The Impact of Creative Ambiguity

A Case Study of the Aftermath of the Kosovo-Serbia Brussels Agreement 2013

Minja Salie Odai

Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Global Political Studies Bachelor Thesis 12 credits Spring semester 2020 Supervisor: Ivan Gusic

Abstract

Creative ambiguity as a negotiation strategy is used often in peace agreements and refers to when ambiguities are used in agreements to serve as a positive motivation to get over obstacles. While it has many positive impacts, the use of creative ambiguity also often times shifts the burden of the negotiation phase to the implementations phase, and thus can result into agreements that are not implemented as well as plummeting the relations between the parties affected. This thesis aims to understand how the use of creative ambiguity in the Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia had an impact on the heightened conflict between the countries. This thesis is a single instrumental case study that illustrates the issue of creative ambiguity through the case of the Brussels Agreement. Through analysing interferences from material mainly collected from both countries’ government websites, this study conducted that the use of creative ambiguity had a harmful impact not only on the relations between Kosovo and Serbia, but also on the implementation of the agreement.

Key words: Creative ambiguity, peace agreements, post-conflict reconciliation, Kosovo and Serbia, normalisation of relations

Words: 13,700

List of Abbreviations

ASM Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities EU European Union IBM Integrated Border/Boundary Management ICJ International Court of Justice IDP Internally Displaced People KLA Kosovo Liberation Army NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council

Table of contents

1 Introduction ...... 1

1.1 Research Problem ...... 2 1.2 Aim and Research Question ...... 2 1.3 Relevance to the Field of Peace and Conflict Studies ...... 3 1.4 Outline of the Thesis ...... 4

2 Background and Previous Research ...... 5

2.1 Kosovo-Serbia Relations Briefly ...... 5 2.2 Negotiation and Mediation Efforts Between Kosovo and Serbia ...... 7 2.3 Brussels Agreement and the Use of Ambiguities...... 8

3 Theoretical Framework ...... 10

3.1 Negotiations ...... 10 3.1.1 Creative Ambiguity ...... 12 3.1.2 Arguments for the Use of Ambiguities ...... 13 3.1.3 Arguments Against the Use of Ambiguities ...... 16 3.2 Operalisation ...... 19 3.2.1 Interpretation of the Agreement ...... 19 3.2.2 Compliance...... 20 3.2.3 Saving Time and Costs ...... 20 3.2.4 Building a Dialogue ...... 20

4 Methodological Framework ...... 22

4.1 Case Study ...... 22 4.2 Case Selection ...... 23 4.3 Validity and Reliability ...... 23 4.4 Material ...... 24 4.5 Ethical Considerations...... 26 4.6 Analysis of Material ...... 27 4.7 Delimitations ...... 27

5 Analysis ...... 29

5.1 The Agreement ...... 29 5.2 Analysis Through the Operational Questions ...... 30 5.2.1 Interpretation of the Agreement ...... 30 5.2.2 Compliance...... 34 5.2.3 Saving Time and Costs ...... 36

5.2.4 Building a Dialogue ...... 38

6 Concluding Discussion ...... 42

6.1 Concluding Statement ...... 42 6.1.1 Suggestions for Future Research ...... 43

7 References ...... 45 Other sources: ...... 48

Appendix I - Sources...... 49

1 Introduction

Negotiations as a non-violent conflict resolution method have increased rapidly after the post-Cold War era, albeit being a popular one before as well. These include mediation and different forms of negotiation strategies from bargaining to power mediation (Bercovitch, 1992:4). The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia can be traced to before the break of Yugoslavia but had its peak in the late 1990’s with NATO interference (King & Maison, 2006:45). In 2008, Kosovo declared independence for the second time, yet Serbia has not recognised the independence despite the confirmation of the International Court of Justice that the declaration is not in violation with international laws (Bieber, 2015:288). Serbia continues to regard Kosovo as an autonomous state under Serbian rule, and the Serbian majority municipalities especially have been a source of dispute between the two sides. Mediation efforts from the European Union to normalise the relations between Kosovo and Serbia started in 2011, with what some regard as a breakthrough in 2013 by the signing of the Brussels agreement between Kosovo

and Serbia1. The signing of the agreement can be contributed to the use of creative ambiguity, a strategic method used both in negotiation process and formulating an agreement, where issues that seem unnegotiable are left out of the agreement and sensitive issues are formulated in a way that multiple interpretations can be derived from it (Bieber, 2015:306). As the Brussels Agreement is the first agreement signed by Kosovo and Serbia, it sparked the interest of doing a case study for understanding the use and impact of creative ambiguity in peace negotiations. Thus, this thesis is a single instrumental case study of the normalisation agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, in which the phenomenon of creative ambiguity is studied. This study does not provide opinion whether Kosovo should be recognised by Serbia. However, for clarity, Kosovo is referred

1 Formally the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations and here after referred to as the Brussels Agreement

as a country in this thesis, following the 2010 ICJ ruling where Kosovo’s declaration of independence was ruled as not a violation of international laws (Bieber, 2015:295).

1.1 Research Problem

Creative ambiguity as a negotiation strategy is often used in different forms of bi- and multilateral negotiations (Zartman, 2008:22). It can have multiple positive side effects, such as achieving a signed agreement, saving time and breaking deadlocks (Troitskiy, 2019:230). In certain scenarios, agreements formulated by using creative ambiguity can be durable with a straightforward implementation phase (Rudnianski & Bestougeff, 2007:151). Nevertheless, the use of ambiguities in peace agreements can lead to problems. Although the Brussels Agreement was signed in 2013, little of what was agreed upon has been implemented to satisfy both parties. Furthermore, the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia has degraded, and getting back to the negotiation table seems unlikely. Therefore, understanding what sort of a role creative ambiguity in the Brussels Agreement has had in creating the aforementioned problems, highlights when and if ambiguities in peace agreements should be used.

1.2 Aim and Research Question

The purpose of the study is to show how the use of creative ambiguity, which was a conscious choice by the European Union as a mediator in the Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia 2013, has perpetuated the conflict between Pristina and Belgrade despite the intention of the agreement to normalise their relationship. Thus, the phenomenon that will be analysed is the creative ambiguity and its implications. The aim is to shed light on the use of creative ambiguity in peace agreements through a single instrumental case study of the Brussels Agreement.

Research question:

How can we understand the role of creative ambiguity in the heightened conflict between Pristina and Belgrade in the aftermath of the Brussels Agreement?

Operational questions:

1. How was the agreement interpreted?

2. Did the opposing parties view each other as non-compliant?

3. Was there a need for more negotiation rounds? Was the agreement successfully implemented?

4. Did the parties’ relationship improve?

1.3 Relevance to the Field of Peace and Conflict Studies

According to Galtung (1996:265): “Peace is what we have when creative conflict transformation can take place non-violently”. Negotiations are a non-violent method for conflict resolution (Bercovitch, 1992:4), and to understand whether the consequences of the negotiations might have the opposite effect than what is desired, is central for improving the method. The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia remains sensitive and on the brink of conflict, thus the normalisation of the relations between the two countries has not been achieved. Additionally, the post-conflict situation in Kosovo remains in negative peace, where direct violence remains mostly, although not completely, absent, but cultural and structural violence are specifically visible in the northern part of Kosovo. “All these absences of types of violence add up to negative peace; as by mutual isolation unrelated by any structure and culture. This situation is better than violence, but it is not fully peaceful because positive peace is missing

in this conceptualization” (Galtung, 2011:1). For example, the northern town Mitrovica in Kosovo is divided into North Mitrovica, with Serbian majority, and South Mitrovica, with Albanian majority, while interaction between these two parts of the city is non-existent (Gusic, 2020:151). The Brussels Agreement has not been fully implemented after seven years, the question of Serbian minorities and the lack of dealing with the status of Kosovo especially causing difficulties. These notions suggest that the negotiation methods have not achieved what was expected. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the field of Peace and Conflict Studies because understanding how creative ambiguity as a strategy used in non- violent conflict resolution can have an impact on actually heightening the conflict rather than solving it is central for improving negotiation strategies.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The introduction presented the context, aim and research problem of the study. The following chapter focuses on background and previous research by guiding the reader through Kosovo’s and Serbia’s relationship prior, during, and after the 1990’s wars in former Yugoslavia. Additionally, a brief description of the EU’s mediation efforts between Kosovo and Serbia prior to the Brussels Agreement is offered. The third chapter offers a theoretical framework based on negotiation and diplomacy literature, while focusing on the use of creative ambiguity in peace agreements. The fourth chapter outlines single case study as a method, including a material discussion as well as delimitations of the study. The fifth chapter is the analysis, which starts with an overlook at the Brussels Agreement, followed by analysis through the operational questions. Lastly, the sixth chapter presents the concluding remarks about the findings discussed in the analysis. Furthermore, suggestions for further research are presented there.

2 Background and Previous Research

2.1 Kosovo-Serbia Relations Briefly

The focus in this section will be on the Yugoslavian era, namely the post-Second World War Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1945-1991 (SFRY), as well as the 1990’s wars in the region and the aftermath.

