Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram - Thai Wartime Leadership - Reconsidered

Department of History, Academic Division, Lt.Col.Dr.Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid1 Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram - Thai Wartime Leadership - Reconsidered

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1Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid is a lecturer in the Department of History, Academic Division, Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. He received a B.A. in Political Science from Thammasat University, an M.A. in Thai History from Chulalongkorn University, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Southeast Asian History from University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. His research interests include modern Thai and Southeast Asian history. He may be contacted at the Department of History, Academic Division, CRMA or at [email protected].

60 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 „π∫√‘∫∑¢Õß°√–· °“√µàÕ Ÿâ¢ÕßºŸâπ”∑âÕß∂‘Ëπ- ardent nationalists and were impressed by π°™“µ— π‘ ¬¡‘ ‚¥¬∑”°“√»°…“‡ª√÷ ¬∫‡∑’ ¬∫®Õ¡æ≈’ Japanûs victory over a Western Power, as ª. °—∫ºŸâπ”ª√–‡∑»µà“ßÊ „π‡¢µ‡æ◊ËÕπ∫â“π‡Õ‡™’¬ well as were interested in Japanûs de- µ–«—πÕÕ°‡©’¬ß„µâ¥â«¬°—π ¥â«¬«‘∏’°“√»÷°…“∑“ß velopment as an alternative model. When Prosopography or Collective Biography ‡æ√“– the Pacific War broke out in 1941, Phibun „π∞“π–ºŸâπ”ª√–‡∑»‡≈Á°Ê æ«°‡¢“¡’¿Ÿ¡‘À≈—ß∑“ß and his neighboring Asian Leaders chose ß§¡-‡»√…∞°— ®∑‘ ‡À¡’Ë Õπ°◊ π— ·≈–µ“ß¡à ª√– ∫°“√≥’ å to collaborate with the Japanese because ∑“ß°“√‡¡◊Õß´÷Ëß≈â«πµ°Õ¬Ÿà¿“¬„µâ ¿“æ·«¥≈âÕ¡ they thought that only in this way could ∑’Ë§≈â“¬°—π §◊ÕµâÕßµàÕ Ÿâ°—∫Õ‘∑∏‘æ≈¢Õß¡À“ they survive and advance the case of Õ”π“®µ–«—πµ° ®÷ß‰¡à·ª≈°„®∑’Ë®Õ¡æ≈ ª. ·≈– their political power, factions, and Nations. ºŸâπ”„π·∂∫‡æ◊ËÕπ∫â“π à«π¡“°µà“ßÀ—π‰ªæ÷Ëß·≈– Undeniably, collaboration was the only µ—¥ ‘π„®‡¢â“√à«¡ ß§√“¡ΩÉ“¬≠’ËªÿÉπ‡¡◊ËÕ ß§√“¡ alternative against the Western Powers and ‡°‘¥¢÷Èπ ©–π—Èπ°“√‡ªìπæ—π∏¡‘µ√°—∫≠’ËªÿÉπ„π ¡—¬ also offered the only opportunity to arouse ß§√“¡‚≈°œ ®÷ß‰¡à„™à‡ªìπ§«“¡∑–‡¬Õ∑–¬“π the populationûs fever and to build a µ“¡·∫∫Õ¬à“ß≈—∑∏‘ø“ ´‘ µå¢ÕßºŸâπ”‰∑¬ ·µà‡ªìπ United Front, as well as to strengthen native §«“¡®”‡ªìπ·≈–‡æ◊ËÕ§«“¡Õ¬Ÿà√Õ¥¿“¬„µâ ∂“π- political power. °“√≥∑“ß°“√‡¡å Õß√–À«◊ “ßª√–‡∑»„π¢≥–πà π—È ‚¥¬ ‡©æ“–°“√·¢àß¢—πÕ”π“®·≈–Õ‘∑∏‘æ≈¢Õß¡À“ Introduction Õ”π“® ÕßΩÉ“¬ √–À«à“ßΩÉ“¬‡¥‘¡π”‚¥¬µ–«—πµ° Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, popu- ·≈–„À¡àπ”‚¥¬≠’ËªÿÉπ larly known as Phibun (Pibul), was the Thai Prime Minister during the Second World Abstract War when Japanese troops entered Thailand In this article the author re-examines on December 8, 1941. After some token Phibunûs actions during the Pacific War. skirmishes against the Japanese to vin- The main question concerns Phibunûs decision dicate the countryûs honor, the military to become one of Japanûs Allies in 1941, regime under Phibun allowed Japanese and I would suggest that the best way forces to march through Thai territory. to understand Phibunûs role is to consider Then Phibun joined them as an ally in him as one of the ùnew eliteû and a the war to regain control of the political local Nationalist Leader in comparison to situation. Phibun hoped to save the army the other Leaders of the Southeast Asia. and the country, at least its formal so- Phibun and his neighboring Leaders came vereignty, and to escape the ravages of from similar backgrounds. They were Japanese conquest. members of the ùmiddle classû and of His actions during the War, however, the new elite. In addition, they were still remain both memorable and contro-

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 61 versial in Modern Thai History. The most late 1930s through to the Pacific War, prominent question concerns Phibunûs to examine Phibunûs behavior. On the decision to become one of Japanûs Allies other hand, Thai works such as those by in 1941. Although many scholars have Thamsook Numnonds (1977)5, Charivat tried to answer this question, they are Santaputra (1985)6, and Kobkua Suwan- quite different in both their approach and nathat-Pian (1995)7 mainly use Thai resources interpretation, than that of my own. The and focus on internal factors, particularly main point is that they have explained Thai Politics and Traditional Thai Diplomacy, Phibunûs behavior and role in the wrong to analyze his behavior. While both views context. have their own strengths, their weakness Scholars of this period may be roughly is similar when they consider Philbunûs divided into two thoughts: one American behavior to that of a fascist leader, such and the other Thai. On the one hand, as Hitler or Mussolini.8 the American works such as those by In contrast to such an approach, Edward Thadeus Flood (1967)2, William Swan I argue that the best way to understand (1987,1988)3, and E. Bruce Reynolds (1994, Phibunûs behavior is to consider him as 2005)4 primarily rely upon Japanese sources one of the ùnew eliteû and a local Na- and other international factors, especially tionalist Leader in the Southeast Asian the Thai - Japanese Relationship from the context, which confronted the conflict of

2Flood, E.T., çJapanûs Relations with Thailand, 1928-1941é (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1967), and çThe 1940 Franco-Thai Border Dispute and Phibunûs Commitment to Japané, Journal of Southeast Asian History, X (September 1967): 304-325. 3Swan, William, çThai-Japanese Relations at the Start of the Pacific War: New Insight into a controversial Periodé, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XVIII, 2 (September 1987): 270-293; and çJapanese Economic Relations With Siam: Aspects of Their Historical Development, 1884-1942é. (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1988). 4Reynolds, Bruce E., Thailand and Japanûs Southern Advance 1940-1945. (Hampshire: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994); and, Thailandûs Secret War: The Free Thai, OSS, and SOE during World War II. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 5Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand and the Japanese Presence 1941-1945. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977). 6Charivat Santaputa, Thai Foreign Policy 1932-1946. (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1985). 7Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailandûs Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades 1932-1957. (Oxford University Press, 1995). 8Except Kobkuaûs work, she argues to say that Phibunûs nation-building programme was more or less a replica of the Fascist or Nazi model of nation-building could only lead to an academic cul-de- sac. See Kobkua, Thailandûs Durable Premier, 103.

