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Tarila Marclint Ebiede

Instability in ’s : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

Tarila Marclint Ebiede

Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building About the author

Dr. Tarila Marclint Ebiede is a research fellow at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development, KU Leuven, Belgium. He has previously worked as a researcher at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht and at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa, . He is an expert on peace, security and governance issues in Sub- Saharan Africa with a special focus on Nigeria.

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L’utilisation commerciale des médias publiés par la Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) est interdite sans l’autorisation écrite de la FES. « Les idées et thèses développées dans la présente étude sont celles de l’auteur et ne correspondent pas nécessairement à celles de la FES ». Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 04 Abstract 05 Background and context 06 Stakeholder analysis 10 The nigerian government 10 Oil-producing communities 11 International oil companies (IOCS) 12 Interactions of stakeholders in the context of violent conflicts 13 in the Niger Delta Community versus state and IOCS conflict 13 Intra-communal conflicts 15 Inter-communal/Inter-ethnic conflicts 16 Political (Electoral) violence 17 Criminal violence 17 The post amnesty programme in the Niger Delta 19 Reintegration of ex-militants in the Niger Delta 21 Immediate outcomes of the DDR programme 22 New threats in the Niger Delta 25 Reasons for renewed instability 25 The response of Nigeria’s government to renewed instability 27 Continuous threat of instability in the Niger Delta 28 Conclusions and recommendations 29 References 33 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication is the result of rigorous scientific work undertaken by the Peace and Security Centre of Competence in Sub-Saharan Africa office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) to reflect on the economic and security situation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. The aim is to contribute to the proposal of new approaches and responses to collective security. We would like to express our warmest thanks to all the experts who actively participated in this collegial work with their multidisciplinary and multisectoral contributions. The FES-PSCC expresses its deep gratitude to Prof. Augustin Ikelegbe Professor at the University of Benin (Nigeria) and Prof. Henry Alapiki Professor of Political Science and Director of Global Cooperation at the University of Port Harcourt (Nigeria) for their generosity in sharing their knowledge and experience to complete this study. A special and sincere thank goes to Dr. Tarila Ebiede Marclint who has duly drafted this publication in accordance with the request of the FES-PSCC.

4 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

ABSTRACT

Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta region has been in the Niger Delta. The study notes that the im- a hotbed of violent instability in the last two plementation of the Post Amnesty Programme decades. These violent events have had (PAP) focused on armed militancy, which is negative impact on human security and un- only one dimension of the Niger Delta conflict. dermined the security and stability of Nigeria’s The study found that the Federal Government oil industry, as well as the collective security of of Nigeria failed to address the root causes the Gulf of Guinea. In June 2009, the Federal of conflict and political violence in the Niger Government of Nigeria proclaimed an amnesty Delta after the implementation of PAP. The and implemented a disarmament, demobi- study also found that the objectives of PAP, lisation and reintegration (DDR) programme particularly the demobilisation and reintegra- for armed militant groups in the Niger Delta. tion of ex-militants have not been fully realised. The DDR programme in the Niger Delta was Instead, ex-militants remain connected to their implemented under a framework that is locally old militant networks and have been unable known as the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP). to find gainful employment after undergoing The Niger Delta experienced relative peace expensive educational and vocational training and stability following the implementation of programmes. In the short term, the study PAP. However, hostilities targeting oil industry recommends that there is an urgent need to infrastructure have started occurring again reform PAP to enable it facilitate the sustain- since January 2016. These hostilities have been able reintegration of ex-militants. The study carried out by new groups such as the Niger recommends that long term peace in the (NDA) and the Niger Delta Delta can only be achieved when the Nigerian Greenland Justice Movement (NDGJM). The government addresses the root causes of the reoccurrence of militant violence in Nigeria’s different dimensions of conflict and political Niger Delta shows that PAP has not been able violence in the Niger Delta within a comprehen- to achieve sustainable peace or security in the sive framework for peacebuilding and security Niger Delta. There is an urgent need to explain in the Niger Delta. Finally, the study notes that why the PAP was not able to lead to sustain- the recommendations can only be achieved in able peace and security in the Niger Delta. The an environment of political governance that is study also explains the root causes of conflict inclusive, transparent and accountable to the and political violence in the Niger Delta. ordinary people in the local communities of the Niger Delta. The study adopts a political economy approach. The study evaluates the role of different stakeholders involved in conflicts and political violence in the Niger Delta. The stakeholder analysis concludes that there are different di- mensions of conflict and political violence in the Niger Delta. The analysis notes that there is an intersection of the dimensions of conflicts and different stakeholders. This intersection contributes to the complexity of the conflicts

5 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

Background and Context South West. Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers States are in the South Nigeria’s Niger Delta, measuring about 70,000 South. Imo State is in the South East and Ondo km², is Africa’s largest and the World’s third State is in the South West. The Niger Delta is largest Deltaic region. The region stands in a largely defined by oil production. This is why geostrategic location on the shores of the Gulf oil producing states in different geopolitical of Guinea, bordering Nigeria and the Southern zones are included in the official definition of axis of the Atlantic Ocean. In 1956, the Royal the Niger Delta. Dutch Shell Company discovered commercial quantity of crude oil deposits in Oloibiri com- The Niger Delta is densely populated. Bayelsa munity, which is in present day . State, the least populated in the region, has a Since then, crude oil exploration and produc- population of over 2 million people. Cross River tion has continued unabated in the Niger State has a population of about 3.5 million peo- Delta. It is estimated that the Niger Delta re- ple. This is followed by Abia State with a popu- gion has about 37 Billion barrels of crude oil lation of about 3.5 Million people. Edo State deposit (OPEC, 2017). Globally, Nigeria’s Niger has a population of 3.9 million people. Ondo Delta has the 10th largest crude oil reserves. In State, the fifth most populated state in the re- addition to crude oil, the Niger Delta region is gion, has a population of 4.1 million people. also richly endowed with over 120 trillion cu- Imo State has a population of about 4.7 million bic feet of Natural Gas (OPEC, 2017). Current people. Similarly, has a popu- estimates suggest that there is the capacity to lation of over 4.7 Million people. produce about 2.5 million barrels of oil per day has a population of about 4.9 million people. in the region (NNPC, 2017). Rivers State, the most populated state in the Niger Delta, has a population of more than 6.2 The Niger Delta is a densely populated, culturally million people (National Bureau of Statistics, and politically diverse region. An estimated 2017). While their output varies, oil production 30 million people live within the region’s takes place in all of these states. This places the 70,000 km2 geographical territory. At least states in the Niger Delta in a strategic position 10 million of this population are youth within within the Nigerian federation. the age bracket of 18-34 years. Culturally, the region is made up of about forty ethnic The Nigerian State has benefitted immensely groups. Major ethnic groups in the Niger from oil production. Crude oil production Delta are the Ijaw, Isoko, Ikwerre, Urhobo, and exports account for about 70 percent of Itsekiri, Isoko, Efik, Ibibio, Benin and Anang. export revenue for Nigeria (Ministry of Budget These ethnic groups are spread across nine and National Planning, 2017). Historically, it is states within Nigeria’s federal administrative estimated that a total of 32.7 billion barrels structure. Nigeria’s federation is divided into 36 of crude oil were produced between 1960 States. These States are further divided into six and 2014. Budget IT, a leading public-sector geopolitical zones. The geopolitical zones are transparency initiative in Nigeria, estimates that South East, South South, South West, North Nigeria earned about US$ 509 billion (NGO) Central, North West and North East. The Nine from 1999 to 2013. This is the major source of States in the Niger Delta are within the three funding for all levels of government within the geopolitical zones: South South, South East and Nigerian federation. However, oil production

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has had significant negative impacts on the Constitutionally, all revenues accruing to the environment and human population in the NNPC, DPR, and FIRS from oil industry activities Niger Delta. It is estimated that more than are expected to be transferred into the 13 million barrels of oil have been spilled in Federation Account held at the Central Bank the Niger Delta since oil production began of Nigeria (CBN). The Federal Government in the region. This has had a devastating receives oil revenues on behalf of the ‘36 States impact on the environment, degrading the and 774 Local Government in Nigeria’. rich biodiversity of the region. Oil industry- induced environmental pollution has led to the Oil revenues do not directly go to communities loss of farmland and destroyed aquatic life. where crude oil production takes place. Instead, This has negatively impact on local economic allocations are made to States and Local activities, as indigenous people largely depend Governments, which are responsible for the on farming and fishing as primary sources of administrative control of these communities livelihood. It is estimated that 70% of people within the Nigerian federation. Oil producing in the region live below the poverty line. There communities argue that they tend to benefit is 40 per cent youth unemployment. The oil less from oil production as they are excluded producing communities in the Niger Delta are from the distribution of oil revenues. Instead, also known to lack public infrastructure such it is the elites that control the state and local as roads, schools, hospitals, electricity, drinking government structures that determine how water, and markets. The negative impacts of these revenues are spent. Next to this, is a oil production on the environment and lack of claim that States in the Niger Delta are entitled development infrastructure in the Niger Delta to more rents from oil production beyond have in turn, diminished the quality of life of the current 13 percent derivation principle. people in the region. This claim is premised on claims of resource ownership and environmental consequences The Nigerian constitution bestows ownership of oil production by communities in the Niger of crude oil to the Nigerian State. However, Delta. These contentious claims have largely exploration and production are carried out shaped the relationship between communities, either through Joint Venture Agreements (JVA) the States in the Niger Delta and the Nigerian or Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs). JVAs government. and PSCs are contractual principles that governs the relationship between the Nigerian Oil production in the Niger Delta occurs either Government and International Oil Companies within or in close proximity of communities. (IOCs) operating in the Niger Delta. The One consequence of this is that the activities Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) of IOCs affect the socio-economic and political represents the interest of Nigerian Government structures, as well as the natural environment in these contracts. The NNPC has majority of the communities. Specifically, oil exploration interests in its partnership with IOCs. IOCs, on destroys the environment which is the main the other hand, are expected to pay royalties source of livelihood of people of the communi- and taxes from its profits in the Niger Delta. ties in the Niger Delta. Oil producing commu- While royalties are paid to the Department nities in the Niger Delta have had to struggle of Petroleum Resources (DPR), taxes are paid for IOCs to implement development projects to Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS). in their communities. IOCs have conceived and

