT) has fundamentally changed the way we live, work and play. It has had the effect of concentrating operational value into ever smaller spaces, over less time and using fewer resources, than at any time in our history. Commercial Real Estate (CRE) is increasingly joining light industrial properties in being a rounding error in the value of the operations they house. This is new. The changes in ICT have so far followed an evolutionary trajectory in line with Moore’s Law (Moore 1965). Today, the reduction in microprocessor size has reached the atomic limits of the materials. ICT is poised for a technological revolution that will leverage organic systems, quantum computing and artificial intelligence. Quite what this will mean in practice over the next ten years remains speculation. However, what is clear is that the ICT changes to date have changed the way people around the world view loss. The tolerance of operational interruption is reduced, as the consequences of loss or interruption continue to rise.

The cost of loss today is greater than ever before. Industry, insurers and governments no longer have the capacity to underwrite the losses arising from a catastrophic event, such as Hurricane Katrina.39 The onus is back on the operator to ensure that they can survive a disaster and return to normality as quickly as possible. Projecting forward loss coverage based on historical data is to ignore the invalidity of the underlying assumption that the future will reflect the past. Other trends in hazards from cybercrime to climate change also make the projection of hazards into the future difficult. One doesn’t need to know what will cause the failure of a system component or supplier to prevent that failure causing whole system failure. We can understand our own operations and how consequence cascades. Causal chain analysis is the most commonly used approach to such operations analysis. Resilience at its most basic level is reducing the risk of systems loss and failure, irrespective of the cause. This is vital for post-conflict rehabilitation.

The primary concern in any post-conflict community is a sudden return to violence or conflict. There can be any number of causes, but if the progress made in transitioning to normalcy is to be preserved, albeit paused, the infrastructure rehabilitation must be resilient. This suggests a mix of

39 Hurricane Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane that struck the Gulf coast from Florida to Texas between 23rd and 31st August 2005 with winds reaching 280 km per hour. Causing approximately $125Billion is damages, it is thought the costliest such event, though not the strongest.

82 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure local and centralised reconstruction and development projects so that the community wide essential services are not compromised by the loss of a few capital assets. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) notwithstanding,40 critical infrastructure is often destroyed through direct targeting or collateral damage.

In planning for sustainability and resilience in infrastructure projects, it follows that one must specify a performance and a capability. Performance is typically represented as a maximum resource demand per topographical area. For example, one might set a power consumption limit of 8W/m2 floor area to maintain an acceptable outcome performance range. The capability specification would accompany the performance specification requiring that the temperature must remain within a particular range for a minimum of 12 hours following the loss of energy supply. This approach to design brief requirements and specifications is not universal, traditionally only used for high value and disaster designated facilities. More recently, it is being used for municipal planning standards, such as the City of Toronto’s 2018 Green Standard that sets the sustainable design requirements for new private and city-owned developments. These design requirements also reduce the susceptibility of those building occupants to harm, from a prolonged winter power outage, for example.

Compliance is demonstrated through Level 5 commissioning, which is itself a well-established practice.41 For example, the planning criteria of a hospital centre on patient care, patient safety and staff safety. In commissioning hospital systems, one would incrementally fail sub-systems and components to see if the system of systems is capable of preserving patient care, patient safety and staff safety. If any of these three criteria is compromised during the testing, the systems are reviewed and reconfigured. This approach to preserving purpose is the practical delivery of resilient infrastructure systems.

4.6. A Unifying Concept of Infrastructure From the outset of this research, I have reviewed the heuristic practices that I have been familiar with over more than 25 years of infrastructure planning. Each was deconstructed to see if it would stand up to first principles and if the results would be measurable. Many of the practices remained

40 Rule 7 of the Customary IHL: The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects. Customary IHL was originally published by the ICRC through Cambridge University Press, but today is maintain through a website, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law. (accessed 11 May 2018) 41 ASHRAE Standard 202-2013: Commissioning Process for Buildings and Systems.

83 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure intact after the review process, while others I have simply shelved as unsupportable. Some simply needed to be adjusted so that their product would be measurable and compatible with other disciplines and tools. The infrastructure engineer and planner must be intelligible to the financier. All three deal with risk, yet too often the definitions of common terms are misapplied or redefined by one or the other. Probability is a common example. Probability is a precise mathematical term and it has specific meaning in risk. It is “the extent to which an event is likely to occur, measured by the ratio of the favourable cases to the whole number of cases possible.”42 Yet the term is often used when the number of favourable events is at best a guess based on past performance. When we don’t have the Law of Large Numbers and similar actuarial tools to fall back on, the best we can truly say is what the likelihood of an event is. Therefore, one might ascribe a probability of failure to a standard machine part, but ascribing a likelihood to a building that is subject to changing climate and operations is guess work at best.

I developed the incident sequence, described above, to address a deficiency in practice that would allow infrastructure engineering to be financially intelligible. It allows the infrastructure engineer to sequence capital projects by controlling the Value at Risk (VaR) at any particular stage of the project. In so doing, one can influence project credit rating, insurance and cost of debt. It also forced a fresh look at measurement and particularly a review of how likely outcome can be measured during the project. This was demonstrated, in partnership with industry, and how causal chain analysis can enable this process. These tools in combination with heuristic practices, provide a risk continuum from concept to financing, and design to commissioning, using a common language and data set. This provides the processes for a conceptual approach to infrastructure. It has allowed us to capture the risks inherent in infrastructure planning. For example, one can expose the risks of a capital asset being stranded before its operation has recovered the capital cost. Through a first-principles interpretation and development of heuristic practice, we have the means to interpret a practicable unifying concept of infrastructure.

When we draw the key components of the concept of infrastructure together, we can say that:

a. Infrastructure is defined by its purpose; the continued fulfilment of that purpose defines the infrastructure requirement, hence design brief and specifications.

42 Elliott 2012.

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b. The value of the infrastructure is directly related to its use, performance and/or response capability. Therefore, irrespective of its configuration or expense in construction and operation, value will be defined by the local benefit. c. The value must exceed the cost over the life of the infrastructure, if the system is to be socio-economically viable. d. Infrastructure changes the environment in which it exists and therefore also its use over time. It is both the product and enabler of its context, influencing socio-economic change and market perceptions. Infrastructure risk and value are therefore dynamic; outcomes do not necessarily follow what is planned. e. Infrastructure networks are complex adaptive systems. f. Infrastructure systems design are optimised when the least energy is expended in reliably delivering a resource to its point of consumption. g. The balance of the infrastructure domains with the human domain determine value and the capacity for resilience, since each domain may compensate for temporary deficiencies in others until a new synergy is attained. h. The measure of any infrastructure system is based on its outcome; the measure of whether infrastructure is likely to deliver the planned for outcome is based on a convergence/coincidence of indicators of the anticipated outcome through its construction and operation. This measure is therefore based on the infrastructure purpose and necessarily relative within a locally changing context over time rather than any absolute measure.

These components need to be configured around a unifying purpose for infrastructure, to deliver a viable unifying concept. I have concluded that purpose is Health.

The 1948 World Health Organisation (WHO) definition of health is a complete state of physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity (WHO 1948). This definition was expanded at the WHO 1986 Ottawa Conference43 to specify the determinants (prerequisites) of health, which included as much an emphasis of how people live as on the environment in which they live. All aspects of this are directly or indirectly influenced by infrastructure. In fact, infrastructure is inseparable from health. From Dr. John Snow’s

43 The prerequisites for health are used to inform the relationships (conditions and resources) between individual, community and environment. http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/. (accessed 11 May 2018)

85 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure observations44 and Joseph Bazalgette’s water and sewerage systems,45 we have a clear alignment between basic [non-communicable diseases] public health and infrastructure. But does the purpose of infrastructure and how it’s used change with the situation? Policy must be implementable (Siu 2013). But for the Great Stink,46 the significant funds would not have been made available for Bazalgette’s sewerage scheme, despite its true purpose being to prevent cross contamination of the water supply from the cesspits and sewers. It illustrates how the public perception of need informs not only eventual adoption of infrastructure works, but the support for the planning, resourcing and implementation.

In post-conflict environments, the population gradually slides down Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow 1943). Maslow expanded on his theories in Motivation and Personality (Maslow 1954). After explaining the pre-requisite nature of physiological needs, he draws particular attention to the need for safety, or at least the sense of safety, which is particularly strong in children and the most vulnerable. In protracted and post-conflict areas, the association of safety and improving reliable essential services is essential for the community to build, adopt and self-recover. Direct individual engagement in these works are useful, but there must be confidence in the function that they enable. The essential services must be resilient and this needs to guide the infrastructure development. That means a sequencing of capital works around a managed Value at Risk, in the event of a return to violence, rather than resources. It also means that all new works must be seen to function upon commissioning. Commissioning a wastewater treatment plant without an electrical supply is counterproductive. Therefore, infrastructure works are necessarily planned in balance with the connected infrastructure systems and the essential services provision as a whole.

44 Dr. John Snow, a London physician, theorised that the 1854 cholera outbreak in Soho, London UK, was carried in the water supply. By mapping where all the patients resided and ultimately where they had drawn their water from, with the Rev. Henry Whitehead’s assistance he was able to identify the Broad Street pump as the “locus of infection,” against popular opinion. He is credited with being the pioneer of epidemiology and greatly influenced the public health and the substantive improvements in municipal sanitation and water supply. 45 Sir Joseph William Bazalgette, chief engineer of the Metropolitan Board of Works from 1856, was directed in 1858, following the Great Stink, to implement his plan for an upgraded metropolitan sewerage network. Though his plan was greatly influenced by Dr. John Snow’s theories about the transmission of cholera and other diseases through the water supply, it is generally recognised that the enabling act by parliament was only passed due the popular fear that cholera was spread by the miasma, or foul air. Initial operation began in 1865, though the sewerage system was only completed in 1875. 46 The Great Stink of 1858 London, UK, occurred due the combined effects of hot weather, untreated human waste and industrial effluent. At the time, miasma, or foul air, was believed to carry diseases such as cholera. This popular perception was reinforced by the coincidence of cholera outbreaks and periods when the River Thames was particularly foul smelling.

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The focus for infrastructure work cannot be the individual asset or infrastructure network. The focus needs to be on the essential service improvement and the means of achieving it.

The demands of the infrastructure systems change as the needs of the community change. In urban areas, this becomes a more acute problem. Without the availability of space, Water-Sanitation- Hygiene (WaSH) becomes the enabler of close proximity living. As our cities densify, this need for WaSH to contain basic public health becomes more acute. Local communities will adjust the infrastructure to suit the immediate health priorities. This relationship and what it means for WaSH infrastructure works is predominantly heuristic practice. While significant advances in our understanding continue each year (Routledge 2015), WaSH systems are still too often considered in isolation from other systems supporting the essential services, such as transportation or energy (Anderson 2015).

The use of infrastructure will change according to the circumstances. While one can’t always predict what the new use of the infrastructure will be, the functional relationships of the infrastructure with its original purpose with a wider system of systems must be part of works planning. The basement, below the ice rink, of Zetra Stadium in Sarajevo became the city mortuary when the city was under siege, because it was the coldest facility when there was no power and the dead couldn’t be buried due to the threat from snipers. The purpose of the infrastructure was changed to meet an immediate requirement that was ultimately centred on public health. The stadium was still functional, despite the change of use and failures in supporting systems. As an infrastructure system, Zetra Stadium was resilient.

One might reasonably ask what aspect of public health should be the focus for defining the purpose of an infrastructure project, when the needs are subject to change in line with the conditions at the time. This focus might be physical, psychological or social wellbeing. The driver is defined by local need, as that is where the benefit is felt. If we describe the unifying purpose of infrastructure to be [WHO 1948] Health, we can encompass infrastructure built for economic benefit, as well as aesthetic, public realm and physical health benefits. However, to be practicable in post-conflict areas, the unifying purpose and wider concept must be applicable in reverse. By observing the relationship between the population groups and the essential services, we should be able to determine what the service-enabling infrastructure systems functionality and condition is.

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During the field survey 9-16 November 2017, I investigated this relationship specifically. I mapped the resource demand distribution across the Gaza Strip and compared it with the infrastructure laydown and operation. There were direct correlations between individual resource consumption and infrastructure laydown. For example, the electricity infrastructure laydown reflected what would be expected for the patterns of electricity use. However, this was not so apparent when we looked at the systems level of essential service provision. For example, given the condition of the wastewater system and the massive release of untreated sewage into the Wadi Gaza and Mediterranean Sea, and contamination of ground water in some areas, one would expect increased rates of stunting, diarrhea and chronic bowel diseases.

There were indeed increases over the last decade in stunting and chronic conditions. However, they were not as extreme as expected and individual patients could not be georeferenced and so compared with the infrastructure laydown and condition. This was raised with the local head of the WHO mission, who explained that there was no non-communicable disease epidemiological study to reference and while increases in chronic diseases had been observed, they remained within the regional norms and were therefore not a matter for concern. Further discussions with the Islamic University of Gaza head of microbiology confirmed that no non-communicable diseases epidemiological study had been conducted since 1967, when the WHO mission in the Gaza Strip began.

Linking diseases to infrastructure is difficult. Georeferencing of diseases needs to link the individual patients’ pattern of life and interaction with the infrastructure to identify the locus of infection. It is more complex than the case that confronted Dr. John Snow in 19th Century Soho, despite our far greater understanding of the precursors and vectors of diseases. There is no geospatial gazette, standardising the geospatial data collection, datum, and taxonomy in the Gaza Strip. Each municipality and utility uses its own version. The ICRC Water & Habitat Unit is facilitating the local development of a Geospatial Gazette since the field survey and investigating the establishment of a continuing non-communicable diseases georeferenced epidemiological survey. The conduct needs to be carefully managed so that the findings can be used to intelligently and efficiently inform changes in development policy and prioritisation of projects (Ocaña-Riola 2010).

I was unable to prove a link at the micro or even meso scale between trends in disease incidents and infrastructure development, either way. With these two initiatives by the local ICRC

88 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure delegation to develop a comprehensive understanding of the spatial relationships between disease and infrastructure, subsequent studies and infrastructure planning work will be able to gain the necessary levels of understanding. However, the macro relationships are indicative of a direct relationship, albeit circumstantial. Patterns of contamination in the water and food supplies from agricultural and human effluent are observable. There are increases in non-communicable diseases, such as stunting, cancers and Crohn’s disease known to be associated with poor sanitation and the observed toxins. The Islamic University of Gaza has conducted some studies into the food system and found high levels of toxins and antibiotics in poultry and fish, as well as e-coli contamination of drinking water, fruits and vegetables. The ICRC is investigating how to enable such studies to provide conclusive results. So far, the evidence is indicative and highly suggestive, but remains circumstantial. This will change.

However, for the purposes of this investigation, there are sufficient indicators that the unifying concept works in reverse. During the Gaza survey, householders were observed throwing solid waste into the Wadi Gaza, already contaminated with untreated sewage from a wastewater treatment plant by-pass. The combined leachate was then collected and directly used as vegetable fertiliser. The local behaviours were all directly influenced by the infrastructure functionality and where the benefit was realised. Observing these behaviours, we were able to identify infrastructure deficiencies and indicators of outcome using the causal chain models described earlier. These infrastructure deficiencies were then compared with actual field observations of the infrastructure and we found consistency of [infrastructure] cause in each assessment, as well as a correlation with the preliminary [remote] infrastructure assessment. This provided sufficient confidence to build the unifying concept of infrastructure around the purpose of health, and the supporting components and planning characteristics that make it applicable. Analyses conducted separately, from infrastructure to expected community health effects and from observed community behaviours to infrastructure function, support this concept.

Building on the health purpose in a vitae systems of systems, we can add two further statements to the unifying concept:

a. The use and operation of essential services infrastructure is dictated by how it meets the community health purpose within available resource capacity. The corollary of this is that the essential services infrastructure that is intelligently resourced will have the highest inherent capacity for rapid restoration of purpose.

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b. The community need for health preservation in post-conflict communities will rapidly drive a new synergy between the infrastructure and human domains, resulting in a new local and regional equilibrium between communities and with infrastructure networks. This means that the new equilibrium will respond to relief aid as a contextual stress that changes inherent capacity for response and recovery.

It remains unclear to what extent this unifying concept has been formed by the Gaza Strip study, despite being conceived out of the experience of many different conflict and post-conflict regions. I have confidence that I can infer infrastructure performance and condition from what is observed. The absence of a conclusive association is not a serious concern, because ultimately the value in a unifying concept is to make reasonable sense of a highly complex post-conflict situation with damaged infrastructure and locally adapted services and facilities. This macro level of understanding provides a focus for the subsequent investigation and planning. It also provides a far better evidence trail than the subjective assessment more usually employed.

4.7. Comment. My aim in this chapter is to propose a unifying concept of infrastructure that provides a way for the infrastructure engineer to interpret what is observed. My approach has been to deconstruct heuristic practice to build a capstone model that links all the components by a common red thread. As far as practicable, this has been a first principles approach. While I have developed tools that link components of infrastructure planning together and related everything back to the other stakeholders in the infrastructure project, some gaps remain. Nonetheless, the product fits my professional experience of infrastructure planning, and the experience of other collaborating engineers and non-engineers with different field experiences to mine. I have had the opportunity to field test the concept in the Gaza Strip with the ICRC Water & Habitat Unit. This provided an important reality check in the availability of data that would allow definitive associations between what one understands from the unifying concept and what is happening locally. Nonetheless, the macro associations give confidence that the unifying concept works. It can always be improved. As a “Rosetta Stone” for infrastructure engineers to understand what is observed, it can provide a first step towards automation of the interpretation process through machine learning. That means that the recognition of what exists needs to not only be heuristically compliant with what the unifying concept needs for interpretation, it should also be possible to automate and provide the essential understanding of the situation in as close to real time as possible.

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I address existing practice and how it needs to change in Chapter 6. However, the challenge in any vitae system of systems understanding remains familiar IC practice. The IC’s focus is on crises. Infrastructure is not, in the main, a crisis activity, but rather something whose outcomes are more long term. There are three issues arising from my observation of current IC practice:

a. Following the logic arising from the unifying concept and the preceding requirements piece, infrastructure has a closer association with non-communicable diseases. I do not recall ever seeing a non-communicable diseases epidemiological study in a post-conflict area, and the Gaza Strip field survey proved no different. The IC’s health focus is solely acute diseases and trauma. When I investigated the relationship between sanitation and concerns over infrastructure-related non-communicable diseases, I was told that the mandate is reactive/emergency only and WHO does not monitor for these diseases. Gaza is not a special case. The crisis focus of post-conflict intervention challenges the very data set that informed infrastructure planning requires. How does one address this? The ICRC sub-delegation in the Gaza Strip is starting a local change, which is influencing their operations in other conflict areas. The ICRC is in many ways unique, and this influence does not appear to extend to other humanitarian agencies. This is a political science issue that resides outside of the thesis scope, and deserves further study. b. In defining the criteria for restoring inherent resilience capacity in local communities so that they can withstand a return to violence, however brief, it leads to the recognition that there must be a balance between local and capital infrastructure. The risk exposure of capital infrastructure under a return to violence negates economies of scale. This runs contrary to the need that international donors have to represent their contribution to domestic audiences in relatable and politically expedient terms. Furthermore, many donors prefer capital projects because they may award such projects to their own national contractors and need to make them worthwhile or simply because they are more marketable. Such an approach runs counter to most if not all principles of infrastructure development planning and the rehabilitation requirements.

The unifying concept provides a means of interpreting the presented evidence and challenging these familiar IC practices. Recognising these issues, informs the implementation framework presented in Chapter 6. However, while the development of infrastructure planning tools can

91 Chapter 4: Building a Unifying Concept of Infrastructure change professional practice, they rarely influence political or diplomatic practice. These issues merit further multidisciplinary investigation.

