IVV\

IVV\ 1~ 198 3OadwaY N oh N.Y. 106738 a(212) 962-121.0 iov."Ii 'n (1 President .binFand. Presidenlt I is I xccalv. Director lrIx'dia.uents to the Implementation of the Unri te ILi nPIT'n for Nmni bia Presented to: The Unitey i Nations Council for tNamibia Semiror o n Fl forts to implement, the United i.ation.; Plan for- tho Independence of Namiibia Septeiiiber ( 1 1 T'oronto, I! tf;: If 11 I, J, ''i, I I iiml i!id, 1" "163 -1 lobhOw, III (. A)',i a Fwld. 1966

Q. j~A Ai rits to0 t1h0 Irapi r-.'rt iofl of tWe UiteII d Hatim Man~ H 111r NwAribi a A Sury f'< cih PcA),- I iiparel ',, ' 11 1 ii' J(,n (PU' lott ee on Africa for the Wid lNatjeo..i', Cotii for NiamiiiL o.~ 1 n Eff ris to Implement the Unitod 1 Ai'.ew3 hzvao. rii thi. th 0~q~ of iiU'ibi 011 soon win tkd(i :i .pn Jenco. illitary rw r fla ccine Anr g ola ari 2ICuban force,, has orced ' ot PAt i o to 'e . o fr(,n so'.trii o Ail o. So uth Africa, Laced 1 with ph rgintrr~ :~ct~ ~ is f ' iig ei iigceoricciic as t roweiit of' its cc n; oii Namiin ami Lr'owr au in the territory as a mmlt of' 15A10's p iltical anJ iilita r y rWliiy'Iion of' the Namilbian preo_. P t , ' Im no n ai nbc P of'ei 'ini t IP panA appearen toL be on the verge of pulling aut of' Nam~i" In 1978 [, 1 )o1 andi 19P4 U.S. le ;.otiaLions yr re r'pe[Ki y Mus to maching ri sett' ( -nr i t would include H PU . il ltatiol riOf Lii. itc~ I I I I s Sc cci 11 omi ii Iwolution 435t. ANwi tin mWirr 'finca D .1ked iiih I n ii i~e. Al i oc'carsion, the tlUsct ii va; did riot havee thspi it i il I to exert oufflaP ut pressure on Pretoria oa settlIci, l ,,, 1h_ 1 .i~ ii I O to the iiiuplemnt ation of' the United Nations a dn WH.a 'Ir I o's wilitary leadecrs still pref'er to defend urti on t th' e ' 1 A Inbordecr, rn h r thai the Orange River., " i r Icrawi''iw N7lb-ia wounldi ,-appowrt for Sont P Africa' nlv Ads NOW m! nom I*iflicnit. Fi iiiil. , iree does riot appear i l o a r ].n twile RN hAiir n goe'r c-mr nt thalt uctol I be pirepa~red to acc -'I enrol in. rx: iii ~ l" lr.c',1K i'ii a hov . i e j ;'rr'i ion rric and pcilitic' Ii~~~~~~ iexe'ii i i iir pci 'i writ econiomic arid olii ii mnii i . 'lkn lh: IWILA W '.' Wmcri Wit in ;stc-rce ol -supporto for Jnii,, 1:1 r NK W. in.1i' Angol rml 'Ii m Aar Wile IEcagan t: idH A t rak 'n p i mk Is fr ne ijatJi betweenu tie HL/ an I Ti'A i cti I i. i :" 1,iri k,I11' ';0Lth Al ic i I I w'ii werv t 'o will Iri w Iim NiJamibia. But that wtiria wim Ie iirii 1 is m; irt mi of' snot ained r'~sw:e eori the Nanibiari ec';dv Icm*2iiz I n Iii r ilu i miit 1arily by IWAI . Comipirehenisi ve c. 000 1Rii Lo i by tiO I. or', llI1 sCould also conitrib ute significantly to tire e'oi ,ott A! i~ to w it ildraw Amo OANib. Pir'aoria dc,2; io t yo, aP, cr ar to be under' sufficclent pressure to force a r' :ifran WOWU gi v. lie whit e rilnorit y loverruentl: other millitan'y )I J"jiticai nl ~~ Norl Iicless, tin pe~ople of Western nations have force~d line norur K tou anwwo 'Isi Iiant sanctionis against South Afr icn. anrrL1trie Ms col pay a mor 'conatr'uctivec r'ole in supporting the ci '' fa P K ' iiNornbin veforcr'gconipr'ehensive sanctions Ji tSonth Afrc

The current round of negotiations between South Africa, , and the United States have raised hopes both inside and internationally that cenuine indepen ence m iy soon be a reality. Military pressure onl South Afric e appears to have forced a withdrawal from Angol aind the rising costs of tre war combined with a cNanging i ntlllt ~io a] situation are factors that seem to make a settlement more likely. However, this is not the first time that Namibia has appeared to be on the brink of achieving its indepedance. * The proposal that the U.S., Britain, , Germany and Canada put forward in 1978 (which late!r became the basis for UN Security Council Resolution 1435) called for independence in Namibia "by 31 December 1978 at latest." (This proposal and problems arising from Resolution 135 are beyor the scope of this paper.) On moving to the State Department in 1981, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker confidently declared that Namibia would be independent "in 18 months." * In early 184 Angola and South Africa signed a ceasefire and S, )uth African troopLs withdrew to the Namibian border. At that time the U.S. establiLi('I an office in Windhoek to monitor the ceasefire, and talks between South Africa and SWAPO on the implementation of -Ht 1435 began in Lu-,Laks, . In each case the South African government raised technical objections, simply pulled out of the negotiations or went ahead unilaterally with political or military maneuvers designed to scuttle the initiit Lvc,. And at each point the Western nations -- inlciuding both the Carter ;uid Reagan administrations -- did not have sufficient political will or interest to pressure South Africa into accepting a settlement. Rather, Western