Eighty percent of the time, American airmen received their targets only after they had taken off. PERATION Enduring Freedom command in a harsh, politically com- marked the first time the US plex environment. The airpower com- military responded to an act ponent set the conditions for a coali- Oof terrorism with a large- tion campaign and achieved success scale, sustained, conventional-force from the first night onward, adapting operation. The war on the Taliban to tactical constraints and bringing An Air War and al Qaeda was most intense from precise firepower to bear. Indeed, 80 October 2001 through January 2002, percent of the targets struck by US when it featured mostly air and space airpower were “flex targets”—those power. given to pilots en route. It was not, however, a massive air The Sept. 11 attacks came as a war; the sortie count from its start thunderous strategic surprise. It took through takeover of major Afghan time for the Bush Administration to Like No cities was about half that of Opera- formulate its response. Soon, how- tion Allied Force in the Balkans in ever, US attention was drawn to 1999 and nowhere near that of the Osama bin Laden’s nest, Afghani- Gulf War in 1991. stan. Its Taliban rulers had offered What made OEF unique was that the Saudi–born terrorist a safe har- Other joint airpower was able to respond on bor since 1996. Thus, the first step in By Rebecca Grant USAF photo by SrA. James Harper Excerpted from the Air Force Association Special Report “The Afghan Air War,” published by AFA’s Aerospace Education Foundation. The full report is available on the Web at www.aef.org (go to publications, then Eaker Institute Papers). 30 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2002 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2002 30 Eighty percent of the time, American airmen received their targets only after they had taken off. PERATION Enduring Freedom command in a harsh, politically com- marked the first time the US plex environment. The airpower com- military responded to an act ponent set the conditions for a coali- Oof terrorism with a large- tion campaign and achieved success scale, sustained, conventional-force from the first night onward, adapting operation. The war on the Taliban to tactical constraints and bringing An Air War and al Qaeda was most intense from precise firepower to bear. Indeed, 80 October 2001 through January 2002, percent of the targets struck by US when it featured mostly air and space airpower were “flex targets”—those power. given to pilots en route. It was not, however, a massive air The Sept. 11 attacks came as a war; the sortie count from its start thunderous strategic surprise. It took through takeover of major Afghan time for the Bush Administration to Like No cities was about half that of Opera- formulate its response. Soon, how- tion Allied Force in the Balkans in ever, US attention was drawn to 1999 and nowhere near that of the Osama bin Laden’s nest, Afghani- Gulf War in 1991. stan. Its Taliban rulers had offered What made OEF unique was that the Saudi–born terrorist a safe har- Other joint airpower was able to respond on bor since 1996. Thus, the first step in By Rebecca Grant USAF photo by SrA. James Harper Excerpted from the Air Force Association Special Report “The Afghan Air War,” published by AFA’s Aerospace Education Foundation. The full report is available on the Web at www.aef.org (go to publications, then Eaker Institute Papers). 30 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2002 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2002 30 C-17 airlifters carried out a long- distance airdrop of humanitarian daily rations. Air strikes to eliminate air defenses and other key targets were a logical first step, given the success of air- power in the conflicts of the 1990s. But Rumsfeld took pains to point out USAF photo by SSgt. Shane Cuomo that a few days’ worth of strikes would not topple the Taliban. “We have to have a clear under- standing of what is possible in a country like that,” Rumsfeld said. “That country has been at war for a very long time. ... They do not have high-value targets or assets that are the kinds of things that would lend themselves to substantial damage from the air.” It was plain from the outset that An airman prepares a precision guided bomb during Operation Enduring OEF was not going to unfold accord- Freedom. After dropping a portion of their loads, USAF’s B-1Bs, such as this ing to a predetermined strategy. The one, and B-52 bombers were on-call for emerging targets. Gulf War air campaign of 1991 pounded Iraqi forces for 38 days as reducing the terror threat would be sea but turned back on station after the US “tried to set conditions” for to eliminate al Qaeda bases in Af- hearing