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Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture A common understanding that is based on best available current evidence has been a consistent requirement at each stage of this thesis. It is the essential common reference used to inform expert opinion and perspective, and which evolves and matures as more stakeholders become engaged. The challenge, as already noted, is knowing what can be reasonably derived. This chapter explores what the common reference comprises, how best to leverage heuristic practices and emerging technologies in developing a functional COP, and how it might evolve. The goal is to answer Question 2. How can one inform a common understanding of what exists, and so inform the development of implementable infrastructure reconstruction needs?

5.1. Tableau(x) based COP Codified by Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707) in the late 17th Century (Vauban 1669), terrain intelligence was the synthesis of the natural and built domain to inform how military forces might move and use the terrain for protection and cover from sight. Vauban made terrain intelligence more about science than art. His predecessors, Jean Errard (1554-1610), Antoine de Ville (1596-1656) and Blaise de Pagan (1604-1665), had focused heavily on the use of three dimensional geometry in the design of fortifications, reflecting steady enhancements from a fixed point perspective. That is, they looked at the terrain around a fortification or other structure, from the perspective of an observer in or on the structure. Conversely, Vauban was not fixed in space, but rather saw the terrain as a variable, like the weather, depending on what you wanted to do and therefore understand (Barros 2006). This underpinned his extraordinary success as an attacker of fortifications. He viewed the terrain as a three-dimensional map of the area of operations, which he referred to as a “tableau.” The analysis of battle space is still based on the tableau(x) today, as is modern fortifications planning and design (Hay 2016b) and military campaign planning (US DoD 2014).

The combat planning requirements that define how the tableau is typically developed are different to the infrastructure planning requirements. Combat occupies a small time period compared to the operational life of infrastructure and therefore the influences and dependencies will be different. For example, military commanders aim to conclude combat actions before the Planning Point of the Incident Sequence is reached, for the operation in question. Nevertheless, Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (IPOE) (US DoD 2014) has been the basis of heuristic conflict and post-conflict infrastructure planning practice since the Bosnian War (1992-1995). The Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture tableau remains the basis of this heuristic application and is much expanded from Vauban’s area of operations to include the areas of influence and interest.

The area of operations refers to the space in which the subject organisation has freedom of action. This means that they can build, demolish and create obstacles, as they feel necessary. The area of influence is the area of annulus around the area of operations and refers to the space in which the subject organisation can request and influence third parties to make changes to their space, but which the subject has no direct control over at all. The streets around an embassy, for example, do not belong to the embassy, but the municipality will typically be influenced by specific planning requests by the embassy. An illustration of this might be the US embassy in Ottawa, where the embassy’s security requirements have influenced the City of Ottawa’s rerouting of traffic flows and lane restrictions on Sussex Drive. The area of interest is the area beyond that. It is of interest with respect to either the hazards or dependencies of the subject operation or organisation. For example, if one faces a fluvial flooding hazard at the subject site, the area of interest will include the water catchment area for the river, and so establish the necessary preconditions and indicators of an approaching flood hazard before it affects the area of operations directly. More typically associated with hazard identification and travel time calculations, the area of interest is also useful in recognising other community demands on common infrastructure and changes in the logistical base for the operation.

As a conceptual representation of reality, one can think of the tableau like the green LEGOTM mat that defines LEGOTM diorama models in time and space. The difference is that for infrastructure planning, we need to recognise the relationship that the infrastructure has with human behaviour during (re)construction and operation, as well as the direct physical hazard and operational dependency associations. This human relationship to infrastructure has not typically been included in tableaux development, beyond the identification of community areas and demand distribution. Largely through the constraints of manual practice, heuristic use of tableaux incorporates the socio-economic considerations as a factor rather than an actor in the planning process. I believe that this is a failing in heuristic practice, rather than any deficiency in the application of tableaux.

In exploring the planning and delivery of sustainable infrastructure, Charles Ainger & Richard Fenner identify socio-economic sustainability as a principle of sustainable infrastructure planning (Ainger & Fenner 2014). Any post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction or development must similarly be sustainable and owned by the community, if it is to be fully adopted and contribute to

94 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture the community’s resilience capacity in the event of a return to violence. Ainger & Fenner discuss it in terms of social sustainability, as defined by Andrea Colantonio in a 2009 conference paper, as yet unpublished. She later explored social sustainability, providing a comparison of traditional and emerging approaches (Colantonio 2013). While her focus is essentially in stable regions, the importance of Health as the determinant is clear. The conceptual parallels to post-conflict are striking, despite her examples being highly developed and affluent cities. Having previously identified the need for community ownership of the infrastructure in Chapter 3, it is now worth exploring what this means and how to inform it.

The need to consult with the local population and involve them in the planning and development of the infrastructure has been well established in literature, from Schumacher (1973) to Blockley & Godfrey (2017). The question is not whether to engage the local population, but rather to what extent and how to inform that engagement. Sherry Arnstein identified eight levels of stakeholder engagement that she called the Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1969). She used it to explain how inadequate levels of engagement can result in inappropriate consequences and a loss of trust over time of the population in the authority. She advocates strongly for the empowerment of local communities, which resonates with Aldrich’s findings around Social Capital (Aldrich 2012). It would appear, from experience, that much of the stakeholder engagement in post-conflict rehabilitation is secondary to the imposition of an expert solution, rather than a solution developed in partnership with the local population, much less one developed by the local population and facilitated by the IC experts.

Ainger & Fenner align Colantonio’s levels of stakeholder engagement with Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (Ainger & Fenner 2014:54). In my own experience and in consultation with colleagues, it would seem from Arnstein’s definition that the predominant form of stakeholder engagement in protracted conflict and post-conflict areas is Level 4: Consultation with rare Level 6: Partnering. There are examples of locally generated infrastructure development plans, such as the Palestinian Water Authority’s Wastewater Master Plan for Gaza, yet they do not appear to reflect the actual constraints that cause unintended consequences, discussed in Chapter 3. Notwithstanding, partnering is a key part of how the ICRC defines its work (ICRC 2009 & 2016), and is definitely a best practice goal. What does the tableau need to include to inform this dimension of post-conflict infrastructure planning practice?

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The underlying premise of stakeholder engagement is shared understanding and a common reference to make informed judgement-based decisions, rather than managing diverse opinion- based ones (Chapter 3). Therefore, the information represented in the tableau needs to inform that shared understanding of the situation and issues rather than identification of problems or the provision of a solution. This would appear to already be possible with some forms of machine learning development47, but not appropriate in this application. The complexity of representing the full infrastructure system of systems for the integrated essential services in conflict and post- conflict areas is already addressed using georeferenced causal chain models that allow the user to stress an area or asset and see how the effects cascade through the systems.48 However, the socio- economic representation is not typically dynamic in such models, whether heuristic or theoretical. Despite this, it is possible to associate carrying capacity of infrastructure with the local population demand density distribution (Chapter 4) and the health associations with different infrastructure conditions (Routledge 2015, Davis & Lambert 1995) are well established internationally as Public Health engineering. In many ways, modern critical infrastructure that was planned and designed for public health purposes is no longer seen as such, and yet remains a significant component of public health (Mohanty et al 2016). So why aren’t these aspects heuristically integral to the tableau? If the tools and practice are present without effective delivery, there must be an impediment that needs to be addressed.

The immediacy of crisis demands does not affect infrastructure planning, due to the significantly different planning horizons. However, the presence of a crisis or near emergency does increase the pressure on the IC to be seen to do something and individual donors to be contributing to something tangible. The causes of this are discussed in Chapter 3 and so not repeated here. However, this pressure to produce a plan does not allow the time for participatory development, which can be measured in months and years (Chambers 1997). Much of the time needed for participatory development is the establishment of a trust relationship between community and planner and for the community to internalise and fully understand the situation and issues. Tamara Plush proposed using participatory video (Plush 2012). Extrapolating from her concept, being able to visualise both the situation and play out various scenarios can be used to accelerate local

47 The Economist online: “Babbage: When AI meets reality” 27 July 2016 “Why artificial intelligence is enjoying a renaissance” The Economist 15 July 2016. See also The Economist “Ethics: Frankenstein’s paperclips” 23 June 2016, “Artificial Intelligence: March of the machines” 23 June 2016, “Artificial intelligence: The return of the machinery question” 20 June 2016, and “Why firms are piling into artificial intelligence” 1 April 2016. 48 The GeoLogik application with RiskLogik integration, produced by Deep Logic Solutions Inc., www.risklogik.com.

96 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture community understanding and represent their issues to the planners against the same frame of reference. While video representation remains only a proposal of concept, the need to be able to visualise the overall system of systems effects of different projects and events against the current situation can be met from a digital tableau with supporting dynamic applications and a suitable Graphic User Interface (GUI). Military applications already use a VBS249 interface to simulate consequence of tactical options in battlespace training and rehearsal. It is conceivable that something similar could be used to visualise the effects of an infrastructure project.

Though still essentially a tableau, the enhanced capability through digitisation allows the user to visualise consequence over time. In time, this will undoubtedly lead to the inclusion of autonomous simulant behaviour (agent modeling) and eventually a form of discrete event and/or stochastic simulation. Today, it can allow us to understand the dynamic system of systems holistically, which means the inclusion of the virtual domain and the ability to constrain options through regulation and social fiat. This opens the viability of Projection, which is the heuristic practice of inserting a discrete operation with predefined dependencies and resource demands into a new system. The corollary of intelligent resourcing, it ensures that the projected operation is indistinguishable in all the essential outputs from the original operation and can be supported by the host system. It is not unlike franchising a Canadian coffee and donut chain today, or expeditionary fort construction by Roman legions 2,000 years ago.

The projection of resilient operations through virtual networks was an area in which I collaborated with Jennie Phillips at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto (Phillips & Hay 2017). Based on experience and current heuristic practice, such informed projection allows us to identify which works will have the greatest stabilising effect on the vitae system of systems, because it influences the human behaviour in neighbouring systems and has the stable capacity to meet essential demand (MOC) during periods of stress. The underlying concept is that when a single node in a complex system has been stabilised and made resilient, it reduces the instability for neighbouring nodes and provides a reliable example for its neighbours to stabilise. Ultimately, there will be a critical mass of stable nodes in the system to stabilise the whole. Again, this is a conceptual extrapolation of heuristic practice based on the possibilities presented here, rather than a presentation of current practice. Nonetheless, the integration of these various domain models

49 VBS2 (Virtual BattleSpace 2) was developed in 2007 by the US Marine Corps and the Australian Defence Force in collaboration with Bohemia Interactive Simulations, https://bisimulations.com.

97 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture with the digitised tableau, presents significant possibilities that can greatly enhance current practice around human interaction with the infrastructure.

We need the COP to provide common understanding between all stakeholders in post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation. The traditional tableau provides a suitable framework for the COP, lending itself both to digitisation and integration with georeferenced causal chain modeling. In its digitised format, we can include time-segmented demand profiles for the area in question, as a basis for comparison with the infrastructure laydown and to inform carrying capacity and hazard travel time calculation. It is also conceivable that we can incorporate virtual and human domain dynamics and represent this in full simulation, though that remains beyond the scope of this thesis and current practicability. However, in being able to represent infrastructure systems consequence, and therefore capacity of the essential services that the infrastructure enables, we are able to illustrate consequence in a tangible way, thereby promoting both awareness and understanding across all stakeholders. It also means that we can align the different mission time horizons of emergency aid and relief agencies with their reconstruction and development counterparts around a common understanding of consequence and eventual outcome. This meets the requirement of the COP (Chapters 3 & 4). The [heuristic practice] tableau format is used as the basis for COP development in this thesis. So, what must the COP comprise to provide common reference?

5.2. Components of a COP Heuristically, the components of a COP are the physical systems of infrastructure across the natural and built domains. When they are included, the virtual and human domains are typically seen more as influences on the risk profile of the operations. Instead, I propose that they are integral to proper understanding of the current situation and define freedom of action in the area. The virtual domain will include those essential intra- and inter-community relationships, the population’s sense of place and ownership of their future. Aligning with the core rehabilitation requirements, particularly around former combatant reintegration, developing inclusive institutions and reconciliation, as well as making best use of all the local resources, the COP must recognise the most vulnerable, including the actual and effective widowed households and the intergenerational transfer of trauma. This needs to be developed.

Imagine, if you will, a three-dimensional topographical model of an area. You have the ability to dive below the surface and explore the subterranean structures, geology and soils. As you rise above the surface again, additional layers are brought into view, illustrating a feint skein of

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Essential Socioeconomic Fabric Components Services Critical Infrastructure

Influence Tableau(x) Models

Dependency

Virtual

Domains Built Natural

Human

Figure 11. An illustration of the data process flow to build the components of the COP from domain data through recognition models. Note that each domain in represented in each model and each model is represented in each component. Therefore, deficiencies invalid assumptions around data and recognition can incur a compound error in the components and hence the interpretation of what a change would mean. Hence the emphasis on auditability and the rigorous maintenance of the Calculation Plan to record all data sources, assumptions, analyses, deductions and findings. connections between infrastructure and function with thresholds of performance denoting failure or continued performance. In amongst these buildings we see the actions of human beings, influenced by their environment and the routine demands of their situation. Their movement is similar to

99 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture watching a Sim City50 cycle. The rules governing these relationships and the behaviour of the inhabitants are represented as constraints to each function, and currently represented in COP models. The Sim City dynamic, as predictor of human behaviour, is sadly not currently possible. However, as we draw out further, we can see more of the surrounding area and more of the inherent hazards. Like watching the ripples extending away from a dipped finger in a still pond, we can see the effects of a change in performance of one function or a failure of an asset affecting something else and so on through a seemingly endless cascade of consequence.

Like the surface tension of water gradually damping the ripples in the pond, so the inherent inertia across the vitae system of systems eventually dulls the cascade of consequence. However, something relatively close to the source of the disturbance or particularly sensitive to it can be upset and itself cause a more serious cascade of consequence. Like the frog hopping from lily pad to lily pad, but the slight disturbance caused by a passing boat moves the destination pad slightly mid-hop—the frog lands in the water to be devoured by a pike. Sometimes the current performance is very close to the threshold of failure. These are the critical vulnerabilities that we wish to draw out of the COP. They help us identify vulnerable people, assets and functions, and therefore where we need to focus effort around a common recognition of need.

To build these layers, we need to build three models. The first is the tableau model, based essentially on geospatial information. It is an evidential model of what is where, what it is and does and its physical connectivity. The second is the dependency network model. Heuristically, this is a causal chain model. The main reason that a causal chain model is typically used instead of a Bayesian Belief System model, is the need for feedback loops to account for system adaptation to change. I briefly experimented with a Bayesian Belief System model, using the MicroSoft BNx tool, which is provided free of charge by MicroSoft for research purposes.51 Influenced by Daud Nasir, Brenda McCabe and Loesie Hartono’s paper on evaluating risk in construction (Nasir et al,

50 Designed by Will Wright and published by Maxis, Sim City is an open-ended city building video game that has gained in popularity since its launch in 1989. It is based on free agent modeling, albeit with predefined constraints, in which the player adjusts the natural, built and virtual domains to encourage sustainable economic development and resilience to disasters. In the last 15 years it has spawned many “Sim” spin-offs. 51 MS BNx is a Bayesian Belief Systems network mapping and analytical tool developed by MicroSoft for research purposes. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/msbnx-a-component-centric-toolkit-for-modeling- and-inference-with-bayesian-networks/ There are other more advanced modeling systems available, such as the French application BayesiLab 7.0, by Bayesia SAS, www.bayesia.com. Bayesia uses their application to support development in Artificial Intelligence (AI), and interestingly does permit feedback loops for self-learning. This application has not been investigated further under this thesis, though the possibilities of linking the COP with implementation planning through a self-learning application are particularly exciting and suitable for future research.

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2003), I thought that it might be possible to use a construction risk tool in the COP to provide a continuity of data and analysis from COP through to the implementation.

For this experiment, I constructed two identical post-conflict infrastructure project implementation models. The model nodes where based on both recorded and experienced influences and processes. On a forward run, the MS BNx model produced much the same result as the RiskLogik causal chain model. However, when local past experience was activated in the model and the influences of institutional bias and political influence, the lack of any feedback into the MS BNx meant that it couldn’t reflect how these virtual influences would change the project conduct or outcome. I looked at building conditional sub-models in the MS BNx model to allow for the possible feedback loop responses, but it meant that I lost correlation and connectivity with the COP. I would not discount the use of MS BNx for the implementation planning, as the applicability of the construction risk evaluation in the actual project construction of post-conflict infrastructure is apparent. This experiment is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, when I explore implementation specifically. However, for the purposes of the COP, I decided to stick with the causal chain models, per current heuristic practice. The key criterion for this thesis is that it is practicable and so as far as possible makes best use of existing tools.

The third model is the least developed heuristically. It is the influence model that connects to the dependency model by establishing the nature of many dependency relationships and the thresholds for failure. While we can calculate these thresholds and the associated resource demands, and so the influence of a resource constrained environment on operating performance across a community, it is the relationship of the human being, individually and collectively, with its environment that is lacking. It is one of the questions that emerged from Chapter 3, where I explored the requirement, and remains a fascinating area for further research. For the purposes of this thesis, I am sticking to what is evidentially measurable and practicable in making post-conflict rehabilitation effective again. Critically, this is based on the assumption that all human actors and activities within the systems will behave in accordance with the system rules. Aberrant behaviour cannot be captured in current heuristic practice, simply because we are not yet able to apply effective modeling of “free will” in existing agent modeling. This is something that I seek to investigate in the future, but is outside the scope of this thesis. Similarly, understanding the influence of surroundings on human behaviour and health would undoubtedly improve the practice, or at least recognising what better practice should be, but it is too extensive an area of

101 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture investigation and something we continue to struggle with in stable developed economies. For the purposes of this thesis, our limited understanding of influence, as heuristically practised, will have to suffice.

To inform these three component models, we need to build component understanding. The first part is geospatial analysis. This is more than simply a collection of geospatial data; it uses Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) (Bivand 2010). Since it was first defined as a practice in 1983 (Good 1983) and finally crystallised around Michael Goodchild’s “call to action” (Goodchild 1987), ESDA is now well-established. It is most commonly associated with the regional analysis of crime (Murray et al 2001), poverty and health. Of particular interest is its application to land use, agriculture and contamination. These are all indicators of human interaction with the built infrastructure and provide rich leads for further investigation. For example, one can determine from satellite imagery how land is being used, whether for agriculture, waste, housing etc. This provides an immediate sense of what the food carrying capacity of the land can be and therefore what scale of dependency on outside support. Similarly, types of

Figure 12. A Near Infra-Red band 1 (NIR1) spectrum image of the sewage treatment plant at the Wadi Gaza estuary. This image was extracted from the 2016 Airbus 4 Band 50cm GSD imagery supplied by ICRC. Note the similarity of return between the two western settling ponds in the sewage plant (the eastern pond is covered with a rubber membrane) and the near shore sea water. This suggests similarities in the compounds and the Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) present. While this is an initial indicator of littoral water contamination, much more sophisticated analysis would be required to determine exactly what compounds are present and in what concentrations, and from that to extrapolate effects in population health. This is sufficient evidence to prompt urgent investigation

102 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture building will indicate public service access, though not the condition, and the land parcel structure will indicate what forms of governance practice operates. For example, small sub-divided parcels of farm land typically indicate Sharia Law applied to inheritance. This will in turn suggest a more likely theocratic rather than secular government structure. More recent advances in multispectral imaging can indicate levels of pollution. ESDA provides the core data set for the tableau model, while also informing the development of the other two models.

During the preliminary analysis of the Gaza Strip, we identified a similar spectral signature in the coastal seawater to the facultative sewage lagoons. Figure 12 refers. We concluded from this that untreated sewage was being released into the sea. There are several large capacity wastewater treatment plants in the Gaza Strip, which means that such levels of sewage contamination in the sea can only be caused by a loss of function at the plants, either due to a lack of power, maintenance resources or conflict damage. Cross referencing with the IC’s recent projects indicated that the plants are neither damaged nor lack capacity. Therefore, it is most likely due to a lack of electrical power and hence there must be issues with the power supply system. Similarly, there are likely to be more contamination sites and potential sanitation issues, which was confirmed by the WHO’s recorded uptick in the incidents of stunting. The same analysis also suggested a possible contamination of the food protein cycle, specifically fish. Subsequent field investigation also showed that there are some areas in the Gaza Strip releasing sewage directly into the sea, while not all plants fully treat sewage. This ESDA approach is part of a wider process of observation and deductive reasoning, which is meticulously recorded in the Calculation Plan for subsequent audit and transparency. As with any form of infrastructure risk analysis, it is important to provide an auditable record of evidence and analysis for future scrutiny. In post-conflict areas, it is also important for project risk assessment and to support argument against some of the typically vested interests that will resist change.