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implemented corporate social responsibility the Niger Delta became characterised by violent (CSR) policies to influence their relationships and non-violent protests over oil resources by with oil-producing communities. These policies the end of the 1990s. have not often led to the intended outcomes. CSR projects are known to have fueled patron- Nigeria’s transition to democratic rule in May age politics and divisions within communities. 1999 had an impact on the nature of youth This has resulted in contentious relationship agitations in the Niger Delta. First, democracy between oil producing communities and IOCs opened the civil society space and encouraged in the Niger Delta. youth groups to demand for resource rights. Second, regional political elites seeking to Since the early 1990s, local activists in the Niger capture political power employed and armed Delta embarked on violent and non-violent youth gangs to subvert the electoral process in actions to protest against the development their favour. Youth participation in democratic conditions in the Niger Delta. Ethnic civil society politics led to the proliferation of civil society organisations and traditional rulers called for groups in the Niger Delta. However, the alliance increased development funding by the national between regional political elites and youth government for the Niger Delta. In addition, activists in the electoral process had perverse there were agitations demanding IOCs and effect on both politics and youth agitations in the Nigerian government to address the the Niger Delta. Youths employed by regional environmental consequences of oil production in political elites, especially in Rivers State, the Niger Delta. However, the poor development carried out electoral violence with the aim of conditions of the region remained unchanged facilitating the electoral victory of their political and oil pollution continues unabated in the patrons. This occurred during the 2003 general Niger Delta. Beginning from the late 1990s, elections in Rivers and Bayelsa States. It was youth groups became more prominent in the reported that Peter Odili, the then Governor agitations for development in the Niger Delta. of Rivers State, recruited Alhaji Asari Dokubo, In December 1998, The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) who was a President of the Ijaw Youth Council proclaimed the famous Kaiama Declaration. (IYC), to carry out electoral violence during the As part of its demands, the Declaration called 2003 general elections. Other prominent youth on IOCs to end all oil production in the Niger leaders, such as Ateke Tom of Okrika Town in Delta. The IYC also called on youths from the Rivers State, were also mobilised by Governor Ijaw ethnic group to occupy all oil production Peter Odili during the 2003 general elections. facilities in the Niger Delta. This Declaration was followed by widespread protests by youth The violent mobilisation of youth groups dur- across different cities in the Niger Delta. The ing the 2003 electoral process led to the pro- Nigerian government violently repressed these liferation of small arms and light weapons youth agitations. For example, a protest (SALW) in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. This situation organised by the IYC in Yenagoa, the capital had an impact on youth activism in the Niger of Bayelsa State, on December 28, 1998, was Delta. Ownership of SALW made it possible for violently dispersed by the . The youths to carry out armed attacks in a bid to IYC organised several protests in the months register their grievances on issues of resource that followed. The agitations led to more rights in the region. This contributed to the repression by the Nigerian military. In general, change in the dynamics of youth activism in

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the Niger Delta. By the mid-2000s, many youth ative impacts on the revenue accruing to the groups had begun using violent means to reg- Nigerian federation. President Umaru Musa ister their grievances against International Oil Yar’Adua, who was sworn in as President of Companies (IOCs) and the Nigerian Govern- Nigeria on May 29, 2007, adopted a concilia- ment in the Niger Delta region. These groups tory approach following repeated failures of began to assume formal militant structures the military approach to stem the tide of mili- and identities. Militant camps were established tant attacks. It is in this context that the Federal in the swamps of the Niger Delta. The groups Government announced an offer of amnesty that emerged carried out armed attacks target- and a disarmament, demobilisation and reinte- ing oil industry infrastructure. Kidnapping and gration (DDR) programme for armed militants hostage taking of expatriate staffs of IOCs was in Nigeria’s Niger Delta in June 2009. a common strategy adopted by the nascent militant groups in the Niger Delta. These ac- The DDR programme in the Niger Delta was im- tivities were coordinated under the group the plemented under the institutional framework of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger a Post Amnesty Programme (PAP). There were Delta (MEND). uncertainties over the nature of the amnesty and structure of PAP. For example, while there Nigeria’s oil production suffered as a result of were negotiations between armed groups and increasing militant activities in the Niger Delta. representatives of the Nigerian government, In response, the Federal Government increased these negotiations were not formally signed as its military campaign in the Niger Delta. The a binding peace agreement. After several po- Nigerian military targeted youths in the region. litical persuasions from local political leaders, This contributed to human rights violations, as armed militant groups accepted the amnesty. collective punishment of communities by the This was followed by the implementation of a military became common occurrence in the DDR programme. There was also an immediate Niger Delta. Notwithstanding these military cessation of hostilities by major armed groups actions, the growing insurgency in the Niger in the Niger Delta. This relative stability led to Delta escalated. There was a proliferation of increase in crude oil production in Nigeria’s oil militant camps across the Niger Delta. Militant industry. In the interim, the Post Amnesty Pro- groups developed sophisticated tactics and gramme (PAP) remained the major stabilisation carried out more ambitious attacks targeting effort by the Nigerian government in the Niger oil industry infrastructure in the Niger Delta. Delta. It reshaped the relationship between the This led to a loss of about 500 thousand bar- Nigerian government and armed groups that rels of crude oil production per day in 2006. emerged in the region. Initially, the plan of the From 2006 to 2008, Nigeria’s oil production Nigerian government indicated that PAP will be stood around 2.2 million barrels per day, lower implemented over a period of five years (2010 than the estimated production capacity of 2.5 – 2015). However, the government has main- million barrels per day. A deep decline was wit- tained funding of PAP up to 2017. There is cur- nessed in 2009 when oil production fell further rently no indication that the programme will be to 1.75 million barrels per day (Bloomberg, terminated in 2018. 2016). This decline was as a result of increased militant attacks on oil industry installations in Renewed threats involving new armed groups the Niger Delta. The fall in production had neg- in the Niger Delta emerged in early 2016 de-

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spite the continuation of PAP beyond its esti- Stakeholder Analysis mated end year. New attacks have been carried out by armed groups such as the Niger Delta The context discussed above is largely defined by Avengers (NDA). The NDA, like previous armed competing interests from different stakeholders groups in the region, claimed to be represent- in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. These stakeholders all ing and expressing the grievances of oil pro- have an interest in oil production and stability ducing communities in the Niger Delta region. in the Niger Delta. From the contextual analysis, The NDA has repeatedly targeted oil industry the key stakeholders in Nigeria’s oil industry are infrastructures. This has negatively impacted oil (1) the Nigerian Government, (2) Oil Producing production in the Niger Delta. The emergence Communities in the Niger Delta, (3) International of the NDA and its destructive attacks on oil Oil Companies. While all stakeholders tend to industry infrastructure questions the effective- have a common interest in the production of ness of the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP) as oil, their actions vary according to their place in a peacebuilding policy instrument by the Ni- the process of oil production and distribution gerian government in the Niger Delta region. of rents accruing from oil production. In the This question is even more urgent because PAP context, understanding stakeholders in Nigeria’s has been ongoing for more than five years and Niger Delta also needs to take into account it has trained more than fifteen thousand ex- the heterogeneous nature of the conflict in militants in a bid to promote peace. The emer- the region. Stakeholders here constitute of gence of the NDA brings a sense of urgency to multiple actors within one framework. This the situation in the Niger Delta. This indicates calls for further clarifications of each category that the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP) has of stakeholders that have been identified. not been able to address the underlying causes of instability in the region. The Nigerian Government The persistence of militancy raises concerns for both the Nigerian government and the inter- The Nigerian government is composed of a national community. Militancy in the Niger Del- range of institutions at both national and re- ta continues to reduce oil production, further gional level. Within Nigeria’s federal structure, depressing the country’s economic viability in the Nigerian government is comprised of the a period of low oil prices. Militancy also pro- Federal, State and Local (municipal) govern- vides a conducive environment for oil theft, a ments. The laws governing the oil industry criminal phenomenon that thrives in the Niger were established by the Federal Government. Delta. Militancy in Niger Delta creates an op- The Federal Government has also established portunity for criminal networks to thrive in the public institutions to govern the oil industry, Gulf of Guinea. Of particular concern is piracy as well as facilitate the development of Nige- in the Gulf of Guinea. Armed groups from the ria’s Niger Delta region. These institutions are Niger Delta are prominent actors in the piracy the Ministry of Petroleum, Niger Delta Devel- networks of the Gulf of Guinea. These threats opment Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry are of concern to both the Nigerian govern- of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA). The Ministry of ment and the international community. Petroleum is the state institution responsible for oil industry governance in Nigeria. This function is implemented by different institutions within