nations seemed to incorporate South African objections into their own proposals and raise further impedinnts to a settlement. But both the internal situation and ile international situation have changed since 198r1. The South Africanst desire to negotiate a ceasefire and withdrawal from Angola is clearly a result of pressure from the offensive of combined Angolan, Cuban atd SWAPO forces fighting this spring in southern Angola.The cXrumitment of additional Cuban troops to the defense of Cuito Cuanavale and .i,proveriients in FAPITA's military power were reportedly particularly imiportairt in forcilngj a South African withdrawal. (There were some reports that South African troops were trapped in positions around ,> . iio Ci anavle -forc'i n1 Pretoria to negoti ate a eea:;.efire just. to ,:uhre hir ttrooj1s sNC-e- Ot Urn to Namihbia.) rIrprovererints iii Angola's air force have also been particularly rtportant in altering ihe military balance in the region. The Anolan airforce s - port2dly shot down at least two of South Africa's twelve Cheetah jet fighters and South Africa, faced with the 1977 United Nations arrs embargo, cannot afford to lose more jet fighters it cannot replace. Even the introduction this August of the Cheetah-E jet fighter which reportedly can outperform the MIG-23 aircraft the Angolans are currently flying, seems unlikely to seriously alter the new military balance as Pretoria's air force clearly does not have the capability to produce these fighters in large numbers. The rising white (asualty rate in the war in southern Angola has also begun to have domestic political repercussions back at home. The refusal of more than a hundred young conscripts to serve in the South African Defence Force earlier this year was ample evidence of this as are the gTrowing crl les from influential progovernment church and mn.,ia offjci (2 c l liti for a reassestent of troop deployirients i t A lnlcd a. An editl'ril Ii t e official jou1rnal of' the Dutch Reformed Church, Die KerkLde raised the question: "We have to ask ourselves if it, is, any longer, right for South African soldiers to be in Angola."' Added to these calculations is the rising economiJc cost of the war, in Angola and the continuing occupation of' Namiibia, particularly for an economy facing mounting international sanctions. The war in Angola reportedly costs more than $1 million a day and Foreign Minister Pik Botha has claimed that Pretoria has spent almost $2 billion in Namribia since 1966-, half of that sum spent over the past four years. Finally and perhaps most critically, South Africa has been unable to create an internal, anti-SWAPO alliance inside Namibia that could pose a significant altemnative to the liberation movement in a post-independance Nam'ibia. The growth of pro-SIAPO trade unions, student organizations and community groups that draw huge crowds to rallies throughout the country has compounded the pressure on the government. In addition, SWAPO's military wing, PLAN, reported to have significantly stepped up its attacks on South African forces irm nortierrn Namibiao These rising military and econconic costs are almost certainly what propelled South Africa's rulers to negotiate a speedy i:ithdrawal from Angelsj. The question now is whether, after seventy 3 years, the government in Pretoria faces strong enough pressures to force its withdrawal from Namibia and acceptance of internationally supervised elections under the U1 plan. Still Strong Impediments to a Settlement Although there are new pressures on the South African government, there appear to be substantial impediments to any international settlement in liamibia. Thce government in Pretoria and its Administrator General in Namibia, in fact, have recently been raising objections and conditions that sounA remarkably similar to statements that blocked earlier settlemnts. In a speech to the 1r1aional Party Congress in Durban in midAugust, South Afrienn State President. P.W. Botha said that before the United Nations pl n could be implcmenttnd the UN must convince Pretoria that it would be impartial in supervising the process. Botha also sun ,gest ed that Pretoria might demand that the a i nt~:lit.i n corn:. iii ,i y gr -(. to pay South A f rica $.1.8 billion, a : 1 li torLi ; :y it. 1i n, i pumjlcd inl -) Namibia ,;jrice 1966. Finally, iIha sk.ed, wUil i u i:; would take over and guarantee the more than $300 million worth of' loans South Africa has taken out internationally to shore up the battered Namibian economy? Officials of SWAFO have rejected outright any suggestion that Pretoria should be reconipensed for the costs it has incurred during the illegal occupation of Namibia. But South Africa is certain to raise the demand of finacial guarantees as negotiations proceed and this may provide a pretext for balking at the implementation of SCR 435.

