EL FARO ACCIDENT TIMELINE Significant events aboard the Taken from the voyage data recorder transcript (VDR)

Date Time (EDT) Event Sept. 29 ~9:30 PM El Faro departed Jacksonville, Florida bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico. ------Sept. 30 5:36 AM VDR recording of audio began. Sept. 30 6:41 AM Captain Michael Davidson said “Oh look at that red sky over there. Red in the morn’ take warning. That is bright.” Sept. 30 7:01 AM Captain Davidson and Steve Shultz adjust course slightly to keep their distance from Tropical Storm Joaquin. Sept. 30 8:31 AM Captain Davidson said “we'll be about sixty miles south of the eye. it should be fine. we are gunna be fine– not should be– we are gunna be fine.” Sept. 30 10:39 AM Jeremie Riehm told unidentified 3 they are nearly “on a collision course” with the storm. Sept. 30 2:15 PM Captain Davidson and Danielle Randolph heard radio callouts being made by a Coast Guard aircraft broadcasting a hurricane warning to mariners below over VHF radio. Sept. 30 2:17 PM Captain Davidson told Second Mate Randolph that he “will be up the entire night for the most part.” Sept. 30 3:28 PM ‘‘Nobody in their right mind would be drivin’ into it,’’ unidentified

1 Able Seaman 2 said of the storm. Second Mate responded with a sarcastic laugh, ‘‘We are. Yaaay." Sept. 30 3:46 PM Chief Mate Shultz asked Second Mate Randolph if there was any change with the storm. The Second Mate said it is “still comin’ right for us or we’re headed right for it.” Sept. 30 4:15 PM Unidentified Able Seaman 1 overheard the Captain and Chief Mate discussing the storm and asked the Captain if there was a chance they could turn around. The Captain replied “Oh. No no no. We’re not gunna turn around – we’re not gunna turn around,” and added “the storm is very unpredictable—very unpredictable” and “this one in particular is very erratic.” Sept. 30 6:55 PM Chief Mate Shultz suggested to Captain Davidson adjusting course again, farther south. Captain Davidson agrees. Sept. 30 ~8:00 PM Captain Davidson left the bridge and was not heard there again until 4:09 AM. Sept. 30 8:24 PM Third Mate Riehm told unidentified Able Seaman 3 he was concerned about how close they would be getting to the hurricane. “Maybe I’m just being a chicken little,” he said. Sept. 30 9:19 PM Third Mate Riehm discussed needing an escape route, then said he was not going to second-guess Captain Davidson. Sept. 30 11:05 PM After receiving the latest hurricane forecast, Third Mate Riehm called Captain Davidson and told him he might want to take a look at the latest weather report. The Third Mate said the hurricane is advancing toward their trackline, then offered to plot it out and call the Captain back. Sept. 30 11:13 PM Third Mate Riehm called Captain Davidson back and told him at 4:00 AM they will be 22 miles from the center of the hurricane “with gusts to 120 and strengthening”. The Third Mate presented the option of turning south at 2:00 AM to add more distance between them and the center. The suggested course change was apparently not authorized. Sept. 30 11:26 PM Third Mate Riehm told unidentified Able Seaman 3 the Captain seemed to think they will be south of the storm by then and the winds won’t be an issue. The Third Mate said, “I trust what he’s saying – it’s just, being twenty miles away from hundred knot winds – this doesn’t even sound right.” ------Oct. 1 1:15 AM SiriusXM satellite radio, playing on the bridge, broadcasts a news update which indicated Hurricane Joaquin was upgraded to a category 3 storm. Second Mate Randolph said, “Oh my god…Now it’s a category three.” Oct. 1 1:20 AM Second Mate Randolph called Captain Davidson. In the 90-second conversation, she told the Captain the storm had intensified and

2 suggested altering course south. The suggested course change was apparently not authorized. Oct. 1 4:09 AM Captain Davidson arrived on the bridge. Referring to the swells, he said, "Well, this is every day in Alaska. This is what it's like." Oct. 1 4:37 AM Richard Pusatere called the bridge to discuss the impact a list was having on oil levels in the engine room. Oct. 1 5:03 AM Captain Davidson said “we’re getting conflicting reports as to where the center of the storm is.” Oct. 1 5:43 AM Captain Davidson is first told of a problem, a flooding situation in Hold 3. He ordered the Chief Mate Shultz to investigate. Oct. 1 5:52 AM Captain Davidson was told a hate, called a “scuttle” was open. He ordered unidentified Able Seaman 1 to turn the rudder left twenty degrees to bring the list to the port side. Oct. 1 6:01 AM Chief Mate Shultz told Captain Davidson over the radio that they closed the scuttle. Oct. 1 6:13 AM El Faro lost propulsion. Captain Davidson said, “I think we just lost the plant.” Oct. 1 6:17 AM Captain Davidson is told of water sloshing, coming in through the ventilation in the engine room. Oct. 1 6:32 AM Second Mate Randolph began formatting a distress message, as directed by the Captain. Oct.1 6:49 AM Second Mate Randolph offered coffee to Captain Davidson and unidentified Able Seaman 1, who replied “Give me the Splenda not the regular sugar.” Oct. 1 6:59 AM Captain Davidson called TOTE Maritime’s designated person ashore (DPA) and left a voicemail explaining they had a navigational incident. Oct. 1 7:02 AM Captain Davidson called TOTE’s contracted emergency call center for assistance in reaching a DPA. He told the operator he had a marine emergency and described the situation. At one point he said “the clock is ticking.” Oct. 1 7:06 AM TOTE Maritime’s contracted emergency call center connected Captain Davidson with a DPA. The Captain told him they had a 15- degree list, the engineers were unable to get lube oil pressure on the plant so they had no main engine. He said they were trying to pump water from the hold but were not gaining ground. The Captain provided their position and said he was going to activate the emergency distress buttons. He said nobody was panicking and they were going to stay with the ship. Oct. 1 7:12 AM Captain Davidson ordered Second Mate Randolph to send the distress message and push the SSAS button. Oct. 1 7:14 AM Chief Mate Shultz arrived back on the bridge and told Captain Davidson the water level was rising. The Captain asked where it was

3 coming from. The Chief Mate told him the Chief Engineer said something hit and ruptured the fire main hard. Oct. 1 7:18 AM Chief Mate Shultz said he saw “cars bobbing around” in 3-Hold. Captain Davidson called the engine room to ask if they could isolate the fire main, “’cause that may be the root cause of the water comin’ in.” Oct. 1 7:27 AM Captain Davidson gave the command to ring the ship’s general alarm. Oct. 1 7:29 AM Second Mate Randolph yelled about containers in the water. Oct. 1 7:29 AM Captain Davidson gave the command to ring the abandon ship alarm and said “Tell ‘em we’re goin’ in.” Oct. 1 7:30 AM Captain Davidson said the “bow is down.” Oct. 1 7:31 AM Captain Davidson told Chief Mate Shultz over the radio to put the life rafts in the water. He said, “Everybody…Get off the ship, stay together.” Oct. 1 7:36 AM Unidentified Able Seaman 1, who is stuck on the bridge, yelled for help.” He told Captain Davidson his feet were slipping and asked for a ladder or a rope. Oct. 1 7:38 AM “You gunna leave me,” said unidentified Able Seaman 1. “I’m not leavin’ you let’s go,” said Captain Davidson. Oct. 1 7:39 AM Able Seaman 1 said, “I’m a goner.” The Captain yelled, “No you’re not… It’s time to come this way.” There is a building rumble and the recording ends.

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