The next stage of investigation is to analyse the operation, organisation and context. In the case of Gaza, as with the majority of conflict areas, there is a considerable amount of open source information ranging from standard references such as Whittaker’s Almanac, Economist Intelligence Unit and the CIA World Fact Book to UN publications and studies, World Bank reports and papers by various international organisations, agencies and think tanks. Local authorities reporting is variable. In the case of Gaza, there was a considerable amount of local authority reporting and the challenge was to establish correlation between the different

103 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture perspectives. Working from initial filter criteria that any presented evidence had to be in context and cross reference with an authoritative source, we rejected roughly 60% of the reporting found by open source literature review. Nonetheless, the remaining 40% of data did still provide a sound basis for the dependency model. Furthermore, the rejected reports did still generally provide a useful thematic source of information that helped inform the influence modeling.

When we explore the fusion of these models in COP development, it must be with a purpose in mind. I have proposed that for post-conflict infrastructure, and arguably all other infrastructure, that purpose is Health. I termed this the unifying purpose of infrastructure and refers to the WHO’s 1948 definition of Health. That is the “complete state of physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” This means that the COP is developed to a purpose and therefore can only be expected to provide common reference to that purpose. For example, in developing a COP for the purpose of Health, it cannot be expected to provide a common reference on institutional governance. However, it can represent the impact of a change in institutional governance on health if its effect on the COP components can be defined. In effect, a COP cannot provide a universal reference. Each deduction and assumption made and recorded is focused on the common purpose. Therefore, the evidential base will have a clear universal utility, but the deductions and derivations from it, particularly with respect to ESDA will not have universal application.

Building from the tableau, we are able to represent the built infrastructure in its natural domain context and interface that with the dependency model to define the operation of the essential services that we seek to restore and improve in the post-conflict area. The influence model is less defined and can only be added once the other two are fused. By adding the influence model, we are changing the thresholds of consequence in the dependency model, access to the infrastructure networks that enable to the essential services, and [so] the benefit that they can have across the demand areas. This fusion provides further material understanding of local dynamics; it identifies further indicators for investigation and the findings used to update the models. In effect, once established the COP becomes an iterative development, reflecting incrementally greater understanding. In this respect, it differs greatly from the military approach and existing heuristic practice, which are both snap-shot models and not dynamic over an extended time horizon. To fulfil the core requirement, the COP is both defined in purpose and scope, but is also a living reference that absorbs changes in both understanding for a second iteration of ESDA and risk

104 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture analysis. Each time a scenario is tested on the COP, gaps in understanding are addressed and the whole tends closer to a near real-time representation of reality. Critically, through its iterative development around a single purpose, it is free from stakeholder perspective and so fulfils the common reference role.

While the COP has been built using three models, it actually presents three distinct components. Each component is meshed into the others, drawing upon the same three base models. With each iteration, the components evolve, each defined across all four domains. The three components are: Critical Infrastructure, Essential Services, and Socioeconomic Fabric. Human behaviour modeling is not represented, but would inform all three components, as and when it can be fully incorporated into the influence model. Each stage of COP development will produce intelligence outputs that progressively enhance understanding of a particular issue. This extension of heuristic practice was field tested with the ICRC in the Gaza Strip in November 2017. By May 2018, the COP had been developed through three iterations to the point where it could be considered to be in a maintenance cycle. This means that the COP develops with actual changes on the ground, and gaps in knowledge are gradually being plugged with each query and analysis. We tested the COP application with the ICRC Headquarters WatHab team in May 2018, by conducting a contingency planning exercise. The scenario involved unusually high rainfall in Hebron, combined with full catchment ponds along the HaBesor.

Tracing the potential flooding extents in the Gaza Strip, provided a clear indication of what critical infrastructure assets were at risk and what impact that would have on essential services. It was also possible to say which areas of the population would be directly affected and which areas would be indirectly affected. From this, the ICRC team was able to prioritise what asset functions needed to be protected from flooding, or alternative plans implemented. They were also able to identify preparatory works to reduce the effects of the flood, as well as precautionary works that would be activated during the initial indicators of a likely flood, identify vulnerable parts of the population, including the most vulnerable, and liaise with the different stakeholders ahead of time for an integrated contingency plan. The whole process took two hours, for their first use of the tools. This is a considerable advance on current practice, roughly one day and more typically two, and provides a key insight into the value of the COP as common reference. The process also, highlighted gaps in the data set of the COP tableau, specifically around stand-by diesel fuel

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106 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture capacity and areas where the local authorities did not provide demand density distribution information. These questions have since been addressed and were incorporated into the amended COP by the follow up field staff analysis and briefings in June 2018.

Subsequent scenarios played through the COP included the failure of specific critical infrastructure assets and systems due to violence or lack of resources. The COP was able to provide similar value assessments and inform planning. With each iteration, the COP matured, affording the analysts a progressively more nuanced understanding. That said, multiple iterations of the same scenario did not yield better results. To genuinely develop, the COP benefited from a mix of scenarios. When the same flooding scenario was exercised after several other scenario iterations, the flooding- contingency plan criteria changed subtly. So, this COP of integrated components built from the three distinct models does work in practice and meets the requirements in Chapters 3 and 4. However, if it is to be transferable beyond the special case of the Gaza Strip, there needs to be a reliable data collection approach to inform the three models. Furthermore, it needs to be timely and provide reasonable confidence that it represents the current situation, even with a paucity of authoritative references. In effect, it must be best confidence in near real-time.

5.3. COP Component Data The primary considerations for a COP are that it is objective analysis of the evidence, auditable and repeatable. The data collection for each model and so each component must reflect that, hence the primary filter of evidence being provided in context and cross-referenced to an authoritative source. It is not always possible to build a full COP within these very basic constraints, so it is practicable to use these criteria for the quantitative models and use a median interpretation of all other reporting to inform a thematic or qualitative enhancement of the models. As mentioned, the data is used to inform the models, which combined then inform the components of the COP. The model construction therefore drives the data collection, starting with geospatial information for the tableau. Figure 11 refers.

While geospatial information is not always reliable when it is available, outside of most developed countries, there is a certain confidence in identifying a physical entity in real space. It is either there or it isn’t. However, many authorities simply do not know where their infrastructure is and asset registers are rarely comprehensive, even in the developed world. Building a comprehensive understanding of infrastructure laydown and use is a current priority for the Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure, as it grapples with the next generation of infrastructure planning in a changing

107 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture market and risk context. Stand-off recognition, a military tool in campaign planning, offers a real- time geospatial laydown derived from satellite imagery. I think that it can also provide the means to bound or limit what is possible in reporting.

Data filtered according to the primary criteria is relatively simple to analyse; we can apply established international norms and known general associations to deduce a series of outputs.52 These can range from hard conclusions that can be used to inform planning with high certainty, to Requests to other agencies For Information (RFI) and areas for further investigation or Critical Information Requirements (CIR). The thematic piece is altogether different and is typically drawn from reports and papers written from a definite perspective. I found, with my Southern Harbour and RiskLogik colleagues, that in our open-source research of the Gaza Strip that there was a tendency for reporting by external agencies to selectively use evidence to support their argument rather than presenting the same evidence in context and deriving a conclusion from that. Findings were therefore either exaggerated or taken out of context.

Of particular interest were public/published reports and papers written by humanitarian and development agencies. A significant proportion seemed to be a particularly local perspective and rarely presented comparison with other parts of the region or equivalent situations elsewhere. When I asked about this point during the Gaza Strip field survey, it was apparent that many of the foreign officers (of all agencies) would defer to local staff in preparing the reports, without necessarily applying an appropriate level of objective scrutiny. While the locally employed staff are typically highly educated and very capable, they have been rewarded in a system that needs a crisis to exist. International aid and project sponsorship are typically in response to a crisis, charities are given money towards their efforts to alleviate a crisis and so on. Identifying and reporting impending crises brings reward and, in many cases, leads to reported assessments that do not reflect ground truth. This is not a definitive conclusion, but it does amplify the need for an evidential and unbiased frame of reference against which these reports can be validated and/or calibrated.

ESDA provides anchors in fact that can be used to validate and cross-reference claims made in reports. For example, the received wisdom recorded in a wide variety of reports on the Gaza Strip

52 The health impacts of chemical exposure is known about and there is a growing body of evidence that establishes diseases with specific chemicals (WHO 2016). This is extended into a broader understanding of the environmental influences on health from exposure to biological and chemical substances, amid the influences of a changing climate (WHO 2003, WHO 2006, Prüss-Üstün & Corvalán 2016).

108 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture shows 176km2 of agricultural land out of a total area of 365km2. This reflects the Palestinian Authority land-use planning map. Using feature extraction techniques, we analysed the multispectral satellite imagery to exclude a building surfaces, roads and other “hard” surfaces that do not return a chlorophyll signature. The resulting agricultural land available for cultivation is 53km2. The officially quoted and universally accepted value of 176km2 is simply not possible. However, such ESDA is only as good as the currency of the images and the spectral banding of the data in those images. Aerial imagery would be ideal, but due to security concerns of the armed factions, wholly impractical in a post-conflict area. Current developments in satellite imagery makes suitable imagery accessible, both technically and financially.

For the Gaza Strip field surveys we used the declassified Airbus Pleiades imagery.53 The anticipated Canadian satellite Constellation54 will allow a “pitch and catch” approach to these surveys, providing a higher degree of three-dimensional resolution, as well as multispectral imaging.55 High quality current data capture and analysis is possible and improving daily. Combined with ESDA, it is known as stand-off recognition. This well-established military intelligence and planning tool, has the very real potential with some development to yield far greater value in the humanitarian space and in particular for infrastructure systems recognition. I propose that combined with the universal concept of infrastructure, we can have real-time understanding of infrastructure systems in a vitae system of systems. In effect, we can use stand- off recognition to not only provide the basis of the tableau model, but provide the framework for the dependency network and influence models also. We need to explore stand-off recognition in more detail.

5.4. Stand-off Recognition Being able to understand what infrastructure actually exists in a post-conflict area and how it functions is a key aspect of the COP. The Unifying Concept of Infrastructure allows us to interpret

53 The Airbus Pleiades 1A/1B satellite imagery has a 0.5m resolution, which will suffice for highly accurate infrastructure network mapping, if not precise positioning. Nonetheless, the accuracy has consistently proven to be better than 97% during the field survey. The next generation of Pleiades, Pleiades Neo, will improve the resolution to 0.3m accuracy. Of particular note is that Pleiades includes multispectral imagery that enables advanced ESDA, and regular revisit capability to observe changes. In the case of the Gaza Strip, the revisit was roughly every 10 days. http://www.intelligence-airbusds.com/spot-7-launch_de/ (accessed 2 July 2018) 54 The Canadian Space Agency is launching the first RADARSAT Constellation satellites in November 2018 with goal of improved operation Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and system reliability. It is anticipated to cover 90% of the world’s surface daily through a 4-day cycle. Arguably the most advanced non-military earth observation tool in existence, the possibilities for its application are limited only by our ability to process and use the collected data. 55 The hyperspectral cube concept overlays multiple forms of geo-observation to more fully understand what is at a specific point on the earth. This blending of multiple systems, from synthetic aperture radar to multispectral imaging to traditional visual spectrum imagery, allows each layer to contribute to the overall understanding and addresses deficiencies in others. Fusing these multiple information types exceeds practicable traditional techniques and is seen as a useful AI application in the future.

109 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture what we see, but only if we are able to recognise what is observed. Stand-off recognition is based on the idea that given certain tells or indicators, one is able to recognise what is seen. For example, a military image analyst will look at an aerial image of some enemy tanks behind a hill on a battlefield and recognising various tells is able to identify what type of tank they are and their capabilities. This is also applied to infrastructure. During the Second Gulf War (2003), we discussed the Iraqi electrical infrastructure reconstruction with the German company (Pesag, now part of E-On), who were originally involved in the system design and laydown, to identify various tells that would allow us to work out what the electrical distribution was.

The infrastructure laydown had changed significantly in the intervening 25 years, but the configuration was unlikely to have done. This is simply because in upgrading or developing a system, it is extremely rare for the local authority to replace all existing infrastructure, supply networks, and the skills base. The preferred approach is to build on what is already there, update and develop. In this case, we were able to use the number of insulators on the transmission and distribution poles to see what electrical power was distributed where, compare this with the domestic demand and so identify any unusual power demands. This was all possible from aerial and satellite imagery. Immediately following the conflict, field teams would verify the insulator count and update the electrical distribution maps. This ability to recognise infrastructure assets and function remotely is generically known as stand-off recognition.

Stand-off recognition has the potential to greatly inform the planner’s situational awareness of the infrastructure in post-conflict areas. The product is typically represented as a tableau, upon which all further analysis and planning is based. Today’s heuristic practice uses digital tableaux that upon first inspection appear to be the same as their traditional predecessors, but incorporate multiple layers denoting all known information. This presents a capability development on the traditional approach because we can now compare the demand distribution with the functional infrastructure and, depending on observed use, derive the carrying capacity of the infrastructure systems, for example. The quality of analysis that this affords is far greater than even just ten years ago, though many of the assumptions in heuristic practice are challenged by a post-conflict reality. As discussed in Chapter 3, populations move during conflict and their needs and concentrations of demand will change. Multiple families may be living in a house that would ordinarily house one family. The demand density for a commodity/resource has also changed. Therefore, we cannot directly apply the military stand-off recognition model to infrastructure planning, as if the area of

110 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture operations was stable. Our use of stand-off recognition needs to be more intelligent. We can therefore summarise:

a. Existing military practice has the near real-time dynamic currency required for post- conflict infrastructure recognition, but doesn’t inform systems functionality or capacity. b. Stand-off recognition applied to infrastructure planning is based on a stable socio-economic context and demand density distribution.

While this degree of geospatial analysis is at the leading edge of industry practice, it remains industry capability and so increasingly accessible to planners in humanitarian agencies as the technological change drives further efficiencies. This has been taken as the baseline capability standard for this thesis. Post-conflict stand-off recognition must inform infrastructure laydown and function, the dynamic change in demand density distribution against infrastructure carrying capacity, and the community effect of the infrastructure in real time. We can build on existing capabilities and develop them as an enhanced tool within the COP development process.

There are three levels of understanding that stand-off recognition can potentially inform. The first is the physical laydown and position of the infrastructure systems. The second is the relationship between local demand and infrastructure carrying capacity. The third is how the infrastructure influences community functions and behaviour. Depending on how reliable these three findings are, stand-off recognition can inform an intelligent approach to post-conflict areas at the initial stages, potentially preventing the often-incompatible relief and reconstruction approaches that are not aligned with local need. It has the potential to fill the gap in understanding across the IC and other stakeholders, reducing the perception difference and so improving alignment. It is therefore useful to explore each level of understanding.

a. Physical Laydown. Understanding what infrastructure asset is where, and being able to observe or derive the infrastructure network from that, provides the basis for comparing the infrastructure laydown with demand clusters, political boundaries, supply chains and battle damage. Aside from the general appreciation of laydown, it allows us to begin building an asset register by establishing “what is,” and it identifies areas of particular concern for field investigation. Modern aerial and satellite imagery standards suggest that a high degree of positional accuracy is possible. Furthermore, the digitised tableau can associate assets generically and provide a reasonable network laydown of the infrastructure.

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b. Carrying Capacity. As discussed, carrying capacity is the ability of the infrastructure to meet the demand. It is normally bounded by how much demand the infrastructure can physically support and what is financially sustainable in terms of receipts for resources consumed against the cost of operating and maintaining the infrastructure. In a post conflict situation, these bounds are less relevant than the equilibrium that is reached between the demand and the infrastructure. By mapping the demand distribution across the area and comparing with the infrastructure, we are able to derive the range of functional performance of the infrastructure and so its capacity, for whatever reason. Carrying capacity is the product of two factors, the condition and capability of the infrastructure and the supply of the resource/commodity carried by the infrastructure. Both are significantly impacted in post- conflict areas. At this level of understanding, we are necessarily focused on the local beneficiary and the ability of the infrastructure to meet that demand, rather than how. Once again, the use of multi-spectral aerial and satellite imagery affords a reasonable understanding of: demand concentrations, such as population; profile, what the demand arises from such as lighting or industry; and environmental context, such as treated/untreated sewage discharge. There is scope for misinterpretation of the data due to unstructured ESDA, though one would expect a reasonable level of confidence in the analysis to inform carrying capacity. This stand- off analysis must always be comprehensively recorded, even if much of the positional analysis is so routine that it isn’t. The assumptions will need to be revisited as part of each iteration of the COP. c. Influence. How the infrastructure systems influence the behaviour and organisation of the local communities has traditionally been a function of the analyst’s professional experience and familiarity with the regional culture and social norms. However, the unifying concept of infrastructure provides a means of interpreting what is recognised to understand what the new equilibrium is. As discussed, our understanding of how human beings are individually influenced by their environs remains an area for further extensive investigation. Here, we’re considering the meta influences on whole communities, even if we don’t understand the internal dynamics. This understanding will expose where the focus of reconstruction should be, whether directly or indirectly enabled, and the relationship between relief aid and infrastructure reconstruction around a common purpose.

While the logic flow has stood up to scrutiny and it worked in simulations, it was unclear whether this would hold true in the field. A field trial was therefore devised. I conducted an experiment to

112 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture compare the digitised traditional tableau approach with a satellite-enabled stand-off recognition approach. The essential constraint on this experiment is that all tools and data must be readily accessible and all tools established heuristic practice. That way, the only change being tested is this thesis. The area of investigation was the Gaza Strip. The experiment comprised three distinct and separate activities.

a. Traditional. The Desk Top Study (DTS) used all available open source literature to build a traditional-style digitised tableau using the unifying concept of infrastructure. The analysis and findings were date stamped upon completion and subsequently for field validation use. b. Stand-off. The stand-off study applied geospatial analysis to commercially available aerial and satellite imagery, again applying the unifying concept of infrastructure. This too followed a strict sequence of initial analysis under blind conditions and then compared with the field validation findings. The study was date stamped after the initial analysis and before comparison with the field findings. Due to challenges over data availability, the stand-off recognition was necessarily conducted by a team in RiskLogik unconnected with the research project after the field survey. The original providers of the 0.5m resolution satellite imagery withdrew their support of this research at the last minute. An alternative sponsor was found following the field survey and hence the stand-off study was conducted a little later than originally planned. c. Field Validation. The field survey used the traditional tableau to build the control tableau. The traditional and stand-off tableaux were subsequently compared with the control tableau against the three levels of understanding.

The comparison of findings with the control were generally much as expected, though with some surprises. Of particular note is that the stand-off recognition identified aspects that were not discernable on the ground without extensive testing, such as soil and seawater contamination levels. It also identified stranded assets that were either no longer functional in the infrastructure network or simply lost from the corporate knowledge of the local utilities. The stand-off recognition provided far greater reliability in positional accuracy and network laydown than the traditional approach. It also provided a valuable initial assessment of the profile and density of demand across the area. I do not believe that I/we took full advantage of this aspect during the study and it is something that merits further exploration. Both traditional and stand-off recognition

113 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture provided reasonably reliable carrying capacity estimates. However, the interpretation of influence was substantially greater using the stand-off approach.

