Relating Conceptual Structure with Flexible Concept Use
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University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2019 Relating Conceptual Structure With Flexible Concept Use Sarah Solomon University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the Neuroscience and Neurobiology Commons Recommended Citation Solomon, Sarah, "Relating Conceptual Structure With Flexible Concept Use" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3414. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3414 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3414 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Relating Conceptual Structure With Flexible Concept Use Abstract Our mental words are populated with concepts — rich representations of knowledge about things in the world (e.g., diamonds, pumpkins). In language, words are used to refer to these concepts (e.g., “diamond”, “pumpkin”) and to communicate with others. This is quite impressive given that a word does not activate the same information each time it is used: conceptual information is flexibly activated based on the context. For example, the phrases “raw diamond”, “baseball diamond”, and “diamond eyes” evoke different kinds of diamond information. This flexible concept use is not only exemplified in creative language, but in creative thought and natural language more generally. The goal of this thesis was to leverage methods in cognitive neuroscience, network science, and computational modeling to explore the kinds of conceptual structure that can support this flexible concept use. In the first study (Chapter 2) I capture the global structure of concepts in novel feature-based networks, and show that aspects of this network structure relate to text-based and empirical measures of flexible concept use. I subsequently narrow in on the local representations of conceptual features that relate to flexible concept use yb observing what happens when concepts combine. In one fMRI study (Chapter 3) I show that feature uncertainty predicts the extent to which features (e.g., green, salty) are flexibly modulated in the brain during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations (e.g., “green pumpkin”, “salty cookie”). In follow-up studies (Chapter 4) I further reveal the relationship between feature uncertainty and flexible eaturf e activations in combined concepts. In combinations that modify conceptual brightness (e.g., “dark diamond”, “light night”), an explicit behavioral measure of conceptual feature modulation is predicted by feature uncertainty as well as by a related predictive combinatorial Bayesian model. An associated fMRI study reveals that flexible eaturf e modulation and feature uncertainty relate to responses in left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), suggesting roles for these regions in flexible concept activation. Taken together, this work reveals relationships between conceptual structure and flexible concept use in behavior and in the brain. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Psychology First Advisor Sharon Thompson-Schill Keywords conceptual combination, conceptual knowledge, fMRI, language, network science, semantic memory Subject Categories Cognitive Psychology | Neuroscience and Neurobiology | Psychology This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3414 RELATING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE WITH FLEXIBLE CONCEPT USE Sarah Solomon A DISSERTATION in Psychology Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2019 Supervisor of Dissertation Graduate Group Chairperson Dr. Sharon Thompson-Schill Dr. Sara Jaffee Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Psychology Professor of Psychology Dissertation Committee: Sharon Thompson-Schill, Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Psychology Russell Epstein, Professor of Psychology Lyle Ungar, Professor of Computer and Information Science ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people, animals, and places supported me while I completed the work in this dissertation and I would like to extend my gratitude to all of them. I first want to thank my advisor, Dr. Sharon Thompson-Schill, for the many years of mentorship. I benefited immensely from your analytical and creative insights, which gave me new ways to think about and solve problems. Thank you for letting me pursue my risky or offbeat ideas — some of which are now contained in this thesis. I am also appreciative of your culinary mentorship which introduced me to foods that I may not have tried otherwise. My research output and research experience would not be what it is without the contribution of past and current members of the Thompson-Schill lab. The fresh ideas, constructive criticism, and professional and personal companionship you all provided was immensely valuable. Thank you to everyone who put up with me popping up at your desks unexpectedly to discuss the scientific or non-scientific crisis du jour. I am also thankful for the larger communities at Penn that have supported me at various points and in various ways. I learned a lot from seminars and workshops hosted by the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, Computational Neuroscience Initiative, MindCORE, the NSF IGERT Traineeship in Complex Scene Perception, and the Psychology and Neuroscience departments. Thank you to individual faculty — especially committee members Dr. Russell Epstein and Dr. Lyle Ungar — for your valuable insights and feedback. And a big thank you to the fellow graduate students in the Psychology department who made this experience what it was (#gradschool). I am also grateful for all of the Philadelphia cafés, restaurants, and bars in which I completed much of this work. Thank you for the space, the coffee, the delicious snacks, and the wine. Thank you to Samantha (i.e., Sammies, Samsies, Sammers) the cat — you were with me for all of the highs and all of the lows. You are the cutest thing in the world. And of course, thank you to my family for your ever-flowing support. ii ABSTRACT RELATING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE WITH FLEXIBLE CONCEPT USE Sarah Solomon Sharon Thompson-Schill Our mental words are populated with concepts — rich representations of knowledge about things in the world (e.g., diamonds, pumpkins). In language, words are used to refer to these concepts (e.g., “diamond”, “pumpkin”) and to communicate with others. This is quite impressive given that a word does not activate the same information each time it is used: conceptual information is flexibly activated based on the context. For example, the phrases “raw diamond”, “baseball diamond”, and “diamond eyes” evoke different kinds of diamond information. This flexible concept use is not only exemplified in creative language, but in creative thought and natural language more generally. The goal of this thesis was to leverage methods in cognitive neuroscience, network science, and computational modeling to explore the kinds of conceptual structure that can support this flexible concept use. In the first study (Chapter 2) I capture the global structure of concepts in novel feature-based networks, and show that aspects of this network structure relate to text-based and empirical measures of flexible concept use. I subsequently narrow in on the local representations of conceptual features that relate to flexible concept use by observing what happens when concepts combine. In one fMRI study (Chapter 3) I show that feature uncertainty predicts the extent to which features (e.g., green, salty) are flexibly modulated in the brain during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations (e.g., “green pumpkin”, “salty cookie”). In follow-up studies (Chapter 4) I further reveal the relationship between feature uncertainty and flexible feature activations in combined concepts. In combinations that modify conceptual brightness (e.g., “dark diamond”, “light night”), an explicit behavioral measure of conceptual feature modulation is predicted by feature uncertainty as well as by a related predictive combinatorial Bayesian model. An associated fMRI study reveals that flexible feature modulation and feature uncertainty relate to responses in left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), suggesting roles for these regions in flexible concept activation. Taken together, this work reveals relationships between conceptual structure and flexible concept use in behavior and in the brain. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT ........................................................................................... II ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. III LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................. VII LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................... VIII 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1 1.1 Conceptual compositionality ......................................................................................... 2 1.1.1 Neural models ............................................................................................................. 2 1.1.2 Cognitive models .......................................................................................................