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Opposition to

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Alternative title Notes and Documents - Centre Against ApartheidNo. 31/71 Author/Creator United Nations Centre against Apartheid; Roskam, Karel L. Publisher Department of Political and Security Council Affairs Date 1971-07-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) , Netherlands Coverage (temporal) 1971 Source Northwestern University Libraries Description This paper on Netherlands opposition to apartheid is the fourth in a series prepared in pursuance of a request by the Special Committee on Apartheid to publicize anti-apartheid activities around . Previous publications include: "Scandinavian opposition to apartheid", No, 23/70; "Irish opposition to apartheid", No. 3/71 and "World against apartheid", No, 10/71. Dr. Roskam is on the staff of the Africa Institute at the University of Leyden and has written extensively on South African and African affairs. He is the author of Apartheid and (Leyden, i960). The views expressed are those of the author. Format extent 9 page(s) (length/size)

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http://www.aluka.org NOTES AND DOCUMENTS*

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS* NETHELANDS OPPOSITION by Dr. Karel L. Roskam 1971 LNote: This piper on Netherlands opposition to apartheid is the fourth in a series prepared in pursuance of a request by the Special Committee on Appatheid to publicize anti-aparthed activities around the world. Previous publications include: "Scandinavian opposition to aPatheid", No. 23/70; "Irish opposition to aartheid", No. 3/71 and "World against aartheid", No. 10/71. Dr. Roskam is on the staff of the Africa Institute at the University of Leyden and has written extensively on South -African and African affairs. He is the author of Apartheid and Discrimination (Leyden, 1960). The views expressed are those of the author]. 71-14851 *All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted. Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated. No. 31/71

NETHERLANDS OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID Special relationship with South Africa The announcement in that Queen Juliana of the Netherlands had contributed to the Programme against Racism of the World Council of Churches has hurt the dominant Afrikaner element in South Africa. According to the South African press, the were deeply shocked because these descendants of mainly Dutch immigrants customarily have a feeling of piety and respect for Dutch royalty. This dates back to the Boer War (from 1899 to 1902) when Juliana's , the young Queen Wilhelmina ordered the Dutch warship, the "", to bring Transvaal's President Paul Kruger to . At that time the Afrikaners, who were fighting against what was considered perfidious British imperialism, were popular heroes in the Netherlands. Traditionally the have always had special interest in South Africa, beginning in 1652 with the landing of Riebeeck at the Cape. When this Dutch colony became British at the beginning of the , interest dwindled, but it flared again during the Boer War. Historical links and common cultural, religious and linguistic roots have kept that interest alive ever since. No wonder then that in the Netherlands the policy of apartheid had been debated more heatedly than perhaps anywhere else, since the Afrikaners coming to power in 1948 introduced this Dutch term to international politics. Gradually, and to their dismay, the Afrikaners began to realize that their popularity as a defenceless people at the beginning of the century had virtually disappeared in the 1960s when the shooting at Sharpeville occurred and the African political organizations were banned. From celebrated heroes, they had become suspect oppressors. It is admitted that hostile criticism coming from the Netherlands hurts more than that coming from Britain - the historical enemy of the Afrikaners.l/ South Africa's ruling class puts the blame for this change in Dutch attitude on allegedly distorted reports in the varied and multivoiced Dutch press, radio and television, and on what is loosely termed the power of socialism in Dutch national life.2/ This misconception (if not a deliberate deception) arises out of the peculiar Afrikaner fear of change which is labelled "liberalism", "socialism", "communism" or "" - all to be considered inimical to Afrikaner national ideals. _/ It is often stated in South Africa that the most critical antiaartheid opposition is to be found in the Netherlands. Information Manual of the International Defence and Fund, p.261; qape Times, February 16, 1971. 2/ See e.g. Dagbreek, November 24, 1968 and the editorial comments of the following South African papers: Hoofstad, Tansvaler, Volksblad and Die__B~er, February 15 and 16, 1971.

