NUMBER 17 May 2010
THE GHOSTS OF NEGOTIATIONS PAST: HOW PALESTINIANS ARE APPLYING PAST LESSONS TO THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS
Khaled Elgindy
INTRODUCTION 1. Realities on the ground must move in par- allel with negotiations at the table. Despite the launch of indirect, “proximity” talks be- 2. Don’t engage in negotiations for their own tween Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinian President sake. Mahmoud Abbas continues to resist a resumption of direct negotiations with Israel absent a full settlement 3. Agreements are meaningless without im- freeze. As chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organi- plementation. zation (PLO) and president of the Palestinian Authority 4. Incrementalism does not work. (PA), Abbas also insists that any new negotiations pick up where previous talks left off in December 2008 and 5. Avoid being blamed at all costs. that the parties spell out ahead of time a clear “end- 6. Don’t go it alone. game,” including a timetable for concluding negotia- tions. While these may seem like unreasonable precondi- LESSON #1 tions, Palestinian reluctance to dive headfirst into yet another round of negotiations is rooted in some genuine, REALITIES ON THE GROUND MUST MOVE IN hard-learned lessons drawn from nearly two decades of PARALLEL WITH NEGOTIATIONS AT THE repeated failures both at the negotiating table and on the TABLE ground. More than anything else, two decades of peace- Not only have negotiations failed to bring Palestinians processing have taught Palestinians that for any nego- closer to their national aspirations but the peace process tiations process to succeed, realities on the ground must itself has presided over (and in some ways facilitated) a move in parallel with—or at least not in opposition deepening of Israel’s occupation and an unprecedented to—negotiations at the table. For Palestinians, nothing schism within the Palestinian polity. Such failures have does more to demonstrate Israeli bad faith than Israel’s cost the Palestinian leadership dearly in terms of both its drive to create “facts on the ground”—most notably its domestic legitimacy and its international credibility. ever-expanding settlement enterprise, along with the While it remains committed to a negotiated settlement ancillary policies of home demolitions, residency (ID with Israel based on a two-state solution, the PLO/PA card) revocations, and internal closures. And nothing leadership has been forced to rethink previous ap- does more to undermine the Palestinian leadership’s proaches to the peace process and to negotiations, as political standing and domestic credibility than continu- much for its own survival as out of a desire for peace. ing to engage in a negotiations process while Israel per- sists in expanding settlements and undertakes other Haunted by past failures, Palestinian negotiators are now measures designed to pre-determine the outcome of guided, to varying degrees, by six overlapping and some- those negotiations. times conflicting lessons:
Khaled Elgindy is a Visiting Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Under the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement tiations, triggered a crisis that threatened to derail the (Oslo II), the parties agreed that “[n]either side shall ini- process even before it started. Like the Ramat Shlomo tiate or take any step that will change the status of the announcement, the Har Homa tender was roundly con- West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of demned by the international community, including U.S. the permanent status negotiations.”1 However, Israel has Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who said that interpreted this provision narrowly, arguing it applies “there just shouldn’t be anything that might try and only to the legal status of the occupied territories rather judge… the outcomes of final status negotiations. It’s than to their physical or demographic status.2 And al- even more important now that we are really on the eve though the specific need for a settlement freeze was ad- of the beginning of those negotiations.”6 dressed belatedly, first in the 2001 Mitchell Report and then in the 2003 Quartet Road Map, the Palestinians’ Despite angry protests by the Palestinians, Israeli Prime failure to secure a cessation to settlement activity Minister Ehud Olmert, though expressing regret over throughout the previous decade of negotiations has the timing of announcement, refused to cancel the Har haunted them to this day. Homa tender. Har Homa was only the first of many new Israeli settlement projects announced in the weeks During the Oslo years, from 1993-2000, Israel’s settler and months after Annapolis. In fact, in the year after population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew by an Annapolis, during which negotiations were taking place, unprecedented forty percent, even as Israel issued tenders for 2,300 set- the parties were ostensibly negotiat- tlement housing, more than the pre- ing the fate of these areas. It was also vious two years combined. around this period that Israel began The Palestinians’ failure to secure to impose the first of many access a cessation to settlement activity For President Abbas and his gov- and movement restrictions on Pales- throughout the previous decade of ernment, however, the stakes were tinians in the West Bank and Gaza negotiations has haunted them to considerably higher. The PLO lead- Strip, beginning with the June 1991 ership was split over how to deal requirement to obtain permits to en- this day. with the Har Homa crisis, even as ter Israel or Israeli-annexed East Je- public pressure on Abbas mounted rusalem, followed two years later by for him to quit negotiations. Already the introduction of military check- severely weakened by Hamas’s take- points along the 1967 line (“Green Line”) and the mu- over of the Gaza Strip just a few months earlier, the nicipal boundary of Israeli-defined Jerusalem. Additional Palestinian leadership faced a critical choice—either checkpoints were added following the Oslo Agreements take a principled stance and pull out of negotiations, in 1995 between Areas B and C.3 Since then, the internal thereby incurring U.S. anger and international disap- closure regime has been vastly expanded to comprise proval, or continue to negotiate despite ongoing settle- nearly six hundred physical barriers, including some ment activity (as they had done throughout the Oslo ninety checkpoints throughout the West Bank.4 years), and risk further eroding their domestic standing among the Palestinian public. Since Oslo, attempts to reinvigorate the peace process or initiate negotiations were frequently accompanied by a LESSON #2 surge in Israeli settlement activity. This was certainly the DON’T ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR case after the November 2007 Annapolis Conference, THEIR OWN SAKE when on December 2, 2007—just days after the Bush
administration had brought Israelis and Palestinians back President Abbas ultimately relented and remained in to the negotiating table for the first time in nearly seven the Annapolis peace process, largely due to U.S. pres- years—the Israeli government published tenders for sure. This despite the fact that very few of those in- more than 300 new housing units in Har Homa, a strate- volved—Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans alike— gically-located settlement in East Jerusalem established actually believed the Annapolis process could succeed. during the Oslo years.5 Much like the announcement of President George W. Bush himself, entering his final 1,600 new units for the East Jerusalem settlement of year in office and saddled with two unpopular wars and Ramat Shlomo during Vice President Joe Biden’s March sagging popularity at home, was only nominally en- 2010 trip to Israel, the timing of the Har Homa project gaged in the process, leaving it to his secretary of state was highly suspect from the point of view of Palestinians to shoulder the burden more or less alone. Fewer still and many in the international community. Then, as now, believed that Prime Minister Olmert, facing a criminal the announcement of a new settlement project in East indictment and likely resignation, had either the man- Jerusalem just as the parties were about to restart nego-
THE GHOSTS OF NEGOTIATIONS PAST| MEMO NUMBER 17 | 2 date or the internal political backing to conclude a peace even greater urgency to return to negotiations, which deal with the Palestinians. was—and remains—its only means to bring about change. Despite the rise of the Fateh-affiliated Al-Aqsa Annapolis was not the first time Palestinians had yielded Martyrs Brigade early in the Intifada or the rhetorical to U.S. pressure on matters of process over substance— homage paid to “armed struggle” during its party con- a pattern that was virtually institutionalized throughout gress in July 2009—which may be seen more as at- the Oslo years in the 1990s. Meanwhile, three formal tempts to avoid being outflanked by Hamas than as a rounds of permanent status negotiations—Camp David genuine shift in strategy—the PLO’s dominant faction in 2000, Taba in 2001, and Annapolis in 2007—along remains the party of negotiations and not of resistance. with a dizzying array of protocols, memorandums, summits and other micro-initiatives—the Hebron Herein lies the paradox for the Palestinian leadership: Agreement, Wye River Memorandum, Sharm el-Sheikh On the one hand, as the party of negotiations, only Memorandum, Tenet Plan, Mitchell Report, Road Map, Fateh and the PLO can deliver a deal with Israel. At the “Disengagement,” etc.