62 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 World Powers - the Western and the in which they tried to deal with the Japanese. I believe that by comparison, Japanese during the Occupation occurred Phibunûs behavior and his role in the War in the same way or not and also the with that of the other Southeast Asian reasoning behind their decisions. I hope Leaders is more revealing because those that by comparing the behavior of other Leaders were also members of the new the Southeast Asian Leaders one can elite and prominent local nationalists who better understand Phibunûs behavior and had to deal with both the Western Powers his role in Modern Thai History. and the Japanese influence. In my comparison, I have applied Bendaûs Thesis and the collective biography or prosopography9 as Emergence of the Modern the methodology to interpret the modern Southeast Asian Elite Thai and Southeast Asian elite. Following To understand the emergence of the this, I will first begin with Harry Bendaûs new elite, Bendaûs work provides an excellent Thesis and the emergence of the modern initial conceptual framework.10 Benda Southeast Asian elite. I will then analyze explicitly models the factors that contribute the personal backgrounds of Phibun, Dr. to the emergence of these two types Ba Maw, Aung San, Sukarno, Mohammad of oligarchic elite that he has identified Hatta, and Manuel Luis Quezon, in order with the 1960ûs in Southeast Asia. They to understand their characteristics and are çideal typesé a la Weber, and he reasoning. Next, I shall focus on their is careful to qualify both in his classifying political experience to explain why most schemes and the variables with which he of these Leaders decided to cooperate produces the two differing groups. His with Japan, while the Leader of the two types of elite are an çintelligentsia Philippines distanced himself from them. eliteé, which owes its power solely to its Finally, I will concentrate on those who Western-style education and orientation, collaborated to examine whether the way and a çmodernizing eliteé, which owes

9For an interesting survey of its literature in 1971, see Lawrence Stone, çProsopographyé, Daedalus 100 (1971): 69-85; and for more updated aspects of this method, see Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, çThe Seri Thai Movement: The First Alliance Against Military Authoritarianism in Modern Thai Historyé (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2005), Chapter 1. 10Harry Benda, çPolitical Elites in Colonial Southeast Asia: An Historical Analysisé, Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda. (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1972), 186-204.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 63 its position to its long-standing social position can be classified as the çintelligentsia or çascriptiveé nature. eliteé. Like Burmese, Java was Indianized, Nevertheless, Benda is not interested which meant that it was a society of in the politics of these elite, just their basically two classes, a King and His sociological origin. He identifies the two Subjects. Typical of this pattern was the variables involved which produced these fact that all power and control over land two different outcomes. First, there are resided with the King and the Royal Family, the çpre-modern influencesé (whether the and there were no landed classes. With States in question were çIndianizedé, Colonial Rule imposed by both the British çSinicizedé or çHispanizedé) and the second, and the Dutch, this situation meant that the nature of the Colonial Rule underlying the pre-modern elite were essentially these structures that affected the out- destroyed by it. The elite who eventually come: direct as opposed to indirect rule.11 wrestled power from the British and the The emergence of the new elite in Dutch, were not of the ascriptive class Thailand and the Philippines, according but that of a new unattached elite arising to Bendaûs model, can be classified as from their Western education and orien- the çmodernizing eliteé. For instance, in tation.13 the latter case, the Spanish essentially Whether one agrees with Bendaûs transformed the datus into a privileged, model or not, it cannot be denied that landed class of principles, the major the role of education in the creation of beneficiaries of the new social, economic, the new elite was paramount. (For Benda, and legal order introduced by the Spanish. the acquisition of education appears to In the 19th Century, a class of mestizos be a key independent variable in his was able to inter-marry and overtake this model although he does not identify it group. Benda characterizes the Philippines as such). However, if we compare the as a case of the çmodernizing eliteé because emergence of the new elite in Thailand, the elite of the 20th Century was drawn Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there on an ascriptive basis from a class structure appears to be several major variables established in the previous centuries.12 which led to the creations of the new In contrast, both in Burma and elite in those four Nations, one of them Indonesia, the emergence of the new elite, being education, which seems to be a

11Benda, Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia. 12Benda, Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia, 194. 13Benda, Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia, 196-200.

64 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 necessity in them all.14 to introduce education. This trend was also evident in Burma, Indonesia, the Phi- Background of Phibun lippines, and even in Thailand, an inde- and Other Southeast Asian pendent state, which introduced its own Leaders educational system.15 In the three former Phibun and his neighboring Leaders cases, the unintentional consequence of came from similar backgrounds. All were the policy to educate a greater number members of the ùmiddle classû and also of Colonial subjects, however, was as of the new elite. As part of this group, Benda has shown, to produce an elite they were also all ardent nationalists who which came to see itself through a led their respective movements in their nationalistic framework, as the rightful leaders own Countries. Most of them shared the in their respective Countries. same feelings towards Japan. They were During the emergence of nationalistic impressed by Japanûs victory over a Western movements at the turn of the Century, Power and were also interested in Japanûs the Filipino, Burmese, Thai and Indonesian development as an alternative model. Leaders had all come from middle-class During the 19th Century, States backgrounds and possessed a Western worldwide were growing in their capacities education and training. and in the tasks which they undertook. Quezon was born in 1878 in Baler, Their growing military and economic strengths in the Province of Tayabas. His father required a vast increase in the numbers was a mestizo - a son of a Spanish father of bureaucrats and state officials. In order and a Filipino mother. Like Sukarnoûs to produce individuals capable of running father, Quezonûs was also a village school the State, the Colonial Powers were forced teacher.16 When the Filipinos first fought

14In the case of Thailand, see Warunee Osatharom, çKansuksa nai sangkhomthai ph.s.2411-2475é (Education in Thai society 1868-1932). (M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1981), in the case of Burma, see John Leroy Christian, Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Economic Development. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), in the case of Indonesia, see Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. (The Hague, 1970), and in the case of the Philippines, see Benedict Anderson, çCacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreamsé, in Vincente L. Rafael, ed., Discrepant Histories: Translocal Essays on Filipino Cultures. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 3-47. 15In the case of Thailand, see T. Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915. (Kuala Lumpur, 1977); and David K. Wyatt. Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 16Elinor Goettel, Eagle of The Philippines President Manuel Quezon. (New York: Julian Messner, 1970), 15- 16.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 65 against the Spanish between 1896-98, and Burma. At the age of fifteen, Aung San then later against the Americans, 1899- won a scholarship and a prize for coming 1902, Quezon offered his services to the first in the Pre-High School Government Revolutionary Army. He was commissioned Examinations held throughout the Country as a Second Lieutenant, and later became in the Buddhist and National Schools.21 Aide-de-Camp to General Aguinaldo.17 In 1932, when the Saya San uprising was Dr. Ba Maw was born in 1893 at suppressed and its leaders executed, Aung Maubin. His father was an Official to the San first enrolled into a college.22 Courts of Kings Mindon and Thibaw.18 His Sukarno was born in 1901 in Surabaya father was also a Nationalist Leader and and started his primary education at the it was not surprising that Dr. Ba Maw school where his father taught in Mojokerto.23 became the Chief Defense Counsellor for In 1916, Sukarno studied high school at Saya San, the Nationalist Leader of the the Hogere Burger Scholl (HBS) in Surabaya, 1930 Peasant Rebellion, and for other where he lived in Umar Sayed Tjokroa- rebellion leaders.19 minotoûs house. This environment was of Phibun was born in 1897 in Nonthaburi, crucial importance to Sukarno because now a satellite town of Bangkok. His Tjokroaminoto was a Chairman of the Mass parents were hard-working durian produc- Nationalist Organization, Sareket Islam. In ers. At the age of twelve he was sent addition, Surabaya was also a central to the Military Academy, where he location that figured strongly in Indonesian graduated in 1915.20 Nationalism at the time, as well as, the In the same year, Aung San was crucible of nationalist thought and ac- born into a farming family in Natmauk, tion.24 a small township in the dry zone of Central