- 2 As it is beyond the scope of this paper to dwell at length on the complicated pluriformity of Dutch political life, suffice it to state that the Dutch Social Democratic Labour Party (although the biggest single party) scored just under 30 per cent of the vote in the 1971 election and that only one out of the five main broadcasting and TV corporations can be regarded as expressly promoting progressive ideas. The daily and weekly press is predominantly centre or right- wing rather than socialist. In fact, critics of aratheid can be found in all the political parties, churches and walks of life. Notable among the sharpest critics, one finds Calvinist theologians, economists, politicians and editors, all of whom belong to the non-socialist Anti- Revolutionary Party. Whereas sympathy for the Afrikaners lingered longest precisely in the (DRC), the eyes of these Dutch Christians were gradually opened by incidents as Sharpeville, the banning of Chief Lutuli, the Rivonia trial, and the foundation of the Christian Institute. At synods of the DRC / (whose sister church is the largest in South Africa), the issue was hotly debated and apartheid was finally considered to be contrary to Biblical concepts, Christian teaching and accepted democratic principles. Attempts by a small fringe group of reactionary clergy and politicans 4/ to sway Dutch public opinicn more in favour of the Afrikaners (in their terminology considered as "blood relatives) have so far failed to gain substantial support. Apartheid as such is no longer an issue for serious discussion in the Netherlands - all the major political parties condemn that policy unreservedly. In that respect, apartheid has almost become a domestic political question rather than merely one of the many other foreign issues. However, it is precisely because of the common background that even some opponents of apartheid in the Netherlands argue in favour of a continued dialogue as the one means which, it is thought, might still influence the Afrikaner "relatives". On the other hand most anti-akartheid movements in the Netherlands have gradually come to accept that the "external" dialogue is bound to remain fruitless since the elements in South Africa consistently refuse the more fundamental "internal" dialogue. Therefore, the issue at present is: how to fight apartheid? The issue is, therefore, a dialbgue on "Dialogue", a debate on the ethics and effectiveness of isolation and on the of violence in the pursuit of self-determination. The Dutch and apartheid The kingdom of the Netherlands still extends outside Europe into the with the Dutch and as formally equal partners in the realm. 5/ This fact is the key to the policy of the Dutch Government on apartheid. Originally, most Western members of the United Nations held 5/ Lunteren, 1968 and 1970. 4/ Nederlandse Zuidafrikaanse Werkgemeenschap-NZAW, founded in 1963. 5/ These former colonies have by and large become autonomous, although Dutch preponderance has given rise to demands for full independence and regional orientation instead of continued economic dependence on Europe. the view that the racial policies of South Africa should be treated as an internal affair of the recognized South African Government. Upon requests from the of Surinam and the Antilles, representing multi-racial societies, the Dutch Government changed its attitude in 1952, as became at the Sixth General Assembly. At that time, the Dutch delegation was instructed to identify itself less than before with South Africa, because the impression had to be avoided that the Government would wish to protect the South African apartheid legislation. _/ Ever since that time, the Dutch Government of the day has stated its unequivocal opposition to apartheid as an objectionable system of exploitation and discrimination. The voting record on various United Nations resolutions bears this out. On other occasions the Dutch Government felt compelled to abstain from voting as the proposed resolutions were felt to be beyond the powers of the General Assembly or were considered to be "not realistic and as such cannot commend the wide support that would make them effective". 7/ This attitude has been consistently adhered to by the Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs which is mainly responsible for formulation of policy and for voting by the Dutch delegation. 8/ According to this policy, it would not be in the Dutch interests to support measures calculated to isolate South Africa. However, this did not prevent the Government from deciding to donate 100,000 Dutch (approximately $28,000) in 1965 to the International Defence and Aid Fund. This led to agitated protests amongst Dutch immigrants in South Africa (since World War II numbering 40,000), who staged a demonstration outside the Dutch embassy in Pretoria. The Government argued that the gift was meant for humanitarian purposes, for legal and welfare aid to South African political prisoners and their dependents. Otherwise the Dutch Government kept strictly to its declared principles of non- interference in South African affairs on the grounds that the maintenance of normal diplomatic, cultural and economic relations with South Africa would offer better prospects for change than isolation and boycott. 9/ In conformity with this view, invitations were extended to several South African Government Ministers, including the Ministers of Transport, Justice, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and the Interior, to visit the Netherlands in 1969. In November 1970, the Dutch Vice-Premier, Mr. Bakker, officially visited South Africa. 6/ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 29, Verslag over de 6e Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, 1952, p.68. Y/ Dutch delegates in the Fourth Committee on November 16, 1970. / Consisting of professional diplomats but during the General Assembly enlarged with Members of of various political parties and other experts in an advisory capacity. 9/ According to the explanation of vote in the Special Political Committee on November 15, 1968, the Dutch official policy with regard to apartheid is founded on three points: (1) It is essential to maintain contacts with South Africa on a personal and human , especially those with the Churches, with the press, with youth groups and with opposition groups, with the specific intention of convincing the other side that policy of gkwrthei is false and to strengthen them in their opposition to that policy. (2) Assistance must be provided to the victims of the policy of a-theid. (3) Pressure should be exerted on the Government of South Africa by means of effective and practicable measures." The Dutrh delegate to the Special Political Committee of the 25th