—all failed to produce an agree- same time, their willingness to engage in seemingly per- ment, or even to generate sufficient momentum toward petual negotiations with little to show for them has se- one. Moreover, since no politician, movement, party, or verely eroded their moral and political legitimacy in the government has unlimited political eyes of many Palestinians. capital, each of these failures exacted Only Fateh and the PLO can a heavy price on all those involved— deliver a deal with Israel. At the LESSON #3 especially, as the weakest party, the AGREEMENTS ARE Palestinians. same time, their willingness to en- MEANINGLESS WITHOUT gage in seemingly perpetual nego- Although the 1995 Interim Agree- tiations with little to show for them IMPLEMENTATION ment promised to resolve all out- has severely eroded their moral and As a corollary to the above lesson, standing issues within five years— political legitimacy in the eyes of including Jerusalem, settlements, Palestinians have also come to un- borders, refugees, and security—by many Palestinians. derstand that any agreement, with- May 1999, the end of the “interim out a reasonable assurance of its period,” the process had succeeded only in generating implementation, is essentially mean- more process. As deadlines came and passed, U.S. offi- ingless. The recent past is littered with agreements that cials became increasingly focused on keeping the process were painstakingly negotiated but never implemented. alive, irrespective of any progress made or whether pre- vious obligations had been met. At the end of the Camp The 1995 Interim Agreement, for example, called for a David process, on President Bill Clinton’s last day in gradual transfer of power from Israel to the PA office, the PLO’s Negotiation Affairs Department of- through three “further redeployments” (FRDs). Al- fered the following assessment of the previous seven though Israel had agreed to complete these by October years: “Under US supervision, the Palestinian-Israeli 1997, it only carried out two FRDs (and only after mul- ‘peace process’ has become a goal in and of itself. A false tiple delays and several rounds of renegotiation) and sense of normalcy has been created because of the on- never implemented the third. While the Palestinians going process of negotiations.”7 viewed these as major breaches of signed agreements, the Israelis pointed to various Palestinian violations of Notwithstanding such critiques, the PLO, particularly its the Oslo Accords, such as the PA’s bloated and multi- dominant Fateh faction, has been somewhat complicit in plicative security forces and incitement. this phenomenon—at least until recently. Since its his- toric recognition of Israel (within its pre-1967 borders) The same held true a decade later. Most provisions of and its strategic decision to pursue a negotiated settle- the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Ac- ment with Israel in 1988, the PLO has rarely turned cess (AMA), concluded shortly after Israel’s unilateral down an opportunity to negotiate. Therefore, unlike “disengagement” from Gaza, went unimplemented al- Hamas, which derives its political and street credentials most immediately after it was signed. While Israel from “resistance,” the PLO/Fateh derives its legitimacy claimed the Palestinians had failed to reform the border and relevancy mainly through negotiations. agency as the AMA required, the Palestinians accused Israel of reneging on virtually all other provisions. Re- Moreover, in the face of Hamas’s growing political and gardless of who was to blame, there is little doubt that military strength, particularly after the start of the Al- the AMA’s lack of implementation, which resulted in Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the PLO/Fateh leadership felt the de facto closure of Gaza’s borders, contributed
THE GHOSTS OF NEGOTIATIONS PAST| MEMO NUMBER 17 | 3 greatly to the events that followed, including Hamas’s structive ambiguity” have long since passed. This in- surprise electoral victory in January 2006 and its violent cludes what Palestinians have come to view as pretexts takeover of Gaza in June 2007, as well as the dramatic for delaying a comprehensive peace deal, such as the increase in Palestinian rocket fire at Israeli towns. “security first” (and its close ally “reform first”) doc- trine that prevailed throughout most of the previous Previous attempts to identify the reasons for the lack of decade, along with similarly diversionary promises of implementation of a particular provision or agreement “economic peace” like the one now proposed by Prime typically deteriorated into mutual accusations of the “he Minister Netanyahu. This also