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the Ministry. One prominent institution with- role in state creation. Leaders of ethnic groups in the Ministry of Petroleum is the Nigerian demand for the creation of states as a way to National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The attract development to their homelands, as NNPC is the state-owned entity that represents well as increase their political representation the Nigerian government in oil industry opera- within the Nigerian federation. In Nigeria’s Ni- tions. As the state’s commercial representative ger Delta, regional leaders use the platform of in the oil industry, the NNPC is the primary in- state governments to demand for increased oil stitutional pipeline through which oil revenues derivation to the region. Thus, even though extracted from the Niger Delta are transferred states are governing units within the structure to the Federal Government. of the Nigerian federation, they are known to have persistently expressed demands for The NDDC was established in year 2000 increased derivation. This position is against through an Act of Parliament. The NDDC is a that of the Federal Government of Nigeria that development interventionist agency funded by seeks to maintain the current status quo. the federal government and IOCs. The NDDC is mandated to implement infrastructural and human development projects across Oil-Producing Communities all the oil producing states in Nigeria. The MNDA was established in 2007 by Alhaji Oil producing communities are key actors within Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, the then President of the prevailing contestation for resource rents Nigeria. President Yar’Adua established the in the Niger Delta. There is a consensus within MNDA as a fulfillment of his 2007 election communities that the exploration and produc- campaign promise to the people of the Niger tion of crude oil in the Niger Delta has not led Delta. The MNDA was designed to facilitate to development. This has led to protests against infrastructural and human development in IOCs operations in local communities. However, Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. However, unlike oil producing communities are made up of the NDDC, the MNDA is solely funded by the multiple actors and interests. Historically, tradi- Federal Government. These institutions are tional rulers and members of the Community the prominent vehicles through which the Development Committees (CDCs) are known government seeks to transfer oil wealth to the to have represented the interest of oil produc- Niger Delta. However, these organizations are ing communities in the oil sector. Chiefs and known to have performed poorly in fulfilling Members of CDC are responsible for negotiat- their mandate. They have been characterized ing with IOCs and government institutions in by corruption, lack of transparency and low the oil sector. However, this has changed over accountability. the years. Youth groups emerged as prominent actors in community agitations against IOCs. The second level of governmental actors are The emergence of youth groups challenged the the State Governments. Historically, states have dominant place held by traditional rulers and been created in Nigeria in response to ethnic chiefs in local communities. Although all groups agitations. This ethnic dimension of states in within communities are known to canvas for Nigeria also makes them a platform for eth- development and resource rights, research has nic groups to canvass for their interests within shown that these groups have increasingly be- Nigeria. In Nigeria, ethnicity plays an important come motivated by financial and political gains.

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Several armed groups have emerged in the Oil producing communities are the least Niger Delta. All of these groups claim to repre- beneficiaries of Nigeria’s oil wealth. However, sent the grievances of oil producing communi- these communities are also characterized ties. While different militant groups emerged by competing factions and interests that are in the Niger Delta, these groups were largely indigenous to the communities. These factional organized under the umbrella of the Move- powers and interests are in competition to ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta control political power and decision-making (MEND). However, individual commanders had structures in communities. The purpose of this control over their militant units. MEND is used competition is to enable them to gain control as a framework to coordinate communication of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) projects of militant attacks and demands of militant implemented by IOCs. This control leads to groups. Politically, militant groups persistently financial benefits. These competing interests pressured the federal government to address within communities tend to obscure the the grievances of oil producing communities. grievances of the majority of people adversely These groups are known to be engaged in oil impacted by oil production. However, these theft, locally known as oil bunkering. Militant grievances remain popular among local people groups from the Niger Delta are also partici- and remain a binding motivation for protests pating in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. These against IOCs and the Nigerian Government. criminal activities are used to generate funds to finance the armed militancy. International Oil Companies (IOCs) One consequence of armed militancy in the Niger Delta is that militant groups became There are about twenty IOCs operating in the oil powerful and dominant actors in the oil rich fields of Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Prominent IOCs region. This power and dominance is an are Shell Petroleum Development Company outcome of the attention militants received (SPDC), Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL), Nigerian from IOCs and the Nigerian government. The Agip Oil Company (NAOC), Exxon Mobil activities of militant groups had direct impact and Total. These IOCs have different levels on oil production. Non-violent groups in of engagements. IOCs operating in Nigeria’s communities such as traditional rulers and CDC Niger Delta are typically enter into a Joint members remained influential. But the actions Venture (JV) or a Production Sharing Contract of militant groups created a sense of urgency (PSC) with the Nigerian National Petroleum within the oil industry. Hence, the IOCs and Corporation (NNPC). The profit motive of IOCs the Nigerian government initiated several is self-evident. But IOCs have also engaged strategies to engage militants. The attention in CSR projects as a way of building social received by militants increased their power capital and maintaining good relations with within community politics. Increasingly, militants communities in the Niger Delta. CSR projects gained influence within communities. In some have largely been criticized as having limited communities, militants displaced traditional impact on communities. Some critics have rulers and took control of the CDC. This made blamed CSR projects for fueling divisions militants the dominant powers in communities within communities. However, CSR projects of where they exist in the Niger Delta. IOCs have also evolved. Current efforts of IOCs have applied a partnership mechanism that

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seeks to collaborate with Non-Government Interactions of Stake- Organizations (NGOs) and Government holders in the Context of Institutions in the design and implementation Violent Conflicts in the of development projects. Niger Delta Militant activities directly target IOCs in the Niger Delta. Beginning from community prot- For the last two decades, the armed insurgency ests, local agitations was always focused on led by militant groups has been known as the shutting down the operations of IOCs in local dominant form of conflict in the Niger Delta. communities in the region. The emergence of However, it should be said that the Niger Delta armed militancy increased the vulnerability of oil has also experienced other forms of conflict industry operations in the Niger Delta. Armed and political violence. Both armed militancy militants bombed oil industry infrastructure and other types of conflict and political violence and kidnapped expatriates. This often led to a have shaped the context of violent conflicts in declaration of force majeure by IOCs. Increased the Niger Delta. While many commentators militant agitations by local communities also have viewed these forms of conflict and led to more corporation between IOCs and political violence as differentiated, research has the Federal Government of Nigeria in the area shown that, in fact, the actions of stakeholders of security. IOCs used the services of Nigerian involved in the different forms of conflicts are security agents to suppress community protests. mutually reinforcing. An interrogation of the This security relationship intensified during the different dimensions of conflict shows the period of armed militancy, as troops from the interaction of different stakeholders within the Nigerian military were constantly deployed to context of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta. secure oil industry facilities and personnel in the Niger Delta. Community versus State and IOCs Conflict

Conflicts between communities on the one hand, and the Nigerian State and oil industry on the other constitute the overarching narrative of conflict in the Niger Delta. Since the discovery of oil, communities in the Niger Delta have been involved in agitations against the State and oil industry over poor development in the region. This has resulted in protest movements and litigations carried out by communities against the State and oil industry. This is particularly so because most people in communities in the Niger Delta continue to experience endemic poverty even though oil produced from their region has become Nigeria’s main source of revenue. The neglect of development in local

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communities and environmental pollution as- tion of community warlords and gang leaders sociated with oil production became the into anti-State militants is apparent in the lead- foundation for anti-state mobilization in local ership of key militant groups in the Niger Delta, communities in the early 1990s. such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People’s At first, anti-state mobilization was characterized Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and Niger Delta Vigi- by non-violent ethnic movements in the Niger lante (NDV). Delta. A high-profile example was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). From a political economy perspective, a complex Civil society organizations such as MOSOP network of actors and interests emerged in the mobilized communities against the Nigerian Niger Delta as a result of the region’s nature of Government and oil industry. Their demands conflict and political violence. An aspect of this were mainly associated with rights to oil rents, political economy is the emergence of a ‘conflict inclusive and sustainable development in the economy’. This conflict economy is hardly Niger Delta and environmental remediation. distinguishable from the genuine struggles Civil society movements were mostly repressed of the local people. This created the crucial by the then military government of Nigeria. challenge of identifying and differentiating the The symbol of this repression was the murder, different forms of conflict and violence. The in Port Harcourt on 10 November 1995, of Ken analysis so far suggests that there are at least Saro Wiwa and nine other Ogoni activists by the six categories of actors that became apparent in General Sani Abacha-led military government. the context of the conflict and political violence. His murder marked a turning point in agitations They include: community chiefs and leaders, by local communities against the state, because local and regional politicians, non-violent civil it was the first time the Government had used society movements, women’s groups, youth state institutions to prosecute and murder groups and violent militant groups. To a large environmental activists for what has since been extent, these different groups now frame the described as trumped-up charges by the General narrative driving their participation in the Niger Sani Abacha-led Nigerian military government. Delta conflict in the overarching discourses on resource rights and political marginalization. Research has shown that all forms of commu- However, the analysis also suggests that beneath nal and ethnic conflict have an impact on the these overarching narratives lay overlapping emergence of armed militias in the Niger Delta. dimensions of conflict. Youths who participate in these conflicts are often organized into armed groups represent- The disagreement between the ethnic com- ing factional interests. During the first phase munities of the Niger Delta and the Nigerian of armed militancy lasting from 2005 to 2009, State is a key dimension of this conflict. In this youths armed and mobilized by local elites category, all identified groups appear to be in against fellow members of their communities opposition to the current governance framework emerged as armed militants. Similarly, youths of the oil industry and the allocation of crude oil who became community warlords in inter- rents. For example, local and regional politicians, ethnic conflicts emerged as leaders of militia who emerge as representatives of Niger Delta groups during the anti-State armed militancy communities in the National Assembly often that characterized the region. This transforma- decry the continuous use of the Land Use