- 4 Although a frLtheld features every year in Parliamentary debates on the foreign affairs vote, the Dutch Parliament as such has never deliberated at length on South Africa. Government policy is endorsed by the majority of the members of the various Parliamentary committees on foreign affairs. In the early 1960s, Parliament planned to send a delegation to visit South Africa, but this never materialized as the Government in Pretoria refused to allow a flexible programme, including a visit to Chief Lutuli. Since then, however, some parliamentarians and parliamentary party leaders have visited South Africa and returned for the most part with mixed feelings. Although some of them pleaded for more understanding, a survey taken in 1969 showed that more than 81 per cent of the 225 Dutch Members of Parliament believed apartheid totally or largely unacceptable on moral grounds. No wonder then that the visit of Mr. Bakker to South Africa was critisized in Parliament as he had failed, in the eyes of his critics, to speak up to his hosts. It seems, nevertheless, that the majority of Dutch Members of Parliament favour a dialogue and the strengthening of existing relations. The Dutch Government's policy of continued dialogue is supported not only by most Members of Parliament, but also by Dutch business and trade interests, as represented by the Central Organization of Promotion. After the general trend of a decline in trade due to Sharpeville, a 33-man trade mission went to South Africa in 1968. This was critisized in the press and in Parliament, but was defended by business interests on the ground that trade with South Africa should not be considered as a sign of support for apantheid, which in its petty aspects was rejected. The prevalent attitude in Dutch commercial circles remains that trade and politics should be kept as separate categories. This view is generally supported by the Dutch Government which nonetheless rejected in May 1967 the application of five for an export permit for the supply of submarines, aircraft and supplementary equipment to South Africa, estimated to be worth 2,000 million guilders (approximately $550 million) l/, in adherence to the United Nations resolution on the arms embargo as accepted by the previous Government. The volume of trade with South Africa has increased but not as rapidly as in the case of and is not nearly as substantial as that with Britain. Imports from South Africa (mainly agricultural products) rose in 1970 to a total of 126 million guilders (approximately $35 million), an increase of 32 per cent over 1969; to South Africa (predominantly electrical appliances, machinery, textile products, and chemicals) rose to 267 million guilders ($74 million) in 1970, an increase of 21 per cent over 1969. Also in 1970 the KLM Royal Dutch was allowed a 50 per cent increase in its passenger/freight volume to and from South Africa. Moreover, a combined Dutch-South African Chamber of Commerce was opened in Johannesburg. Dutch investment in South Africa is estimated at 200 million guilders ($55 million) but substantial investments are made through international with a large Dutch share such as Shell, and . session of the General Assembly expressed similar ideas on November 27, 1970, although he also stated that it is not very likely that the South African Government "will be easily persuaded to change (its policy)." lP/Rand Daily MaiL, 15 and 24 May, 1967.