explains why Palestinians said/she said” variety, resulting ultimately in a continua- have consistently opposed the option of a “state with tion of the status quo. Such experiences have prompted provisional borders”8 and other ostensibly temporary Palestinian demands for the creation of a robust monitor- initiatives—today’s “provisional” arrangement is likely ing & verification mechanism, under the auspices of a trusted to become tomorrow’s permanent reality. third party, as an integral component at all stages of the process. Palestinian aversion to partial and piecemeal ap- proaches applies equally to matters of substance. LESSON #4 Hence, Palestinians generally oppose (though not al- INCREMENTALISM DOES NOT WORK ways consistently or successfully) attempts to break out or otherwise postpone certain permanent status issues The chronic lack of implementation and failure to ad- from others, such as by agreeing to negotiate “borders here to agreed-upon deadlines has permanently soured first,” thereby putting off issues such as Jerusalem and Palestinians against anything resembling incrementalism. refugees, which Israel has historically sought to avoid Whereas the logic of the Oslo process was to put off the negotiating. Throughout the Annapolis talks, for exam- toughest issues until the end, experience has taught Pal- ple, Israel sought agreement on borders that excluded estinians that these issues only get harder over time—if “Greater Jerusalem,” and then later to postpone the only because of ever-changing “facts on the ground.” issue of the Old City (and the Haram/Temple Mount) Consequently, Palestinians have come to believe that in negotiations on Jerusalem. To Palestinians, such de- attempts to manage the conflict rather than resolve it are lays could only be seen as a way to buy time—and pro- destined to fail. vide political cover—for the creation of even more Is- raeli “facts on the ground.” The entire Oslo process was premised on the notion that incremental progress on smaller-scale, “day-to-day” is- LESSON #5 sues (e.g., security cooperation, the gradual transfer of AVOID BEING BLAMED AT ALL COSTS administrative responsibility, improved economic condi- tions, etc.) would help build confidence between the When President Abbas and his negotiators decided to parties and enable them to tackle the more central issues remain in the Annapolis process, even in the face of of the conflict further down the road. However, the suc- dramatically increased settlement activity, they did so cess of this formula rested on two key assumptions: first, with the memory of Camp David fresh in their minds. that current arrangements would be temporary; and more Yasser Arafat’s initial reluctance to accept President importantly, that the status quo would continue in the Clinton’s invitation to the July 2000 Camp David peace meantime—both of which were thoroughly and repeat- summit is now well known. In addition to citing the edly breached almost from the start. The reality was that parties’ general lack of readiness, Arafat also expressed settlements continued to expand at unprecedented rates his fear that Palestinians would be blamed should the throughout the Oslo years and during subsequent nego- summit fail—both of which eventually transpired. tiation processes. Meanwhile, endless delays and missed deadlines effectively transformed such “interim” ar- Since then, the Palestinian leadership has been virtually rangements into permanent realities. obsessed with avoiding blame for any failures in the peace process. While U.S. pressure may have been be- Without a genuine, “loophole-free” settlement freeze hind the Palestinians’ initial decision not to quit the and a concrete timetable for concluding negotiations, the Annapolis process, the decision to continue in the proc- Palestinian leadership has little to gain from engaging in ess throughout most of the following year—despite a process that historically has only eroded their negotiat- continuing “facts on the ground” and major doubts ing positions and undermined their domestic legitimacy. about the seriousness of the process—was driven As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the days of “in- largely by a desire to avoid being blamed for its failure. terim agreements,” “provisional solutions,” and “con-