17Carlos Quirino, çQuezon, the Nationalisté, Historical Bulletin 22, nos.1-4 (January-December 1978):174-184. 18Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1930-1946. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 436. 19Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 436; and see David I. Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia. (Colorado Westview Press, Inc., 1982), 31. 20Kobkua, Thailandûs Durable Premier, 1-2. 21Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma. (The University of Queensland Press, 1984), 1-3; and Maung Maung, Aung San of Burma. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 3. 22Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma, 4. 23Kahin, George McTurnan. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 90. 24J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography. (Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1972), 29.

66 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 Hatta was born in 1902 in Bukittinggi, Modern History, and Political Science at the center of Minangkabau in Sumata. Rangoon University.29 Sukarno earned an Hattaûs family were deeply religious as both Engineering Degree from the Bandung his grandfather and father were religious Technical College,30 while Quezon studied teachers. Hatta himself was very religious Law at the University of Santo Tomas, and he was one of the comparatively Manila.31 few Western-trained Leaders in Indonesia, Quezon, who became the first Presi- who from childhood had been well-known dent of the Commonwealth and he was for his devotion and attachment to Islam.25 also the first example of the new elite Three of them had studied in Europe: player in this group. He came from a Phibun studied Artillery in France from 1924 lower middle-class Spanish mestiza family to 1927.26 Dr. Ba Maw studied Law in background. His education was sponsored India, England, and France from 1914 to by the Spanish clergymen. He fought 1924.27 Hatta studied and earned an for the revolution, spent time in jail but Economics Degree in Holland in 1932.28 managed to finish with a Law Degree. Though Aung San, Quezon, and Sukarno His election as Governor of Tayabas, where studied in their own Countryûs, their he was a political outsider, arose from education was strictly along Western lines. a variety of factors: his ties to Spanish Aung San studied Art, English Literature, elite culture through his family background,

25Mohammad Hatta, çMy Familyé, in Mohammad Hatta: Indonesian Patriot. Edited by C.L.M. Penders. (Singapore, 1981), 1-17; and Deliar Noer, Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings by Mohammad Hatta. (Netherlands: Mouton & Co, 1972), 5-6. 26Kobkua, Thailandûs Durable Premier, 2. 27Taylor, Robert H., çBurma in the Anti-Fascist Waré in Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation. Afred W. McCoy, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 160; and Ba Maw. Breakthrough in Burma, 436. 28Mohammad Hatta, çAn Economic Graduate Returns To Indonesiaé, in Mohammad Hatta: Indonesian patriot, 128-134; and Willard A. Hanna, Eight Nation Makers: Southeast Asiaûs Charismatic Statesmen. (New York: St Martinûs Press, 1964), 21. 29Maung Maung, Aung San of Burma, 3. 30Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 43-44; and Legge., Sukarno: A Political Biography, 62-64. 31G.H. Enosawa, Manuel L. Quezon: Form Nipa House To Malacanan. (Tokyo: The Nippon Press, Ltd., 1940), 130-131.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 67 his education, and his own individual talent.32 with an opportunity to enter into the Quezonûs case thus confirms the impor- political arena.33 Dr. Ba Maw was an tance of education as the route to power, Advocate and became a Lawyer-Politician with Quezon fitting nicely into Bendaûs during the Dyarchy and Burmaûs Consti- ùmodel of the modernizing eliteû - someone tutional Period,34 while Aung San, Sukarno, from an ascriptive class with a Western- and Hatta had first appeared to be part style education and orientation. of the new elite when they were students Like Quezon, Phibun, Dr. Ba Maw, in University. The three later became Aung San, Sukarno, and Hatta would emerge prominent student-politicians during the in- as the new elite in this context - Western tensifying nationalistic campaigns in Burma education and training. and Indonesia.35 Upon his return to Thailand in 1927, Growing up in the new elite, Phibun Phibun was assigned to serve as a Major and his neighboring Asian Leaders also on the Army General Staff and to teach got the feel of the nationalistic ideas from at the Military Academy. He held this their Western education and the real post until the overthrow of the Absolute experience gained in their own Countries. Monarchy in June 1932, in which he was They, therefore, were all ardent nationalists involved as a leader of a small group who led their respective movements within of about twenty junior officers within the their own Countries. Phibunûs period has Peopleûs Party. After the Revolution of been seen as the growth of an assertive 1932, Phibun was appointed a Minister Thai Nationalist Movement.36 Quezon in the first Cabinet, which provided him became the leading advocate of national

32Michael Cullinane, çThe Politics of Collaboration in Tayabas Province: The Early Political Career of Manuel Luis Quezon, 1903-1906é, in Peter Stanley ed., Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine- American History. (Cambridge, 1984), 59-84. 33Jiraporn Witayasakpan, çNationalism and The Transformation of Aesthetic Concepts: Theater in Thailand during The Phibun periodé, (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1992), 91-95. 34Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 436; see U Maung Maung, Burmese Nationalist Movement, 1940-1948. (Hong Kong: Kiscadale Publications, 1989), 1-18; John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 511-520. 35U Maung Maung, Burmese Nationalist Movement, 1-18; Hanna, Eight Nation Makers, 21; and Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 90. 36Benjamin A. Batson, çSiam and Japan: The Perils of Independenceé, in Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, 273.

68 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 independence. He led the Nationalist Asian Nationalism. Knowledge of epoch- Movement of the Philippines for the making events in neighboring countries in seventeen years.37 The key political figures Asia, such as the events in China, India, engaged in the Nationalist Movement of and Japan also promoted nationalistic Burma both before and during the Second sentiments amongst the Southeast Asian World War were Dr. Ba Maw and Aung people.40 However, in comparing Phibun San, who headed a group of younger with his neighboring Asian Leaders, we radicals of the Thakin and the Anti-Fascist can see that one of the most prominent Peopleûs Freedom League (AFPFL).38 Sukarno factors was the Japanese influence. and Hatta rose to their own prominence The Japanese influence, according in the Nationalist Movement of Indonesia to Dr. Ba Mawûs memoirs, dominated the before and after the War.39 minds of most Southeast Asian nationalist leaders. It worked within the broad spectrum Nationalism and the Japanese of the radical mind throughout Southeast Influence Asia. In actual fact, it goes back to The spread of nationalism from the the most important event in recent Japanese European to the Rest of the World has Military History, its victory over Russia in probably been the most influential force 1905. It was the first victory in a very in the Twentieth-Century. Nationalism in long time by an Asian Country over a Southeast Asia was influenced by a number more powerful country. The impact of of factors, most notably that of Western that victory on the Asian subconscious education which had opened the minds never really died away. It was further of the Southeast Asian Leaders to the deepened by Japanûs subsequent rise as political ideas of the West, including self- a World Power that was capable of holding government. Also, economic dislocation its own against the Western militarily might and distress caused by Western Rule was, and its industrial strength. Japanûs victory indeed, crucial for the growth of Southeast over Russia was a historical break-through