During the SFRY era, it was Tito’s intention that Kosovo, together other Albanian regions would be returned to Albania eventually, given that the Serbian nationalist

would not oppose it too harshly (King & Maison2, 2006:33). This, however, never happened. Kosovo remained one of the poorest areas in the region, and although Albanians were represented under a system of proportional representation, Kosovo became an ‘autonomous province’ within Serbia in 1974 (ibid.). Yet this brought little satisfaction to the Albanians living in Kosovo; mainly because Slavic groups inside SFRY were considered nations with their own republics, compared to Albanians who were only regarded as a nationality (ibid.; Vujačić, 2016:17). Additionally, Albanians and Serbians were constantly clashing over accusations of assaults and threats as well as systemic problems (ibid.:34). The rise of Milošević brought a change of politics from socialist ideology to Serbian nationalism (ibid.:37). Milošević’s actions were met with protests, as his aims were to make Serbia ‘whole’ again by renouncing the 1974 autonomous status of Kosovo (ibid.). Segregation between Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo commenced to new levels: children were taught separately, Albanians were

2 Author’s note: this is one of the few sources that present Serbian and Kosovar history in a way that both sides are satisfied of the portrayal

removed from police forces, teaching positions and state jobs, and the Albanian- language media was supressed (ibid.:38-39). This was met with Kosovo’s first declaration of independence on 19 October 1991 (ibid.:39). Followed by the declaration, Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo were further segregated; while Albanians were in charge of the private sector, Serbia was in charge of the public sector (ibid.:40). The 1995 Dayton Peace Conference to end the war in Bosnia dismissed the question of Kosovo, as too much was on the plate already (ibid.:41). The general atmosphere in Kosovo was to trust that the international community would pressure Belgrade with the situation in Kosovo, as it had in Bosnia. But the lack of attention given to Kosovo in the Dayton Accords, the optimistic hope from the EU that making Kosovo independent in any other way than in name would be enough, together the lift of the embargo previously issued to Serbia, put pressure in Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to transform itself from protestors to paramilitary army (ibid.:42). In early 1998, the Yugoslav army attacked areas in Kosovo that had KLA support, which escalated into a full-fledged war (ibid.:43). The International community recognised the excessive use of force and extrajudicial measures taken by the Yugoslav army, but reckoned KLA committing similar offenses, just on a smaller scale (ibid.). Concern grew and was met with the UN S/RES/199 that demanded a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo (idib.:44). Unfortunately, these methods did little to prevent Milošević from continuing his quest to have Kosovo under Serbia’s rule, which resulted in the first ever armed attack from NATO to a non-member country without United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) approval (ibid.:45; Mehmeti & Radeljić, 2016:4). Operation Allied Forces managed to force Milošević to withdraw his army from Kosovo after a series of airstrikes on both Serbian and Kosovar ground (ibid.:46). What followed was a UN mandated peace keeping mission, where for example United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) were in charge of the judicial, legislative, executive powers, as well as security and state formation of Kosovo (Knoll, 2005:638; Mehmeti & Radeljić, 2016:5). On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence the second time. The challenges Kosovo has faced with the road to independence have been more complex in comparison to the other countries that emerged from the former

Yugoslavia (Bieber, 2015:286). The key obstacle has indisputably been Serbia’s refusal to acknowledge any other status of Kosovo than autonomy within Serbia, which is stated in their constitution (ibid.:288). Disputes over the status of Kosovo still remains one of the main reasons for the inflamed relations between the two countries.

2.2 Negotiation and Mediation Efforts Between Kosovo and Serbia

Based on a 2005 Special Envoy report, Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari issued the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement in 2007, which consisted of 14 articles dealing with human rights, rights of IDPs and cultural heritage (Clark, 2014). The proposal became a basis of Kosovo’s constitution although Russia blocked it when it was presented to UNSC, and Serbia rejected it on the basis of the Serbs living in Kosovo (ibid.; Bieber, 2015:290). The EU mediated talks between Kosovo and Serbia commenced in Brussels March 2011 without a set timetable, roadmap or goals (Bieber, 2015:297). The aim of the talks was not to solve the issue of Kosovo’s statehood, but to produce modest progress by putting the major and sensitive questions aside and work through technical terms (ibid.:297). The question of Kosovo’s statehood was not only sensitive with Serbia, but also on the side of the mediator, as five EU countries had not recognised Kosovo as a state (Beha, 2014:116). The initial topics included land and civil registers as well as the recognition of Kosovo’s educational diplomas, issues that would have a direct impact on the people living in Kosovo without any allegory or link to statehood (Bieber, 2014:300). The talks prior to the Brussels Agreement were purely marked as talks, thus any conclusion that was arrived to was not an agreement or a treaty between the two countries (ibid.). Between 2011 and 2012, the countries went through ten rounds of talks, completed by a conclusion of talks, where further issues such as custom stamps to allow legal trade was concluded (ibid.). Gradually more complex issues such as border management were brought up to be dealt with, but from early on, creative ambiguity was used to arrive to a conclusion and to keep the negotiation process

ongoing (ibid.:302). One of these issues were the border between Kosovo and Serbia, which was referred to with the acronym IBM: this meant that Serbia could sell it as “Integrated Boundary Management”, whereas for Kosovo it meant “Integrated Border Management” (ibid.; Beha, 2014:107). This, however, led to a more difficult implementation process than what the actual talks initially were, but nonetheless, kept the talks ongoing. By 2012, it became clear that an actual political settlement was needed between the two countries, so that the technical agreements could be implemented (ibid.:304). By late 2012, EU had delivered the guidelines to what direction the talks would continue to and resulted in the breakthrough of the Brussels Agreement in April 2013 (ibid.305-306).

2.3 Brussels Agreement and the Use of Ambiguities

This section focuses on previously published literature on the Brussels Agreement. For a more detailed research on negotiation strategies and the use of ambiguities in peace agreements, see the theoretical framework in chapter three. The idea is to obtain an overview and position the thesis accordingly, as well as how this case study can contribute on addressing possible research gaps.

The Brussels Agreement and its ambiguous nature has been researched by a few scholars (e.g. Beha, 2014; Bieber, 2015), where focus has been on disambiguating the agreement and addressing the difficulties detected in the implementation phase. These works establish the fact that creative ambiguity was used in the agreement, as well as pinpoint what exactly in the agreement was ambiguous, what was left out of the agreement, and the reasons behind the use of creative ambiguity. The nature of the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia were extremely sensitive, therefore, it was feared that the negotiations would arrive to a deadlock or a failure if the sensitive issues, such as Kosovo’s status would be dealt with in any way (Bieber, 2015:303). As mentioned before, these works do draw some connections between the use of creative ambiguity and difficulties in implementation phase but lack an overall analysis on the possible impact it had in dealing with the relationship between the two countries.

While the use of creative ambiguity in the Brussels Agreement has only been studied by few, research on the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia (e.g. King & Maison, 2006; Mehmeti & Radeljić, 2016; Ramet, 2005; Maloney, 2018) and the use of ambiguities in peace agreements on a theoretical level (see for example Pehar, 2001; Ikle, 1964; Franck, 2002; Zartman, 2009, further elaboration on their work in chapter three) have been studied vastly. The dispute over the Kosovar territory and to whom it should belong to has been a constant battle for well over a century, with justifications from both Serbian and Albanian sides dating to historical events even as far back as the 6th century (Mehmeti & Radeljić, 2016:3; King & Maison, 2006:25). A lot of the literature focuses on the SFRY era as well as the Yugoslav wars and international intervention, which undoubtedly have a key role when researching the relationship between these two countries. However, to understand the current relations today, recent events that have had an impact, such as the Brussels Agreement, could give valuable insight as well. Therefore, while both the ambiguities of the Brussels Agreement have been studied to a certain extent by couple of researchers and the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia is vastly researched, there is a research gap with tying these two together and exploring the causal effect i.e. the creative ambiguity as a factor that had an impact on the relationship between the two countries during the past seven years. This study aims to contribute to that research gap by conducting a single instrumental case study, drawing from the theoretical framework of the use of ambiguities to answer whether the use of creative ambiguity had an impact in the heightening conflict between Kosovo and Serbia.

3 Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this section is to frame theoretically how to succeed in peace negotiations. This is to guide when analysing creative ambiguity. First, an overall view on the negotiation process is provided, including participation and desirable outcomes, followed by theories of the use of ambiguities in peace agreements. Both the negative and positive aspects of creative ambiguity are explored in this chapter. In other words, to analyse creative ambiguity in the Brussels Agreement, a set of operational questions will be constructed based on diplomatic and negotiation literature, to see what sort of an impact creative ambiguity can have.

3.1 Negotiations

Zartman (2009:56) distinguishes the negotiation approach of concession/convergence, which grasps the nature of negotiations the most. It views negotiations as a learning process, where the opposing parties react to each other’s concession behaviour. This approach includes examples such as bargaining and territorial concessions (ibid.). The concession/convergence approach attempts to answer the question “how to bargain best” and focuses on the process of negotiation (ibid.:15). Zartman continues to identify five different ways to arrive at convergence: simple coincidence of initial positions, where the parties come to understand that their proposals are in fact identical; concession, where the other party gives in to the other side’s demands; counter concessions or compensation, which are often coupled with a second category where the party that received the concession counters with their own concession; compromise or joint concession, where both parties give-in some and arrive at an agreement somewhere between their initial proposals; and finally avoiding convergence, in which explicit convergence is ignored, thus resulting in ambiguities (ibid.:22).