The source reliability of the data in stand-off recognition, combined with the broad range of coincidental data collection, allowed more [evidential] auditable interpretation of how the infrastructure influences the local socio-economic dynamics. However, the traditional approach retains a significant advantage over the stand-off approach, as tested here, in that it affords texture to the analysis. In conducting the DTS, we can extract commentary on governance and the wider Level of Traditional Stand-off Recognition Understanding Positional >85% accuracy, >97% accuracy of assets and networks. though incomplete Supplementary assets identified in analysis that with 30% gaps in are not recognized by utilities. Some masking data and no common in urban areas where conflict rubble hasn’t datum, which makes been removed, deemed non-functional assets. network accuracy difficult to estimate. Carrying >70% accuracy for >85% accuracy of demand distribution and Capacity the 50% coverage recognition of demand type. Assessment of possible with demand density inconclusive. Relationship of available data. infrastructure laydown to demand distribution >90% Influence Obscured until the The initial run identified inconsistencies masking effects of between expected infrastructure effect on relief aid could be community health and that recorded with an defined. Thereafter, accuracy >85%. In the comparison, it was >80% apparent that the analysis could have exposed the nature of local adaptation to infrastructure deficiencies but capture of influence <60%.

114 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture socio-economic context of the area. Very little of this is auditable, since many of the reports accessed through open source were biased and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this tonal/thematic awareness proved invaluable during the field survey, providing contextual understanding to prepare my interactions with utilities, authorities and other stakeholders. A correlation of findings with the control in excess of 85% accuracy has been taken as the threshold of confidence, reflecting the confidence levels required for infrastructure planning.

The core finding in this experiment is that rather than presenting an alternative approach to developing the post-conflict infrastructure tableaux, stand-off recognition is an enhancement to the traditional approach. It is best used as the framework of the DTS, guiding the literature review and analysis through ESDA. This is certainly a new approach for the analysis of post-conflict areas. Beyond providing that necessary audit trail of analysis, improved positional accuracy and understanding of infrastructure influence on socio-economic dynamics, it allows the user to better align with the local perspective and needs by reducing the reliance on perception to fill in the gaps in understanding. Nevertheless, even the traditional approach remains an industry best practice that is not widely practiced. There is nothing to suggest that the adoption of stand-off recognition will change the approach by many humanitarian agencies, but it will enable those who do plan their engagement to do so better informed and able to adopt an integrated and focused strategy. The three tableaux were subsequently combined to provide the ICRC with a comprehensive tableau that underpinned their COP for the Gaza Strip.

5.5. A Step Change in Stand-off Recognition This experiment reflects the current state of best practice and not necessarily what stand-off recognition can achieve. It is therefore worth exploring what stand-off recognition can do today, even if not current best practice, and where next in its evolution. Stand-off recognition informed by data from multispectral, hyperspectral, radiometric and electromagnetic sensors and analysed using ESDA techniques supported by artificial intelligence engines, has the potential to deliver evidence based, auditable and timely decision support for humanitarian and development aid decision making at un-precedented levels. These advances in the fields of remote sensing, data science and artificial intelligence offer the prospect of being able to gain deep situational insights about any Area of Interest prior to deploying field staff or committing resources.

Such capability would be particularly useful in obtaining vulnerability data in situations where conflict is not fully terminated but humanitarian and reconstruction needs are great such as Syria

115 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture and Afghanistan. It would obviate the requirement to put field officers in unnecessary danger and likewise reduce the dependence on local anecdotal accounts to form coherent Situational Awareness. Persistent use of focused stand-off recognition capabilities offers the possibility of near-real-time progress monitoring. This means that using the indicators of anticipated outcome (Chapter 3) we can remotely enable outcome-based program monitoring vice the most commonly used output-based model. Even though the current evolution of earth observation technology and Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) suggests that the basic components of such a capability already exist, they are not yet synthesized into a coherent body of practice with proven field applications.

Fusing evolving earth observation technologies and ESDA into a coherent stand-off recognition capability that is evidence based and auditable, and therefore accepted as authoritative, depends not so much on stitching the different data together, but rather on developing reliable indicators on the ground that the sensors can be tuned for and that AI-based feature extraction can recognize reliably. During conflict, one or more elements of the vitae system of systems, induce stresses in the fabric of the local community. As discussed, individuals and communities will adapt their behaviours and these changes leave signatures that can be recognised using ESDA.

While post-conflict infrastructure response tends to focus on building back what existed antebellum, the local patterns of life will have changed. These changes can be recognised remotely, exposing immediately the potential divergence of relief effort with actual need. Currently, we have been able to recognize changes in land use and extrapolate the effects on food security, ground water allocation, the over use of agricultural soil amendments and crop inputs, solid waste management practices and ultimately public health effects in the Gaza Strip. However, some important indicators, such as ground water quality and aquifer recharge rates, remain opaque. It was the same when we looked at the serviceability of the cold chain systems and the distribution of frozen foods and medicines. Hyperspectral analysis offers the possibility of investigating these systems remotely. Combined, these indicators can provide a sense of electricty need and challenge our western belief that electricity is the precursor to rehabilitation. That assumption only holds true if we create the need for electricity in our infrastructure rehabilitation planning. In the post-conflict absence of electricity, not all functions have ceased for want of it. Recognising the real time changing need of the community allows us to properly focus reconstruction on need to enable the local recovery.

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Aside from a more accurate and timely recognition of local need, stand-off recognition with persistent change monitoring offers the possibility of an evidence based and auditable outcomes evaluation of reconstruction/rehabilitation programs. In agricultural recovery programs, for example, the use of hyperspectral analysis to monitor crop health, soil moisture content, yield and pesticide residue can provide empirical evidence of progress in agricultural practice reform directly tied to incentive programs. Longitudinal studies of agricultural data are already yielding important information about land use changes that have direct impact on food security and economic sustainability. Experiments in the use of AI to detect change in land use over time and so reduce the human effort required are already producing promising results.56 Such capabilities can have a profound influence on post-conflict rehabilitation efforts.

One of the biggest challenges in the remote development of the tableau, as a basis for the COP, is establishing an accurate Digital Elevation Model (DEM). Radar interferometry offers the potential for both high positional accruacy and low uncertainty in elevation values. The same technology applied in a sideways (oblique) viewing geometry can detect translation of structural members subject to close-proximity blast effects. This would allow us to prioritise Bomb Damage Assessment in conflict areas and triage critical infrastructure condition and value. It would therefore cue more accurate field investigations, possibly using LiDAR sensors with competent structural inspection.

Remote sensing includes a rapidly developing Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) capability that is used to map aquifers and can potentially calculate extent, recharge rates and so carrying capacity. Meanwhile, advances in hyperspectral analysis is greatly improving our understanding of surface water conditions and levels of contamination. These two applications have the potential to fundamentally change post-conflict relief response planning, as well as inform the infrastructure reconstruction priorities to promote self-stablisation of essential services.

While we can achieve a level of stand-off recognition using readily-available satelitte imagery that was unthinkable even just five years ago, the IC engagement in post-conflict areas appears willfully ignorant of the evidence it provides. What is missing is a coherent way of drawing these evolving technologies together into a single stand-off recognition product. I assess that it is one of

56 RiskLogik (www.risklogik.com) and SightLine (www.sightlineinnovation.com) are jointly pursuing an AI-enabled feature extraction application that will lend itself to pattern comparison and identification of change by location and function. It was successfully trialed using the Gaza Strip data.

117 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture the most valuable information sources available to infrastructure engineers and planners, and possibly the least used in current decision-making. As demands for accountability across international organisations increases, this is almost certainly going to be the evidential basis that will define what was reasonably foreseeable. In parallel, there is the aspiration in industry of moving from ESDA to Predictive Spatial Data Analysis (PSDA).

This would depend on significant advances in AI and the enabling computing systems, such as promised by quantum computing, and the ability to process massive data flows from fused hyperspectral and radiometric platforms. This is beyond big data challenges. For example, through persistent observation it may be possible to discern changes in human systems in response to stimuli through emergence. That means that we could predict the likely outcome arising from a variety of proposed projects subject to multiple stimuli projected over time. In effect, we are starting to evidentially populate the human domain and build out the influence model in our COP. I think that this is within grasp, if we can find a framework that coherently synthesyses the many spatial data feeds.

Stand-off recognition is already integral to existing heuristic best practice. However, I believe that it is only being used to a fraction of its potential in post-conflict infrastructure planning by humanitarian agencies. I propose a fundamental revision of what stand-off recognition is in the post-conflict infrastructure COP. It can provide a timely understanding of what exists and the local needs, and so inform an aligned approach to relief and reconstruction. This represents the greatest single next step in capability development, and will make the benefits of this thesis approach immediately tangible to practioners. A paper describing the use of stand-off recognition in the development of the Common Operating Picture and the application of the unifying concept of infrastructure to interpret what is recognised for the timely and coordinated delivery of post- conflict infrastructure relief and reconstruction has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication in the 2019 special edition of the International Review of the Red Cross “Protracted Armed Conflicts.” Hay AH, Karney B, Martyn NQJ “Reconstruction Infrastructure for Resilient Essential Services during and Following Protracted Conflict – a Conceptual Framework.”

5.6. Comment In this chapter I explored the tableau-based COP and its heuristic use in conflict areas and infrastructure development, to inform a common understanding of what is. Through this exploration, I reduced the COP to its component parts and investigated how it is assembled from

118 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture the source data. I have proposed a more holistic framework for COP development that remains as structurally robust as in heuristic practice, but which also exposes and allows for gaps in data and understanding. Structurally, the four domains of a vitae system of systems are used to build the three models: tableau, causal and influence. These models are interconnected by their common use of domain information and together inform the three familiar components of the COP: Essential Services/Operations, Critical Infrastructure and Socioeconomic Context. The “anchor” in this approach is the tableau, representing physical assets and connectivity in time and space. The challenge is to ensure that the tableau data is up-to-date, which can be extremely difficult in conflict areas. The advances in stand-off recognition, more familiar as a military intelligence tool, allow the infrastructure planner the required currency and oversight for tableau construction. Through advances in satellite-based geospatial observation technology and ESDA, they also hold the promise of informing the other models by setting the boundaries of what is possible. To the limits of current publicly available technology, this proposed COP approach is being applied by the ICRC to great effect in Israel and the Occupied Territories. As stand-off recognition advances, so will the value of this approach. In this chapter I have addressed Question 2. How can one inform a common understanding of what exists, and so inform the development of implementable infrastructure reconstruction needs? I have also identified how one might bring the COP to near- real time by making best use of the rapid evolution in Stand-Off Recognition and Earth Observation technologies.

In addressing the need for common reference in conflict areas, I have found that the nature of the resulting understanding can also inform infrastructure development policy in more stable areas. Discussions with the Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure over the last two years have highlighted a driving concern amid a rapidly changing risk context (technological, climate, political, demographic and market expectation) that they need to better understand the functional value of existing and proposed infrastructure over its life; the Ministry needs to minimise the risk of stranded assets. My proposed COP approach may yet prove more immediately useful in Ontario. It also provides an informed platform for a fresh approach to engineering in society, where the esoterica of the infrastructure engineer are more tangibly represented in the public domain. I would hope that it could facilitate a professional re-engagement between the engineering profession and society, even as the changing risk context is also changing the design professions.

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There is a key field of research that arises from this work: advancing stand-off recognition. Current practice and capability are fast evolving, but while the geo-spatial observation technologies can provide ever more accessible and accurate mapping and feature recognition, there remains the challenge of recognition and interpretation of ever-greater amounts of data and still provide an intelligible and auditable record of analysis. The fledgling application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the issue is already showing valuable results, such as with feature extraction. In the Gaza example, the AI feature extraction of agriculturally viable land showed a third of the official figures, raising questions over the already very high fertiliser and water use. The ability to conduct such analyses across the area of interest for each investigation means that time and effort spent on primary analysis of the data is greatly reduced, key issues highlighted and the full audit trail automatically populated. This alone would halve the COP construction time, while making it more comprehensive. However, it also holds out the possibility of applying the Unifying Concept of Infrastructure to interpret what is recognised and extend into autonomous simulant behaviour modeling. An extension of free agent modeling with actual infrastructure influences on human behaviour. Rather more than the scope of one or more PhDs, yet possible if we can advance stand- off recognition capability and practice. It is very strongly recommended that UofT facilitate a PhD thesis in this area; its value extends far beyond post-conflict infrastructure and is immediate.

I have a dream of fuzzy tiles. Imagine, if you will, a three-dimensional blue projection model of a city that sits on top of its green LEGOTM mat. Critical assets and essential functions are identified in augmented reality. Where there is absolute confidence in the supporting evidence, the image is clear with a fine resolution. Areas where there is less confidence in the supporting evidence the resolution is less distinct and so on. When I apply a stress or shock to the model, I see the consequences cascade through the model in amber to denote change. Where there is a clear causal chain between input and effect, the change is clearly defined. Where there is less confidence that change vibrates slightly to denote variability, and so on through the levels of confidence. When I inspect a consequence, I see the sensitivity and range of consequences that can arise at that asset or functional node; by selecting an option from the range of possibilities, I see the impact cascade again from that point. I can play the shock or stress through time also, watching the flood waters rise in a building until they reach the point at which it compromises function and the cascade of failure resumes. In effect, I can experience the consequences of a disruption to the vitae system of systems, I can experiment with different mitigations and I can compare with the inherent risk profile. Each action stimulates an automatic calculation of whole cost of risk and I can recognise

120 Chapter 5: Understanding: Establishing a Common Operating Picture the investment value. As companies like RiskLogik experiment with AI in COP development and virtual reality, my dream of fuzzy tiles looks increasingly like it could move from imagination to scientific reality. The ability to visualise what an event means and explore the options for impact mitigation is significant. It puts the use of the COP into the wider operator world and not something that needs engineer interpretation. This means that the results of an essentially complex system of systems analysis of impact becomes tangible to decision-makers, irrespective of background. It also means that we can have an audit trail of evidence to support each assessment and mitigation strategy option, with full financial accounting. I believe that this is within reach, and will benefit all municipalities, in peace and conflict.

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Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning A common reference that supports a more comprehensive understanding of the situation in context is possible using a revision of currently available tools. The basic building blocks already exist and are in heuristic practice. This begs the question why a more evidence-based common reference isn’t already being used and more particularly why implementation of relief and reconstruction projects is often marred by foreseeable challenges. Why is implementation underperforming and what can we do about it? Exploring the deficiencies in current practice also exposes the constraints and limitations on how any implementation framework must function if it is to be readily adoptable and effective in enhancing benefit for post-conflict communities.

This chapter explores infrastructure project implementation in post-conflict areas and addresses Question 4. How should one deliver post-conflict rehabilitation? The ultimate goal is to propose a readily adoptable implementation framework that is as comprehensive as possible to better enable the practicable delivery of infrastructure planning. I suggest what such a framework must comprise, recognising the need to be flexible enough for practical application in different regions.

6.1. Framework Requirement The rehabilitation requirement was explored in Chapter 3, identifying aspects where the practice of infrastructure rehabilitation was at odds with the agreed approach or requirement. Some of this deviation was entirely conscious, such as where the domestic and strategic interests of the donor country dictated the approach over local requirements (Girod 2015), or where planners simply defaulted to a familiar end-state model in the absence of any operational understanding of the local essential services dynamics. I argued that the consistent deficiency lay in the common reference: evidence based, repeatable, comprehensive and objective. When there is a common reference between planners, donors/sponsors and local community, there can be informed dialogue and much of the understanding process in Participatory Learning & Action (PLA) can be addressed more quickly (Chambers 1997). As Arnold H. Glasow (humorist for New York Times and Wall Street Journal, 1905-1998) so succinctly put it “The fewer the facts, the stronger the opinion.” This is all the more powerful when the area in question is both remote from, and exceeds the individual comprehension of, decision-makers. A corollary of Wolfensohn’s forward to Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank. (WB 1998), the generation of staff who had experienced war and understood the nuances of conflict areas were replaced by staff without such backgrounds. This suggests that much of what was an implicit corporate and organisational Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning cultural understanding of conflict areas was simply assumed and not expressly included in practice. This reinforces the view that understanding is the essential enabler, and all that entails. Individual nations will always have their own domestic and geopolitical drivers, but when the planning staff have that understanding there is greater potential for alignment.

This presents the question whether armed with greater understanding, the staff will promote greater alignment between donor nation and local community. Evidence suggests not (Pugh 1998, WB 1998, OECD 2005, Riddell 2008, Knack et al 2010, Kharas 2011, Killen 2011, Anderson 2015). However, there is an increasing trend towards accountability, which the humanitarian community embraces and fears in equal measure. This will drive behaviour within the humanitarian agencies. In conversation with the ICRC in the Gaza Strip, it is clear that they see the rising need for accountability and seek to get ahead of donor nation expectations by being able to demonstrate that they have developed their evidential understanding of local needs and situation as far as reasonably foreseeable, and more specifically practicable. Understanding needs to translate into action and for that there needs to be a framework for implementation. This means that we must explore these institutional influences on planning and implementation in the humanitarian agencies, as well as the nature of implementation. The aim of this thesis is to work within and develop the existing practices to better align infrastructure rehabilitation with local needs. This means addressing as far as possible the generic institutional inertia impeding any substantive change of practice.

6.2. Accountability There are conflicting opinions about how this push for increased accountability arose in humanitarian efforts, but it seems to coincide with the 2005 Paris Declaration and the international agreement on the need for greater alignment between what is built and what is needed. It was expressed most vividly to me during the first Gaza Strip survey by a local foreign officer. To paraphrase, she asked at what point we [the IC] accept responsibility for delivering a capital project that we know is locally unsupportable, increases dependency on aid donors and increases community vulnerability under a return to violence. She was referring to the NGEST plant. The drivers to deliver projects like this that can be seen to not deliver real overall benefit locally go beyond Girod’s donor self-interest (Girod 2015). Such projects are typically pursued with local engagement. For example, the NGEST plant that I previously described, was built as a result of planning and direct engagement by the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU), justified

123 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning with the argument that the electricity supply will follow. It hasn’t. When we investigated the planning and decision points for this project, it was clear that all planning was in response to an immediate need though in isolation of the wider context and certainly does not appear to have included any system of systems assessment. The engineers, local and foreign, were highly qualified and capable. There did not appear to be a planning protocol for such works.

The lack of a protocol feeds the greatest fear over accountability. Of those foreign officers, from a variety of agencies, whom I spoke with, the majority were concerned about individual accountability when there was no individual control over decision-making. The sense was that accountability needed to be collective, even institutional. This would certainly reinforce the need for simple and commonly recognised protocols for infrastructure planning. However, the alignment of accountability with responsible decision-making and resource authority is more complex in the humanitarian arena. The governance of humanitarian agencies in post-conflict rehabilitation is outside the scope of this thesis. However, defining a set of planning protocols that can be referenced by the local foreign officer and infrastructure engineers does at least institutionalise the accountability.

So far, the idea of accountability has been very much defined by how it is perceived by those being held accountable, or at least anticipating that they will be held accountable. Aside from the evident need for accountability to be collective, it is still felt individually. It is therefore useful to explore how individuals and institutions are held to account, or at least how it is anticipated that they will be held to account. Some of the smaller humanitarian agencies already consider accountability core to their corporate culture. These are typically agencies and charities whose funding streams depend entirely on the results they deliver. Those results are not measured in terms of dollars spent, but rather local benefit, and they experience the full scrutiny of media interest. Accountability is in effect a brand-defining activity. Often, alignment is assessed by asking the local population if they got what they wanted. Perhaps over-simplistic, but questions centre on the idea that the local is best positioned to define their need. As discussed earlier, in post-conflict areas it is exceeding rare that local professionals with a systems level understanding remain and it is unclear how well equipped the remaining locals are to articulate this need for such a survey. While the common reference of a COP will help address this, the perception is that the media will intuit according to their preconception what the evidence of local perspective means about the humanitarian agency’s performance. Convoluted and indistinct to say the least. This goes beyond

124 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning the need for common reference and planning protocols to the essence of professionalism, echoing the origins of the Grand Bargain of the 19th Century that established the modern-day professions.57

The other influence on behaviour, individual and institutional, centres on a popular perception of what leadership is. In western culture and by extension through much of the international humanitarian sector, crisis leaders are lauded over those who avoid a crisis. Ignoring the causes of a crisis is actually poor management and runs counter to Drucker’s first fiduciary responsibility, to protect against loss (Drucker 1993). It is also inefficient. Objective assessments of leadership and good management concur that it is better to avoid a crisis than to manage through one. To paraphrase Arnold Glasgow once more “One of the tests of leadership is the ability to recognise a problem before it becomes an emergency.” That is not the popular route for political or corporate advancement. Infrastructure planning is not something that is typically associated with crisis leadership, since the act of planning infrastructure is itself a part of crisis avoidance. However, within many humanitarian organisations, the individual and corporate need to be seen to respond and be actively engaged in a crisis may detract from the deliberate consideration and planning needed for infrastructure rehabilitation.58 The choice is often a stark one, assign all resources to solving the immediate issues or assign a portion to reducing the likelihood and consequence of a reoccurrence. Popular recognition follows the first. In my experience, it is rare for the latter to be recognised.