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Decree and Petroleum Industry Decree. The Land of the region’s environmental problems. These Use Decree transfers all land to the Nigerian pressures have yielded results. For example, the Government. The Petroleum Industry Decree Nigerian Government agreed to implement transfers ownership of all petroleum minerals the report of the United Nations Environment to the Nigerian Government. The combine Programme (UNEP) on oil spills in the Ogoni effect of both Decrees limits the rights of local area of Rivers State. In addition, Bodo, an people to land and petroleum resources. ethnic community in the Ogoni area, instituted a case against Shell over oil pollution of their People from local communities of the Niger land. Shell offered a settlement of $83 million, Delta have repeatedly demanded for increased which was accepted by the community. These revenues since the end of the Nigerian Civil outcomes are the result of extensive advocacy War in 1969. In 2005, the representatives of by civil society groups and ethnic communities. the Niger Delta states staged a walk out from Conversely, the actions of armed militant the Nigerian Political Reform Conference after groups differ from those of civil society groups their demands for increased revenue allocation in the Niger Delta. Militant groups were able to Niger Delta States were rejected by other to establish themselves as principal actors in delegates at the conference. Similarly, members the Niger Delta conflict by the use of violence of the House of Representatives representing targeting oil industry infrastructures and the Niger Delta states have expressed displeasure at kidnapping of expatriate oil workers. The the ongoing constitution-amendment process activities of non-violent movements and violent after their proposal for the abrogation of the militant groups have put pressure on the Land Use Decree was rejected by other members Nigerian Government. However, unlike non- of the National Assembly. These examples show violent civil society movements, the impact of that the political elites and leaders from the the armed militant groups was immediately Niger Delta identify closely with the agitations felt by the Nigerian government because the for increased oil rents in the Niger Delta. attacks by militant groups led to reduced oil production and attendant revenue losses for Civil society groups and armed militant groups the Federal Government. play vanguard roles in the conflict between oil producing communities and the state and IOCs in the Niger Delta. These groups have adopted Intra-communal Conflicts different strategies in their struggle. The civil society groups and ethnic communities have Intra-communal conflict is a common form of used extensive advocacy and litigation within conflict and source of political violence in the the national and international community. Niger Delta. This form of conflict often involves Groups such as Environmental Rights Action actors belonging to the same communities. (ERA) have remained at the forefront for Intra-communal conflicts are usually caused environmental remediation in the Niger Delta. by disputes over land and contention for These groups have developed international leadership positions in communities. While partnerships with human rights organizations land disputes are frequently about contentious such as Amnesty International, which has put ancestral claims within communities, leadership pressure on the Nigerian Government and disputes are often related to competition for multinational oil companies to address some power and control. The struggle for the control

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of rents and benefits accruing to communities One immediate consequence of intra-com- from oil production is one major driver of munal conflict is the destruction of lives and the competition for power and control in property. Warring factions in communities communities. This competition leads to violent attack other community members, often leading conflict. to deaths. This is followed by retaliation, which then leads to a cycle of conflict. In most cases, The key stakeholders in intra-communal con- these conflicts were terminated following state flicts are local groups consisting of traditional intervention, but the perpetrators of violence chiefs, Community Development Committees are rarely prosecuted. The failure to prosecute (CDC) members and youth groups in com- perpetrators of violence often leaves victims munities. IOCs are also passive actors in of conflict aggrieved. Even after the cessation community conflicts. This is especially the of hostilities, the drivers of conflict remain case where such communal conflicts are unresolved. Hence, the conflict itself is simply driven by local competition for the control of frozen and not fully resolved. rents and benefits accruing to communities from corporate practices of IOCs. An example There is a link between intra-communal vio- of this form of conflict is the 1998 crisis in lence and the proliferation of small arms and Peremabiri community of Bayelsa State. In light weapons (SALW). Factional groups in- this crisis, community factions fought over volved in intra-communal violence seek arms compensation payments received from Shell and ammunition in their bid to overpower op- Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). posing groups in communities. Communities The compensation payment became necessary that are involved in this type of conflict are due to an oil spill from SPDC pipelines in the often awash with SALW, even when violence community. Members of the community argued ends. Hence, there is usually a link between that SPDC agreed to pay a compensation of these forms of conflict and criminality, because about US$2.2 million. However, a faction of youths who were involved in the conflict use community leaders negotiated and received SALW for criminal activities. about US$100 Thousand from SDPC. It led to a violent confrontation between those who negotiated with SPDC and those who insisted Inter-Communal/Inter-Ethnic on the payment of US$2.2 million. The group Conflicts of community leaders that received US$100 Thousand from SDPC were dismissed from Inter-communal conflicts are those forms community governance. However, they did not of conflict that involve at least two opposing receive the agreed compensation from SPDC. communities. This form of conflict has been Instead, the Nigerian government intervened a common feature of some communities in with the military to ensure continuous oil the Niger Delta since the late-1980s. In most production by SPDC. This shows that the cases, inter-communal conflict is driven by corporate practices and approaches to economic factors mainly associated with dis- community engagement, dispute settlement puted claims over land used for farming and and compensation for environmental pollution fishing activities. These conflicts are heightened from oil activities of IOCs may lead to violent when crude oil production takes place on intra-communal conflicts. disputed land. Inter-community conflicts also

16 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

occur over equity claims in the distribution of forms of criminal activities in cities and towns political opportunities at the level of the local in the Niger Delta. This form of violence also governments. Intra-communal conflicts could contributes to the formation and strengthening occur among communities with similar ethnic of armed groups in the Niger Delta. Peripheral compositions. Ethnic based inter-communal groups which hitherto had little or no access conflict has significantly contributed to the to arms and ammunitions become empowered socio-political order in the Niger Delta. This form through access to arms during elections. Thus, of conflict has occurred as a result of disputed after elections, they are able to carry out more claims over land. Ethnic groups also fight over ambitious and lethal attacks. political competition within the Nigerian State. A typical example of ethnic conflict as political The relationship between politicians and competition and contested claims over land is youths is largely defined by a patron-client the Ijaw versus Itsekiri conflict in Delta State. dynamic, with the political elites acting as the patrons, while youths are the clients who carry out the violence during elections. This Political (Electoral) Violence relationship was mainly observed during the 2003 general elections in Rivers State. During The competition for political power at state- the elections, the People’s Democratic Party level has led to electoral violence in the Niger recruited and armed youths from the Ijaw Delta. It is important to take this violence Youth Council (IYC) in Rivers State. These into account in explaining the context of youths, who had hitherto been known as conflict in the Niger Delta, because this feeds activists in communities, carried out acts of into the larger, complex network of violence electoral violence in a bid to ensure the victory in the region. Politicians, in their bid to win of their patrons in the electoral process. Since elections, often arm and mobilize youth gangs 2003, electoral violence carried out by armed against their opponents. Members of these youths has been a recurring phenomenon gangs are drawn from local communities and during elections in the Niger Delta. urban-based confraternity groups. Electoral violence has been a recurring phenomenon in the political process in the Niger Delta since Criminal Violence Nigeria’s return to democracy in May 1999. This form of violence has been particularly Criminal violence is an important dimension evident in Rivers and Bayelsa states, where it of the conflict context in the Niger Delta. It is has been reported that elections became a “do manifested as sea piracy, oil theft (bunkering), or die affair” leading to a “war-like situation”. hostage taking, armed robbery and gang violence, among other crimes. Sea piracy occurs The nature and outcome of electoral violence at two levels: within the internal waterways of often leads to the proliferation of SALWs. the region and within the Gulf of Guinea in the Politicians who arm youth gangs do not often Atlantic Ocean. While waterway piracy impacts engage in any form of disarmament after only on human security in the region, sea piracy elections. Hence, the gangs that are armed for in the Gulf of Guinea impacts on international elections keep their weapons afterwards. In trade, transport and regional security. Sea many instances, these arms are used for other piracy is mainly carried out by armed groups.