37See Alfred W. McCoy, çQuezonûs Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine Authoritarianismé, in Philippine Colonial Democracy, ed. Ruby R. Paredes (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989), 116. 38David Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 279-280; Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma, 10-13; and Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 51-102. 39Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle, 211-224; and Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 90-94. 40D.R. Desai, Southeast Asia: Past & Present. (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 136-137.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 69 which gave all oppressed races new ments in Southeast Asia, namely in Burma dreams.41 and Indonesia.44 Whether one agrees with Dr. Ba Mawûs By contrast, the Japanese influence, argument or not, it cannot be denied particularly the Japanese victory in 1905, that the Japanese influence made a deep was less of the case in the Philippines. impression on the Burmese, Thai, and Having fought against the Spanish and Indonesian Leadersû dreams. These Leaders Americans between 1896-1902, the Phi- recognized that Japanûs Power could help lippines had made it clear that it preferred them achieve their major aim. Thai Leaders to rule itself. In addition, the Filipinos directed often looked on Japan as a model of their cultural and economic nationalism a successful Asian entity against the West.42 more against Japanese than towards the Moreover, Phibun viewed Japan as a big Spanish or the Americans. power that could support the Thai During the decades of American Rule, Government with both its Internal and some Filipinos reacted by admiring the International Policies and against the Western Japanese, inheritors of an ancient culture Powers.43 The Burmese and Indonesian and the leading Oriental Power. Pio Duran, Leaders also viewed the Japanese in this for example, argued that Filipinos should way. For them, the Japanese could help consider being assimilated by Japan.45 to overthrow the Western Colonial System Most educated Filipinos including Quezon, and to establish a new regime as well however, preferred to believe the contrary. as enhancing their own political power. They tended to seek a social life integrated The rise of Japan as the leading Asian with those whose Occidental Culture they Power in the World, therefore, was very shared. More importantly, when America much welcomed by them. In addition, had promised by Constitutional Develop- the idea of the Asian People being ment to evolve another Republic in the emancipated from European Colonialism Philippines, most Filipinos cooperated, and was influential to the Nationalistic Move- moderate constitutionalists replaced mili-

41Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 47. 42Batson, Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, 273. 43Charnvit Kasetsiri, çThe first Phibun Government and Its Involvement in World War IIé, Journal of the Siam Society, 62, 2 (July 1974): 56-62. 44See Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 51. 45Pio Duran, Philippine Independence and the Far Eastern. Question. (Manila: Community Publishers, 1935), 152, 164.

70 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 tary nationalists as her leaders.46 In this struggle, it was not surprising to Phibun and his neighboring Asian see that the influence of nationalism played Leaders were members of the çmiddle a major role in their political effort. Like classé and became the new elite, who his neighbors, Phibun was involved in politics possessed Western education and training. because he intended to solve the prob- As the new elite, either the çintelligentsiaé lems stemming from his concerns over or çmodernizingé, they were all ardent independence and the West. In the fight nationalists who led the respective na- to solve the National problems, Phibun tionalist movement in their countries. would eventually get engaged to the Nevertheless, although they appeared to Japanese because he recognized that have the same character and thoughts, Japanûs Power could help him achieve the new elite and nationalists did not look his goal. Phibunûs experience was similar to the emergence of Oriental Power with to that of the Leaders of Burma and the same view. While the Japanese in- Indonesia, where the Colonial Rulers had fluence made a deep impression on the no intention of granting independence, Burmese, Thai, and Indonesian Leaders, but it was rather different for Quezon in their counterparts in the Philippines still the Philippines, where American Policies cooperated with their Occidental Ruler had permitted the granting of Full Sov- and therefore maintained its loyalty to the ereignty. United States. The major factor that made Phibunûs involvement in politics began them different was their political expe- in Paris in 1927, where he became rience. acquainted with Pridi Phanomyong and a select group of students known as the Political Experience Peopleûs Party. The People Party declared Although Thailand was not colonized that if they were to attain power, then by Western Powers, the struggle of the they would establish absolute national in- Thai Leaders was no different from that dependence.47 After the overthrow of of the other Southeast Asian Nationalist the Absolute Monarchy in 1932, Phibun Leaders of the time. Thai Leaders, par- became disillusioned with the current political ticularly after the 1932 Revolution, had tried development of his Country. He first to eliminate Western influence and powers. became the Minister of Defence in 1934.

46Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946. (New Haven: Yale University, 1965), 37-39. 47See Reynolds, Thailand and Japanûs Southern Advance, 8-9.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 71 Later, in 1938, when Phahon became the tional issues.50 The real turning point in Leader of the People Party and when Thai - Japanese relations, came during the the second Premier at that time chose French Indochina War of 1940-1941, when to retire, Phibun became the third Premier the Thai Armed Forces were receiving to take Office after the 1932 Revolution supplies from Japan. Also during that period, and was to hold that post until the outbreak Japan had mediated in the Franco - Thai of the Second World War in Southeast Border Dispute and they were of course, Asia during 1941.48 heavily biased towards Phibunûs Govern- During this period, Japanûs impor- ment.51 tance to Thailand had increased steadily. Although the Thai success in the The Leaders of the 1932 Revolution, which French Indochina War was of great benefit included Phibun, hoped that eventually to the Phibun Government, the War had Japan, with its anti-Western attitudes, would a further effect on the future of Phibunûs help them to counter Western influence.49 Foreign Policy.52 The War was the first They were all for making use of Japan major incident that moved Thailand into as the political and economic lever with conflict with the West and it paved the which to use against the demands and way for future Thai co-operation with Japan. influences of the Western Powers in Thai- During the War, the Phibun Government land. had sent a number of Diplomatic Missions By 1938, Thailand already appeared to sound out international opinion. Both to be moving towards Japan and away Great Britain and the United States had from its traditional European regional mentors, made it clear that they preferred the Britain and France. This was reflected ùstatus quoû that was already in place in the consolidation of military rule and in Indochina. the adoption by Phibun, Leader of the In addition, the United States Go- Military, of a quasi-fascist authoritarian State, vernment had decided to block the delivery with a pro-Japanese stance on interna- of planes, which had been bought by

48Kasetsiri, çThe first Phibun Governmenté, 35. 49Kasetsiri, çThe first Phibun Governmenté, 56. 50Kobkua, Thailandûs Durable Premier, 245; and Batson, Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, 272- 276. 51See Kamon Pensrinokun, çAdaptation and Appeasement: Thai Relations with Japan and The Allies in World War IIé in Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective. Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds (ed.) (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1988), 136-150. 52See Santaputra, Thai Foreign Policy, 192-243.