THE GHOSTS OF NEGOTIATIONS PAST| MEMO NUMBER 17 | 4 This thinking is also evident in internal matters, most tection force” in the early days of the Al-Aqsa Intifada,9 notably with regard to Palestinian security efforts. Unlike as well as the PLO’s decision to refer Israel’s construc- in the past when Arafat might have been tempted to tion of the “separation wall” in the West Bank to the leverage PA security forces against Israel, the current PA International Court of Justice in 2004.10 More recently, leadership is determined not to allow the issue of Pales- some senior Palestinian officials have even floated the tinian security performance to serve as a pretext for de- idea of bypassing negotiations altogether by seeking a laying progress in political negotiations. As a result, both UN Security Council resolution recognizing “a Palestin- President Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad have ian state along the June 4, 1967 borders, with East Jeru- repeatedly sought to reassure Israel that Palestinian secu- salem as its capital.”11 rity cooperation would remain a constant, irrespective of progress (or lack thereof) made at the political level. Having been greatly weakened over the last decade, the Palestinian leadership understands it can no longer af- This mindset has worked both for and against the Pales- ford to act alone. Furthermore, given the nature of re- tinians. On the one hand it has allowed them to assume gional and international involvement in both Israeli- a “leave no stone unturned” posture in the quest for Palestinian affairs and intra-Palestinian disputes, it may peace, thus endearing them to the United States and the not even have the ability to do so even if it wanted to. broader international community. On the other hand, The fact that some forty percent of the PA’s $3.1 bil- their determination not to be painted lion budget comes from interna- as the “party of no” has opened them tional donors, three-quarters of it up to charges from certain Palestin- from western nations, undoubtedly ian and Arab quarters of being “serial In many ways the Arab world informs its political and even diplo- negotiators,” further eroding their serves as the Palestinians’ “strate- matic decisions and priorities. credibility. Such conundrums high- gic depth,” helping to offset (how- light the inherent tensions between ever modestly) the power imbalance At the center of the Palestinians’ competing Palestinian interests, and renewed drive for multilateralism is serve as further incentive for Pales- with Israel. their growing reliance on Arab states tinians to stay away from negotia- for political, material, and moral tions. support. In recent years, the Pales- tinian leadership has intensified ef- LESSON #6 forts to coordinate a negotiation strategy with Arab DON’T GO IT ALONE states—particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The Palestinians’ enthusiastic support for the 2002 In light of the Palestinians’ traditional predisposition for Arab Peace Initiative, which called for a comprehensive multilateralism and internationalization, the PLO’s stra- regional peace based primarily on a resolution of the tegic shift toward bilateralism throughout the Oslo years Palestinian question and which now lies at the core of now looks to have been a losing bet. The 1993 “Declara- the PLO’s diplomatic strategy, exemplifies Palestinian tion of Principles,” which launched the troubled Oslo reliance on Arab patronage. process, was the result of a secret “back channel” be- tween Israel and the PLO with little outside intervention, In many ways the Arab world serves as the Palestinians’ save that of their Norwegian hosts. Palestinians again “strategic depth,” helping to offset (however modestly) went solo when they reluctantly agreed to attend the the power imbalance with Israel. Moreover, the Pales- Camp David summit in July 2000, only to realize that tinian leadership’s growing reliance on Arab states is a their ability to conclude an agreement on Jerusalem, direct outgrowth of its rapidly declining domestic and refugees, and other regional issues without the involve- international standing. Keenly aware of its own political ment of key stakeholders in the region was severely lim- and diplomatic weakness, the Palestinian leadership ited. As a result, Palestinians have now come full circle. must rely on Arab states to provide “political cover” 12 not only for resuming negotiations with Israel but Having concluded that bilateral negotiations alone, even even for affirming its own legal-political legitimacy. For with active U.S. engagement, are not sufficient to over- instance, President Abbas’s need to obtain official Arab come the vast power imbalance with Israel, the Palestin- League endorsement for extending his term as PA ian leadership has intensified efforts to internationalize president, which technically expired in January 2009, is the conflict and mobilize multilateral action at both the a telling sign of his waning legitimacy—particularly regional and international levels. Early signs of this were since his leadership of the PLO, which claims to be the evident in Palestinian appeals for an “international pro- “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian peo- ple,” was and remains unchallenged.