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Oil theft has been found to involve a complex beyond the overarching narrative of anti-state network of actors in the Niger Delta region rebellion. These contradictions are manifest and in the Nigerian State apparatus. Oil theft is in intra-communal, inter-ethnic and inter- carried out by local youths, political and military communal conflicts, and other forms of political elites in Nigeria and youths in communities in violence. Clearly, the actors involved in the the Niger Delta. In practice, there are at least different forms of violence are interconnected. three levels of oil theft in the Niger Delta. The For example, youths who emerged as armed first is conducted by corrupt members of the militants had been involved in community Nigerian Government and the oil industry. It militias in earlier communal conflicts in the involves over-invoicing and overloading of oil region. Similarly, most members of militant tankers at oil export terminals and benefits oil groups are known to have served as armed industry and State elites. The second form of thugs of the political elites that perpetrated oil theft involves the sabotage of oil industry election-related violence. Participation in infrastructure. It is conducted on a large scale electoral violence was a foundation for armed with oil stolen from pipelines loaded into mobilization by militant youth groups in the trucks and sold on the international market. Niger Delta and these internal conflicts cannot It involves local criminal networks, militant be ignored in attempting to understand the groups and dishonest security agents and conflicts and address them using a holistic government officials. The third form of oil theft security framework. is that of oil for artisanal refining carried out by local groups. These groups provide locally Communal conflicts facilitate other forms of made infrastructure used to refine oil which is political violence in the Niger Delta. This is supplied to the local and regional market to because actors involved in communal violence meet the energy needs of low-income earners. use political violence to compete for power. It is estimated that at least 13,000 barrels of When gained, this power is then used to oil are refined daily by artisanal refiners spread dominate community affairs. In some instances, across the Niger Delta. The amount of crude militants who had participated in communal oil stolen for artisanal refining is insignificant conflicts emerged as community overlords, when compared to Nigeria’s daily production. occupying important positions in the traditional However, the criminal nature of this activity institutions of governance. Leaders of militia affects the socio-political order in local groups also gained political influence within communities and the crude methods of refining state communities based on their positions as contributes significantly to environmental pol- local warlords. One key consequence of this lution. This form of illicit refining has led to was that, as armed militants gained influence state sanctions and punitive action by the in their communities, ordinary civilians who Nigerian military. Unlike other forms of oil had previously occupied these positions theft, the violence associated with artisanal of influence were displaced. Hence, one refining is mainly between the groups involved consequence of the armed militancy was that it in artisanal refining and the Nigerian military. divided opinions over traditional authority and political power within Niger Delta, especially in The analysis of the context of violent conflicts communities where armed militants used as in the Niger Delta also demonstrates that there their operational base. are internal contradictions fueling the conflicts

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The complex interactions of actors and groups, The Post Amnesty and the outcome of armed militancy in the Programme in the Niger Delta reveals that the agitations for Niger Delta resource rights in the region occurs alongside a competition for political power within local communities. By 2009, violent conflicts in the On assuming office in May 2007, President Niger Delta had evolved from an expression Umaru Musa Yar’Adua identified the Niger of grievances against the Nigerian State to Delta as one of his areas of focus. He promised a competition for power between different to address the development issues in the Niger groups. At best, this development can be Delta and resolve the crisis between the people described as reflecting the same problem: all of the region and the Nigerian state. To fulfil groups involved in the expression of grievances this promise, President Yar’Adua formed the against the Nigerian state were also involved in Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) to local competition for power. review and identify the root causes of the region’s violent conflicts. The committee was also mandated to make recommendations that would enable the Federal Government to resolve the situation in the region. The NDTC engaged extensively with militia groups, civil society organizations, traditional rulers and local political groups and in November 2008, its subsequent report made the following key recommendations:

• Increase the derivation from 13% to 25% and provide additional revenue for new in- frastructure and sustainable development; • Open the trial and bail offer to the accused militant, Henry Okah; • Complete the East West Road including spurs to the coast; • Pay the outstanding statutory funds owed to the Niger Delta Development Commission; • Begin a disarmament process for youths involved in militancy through a credible de- commissioning, disarmament and rehabili- tation (DDR) process; • Establish a Youth Employment Scheme that would find work for at least 2,000 youths in each local government area in Niger Delta states. (Niger Delta Technical Committee Report, 2008)

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These recommendations formed the basis on “post-militancy” Niger Delta, the Government which the Nigerian Government negotiated announced that it would “institute programmes with armed militant groups in the Niger Delta. to assist in disarmament, demobilization, To drive this dialogue, the Government formed rehabilitation and provision of reintegration the Niger Delta Peace and Reconciliation assistance to the militants”. The Government Committee (NDPRC), led by Senator David hoped that the amnesty and DDR programme Brigidi. The NDPRC carried out an extensive would “contribute to security stabilization dialogue with all armed groups in the Niger in the Niger Delta … as a precondition for Delta, with committee members crisscrossing medium- and long-term development” (The the region’s creeks to negotiate with armed Post Amnesty Programme, 2009). Armed groups. The Committee assured the militants militants were given a period of sixty days that the Nigerian Government was deeply to accept the amnesty and register for the committed to the development of the region. DDR programme. The proclamation laid the In peacebuilding practice, these consultations foundation for the establishment of the Post- would be considered as negotiations leading Amnesty Programme (PAP) in October 2009. to an agreement between armed militants The Government appointed a Special Adviser and the Nigerian government. However, these on the Niger Delta and PAP Chairman to lead negotiations mainly focused on prominent the implementation of the amnesty and DDR. armed militants. There were very limited Subsequently, key militants started embracing consultations with other stakeholders within the offer made by the Nigerian Government. communities that have been impacted by conflicts. Hence, the peace process initiated At the end of the amnesty period in October by the national government excluded several 2009, armed militant groups surrendered other stakeholders within communities that about 2,760 assorted arms and 287,445 forms have been impacted by violent conflicts. of ammunition as part of the disarmament component of the DDR programme. The On 25 June 2009, President Umaru Musa submission of arms and ammunitions by Yar’Adua announced an amnesty for armed armed militants marked the beginning of the groups in the Niger Delta. In his announcement, implementation of the DDR programme in the President said that militants must the Niger Delta after the proclamation of the demonstrate “willingness and readiness to presidential amnesty programme. The Nigerian surrender their arms, unconditionally renounce military was responsible for the collection and militancy and sign an undertaking to that destruction of weapons surrendered by the effect”. This proclamation was based on militants. Although militants submitted a large Section 175, sub-section 1 of Nigeria’s 1999 cache of arms, there was no audit to confirm constitution, which states that “the President whether there was complete disarmament in may grant any person concerned with or the Niger Delta. This raises a critical challenge convicted of any offence created by an Act of as reports and events indicates that the region the National Assembly a pardon either free or is still awash with SALWs. subject to lawful conditions”. The demobilisation component of the DDR Recognizing the need to manage the transition programme took place at Obubra, Cross River of militants who accepted amnesty into a State. During demobilisation, ex-militants who

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accepted the amnesty engaged in activities emerging from armed conflict and is commonly such as verification and documentation, seen as crucial in determining the success transformational training, peacebuilding or failure of DDR programmes. Successful and conflict resolution training, counselling reintegration implies that ex-combatants who and career guidance, wellness assessment, have undergone DDR programmes will live reintegration classification and education peacefully in post-conflict communities without and vocational placement. As with most resorting to violence or being discriminated demobilization programmes, the PAP expected against by members of those communities that these activities would re-orientate ex- (United Nations, 2010). To achieve this goal, militants, sever group ties and prepare DDR programmes ensure that ex-combatants militants for reintegration. By the end of the receive support and training that will enable demobilization programme in 2010, the PAP them to find jobs and engage in legitimate committee announced that it had successfully economic activities. demobilized 26,361 ex-militants. The PAP was, thus, prepared to facilitate the reintegration The Nigerian Government took steps to facilitate of ex-militants who had undergone the the reintegration of ex-militants in line with demobilization programme. global DDR practices. First, the Government decided to pay a monthly stipend of US$400 A key objective of demobilisation programmes to ex-militants. This sum was agreed as part of in DDR initiatives is to weaken the cohesion of efforts to ensure that ex-militants had an income militant groups. It aims to end the relationship while undergoing educational and vocational between ordinary fighters and the leaders of training which would prepare them for long- armed groups. However, the Niger Delta DDR term employment in various sectors of the programme tends to reinforce this relationship. economy. The ex-militants undertook training In the Niger Delta, the monthly stipends in vocational fields such as agriculture, agro- allocated to ex-fighters are paid through the allied processing, transportation, cold-room leaders of armed groups. This gives the ex- management, information and communication militant leaders an important role to play in the technology, maritime services, building and DDR process in the Niger Delta. This function construction professionals, oil and gas, and also ensures that they maintain control and environment and sanitation management. Ex- influence over their fighters. As such, this militants who decided to further their academic feature of the Niger Delta DDR programme training were given the opportunity to pursue defeats the aim of a demobilisation programme. their education in disciplines such as law, political science, business management, mass communication, international relations, public Reintegration of Ex-militants in the administration, medicine, engineering, applied Niger Delta sciences, building and construction, and information and communications technology. Following standard practice in DDR programmes, The structure and content of the reintegration the Nigerian Government committed itself to component had an impact on the funding of facilitating the reintegration of ex-militants in the programme. At conception, the Nigerian the Niger Delta. Reintegration of ex-combatants Government estimated that the entire amnesty is a common challenge faced by societies programme would cost about USD 361 million,