72 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 the Phibun Government from an American Policies did not allow full sovereignty. The company and way-laid them in Manila British were proceeding at a ùsnailûs paceû prior to their delivery in Bangkok, due to with self-government. In 1937, Burma was the deteriorating situation in French separated from British Ruled India and its Indochina. Japan immediately offered the new Constitution formed the basis of the same number of planes to the Phibun Burmese Governmental Structure, with a Government.53 Thus, Phibun became Burmese Prime Minister and Cabinet. The convinced that there was nothing to be essentials of power, however, remained gained from any further association with firmly in the hands of the British Governor the West. The traditional Francophobic and with Westminster.56 When the Second attitude had broadened into a general World War began in 1939, it stimulated anti-Western feeling, which now included Burma, as in India, to demand that Britain America. should grant them immediate indepen- After the Indochina War, the Bangkok dence. The key political figures engaged - Tokyo Relationship improved immensely in the nationalist agitation of this period and Phibun began to give serious con- were Dr. Ba Maw and Aung San.57 sideration to the Japanese idea of çAsia Dr. Ba Maw and Aung San were for the Asiaticsé.54 In addition, to working involved in politics during intensifying Burmese with the Japanese, Phibun believed that nationalist campaigns. Dr. Ba Mawûs in- Thailand could stand as an independent volvement in politics began when he was and equal partner in overthrowing Western a leader of the parliamentary wing of domination in Southeast Asia.55 GCBA (Anti-Separation League).58 In 1932 Like Phibun, both Dr. Ba Maw and - while Phibun overthrew the absolute Aung San hoped that the Japanese could monarchical system in Thailand - Dr. Ba help them to achieve their goals. The Maw won a landslide victory in the 1932 Burmese Nationalist Movement moved closer Elections. When he became Minister of to the Japanese influence because British Education and Public Health in 1936, he

53Santaputra, Thai Foreign Policy, 192-243; Kasetsiri, çThe first Phibun Governmenté, 50-51; and James V. Martin, Jr., çThai-American Relations in World War IIé, The Journal of Asian Studies, XXII, (August, 1963): 454-455. 54Kasetsiri, çThe first Phibun Governmenté, 56. 55Ibid., 58. 56Cady, Southeast Asia. 518-520. 57Ibid., 520-526. 58Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 436.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 73 formed and led the Sinyetha Wunthanu politicians. Dr. Ba Maw was the President Party (Poor Manûs Party).59 In 1936, Dr. of the Bloc and Sung San was the General Ba Maw won the General Elections and Secretary. The message of Freedom Bloc formed a Coalition - made up of minor to the Nation was that the people would parties, minority leaders, and defectors support the British War Effort only if they from other parties - to lead the first were promised independence at the end Government of separated Burma.60 Be- of the War. If the British Government tween 1937 - 1939, while he was Prime was not prepared to make such a Minister, Dr. Ba Maw formed and led the declaration, then the people should oppose Freedom Bloc together with Aung San. the war effort strenuously.63 The British Aung Sanûs political involvement began authorities responded by making large- when he was a student at Rangoon scale arrests of the nationalists. By the University. The 1936 Strike, which was an end of 1940, many of the Thakin leaders, important landmark in the political de- including Dr. Ba Maw, who had refused velopment of the young nationalists, made to co-operate with British Policies in any Aung San widely known as a student way, were sent to prison.64 leader.61 In 1938 he left university to At the same time that Dr. Ba Maw become a member of the çOur Burma was imprisoned, Aung San went under- Partyé (the Dobbama Asi-Ayone) of Thakins ground and slipped out of the country (Our Own Master), the only militant and to search for supporters to provide aid intensely nationalistic political party in the in Burmaûs struggle for independence. He Country at the time. He was soon elected went to Amoy in China and stayed there General Secretary of the Party.62 for two months, during this time Japanese In 1939, after the outbreak of the agents came and arranged for him to War in Europe, Aung San helped found go to Tokyo.65 After staying in Tokyo the Freedom Bloc, an alliance of Dr. Ba for about three months, Aung San returned Mawûs Sinyetha Party, the Dohbama Asi- to Burma early in 1941 to convey the Ayone, the students, and some individual plans given him by the Japanese to his

59Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 436; Steinberg, Burma, 31. 60Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, 279-280. 61Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma, 10. 62Maung Maung, Aung San of Burma, 4. 63Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma, 13; and see Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 51-102. 64See Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 218-228. 65Maung Maung, Aung San of Burma, 4.

74 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 friends, çthe Thirty Comradesé. He went crushed as a political force following its back to Tokyo soon thereafter, taking with abortive revolts.69 In an alarmed reaction him the first group of young men to be to what was seen as the threat of com- given military training by the Japanese munism and political extremism, the Dutch for the purpose of leading an uprising sent key nationalist figures into internal exile in Burma.66 in the late 1920s and early 1930s; among Similar to Phibun, Sukarno and Hatta these figures were those who were to also hoped that the Japanese could help become the leaders of the Indonesian them achieve their major aim. The In- nationalist movement: Sukarno, Hatta, and donesian Nationalist Movement moved closer Sutan Sjahrir.70 to the Japanese influence because Dutch Sukarno and Hatta, like the Burmese Policies had no intention of granting Leaders, were involved in politics during independence to their territories.67 In the the intensifying nationalist campaigns. 1920s and 1930s the Dutch provided little Sukarno and Hattaûs involvement in politics leeway for the development of an In- began when they were university students. donesian nationalist movement that could Sukarno had his role in Bandung whereas bargain for political concessions and Hatta had his in Holland. While Hatta increased representation in the manner was a student of Economics and President of the Burmese nationalists. Although the of the Indonesian Students Association, he consultative powers of the Volksraad also rose to prominence in the nationalist (Peopleûs Council), set up in 1918, were movement abroad at the same time that minimally expanded in the ensuing years, Sukarno was rising to prominence in in the end it could not satisfy Indonesian Indonesia.71 In 1927, the Partai National aspirations.68 The first mass nationalist Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) or movement, the Sarekat Islam, split-up in PNI was established by the members of the early 1920s; then between 1926 - 1927, the Bandung Study Club under the the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was chairmanship of the young engineer,

66See Calvocoressi, Peter., Wint. Guy., and Pritchard, John., Total War. Volume 2. Revised second edition. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 1000-1002. 67See Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against The West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 33-49. 68Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, 34-37. 69Ibid., 37. 70Ibid., 38-42. 71Hanna, Eight Nation Makers, 21.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 75 Sukarno. The PNIûs aim was for complete Sukarno and Hatta, like the Burmese economic and political independence for Nationalists Leaders, felt hopeless in their Indonesia, with a Government elected by, struggle for independence and their attempt and responsible to, the Indonesian people. to find foreign aid. Indonesian nationalists Such independence could only be reached, looked up to Quezon and, when he visited it held, by total non-compliance with the Java in 1934, they asked how to go about Dutch.72 In 1932, Hatta returned home gaining independence. Quezon said çOpen and became involved with Sukarno in the all these windows and shutters, then take nationalistic cause.73 away your guards. Hold your meetings Sukarno was arrested twice; the first in the open, and in front of the Dutch time in 1927 and then in 1933. The Dutch themselves...make a hell of a lot of noise! also arrested Hatta and hundred of others, And if you do that long enough, youûll including Sjahrir in 1933. After that, the eventually get what you wanté.76 What Dutch consigned Sukarno and Hatta into the Indonesians replied or thought was exile. Sukarno was sent to Endah and not recorded. Sukarno had made a hell then to Sumatra, to the town of Bengkulu of a lot of noise and the Dutch banished or Benculin, where he was confined until him to Flores.77 For these Indonesian released by the Japanese in 1942.74 Hatta Nationalist Leaders, therefore, it seems that and Sjagrir, along with numerous others, they were çwaiting for Japané.78 Sukarno, were sent to Boven Digul and were later who had already declared in 1929 that relocated to Banda Neira, one of the the Pacific War would hasten the coming original çspice islandsé of the Moluccas, of freedom, looked forward to the outbreak where they were confined until their release of the Pacific War by saying that Indo- just before the Japanese invaded in early nesian çwould receive help from other 1942.75 Asian peoplesé.79

72Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 90. 73Hanna, Eight Nation Makers, 21. 74Ibid., 30. 75Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 93-94. 76Carlos Quirino, Quezon: Man of Destiny. (Manila: McCullough, 1935), 35-36, cited in Friend, Between Two Empires, 170; Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, 53. 77Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, 53. 78See Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle, 211-224. 79Ibid., 216.

76 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 Unlike Phibun and other nationalist Quezonûs political career that had Asian leaders, Quezon did not need the run for twenty-eight years, where he had Japanese help to achieve the major aim. held the foremost electoral positions that The Philippine Nationalist Movement did his Country could offer (Senate President not move closer to the Japanese influence and President of the Commonwealth) during because American Policies had been the crucial years of the movement for initiated to develop self-government and national independence. He started out permit Filipinos to gain their independence. as a Provincial Fiscal in Mindoro and When the Americans completed their Tayabas (1903), Provincial Governor in takeover of the Philippines in 1901, they Tayabas (1905), and an Assemblyman (1907). decided to promote Filipino political His close relationship with some of the participation towards the distant goal of most influential Americans in his area - self-government. President William McKinley, Philippine Constabulary Chiefs H.H. Bandholtz in 1900, asserted that the goal of US Policy and James Harbord, Judge Paul Linebarger in the Philippines was to guide the Filipinos and James Ross - were a major factor to self-government.80 Following this man- in his rise to prominence. From the Assembly, date, the first Civil Governor, William Howard Quezon went on to become Resident Taft, launched a program which high- Commissioner in Washington, D.C. (1909 - lighted: mass education; expansion of health 1916), returning to the Philippine political services; expansion of the civil bureaucracy scene in 1916 as Senate President until based on native participation; and Filipino 1934, then becoming the first President political participation, beginning with local of the Commonwealth (1935 - 1944), a elections.81 At this political level, it allowed position he held even during the tenure Quezon to emerge as a major political of the Government-in-Exile in Washington figure, who had led the nationalist movement until he died in 1944.82 and obtained the independence by During his political career, Quezon peaceful means, by persistently and was one of the longest and the most continuously pleading his cause in the halls successful leading advocates for national of the U.S. Congress and the White House. independence. The route to indepen-

80Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom (ed.), The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance. (Quezon City: Ken Incorporated, 1987), 40. 81Ibid., 43-44. 82See Cullinane, Reappraising an Empire, 59-84; McCoy, Philippine Colonial Democracy, 114-156.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 77 dence advanced step by step in the early Quezon.86 On April 1, 1941, Quezon created 1930s.83 Following the Tydings-McDuffie the Civilian Emergency Administration (CEA) Act of 1934, a self-governing Filipino Go- to prepare Civil Defense Plans for the vernment - the Philippine Commonwealth Country. Later in the month, an Alien - and Head of State had been installed, Registration Law was passed, primarily to even though the Americans still retained check on overseas Japanese.87 During the ultimate sovereignty. They, however, this period, Quezon frequently reiterated agreed on a timetable for the transition that the Philippines would fight with the to full Independence by 1946.84 United States against Japan: çAt stake This timetable, made the Philippine is our own future independence and the Nationalist Movement entirely different from assurance that independence may that of Burma and Indonesia. The Filipinos endure.é88 Not surprisingly, Quezon de- did not need any help from the Japanese. cided to leave and set up the Govern- Instead Japan appeared as a threat to ment-in-Exile in America when the Pacific the success of the post-independence War arrived.89 Republic of the Philippines.85 In this sense, Prior to the Pacific War, Phibun and Quezon still cooperated with Americans his neighboring Asian Leaders intended to and prepared to defend itself against the solve problems stemming from their concerns Japanese attack when Japan Imperialism over independence and Western Powers, became more menacing throughout the and learned how to deal with both the later 1930s. In 1935, Quezon asked Douglas Western and Japanese in order to maintain MacArthur to come to the Philippines to and obtain their goals. Phibun intended develop a Military Plan to make the Islands to co-operate with Japan because he secure. MacArthur was appointed Military learned that only by collaboration with Adviser to the Commonwealth Govern- them could Thailand stand as an inde- ment and was basically responsible to pendent and equal partner in overthrowing

83See Friend, Between Two Empires, 95-108. 84Ibid., 136-148. 85See David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War. (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1967), 22-25; and Friend, Between Two Empires, 169-183. 86Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, 20-21. 87Ibid., 25. 88Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), 354- 355. 89See Manuel Quezon, The Good Fight. (New York: Appleton-Century & Co., 1946).

78 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 the Western domination of Southeast Asia. munal group they were leading.90 The Phibunûs alternative was similar to that of ways that Phibun and his neighboring Asian the Leaders in Burma and Indonesia, where Leaders tried to deal with Japan were nationalists felt hopeless in their struggle not too different from one another. They for independence, unlike Quezon in the manipulated the Japanese skillfully to further Philippines, where the Japanese appeared their own political ends and in a manner as a threat to the success of a full that left the Japanese Military confused sovereignty. When the War arrived, Phibunûs or vengeful but rarely in command of choice was clear. Like his neighbors, the situation. there was also resistance, Phibun wanted to reach his Countryûs within their co-operation. major aim - Independence - so he chose Although the emergence of Japan to co-operate with the Japanese. Quezon, afforded Thailand an opportunity to satisfy on the other hand, had learned that by the political needs of the Leaders of the working with the Americans that they would 1932 Revolution on the one hand and allow the Philippines to gain her own to serve national interests on the other, independence. it would be an exaggeration to say that Phibun was ready to join Japan before Co-operation with Japan the Pacific War started. Unlike Burmese When the Pacific War broke out in Leaders, Phibun decided to co-operate 1941, Phibun chose to collaborate with with Japan only when the Nation was the Japanese rather than to resist them invaded and there was no prospect of because it offered the survival of their help from the Western Powers, especially interests, peoples, and Nations. The same from Great Britain.91 situation prevailed in both Burma and When Japan invaded Thailand on Indonesia, though not in the Philippines. December 8, 1941, Phibun let the Japa- In the two former countries, the leaders nese Forces pass through his Country to first attempted to assure their own political attack Burma and Malay. After that, he survival and then to advance the cause decided to collaborate with Japan by of whatever national, factional or com- signing a Treaty of Friendship and Military