To advance the concept of an implementation framework, within the existing rehabilitation paradigm, I must therefore address these issues, arising directly and indirectly out of this fear of accountability. The need for a common reference is discussed through the core of this thesis and not repeated here. The need for planning protocols is addressed directly, drawing upon established

57 Richard and Daniel Susskind argue that the rapid changes in Information & Communications Technology is changing society’s needs and expectations of the traditional professions, from medicine and law to clergy and designers. The challenge facing the professions is that they must evolve or become irrelevant. (Susskind & Susskind 2015) 58 Herein lies possibly the biggest challenge for humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian action is very much reactive; traditionally centred on alleviating suffering in camps and rural areas. This role is reinforced by donor financing in six- month to one-year cycles. As populations become more urban and conflicts more protracted, some agencies are reconsidering their approach with a few attempting since 2011 to tackle this directly by engaging in some reconstruction work during pauses in fighting and at the immediate cessation of conflict. This has been traditionally where the development agencies would step in. Neither is well-equipped for this space and there needs to be improved collaboration and coordination between humanitarian and development agencies, including some exchange of skills. This might include possibly sponsoring particular technical/professional posts in each others organisation, as many government ministries do within an administration. This would address individual concerns over professional development, advancement and compensation.

125 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning heuristic practice reapplied to the post-conflict rehabilitation context. The nature of the professional requirement on infrastructure planners needs to be explored, as it informs how engineers may use the protocols. However, while recognising the influence of organisational culture and preference for heroic action, any substantive investigation and recommendation on how to address organisational culture is necessarily out with the scope of this thesis. Once we have a clear direction on the “mechanics” of the implementation framework, we can look at implementation planning and confidence in delivery.

6.3. Stimulating Adoption Any reconstruction must be adopted by the local population if it is to be successful. It is the corollary of purpose and value. If we build something and it is not used, it has no value. Similarly, if that infrastructure is not maintained and fails, it is not used and loses value. There is no shortage of infrastructure projects that have not been adopted by the local community and therefore do not deliver their purpose. For example, the US Government built the a water treatment plant on a Caribbean island, to service their WWII airbase. A traditional sand filtration plant, it was easily taken over by the local water utility, when the US Forces left the island and airbase was converted into an international civil airport. As the area densified, a further plant was built. This second plant was a membrane plant built by international donors in the 1990s. It could not be maintained locally and was taken off-line soon after commissioning. In time, the utility was able to redress the situation. Having to make good past work, as opposed to progressively building capability and capacity, is not the most efficient use of resources. All the more critical in a protracted conflict area. This provides a good example of intelligent resourcing, or more correctly the lack of intelligent resourcing in the planning, design and construction of the second water treatment plant in the example, and due to system demand the resulting compromise of a previously functioning capability. I have already explored the other influences on why this might be, including the need for US domestic politics to award development contracts to US firms. However, when we consider post-conflict areas, is it necessarily that simple? There is the question of balance between individual systems’ carrying capacity. For example, in the Gaza Strip, the new NGEST plant could not be commissioned because the electrical infrastructure cannot support it. That is a question of infrastructure planning, but what of the skills? If the developing agency is still in the area, could there not be a practical extended transition period where new skills are gradually transferred locally? This is one of the central justifications for capacity building.

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Capacity building is conceptually a sound idea. It fills gaps in local technical capacity to permit local delivery of services and ownership of systems. However, it has become synonymous with qualifications. As already discussed, when top candidates gain internationally recognised qualifications in a post-conflict area, they effectively have the means to escape the area and so contribute little to the local recovery effort. Capacity building is typically defined by what outsiders identify as the gap in capacity and articulated in terms of qualifications. Qualifications are the common metric for many professions, providing a surrogate for competency that is more difficult to contest. We can identify a capacity gap in terms of what the individual must be capable of doing, or competent at. When determining what this means for training and education to address the capacity gap, internationally recognised educational modules associated with appropriate qualifications are selected. It stands to reason that in order to make such education and training attractive, it is rounded out to an academic qualification. What that then means in professional terms will depend on the awarding body. If the professional association recognises academic qualifications, time of practice and a recommendation as the threshold for professional recognition, it will be more attractive and simpler for the local practitioner to leave. If the professional association requires a demonstration of competency independently assessed as the threshold for professional recognition, it then becomes more attractive for the local practitioner to remain locally and build the necessary portfolio of responsible experience. Conversely, if we do not define the capacity gap by the higher professional orders, but rather by the competency to maintain, repair and adapt existing infrastructure and socio-economic systems, we build the community capacity to support professionals.

In a post-conflict society, the ability to maintain the infrastructure using local resources will be important for local ownership, but so will the nature of the regulating/controlling authority and the community perception of the infrastructure value. The nature of the controlling authority has been discussed, specifically whether it is extractive or inclusive (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). The community perception of the infrastructure is more complex. There is the self-interest of local stakeholders wishing to exploit the situation and manoeuvring the infrastructure solution for political or financial gain to a particular location and under specific conditions. More collectively, there is the experience of the last project and the tangible benefit for the community. When the community sees direct and tangible benefit to the community from an infrastructure project, such as through local employment, potable water, sanitation, education, freedom of movement etc, there will be a willingness to accept the next project and an expectation of similar benefits. This is where

127 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning the alignment between local needs and reconstruction effort is so fundamental to local benefit, and the basis for PLA (Chambers 1997). Once again, this needs to be unpicked because in post-conflict societies the situation is more complex.

I once conducted an outline design for a rainwater catchment, storage, treatment and distribution system for an island community in the Indian Ocean. The design complied with intelligent resourcing principles, and local stakeholders had been involved in the requirements definition and land use discussions from the outset. My design was rejected by the local engineer. His challenge was why I should be trusted. After an awkward and embarrassing meeting, I learned that their past experience of working with foreign consultants was less than favourable. They perceived external advice and assistance to be motivated by self-interest, and not necessarily to the benefit of the local population. Despite the needs in a post-conflict area often being so much greater, exaggerated by political and economic instability, similar self-harming distrust of external stakeholders exists, intended as self-preservation. In the reconstruction following the Bosnian War (1992-1995), we had to convince communities that the benefits of reinstating the railway connections through the country outweighed their perception that their neighbours would use it to attack or disadvantage them. I encountered a Bosniac community that didn’t want to be connected to a grid supply that came through a near-by Bosnian Serb community, because of deep-seated distrust arising from their war experience. An alternative electrical supply connection was made. The question of trust and more specifically social trauma is a constant in any exploration of capacity. If there is to be any benefit, the local population must be capable of engaging and willing to do so also. This is perhaps the true nature of post-conflict poverty.

Banerjee’s excellent exploration of the nature of poverty discusses how individual households will prioritise activities according to the immediacy of impact and need (Banerjee & Duflo 2011). George Orwell included instant gratification as a priority for expenditure (Orwell 1937). A nurse may be needed in the community, but her first priority is to care for her own infant or invalid spouse. This situation is amplified in widowed households. When we look at post-conflict rehabilitation, we are looking at creating a better future for the next generation, not just the alleviation of suffering today. We need to invest part of our approach to enabling the next generation. The leading projects in post-conflict have created community schools to enable adults in each household to work on reconstruction according to their ability. The community schools would run through the working day and provide vaccinations and a nutritious balanced meal for

128 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning every child each day. Typically, this would include children as young as 2 years of age and sometimes infants also. By removing the pressing need for childcare from the household and investing in a healthy next generation, household capacity is being expanded across the generations. This best heuristic practice model is not universal. This may in large part be because such activities are considered outside of infrastructure planning and engineering, even if they are aligned and expand the available resource pool.

There is also the question of trust. German parents resisted Sesame Street for many years because they felt that they should be the ones to teach their children social values, not vicariously through a state-provided television program. The heuristic model described above would probably not have worked well in post-WWII Germany, but as already discussed the social fabric and institutions were intact. Marc Hooghe (Hooghe et al, 2012) associates trust with education, amplified by cognitive abilities rather than occupational prestige. Nevertheless, the need to trust that there will be a benefit for an engagement must be more than cognitive. One can reason that sanitation is necessary because it is known that the lack of sanitation is associated with disease and incapacity. In a post-conflict area, it doesn’t mean that the trust in that exchange will be universal. A surviving parent may fear losing a child while away at work. It doesn’t need to be rational and it doesn’t even need to be a product of personal experience.

The concept of intergenerational trauma is well-established today. It is the Rt. Hon. Paul Martin’s current focus with aboriginal communities in northern Canada59 and has been investigated for many years around inner-city societal dynamics. Dr. Bruce Perry, Senior Fellow of the Child Trauma Academy in Houston, Texas, wrote “Incubated in Terror” in 1995 (Perry 1995) and there have been further studies published in the Lancet and elsewhere about not only the insidious nature of trauma being projected from generation to generation, but also the role of early years education in mitigating and even halting that intergenerational transfer (Sokolowski et al, 2013, Black et al, 2017). The implications for reconciliation and combatant reintegration are significant, and these are essential components in effective rehabilitation. It means that while infrastructure reconstruction can provide the common purpose and vehicle for combatant reintegration and reconciliation, it needs to be supported by a social program that not only develops community

59 The Martin Family Initiative, https://www.themfi.ca, is improving elementary and secondary school education for First Nations, Métis Nation and Inuit in Canada, working in partnership with local and government stakeholders. In providing high quality education for aboriginal communities, it is creating the conditions to address intergenerational trauma. This extends to early years learning initiatives.

129 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning cohesion, but enhances mental and social wellbeing also. This is an engineering thesis and not a psychology one, so this association is not explored further here. However, this is a critical link and needs to be investigated by better qualified researchers than I. The understanding of how infrastructure relates to physical, mental and social wellbeing during construction as well as its operation is as fundamental a step forward as the development of a Public Health association in the late 19th Century. The challenge is that this falls between the defined academic disciplines and specialisations.

The adoption of infrastructure by the community is based on individual capacity, but remains an essentially collective attribute. The capacity of the community to act [and perceive] collectively is Social Capital. Built of social cohesion, it relies upon community focus and identity. The capacity of a community to adopt the infrastructure through a sense of collective ownership and benefit of the essential service that it enables determines both the contribution that the community can make to the reconstruction effort and the benefit that it can derive, individually and collectively. I suggested that capacity is the measure of poverty, rather than monetary wealth. Post-conflict, where there is a lack of formal economy and all socioeconomic groups have a subsistence existence, will separate those with the capacity to benefit and those without. The former will recover and the latter will not, constraining Deaton’s opportunity (Deaton 2013) and empowering Acemoglu’s extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). An equity of access to the essential services can elevate households above the Maslow’s survival needs towards being part of the community and the aspiration for betterment. Capacity can also be measured as an indicator of anticipated outcome, since it is a precondition. Household capacity can be measured as a simple time allocation of the working age occupants. The time available to earn an income is an indicator, when associated with levels of vaccination and nutrition, and child education.

While individual and collective capacity is the key to adoption of infrastructure, it does not deliver reconstruction or rehabilitation. It defines the potential to benefit through being able to engage directly with an opportunity and to receive the rewards. For potential to be realised, there needs to be opportunity. The infrastructure reconstruction and development work within the rehabilitation process can provide that opportunity, both during the construction period and the subsequent operation. However, to make infrastructure projects viable opportunities that locals can benefit from, we need to investigate what turns potential into action.

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6.4. Capacity-Benefit Relationship The capacity of the population to benefit from an improvement in essential services, does not necessarily mean that it will. Setting aside the complexities of actually having the necessary individual and collective capacity in the post-conflict environment, there still needs to be a mechanism that makes benefit attainable.

As already discussed, project planning and implementation conducted in isolation can have negative effects upon the local population, including an increase in fragility as demonstrated by the NGEST plant in the Gaza Strip.60 However, when we explore the idea of value, specifically around the use of infrastructure, we see a clear separation of the components of capability that the infrastructure represents. The infrastructure enables an essential service. For the population to benefit from that essential service, they must have the capacity to engage and benefit as well as have access to it. For example, if a government buys sufficient vaccines for all children and distributes them in the right proportions to the clinics, it does not mean that all the children will be vaccinated. The households must be aware of the vaccination program and availability, and must be able to get their children to the clinics for vaccination. We cannot assume equity of access to clinics, or indeed common availability of households for the vaccination window of opportunity. When we break this down into its constituent parts, we have facility, access and capacity. Infrastructure rehabilitation affects each component, representing a capability that defines either the potential or realisation. The potential may be emergency services that are not operating until called, or a potable water supply that operates continuously. I have called this relationship beneficial capability. When the three components are in balance there is capability that benefits the local population.

In June 2018, Egypt announced that it would build an industrial facility in Sinai, beside the Rafah Crossing to afford some economic benefit to the population of the Gaza Strip.61 While there is a reasonable assumption that the technical skills and labour capacity exists in the Gaza Strip, it doesn’t mean that the net benefit will be what it could be. There are the internal capacity issues among the households and communities of the Gaza Strip, as well as deeply riven political factions that proclaim varying degrees of support for the initiative. However, for those with the capacity to

60 It is important to note that draining the Beit-Lahia sewage lagoons, which were on the verge of collapse and causing an environmental and public health disaster, is an important achievement in and of itself. However, in the process it changed the character of the risk and moved it with more chronic vice acute consequences. 61 Bar’el Z “Deal of the century might be up to Cairo” Haaretz (Tel Aviv) 24 June 2018 (99)30149:1

131 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning engage and benefit, there is the challenge of access. In an area with severely limited fuel imports, there is relatively little private or public transportation. This can be overcome through communal action by setting up a bus service, which itself is beset with political and criminal challenges. The Sinai Peninsula has an ongoing Da’esh62 insurgency, which will make function of and access to the industrial facility a further challenge. The Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation in the Sinai Peninsula notwithstanding, access will remain the most demanding component. For the Egyptian initiative to deliver real benefit there are practical issues that need to be addressed and systems established through the development and construction of the facilities.

We can apply the same concept to the development of clinics and schools, markets and essential services. Arguably, it is not even a peculiarity of conflict areas and can be applied to developed cities.63 If there is a facility, the targeted population must have access to the facility and the capacity to engage with and benefit from the services provided. If we now consider what beneficial capability means in planning terms, it is a mechanism for associating benefit from a service to a group of people. In the already divided and distrustful environment of post-conflict communities, this can be applied for exploitative or inclusive purposes. The aim is rehabilitation of community and economy through the infrastructure systems that enable the essential services. The unifying purpose is Health: complete physical, mental and social wellbeing. For the last element of that to be true, beneficial capability must be applied using equity of access. That is that all sectors of the community have access to the facility. The distinction therefore becomes the capacity of individuals and households, not the community.

Mahatma Ghandi is reported to have said, though I am unable to find the source, that the true measure of a society is how it treats its most vulnerable members.64 The application of beneficial

62 Da’esh as an anglicised abbreviation of the full Arabic name of the Islamic State jihadist terror group, “al-Dawla al- Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham,” also known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or simply Islamic State (IS). Though they have now lost ground they once controlled in Iraq and Syria to the local government forces, they still pose a potent terror threat across the Middle East and in the home countries of their returning foreign fighters. Seen as a more extreme alternative to Al Qaeda, they have predominated in the weakly controlled areas, such as the Sinai Peninsula and throughout Syria during its civil war. 63 We shall be applying the concept of beneficial capability to several Toronto Community Housing (TCH) sites, in collaboration with the City’s Chief Transformation Officer, Michael Kolm. The objective is to assess each of the TCH buildings and sites, designated by the CTO for investigation, to see whether or not it is possible for tenants to access the essential services provided to them and how one might improve their access overall. This is seen as the first step in a city-wide non-communicable diseases epidemiological study of TCH property, in a bid to improve the overall physical, mental and social wellbeing of the TCH population. 64 This quote, widely attributed to him does not appear to have come from one of his publications, but rather from a speech. I have found many references to it, but no source. Gandhi M (n.d.) AZQuotes.com. (Accessed 13 August 2018) https://www.azquotes.com/quote/877037.

132 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning capability with equity of access provides the structural means for a community to build cohesion and social capital, as it rehabilitates. It also expands the available local workforce pool to draw upon for infrastructure works and generates more direct and indirect local benefit than presently. The ability to maximise use of the local workforce can be particularly important. During reconstruction works in southern Iraq, it was important to not import Sunni and out-of-area trades into an overwhelmingly localised Shia area. The onus was on [Multinational Division South] to enable the local population to work on utility and other infrastructure reconstruction projects, ensuring that they were designed to suit the local trades capacity. Intelligent Resourcing was used to enable local benefit; beneficial capability would have provided the structure in which to effectively apply intelligent resourcing. It would have allowed us to maximise the local workforce capacity and stimulate local ownership. I propose the concept of beneficial capability as a protocol for infrastructure planning in post-conflict areas.

6.5. Intelligent Resourcing Intelligent resourcing is a planning and design concept that sees a design adjusted to accommodate locally available materials and trades. There should be no appreciable difference in the capability or function of the end result in fulfilling the original purpose. This concept was described by Vitruvius in his Ten Books on Architecture (Vitruvius 2001). It has been a fundamental planning concept since the Roman Empire, though less applied since World War II with the introduction of modularity, and the mass delivery of modular components anywhere in the world. From personal experience, and the huge logistic burden that it creates aside, modularity does not offer cost efficiencies beyond a brief operational life. In Bosnia (1992 – 1998) we found that the modular camps using the ISO container format were more expensive overall after between 18 and 30 months occupancy. The main reason is maintenance and repair. Instead of patching or replacing an item, a whole panel would need to be replaced and would need to be imported. This hadn’t changed in Afghanistan (2002-2008) where modular components based on timber construction would be eaten by termites and need regular replacement, or Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras standardised for use in Canada were seizing due to the haematite dust of the Red Desert. Intelligent resourcing fits the infrastructure that enables a function or purpose to the particular environment. It remains as relevant today as 2,000 years ago, and yet can be overlooked by narrowly focused planners and designers or wilfully ignored by donor fiat requiring a national product and contractor, irrespective of local outcome. As discussed previously, a more regular use of intelligent resourcing would certainly address many of the issues that today impede the

133 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning effectiveness of post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation, and military expeditionary garrisons.

However, there is a corollary of intelligent resourcing that I researched at some length with a colleague, Jennie Phillips, a PhD candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs, at the University of Toronto (Phillips & Hay 2017). This concept is projection, which is discussed briefly in Chapter 5. The idea has been around in various forms for the last decade in heuristic resilience planning practice, yet not applied to an infrastructure system to my knowledge. The concept is similar to a franchise operation and was consequently nick-named the Tim Horton’s Model by the research team. If we analyse an operation to determine what that operation depends upon to what degree for essential, sustaining and routine operating performance65 we are able to define what is required locally to replicate the operation anywhere else in the world. The power supply may be different, or the water composition, or the transportation networks or the supply chain, but the end product would be consistently the same wherever the operation is conducted. As a resilience planning tool, it also means that local compromise of those enabling services can be compensated for over a tolerance period. In effect, we are able to project an inherently resilient operation anywhere, defining what is required of the local systems to host that operation. Where the host cannot comply, alternative systems are put in place and simply become part of the whole cost of risk for sustained operations.