Issues being addressed in peace negotiations can be divided into two categories: objective and relationship issues (Harris et al. 1998:88). Objective issues need to be laid out clearly, while relationship issues should be given voice as well to achieve a lasting agreement (ibid.:96). Thus, the building of the settlement focuses on the former, but some attention must be given to the latter as that promotes good process and might defuse relationship issues indirectly. Especially when many issues tackled in peace negotiations have deep emotional or psychological reverberations that should be addressed rather than set aside or de-emphasized (ibid.). In practice, this means that the objective issues, for example, territorial disputes, are recognised and clarified, and what follows is the dealing of perceptions of the opposing parties (ibid.). If the negotiations are not conducted this way, arrival at or implementation of an agreement can fail. Choosing participants for peace agreements is not straightforward. Having more parties in negotiations increases the probability of the agreement’s success, as it includes all the sides it affects, giving them more influence and reducing the risk of spoilers, i.e. parties that could sabotage or disrupt the implementation of the agreement (Harris et al.1998:69). However, including more parties in the negotiations can result in new challenges. Nevertheless, the minimal requirement should be to involve the parties that are affected by the agreement (ibid.:71). The value of the agreement increases with the number of parties included, as long as all parties included are essential (Odell & Tingley, 2015:255). Thus, the parties included should be the ones having a genuine stake in the conflict, and those who are actually needed to implement and endorse the agreement (Harris et al. 1998:71). If all affected parties cannot be included in the negotiations, they should at least be kept informed and have their interests represented (Suskind & Babbit, 1994:36). Participation can be divided into two categories: open and closed participation (Saliternik, 2016:623). Open participation refers to a situation where all interested parties are allowed to participate, whereas closed participation refers to the inclusion of stakeholders only. Participation can include decision-making power, or just advising power (ibid.). However, negotiations tend to be exclusionary and stakeholders’ input is rarely heard (ibid.:642). The inclusion of the affected parties increases the understanding of the agreement as well.

Negotiations can be bilateral, i.e. between two parties, or multilateral, between multiple parties (Harris et al. 1998:112). Mediation can be divided into ‘track one’ diplomacy, where the mediator has an official status and recognised power, and ‘track two’ diplomacy, where the mediator does not bring any power or influence on the table (ibid.). One of mediator’s core skills can be defined to produce outcomes in a defined language with no ambiguity, to prevent conflict over interpretation (ibid.:113). The success of peace agreements can be assessed based on fairness, equality

and justice regarding outcomes3. However, as the focus of this study is how creative ambiguity has had an impact on the aftermath and implementation of the Brussels Agreement, the outcome of the agreement will be analysed based on the provisions and the purpose of the agreement, i.e. whether the agreement built relationship between the countries, as normalisation agreements are intended to do (Iklé, 1964:27) and whether the agreed provisions were implemented. A desirable outcome is that the agreement can be implemented and sustained, otherwise it holds little to no value (Harris et al. 1998:345). Moreover, the outcome is more acceptable and easier to implement when both sides are satisfied (Bercovitch, 1992:22). Thus, deeming an agreement successful lies on the fact how well it was able to be implemented, how sustainable it was, and lastly, whether both sides were satisfied with the agreement.

3.1.1 Creative Ambiguity

“Ambiguity means the lack of clarity about the meaning of an important aspect of negotiated agreement – whether substantive or procedural” (Troitskiy, 2019:238). In order for a communication to be ambiguous, it must allow a minimum of two incompatible interpretations (Pehar, 2001:164). Ambiguities can be words, sentences and constructed contradictions. The contradictions can be illustrated by allowing a certain establishment limited powers in a provision of a peace treaty,

3 See for example Druckman, D., Wagner, L. 2019. ”Justice Matters: Peace Negotiations, Stable Agreements, and Durable Peace”, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 63(2), pp. 287–316. doi: 10.1177/0022002717739088.

which would be contradicted by another provision that would allow the establishment to exercise additional functions as well. This is often stated in an ambiguous way (ibid.:167). Creative ambiguity can also be referred to situations where central issues are left out, but enough flexibility is given that it can be interpreted as a resolved issue. This means that issues that could block achieving an agreement, such as territorial issues, are essentially left out, but are touched upon to a certain level, allowing the other party to believe that the issue is handled de facto (ibid.). Using ambiguities in peace agreements is a strategic choice that has to be made; ambiguous and clearly defined agreements represent opposite ends of the negotiation spectrum (Guelke, 2003:60). There are myriad of reasons why to employ ambiguities in peace agreements, which will be discussed in the following sections.

3.1.2 Arguments for the Use of Ambiguities

Peace agreement negotiations are often hampered by many obstacles, such as security dilemmas, broken relationships, trust, emotional and psychological issues as well as issues that are particularly difficult to settle due to strong opposing standpoints (Lounsbery & DeRouen, 2018:140; Harris et al. 1998:88). To tackle these obstacles, ambiguity is often included, since ambiguous terms are easier to negotiate and receive the least amount of resistance from the opposing sides (Pillar, 1983:230). Consequently, the blurred lines provided by creative ambiguity hide the underlying differences of the opposing parties, and efforts to clear up those lines might hinder the process of coming to an agreement by highlighting them (ibid.; Troitskiy, 2019:238). Thus, ambiguities in the agreement can enable the negotiating parties to come to an agreement and end a war, hostilities or friction (Pehar, 2001:190). Here, the argument entails that ambiguous formation is valuable as it allows the opposing parties to sign some sort of an agreement (ibid.:189). Addressing issues that are sensitive and difficult to negotiate pose a threat to the negotiation process as they are one of the main reasons for the cessation of negotiations and communication (ibid.:172). Ambiguities can be used to get past

these issues and are thus a valuable strategy to combat deadlocks and discontinuities (Pillar, 1983:230). Additionally, ambiguous language can reduce fears of an unfavourable deal (Troitskiy, 2019:239). An ambiguous agreement can also bring the two parties together to sign an agreement to end hostilities, which should count for an improvement even if the ambiguous nature could cause further conflict in later terms. With the signing of the agreement, the relationship has inevitably taken a step in the right direction (Pehar, 2001: 190). Whether the use of ambiguities causes conflict in later terms is not seen a major threat, as a fight over words is far less of a problem than physical violence, which would have to be solved with a peace agreement. Pehar relies on Galtung’s notion: “Peace is what we have when creative conflict transformation can take place non-violently” (cited in Pehar, 2001:192) and argues that ambiguity in peace agreements fits to this notion. During negotiation processes, ambiguity can be used to buy time or gain new information (Rudnianski & Bestougeff, 2007:151). This is done so that an ambiguous agreement is made, pushing the possible disambiguating of the agreement in the future and allowing the actors to gain more information, so that a more comprehensive agreement could be conducted later on. Gathering the information during negotiation process, which a more detailed agreement requires, can lead to decreasing support from the home front, as focus there might shift to something else (Odell & Tingley, 2015:262). Moreover, conducting a detailed agreement is time consuming, costly as well as potentially threatening to the process of peace negotiations by disturbing the momentum and making the sides suspect the purpose of the talks (du Toit, 2003:70). Ambiguity can also be used to “ear mark” issues that cannot be solved for later negotiations (Iklé, 1964:22). The idea here is that issues unresolved in the original negotiation has been talked over to a certain degree. When they are reopened in the following negotiations, the opposing parties’ views would not be quite where the original negotiation started, but have evolved closer to each other, and thus, are easier to negotiate when brought up again. For it to be creative ambiguity, the ambiguous language serves as a positive motivation, to help the opposing actors and create opportunities for interaction and to soften the initial disagreement, so that later on there is room for more concrete agreement (ibid.).

Pehar (2001:187) argues that when ambiguities are used in peace agreements, all parties are fully aware of the fact that they are being used and of the consequences that follow. Moreover, because all parties are aware of the use of ambiguities and the possible consequences, the aftermath of the agreement, the possible reoccurrence of the conflict, is more predictable and channelled as the provisions that will be fought over are known in advance (ibid.). This means that the conscious use of creative ambiguity guides the handling of the aftermath. If it is known that issue x can cause problems during the implementation phase due to the creative ambiguity used, all the parties are equipped to handle that issue as it is known beforehand. Under certain circumstances ambiguity can lead to positive outcomes, such as bringing the parties together through the two individual ‘wrong’ interpretations to come up with a joint third interpretation that would benefit both, while also promoting reconciliation through the cooperative effort (Pehar, 2001:189; Troitskiy, 2019:238). Additionally, agreements can be formed with ambiguity if the opposing parties are prepared to take a risk and postpone the disambiguating of the agreement for future negotiations (Troistkiy, 2019:239). The issue of non-compliance linked to the use of ambiguities in peace agreement has two counter arguments: if a party implements an ambiguous provision according to their interpretation, this should not be seen as a sign of non-compliance, as the party does comply according to the agreement, just under their own interpretation (Pehar, 2001:187). Additionally, this would be the same case if the party would be to implement the provision according to the opposite party’s interpretation, as well as if the party chooses to implement the provision after it has been interpreted properly by both parties together, i.e. disambiguated (ibid.). Even if a more specific agreement would be drafted, the risk is that those might be violated as well, especially as these “disputes are essentially a symptom of disagreements about the substance, not the form, of the settlement” (Iklé, 1964:12). On another note, it can be argued that no peace agreement is perfect i.e. resolving all issues, nor should that be sought after as peace agreements are a slow process for transformation (Pehar, 2001:192). What is argued here again is that the opposing sides should learn from the ambiguous agreement to come together and find a third interpretation that fits both sides’ agenda. Or, alternatively, the

creative ambiguity can be used to build a dialogue between the parties, in order for more demanding issues to be resolved later on.