90I apply this idea from McCoyûs analysis, see McCoy, Alfred W., çIntroductioné, in Alfred W. McCoy, ed., Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation, 5. 91See Kamon, Thai-Japanese Relations, 130-150; and Richard Aldrich, çA Question of Expediency: Britain, the United States and Thailand, 1941-1942é, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XIX, No.2 (September 1988): 209-244.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 79 Co-operation and subsequently declared following the attack on Pearl Harbor.94 war on the United States and Great Britain.92 Phibun now had a free hand to pursue This was the first step that Phibun tried his policy toward the cause of Nation. to assure his political survival. For instance, To advance the cause of Nation, Phibun argued that Thailand had to Phibun had tried to accomplish several co-operate with Japan militarily in order objectives. One of them was to continue to prevent the latter from occupying the territorial expansion, which he carried out Country.93 Conversely, a failure to co- during the second stage of his goal of operate with Japan would turn Thailand reclaiming çlost territoryé. In May 1942, into an Occupied Territory, something Phibun Thai troops marched into the Shan States had been working hard to avoid from and occupied the area around Keng Tung the early stages of the War. It cannot in northeastern Burma. This acquisition of be denied that this military co-operation the çUnited Shan Statesé or çOriginal Thai was, to Phibun, the best possible way Statesé was confirmed by a Treaty with to save the Nation, as well as to strengthen Japan in August 1943, at which time the the political power base of his Faction, Japanese also turned over to Thai Ad- a Military Group within the Peopleûs Party. ministration: Perlis, Kedah, Trengganu, and On the strength of the Military Pact Kelantan - the four Malay States that King with the Japanese, Phibun could advance Chulalongkorn had transferred to Britain the cause of his faction and Nation. By in 1909.95 manipulating anti-Japanese attitudes, he It should be noted that Phibunûs could eliminate the Civilian Faction from Policy to deal with the Japanese was his Cabinet. Pridi, the Leader of the Civi- not only a line of co-operation but also lians, was appointed a Member of the a line of resistance. The broad policy Board of Regents, essentially a non-political line of the Nation was well summarized function. Three other leading Civilian by Phibun when speaking to his Chief Ministers, Direck Chainam, Thawee Bunyaket, of Staff in 1942: çWhich side do you think and Khuang Aphaiwong, were also elimi- will be defeated in this war? That side nated from the Cabinet within two weeks is our enemyé.96 In this sense, Phibun

92On December 21, 1941, a military pact was signed with Tokyo. On January 25, 1942, the Thai government declared war on the United States and Great Britain. 93Kobkua, Thailandûs Durable Premier, 252-254. 94Kasetsiri, çThe first Phibun Governmenté, 54-55. 95Wyatt, David K., Thailand: A Short History. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 258. 96Net Khemayothin, The Underground Work of Colonel Yothi. (Bangkok, 1957), 1.

80 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 was also prepared for resisting Japan when with the elected Assemblymen, disagreed the time came. As the war situation with Phibunûs plan. His Government was changed, Phibun himself made some efforts replaced by a more pro-Allied one, which for the anti-Japanese underground, which conducted intense maneuvering to repair was in contact with China. He also Thailandûs relationship with the Allies, while planned to improve the roads leading to maintaining its relationship with Japan.100 the northwest to allow ready communi- Burmese Leaders, unlike Thai Leaders, cation with the Thai Forces in the Chiang had already co-operated with the Japa- Mai area and the Shan region. It was nese before the War began. As we have in this direction that he anticipated linking seen, Aung San had joined the Japanese up with the Nationalist Chinese in February Training Program in early 1941. When 1943 for joint operations against the Japa- the War started, Aung San worked with nese.97 Colonel Suzuki in Bangkok to establish the In 1943, Phibun also undertook a Burma Independence Army (BIA) and to crash project to relocate the National prepare for the Japanese invasion of Capital to Phetchabun, some 300 kilome- Burma.101 While Dr. Ba Maw was waiting ters north of Bangkok. In his Phetchabun for the Japanese arrival, Aung San and Strategy, Phibun wanted to relocate his the BIA left Bangkok to march into Burma Military Headquarters to a more secure on December 31 1941. After Japanûs location and await the right moment to Occupation of Rangoon in March 1942, turn against the Japanese.98 However, Dr. Ba Maw escaped from the Moukout his project was denied and his Regime Jail and contacted the Japanese in May. fell in 1944 because of an internal political On August 1, 1942, the Burmese Executive conflict, particularly between his Faction Central Administration, an Occupation and that of Pridiûs.99 Many civilian factions, Government, was set up in Rangoon with including Pridi - the Leader of the Dr. Ba Maw as Premier.102 Underground Free Thai Movement, together

97Reynolds, Thailand and Japanûs Southern Advance, 171-172. 98Ibid, 171. 99See Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, The Free Thai Movement and Thailandûs Internal Political Conflicts (1938- 1949). (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1991). 100Batson, Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation, 282-283. 101Becka, Jan., The National Liberation Movement in Burma during the Japanese Occupation Period (1941- 1945). (Prague: the Oriental Institute in Academia, 1983), 74-75. 102Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma, 228-250.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 81 Like Phibun, Dr. Ba Maw and Aung President.106 This Party was the only legal San tried to strengthen their political power party at that time and continued its major and advance their national goal of role in Burmese politics during the Oc- independence during the Occupation. To cupation. After Burmese Independence strengthen their own political power, they was proclaimed in 1943, Dr. Ba Maw attempted to enhance their political power launched a new political party known as base. Aung San emphasized that the the Greater Burma Party to displace the Burmese National Liberation Movement Dou Bama-Hsinyetha Coalition. The pro- should rely on its own strength; he thought fessed task of this new party was to that the most important task was to build contribute to a closer unity of the nationalist up strong National Armed Forces.103 Thus, ranks and to more effectively mobilize the he concentrated on strengthening and people for the construction of the çNew disciplining the Army.104 Aung San, as Orderé and the Prosecution of the War.107 the Commander in Chief of the BIA, and On August 1, 1943, Burmese Inde- some Thakins tried to maintain and advance pendence was proclaimed. The Japanese their positions in Army, the Burma Defence declared Burma to be an Independent Army (BDA). After Burmese Independence and Sovereign State, promulgated the new was proclaimed in 1943, the BDA was Constitution, and formally announced the reorganized and renamed Burma National election of Dr. Ba Maw as Head of State. Army (BNA). Another Thakin, Nei Win became The Head of State also held the Office the new Commander in Chief of the BNA, of the Prime Minister. Some Thakins were after Aung San had taken the post of also Members of the Cabinet: Aung San Defence Minister.105 - Minister of National Defence; U Nu - Dr. Ba Maw first established his political Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the power base and party in November 1942, majority of the posts in the Government when he managed to combine the two of Independent Burma were held by the main organizations of the defunct Freedom Dou Bama-Hsinyetha Coalition, similarly to Bloc into a single party - a coalition called the Burmese Central Executive Administra- the Dou Bama-Hsinyetha, with himself as tion of 1942.108

103Becka, The National Liberation Movement, 105. 104Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma, 22. 105Becka, The National Liberation Movement, 116-118. 106Ibid., 104. 107Ibid., 133. 108Cady, Southeast Asia, 576.