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As with other lessons, however, there is a downside to Whereas the PLO’s 1988 decision to pursue a negoti- Palestinian dependence on international, especially Arab, ated settlement with Israel was in every way a strategic support. The limits of Arab support were demonstrated choice, its need to deliver an acceptable and fair peace most clearly following the 2009 publication of the Gold- agreement with Israel may now be an existential im- stone Report, a report commissioned by the UN to in- perative. In a very real sense then, Palestinian demands vestigate the twenty-three-day Gaza War that began in are actually not demands at all, but needs. Thus, the in- December 2008 and which accused Israel and Hamas of sistence on a comprehensive and genuine settlement engaging in war crimes.13 When the Goldstone Report freeze or on a clearly defined “endgame” is no longer came up for a vote at the UN Human Rights Council, just a matter of principle or international law or even of however, Abbas was subjected to enormous U.S., Israeli, the “viability” of a future state; rather, it is about the and international pressure—including from many Arab feasibility of the two-state proposition itself, as well as states—to postpone the vote. When Abbas succumbed how and by whom the Palestinians will be governed. and agreed to postpone the vote, sparking mass outrage Needless to say, both the United States and Israel have among Palestinians and others around the world, many a stake in both of these. of those same Arab states joined the international chorus of voices harshly condemning him for the decision. Al- The Palestinian leadership’s reluctance to engage in though he reversed his decision, the Goldstone debacle direct negotiations, for now consenting only to indirect, left Abbas personally wounded and severely weakened “proximity” talks, is to varying degrees a reflection of politically. each of these lessons. Ironically, even as the Palestini- ans’ capacity for compromise on the substance of nego- CONCLUSION tiations has remained fairly constant over the years, their room to maneuver on matters of process has nar- Having borne the brunt of nearly two decades of failed rowed significantly. Equally ironic, this new Palestinian negotiations, the Palestinians are now attempting to ap- assertiveness comes at the very moment when the ply lessons from past negotiations to the current peace United States appears to be most interested in resolving process, albeit in ways that are often inconsistent and the conflict and most willing to address Palestinian con- even paradoxical. Moreover, through all of these lessons cerns. runs one overarching message, one that is now deeply ingrained in the leadership’s collective psyche: the In many respects, the Obama administration appears to PLO/PA’s repeated failure to deliver a peace deal with have internalized many of these same lessons—even if Israel, or even improvements on the ground, has a direct only partially and not always consistently. While the impact not only on its “street” popularity or electoral current administration appears to be more attuned to prospects but on its ability to govern as well—as dem- the precariousness of the Palestinian leadership’s posi- onstrated most dramatically by Hamas’s takeover of tion, it is far from certain that it will remain so. As Gaza in June 2007. proximity talks get underway, the success of the process will be determined in large part by how the United The prospect of failure is never attractive or empower- States responds to future Palestinian dilemmas or cri- ing for any party; but whereas American and Israeli lead- ses, namely whether it will seek to accommodate Pales- ers would likely live to fight another day, the same tinian concerns as it is beginning to do now, or whether probably cannot be said of the current Palestinian lead- it will expend valuable time, resources and opportuni- ership. Former U.S. negotiator Aaron David Miller re- ties on the unlikely (and ultimately self-defeating) goal cently wrote of how President Clinton told members of of trying to pressure Palestinians into relinquishing the U.S. negotiating team as they set out for Camp these basic needs. David, “Guys, trying and failing is a lot better than not trying at all.”14 Miller’s anecdote highlights a point he believes the former president missed—that the United States actually could not afford a high-profile failure at Camp David, and did in fact pay a price for it. If this can be said of the world’s sole superpower, what then of the Palestinians?
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1 “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” Article XXXI(7), September 28, 1995. 2 Not surprisingly, Palestinians reject this Israeli interpretation. Moreover, the United States shares the view that Oslo’s “status” provision does apply to prejudice resulting from Israeli settlement activity. For an illustration of the U.S. position, see President George W. Bush’s statement on January 10, 2008 during his visit to Jerusalem just before leaving office: “Neither party should undertake any activity that contravenes road map obligations or prejudices the final status negotiations. On the Israeli side that includes ending settlement expansion and removing unauthorized outposts. On the Palestinian side that includes confronting ter- rorists and dismantling terrorist infrastructure.” “President Bush Discusses Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” The White House, January 10, 2008, available at
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