3.1.3 Arguments Against the Use of Ambiguities

Ambiguities used in agreements obstruct the reflection of language and as the principal purpose of language is to provide information, ambiguous information is less transparent with multiple interpretations and thus, less usable (Pehar, 2001:163). Agreements cannot be assessed only by the nature that they have been signed (Lounsbery & DeRouen, 2018:142). The lasting nature of a peace agreement is far more valuable, as it prevents the conflict from recurring (ibid). A lasting agreement can be ensured with clear and thorough agreements (ibid.). Thus, although ambiguity can be a tool to get past deadlocks and discontinuities, it entails high risks (Pehar, 2001:189). The argument that fight over words or interpretations is less of a problem than actual war or hostilities undermines the importance of durability of the peace agreements and does not take into account Galtung’s notion of negative peace, by reducing the aftermath of the agreement into “fight over interpretation” (ibid.:192), although the aftermath most likely entails far graver issues. The advantage with detailed approach in agreements is that it ensures that the settlement is less likely to fail due to disagreements over interpretation (du Toit, 2003:70). Even in optimistic situations “ambiguous ‘peace agreements’ unleash a psychological war of words and perceptions” and works as a sort of Machiavellian manipulative device that might bring forward momentary gratification by deceivingly meeting both parties’ demands (Pehar, 2001:172). The deceiving nature of ambiguity lies on the fact that both parties have the right to interpret the agreement to their benefit, which will lead to exploitation (ibid.). Thus, resulting in arguments over interpretation and further hindering the building of a relationship through the peace agreement (ibid.:189).

Speaking metaphorically, the inclusion of ambiguous expressions in a peace agreement is comparable to reopening a repository of arms to the parties and inviting them to rearm themselves with a kind of

intellectual weaponry. This intellectual weaponry, i.e. ambiguity, is highly likely to be employed by both parties as soon as the first step in implementation is taken. For that reason, implementation of an ambiguous agreement is very likely to fail (Pehar, 2001:172).

As mentioned earlier, ambiguities can be used to ‘ear mark’ issues that cannot be solved for later negotiations (Iklé, 1964:22). However, such residual agreements are difficult to predict (ibid.18). Although, they could have positive effects by isolating unsettled matters and coming to some sort of an agreement, they might have an immense negative impact on the post-war relationship of the parties for decades and could even escalate another war (ibid.; du Toit, 2003:66). The longer it takes to solve issues, the more difficult the process becomes, consequently leaving them for future negotiations would not help in resolving them (Iklé, 1964:20). Therefore, the failure to establish a detailed settlement leads to a difficult implementation that can require a continued process of negotiations with the need of more agreements to correct and expand the original one (Guelke, 2003:61). The additional rounds of talks and negotiations are time consuming as well, defeating the purpose of having a less time-consuming ambiguous agreement in the first place. Furthermore, the stage of additional rounds and negotiations are highly sensitive for disputes over interpretations and overcoming these obstacles can indeed prove to be even more challenging (ibid.). With detailed agreements, future settlements over interpretations become obsolete (Lounsbery & DeRouen, 2018:142). Presumably, success is faster the easier it is to understand the agreement (Odell & Tingley, 2015:262). Especially when it comes to civil war peace agreements, which the normalisation agreement between Serbia and Kosovo can be seen. An agreement also promotes “a shared vision of the future” (Lounsbery & DeRouen, 2018:142). Thus, the more elaborate and detailed the agreement is, the larger the vision of shared future, the greater the commitment, and therefore more effective it is to maintain peace in the aftermath of the agreement (ibid.). On a different note, the requirement of complying by the agreement is questionable with an ambiguous agreement. When ambiguities are used, the norm that the agreement sets is opaque, problematic for interpretation as well as unfair towards the sides that are to comply with it (Franck, 2002:32). Thus, the

agreement should be transparent and clear on key issues and interpretations to assure that ambiguities do not prevent the sides from understanding what is expected from them in the agreement (ibid.:31). This lack of understanding can lead to non-compliance, since compliance can hardly be expected if the requirements of the agreement are not clearly set and therefore making the implementation of the agreement a near impossibility. Furthermore, one or both of the parties could use the ambiguous language as an excuse for not complying with the agreement. Thus, an agreement can only be classified as fair when the norms of it are fully understood (ibid.). Additionally, success can be determined when a jointly determined value is agreed upon (Zartman, 2008:36). Agreeing jointly on a value rarely allows room for ambiguity of interpretation. Peace agreements are rarely perfect, but they should be arranged to minimize any post-conflict conflict. Therefore, with the risks that ambiguities bring, their usage should be avoided. Moreover, the parties of the agreement are not always aware that their interpretation of an ambiguous agreement has alternatives, and that the opposing party would interpret them in a different way, thus the notion that all parties are aware of the usage of ambiguities and the possible impacts is faulty (Iklé, 1964:15). There are three possible immediate consequences of ambiguity:

(1) the parties have an honest misunderstanding about implications that the agreement fails to spell out; […] (2) one party, while knowing that its opponent expected of the bargain, may pretend that they had a different understanding of it (i.e., the ambiguities or exploited to cover up a deliberate violation). […] [(3)] the parties to the agreement know that the ambiguous terms mean different things to each of them (ibid.).

The first outcome refers to parties being unaware that their interpretation of the agreement differs from that of the other party’s (Iklé, 1964:9). Here, the other party might feel cheated on if the agreement is not fulfilled the way they have interpreted it. The solution would be to have a more specific agreement (ibid.). The second outcome, on the other hand, refers to when the other party purposefully misunderstands the ambiguous agreement to their benefit, thus deliberately violating the agreement, while knowing that the opposing party’s

understanding was different (ibid.; Pehar, 2001:188; Berridge, 2005). Thus, the underlying disputes should not be ‘papered over’ as the two parties insist on their own interpretations, which could hinder their relationship and cooperation. As a result, it is not likely for the parties to jointly disambiguate the agreement (Pehar, 2001:189). The third outcome refers to a situation where “Equivocal language is used to cover up disagreements on issues which must be included for some reason in a larger settlement or which must be dealt with as if there was an agreement” (ibid.:15). This can also be seen as something similar to partial agreements, where undecided issues are left for future negotiations, but the differences are covered up in equivocal terms rather than pinned for following rounds of negotiations (ibid.). Ambiguities can be a good tool in negotiations to ensure flexibility, but in terms of the agreement they can cause more harm than good (ibid.:16).

3.2 Operalisation

The analysis will be assisted by four sets of operational questions derived from the theory. These operational questions aid in answering the research question How can we understand the role of creative ambiguity in the heightened conflict between Pristina and Belgrade in the aftermath of the Brussels Agreement? They are organised below in the same order as they will be analysed in the analysis.

3.2.1 Interpretation of the Agreement

Creative ambiguity can lead to a situation where the opposing parties have opposing views on what was agreed upon. This could happen in three ways: the opposing views are an honest misunderstanding, the parties take intentionally advantage of the ambiguous language and interpret it to their advantage, knowing that their interpretation differs from the other party’s interpretation, or equivocal language is used so that a partial agreement is arrived to (Iklé, 1964:15), Alternatively, the ambiguous language does not create different interpretations, or if it does, the parties could come together to find a solution, i.e. joint third interpretation to satisfy both sides (Pehar, 2001:189).

Therefore, the operational question is: How was the agreement interpreted?

3.2.2 Compliance

Conducting an ambiguous agreement can lead to non-compliance, either something only perceived by the other party or a real one, as what is agreed upon is not fully understood. Provisions, norms and values can be very opaque if creative ambiguity is used (Franck, 2002:32). On the other hand, even if the party only complies the agreement according to how they have interpreted it, it should be seen as compliance (Pehar, 2001:187).

Therefore, the operational question is: Did the opposing parties view each other as non-compliant?

3.2.3 Saving Time and Costs

Ambiguity can save time and costs as an ambiguous agreement is easier to negotiate and agree upon, as blurred lines mask the differences between the parties. Moreover, the ambiguous language can aid the negotiation process to get over impasses or deadlocks (Pillar, 1983:230; Troitskiy, 2019:238). Alternatively, the time and money saved by conducting an ambiguous agreement is defeated by the fact that the implementation process will be long and difficult as additional rounds of talks are needed to disambiguate the agreement (Guelke, 2003:61).

Therefore, the operational question is: Was there a need for more negotiation rounds? Was the agreement successfully implemented?

3.2.4 Building a Dialogue

Solving the minor questions first and leaving the major questions on the side is used to build a dialogue between the two parties (Iklé, 1964:22). However, unresolved issues or different interpretations can lead to hindering the relationship

as well. The ambiguous language can work as a Machiavellian manipulative device that brings only momentary satisfaction by bringing the parties together to sign an agreement, while plausibly causing an escalated conflict in later terms (Pehar, 2001:172).

Therefore, the operational question is: Did the parties’ relationship improve?

4 Methodological Framework

4.1 Case Study

The chosen case study method is a single instrumental case study. A case study is an empirical method that focuses in-depth on a case within its real-world context (Yin, 2018:50; Creswell, 2018:225). Questions such as ‘how’ and ‘why’ are central to the method “to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” (Schramm, 1971, cited in Yin, 2018:49). As this study focuses on creative ambiguity, a case study offers “the opportunity to shed empirical light on some theoretical concepts or principles” (Yin, 2018:79), and is thus suitable for my investigation. Analytic generalisations that can be derived from the specific case is sought after. Analytical generalisation refers to the generalisation of theoretical propositions, thus arriving to statistical generalisations, i.e. deducting probabilities is not the aim (ibid.). A case study can be defined as single or collective as well as intrinsic or instrumental case study (Creswell, 2018:232). Single case study sheds light through one case whereas collective case study focuses on multiple cases. Intrinsic case study’s focus lies on a case that is extraordinary in nature, thus the focus is on the case, while instrumental case study focuses on an issue that is illustrated through the selected case (ibid.:229-230; Stake, 1995:3). With instrumental case study the aim is to understand something more than just the specific case, as the phenomenon studied is not unique to only that case (Stake, 1995:3). Therefore, as the focus of this study is creative ambiguity in peace agreements – the issue- that is illustrated through a case – The Brussels Agreement between Belgrade and Pristina- a single instrumental case study is the most appropriate case study to go by.