82 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 The Burmese Leadersû Policy to deal quickly overran South Sumatra. Early on with the Japanese was not merely a line March 1, they landed on Java and within of co-operation but a line of resistance 8 days the Dutch forces surrendered on as well, like that of Phibunûs. After In- behalf of all the Allied Forces in Java. dependence was proclaimed, it soon On March 17, 1942, Sukarno was invited became clear that the independence was to meet Colonel Fujiyama, the Sumatran only nominal. While Dr. Ba Maw remained Commander. Sukarno decided to accept in the role of collaborator, Aung San was Fujiyamaûs offer without any real hesita- in favor of launching the anti-Japanese tion.110 Sukarno believed that Indonesian resistance movement by co-operating with Independence could be achieved in some the Allies. In July, 1944, Aung San tried way or other through the Japanese to combine the major anti-Japanese Occupation.111 Sukarno quickly contacted movements, the Communist Party of Burma, Hatta, Sjahrir, and some nationalists in the Peopleûs Revolutionary Party, and the Java. They agreed with Sukarnoûs decision Young Army Resistance Group, establishing and discussed future plans to deal with a United Anti-Fascist Movement, finally known the Japanese.112 as Anti-Fascist Peopleûs Freedom League The Indonesian Leadersû decision to (AFPFL). Aung San was elected the President co-operate with the Japanese was no of this League. The AFPFL contacted the different from that of the Thai and Burmese British Army while still co-operating with Leaders. Sukarno and Hatta viewed the the Japanese. By obtaining weapons from Occupation as offering many opportunities both sides, the AFPFL brought its resistance to strengthen their political power and out into the open in March 1945 and advance their national goals. After their continued its fight until the Japanese decision to collaborate with the invader, surrendered.109 Sukarno and Hatta became the Leaders The Indonesian Leaders, also like of the Indonesian Puppet Administration. Phibun, decided to co-operate with Japan Working with the Japanese, Sukarno and when the Japanese arrived. On February Hatta attempted to focus and mobilize 14, 1942, the Japanese attacked and mass movement to gain support for their

109See Becka, The National Liberation Movement, 166-174; and Robert H. Taylor, çBurma in the Anti-Fascist Waré, in Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, 169-174. 110Legge, Sukarno, 151-152. 111Ibid., 149. 112Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 104-105.

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 83 political power and national goals.113 using whatever opportunities that were To Sukarno and Hatta the best way offered for keeping the nationalist hopes of gaining mass support was to awaken, alive. Sjahrir would work to develop an focus and mobilize the nationalistic fever. underground network capable of orga- For this reason, they created the Putera nizing resistance against the Japanese Movement. On March 9, 1943, Sukarno Authorities. He would listen to the Allied began this movement, the Poesat Tenaga radio stations and maintain contact with Rakjat (Center of Peopleûs Power), Putera Sukarno and Hatta, informing them of the or Poetera as it came to be known.114 Undergroundûs development and helping For the Japanese, the Putera was primarily them to develop their own strategy.116 a means for rallying Indonesian support Nevertheless, Sukarno avoided any active behind their War Effort. But to Indonesian resistance until the Japanese surrendered.117 Nationalist Leaders, it was primarily the When the Pacific War broke out in means for spreading and intensifying na- 1941, Phibun and his neighboring Asian tionalistic ideas among the masses and Leaders chose to collaborate with the focusing on concessions from the Japa- Japanese because they thought that only nese, that would lead towards self-gov- in this way could they survive and advance ernment.115 Certainly, it did arouse In- the case of their political power, factions, donesian nationalism and advanced their and Nations. During the War, they cause towards Independence. manipulated the Japanese adroitly to further The Indonesian Leadersû policy to their own political ends. It cannot be deal with the Japanese, like that of the denied that the co-operation with Japan Thai and Burmese Leaders, was both visible was, to Phibun and the Burmese and and invisible. Sukarno and Hatta were Indonesian Leaders, the best means to to work above ground through the save their Countries and to strengthen their Japanese. They would hold Office under personal, political, and National goals. In the Military Administration, serving the addition, it can be seen that although Japanese and softening the harshness of these Leaders accomplished progress their Rule wherever possible, and also by towards their own personal and political

113See Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle, 229-231. 114Ibid., 106. 115Ibid., 107. 116Ibid., 104; Legge, Sukarno, 154. 117See Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, 176-177.

84 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550 agendas, they also accomplished a of the reasons that Phibun resorted to nationalistic mission. In this sense, we can during the War were in the main, the see that the Southeast Asian collaborators only avenue open to Southeast Asian were nationalists, who were more con- Leaders, we can see why Phibun at- cerned with maintaining and/or achieving tempted to deal with both the Western their own cause rather than helping the and Japanese Powers and why it occurred Japanese expansionists, unlike those of the in a similar way to that of most of his Nazis in Europe. As the War situation neighboring Asian Leaders, the exception turned in favor of the Allies, they swapped being the Leader of the Philippines. sides, without jeopardizing their political As a local Nationalist Leader, Phibun integrity because they had learned how joined forces with Japan because they to live with World Politics. Both Phibun had a common enemy, namely the Western and Aung San illustrated this point. Powers. When the Pacific War arrived, he chose to co-operate with the Japa- Conclusion nese. Like the Burmese and Indonesian There is no question that under Phibun, Leaders, Phibun thought that only in this the Government made a serious attempt way could he save his interests, people, to fashion a State into the model of a and Nation as well as advancing the world-conquering totalitarian nation. Fascist cause of his Faction and Country. Due ideals and methods were liberally bor- to its Independence status during the War, rowed. But the Thailand of 1938-1944 Thailand was the Country least affected was but a pale reflection of its Nazi, Fascist, by the direct impact of the War and and Japanese counterparts. It is thus the Japanese Military action. The en- a mistake to liken Phibun with Hitler, Mussolini, trenched Thai elite survived the War and the Japanese Military because they unscathed and with only minor adjustments played a different role. Phibun actions made to the Governmental Personnel. showed how to live with World Politics Phibunûs actions during the War did in a Southeast Asia context. not damage his reputation or influence Phibunûs action during the Pacific greatly. Although his Government fell, War, therefore, needs reassessment. To Phibun was still the obvious Leader of better understand his behavior and role the Thai Nation. After the War and as during the War, we should consider him a result of British pressure, Phibun along as a member of the new elite and local with some other Political Leaders, were Nationalist Leader in comparison to the arrested and charged with War Crimes. other Leaders of this Region. Because But in 1946, the Thai Supreme Court ruled

¿“Õ“®“√¬å à«π°“√»÷°…“ ‚√ß‡√’¬ππ“¬√âÕ¬æ√–®ÿ≈®Õ¡‡°≈â“ 85 that the 1945 War Criminal Acts were example, collaboration was often the only unconstitutional, and the collaboration alternative against the Western Powers. In charges were dropped. In 1948 Phibun addition, collaboration offered the only once again became the Prime Minister opportunity to arouse the populationûs fever and dominated Thai Politics until 1957. and to build a United Front, as well as To most local Nationalist Leaders in to strengthen native political power. In Southeast Asia, it seemed that collabo- this sense, it may be worthwhile to compare ration was the best way with which they Phibun with the rest of Southeast Asian could achieve progress towards their own Leaders, especially the Malaysian and personal, political, and national goals. For Vietnamese.

86 «“√ “√∑“ß«‘™“°“√ æ.». 2550