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which reflects the exchange rate of the Naira infrastructure and restoring production of oil to to the US dollar at the time. This changed in peak levels suggests that it has been successful. 2011, when a new administration introduced As a DDR programme, the Niger Delta amnesty a more extensive educational programme for programme has had other benefits: it has led ex-militants and other beneficiaries. This led to the training of 17,323 ex-militants registered to an increase in the yearly budgeted cost of on the programme with the training of a further the programme. In 2011, USD 532 million 12,677 ex-militants due to be completed by the was budgeted for the programme. This fell end of 2018 (The Post Amnesty Programme, to about USD 479 million in 2012. The Post 2017). This shows that the training component Amnesty Programme (PAP) received a budget of the reintegration programme have had allocation of about USD 428 million in 2013. an impact on human capacity development PAP received USD 408 million and USD 379 in the Niger Delta. Some ex-militants who million in 2014 and 2015 respectively. In 2016, underwent training have gained employment the federal government budgeted about USD in different vocational activities. However, very 281 million for the implementation of PAP. few of those who various vocational training The budget provision for PAP in 2017 was has found employment or are engaged in USD 213 million. The difference in the initial entrepreneurship. Employment figures for estimated cost of the DDR programme and the these ex-fighters are very low compared to the yearly recurring cost of the programme since number of ex-militants who participated in the its implementation is the result of the change amnesty programme. in the reintegration training offered by the PAP. The PAP remains active and a major source of Unemployment remains a key challenge faced its financial cost is the monthly stipends paid by ex-militants involved in the programme. to ex-militants. Available evidence suggests that many of those trained are still unemployed. For example, ex- militants who participated in the programme Immediate outcomes of the DDR have remained dependent on the stipend Programme of USD$400 paid monthly by the amnesty programme, and widespread protests over non- The Niger Delta witnessed relative stability in the payment have been common since late-2015. immediate aftermath of the implementation The delay in payment is mainly associated with of the amnesty programme. The programme the sharp drop in oil prices which has made led to the immediate cessation of hostilities it challenging for the Nigerian Government to against oil companies. Damaged oil industry meet public expenditure commitments. These infrastructure was repaired and put back into protests are an indication that the termination use. Kidnapping of expatriate oil workers was of the payments to ex-militants will leave most significantly reduced and normality started of them without an income and exposed to the to return to the creeks of the Niger Delta. By temptation of illicit economic activities. February 2012, oil production had increased close to its former high of 2.39 million barrels Although unemployment is a common problem per day. The PAP had been proposed in response across the Niger Delta, analysis of the training to the attacks on oil industry infrastructure component of the reintegration programme and the gains made in securing oil industry reveals a problem specific to the amnesty

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programme. In an interview, an ex-militant is that it was not inclusive. The Nigerian govern- participating in the amnesty programme had ment specifically focused on the armed militants, this to say about the training received: thus neglecting other stakeholders within the communities. This exclusion implies that The fact is that we are facing some challenges the Nigerian Amnesty Programme is not a in our training. First, the people that are comprehensive peacebuilding programme. training us are not giving us good training. Instead, it is a short-term programme that We are not working very well. Some days, we seeks to maintain stability for the benefit of the will come for training and we will stay here oil industry. The Nigerian government focused for about 30 minutes and they will dismiss us on facilitating cessation of hostilities, and to go back home. Our training is supposed to not sustainable peacebuilding. This could be be for nine months and we have been here discerned from the fact that while the Nigerian for four months now. In the four months, we government focused on funding the amnesty have achieved nothing. We have not learnt programme, it did not meet the development anything; I can say that the four months have needs of the communities in the Niger Delta. been wasted (The Gist Magazine, 2013). Neither did the government implement the environmental remediation programmes it This ties in with the views of another ex-militant promised to the local communities in the who noted that, “I don’t have experience region. Thus, the exclusive focus of the federal here because I am not learning anything”. government on the training of ex-militants A third ex-militant explained that the period through the DDR programme is a limited of training was too short and did not give approach to peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. him and his colleagues the skills required to There is also limited participation of IOCs succeed in their chosen vocations. Another ex- in the peace process. As identified earlier, militant explained that poor training affected IOCs are critical stakeholders in the conflicts job prospects after the training was complete. in the Niger Delta. Beyond exploration and “Right now, most of my brothers that were sent production of oil, the corporate practices of on training are back home, doing nothing”, he IOCs fuel conflicts in communities. The limited said. These documented views of ex-militants participation of IOCs in the peace process could resonate with many ex-militants who have undermine the process. This is especially the undergone vocational training; it was an case when IOC corporate practices continue to outcome that meant the Nigerian Government fuel conflicts within communities of the Niger had to either continue the payments or Delta. There are initiatives by some IOCs to terminate the programme before ex-militants improve their partnership with communities in had been fully reintegrated. the Niger Delta. For example, Chevron Nigeria Limited has developed the Foundation for the It is noteworthy that while the DDR programme Partnership Initiative in the Niger Delta (PIND). in the Niger Delta has focused on training of ex- The PIND initiative is designed to address the militants, it has been confronted with several socio-economic grievances of communities in challenges. These challenges are inherent in the the Niger Delta. Hence, it largely focusses on process leading to the amnesty and design of the developing the non-oil economic potentials DDR programme. A fundamental limitation of of communities with the aim of facilitating the process leading to the amnesty programme employment. There are still very limited efforts

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to integrate this initiative within a larger government of Nigeria. This approach does development framework of that is pioneered not address the different dimensions of conflict by the Federal government of Nigeria. and political violence that take place within the context of the Niger Delta. Equally, it shows The Federal Government has engaged political that the peace process is not built into a larger leaders at the state level to negotiate with framework of peacebuilding in the region. armed groups. However, there has not been Instead, the peace efforts of the Nigerian a significant effort by regional politicians to government have largely been reduced to the deviate from the use of armed thugs, often cessation of violence and ensuring the security drawn from militant groups, to carry out of oil industry infrastructure in the Niger electoral violence during elections. Militants Delta. To confirm this assertion, the Nigerian who had participated in the amnesty and DDR government has extended formal security programme were reported to have carried contracts to ex-militants to protect oil industry out acts of electoral violence in both elections facilities in the Niger Delta. For example, the conducted in 2011 and 2015. These actions Nigerian government awarded a contract worth show that while armed groups may have US$7.5 Million per month to Government participated in the peace process, they are still Ekpomopolo (commonly known as Tompolo), tied to the patron-client relations that enables prominent militant leader in Delta State. Similar their recruitment to carry out other forms of contracts were awarded to militant leaders in political violence, such as electoral violence. Bayelsa and Rivers State. The implication of As stakeholders, the actions of the regional this is that while it empowers militant leaders and local political elites tend to undermine the in community affairs. Stakeholders within peace process. communities who did not emerge as militant leaders are marginalized. This patronage from Although the initial plans of the peace the Nigerian government gave ex-militant process envisaged the inclusion of several leaders an incentive to ensure the security of conflict stakeholders, the implementation of oil industry infrastructure. This pact between the programme has been largely limited to a armed militants and the Nigerian government pact between armed groups and the Federal led to relative stability in the Niger Delta.

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New Threats in the Niger to use ethnic identities as a means of resource Delta appropriation. This competition led to violent conflict between both ethnic groups. This conflict has been frozen since 2005 following Oil industry infrastructure attacks resumed the intervention of the Nigerian Government. in April 2016. New militant groups claiming The tensions between the Ijaw and Itsekiri to represent communities have emerged. ethnic groups were briefly reignited following Prominent among them are the Niger Delta the emergence of the NDA. The Itsekiri ethnic Avengers (NDA), Red Scorpions and the Niger communities claimed that these attacks were Delta Greenland Justice Movement (NDGJM). carried out by Ijaw militants within the NDA. The emergence of new militant groups shows This shows that tensions remain and renewed that the instability in the Niger Delta has not militancy is threatening the fragile inter-ethnic been resolved. The attacks carried out by the accord in the region. NDA have been most potent: the group claimed responsibility for the underwater bombing of Shell’s Forcados 48-inch export pipeline Reasons for Renewed Instability on 14 February 2016 which was followed by several other attacks. These assaults caused oil Analysis of the amnesty and DDR programme production to fall, reflecting a re-emergence of suggests that the failure of ex-militants to the previous strategy of militants targeting oil find gainful employment is one reason for industry infrastructure. the renewed instability in the Niger Delta. This school of thought suggests that idle Instability and security risks in the Niger Delta ex-militants are engaged in different forms have not only been associated with the of illicit economic activities and crime that activities of new clandestine groups such undermine regional security. For example, the as the NDA. Several other events have also emergence of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) threatened stability of the Niger Delta region. has been blamed for the potential termination The region experienced an increase in oil theft of the amnesty programme. It is argued that and the illegal oil refining. This practice has these groups emerged to apply pressure on pitched criminal groups engaged in oil refining the Nigerian Government to maintain the against the Nigerian military in the creeks of monthly payments to ex-militants. Indeed, ex- the Niger Delta, leading to violent attacks by militants have consistently protested against the Nigerian military against those groups. the potential termination of the amnesty Ethnic and communal tensions between Itsekiri programme. Unemployed ex-militants are at and Ijaw ethnic groups have also resurfaced in risk of recruitment into criminal networks who some areas of the region. This ethnic tension seek to engage in activities such as oil theft and predates armed militancy (2005-2009) and the sea piracy. They are also at risk of recruitment as Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta. The armed thugs by political patrons to perpetuate conflict between the Itsekiri and Ijaw is mainly election violence. This shows that there is an a micro political ethnic struggle over access to urgent need to ensure that ex-militants in the resource rents through the South West Niger Delta are properly reintegrated. Local Government Area (Ukiwo, 2006). In this struggle, members of both ethnic groups sought