As the pace C)I r! .;Ctintions has quickemsed so to has the volume of objections and conditions imposed by Pretoria. South Africa's colonial governor iii Ifai:Jbia, Administ rator General , suggested in early Aucust that he would continue to push for segregated, or "ethnic" elections in th territory before the UN plan could be imp]emente d. In addition, PMennar suggested according to press reports that guarantees to protoct "democracy, private enterprise and the first-world community in the territory" would be needed before the UNI 1'ian could be implemented. The main impedivents, however, are the same factors that have led South Africa to kl k at withdrawing from Namibia for the last 70 years. Do South Africa's military leaders -- and particularly the State Security Council -- believe they can defend South Africa as effectiveiy from the Orange R'iver as they can from the Namibia/Angola bor der? And politically, can the White minority 1overzmcnt and tU ir r 14porters accept a SWAPO led Government in Wi ndhoek? Without access to the debates in government such questions are not easy to answer. There have been rany reports suggesting that P.W. Botha and his miiitary advisers, caught between the rising cost of the war in Namibia and political realities at home, have decided in principal to withdraw to the Orange River. These advisors argue that an independent N amibia, while still heavily dependent on Pretoria econc¢nically would represent less of a financial burden to a sanctions encumbered economy than has the present occupation. However, those in the military who favor continued occupation of INamibia as a basis for the defense of South Africa 5 have always prevailed in past debates. These men argue that a forward defense strat(:gy comprised of' fight.i, on Namibian soil and supporting the Angolan rebel movement UJNTA as part of a regional destabilization policy is South Africa's best defense. Angola poses a particular challenge to South Africa as the MPLA is the only government in the region that has consistently and over time been able to provide the ANC and SWAPO with military bases. (In the recent talks the South African government has tabled a demand that Angola close all ANG and SWAPO military training facilities.) If the South African Defense Force were to withdraw from Namibia that would make destabilization of Angola much more costly and would cut UNITA's supply lines. There is little evidence to indicate that Pretoria is prepared to jettison its longtime ally Jonas Savimbi. P.W. Botha also has to take into account the growing pressures frcm the far right in South Africa which has made ,itrong gains in recent local elections. Political reporters in Johannesburg have *.-wiested that due to this threat from the far right, Botha may be unwilling to conclude negotiations for independence in Namibia prior to the October whit',:- only municipal elections. Adding to these p)res,res, report.L ,, Namibia in late July suggested that far right forces in Namibia may form a "Conservative Party" in the territory with strong ties to Dr. Andries Treurnicht's official opposition Conservative Party in South Africa. In the past, pressure from the far right has been a greater concern for P.W. Botha than that coming from what historically had been a small antiwar movement. A final impediment to South Africa settling in Namibia is the political impact on South Africa's Black majority of another independent, Black ruled country on the border. Anyone who remembers the jubilant dancing in the Black townships of South Africa at the time of Mozambican independence can appreciate the electrifying effect that Pretoria's forced withdrawal from Namibia could have on the liberation :1rnge in South Africa. Strategic and Economic Interests of Foreign States South Africa is not the only state whose strategic interests have historically blocked Namibian independence and could continue to block a settlement. Western economic and strategic interests in southwestern Africa were a major force behind the formation of the Contact Group that has successfully delayed international action on the issue for a decade. Historically, U.S. economic interests in the giant Tsumeb Corporation Limited mining operation in Namibia was an important determinant of Washington's policy toward the territory. And while U.S. economic interests in Namibia have declined significantly in recent years, the US, Britain and other Western countries have retained strong economic interests in South Africa, which they have been unwilling to jeopardise in favor of true independence for Namibia. It is worth noting that the Western Contact Group was formed in 1977, precisely at aI time when there was increasing pressure from the internationl communtity to impose sanctions against South Africa for its intransigence on the question of Namibian independence. In 1976 the Western nations had voted in favor of UN SCR 385, but then vetoed an attempt impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against