A projected operation is inherently stable and when embedded in an unstable network it provides a node of stability that neighbouring operations and systems can rely upon. These neighbouring operations and systems become stable and so the influence spreads through the network. It is similar to placing a drop of red wine on a linen tablecloth. Gradually the red wine wicks along the threads in the weave and colours an ever-greater area until it reaches a maximum dispersion. A similar drop of red wine close by will cause a similar dispersion of colouring until the two meet up and the colour between them intensifies. Ultimately, the table cloth is red. It would appear to work in the same way in infrastructure networks in the built and virtual domain (Phillips & Hay 2018). This has very real potential for the stabilisation of integrated essential services in a post-conflict area. Most significant in application is that by stabilising the right influencing or enabling node, the local systems self-stabilise around it and that means that the local community inherently owns

65 See discussion of the Incident Sequence, Chapter 4.

134 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning their recovery through reconstruction and into development. This needs more research, but shows very real promise.

6.6. Planning Protocol When we are planning post-conflict infrastructure projects, we can say that we are seeking to provide the greatest direct and indirect benefit to the population and stabilise the integrated essential services, aligned with local needs and priorities under a common over-arching goal of physical, mental and social wellbeing across the population. This is a simple and practicable construct. The necessary tools exist or can be adapted from heuristic practice to deliver within this construct, informed by the COP, a common reference for all stakeholders.

The construct is shown at Figure 14. It is enabled by a simple protocol concerning the implementation of infrastructure projects in the post-conflict environment. Its purpose is to provide a clear and simple handrail that guides the practitioner around many of the potential pitfalls and coordinates the infrastructure reconstruction with the developing social capital and economy in a balanced way. Ultimately, this will need to be reflected in the implementation framework guidance provided to practitioners. It can’t negate the effects of a donor wilfully ignoring alignment or pursuing post-conflict infrastructure projects for personal gain. However, it will assist the infrastructure engineer in delivering post-conflict infrastructure projects within imposed constraints. My aim here is not to be prescriptive, but rather guide project selection, development and implementation. The protocol is therefore not conclusive or necessarily comprehensive. The protocol proposed here builds on the unifying concept of infrastructure and the common reference to ensure continuity of purpose and concepts in planning and design through to final delivery.

a. The infrastructure is to directly and indirectly improve the physical, mental and social well-being of the local population. This is little more than a restatement of the ultimate purpose of the infrastructure and that success and project value are measured by its impact on mental and social wellbeing as much as it is on the physical well-being of the population. b. The infrastructure design is to ensure that operation and maintenance are within the capacity of the local materials supply chain and trades and service support. This is a practical statement about how the infrastructure will be used and that it must be locally sustainable. If it cannot be maintained using local skills, it will fall into disrepair and almost certainly not be adopted.

135 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning c. The infrastructure design is to optimise use of locally resourceable materials. This is the direct application of intelligent resourcing, per Vitruvius. When combined with local skills, the infrastructure design ensures that the project is accessible to the local economy. d. The infrastructure function is to be within the carrying capacity of the enabling services. As demonstrated in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere, if the new infrastructure cannot be incorporated into the existing infrastructure system of systems, it is unsustainable and can induce a destabilising burden. Each infrastructure project must add to the carrying capacity of the whole, but cannot itself place an unsustainable burden on the rest. e. The infrastructure operation is safe-to-fail. i.e. to be inherently resilient. The new infrastructure cannot induce fragility or amplify harm under a return to violence, climate change, changing risk context etc. It must be inherently capable of delivering a minimum level of performance that can generally be relied upon in the event that enabling services are compromised, short of direct destruction. f. The infrastructure construction program is to include social initiatives to ensure balanced capacity development and beneficial capability. Put simply, if the infrastructure project is to be successful and benefit the local population, it will require social support measures that enable the community to engage and adopt the project. This is engineering in society, for society and not something imposed on society. g. The infrastructure operation is to be locally accountable, employing locals in managerial, administrative, technical and general labour categories of employment. Planning an infrastructure project is as much about the governance of its delivery, operation and maintenance as it is about the technical engineering. If the associated organisational design and composition is ignored, it can easily become part of an extractive institution, whereas we need inclusive organisations to own and operate the infrastructure if it is to be locally adopted and contribute to the overall rehabilitation of the area.

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While perhaps intuitively what one would hope to do as an infrastructure planner, this proposed protocol extends beyond the normal boundaries of what is academically defined as engineering. On the one hand it exposes an apparent disconnect between the theory and practice of infrastructure engineering. Ultimately, the common goal in theory and practice is what I have suggested is the unifying purpose, Health. The physical, mental and social wellbeing of the population that the infrastructure serves lies at the very heart of any post conflict rehabilitation and exemplifies the humanitarian application of art and science … harnessing the forces of nature in the service of mankind.66 The challenge in this is that this approach to engineering is social

Figure 14. An illustration of how the COP continues through the infrastructure rehabilitation program in a particular post-conflict area. It informs the strategy development, which determines the stage objectives and associated metrics of success towards a final goal, Health. There are the protocols for the rehabilitation program implementation that ensures a critical balance between the infrastructure reconstruction and social capital and economic development, while the local constraints will be specific to the location. Tools and planning concepts, such as intelligent resourcing, enable successful delivery.

66 This quote is generally ascribed to the Institution of Civil Engineers, though perhaps not correctly. In 1827, Thomas Tredgold said “… engineering is the art of directing the great sources of power in nature for the use and convenience of man.” This was subsequently repeated in the Royal Charter of the Institution. F.R. Hutton (1908) in “The Field of the Mechanical Engineer” Engineering Digest 3(10). However, Nikola Tesla is reported to have said “The desire that guides me in all I do is the desire to harness the forces of nature to the service of mankind.”

137 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning science, as well as applied science. It is not the way we are typically taught as civil engineers, though is how we must practice as infrastructure engineers. This is not an irreconcilable difference. Just as civil engineering includes an understanding of public health and the critical role of infrastructure, so infrastructure engineering includes stakeholder engagement, risk and financing, macroeconomic understanding and [system of] systems thinking (Ainger & Fenner 2014, Blockley & Godfrey 2017). This raises the question whether infrastructure engineers and planners are equipped to practice this protocol.

6.7. Professional Practice In Chapters 3 and 4 I explored the challenges faced by infrastructure engineers and planners in determining what the local requirement is. This affects directly actual alignment with local needs, as they will tend to default to what is already familiar. Depending on the professionalism of the individual, this can colour their perspective creating an effective cognitive dissonance when presented with local facts that do not fit the determined solution. I have argued that a common reference will help alleviate this as it will afford the infrastructure engineer and planner a clearer understanding of the actual situation that can be shared with the local authorities and donors. The definition of need and requirement then arises from an informed discourse. There will always remain external influences, such as donor nations’ domestic and strategic agenda, but generally speaking the argument is that provided with current information of the situation, the plans that arise will be more right than not. I tested this idea through informal discussions with 12 of my peers. We are all practitioners in our 50s and 60s with more than 30 years or more responsible experience each, though none have been working at the individual project level for at least 15 years. The consensus opinion was that armed with improved understanding we would be able to balance the multi-disciplinary considerations to identify a viable solution. It is interesting to look more closely at how this peer group was educated and their life experiences.

All were educated in the 1970s and 1980s when a much smaller proportion of school-leavers went on to university education. They are all engineers and described a first principles education with small class sizes and guided tuition. Many had military, diplomatic or other foreign service government experience and had developed professionally in an outcomes-oriented environment that was more tolerant of mistakes than today. There was little external scrutiny in their work, but they were all held accountable and without exception worked in and with the populations that they were helping.

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Today’s infrastructure planners appear less likely to be engineers, though many are architects. Few have any government or prior conflict areas experience and were generally educated in a more closely defined technical scope to be immediately employable upon graduation. In my experience, many will defer to the local employee in reporting local situations and requirements. In itself, this presents a challenge for the local employee who has been retained because of the crisis, and will perceive that they are no longer required if there is no crisis. During the literature search for my research in the Gaza Strip, I came across many reports that could not be validated or claims that were unsupported by the evidence. Why would the foreign officers not more closely scrutinise the local reporting? Either they are indifferent or do not have the necessary skills or confidence to apply due scrutiny.

Between 2007 and 2009, I was part of the Capacity Building Panel of the Institution of Civil Engineers. Over this time, we investigated what competencies would be required of a Chartered Civil Engineer to be international competitive in 2025 and beyond, and what this would mean for their professional development. Our findings were, in retrospect, unsurprising. Chartered Civil Engineers would require a sound broad technical competency based upon a first principles understanding of the discipline. There would be greater emphasis on communication skills and team working, specifically the ability to lead, manage and contribute to multi-cultural, diverse and multi-disciplinary teams. Each engineer would also bring a specialist skill to contribute, such as environmental engineering or water infrastructure. This meant that the undergraduate degree needed to be more first principles based and less procedural, provide greater contextual understanding for civil engineering projects purpose and means of delivery. They would also require a master’s degree that provided the specialisation, and have a certain period of demonstrable responsible experience that they could defend under chartered professional review. The findings of this report were used to inform the continuing review of the Initial Professional Development process for Chartered Civil Engineers. When we look at applying this professional competency set to infrastructure engineering, the requirements are consistent, but it is still not what we are producing from university education.

I assigned an undergraduate BASc student, Antonina Gorshenina, a final year research project in the 2017/2018 academic year. She investigated the competency requirements for infrastructure engineering, and what is required of university education in establishing that intellectual foundation. Her findings are interesting and indicate a lack of multi-disciplinary understanding and

139 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning the softer skills in the normal conduct of current professional engineer academic education.67 Irrespective of how one chooses to view the question, whether academic overspecialisation or a rehabilitation paradigm that didn’t have to be perfect because the practitioners were experienced enough to make it work. The problem is that they didn’t always make it work. While the outgoing generation benefited from a professional formation that was more suited to post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation, it was not enough to reliably compensate for the looseness of the Paradigm. The current generation has largely entered the field directly from university, though we are once again seeing an new influx of former military and foreign service officers in humanitarian and post-conflict work. The past was not a golden age of practice, beset with the same human frailties that we see today from arrogance to hubris to cognitive dissonance. The Paradigm needs to be improved, as does the competency of the infrastructure engineer and planner in the post-conflict environment. It is unclear whether the post-conflict environment is specialist or somehow unique from infrastructure development work in politically and economically stable parts of the world. What is very clear is that the individual practitioner is expected to be a generalist with a broad multi-disciplinary understanding and stronger than average “soft skills” to interact with the multiple stakeholders.

I have sought to develop the courses that I teach at the University of Toronto to represent as closely as possible real practice in infrastructure engineering and planning. The courses are APS1024 Infrastructure Resilience Planning, APS1025 Infrastructure Protection Planning and APS1031 Infrastructure Planning. In each case, I use a structural constructivist approach. I guide the students self-learning with the emphasis on working out what the issues are based upon their risk evaluation of the situation. The projects are real, for real clients in real time. The clients value these projects and have implemented approximately half of the student recommendations over the years. I have also been working with the CIV460 Engineering Project Management & Finance course, which is taught to final year undergraduate applied science and civil engineering students in the infrastructure stream. This course is locked more closely into their respective clients and all their projects over the last three years have been implemented. I have placed the emphasis on planning the infrastructure project, including financing and contracting strategy, with the end result

67 Gorshenina identified competency gaps around systems thinking, business acumen, communication skills, leadership, and adaptability. She made various recommendations as to how academia can partially address these gaps in professional competency. Gorshenina A (2018) Infrastructure Engineer Competencies in 2030. A 4th Year Engineering Science Project Report, Faculty of Applied Science, University of Toronto. (March 2018)

140 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning being the direction to an engineering design team. As with all of the courses that I teach, I build from first principles using the students’ respective experiences to develop a relatable understanding of purpose and the interconnectivity of the vitae system of systems. They are very much based in an international context with projects ranging from hurricane relief facilities in Belize to the redevelopment of Umm Qasr port in southern Iraq. However, arising in part from this research and within the requirement to develop the CIV460 course into a more definite international focus, I have discussed course partnerships with the Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and 1 Engineering Support Unit (1ESU).

The purpose is to develop understanding of actual conditions using all available data sources and tools to determine requirements and implementation strategies. There is mutual benefit in this arrangement. The pilot project for this arrangement was the requirements definition for the redevelopment of the Canadian Forces Station Eureka, 80oN on Ellesmere Island. I was responsible for some final design, construction and its commissioning in 1998/1999 and it is soon due a midlife upgrade due to accelerated retreat of the permafrost. Aside from offering the best possible education in infrastructure engineering that I can to these students, I hope to be able to iteratively distill out what is practicable to teach and what must be learned through experience. The reason for this “test & adjust”68 approach is that the essentials of what infrastructure engineering practice is about falls between the academic specialisations that define research funding streams and professorial appointments.

6.8. Infrastructure Delivery Given the multiple factors involved in delivering any post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation that is genuinely aligned and resilient, it raises the question how much confidence one can have in successful delivery. Do we treat this as a black box process, for which we don’t really understand the internal dynamics, or can we model implementation much as we might a typical construction project? More specifically, I was challenged by a question from the ICRC delegates in the Gaza Strip as to how much confidence I had that a particular project would be successful. While I could assess specific engineering relationships and systems with confidence, ascribing any confidence to how changing perspectives and political interests would influence the already complex project planning process in a post-conflict area was less clear. It also raises the question whether having protocols and competent infrastructure engineers/planners is enough? Do we need to have a sense

68 Military term used for marksmanship development to learn muscle memory of the optimum firing position.

141 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning of what a reasonable expectation of project implementation outcome might be, beyond the measurement of anticipated outcome of the infrastructure itself? If we can’t predict the likelihood of how an infrastructure project will deliver, we can at least identify the nature of the externalities that significantly influence delivery and so equip the infrastructure engineer with a better appreciation of what to prioritise. Arguably, this is the value of responsible experience, but can we codify it for use by the less experienced?

My approach to this question was to first collect peer experiences and heuristic practises known to work. The experiences spanned various Balkans conflicts, Afghanistan, the changing conflicts in Iraq, Sinai and Sudan, as well as the Troubles in Northern Ireland. I was also able to obtain some insight from veterans of the Dhofar Campaign, Oman (1992-1975), East Timor (1999), the Falklands Islands Conflict (1982) and Sierra Leone (the civil war was 1991-2002, while the UK engagement was from 2000). These conflict areas were a mix of internal and expeditionary state conflicts with varying degrees of local governance and institutional structure. A generic set of factors and relationships was extracted and used to build a causal chain model in RiskLogik. This looked at the project process as a whole and its dynamic context rather than any internal project planning or management. I also conducted a sensitivity analysis on this causal chain model to expose what the critical factors might be.

As discussed in Chapter 5, I instinctively think that a Bayesian Belief Network holds the answer, despite my analysis being held up by the inability to include feedback loops in the model logic. The feedback loop is important because there are various aspects of the project implementation, from its first announcement, that will influence public and other stakeholder perceptions and expectations. These changes can shift a project from viable to unviable simply because social capital has shifted counter to it. I explored the idea of combining the Bayesian Belief Network model with a mental model to identify a series of triggers for different network branches, but that was also unsuccessful. While perhaps unsuccessful in delivering a predictive model of project success, this investigation has allowed me to extract the leading influences on successful project outcome, providing useful contextual considerations for any implementation framework.

6.9. MS BNx & RiskLogik My first challenge was to establish what influences may or may not exist on a post-conflict infrastructure project. This is not something that appears to have been studied or reported on before, beyond the narrow focus of an audit. There was some useful information from the various

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conflict infrastructure reconstruction project implementation arranged as a a as arranged implementation project reconstruction infrastructure conflict

outcome of “Sustainable Infrastructure Open.”. Infrastructure “Sustainable of outcome

A network map of the collected influences on post on influences collected ofthe map network A

. .

Figure Figure toan leads that Network Belief Bayesian

143 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning studies on alignment (Pugh 1998, WB 1998, OECD 2005, Riddell 2008, Knack et al 2010, Kharas 2011, Killen 2011, Anderson 2015), and the dynamics of post-conflict donor interests (Girod 2015) and the demands of state-building (Lake 2016).

However, while these studies articulated the factors/influences relevant to the particular argument or observation that was being put forward, they did not provide a recognisable balance. By this I mean that post-conflict reconstruction in practice is often chaotic with every requirement subject to compromise and revision, but it is also an intensely human undertaking. There is a mix of hope and need, often mixed with distrust and resentment as the local community struggles with its own internal issues of reconciliation, reintegration of combatants, and the fear of post-conflict poverty, while also resenting that the international community is there at all. There is no clinical definition of how a project activity is influenced, only whether it has been or not, and, in that particular analysis, by what. I therefore drew on my own experience over the last 30 years and then incorporated the experience of my colleagues. Some of what we collectively identified is perhaps based on little more than an outsiders perception rather than reality. Recognising that it isn’t a perfect summary of influences, I arranged them all as a network and, where practicable, used the published study relationships to reinforce certain links. This network is shown at Figure 15.

At this stage each network node was kept at a default probability setting of 0.5, simply because each situation would have a different weighting accorded to one influence or another. The network map was felt to be generally representative of the generic situation that we had all encountered. The challenge, though, is how to represent a change in perception as a project is being delivered or based upon the experience of a prior one. Prior experience can be captured, or at least represented, in the influence weightings that the user assesses appropriate to the broader stakeholder sentiment. However, changes in influence and particularly social capital during the project could not be addressed by changing weightings. I needed to incorporate a feedback loop of some kind. BBN does not permit feedback loops, so I looked at creating multiple networks that could be applied depending on the weighting change with time. Each network was therefore a time segment. The network book of alternate futures was unwieldy and, at this level of analysis, required more operator intervention to follow the logic through the different networks than simply adjusting the weighting of a particular influence for a range of possibilities.

I explored the question with my colleague, Rory Kilburn, who had collaborated with me in the development of a system of metrics for anticipated outcome (Chapter 3). He built a causal chain

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No Base Model MC Run 1 – Vary Level of Strength Only Min Outlier Median Mean Max Outlier Intelligent Intelligent Intelligent Intelligent 1 Capability Resourcing Resourcing Resourcing Resourcing Optimize 2 Feeding Feeding Feeding Feeding Workforce 3 Local Need Capability Capability Capability Capability Intelligent Optimize Optimize Optimize Optimize 4 Resourcing Workforce Workforce Workforce Workforce Infrastructure 5 Local Need Local Need Local Need Social Capital Project Infrastructure Universal 6 Feeding Requirement Social Capital Project Concept Infrastructure VaR 7 Social Capital Social Capital Social Capital Project Sequencing VaR Infrastructure VaR Infrastructure 8 Requirement Sequencing Project Sequencing Project VaR Universal Early Years 9 Project Prelims VaR Sequencing Sequencing Concept Education Early Years Universal Carrying Carrying 10 Local Need Education Concept Capacity Capacity Carrying Early Years Early Years Early Years Carrying 11 Capacity Education Education Education Capacity Universal Universal IC 12 Carrying Capacity Requirement Concept Concept Expectations

Table 2. Table of results for the first Monte Carlo run varying the strength of relationship between nodes in the causal chain model, using RiskLogik. The priority of nodes in the base model to assess is based on the prioritized inherent risk, showing capability as the highest inherent risk followed by Optimise Workforce etc. Monte Carlo analysis conducted by Rory Kilburn and reproduced here by kind permission.