4.2 Case Selection

As the chapter on previous research shows, the use of ambiguity in peace agreements is not unique to this specific case. Nonetheless, The Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia presents an interesting situation where very central issues were either left completely out of the agreement or were dealt in a very ambiguous way. Moreover, the fact that the agreement was signed in 2013 provides a case that is fairly recent, but still enough time has passed to analyse the aftermath of the agreement.

4.3 Validity and Reliability

Yin divides the validity into three separate categories: construct validity, internal validity and external validity (2018:87). The first one refers to having the right operational measures, which are achieved by multiple sources, in other words triangulation of the data. Triangulation of data can be seen as the essence of a case study as a method, as it allows the use of variety of sources (ibid.:197). Moreover, as case study aims to be both in-depth and contextual when studying the phenomenon, variety and multiple sources play a key role to achieve relevant data. This study aims to triangulate the data by using multiple sources as well as different sorts of data (material is discussed further in section 4.5). The use of multiple sources as well as different sorts of sources increases the construct validity by creating more accurate and convincing base for the analysis (ibid.). Internal validity refers to the aim to achieve a causal relationship instead of spurious relationships (Yin, 2018:197). This can be achieved through pattern matching, which means that the findings of the case are matched to previous work on possible outcomes (ibid.:251). This is achieved by building a theoretical framework on the possible impacts, both positive and negative, of the use of ambiguities in peace agreements. Through the theoretical framework, operational questions are conducted to guide the analysis and to assure that subjective judgements are minimised (ibid.:91).

External validity refers to the generalisability of the study (Yin, 2018:92). As mentioned earlier, what is sought after are analytical generalisations, as the use of creative ambiguity is not a unique phenomenon to this specific case. However, any statistical generalisations cannot be derived, as this is a single case study focusing on only one case. The generalisations that can be concluded from this specific case are hypothetical and in theory, and thus the results may differ when applied to a different case. Nevertheless, the operationalised questions are just as valuable and usable if they would be used in another case. The value of this case study is that it sheds light to a phenomenon, in this case the creative ambiguity and its possible impacts, through a case, the Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. The reliability refers to the replicability of the study (Yin, 2018:93). As this study is faced with time constraints, unfortunately this case study cannot be repeated to minimise the possible errors. Thus, reliability is achieved by being explicit of the procedures conducted (ibid.).

4.4 Material

There are six different types of sources relating to case studies: “documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts” (Yin, 2018:178). This case study focuses on two types of material: documentation and archival records. Moreover, a mixture of both primary and secondary sources will be used. All of the material will be given a short introduction at the end of this section. Documentation sources refer to anything from email and other personal documents to administrative documents, news articles and internal records (Yin, 2018:179). Documentations are useful sources for case studies, since they are easily accessible. However, the researcher has to be careful with the use of these sorts of sources as they might be biased. This does not mean that they are not valuable, but the source of the data has to be taken into account. This means, for example, discussing of the source of the newspaper article and taking into account what are the possible biases. Apart from newspaper articles, official “verbatim”

transcripts are edited before being published and can thus contain biases (ibid.). It is essential to keep in mind the specific purpose of the material as well as the target audience (ibid.:181). When the researcher is transparent and aims at identifying the objectives behind a source, they are less likely to be misled by the source (ibid). Archival records refer to evidence such as statistical data from governments, organisational records, charts and surveys produced by others (Yin, 2018:182). Archival records pose similar problems as documentations: conditions under which they were produced as well as accuracy has to be taken into account. They can either be used to do an extensive quantitative analysis, or to support other forms of evidence, such as documentation sources (ibid.). In this study, they are mainly used to support documentation sources, as the focus is not to conduct a quantitative case study. The main sources for this thesis were governmental records, speeches, press statements and news, from both Kosovo and Serbia. 15 sources from both countries’ government websites were collected from the time period of 19 April 2013 (signing of the Brussels Agreement) to Spring 2020. Ten additional supporting sources were collected from the same time period, that will be discussed as well. The government sources from Kosovo and Serbia were collected from the official government website in English. Collecting the material from the English sites brings delimitating factors to these sources. The Albanian and Serbian sides of the websites could have provided quantitatively more sources, and as the ones published in the English sides are translations, they can be limited in nature. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that press statements and speeches do have their own intentions, for example a press statement can be directed to the masses in a time when their support was needed, thus the manipulative nature of the statement should be taken into account. Therefore, understanding the audience of the source is vital. But, regarding the operational questions of the interpretation of the agreement, whether the countries were seen as non-compliant by each other, or how they depicted each other, these sources are valuable primary sources to analyse that as well as to see how the government sold the agreement to their people. The newspaper sources were derived from two

different publications, to provide more than one point of view. Publications from

BBC and Balkan Insight were used4. Thus, all the news articles were derived from publication houses representing different perspectives. These sources were used to support the governmental documents, as they are secondary sources. This study

also used a survey conducted by the Balkan Policy Group5. Additionally, a briefing paper conducted for the Members and staff of the European Parliament and the Brussels Agreement itself was used to analyse the creative ambiguity in the agreement. The aim of using these additional sources was mainly to get insight of incidents between Kosovo and Serbia. The list of sources used to conduct this thesis can be found in Appendix I - Sources. Each source has been assigned a number for clarification and will be referred with S (indicating source) and a number in the analysis (S1-S40).

4.5 Ethical Considerations

Although, this study does not conduct interviews or directly observe people, ethics still play a role. The researcher aims at minimising personal bias to the extent possible. Every researcher is exposed to preconceived positions, as previous research is to be done before conducting the study (Yin, 2018:140). This can lead to the researcher only exploring/collecting evidence that supports that position (ibid.). To tackle this, a thorough theoretical framework is built that takes into account both positive and negative sides of using creative ambiguities in peace agreements, thus the study is open to contrary evidence as well. Moreover, the accuracy of this study will be considered by triangulation of the data, to also minimise the researcher’s bias. This study aims for credibility by following the methodological as well as theoretical framework. Delimitations of the study will

4 BBC is British public broadcasting network funded by UK taxpayers, (BBC, 2020). Balkan Insight is a publication house part of Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, which is non-governmental network based in Belgrade, Serbia (BIRN, 2007). 5 BPG is a non-governmental organisation aiming to influence policy change and democracy in the Western Balkans (BPG, 2013).

be taken into account in a transparent matter, which will be discussed in section 4.7.

4.6 Analysis of Material

One way of conducting a case study is through theoretical propositions (Yin, 2018:243). These propositions are derived from the theory and can aid everything from the selections of the case, to collecting of the material, and finally analysing the material (ibid.). The theory built and operationalisation of the theory in this study is used for the collection and analysis of the material. The theoretical framework is built to show first how negotiations take place followed by further discussion how ambiguities are used in negotiations and peace agreements and how they might have an impact in the post-agreement setting. Thus, both positive and negative sides of the use of ambiguities are taken into account. Four sets of operational questions are derived from the theory to aid the data collection and analysis. Material is collected so that it is relevant for the operational questions and the analysis is conducted to answer those questions. With the operational questions in mind, the material was thoroughly looked at and interferences were sought to conduct the analysis. This means that answers to the operational questions are sought after from the sources and analysed accordingly to answer the research question.

4.7 Delimitations

Although reliability and validity are ensured as best as possible, such as by triangulating the data, this study still is qualitative and thus subjective (Stake, 1995:45). Subjectivity is not necessarily a complete delimitation as long as the researcher is aware of their own preconceptions and do not allow them to misguide (ibid.). The methodological aspects to limit the misinterpretations have to be taken into account. Moreover, this study does not aim to do statistical generalisations, but is limited to analytical generalisations. Thus, the findings are

not necessarily applicable to another context. The aim of this study is to understand the use of ambiguities in peace agreements through a case study and will shed light on the issues, nevertheless, the aim is not to conduct an analysis that can go beyond the context in hand. Ideally, this study would be conducted to multiple cases to further shed the light on the issue, but unfortunately, as this is a bachelor’s thesis, time and resources do not allow this. The collection of the material was limited to only sources found in English, as I unfortunately do not speak either Albanian or Serbian. Moreover, due to the limited time to conduct this study, and the fact that newspaper articles were not the core sources, only a handful of them were used. Collecting the articles from different publications was prioritised over multiple articles from the same publication to minimise the bias of one source.

5 Analysis

This chapter starts with a brief overlook at the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, followed by the analysis to answer the operational questions that were derived from the theoretical framework. Through the operationalisation questions the research question How can we understand the role of creative ambiguity in the heightened conflict between Pristina and Belgrade in the aftermath of the Brussels Agreement? will be answered. The analysis of the operational questions is arranged according to the order the operational questions were presented in the Theoretical Framework chapter, but as all of these issues are interconnected, some overlapping will occur.

