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Irony and Reductio Ad Absurdum As a Methodological Strategy in Plato's Meno

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Irony and Reductio Ad Absurdum As a Methodological Strategy in Plato's Meno Revista de Rlosoffa (Universidad lberoamericana) 143:127-154,201 7 Irony and Reductio ad Absurdum as a Methodological Strategy in Plato's Meno Luis Guerrero Martinez U NIVERS!DAD IBEROAMERICANA [email protected] Abstract Meno is a good example of the use of Socratic irony as a way of refutation. From the perspective of logic, the reductio ad absurdum argument constitutes a device closely related to irony. In this ar­ ticle, I examine analytically the four elements of irony as they are presented in the dialogue: 1. False knowledge as an initial position assumed by Socrates's interlocutors; 2. Socratic ignorance; 3. the reductio ad absurdum argument; and 4. the acknowledgement of the initial error and ignorance. KEYwoRDs: Socrates, sophists, false knowledge, virtue, definition. Resumen El Men6n es un buen ejemplo del uso de la ironia socrdtica como forma de refutacion. Especlficamente, la forma !Ogica de reduccion al absurdo constituye un dispositivo muy relacionado con Ia ironia socrdtica. En este articulo, se examinan analiticamente los cuatro elementos de la ironia que se presentan en el didlogo: I. el conocimiento [also como una posicion inicial asumida por los interlocutores de Socrates; 2. /.a igno­ rancia socrdtica; 3. la reduccion al absu1·do del [also saber inicial; y 4. el reconocimiento del error y La ignorancia. PALABRAS CLAVE: Socrates, sofistas, folso conocimiento, virtud, defi­ nicion. 128 luis Guerrero Martfnez Irony and Reductio ad Absurdum as a Methodological Strategy in Plato's Meno 129 By Heracles, he said, that's just Socrates' usual In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel mentions irony. I knew, and I said so to these people earlier, Meno5 as an example of Socratic irony as a method, focusing on its that you'd be unwilling ro answer and that, if aporetic nature, and argues that "philosophy must, generally speak­ someone questioned you, you'd be ironical and ing, begin with a puzzle in order to bring about reflection; every­ do anything rather than give an answer. thing must be doubted, all presuppositions given up, to reach the truth as created through the Notion''.6 However, the purpose of this &public, p. 337a1 dialogue is not to make an account of a concept, as might be sug­ gested by Meno's opening question: "Can you tell me, Socrates, can The Socratic and Platonic interest in distinguishing E:rtLO'ti]f.L'Y]-a virtue be taught?" (70a). For even if Socrates immediately redirects hallmark of philosophical reasoning-from tEXVYJ as instrumental Meno's inquiry into the more general question about what is virtue, knowledge turned into an effort to underscore the dialectic form to the dialogue is not an account of the essence of virtue. At the end, expound philosophy, as well as a criticism on the discursive form Socrates excuses himself and leaves this last question unanswered adopt~d by sophists: "The dialogues are both the locus for discussing (lOOb). A reader that expects a lucid exposition about the teaching these 1ssues and exempla of alternatives to linear, monologue, and or the concept of virtue will in all probability be disappointed.7 written discourse paradigms. The defense of dialogue and the cri­ The aim of this essay is to offer an analysis of the ironic struc­ tique of sophistic rhetoric are related to each other".2 ture of Meno. In order to do this, I will divide the essay in two parts. Irony is one of these paradigmatic forms, and it was exercised In the first one, I will offer an introduction to the general concept by both Socrates and Plato. However, E:rtto'tiJf.L'YJ is different in each of irony and Socratic irony. In the second part, I will discuss four one. In Socrates, it is characterized by ignorance, not only as a rhe­ primary features of Socratic irony as we find them in Meno. torical device of counterargument, but also-as will be noted in There is a wide diversity of scholarly studies on this dialogue the following-as a genuine "non-know1edge".3 By contrast, Plato and particularly about Socratic irony. My interpretative angle, ~nderstands irony as a didactic previous step to positive knowledge, nonetheless, does not attempt to incorporate the vastly different 1.e., to the development and accounting of his various theories.4 discussions on specific issues in the hermeneutic and philological debate around this work. I have chosen instead to sketch an outline 1 All quotations from Plato's dialogues are from Plato 1991 y 1997. Pagina­ of the ironic method as it appears in various passages of Meno, and tion is provided in the text. to present, in a more formal fashion, the reductio ad absurdum rea­ 2 Swearingen ,1991, p. 58. See also Bravo, 2009, p. 