- 5 - Under the Dutch-South African cultural agreement, exchanges also take place on the levels of culture, learning and sport. When however two Dutch called at Capetown in July 1970, non-white crew members were refused admission to restaurants and cinemas, although an official assurance had been given that they would not be discriminated against. This led to indignant protests in the Netherlands and although these exchanges have not yet come to an end, various individual academics, sportsmen and artists continue to refuse invitations to go to South Africa on the grounds that appearing before segregated audiences would in fact mean explicit support for partheid. The anti-aartheid movement in the Netherlands is mainly concerned with putting an end to such increasing trade relations and to friendly exchanges in the cultural, academic and the sports fields. Other prominent fields of action are the mobilization of public opinion, support for liberation movements and distribution of source material to the Dutch press. Anti-apartheid organizations The anti-apartheid organizations in the Netherlands vary as to composition, specific aims, methods and general philosophy. However, these groups have in common their desire to contribute to the fight against apartheid which is rejected by all of them as morally indefensible discrimination and exploitation on the basis of race. The first organization set up to expose apartheid is the Comit6 ZuidAfrika, founded in 1960, by a number of theologians, politicians, publicists, trade unionists and students of different political backgrounds. Its aims are to disseminate information on the actual situation in South Africa through articles, lectures and film shows and to influence Parliament and public opinion through protests, demonstrations and petitions wherever it is thought that official and unofficial relations with South Africa will strengthen aatheid. The CZA, with more than 1,CO0 members and a student branch, STUCOZA, issues the periodical Informatie Bulletin (circulation 2,200). Originally the CZA held the view that a dialogue should not be rejected wherever it might become possible to further its aims in contacts with South African . However, influenced by events in South Africa, the Committee gradually changed its emphasis, accepting since 1969 that other than peaceful methods may have to be used in the assertion of self-determination by the African, Coloured and Asian majority. Impressed by the failure of the efforts of "Africa 20CO" 1l_/ to initiate a dialogue, the CZA has managed to convince its broadly based support that a more radical, less circumspect approach may be called for. The CZA over the years has moreover been helping from South Africa and also engaged in fund raising for victims of a theid. In 1965, a Dutch branch of the International Defence and Aid Fund was founded in close collaboration with the CZA and the two organizations merged in 1969. Although it is difficult to assess specific results, it is clear that the CZA fulfills a useful function mobilizing public opinion, press and Parliament, 11/ For information, see Unit on Apartheid, "Notes and Documents", No. 10/71, p.15.