5.1 The Agreement

The agreement between Kosovo and Serbia was a result of ten rounds of talks and consisted of 15 points. Central issues such as Kosovo’s status were left out to strike the agreement (Bieber, 2015:297). Six points out of the 15 deal with the formation of an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities (ASM), as the bilateral structures financed by Serbia in these areas are one of the causes of friction between the two countries (Beha, 2014:103). The formation of the ASM is spelled out fairly in detail on the agreement, but the role and the powers of it remains vague. The agreement states that the role of the ASM is purely a representative one, but also adds that “5. The Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities will exercise other additional competences as may be delegated by the central authorities.” (S1). As mentioned earlier, creative ambiguity can be constructed so that a certain establishment is given specific powers, but then having further protocol that might grant them additional powers if needed in an ambiguous way, which can be seen here. Therefore, the role of the ASM can be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, even the name

Association/Community can be interpreted in myriad of ways as it has two names that technically means different things. The central idea of creating the ASM of Serb majority municipalities was to bring stability into areas that have Serb majority, as well as to solve the issue of parallel structures financed by Serbia (ibid). As stated earlier, one of the central issues, Kosovo’s status, was left out of the agreement. The agreement was referred as status neutral, reflecting the fact that Kosovo’s status was not dealt with. However, what is settled in the agreement is that “neither one of the sides would block, or encourage other to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths” (S1). Both parties are aware of each other’s desire to join the European Union eventually, and it would be difficult to co-exist in that union without recognising each other’s as states. Furthermore, the agreement does state that further issues such as energy and telecommunications are left for future negotiations which will be completed by June 15, 2013 (S1). Thus, leaving issues unresolved was a conscious decision, as can be seen in regards the energy and telecommunications part. Also, striking an agreement with any mention of Kosovo’s status could have been incrementally difficult, if not even impossible at that stage.

5.2 Analysis Through the Operational Questions

5.2.1 Interpretation of the Agreement

How was the agreement interpreted?6

As established in the previous section, central issues were left out from the agreement, such as Kosovo’s status. However, having the notion that neither one

6 This section explores how the Brussels Agreement was interpreted by Kosovo and Serbia. These interpretations represent what the official government consensus at the time was, as the material analysed is from the respective countries’ governmental websites.

will hinder each other’s respective EU paths, could be seen as a sign that Kosovo’s status was indirectly solved. This can be seen in how the then Prime Minister of Kosovo Hashim Thaçi spoke about the agreement at a meeting of the Government of Kosovo on May 14, 2013:

For the first time Kosovo and Serbia as two independent states, on equal ground, at the level of prime ministers, have signed an agreement to normalize relations, enabling the closure of almost a century of a dark chapter and the opening a new chapter, that of peace and interstate cooperation. Above all, through this agreement, Kosovo has established legal and Constitutional control over all the territory of the Republic of Kosovo (S25).

Hashim Thaçi portrayed the agreement as something that two independent states have come together to sign. Moreover, he also referred it as an “inter-state agreement for peace and normalization between Kosovo and Serbia […] historic moment for the improvement of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, as two independent states and a historic opportunity, which will pave the way for good neighborly relations in the EU integration process” (S28). Therefore, although the question of Kosovo’s status was left out, Kosovo’s side interpreted the agreement as something that verifies Kosovo’s independence even further.

The start of the normalizing of relations between Kosovo and Serbia has its main foundation in the conviction of all international actors that the road of independence is irreversible, but the normalization of relations between the two independent states is inevitable. Besides direct benefits for our citizens, through technical dialogue Serbia began to recognize the reality created in Kosovo with the declaration of the state of Kosovo and its recognition by over half the countries of the world (S29).

However, Serbia’s interpretation of the matter paints a completely different picture. The Serbian side remains adamant after the agreement that the Serbian state is the owner of the property in the region, Pristina’s claims otherwise cannot

be accepted by Belgrade and nothing in the agreement suggests that Kosovo’s status has been recognised by Serbia (S5). This same kind of battle of interpretations extended to two other issues that were dealt with in the agreement: the ASM issue as well as issues regarding the elections held in Kosovo couple of months after the agreement was signed. Issues regarding the elections, that were to be held in Kosovo regarding the formation of ASM, were difficult to settle after the agreement. These issues mostly regarded whether Kosovo could use their logo on the ballots and what kind of documents are needed for the voting (S15;S3). Both issues refer to the status neutrality of the Brussels Agreement: if Kosovo was allowed to portray their own logo in the ballots, Serbs voting would interpret it as voting in Kosovo’s own elections. The need of Kosovar identity documentation follows the same rhetoric. When the issue was solved, Serbian’s prime minister’s comment sums up the Serbian opinion quite clearly: “ no more fear that the ethnic Albanian side will try to obtain confirmation for the so-called statehood of Kosovo through local elections … Serbs will be allowed to vote with personal documents, which they possess already now” (S3). Kosovo’s interpretation of the elections however seems to cement their status even further, as the northern Serb majority municipalities would join the nationwide elections for the first time in 14 years (S19). Moreover, as the elections regarded the formation ASM, the role and the powers of it were a topic of interpretation as well. Kosovo’s interpretation of ASM follows the same line of rhetoric as the two already mentioned ones. The formation of the ASM was seen as a form of dismantling the illegitimate Serbian financed parallel structures especially in the north of Kosovo (S29). Additionally, the ASM would not have any legislative or executive powers according to Kosovo’s interpretation, or any power to interfere in any ways on a national level (S22; S25). On the other hand, Serbian side interpreted the formation of ASM on a different note. Serbia saw the formation of the ASM as a form of having power in Kosovo, as the municipalities would not be of the independent state of Kosovo, but rather that of Serbia and thus, the Serbian people have internationally recognised way to proclaim their rights (S7). This would lead to the Serbian people in Kosovo to claim authority and credibility over the Kosovar institutions: “the municipalities, which will be formed on the basis of these elections, will not be the municipalities of an independent state of Kosovo, but Serbian

municipalities through which the representatives of the Serbian people will in the

internationally recognised way assert their rights.” (S7)7. Thus, the municipalities would have powers over important issues such as economic development, education and healthcare financed by Serbia (S38). The government of Serbia encouraged the Serbian minority in Kosovo to take part in the elections for that would give them the control of their own lives, fight for the Serbian state and Serbian national interest (S2; S6). “We will achieve all this if we elect Serbian mayors and Serbian councillors and form Serbian municipalities. Any other outcome is a defeat and will bring Albanians to power in the lands they have never lived in. Long live Serbia!” (S12). As can be seen from the issues reflected above, the two countries’ interpretation highly differ from each other. Thus, this follows the logic presented by Iklé (1964:15), where the use of ambiguities produces two different interpretations. Alternatively, Pehar (2001:189) brought up that if ambiguities are used, the opposing parties could come together to find a middle ground, and thus, a third interpretation to accommodate both sides. This, however, cannot be detected based on the sources analysed. Based on the agreement, it is difficult to say whether the two countries interpreted the agreement differently on purpose, or not. However, the interpretations were conducted to serve each other’s purposes, i.e. Kosovo interpreted the agreement how it best fits them, whereas Serbia interpreted it to suit their side. The status of Kosovo still remains disputed by Serbia, and no common ground has been found regarding that. Additionally, the ASM still remains only partially formed according to the agreement, although additional efforts were made in 2015 to solve the issue. Therefore, the analytical generalisation derived from this analysis can argue that the use of creative ambiguity formed two different interpretations, so far apart from each other, that no satisfying middle ground was found.

7 Author’s note: although this cannot be concluded from the material analysed, one could consider that the Republika Sprska, a Serbian second tier to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could have impacted why Serbia interpreted the ASM the way they did. Republika Sprska has their own government and legislative power issued to them at the Dayton Accords. Therefore, Serbia could have sought to interpret the role of ASM similar to that.

5.2.2 Compliance

Did the opposing parties view each other as non-compliant?

Due to ambiguous language, it can be argued that the parties cannot comply with the agreement, as understanding the provisions is jeopardised (Franck, 2002:31). Moreover, the opposing party can perceive the other one as non-compliant if they seek to implement the agreement according to their own vision and not the other one’s. After the signing of the Brussels Agreement, it seemed at first that cooperation is fruitful and both countries are motivated during the implementation phase. This was shown by the motivation of the two parties to implement the agreement and positive developments, such as the Serbian party deciding to stop the payments for their police structures in Kosovo, and Kosovar party’s dedication to integrate the individuals from those structures to Kosovar police structures (S18). However, impasses with the implementation and disagreements over interpretation occurred fairly fast. Due to these factors, both parties started to blame each other for the problems of implementation. Serbia accused Kosovo for failing to comply by not adopting an amnesty law that they see fundamental prerequisite to continue the implementation, although amnesty law was not mentioned in the initial agreement (S13). Additionally, Kosovo’s decision to form armed forces and defence ministry, something that an independent state most certainly would have, and thus justified in the eyes of Kosovo, was met with deep concern from the Serbian side. “Such activities lead towards destabilisation of the situation in Kosovo-Metohija and are in contrast with the process of normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, reads a statement by the Serbian government” (S15). From Serbia’s point of view, this was in contrast to the Brussels Agreement, as well as gravely destabilises the situation in the region (S15), whereas Kosovo sees it justifiable and as an extension of being an independent state. Moreover, the handling of the upcoming elections that were crucial for the formation of the ASM, was not seen from the Serbian side as being in accordance with the agreement. Pristina’s desire to have Kosovo’s logos on the ballots, which from Serbia’s side was seen as a direct violation of the status neutrality of the agreement (S16) presented itself as problematic. Moreover, Belgrade saw Pristina