of the attacks. hostilities, Myers noted in a late Oc- ghanistan. Beyond that, everything for the tober briefing. “Then,” he went on, The primary internal opposition war in Afghanistan had to go in by “we had a ground component that to Taliban rule came from the North- air. USAF’s Air Mobility Command went in and finished the job. You ern Alliance, a loose coalition of began putting in place an air bridge shouldn’t think of this [the war against irregular forces under the leadership of tankers to refuel inbound aircraft. terrorists] in those terms.” of various Afghan strongmen. Some- For the first time, the air bridge out where in the days after Sept. 11, the of the United States ran in two direc- “A Different War” Bush Administration decided that tions, east and west, converging on Echoing that point was Gen. Tom- teaming with the Northern Alliance Central Asia. my R. Franks, the Army officer com- offered the best hope for “liquidat- OEF began on Oct. 7, 2001. Gen. manding US Central Command and ing” the Taliban and al Qaeda in Richard B. Myers, the Air Force of- thus the war’s top military figure. Afghanistan. ficer who had only recently become “It has been said that those who ex- It was also clear that inserting any Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, an- pect another Desert Storm will won- US military forces into the region nounced the action. He said, “About der every day what it is that this war would require cooperation from Af- 15 land-based bombers, some 25 is all about,” said Franks. “This is a ghanistan’s neighbors. They were a strike aircraft from carriers, and US different war.” complicated group. Afghanistan bor- and British ships and submarines Part of the strategy was to take dered nations whose names must have launching approximately 50 Toma- steps to hunt down key individuals made planners shudder: China, Iran, hawk missiles have struck terrorist and learn more about al Qaeda’s the now-independent republics of targets in Afghanistan.” structure and any plans for future Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ta- On Oct. 7 and 8, strikes by Air operations. Another was to unseat jikistan, and on-again, off-again US Force bombers and Navy fighters hit the Taliban. ally Pakistan. Taliban air defense sites, airfields, The Northern Alliance, always a military command-and-control cen- loose grouping, was not ready for The Buildup Begins ters, and other fixed targets near coordinated air and ground offen- The US soon began assembling major cities and installations. The sives. Aid ranging from ammunition forces, however. The Air Force al- first order of business was to “re- to horse fodder had to be flown into ready had established a modern, top- move the threat from air defenses the theater and air-dropped to alli- of-the-line nerve center, called the and from Taliban aircraft,” Defense ance forces. Trained US special op- Combined Air Operations Center, or Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said erations teams and air controllers CAOC, in a Persian Gulf state. This on Oct. 7. had to link up with assigned ele- center would be used to direct all “We need the freedom to operate on ments of the Northern Alliance. facets of the coming air campaign. the ground and in the air, and the The mechanics of airpower for Moreover, some Navy warships were targets selected, if successfully de- OEF were different from those seen in place in the northern Arabian Sea. stroyed, should permit an increasing in other recent conflicts. Distance The aircraft carrier USS Enterprise degree of freedom over time,” he added. was a major challenge. Navy fight- and its battle group had begun their Humanitarian relief missions be- ers flew more than 700 miles one return to the US after six months at gan on the first night of the war. Two way from their carriers to their com- 32 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2002 bat stations. Bombers coming from precision air wings, the strike fight- intricate deck cycle time of the the British–owned Indian Ocean atoll ers averaged two aim points per air- carrier’s operations created a major of Diego Garcia faced a 2,500-mile craft per sortie, a monumental shift challenge. one-way trip. from the mass force packages of Bombers were less affected by For airmen, the war shifted rap- Desert Storm. A full 93 percent of range limitations and soon shoul- idly from strikes against preplanned the Navy strike sorties delivered pre- dered the major part of the job. targets to a combination of pre- cision guided ordnance. After two initial days of strikes, planned and flexible targets. “After “We are more precise than we the B-2 stealth aircraft flying from the first week, the pilots didn’t know were in the past,” explained Adm.