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No Base Model MC Run 2 – Vary All Min Outlier Median Mean Max Outlier Intelligent Intelligent 1 Capability Capability Capability Resourcing Resourcing Optimize Intelligent Optimize 2 Feeding Feeding Workforce Resourcing Workforce Optimize Intelligent 3 Local Need Capability Capability Workforce Resourcing Intelligent Optimize Optimize 4 Feeding Feeding Resourcing Workforce Workforce Infrastructure 5 Local Need Local Need Local Need Local Need Project Universal 6 Feeding Social Capital Social Capital Social Capital Concept Infrastructure VaR VaR 7 Social Capital Requirement Project Sequencing Sequencing VaR Carrying Early Years Early Years VaR 8 Sequencing Capacity Education Education Sequencing Early Years Infrastructure Infrastructure Early Years 9 Project Prelims Education Project Project Education Early Years Universal Universal Carrying 10 VaR Sequencing Education Concept Concept Capacity Carrying Carrying Carrying Infrastructure 11 Social Capital Capacity Capacity Capacity Project Universal Universal 12 Project Prelims Requirement Requirement Concept Concept

Table 3. Table of results for the second Monte Carlo run varying both the strength of relationship between nodes in the causal chain model and the characteristics of the nodes themselves (importance and belief), using RiskLogik. The priority of nodes in the base model to assess is based on the prioritized inherent risk, showing capability as the highest inherent risk followed by Optimise Workforce etc. Monte Carlo analysis conducted by Rory Kilburn and reproduced here by kind permission.

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network using RiskLogik and incorporated the necessary feedback loops, specifically. The causal chain model relationships were defined by a strength factor, nominally 3, 5 or 7. The nodes themselves were defined by importance (largely determined from the literature of studies) and the level of belief. Two Monte Carlo runs were conducted on the model. The first, Table 2, varied only the strength of relationship between nodes, by node. Interestingly, this brought “Intelligent Resourcing”, “Feeding” and “Capability” to the fore as consistently the most important factors. The second, Table 3, varied all three values: strength, belief and importance, by node. This crystallised the consistently highest priorities as Capability, Optimise Workforce, Local Need, Intelligent Resourcing and Feeding. While not conclusive, it does suggest that how the project is planned and delivered is more important than the project itself. This also reflects the findings through the thesis investigation.

How a post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation project is implemented being more important than the actual project delivery was something of a surprise to me. I have always known that it is critical, but this exercise gave me pause to reconsider my past experiences and the value of less successful or incomplete projects. Neither I or my colleagues could think of any examples from our experience that could challenge this finding. In the absence of a supportable antithesis, I continued to explore how these considerations might be addressed.

a. Intelligent Resourcing has been an established planning principle for two millennia. In the post-conflict application, it is providing the demand necessary to regenerate the local supply chains rather than creating and imposing new ones. b. Capability of the local population to conduct the work and benefit from it reinforces my proposed Beneficial Capability concept, placing the capacity of individual households to engage in the work at the centre of planning. c. Optimise Workforce is about making best use of the skills existing across the potential workforce by addressing more immediate priorities that may otherwise mask or make these skills unavailable. This provides a clear relationship with intelligent resourcing, where the design of the infrastructure is based on the available skills in the local workforce. d. Local Need reflects the received wisdom behind the emphasis for greater alignment, though is so often ignored or assumed. Local Need defines the relationship between the IC and the local population. The clear and commonly agreed articulation of Local Need is an open

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demonstration that the IC has listened to the local population and is acting in the local interest, rather than their own. There is an implicit relationship with Social Capital arising from this, which would be a new feedback loop and potentially place greater emphasis on optimising the workforce. e. Feeding has a stronger influence than merely ensuring the workforce has sufficient nutrition and calories to perform the work. It extends into critical provision for household dependents such as invalids and children.

Much more work needs to be done to expose the nature of these relationships and how one can consistently improve the delivery of post-conflict infrastructure projects by incorporating these factors into the normal infrastructure planning process. However, it did encourage me to explore further into other approaches to mapping infrastructure project delivery models. One that does appear to present well is a study by a team in South Africa using Artificial Neural Network modeling to estimate the contingency requirements for a large portfolio of construction projects (Niekerk & Bekker 2014). Many of the resource complexities and external influences are similar, while the risk context remains different. This may be worth exploring further. The other issue this raises is the need to protect what is achieved through the project, lest a return to violence or natural occurrence compromise this fragile rehabilitation. This is more relevant socially post disaster than necessarily to the infrastructure (Aldrich 2012), and I am extrapolating this to post-conflict situations also. Given the pre-existing condition of near-crisis in post-conflict areas, particularly during the early stages, one can’t rely on layers of crisis management procedure to address these setbacks. In fact, we need to ensure that we weave resilience practice into the planning and delivery of these infrastructure projects, because we need to be able to support these fledgling essential services precisely when they are needed most. The recognition that crisis management is inadequate to deal with these situations is well understood (Boin & McConnell 2007), if not widely practised.

When we apply the need for resilience to the implementation factors that arose out of the causal chain analysis, we find that that only Feeding and Capacity are dynamic, with Local Need, Intelligent Resourcing and Optimise Workforce essentially “baked in” to the project design and implementation plan. Following this rationale through, we must protect the enablers of Feeding and Capacity, irrespective of the condition of the normal enabling systems. Once again, this challenges the received wisdom of post-conflict operations, yet is not incorrect. It subtly shifts the

148 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning emphasis of crisis food relief around the household to a more collective grouping, perhaps clan or community group in which there remains the trust/social capital to enable those with skills to help with the relief and response efforts.

6.10. Implementation Approach Practicably, this thesis cannot propose any predictive tool for infrastructure project success in post- conflict areas. However, while we may not yet be able to predict the success of the project during planning and into implementation, we can measure the anticipated outcome during implementation. That prediction of outcome in much of engineering practice is typically based on our confidence in the application and reliability of the tools we use. In this case, the greater our understanding of the situation, the clearer our understanding of requirement and, when planned and implemented within certain constraints, we can have reasonable confidence in project success, even if we cannot quantify the predictability of that success. Therefore, we must look at the existing rehabilitation paradigm to see how we can adjust it for a more successful implementation. For this process I am viewing success as the comprehensive delivery of infrastructure that is locally adopted and the essential services that it enables are resilient to a return to violence. Ultimately, this is still delivery for the purpose of the physical, mental and social wellbeing of the population.

The core of my overall approach is improved common understanding, or more precisely an enhanced common reference. During the needs analysis for project planning, we can use stand-off recognition to see what the existing situation is and the unifying concept of infrastructure to understand what it means. From this we can derive a requirement that is based more on a common understanding of the situation than projected opinion. During the planning, we are able to draw on established infrastructure planning tools adapted to the post-conflict environment to develop the requirement in context. The common reference allows us to determine what the indicators of a desired outcome would be and to incorporate those into the project management plan. Once the infrastructure is planned and designed, we can plan the implementation using a simple protocol and managing primary influences on project success. Two things predominate through each stage. The first is the common reference, represented by the COP. The second is that the infrastructure scheme is not an engineering problem as much as it is an engineering in society one. This was most significantly reflected in the infrastructure delivery influences mapping exercise. It therefore

149 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning holds that these two things must be consistent and contiguous through the whole rehabilitation paradigm, while remaining dynamic enough to reflect the current actual situation.

We can have reasonable confidence in these adjustments to the rehabilitation paradigm. Each has been peer-reviewed and published, as well as being field tested in the Gaza Strip. They draw heavily on collective experience in multiple conflict areas, while also remaining as close as possible to current leading heuristic practice. Irrespective, we cannot know everything and there are some aspects that we know to work in practice even though we don’t yet understand why. In fact, this investigation has demonstrated one truth more than any other, that the application of these adjustments to heuristic practice does enhance the effectiveness of the rehabilitation paradigm. Will it work in theory, though? There are whole areas of research that have either not been practicable to include in this investigation or simply outside the scope, such as the advancement of hyper-spectral cube in Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis for stand-off recognition, or an investigation into the influences of infrastructure on local population perceptions and behaviours.

A key issue remains how to optimise the individual and collective capacity of the local population to engage in infrastructure works and benefit from it, or indeed the role of early years education in enabling time capacity of the local population while mitigating the intergenerational effects of trauma. This is therefore a capstone thesis, and its implementation reflects that. It is leading towards a framework for infrastructure rehabilitation, rather than a model. This is also appropriate, because each conflict area is different, in both time and space. The geopolitics and socioeconomic balance will be different. Perhaps its inherent weakness is that it depends upon professional interpretation and application. It depends upon the right professional competencies for implementation, as well as an institutional humility that is receptive to contrary points of view and treats the local population as partners and not as a vehicle for domestic advantage.

6.11. Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework Following on from the implementation approach, the Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework must therefore be a practicable adjustment to the existing rehabilitation paradigm. It should be little more than a nudge of existing practice that leverages familiar tools and teaching, if it is to be professionally adopted by infrastructure engineers and planners working in post-conflict environments. We can demonstrate the need for change, but unless it is directly tangible and perceived as relevant it is unlikely to be adopted. I propose that there are five key components that the post-conflict rehabilitation paradigm must include to be effective: common reference, so that

150 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning all stakeholders are using the same source information; a unifying purpose of health (complete physical, mental and social wellbeing) of the affected population; intelligent resourcing; beneficial capability; and a systems view of the situation, which enables outcomes-based metrics and projection of resilient essential services for stabilisation. However the planner wishes to construct their infrastructure planning framework for successful rehabilitation, these components are, in my view, essential.

Quite literally, the foundation for the framework is the COP, which enables better-informed normal practice. This alone will have an impact, informing and so coordinating donor self-interest to better align with local beneficiary needs through project selection. Therefore, while the development and interpretation of the COP is involved, common reference to it is not. I also think that it will make direct local citizen engagement in infrastructure reconstruction planning more realistic. While the need for citizen engagement has been recognised since the late 1960s in infrastructure planning, it hasn’t been as common in post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction due to the time required. The time imperative to transition from relief to reconstruction, though not supposed to be sequential, forced assumptions of requirements and project delivery.

We have the opportunity and means to directly enable timely local population engagement and enable greater alignment overall. While planning principles like Intelligent Resourcing will be familiar, their application in post-conflict areas was inadequately informed. That can now change. My hope is that the simplicity of beneficial capability will make the concept tangible and practicable for the infrastructure planner, though the degree of intra-organisational coordination to align infrastructure with essential services and economic development is less certain. Once again, equipped with the common reference, the infrastructure planner will be able to present an evidential understanding of the current situation to support the infrastructure reconstruction/development plan and coordination requirements. I offer the considerations for successful project delivery to the infrastructure engineer and planner for their heightened awareness and to inform their engagement activities.

To summarise, this Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework would entail:

a. Framework Structure. The COP provides common reference with the Calculation Plan providing an audit trail of the supporting analysis. The COP informs three development thrusts: Balanced Enabling Infrastructure; Essential Services & Social Capital; Sustainable Economic

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Development. Each thrust will involve rehabilitation initiatives appropriate to the situation, which in combination give rise to prioritised practicable rehabilitation projects as part of an integrated and balanced strategy that includes infrastructure reconstruction and development. b. Principles. The planning principles applied to the framework are simply alignment, intelligent resourcing and beneficial capability. These principles should be applied at each stage of project development through the supporting concepts of resilience and equity of access through the delivery and operation of the infrastructure and the systems it enables. c. Protocol. The protocol for the infrastructure project development within an integrated and balanced rehabilitation strategy demands that: the infrastructure directly and indirectly improves the physical, mental and social wellbeing of the local community; the infrastructure can be operated and repaired using local labour and materials; the infrastructure project makes optimum use of locally resourced materials; the infrastructure functions within the carrying capacity of the integrated system of infrastructure systems; infrastructure operation is safe-to- fail; the infrastructure project delivery enables social capacity and beneficial capability; and infrastructure operations are locally accountable. d. Project Considerations. When looking at infrastructure project delivery, the engineering- in-society considerations will greatly influence real lasting success. Understanding the engineering-society relationship demands a system of systems perspective. Though inconclusive, we can suggest careful consideration of the actual and tangible application of Intelligent Resourcing, the use and development of local Capability, Optimise Workforce capacity and use, remain as closely aligned with Local Need as practicable, and ensure adequate and nutritious Feeding of both the project workforce and the households from which they come.

The Framework might be conceptually represented as a series of parallel and sequential work flows, illustrated in Figure 16. Progress of the integrated rehabilitation strategy is measurable using the indicators of anticipated outcome. This does not represent a change in the rehabilitation paradigm, its purpose or conduct. What this represents is a way of enabling better and more professional post-conflict infrastructure planning and reconstruction. It provides audit trails and enhances collective accountability, without exposing the individual infrastructure engineer to exclusive accountability under such volatile conditions. This Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework informs current best practice and makes it more widely accessible.

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6.12. Comment In this chapter, I explored the practical application of the preceding chapters. While each step has been carefully investigated, developed and published internationally through peer review, this chapter in many ways defines the practicability of the thesis. Put simply, this is an engineer’s guide to the pragmatic adaptation and enhancement of existing heuristic practice to address deficiencies in the rehabilitation paradigm. It must be practicable. While it was not possible to field test the whole, due to loss of access to the Gaza Strip upon contract conclusion, each component has been field tested and I have confidence that the resulting implementation framework works. It delivers greater understanding and better-informed decisions, it enables outcomes-based measurement and provide contextually balanced guidance for the planning and design of infrastructure projects in post-conflict areas. As a practitioner, my preference would have been to model a predictive tool to forecast project success. This was not possible. Outside the scope of the thesis, it would have provided a useful input to project risk calculations and finance management. However, my explorations on the periphery of the topic did raise some useful factors that influence real project

Figure 16. A conceptual illustration of the Infrastructure Rehabilitation Framework noting specifically the role of the COP in forming both problem definition and solution strategy development, the balance of enabling infrastructure thrusts with the essential services and social capital and with local economic development. This need for real balance in the thrusts and initiatives arising from each thrust, means that individual task/projects can be sequenced and planned to most efficiently support each other towards a common rehabilitation goal. This doesn’t change the rehabilitation paradigm, but instead informs the decision-making and planning processes for greater efficiency, alignment and local benefit.

153 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning success and the infrastructure planner and engineer may wish to consider in their planning project delivery. In developing an infrastructure rehabilitation framework, I have addressed Question 4. How should one deliver post-conflict infrastructure?

Investigating the implementation process has provided more fields for future research and study. Also, as with the other such fields, these are multi-disciplinary in nature and do not fit conveniently into any one academic specialisation, but rather seem to occupy the space between them. This investigation also brought to the fore an underlying issue around the competency of the infrastructure planner and engineer. While those of us with over 30 years of responsible experience in the field would like to think otherwise, we haven’t been getting it right. The current generation of field practitioners do not have the same backgrounds and experiences as us, but I’m not sure that they are either more or less successful than we were. What is abundantly clear is that the context is changing more rapidly today than at any time previously, and relying on old planning tools is not the right approach. Technological advances have changed expectations, including an increasing demand for accountability. Post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation is a changing practice. When we look at the various conflict areas since World War II, it has really been a case of getting it less wrong in some places, as well as a fair dose of luck. I’ve always believed that we create our own luck. In this case, that luck has reflected an alignment not only between international donor, implementation agency and local population, but internally in the post-conflict community and within the donor government. I concluded that we can and should educate and develop our infrastructure engineers better. This is something that I have taken to heart over the last 8 years that I have been teaching infrastructure engineering at the University of Toronto, incrementally improving the syllabus and teaching processes. Once again, the development of infrastructure engineering education is very much work in progress, and many of the nuances of conflict areas are difficult if not impossible to teach. I offer here some areas for further consideration.

a. The realities of intergenerational transfer of trauma are hard to ignore. We have recognized them in aboriginal communities in Canada and Australia, spurring initiatives to address this with community-based early years education within a reconciliation program. It is also a feature of inner-city poverty and some of the most depressed communities and settlements across the globe. It is no respecter of national wealth or development, but shown to be an hereditary biochemical consequence of traumatic experience. Few experiences are as

154 Chapter 6: Towards A Comprehensive Framework for Infrastructure Planning traumatic as war and particularly civil war. With infrastructure projects being such a significant part of the post-conflict rehabilitation, we should know more definitely the role that infrastructure reconstruction projects can play in treating intergenerational trauma. This is part of the integration of infrastructure projects into the rehabilitation process, rather than something that is done as a contextual enabler of rehabilitation. b. Through the thesis, I have built on my experience of heuristic practice, deconstructing processes and received wisdoms to get to the core of what works or doesn’t and why. While there are some processes that can be improved and I have introduced some new concepts, the fundamental issue is to better inform decision-making at all levels and measuring deliverables by their effect on the local population. This is perhaps obvious, when I suggest that informed decision-making would be better than opinion-based decisions. Yet history suggests that the greatest changes in infrastructure policy and practice have not been professional or informed, but more a result of chance. Dr. John Snow identified in 1854 that a contaminated water pump in Broad Street, Soho, was the cause of the London Cholera outbreak. He advocated for clean water supply and proper sanitation, and was generally supported by the civil engineering profession. While today we recognize him as the father of modern georeferenced epidemiology and public health, the situation was not addressed until sometime later and for altogether different reasons. Sir Joseph Bazalgette, Chief Engineer of the city’s Metropolitan Board of Works, was only given the authority to lay the London sewerage and water supply systems in 1858 following the Great Stink. The new infrastructure removed cholera and other water-borne disease from London, providing one of the greatest health and economic benefits to its citizens in history and yet wasn’t the reason for its implementation. Little has changed since. The reality is that engineers are not fully connected to the drivers of policy and public health, being seen more as the implementers of the solution rather than fully informing it. I have characterized this as the Snow-Bazalgette Dilemma. I suspect that this is a complex mix of policy development, professional conduct and societal expectation. Nonetheless, this is an important issue for the engineering profession as governments around the world are poised for significant infrastructure investment. It’s not just a post-conflict issue.

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Chapter 7: Conclusion Through this work, I seek to improve the mechanics of an imperfect post-conflict rehabilitation paradigm through improved common reference, measurement and implementation planning. In the process, I have found that how we conduct post-conflict infrastructure projects is as important as what those projects are. Infrastructure has a role to play in the rehabilitation paradigm that extends far beyond current practice. It is perhaps how it was originally envisioned, yet somehow, we have lost sight of that purpose and with it the efficient delivery of benefit to the end-user is impeded. This chapter explores the institutional realities that influence adoption and implementation of this thesis.

7.1. Application To grapple with the institutional realities, it is useful to see how the adjustments proposed in this work would be applied and what they mean. Figure 17 refers. The process begins with the Desk Top Study. This typically takes a couple of weeks for a practised team, but with stand-off recognition promises to be closer to 36 hours. This makes the first step of remote situational assessment practicable and timely, informing prioritised relief planning. Ultimately, I am sure this will tend to near real-time situational awareness (18 hours refresh of satellite imagery, for example). This study builds the tableau, and we can now also infer dependencies and influences on the infrastructure systems and essential services that they enable. Through ground-truthing, we can build this into the evidence-based Common Reference in two to four weeks. Common Reference of infrastructure function and need in context against humanitarian priorities allows us to develop the relief planning to include reconstruction requirements. This means that we can reduce the incidents of relief response impeding rapid reconstruction works and so gradually reducing the need for crisis relief. This Common Reference is the initial iteration of the COP and through further remote and field development, our understanding of what the physical situation means in terms of health and socio-economic effects improves. This is necessarily a slower iteration of the COP, drawing on situational experiences of the response effort to date, as well as incorporating supplemental studies, such georeferenced health reporting that will subsequently inform non- communicable disease epidemiological studies. This advanced iteration of the COP may take three months but will allow users to blend development needs and options into the relief-reconstruction planning. This means that the full rehabilitation paradigm can be conceptualised. Subsequent development of the COP based on field experiences consolidates our understanding and allows us to identify indicators of anticipated outcome for rehabilitation initiatives that supplement the Chapter 7: Conclusion project or objective key risk indicators and key performance indicators. The promise of stand-off recognition is that this whole process can tend towards a near-real time situational awareness. We will be able to account for the effects of projects as they are completed on the anticipated effects of the next project or some other initiative. It is a powerful tool with immense potential to make post- conflict rehabilitation more aligned and responsive to the local situation, thereby making the IC engagement more efficient.