manipulating the elections in every way possible, for example by obstructing the voting of the internally displaced persons, as well as hindering other Serbs for participating and thus, thwarting the formation of the ASM (S12). Hence, from Serbia’s side, Kosovo was non-compliant from the start. Moreover, due to them perceiving Kosovo as non-compliant, they feel that they have lost a partner in negotiations: “The [Serbian] Prime Minister pointed out that Pristina does not fulfil its obligations under the first agreement between Belgrade and Pristina – the Brussels Agreement, and that, therefore, Serbia does not have a partner on the other side on whom it can count” (S10). Kosovo, on the other hand, stresses their readiness to implement the agreement, while accusing Serbia from either derailing discussions or interpreting the agreement in a different way “the Serbian side was positioned to discuss about topics outside of the agreements or to interpret the content of the agreement in a different way” (S22; S26; S28). As has been stated, an ambiguous agreement can create differing interpretations, and if the sides are not aware that their interpretation is not the universal right, they may take the opposing interpretation as non-compliance (Franck, 2002:31), which is exactly what happened in this case; Kosovo saw their interpretation as the right one, and going about the implementation according to their vision is moving forward and being compliant, whereas Serbia’s differing view is seen as derailing the discussion and being non-compliant. Moreover, Kosovo viewed this kind of behaviour from Serbia as them not taking the agreement seriously and using it as a platform to bring up past grievances, and by doing this, the implementation of the agreement is not going to be achieved as well or fast as Kosovo’s readiness signals (S29). The creative ambiguity in the Brussels Agreement made the opposing parties see each other as non-compliant, as their interpretations differed, and thus their readiness regarding to how the agreement will be implemented clashed as well. Therefore, the fact that the parties interpreted and complied the agreement according to their vision, was met by the other side not only as non-compliance, but also derailing the process wilfully by the ‘wrong’ interpretation. Thus, as Frank (2002:32) suggested, the opaque provisions, norms and values result into different interpretations, that further had an impact on how the countries would implement the agreement. Therefore, the analytical generalisation that can be derived from this analysis is that creative ambiguity leads to the parties to view

each other as non-compliant. This further can lead to serious problems for implementing the agreement as well as hinder the already fragile relationship between them. Both of these issues will be addressed in the following sections.

5.2.3 Saving Time and Costs

Was there a need for more negotiation rounds? Was the agreement successfully implemented?

The implementation phase of the Brussels Agreement required multiple rounds of talks and even then, failed to be implemented (S38). The long implementation process can be attributed to the ambiguous design of the negotiation process that transferred the burden from the negotiations to the implementation phase (Bieber, 2015:308). To solve the different views regarding the ASM issues, 2015 agreement on the ASM was formulated to clear the provisions agreed upon in 2013 (S38). The 2015 clarification has not been ratified by either one of the parties. Even with multiple rounds of talks regarding the implementation of the agreement and the agreement on the Association of Serb Municipalities for clarification purposes two years after the initial agreement, the ASM issue remains unsolved (S38). A little progress has been done since 2015, and the talks between the two countries have dried out (S38). The dialogue has been stalled by actions made by both countries. Serbia successfully managed to block Kosovo’s Interpol membership in 2018 and claims to be responsible for lobbying 12 countries’ derecognition of Kosovo, which let to Kosovo imposing a 100% import tax for Serbia (S38).

Serbia is not a country that is easy to beat, humiliate and run over, [Vučić] said, and expressed his gratitude to all the countries that voted against the admission or were abstained, noting however that our country should not base its future on defiance and spite, but rather on a rational approach (S9).

Several meetings have been delayed or cancelled, both sides have threatened to pull out of the talks all together, with Serbia’s Vučić announcing that there will be no talks between the two countries before Kosovo has lifted the 100% import tax (S38). Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and in charge of the EU mediation between Kosovo and Serbia until November 2019, expressed concern that she has mostly been able to conduct the talks bilaterally between the countries (S33). The Brussels Agreement has been able to bring some sort of progress: the parallel structures governed by Serbia in North Kosovo are slowly starting to dismantle and integrate with Kosovar structures, however, the integration is still not complete after seven years (S38). Additionally, the northern part of Kosovo is now policed by a Regional Police Directorate, where officers formerly under the Serbian Interior Ministry’s rule have joined, yet, maintaining order in that region has proven to be a struggle (S38). The Kosovar Justice system has incorporated 40 Serb judges and 13 prosecutors, but serious backlog hinders the operation in Northern Kosovo, as not enough translators have been hired to serve the non-Albanian speaking population (S38). Moreover, issues such as citizenship and education still remain unresolved, as Pristina refuses to acknowledge birth certificates in Serbian language, as well as education degrees from the Serbia-accredited University of North Mitrovica (S38). To tackle the impasses and problems implementing the agreement, a new idea to deal with the Kosovo status surfaced in 2018 to readjust the borders (S39). This would have meant a land swap, the Serb majority municipality in North of Kosovo would have been swapped to the south Serbian Albanian majority municipality (S39). This idea was supported by Serbia and briefly by Hashim Thaçi, but as he was the only senior Kosovar to show support, his support was quickly lost (S39). Internationally, this plan gained little support, apart from the USA, as it could have caused more instabilities in the rest of the Balkans. The Western Balkan countries are ethnically divided and having two countries do land swaps based on ethnicity, could have opened a Pandora’s box (S39). Moreover, that solution would have left the issue of other Serbian majority municipalities in Kosovo unresolved (S39). Spring 2019, Berlin hosted a summit to reignite the talks between Kosovo and Serbia. However, the summit ended without

breakthrough and the normalisation of the relations between the two countries remain at a deadlock (S38). The approach of solving technical issues first to make room to tackle the political and sensitive issues has not worked, the ambiguity used in the agreement to save time and money has backfired, while minimal implementations have occurred, anything substantial has yet to be completely solved after seven years from signing the agreement. Thus, as presented in the theory chapter, the use of creative ambiguity can resolve deadlocks, so that some sort of an agreement can be arrived at (Pillar, 1983:230; Troitskiy, 2019:238). At the same time, as in this case, the implementations phase has proven to be extremely difficult, just as Guelke (2003:61) suggested could happen. The implementation phase tends to be sensitive to start with and disputes over interpretations can end up being extremely challenging, if not even impossible to solve (ibid.). Therefore, the analytical generalisation that can be derived from this analysis is that the use of creative ambiguity has not saved time or costs, to the contrary, talks have completely stalled and achieving the normalisation of the two countries’ relations seems further away than before signing the agreement.

5.2.4 Building a Dialogue

Did the parties’ relationship improve?

Initially, it seemed as if the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo improved with the signing of the agreement as both countries seemed optimistic about the future that the signing of the agreement could bring. Thaçi congratulated the agreement as a new chapter of cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo (S22). Internationally, the agreement was heralded as historical (S35). However, due to differences of interpretation and implementing the agreement, as already mentioned, the relationship of the two countries deteriorated quickly. The first issue that caused friction between the two countries, as mentioned before, was how the elections in Kosovo would be conducted (S16). The fact that Kosovo’s status was left out of the agreement, and that one of the provisions prevented the two parties to block each other’s EU journey, something that only a state could

aspire, could be interpreted from the Kosovar side as de facto recognition of their independence. Therefore, having their own logo on the ballots follows this logic, as an independent country would have their own insignia in their ballots. However, Serbia saw this as a violation of the agreement, especially as it was status neutral, i.e. Kosovo’s status was not dealt with, thus, it cannot be interpreted as Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo (S16). Moreover, Kosovo was accused of manipulating the elections, by preventing IDPs from voting (S16). The issue of IDPs was to be handled after the agreement but fell short, and resulted into disputes over the elections, Serbia blaming Kosovo as being non-compliant, as well as being one of the first issues to deteriorate the relationship between the two countries.

By persistent violation of the principle of status neutrality of election materials and bans to officials and members of the Serbian government to visit Kosovo-Metohija, the provisional authorities in the province directly obstruct the implementation of the agreements reached in Brussels and challenge the regularity and the holding of the local elections. The Serbian government warns the EU that with such behaviour Pristina creates high security risks, intimidates Kosovo Serbs and works directly against the stabilisation of the situation (S17).

The failure to implement the agreement has resulted into loss of trust from the citizens of both countries, especially Serbian minorities in Kosovo. A survey conducted by Balkan Policy Group (S36) shows that the majority of Serbs in Kosovo anticipates that the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia will deteriorate, and that the Brussels Agreement have had a worsening impact on the political crisis in Pristina. Even after the 2015 agreement on the ASM, to further help the implementation of the provisions dealing with ASM, has not sparked trust in the Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo (S36). Moreover, both countries have used the deteriorating situation in their domestic politics as well. One of the most notable incidents was prior to Serbia’s elections, when a direct train line between Belgrade and North Mitrovica was opened early 2017. The train line could have been a sign of warming relations

between the two countries, as there has not been a direct train line between Belgrade and North Mitrovica since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 (S36). However, on its maiden journey, the train from the Serbian capital to the Serbian majority municipality of Kosovo was decorated with a slogan “Kosovo is Serbia” in 21 different languages (S36). The Kosovar side halted the train and prevented it from entering Kosovo with police forces on the basis to protect its sovereignty (S36). This was seen from the Serbian side as Kosovo playing war games, with allegations that the Kosovar Police forces would blow up the tracks (S39). Whereas, Kosovo saw it as a clear provocation from the Serbian side: ”provocation like the one with unlicensed train and with incentives to ethnic hatred, are not constructive approach by Serbia” (S31). This incident brought the countries back to a brink of conflict, highlighting the badly inflamed relations between the two. Thus, one of the most sensitive and most difficult issue to solve in the negotiations, Kosovo’s status, was left out of the agreement to build dialogue, has caused further disputes between the two countries, and therefore the creative ambiguity has not helped to bring the two countries together to solve issues. A year later, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Serbia managed to block Kosovo’s Interpol application and has lobbied countries to derecognise Kosovo as a state (S37). This resulted Kosovo to impose a 100% import tax on Serbia, which in turn has resulted Serbia’s reluctance to continue any talks with Kosovo before the taxes are lifted (S37). Currently the talks are halted, and the Serbian prime minister regards the situation as a frozen conflict that is a security risk for Serbia:

[T]he specificity of the situation in Kosovo is such that we have a frozen conflict, which is a potential source of security threat for our citizens for several reasons, and above all because we increasingly see the senseless attacks of Pristina authorities, from which we do not know what we can expect (S10).