27-43. soning that is so important in Socrates' method. In his large dissertation on Socratic irony, and after reviewing the main philological sources on the issue -Plato, Xenophon and Arisrophanes-, Danish philosopher S0ren Kierkegaard argued that Socrates' ignorance was guessing that right opinion [6{18~ d6;a] is a different thing from knowl­ indeed real. See Kierkegaard, 1989, specially the chapter "The World-His­ edge [emm:~J.LTJJ" (98b2). See also Theaetetus for a similar text (2 10a9-b2). torical Validity oflrony, The Irony of Socrates", p. 259-71. The term em· To the same extent, we see an account of tEXVTJ when Socrates suggests an ployed by Plato -and in Greek Classical literature in general- is a/l(l8La, analogy to compare the practical knowledge of the shoemaker and the phy­ which is traditionally translated as "ignorance" or even "foolishness". An sician with the way in which the sophists claim to teach virtue (90d); even important source on the interpretation of this term is Crombie, 2013, p. though, in this case, Socrates makes an ironical use of the term emm:ilf.1TJ. 33-63. 5 I shall write Meno in italics when I refer to Plato's dialogue, and Meno 4 In Meno, we find the concept of EJa.O'tTI!.l.Y] as a type of knowledge that without italics when I make reference to the character. involves awareness and understanding of cause (alt(a), as opposed to com­ 6 Hegel, 1892, p. 406. mon true opinion (6e8~ d6~a): "Indeed, I too speak as one who does not "A number of dialogues end in the same manner, both in Xenophon and have knowledge but is guessing. However, I certainly do not think I am Plato, leaving us quite unsatisfied as to the result" (Hegel, 1892, p. 406). 130 Luis Guerrero Martfnez Irony and Reductio ad Absurdum as a Methodological Strategy in Plato's Meno 131 I. Introduction to the Concept oflrony characters and situations, shows clearly the aforementioned ironical discontinuity: madness and good sense, earnestness and triviality, Irony as a literary form is the free play of language in which the im­ ideality and disillusion. One may even think of a contrasting redu­ plicit meaning of an expression appears as different from its literal plication in its use oflanguage: the colorful descriptions of the absurd 8 meaning. It is ordinarily a discontinuity between the subjectivity adventures; the hyperbolic and nonsensical added to the implausi­ of the person who speaks or writes, and the external appearance of bility of many scenes; the discourses against imaginary enemies that that which he or she is saying; it is a discontinuity between the true lack all logic when heard by third parties; the idealized love ex­ intention of the person and the literality of that which he or she is pressed in an embellished language, but directed to an inadequate conveymg. woman. Let us take as an eloquent example that scene with the In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle associates irony with mag­ merchants where Don Quixote "exclaimed with haughty gesture, nanimity and sincerity. The magnanimous character, he claims, is 'All the world stand, unless all the world confess that in all the world arrogant and frank in his or her self-confidence, even though he or there is no maiden fairer than the Empress ofLa Mancha, the peerless she is ironical when addressing the uneducated (p. 1124b32). 9 Later Dulcinea del Toboso". 11 All these contrasts, along with the diverse on, he refers to irony as the opposite of pretentiousness or haugh­ imagery, constitute an ironical comment on the social, historical tiness, inasmuch as ironists minimize their merits as a manner of and cultural reality of the time. In this sense, Don Quixote offers a avoiding ostentation: "These also mostly disown qualities held in splendid universe of allegories that aims not only to the destruction -high esteem, as Socrates used to do" (p. 1126b25). In this sense, of the well-known chivalric model, but also criticizes a grotesque Aristotle opposes irony to pretense and refers to it as self-depre­ and vulgar sociery that claims to be ruled and measured by a stan­ 10 ciation (p. 1108a21). In Rhetoric, irony is described as a form of dard of disproportionate legalism and morality. In his Charakte­ contempt directed to those who speak in earnest (p. 1379b31), or a ristiken und Kritiken, Schlegel underscores this ironical character manner in which the speaker can express when enraged (p. 1408b8). of Don Quixote, inasmuch as Cervantes "from the very beginning Also in this rhetorical context, irony offers a way to ridicule another makes the exaggerated chivalric ideas collide with the vulgar actuality, person in a debate. In this regard, Aristotle quotes Gorgias when leaving thus no room fior anyone to save t hemse 1 ves , .12 he claims that ridicule is "to confound the opponents' earnest with As mentioned earlier, irony appears in many parts of Meno.
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