- 6 as was evident in 1967 when export licenses were refused for submarines. It is also mainly due to continued pressure by the CZA that a debate has started on the legitimacy of Dutch emigration to South Africa. As a result of this, the biggest Dutch , the 560,000 member NVV, urged the Government in August 1970 to ban skilled Dutchmen from emigrating to South Africa. The CZA co-operates increasingly with militant groups concerned with other southern African territories. As their activities, however, are only indirectly concerned with South Africa, these groups will be merely mentioned, briefly. The most influential and successful of these groups is the Anpola , founded in 1961. It issues the Angola Bulletin (circulation 7,CC0) and Facts and Reports in English (international circulation 700). Its study, ad the NATO was translated into English and Portuguese. The Committee has created an independent foundation, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane Stichtini for humanitarian aid to FRELIMO. It received a $5,000 grant from the Programme against Racism of the World Council of Churches in 1970. Another group with which the CZA co-operates is the Rhodesig Comit6, whose Zimbabwe Bulletin merged in 1971 with the CZA's Informatie Bulletin. A slightly different approach is used by the newly founded working group Kairos (meaning "Now is the time"), which was set up in March 1970 to support the work of the Christian Institute in South Africa. The name indicat that according to the group, South Africa's oppressed population can no longer wait for reconciliation and that the South African whites can no longer perseve in their bitterness. Kairos issues a quarterly magazine Kairos Berichten with about South African churches and their attitudes towards gparthed; and on the attitude of the Government towards the conduct of the churches. Kairos aims at spreading information about the situation in South Africa with particular reference to the attitude of the churches in connexion with gparthei and at promoting financial and moral support for the Christian Institute and its projects and for other organizations and projects of a similar, character. Composed mainly of church leaders and individual Christians, Kairos subscribes to the necessity of maintaining the dialogue, but at the same time does not specifically exclude the possibility of other, less peaceful methods of change. After a three day conference held at the Catholic University of in 1970, under the sponsorship of the Political Faculty of the university in conjunction with the Federation of Scientific Research Workers, the Angola Comit6, the ?hodesib Comit6 and the STUCOZA, it was decided to launch a national campaign of active support for "the liberation of southern Africa from white domination." It was noted at this conference that Dutch public opinion gradually tends to view Apartheid in the wider of southern Africa. It has come to recognize that the white minorities in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies have one common denominator: the maintenance of their supremacy in this part of Africa at the cost of Black, Coloured and Asian population groups. The conference decided to set up work groups in various (mainly university) which were charged with specific tasks, such as analysing the function of Dutch trade and investment in South

- 7 Africa. The results of this long term project will in due course become available. The Aksie.roep Zuidelik Afrika (Action Groups Southern Africa), acts as a co- ordinating body in . A second conference, due to take place in September 1971, aims at expanding the number and scope of the local work groups in order to influence public opinion and Government policy in favour of African nationalism in southern Africa. The work groups also organize local demonstrations, protest meetings, panel discussions, film shows and fund-raising campaigns. The CZA, Kairos and the work groups often overlap, not only in aims and methods, but also in membership. Functional co-operation on a local or occasionally national level, is often found with such groups as .Jaloom (Shalom: a progressive group generally working on third world problems), and its student counterparts NESBIC and SIB; groups like Amnesty International and the Derde Wereld (Third World Shops); and progressive political parties such as the Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party), the Pacifist (PSP), the Rogressive adical Part (PPR), crats 166; and the trade unions NVV, NKB and CNV. Support is often given also by various organizations and groups of resident immigrants (mostly students) from Surinam and the Antilles. The groups mentioned have occasionally invited freedom fighters to lecture in the Netherlands. TV coverage and press publicity of these events have undoubtedly increased Dutch interest in developments in southern Africa. When the World Council of Churches began its Programme against Racism in 1970, a Dutch work group was founded to run the Aktie Betaald Antwoord (Campaign Prepaid Reply). It aims at information within the churches and at support for liberation movements in the fields of education, social welfare and medical aid. This group, which received an undisclosed amount from Queen Juliana, sums up the present opposition in the Netherlands against apartheid as follows: We know the question asked by the murdered, detained and the still active leaders of the suppressed races: When will white Christians in the name of God begin to do justice to the coloured races? We know the reply: fight racism in your own heart and your own environment; support the suppressed so that they may become free men. Then PAY for your reply, through your action and your financial support." The royal gift to this campaign is significantly symbolic of Dutch opposition to apartheid and a welcome reinforcement of the anti-apartheid movement in the Netherlands. The widespread moral support for the aims and purposes of the various anti-apartheid organizations in the Netherlands and the dwindling support for the fringe group agitating in favour of agpatheid, indicates clearly that the vast majority of the Dutch population (itself in some respects a multi-racial society with its Indonesian-born, Surinam and Antilles-born minorities) repudiates apartheid.

- 8 However, these anti-apartheid groups still face considerable oppositior to their aims on the part of the small but influential lobby of commercial, financial and trade interests in the . At present, ways and means are being studied to handle this opposition effectively. To this end, attempts are made to co- ordinate even more the national activities of organizations dealing with southern Africa and to develop international campaigns with similar organizations in other , especially in .