Figure 17. A conceptual illustration of how the COP can be applied and its effect upon the rehabilitation paradigm. The tableau remains the foundation for the COP through each iteration and is what will reflect the changes that a near real-time stand-off recognition detects. In this sense, it will always provide the baseline common reference and potentially attract more stakeholders early in the rehabilitation process than the understanding afforded by the developed COP. Ultimately, this remains a matter of confidence, among other stakeholder motivations and concerns. 7.2. Infrastructure as Context There are three distinct parts of this work: defining the requirement to make the rehabilitation paradigm more effective, establishing and developing a common reference to better inform decision making by all stakeholders, and the provision of a framework to more effectively apply the rehabilitation paradigm to different situations. Each part is linked by a “red thread” of investigation that traces the analytical journey from existing practice to answer a simple challenge, “how can we [infrastructure engineers] better leverage IC engagement in post-conflict areas to substantially improve the situation of the local population?” In the process, I have answered the four questions that defined the scope of this work. Having provided context in Chapter 2, in

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Chapter 3 I answered two questions: 1. How can one determine a rehabilitation requirement that better reflects beneficial outcome for the local community; and how should the rehabilitation paradigm reflect that? and 3. How can one measure community outcome of infrastructure projects during their reconstruction? In the process, I have proposed an outcomes-based system of project measurement that is applied during the project implementation. Chapter 4 proposed a unifying concept of infrastructure that enables the engineer and planner to recognise the function and laydown of observed infrastructure systems in context. This was applied in Chapter 5 to build the Common Operating Picture as an evolving common reference accessible to all stakeholders and in response to Question 2. How can one inform a common understanding of what exists, and so inform the development of implementable infrastructure reconstruction needs? The answers to these questions were also peer-reviewed and are published or awaiting publication. Chapter 6 proposed an infrastructure rehabilitation framework in response to Question 4. How should one deliver post-conflict rehabilitation?

I have proposed that the unifying purpose of infrastructure is Health; the physical, mental and social wellbeing of the population, as defined by the WHO in 1948. The unifying purpose not only defines the infrastructure, but by extension its role in context and this work. While we can have clarity over what the infrastructure is for, the weakness in current heuristic practice ultimately comes down to a lack of real situational understanding. We cannot reach a destination if we do not understand where we are. Throughout, the idea of enhanced understanding underpins this work, both in understanding the current situation based on evidence and without assumption, and in understanding the direct and indirect influences of infrastructure projects.

In exploring the relationship between art and utility, George Santayana, the Spanish-American philosopher, described our actions as shaping our environment, which in turn informs our perceptions and behaviours (Santayana 1921). He could have been writing about infrastructure engineering.

While not necessarily a new idea, it is hugely important and highlights why architecture is so important to the physical, mental and social wellbeing of a community. This applies no less to post-conflict areas. Simon Anholt refers to place-branding and how the built environment defines the identity of the community (Anholt 2011), which Joseph Aicher is more clinical about in his argument (Aicher 1998). Schlomo Angel’s PhD thesis work in Oakland (Angel 1968) indicated the link between environment and crime, which Jane Jacobs also discussed (Jacobs 1961), but

158 Chapter 7: Conclusion eventually emerged as a common design practice known as CPTED69 developed by the Sparta Consulting Corporation and made acceptable to architects by Oscar Newman’s “Defensible Space” (Newman 1970). Like the convoluted link between Dr John Snow in Soho and Sir Joseph Bazalgette, the translation of understanding between professions and disciplines changes with each perspective, for want of a common reference. Infrastructure is part of this contextual fabric, but is more importantly the enabler of it. These examples are merely the tip of the iceberg and the truth of Santayana’s comments are well established. Nonetheless, it barely features in the normal practice of post-conflict infrastructure delivery. We cannot separate the professional disciplines in practice and must find a way of bringing them together to explore and learn from past engagements. To quote Santayana again, “Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it” (Santayana 1921).

Returning to my red thread that traces this investigation, the consistent requirement at each stage is common reference. Common reference not only allows different professions and stakeholders a consistent evidential model of the current situation, it allows one to identify inherent risks to the local population, deficiencies in the existing essential services provision, the evaluation of possible interventions and a means of evaluating success. When we deconstruct the urban vitae system of systems for common reference, we are compelled to consider all four domains in our data collection, to build our three models and deliver the three components of the COP. As we advance stand-off recognition for the tableau that is the basis of the COP, this situational understanding can become closer to near-real time. More than simply a common reference, the COP is a dynamic model of the current situation and can be used to inform planning through the life of the proposed infrastructure developments. This presents the infrastructure engineer with the opportunity to identify projects that are aligned with local needs and do not force donor nations to compromise domestic constraints. It becomes difficult to justify continued pursuit of a project agenda when it is not expected to benefit the local population and its adverse effects are reasonably foreseeable. Understanding forces a more measured approach and reasonable consideration of consequence.

69 Almost exclusively known by its abbreviation, the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a multi-disciplinary approach to the design of public spaces creating areas of community observation and visibility that will deter petty crime. Adopted by many police forces due to its procedural approach, its applications are limited by Sparta’s assumptions used to convert Angel’s work into a repeatable tool.

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7.3. Adjustment vice Change In this pursuit to understand how we have gone wrong in the past and make things better in the future, we are again challenged by the need for better understanding. In fact, our ability to identify the lessons of the past and determine how they can be applied to the situation before us is based entirely on our understanding of the current situation. The Unifying Concept of Infrastructure and the development of PSDA in stand-off recognition using artificial intelligence will make this increasingly accessible to profession and professional alike. The challenge is its adoption by professions and institutions, already beset by rapidly accelerating technological change that is fueling expectations of increased accountability and questions over professional relevancy. It is perhaps better to once more explore this in parts: profession, institution and professional.

I have already touched on the challenges to the professions, particularly those articulated by the Susskinds (Susskind & Susskind 2015) and Jane Jacobs (Jacobs 2004). There is a very real need for the specialisations within the professions to become a little less defined and to accept that technology will redefine what a designer is needed for. Many of the routine activities that were once entrusted to professional engineers and planners are now accessible to the lay person through computer applications. Architects increasingly use structural engineering software optimised for typical architectural applications rather than consulting a structural engineer. Building Information Systems (BIM) enabled military engineers in Afghanistan (2001-2009) to build structures and camps of standardised components with a fraction of the [expensive] professional design staff, though it did place an emphasis on finding a few higher-quality designers. The pace of change will not relent, and we must collectively embrace it or be consigned to creeping irrelevance at a time when we are needed most to answer the emerging problems in a dynamic world.

The professions are as much a product of the educational system that produces their new members as the received wisdom of the Grand Bargain (Susskind & Susskind 2015). There is a self-feeding cycle that necessarily reinforces specialisation over generalism. The professions identify to academia what they require the next generation to understand, defined within the specialisations of the profession and academia. Specialisation in academia through the post-graduate research stream is defined and there is rarely enough time or scope to address the topics between the specialisations that are the essence of infrastructure engineering. I can only conclude that there needs to be a master’s program in Infrastructure Engineering, somewhere.

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The institutional challenges are in my view rather more challenging. Institutions by their very nature are complex adaptive systems of systems with multiple lines of operation and effort determined by the resources allocated. In my experience, institutions operating in post-conflict areas will typically call on a range of experts, who may be assembled from different parts of the institution and/or contracted in. In the infrastructure development world this is more pronounced with many freelance professionals being retained for specific projects or programs once funded. Even though these institutions will typically gather some of the very best practitioners together, the delivery often still falls short of the promise. John Gall observed similar behaviours in organisations that were created for a specific purpose. They hadn’t evolved from simple teams and systems, expanding to include supplementary experts and capacity. Instead, they were created from scratch. On the one hand, one can ask whether the original identifiers of the need and therefore the composition of this team were necessarily equipped to understand the nature of the task. But more fundamentally, the newly created organisation—program team—is doomed to perpetual failure- mode operation (Gall 1977).

Charles Handy describes the organisational structures and cultures that contribute to this dissonance, while not actually addressing it (Handy 1993). However, what this suggests is that organisations working in post-conflict areas need to maintain a cadre of professional expertise, to inform the capability requirement and provide the framework for expanded capacity, and institutionalise stand-off recognition, to build common reference for each conflict area in which they are engaged. To some extent, the cadre approach is used by the ABCA70 nations in expeditionary campaign planning and conduct, such as the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) of the Canadian Forces, but less evident among the humanitarian agencies operating as part of the IC effort in conflict and post-conflict areas. Due to the nature of stand-off recognition and its use of satellite imagery, its use has typically been limited to active military campaign planning and conduct. However, this is changing and the satellite data available today is of a greater resolution and consistency than that available to military forces only a decade ago. Stand- off recognition is accessible today and practicable for humanitarian agency use in post-conflict areas. This means that common reference is attainable, if adopted by these agencies. Its use by the

70 ABCA is an armies-treaty signed in Washington DC in 1947 between US, UK and Canada to cooperate more closely in the planning and exercise of military activities. In 1954, this was formalized as the Basic Standardisation Concept. The group was joined by Australia in 1963 and New Zealand in 2006. It is more commonly referred to as Five Eyes and has equivalents for the members states navies and air forces.

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ICRC in [operationally-defined] post-conflict areas71 is today providing a more contiguous understanding of the environment and the relationship between communities and infrastructure.

What of the professional? The professional today has access to an unprecedented range of resources and expertise. The challenge is to know which is appropriate to the task in hand and which data sources are reliable. I believe fundamentally that professionals seek to do the right thing and deliver a professional service. Whether this is obfuscated by institutional inertia or a national self-interest that places local community benefit below its own advantage is ultimately a characteristic of the particular situation and can’t be generalised. In this respect, the growing call for accountability provides the infrastructure professional useful leverage, because it justifies the use of evidence to establish a common reference rather than assumption and received wisdom that may be as out of date as it is dislocated. We can help the professional through informed demonstration during their formation. Directed learning during early practice, which continues to expand the professional understanding of their activities in context is a major part of initial professional development (Steels 2001) and the pre-requisite for any of the competency-based professional accreditations. There is an opportunity role for both academia and the data providers to guide that initial professional development that is at once commercially viable and has the potential to change the profession for the better. So often, recognising what right looks like and how to achieve it is the driver of successful delivery.

7.4. Successful Generalism Specialisation across all applied science and social science disciplines has created new professional roles, eroding the fabric of stable communities and diminishing their social capital (McKnight 1995). In rehabilitating, post-conflict communities need to draw on precisely these intrinsic capabilities to re-establish community structure and communication. Applying specialisations to the community can be detrimental to that self-regeneration process. By extension, imposing our developed world/western political perspectives on the recovering communities, as a condition of infrastructure funding, undermines the natural and necessary community healing process. Perspective is absolutely key; recognising and respecting others’ perspectives and working with them is professional. Imposing an alien perspective on an unwilling client is not. This also speaks to the growing concern over “ungoverned spaces.” It is too easy to

71 Recognising that ICRC would be outside of its mandate if it were operating in a legally-defined post-conflict area. Section 2.3 Definitions of Conflict of this work refers.

162 Chapter 7: Conclusion associate a lack of internationally-recognised local government with threats to international security. The areas and circumstances that we typically label as ungoverned spaces misses a far more nuanced form of governance that does not necessarily represent a threat. (Clunan & Harold 2010).

Nature abhors a vacuum and local governance is no exception. In my personal experience, I have yet to see a conflict or post-conflict area that does not have any local system of governance in place. It may not reflect what we, the IC, believe that it should be. In post-conflict areas the space is rarely ungoverned and as the professionals at the point of infrastructure delivery, we need to recognise that and work with the local structures and systems as we find them. This requires an open-mindedness that is borne out of professional humility and the leadership skills to make the result work. Universities don’t teach this, so what of the educated and newly qualified engineer in practice?

I set out to make the engineering of post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation better. Through my investigation I have determined that the greatest improvement can be achieved through common reference that supports better informed decision making, whether in understanding the current situation, what the consequences of different project options might be, or measuring success of projects during delivery. I have started building a framework understanding of how to continually improve this common reference, potentially through AI to a near-real time representation of the situation and predictive assessment of options. However, while that begins the engineering enhancements for the infrastructure planner and engineer, the journey of investigation and exploration that developing this work provided suggests that the engineering is likely only half of the answer for infrastructure planners and engineers. How the project is developed and delivered, the enablement of the local community workforce and the facilitation of combatant reintegration and community reconciliation, is arguably the greater part. It is still the domain of the infrastructure planner and engineer, even if they do not fit neatly within the specialisations of academic applied science disciplines. Buckminster Fuller references a perceived split between sciences and arts in academia, which he rejects (Fuller 2010). Yet the more one investigates the field of engineering’s influence in society, the more apparent this separation becomes. In this respect, we find that the infrastructure planner and engineer must be at once both generalist and specialist.

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Infrastructure engineering as a practice is probably a good example of generalism. The practising professional must understand and work within the multi-domain context and socioeconomic nuances of the infrastructure systems. This is heightened in post-conflict areas. Indeed, this is where that emerging demand for greater accountability is really focused. This does not mean that there is any lesser need for engineering specialisation in complex systems risk and the planning of assets to enable the necessary function of these systems. In this respect, it is different from Structural or Geotechnical Engineering, for example. Generalism is both the strength of the infrastructure engineering discipline in practice and its academic weakness in professional formation. I do wonder what R. Buckminster Fuller would make of that.

7.5. The Role of Self-Interest Many of the issues leading to failure of outcome are driven by self-interest. However, self-interest in and of itself is not necessarily a bad thing. It is a powerful force that enables action by international donors and agencies. Undirected and uncoordinated, self-interest can only deliver success by accident and must be tempered. (It would also be impractical to expect all stakeholders to act out of pure altruism.) If we can temper that self-interest by bringing all stakeholders, particularly donors and agencies, to a common understanding of what is needed to what end and in what sequence, we can apportion projects that align that stakeholders’ self-interest with the local beneficiary’s needs. The COP provides us with the opportunity to harness self-interest to greater benefit. As a concept, it can be likened to the practice of allocating risk in a project or contract to the party best equipped to treat it. In this case, we are allocating clearly defined projects in sequence that most closely serve the donor’s or agency’s self-interest.

7.6. Conclusion This thesis proposes several small incremental improvements to existing heuristic rehabilitation paradigm practice, enabled by common reference. Each incremental change will improve the situation, while together they can deliver far greater alignment of IC effect with local need. As such, it is the first step in an evolving work with each implemented change acting as a catalyst for further change. Changes implemented in the Gaza Strip are already influencing other post-conflict areas in the region. This can only be a good thing.

The intent of the work is to make the proposed changes both relevant and implementable by both individual professional and organisation operating in the post-conflict space. This is achieved, with further areas of study identified over the course of the investigation that will further enhance

164 Chapter 7: Conclusion practice. The question this raises is whether this prosed framework is too closely defined by the field study in the Gaza Strip and my experience, which is mainly in the Middle East and Central Asia. I have endeavoured to avoid that at all costs, but the final determination of whether I have been successful in developing a more general framework rather than a regional one will be experience of implementation. I am applying this work through my consulting practice in Central America and Africa, as well as in the Middle East.

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Glossary

All-Hazards A method of analyzing hazards that evaluates the hazard in context to identify how the occurrence of the hazard changes the likelihood and effect that other hazards have of coincidence. It is used to develop hazard profiles that can be used for scenario planning and risk assessment of systems level of operations.

Ante Bellum (Latin) literally, before the war.

Assets Physical resources that represent a value. The value of the asset is based on the utility or capability of the resource in the operation/system, including real property, intellectual property, personnel, investments etc.

Carrying Capacity Carrying capacity is the amount of demand that an infrastructure can sustainably support.

Clusters Economist Alfred Marshall (1842 – 1924) introduced Cluster Theory in his 1890 book Principles of Economics. The theory focuses on the concentration of specialised industries in particular localities around a shared dependency on a critical resource.

Common Operating A commonly understood model that depicts an operation and its Picture (COP) supporting infrastructure geospatially.

Common Risk Picture A commonly understood model that depicts the threats and hazards (CRP) to an operation and the effects upon operational performance. It can be provided in abstract within the Risk Criteria to inform decision making, or represented geospatially to support situational awareness.

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Control Framework An integrated and comprehensive causal chain model of the component functions of an operation and all the services and infrastructures upon which it depends in a cascade to a predetermined order of removal.

Critical Infrastructure All infrastructure that enables the essential function of an operation can be considered critical infrastructure to that operation. When applied to a municipality or region, it refers to the infrastructure that is necessary to support the combined essential functions of the whole; that is to achieve Minimum Operating Capability.

De Facto (Latin) literally, by fact, it describes what happens in reality, irrespective of whether it is legally recognized or supposed to be the case.

De Jure (Latin) literally, by right, it is synonymous with saying “according to law.” Decision-Support A system of information and algorithms that assists intelligent decision making.

Dependency Mapping The identification of each action/service and infrastructure upon which a function depends at full efficiency and capability.

Entity An asset or action with distinct and independent existence.

Epidemiological Study An investigation into the incidence, distribution and control of diseases.

Essential Infrastructure Infrastructure (assets and/or systems) that are necessary to enabled the essential functions of an operation. The operation/organisation fails if the essential infrastructure is compromised. For MOC, all essential infrastructure is synonymous with critical infrastructure.

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Facilities A location, amenity or equipment that enables a specific purpose.

Geospatial Information A digital data system that captures, stores and analyses geographic Systems (GIS) information and presents it in an intelligible form.

Infrastructure Systems The networks harnessing the forces of nature in the service of humanity, defined by the purpose they serve.

Infrastructure Domains The categorization of infrastructure into natural, built and virtual/imagined.

Mental Modeling The objective understanding and visualisation of thought processes.

Minimum Operating The minimum level of performance for functional survival. Capacity (MOC)

Minimum Sustainable The minimum stable level of performance for continuous Capacity (MSC) functionality.

Resilience (Operational) The essential ability of an operation to respond to and absorb the effects of shocks and stresses and to recover as rapidly as possible normal capacity and efficiency.

Risk, Inherent The natural amount of risk inherent in a system without any treatment to reduce its likelihood or consequence.

Risk, Optimum The level of risk that the organization is comfortable with, i.e. within the risk tolerance of the organization.

Risk, Residual The level of risk remaining after risk treatment.

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Risk Treatment A strategy to address risks, comprising one or more approaches: avoidance, acceptance, mitigation/management, transfer (financial and non-financial),

Sustainable/ The ability to maintain a constant level of performance indefinitely Sustainability (without compromising future capability).

Tableau(x) The geospatial model that forms the baseline reference for further analysis.

Vitae System of Systems A complex concentration of diverse operationally and managerially independent systems, distributed geographically, which as a whole and by component parts evolves, adapts, self-organises and produces emergent behaviours that enable the survivability, conviviality and vitality of [human] communities.

WHO 1948 Human Health defined as the complete state of physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity.

WHO 1986 (Ottawa Charter) promotion of human health is the process of enabling people to increase control over their health and its determinants, and so improve their health.

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Bibliography

Peer Reviewed Papers Arising from this Research

Hay AH (2016a) The incident sequence as resilience planning framework. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Infrastructure Asset Management (3)2:55-60

Hay AH (2017a) Post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation requirements. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Infrastructure Asset Management (4)4:109-114

Hay AH, Gómez-Palacio A & Martyn NQJ (2017b) Chapter 11: Planning Resilient Communities. Risk & Resilience: Methods and Application in Environment, Cyber and Social Domains. (Eds. Linkov I & Palma-Oliveira JM) NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – C: Environmental Security. Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. pp313-326

Hay AH & Kilburn RG (2018a) Measuring success in post-conflict infrastructure development. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Municipal Engineer Journal Online publication ahead of print https://doi.org/10.1680/jmuen.17.00040. Dated 23 July 2018.

Hay AH, Karney B & Martyn NQJ (2018b) Reconstruction of Infrastructure for Resilient Essential Services during and Following Protracted Conflict – a Conceptual Framework. International Review of the Red Cross. Peer-reviewed and accepted for publication in special issue Protracted Armed Conflicts to be published in 2019.

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