South Africa for not complying with its provisions. The establishment of the Contact Group was an attempt to deflect further Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions against South Africa. It was this desire to avoid sanctiors that caused the Contact Group (not coincidentally formed of' South Africas five major trading partners), to seek a negotiated settlement. The outcome of this process was the adoption of UN SCR 435 which in September of 1978 South Africa agreed to abide by. But as with previous resolution:; supporting Namibian independence, the U.S. and the other Western powers were unwilling to back up the Security Council plan with action. Instead of independence, the Contact Group has presided over what has turned out to be a decade of protracted negotiations with respect to the fate of Namibia. When South Africa stalled, and then refused to imp)lemcnit UNSCR 113, ihe U.S.,and its.11estern allies were unwilling to apply economic pie ;sures to force South Africa's compliance. Under the ReaE,2n administration, opposition to econonic sanctions has been the key to U.S. policy with regard to South Africa. In fact, the limited sanctions that were passed by the U.S. Congress in 1986 w'ere imposed over strong opposition by the Administration. As a result, were South Africa to obstruct the present attempts to itNplement UNSCR 435, even the threat of further economic action by the West would be unlikely. Perhaps the strongest U.S. impediment to a settlement, however, comes as a result of the American attenpt to impose its political will on neighboring Angola. Early on in the Reagan administration policy makers raised the suggestion that independence for Namibia should be linked to a withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola. This policy of "ilinlage" ha; posed a major impediment to independence in Namibia. The Reagan administration persuaded Congress to lift the ban on covert assistance to UNITA in 1985 and, since 1986, has been providing at least $15 million worth of' covert assistance to Savimbi's rebels. According to conservative lobbyists and Congressional sources, the administration is seeking to nearly triple Savimbi's military aid budget for the coming year. In talks in mid-August Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker specifically reftsed to halt "covert" U.S. weapons shipments to UNITA as long as Soviet military assistance to the Angolan government continues. The administration l s now suggested that "national reconciliation" in Angola is t 1e" ry for th1e :c:;:;fnl implumentation of th e peace accords and for the end of superpower involvementin the region. Since the resumcption of aid to UNITA in 1986, the American political and mil tary commitment to Savimbi ha.; grown considerably. In addition to direct military aid, the US is reportedly helping UN.IIAT e8to 1)b W)- . o in sout torn Zai ire. Underlying thi,; support is the cuccess of Savimbi's efforts over the last few years to broaden his political base in the U.S. Long a favorite of the far right, Savimbi has used a $600,000 annual public relations budget, and a growing taste for interventionism among Democrats to bui d hipartisan support for the administration's Angola policy. This June Savimtibi hirinself attended the inaugural meeting of the enate Task Force on Angola, a bipartisan pro-UNITA group that is chaired by Arizona Democrat Dennis DeConcini and includes such prominent Senate Democrats as William Proxmire and Florida Fenator Robert Graham. The Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen is also on record as having signed a letter to President Reagan urging him to support "national reconciliation" in Angola. The strength of Savimbi's support in Congress may actually serve to inhibit Crocker's ability to make even tactical concessions to the Cubans and Angolans in the coming talks. Pro-Savimbi moderates like DeConcini have already endorsed the administration position that U.S. support for UNITA is "not on the table" in the tripartite talks and are unlikely to accept an aid cut-off later. Farther right, conservative groups including the influential llerit age Foundation and the Con:ervative Cauc ,s, have already COI ,411fl Rd the I. IL a:s a "; ow- mot ion scl lout" of' UNITA, that would Ji, vitahly lead to the cut-off of' U.S. support for the rebels. And while conservative influence has waned in the final days of the Reagan administration, the far right still has access to Reagan him!self and could have a significant impact cn the upcoming November eliections. Balance of Factors While there are a variety of forces at play in the conflict in southwestern Africa, none is more important, or more totally ensures the final independence of Namibia than the continuing struggle of the Namibian people themselves, led by SWAPO. The commitment of the

Namibian people to escalating the political and military struggle makes the only relevant question whether independence will come as a result of the present set of circumstances and negotiations or at a time in the near future. At present it is difficult to forsce how the balance of elements will work out and whether the current negotiations will lead to a settlement in the near future. Many of the same factors that have blocked a settlement in the past remain important. Yet, South Africa is under unprecedented internal and international pressure today. Pretoria's Angolan withdrawal was certainly a function of military pressure and international sanctions are clearly an important Factor in making the cost of South Africa's occupation of Naiiibia difficult to bear. 'There is little public evidcncc to lindicate, however, that the cufiuli-.tive effect of illese pplessures i., enough to force the South African government to withfdraw from Namibia at this time. Tlaerefore, efforts by the interniational comr,.Jnity to increase pre ssure on the apa;..heid regime, both economically and politically, co..d be decP ive:. On Se-rtcnber 8th, the U.S. Senate is to begin consideration of' r "ill, S. 2378, that would impose stringent economic sanctions a -inst Pretoria. Adoption of these measures by the United States and passage of similar measures by South Africa's cther major trading partners could make the burden of maintaining an occupation army of 100,000 strong too expensive for the minority regime's diminished means