25 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

A second, and significant, reason why there in Rivers State and Ibibios in Akwa Ibom State has been renewed instability in the Niger Delta protested their non-involvement in the amnesty is the termination of some security contracts programme. For many of these youths, the awarded to ex-militant leaders. This action was amnesty and DDR programme were seen as carried out by President an opportunity to benefit from the oil rents when he assumed office on May 29, 2015. in the Niger Delta. They argued that youth of President Buhari instructed the cancellation of the Ijaw ethnic nationality were not the only oil industry contracts awarded to Government affected group and demanded inclusion in any Ekpomopolo in Delta State. In addition, Govern- scheme that sought to address the concerns ment Ekpomopolo was also charged with of youths in the region. In extreme cases, defrauding the Nigerian government. These ethnic groups such as the Itsekiri that had actions meant that the informal pact between been involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the the Nigerian government and Government Ijaws claimed that they had been politically Ekpomopolo that was established within marginalized by the Ijaws under the Jonathan- the context of the amnesty programme was led Federal Government. To pacify the Itsekiris, broken. Although the government terminated the PAP then offered Itsekiri youths at least 52 the security contracts of Government Ekpomo- scholarship positions in the United Kingdom. polo, similar actions were not taken against However, dissatisfaction over the beneficiaries other ex-militant leaders in Rivers and Bayelsa of the amnesty programme remains, and is State. Thus, ex-militants in Rivers and Bayelsa partly behind the emergence of new groups, States remained powerful in their communities, such as the Niger Delta Greenland Justice despite the political transition at the national Movement (NDGJM), that continue to carry level. The data presented in Table 1 shows that out attacks against oil industry infrastructure in the actions undertaken by Niger Delta Avengers Delta State. have largely taken place in Delta State. There have been very limited attacks in Rivers and The state patronage channelled to militia Bayelsa State. Based on this, it is evident that leaders also created a paradoxical situation for the disagreements between Government the Nigerian Government, by entrenching ex- Ekpomopolo and the Nigerian government is militant leaders within the political economy of a key factor that has led to renewed hostilities the oil industry. This entrenchment became an in Delta State. incentive for ex-militants to retain their power. However, the key source of power of ex-militant It is commonly argued that the amnesty leaders is their ability to mobilize networks of programme favoured armed groups that were ex-fighters that are able to carry out violent predominantly members of the Ijaw ethnic attacks on oil industry infrastructure. This means nationality. Hence, the initial phase of the that efforts to displace these leaders from their DDR programme involved extensive benefits positions of power are likely to threaten the being offered to youths from the Ijaw ethnic Niger Delta’s fragile peace. This state patronage extraction. The reason for this is because is unlikely to continue forever, however, and it is militancy was mainly concentrated in Ijaw the underlying driver behind the emergence of communities in the Niger Delta. Youths from new militant groups such as the NDA. other ethnic groups, such as the Itsekiris and Urhobos in Delta State, Ogoni and Ikwerres

26 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

The failure to engage other community actors General Boroh made commitments to these in the peace process has limited the success of youths that the PAP will continue until the DDR in addressing the various dimensions of Nigerian government develops a strategy to conflict in the region. As ex-militants exit the replace the current programme. Indeed, the amnesty programme they face the problem of Nigerian government continues to implement economic reintegration and are also likely to the PAP, and ex-militants still receive monthly face other dimensions of conflict that remain stipends from PAP. The PAP has also continued latent in local communities. This will bring them the training of ex-militants, and also launched into contact with community members who a plan to maintain training institutions that have not been engaged in the peace process. will empower youths with different vocational In cases where this contact is not harmonious, skills in the Niger Delta. These plans were renewed communal violence will follow. As in announced by PAP as a demonstration of the the past, communal violence could again create government’s commitment to the reintegration the foundation for new forms of militancy in of ex-militants. the Niger Delta. The reassurance received by ex-militants en- rolled in PAP was not extended to youth that The Response of Nigeria’s are agitating to be included in the reintegration Government to Renewed Instability programme. Hence, claims by new militant groups such as the Niger Delta Greenland Justice The Nigerian Government first launched a Movement (NDGJM) remain unaddressed. The military operation in response to renewed PAP has announced that it has officially closed instability in the Niger Delta between November registration of new militants into the federal and December 2016. Code named “Operation government reintegration programme. The Crocodile Smile”, the military was mandated lack of a new policy instrument to address to secure oil industry infrastructure in the youths that have taken up arms to press home creeks of the Niger Delta. The launch of the their demands to be included in the programme “Operation Crocodile Smile” was designed to creates a policy lacuna in the peace process address security challenges such as militancy, in the Niger Delta. State governments in the kidnapping and oil theft. Military operations led Niger Delta have attempted to fill this lacuna. to arrests of suspected militants and destruction For example, The Rivers state government of emerging militant camps in Delta and Edo conducted a disarmament exercise for armed States (Daily Post, 2017). However, tensions youths in the State in November 2016. Similar remained in the region. programmes were implemented in Imo and Bayelsa State. However, these programmes The Nigerian Government, through the Post were limited to disarmament and there have Amnesty Programme (PAP), engaged with not been any comprehensive reintegration local community leaders and stakeholders efforts by the state governments. to negotiate with restive youths. General Paul Boroh, the Chairman of PAP and Special Beyond the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP), the Adviser to the President on Niger Delta, em- Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has also barked on extensive tour of communities engaged in political consultations with regional where renewed hostilities had occurred. elites and traditional rulers in the Niger Delta.

27 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

This consultation was carried out by Professor NDRC is not known to have carried out any Yemi Osinbanjo, Nigeria’s incumbent Vice major attacks in the Niger Delta. The actions President. The Federal Government of Nigeria of the NDRC shows that renewed hostilities by organised a summit with the Pan Niger Delta the NDA may attract lesser known groups to Forum (PANDEF) on November 1, 2016. After carry out attacks in the Niger Delta. This points this summit, the FGN announced a 20-point to the fact that the Niger Delta region remains agenda that would guide new intervention in fragile and susceptible to renewed violence the Niger Delta. This agenda covered a broad and instability in spite of the implementation range of short term and long-term strategies to of the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP). achieve stability, peace and development in the Niger Delta (Ministry of Petroleum Resources, 2017). This renewed engagement indicates that the FGN seeks to move beyond the Post Amnesty Programme (PAP) in its efforts to end instability and build peace in the Niger Delta. However, the implementation of a new strategy is yet to begin, and the threat of instability in the Niger Delta remains.

Continuous Threat of Instability in the Niger Delta

The initiatives undertaken by the Nigerian government led to cessation of hostilities by the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). On August 22, 2016, the NDA announced that it is imple- menting a “ceasefire” and will cease attacks on oil industry infrastructures in the Niger Delta (Energy Aspects, 2016). The ceasefire was announced to allow for the ongoing talks between the government and regional stakeholders in the Niger Delta (i.e. traditional rulers, regional politicians and militant leaders). The ceasefire has remained in place since August 2016. However, there have been renewed threats by the NDA to call off its “ceasefire”. On November 4, 2017, the NDA released a new statement threatening to call of its ceasefire (Premium Times, 2017). Similarly, a lesser known group, the Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders (NDRC), called for renewed hostilities in the Niger Delta. The

28 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

Conclusions and In the light of the analysis so far, we therefore Recommendations make the following recommendations:

In the short term, the Nigerian Government The analysis in this paper shows that conflict should reform the Post Amnesty Programme and political violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (PAP) to facilitate the sustainable reintegration are driven by two sets of complex factors. The of ex-militants. A key finding in this study is that first are the political, economic and structural ex-militants that have been trained in different factors within the Nigerian federation that vocational and educational fields under the Post make the region vulnerable to violence. These Amnesty Programme (PAP) remain unemployed. factors include the uneven distribution of A key reason that has been identified is that crude oil revenues, the widespread poverty in the ex-militants have received training in areas the region and the environmental pollution that do not reflect the dominant economic associated with oil production. The second set activities in the Niger Delta. There was extensive of factors, which lead to violence, relate to the emphasis on vocational training in the oil sector. internal struggle for power among different Although the oil sector is the key industry in groups in the Niger Delta. The analysis so far the Niger Delta, it is not a high employer of suggests that the dynamics of conflict and labor. Even though the oil industry accounts political violence are two sides of the same for 90 per cent of Nigeria’s foreign revenue, it coin – the actors involved in these conflicts are only generates about 65,000 direct jobs and present in both the conflicts between the local 250,000 non-direct jobs in the employment people and the Nigerian government, and they sector during periods of optimal production. are equally involved in localized power struggles This accounts for 0.01 per cent of the Nigerian that lead to violence. The exclusion of local workforce. Conversely, Agriculture employs communities from oil revenue management about 60 per cent of Nigeria’s labor force. provides a justification for the escalation of Hence, there is a need for PAP to reorient ex- local violence against the state and oil industry. militants towards economic sectors such as The grievances held by local communities Agriculture and Small-Scale Manufacturing against the Federal Government of Nigeria that are in need of labor, especially vocational intersects with localized power struggles to skills, and investments. produce the prevailing political order in the Niger Delta. However, peacebuilding initiatives A new PAP would need to reform the financial taken by the Federal Government have mainly incentives paid to ex-militants. As the analysis focused on militant violence against oil industry shows, monthly stipends paid to ex-militants infrastructure – in other words, the State has tends to attract non-militant youths to seek responded to only one set of actors within one inclusion in the Post Amnesty Programme of the two overarching frameworks of conflict. (PAP). An initiative by PAP that seeks to invest The analysis shows that this has inadvertently its funding in job-creating activities will prove exacerbated the internal struggle for power, a more sustainable means of facilitating the which has not been tackled, thereby creating a reintegration of ex-combatants. Hence, the complex problem that requires both short- and PAP needs to develop a strategy that enables long-term strategies to resolve. it to terminate the payments to ex-militants, while investing in job creation enterprises that

29 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

will provide jobs to the youth population in rights violations as detailed in this paper. the Niger Delta. This strategy will enable PAP Therefore, it is recommended that the FGN accommodate members of new militant groups develops a security strategy that includes such as the Niger Delta Greenland Justice all community actors as stakeholders in the Movement (NDGJM). There is an opportunity for Niger Delta. This strategy should deviate from PAP to direct youths into large scale agricultural exclusive focus on ex-militants and armed projects in the Niger Delta. However, these groups, and be more community-focused. By projects would also require investments from doing this, local actors will take responsibility PAP. The monthly stipends paid to ex-militants for the security of oil industry facilities in their should be invested in these projects. In turn, ex- communities. This strategy would be designed militants and other youths in the Niger Delta as a “social enterprise”. This community-based would have job opportunities in industries that security structure could be funded by industry receive financial investments from PAP. actors. Currently, the oil industry invests heavily in the security of its infrastructure in the Niger In the medium term, the Nigerian Government Delta. Investment in a community-based secu- needs to address the internal conflicts in the rity model would create jobs, and a sense of Niger Delta. The analysis shows that internal responsibility and ownership among local conflicts such as communal and ethnic violence communities. are the foundation for armed militancy in the region. Presently, the government has not The Federal Government of Nigeria needs to resolved most of the internal conflicts in the expedite action on the environmental reme- Niger Delta region. While these conflicts may diation of the Niger Delta. This is another not have escalated recently, they remain frozen opportunity to develop a community-based and unaddressed. Renewed escalation of these strategy. The current framework of environ- conflicts could fuel instability in the Niger mental management in the Niger Delta vests Delta. To address these conflicts, the Nigerian responsibility in state institutions. A new environ- Government will need to conduct an extensive mental strategy that includes community review of all internal conflicts in the Niger Delta. stakeholders in both clean-up and monitoring of Next to this, the government should establish environmental pollution in the region needs to be a framework for resolving these conflicts, such developed. Involving community stakeholders as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in environmental remediation would lead to job in communities that have experienced internal creation. Furthermore, transfer of monitoring conflicts. The evidence gathered by the TRC responsibilities to communities would give would be used to engage local stakeholders local stakeholders the incentive to end pipeline in dialogue that is focused on developing a vandalism and other activities that contribute resilient local governance mechanism in conflict- to environmental pollution in the Niger Delta. impacted communities of the Niger Delta. The Federal Government of Nigeria also needs to compel oil companies operating in the Niger The Federal government needs to develop an Delta to adhere to global standards, and give inclusive security strategy to secure oil industry more priority to environmental management. infrastructure. The military approach used by For instance, as part of CSR, IOCs could de- the FGN has proven to be counterproductive. velop new mangrove vegetation that has This approach has also led to gross human been depleted due to oil and gas production.

30 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

This will contribute to the restoration of the to minimize resource duplication. There is also environment of the Niger Delta region. an urgent need to improve transparency and accountability within these agencies. As noted There is also an urgent need for all IOCs to in the analysis, resources allocated to the improve their CSR and corporate practices in NDDC and FMNDA are often diverted through the Niger Delta. Current innovations such as cronyism and corruption. Hence, the agencies Chevron’s Foundation for Partnership Initiative have very limited visibility and impact in local for Niger Delta (PIND) should be mainstreamed communities. To be effective, the FGN must and expanded. PIND adopts CSR practices tackle corruption in these agencies, to ensure that include all stakeholders in communities. that development programmes benefit the However, its reach in the Niger Delta remains impoverished communities in the Niger Delta. limited. Learning from the successes of PIND, IOCs in the Niger Delta should improve on CSR Above all, in the long term, the Nigerian Gov- and other corporate practices that determine ernment must address the structural issues their relationship with local communities. that provide the ideological foundation for anti-state militancy and community agitations There is an urgent need for the Federal Govern- in the Niger Delta. The Federal Government of ment to engage with State Governments Nigeria will need to restructure the revenue- on improving revenue management and allocation formula so that a higher proportion transparency at the state level. This is important of oil revenue is transferred to oil-producing as state level corruption contributes to the poor communities. This is important because there development conditions in the Niger Delta. For is greater public awareness that oil produc- example, there is ample evidence to show that tion can fund local development if revenues state officials and regional politicians have been are fairly distributed. In short, restructuring the engaged in misappropriation of public funds revenue-allocation formula is fundamental to that ought to have been used for development bringing wealth and prosperity to the Niger projects in local communities. Addressing state Delta and ensuring that oil wealth benefits level corruption will drastically improve the local people. Current proposals for reform- developmental impact of current revenues ing the revenue allocation in the Niger Delta allocated to States in the Niger Delta region. have called for an increase of the oil deriva- tion ratio to 25 percent. If adopted, this will The Federal Government of Nigeria should lead to an increase in the oil rents transferred reform its development interventionist agen- to states with oil producing communities. cies in the Niger Delta. Agencies such as However, this proposal has been politically the Niger Delta Development Commission opposed by other regions of Nigeria. Given (NDDC) and the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta the structural implication of this proposal on Affairs (FMNDA) are in need of reforms to the Nigerian federation, it is necessary for the make them more effective in delivering their federal government to engage in a national developmental roles to the people of the dialogue to address this challenge. One way Niger Delta. One area in dire need of reform is to accommodate this demand is to include improving programming and budget practices. the reform of revenue distribution in the on- The multiple development agencies should going debates on restructuring of the Nigerian also align their programs and interventions, federation, with the expectation that, the fed-

31 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

eral government will transfer control of key revenue generating activities to state govern- ments, which are currently within the control of the federal government. Giving more con- trol to states for key revenue generating activi- ties would create an opportunity to compre- hensively address the developmental needs of the Niger Delta.

These recommendations are meant to reorient the Nigerian government towards an inclusive peacebuilding framework which reflects the interests of all stakeholders in the Niger Delta. The successful implementation of these recom- mendations depends largely on political governance that is inclusive, transparent, and accountable to the ordinary people in the local communities of the Niger Delta.

32 Tarila Marclint Ebiede | Instability in Nigeria’s Niger Delta : The Post Amnesty Programme and Sustainable Peace-Building

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36

FES Peace and Security Series No. 27

About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series As a political foundation committed to the values of The lack of security is one of the key impediments social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims to development and democracy in Africa. The at strengthening the interface between democracy existence of protracted violent conflicts as well as and security policy. FES therefore facilitates political a lack of accountability of the security sector in dialogue on security threats and their national, many countries are challenging cooperation in the regional and continental responses.The FES Africa field of security policy. The emerging African Peace Peace and Security Series aims to contribute to and Security Architecture provides the institutional this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely framework to promote peace and security. accessible. The series is being published by the FES Africa Security Policy Network.

About this study Using a political economy approach, the study ex-militants have not been fully realised. Based on evaluates the role of different stakeholders involved the key findings of this analysis, long-term peace in conflicts and political violence in the Niger Delta. in the Niger Delta can only be achieved, if the The study notes that the implementation of the Nigerian government addresses the root causes of Post Amnesty Programme (PAP) focused on armed the different dimensions of conflict and political militancy, which is only one dimension of the violence within a comprehensive framework for Niger Delta conflict. The Federal Government of peacebuilding and security in the Niger Delta. As a Nigeria failed to address the root causes of conflict condition precedent, it is mandatory to secure an and political violence in the Niger Delta after the environment of an improved political governance, implementation of the PAP. Through this study, inclusive, transparent and accountable to the it becomes clear that the objectives of the PAP, ordinary people in the local communities of the particularly the demobilisation and reintegration of Niger Delta.