As can be seen from the deterioration of Kosovo’s and Serbia’s relations since the Brussels Agreement was signed, that in this case, leaving the major and sensitive issues aside, and having ambiguous language has not brought the two countries together, to solve the remaining of the issues. Thus, although the

creative ambiguity surely aided the fact that an agreement was arrived at and solved some deadlocks, the relationship between the two countries are extremely low and on the brink of conflict. Thus, the use of creative ambiguity brought only momentary satisfaction as suggested by Pehar (2001:172), and the building of the dialogue has failed as talks have ceased completely. The use of the creative ambiguity by leaving issues for future negotiations, where they might be easier to deal with (Iklé, 1964:22) failed, as additional rounds have achieved very little. The goal of normalisation of the relations between the two countries has turned into a power game between them, where both countries tend to display to their nationals that no concessions have or will be made. Normalisation of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia seems further away than what it was before the signing of the Brussels Agreement. Therefore, the analytical generalisation that can be derived from this section is that the use of creative ambiguity has severely damaged the relationship of the parties, by heightening the conflict to a new level.

6 Concluding Discussion

6.1 Concluding Statement

As can be seen from the analysis, the use of creative ambiguity brought forward a myriad of problems. The research question that this thesis aimed to answer was: How can we understand the role of creative ambiguity in the heightened conflict between Pristina and Belgrade in the aftermath of the Brussels Agreement? The two countries interpretation of the agreement differed greatly from each other across most of the provisions. Kosovo regarded the agreement as a de facto recognition of their independence, whereas Serbia emphasised the status neutrality of the agreement. Moreover, the navigation through the issue of what the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities actually entails proved to be highly problematic, and still remains unresolved. The creative ambiguity formed opposing interpretations between the two countries and no common ground, or third interpretation was found. Additionally, both Kosovo and Serbia viewed each other as non-compliant due to the fact that their interpretations clashed greatly with each other. Issues such as how the elections in Kosovo would be conducted, from having Kosovo’s logo on the ballots to who is entitled to vote proved to be one of the first issues to come up after signing the agreement. This had a major impact on the difficulties in implementing the agreement as well as plummeting their relationship. The Brussels Agreement was followed by multiple negotiation rounds to figure out how to implement the provisions agreed on the agreement, and eventually failed to implement most of the agreed provisions. Therefore, the time saved by conducting the ambiguous agreement was defeated by problematic implementation phase, which still, after seven years, has not been able to implement most of the provisions. Moreover, the Brussels Agreement was

supposed to be followed by further agreements, but due to the fact that the initial agreement was, and still is, so difficult to implement, little has been achieved between the two countries after that. One of the biggest impacts the use of creative ambiguity has had is on the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. The Brussels Agreement’s main purpose was to normalise the relations between the countries; however, the relationship has plummeted drastically since the signing of the agreement and remains on the brink of conflict. Incidents such as Serbia blocking Kosovo’s Interpol application, lobbying countries to derecognise Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo issuing 100% import tax as a punishment, forming an army and Serbia celebrating the renewed train connection between Belgrade and Mitrovica by painting the train with slogans “Kosovo is Serbia” and thus bringing the conflict to a new level, could have plausibly been avoided if the Brussels Agreement had been conducted in a clear manner with central issues solved. It should be noted that creative ambiguity is not the sole factor to blame when it comes to the heightened conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, however, as concluded here, it certainly had an impressive impact on it. Additionally, if the agreement could have been conducted in a clear and lucid manner, the implementation phase most likely would have been less problematic, and the normalisation of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia could have been achieved. This suggests, that the use of creative ambiguity should be avoided in peace agreements, especially when the relationship between the countries are on a such a weak base as it was and is between Kosovo and Serbia.

6.1.1 Suggestions for Future Research

The use of ambiguities in peace agreements have been studied greatly on a theoretical level but lacks understanding on the practical level. This study’s aim was to understand the role of the creative ambiguity in the aftermath of the signing of the agreement, i.e. the consequences of the use of creative ambiguity. As this is a single case study, only analytical generalisations can be derived, ones that heavily suggest against the use of creative ambiguity. Thus, to understand the influence of creative ambiguity, I call for increased research to prevent instances such as the plummeting of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. The

future research should bring the use of ambiguities from the theoretical level to the practical one, which could be achieved for example with a multiple case study to assess how the initial circumstances have an impact with the use of creative ambiguity for the aftermath of the peace agreement. Although, the use of creative ambiguity has its strengths, based on this research, it feels haphazard and irresponsible from the mediator to use such a strategy to normalise relations that have been clashing for centuries.

7 References

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Appendix I - Sources

Source 1: The First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations, 2013. Available at: http://www.kryeministri- ks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNI NG_THE_NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRU SSELS_en.pdf (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 2: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=96300 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 3: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=95946 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 4: Press Statement, 2019. Government of Serbia. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/141185/serbia-ready-to-protect-serbian- people-in-kosovo-metohija.php (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 5: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=96124%20 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 6: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=96216 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 7: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=96289 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 8: Press Statement, 2017. Government of Serbia. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/120302/serbia-will-not-allow-attack-on-its- people-in-kosovo-metohija.php (Accessed: 20 May 2020)

Source 9: Press Statement, 2018. Government of Serbia. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/133958/denial-of-kosovos-entry-into- interpol-strengthens-position-of-serbia.php (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 10: Press Statement, 2018. Government of Serbia. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/131956/frozen-conflict-in-kosovo-potential- source-of-threat-for-citizens.php (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 11: Statement of Government, 2018. Government of Serbia. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/135263/harshest-condemnation-of- formation-of-so-called-kosovo-army.php (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 12: Press Statement, 2018. Government of Serbia. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/134183/serbia-will-stand-by-its-people-in- kosovo.php (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 13: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=93685 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 14: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=95560 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 15: Press Statement, 2014. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=100027 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 16: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=96202 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 17: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Serbia. Available at: http://www.arhiva2.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=97702 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 18: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/the-fourth-round-of-talks-continues-on-the- implementation-of-the-agreement-for-the-normalization-of-relations-between- the-republic-of-kosovo-and-the-republic-of-serbia-with-eu-mediation/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 19: Report from The Government of Kosovo, 2016. Available at: https://kryeministri-

ks.net/repository/docs/Kosovo_Report_on_State_of_Play_in_the_Brussels_Di alogue_15_June_2016-signed.pdf?page=2,9,7637 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 20: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/fifth-round-of-talks-on-implementation-of- normalization-agreement-taking-place-in-brussels/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 21: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/prime-minister-thaci-informed-the-ldk-leader- isa-mustafa-about-the-development-of-dialogue-in-brussels-and-on-the- approximate-agreement/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 22: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/prime-minister-thaci-the-option-of-peace- stability-and-integration-has-won/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 23: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/press-release-by-the-government-of-the- repoublic-of-kosovo/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 24: Press Statement, 2018. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/prime-minister-haradinaj-the-finals-of-the- dialogue-between-kosovo-and-serbia-mutual-recognition/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 25: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/held-in-brussels-first-meeting-on-the- implementation-of-the-agreement-for-the-normalization-of-relations-between- the-state-of-kosovo-and-serbia/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 26: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/the-government-of-kosovo-approved-the- approximated-agreement-implementation-plan-of-may-22-2013-signed-by- the-prime-minister-of-the-republic-of-kosovo-and-the-prime-minister-of-the- republic-of-serbi/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 27: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/the-second-meeting-on-the-implementation-of- the-agreement-on-normalizing-relations-between-the-republic-of-kosovo-and- serbia-is-held-in-brussels/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 28: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/in-brussels-the-fourth-round-of-talks-continue-

on-the-implementation-of-the-agreement-on-normalizing-relations-between- the-republic-of-kosovo-and-the-republic-of-serbia-with-eu-mediation/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 29: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/speech-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-republic-of- kosovo-hashim-thaci-at-the-un-security-council-meeting/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 30: Press Statement, 2013. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/prime-minister-thaci-the-independence-of-our- country-and-the-freedom-of-kosovos-citizens-are-secure-for-ever/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 31: Press Statement, 2017. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/minister-edita-tahiri-asked-the-eu-to-stop- serbian-illegal-train/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 32: Press Statement, 2017. Government of Kosovo. Available at: https://kryeministri-ks.net/en/prime-minister-mustafa-expresses- determination-of-the-government-to-fully-implement-the-legality-and- constitutionality/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 33: Zivanovic, M., 2018. ‘Serbian President Cancels Meeting With Kosovo Counterpart’, Balkan Insight, 07.09.2018. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2018/09/07/serbian-president-cancel-meeting-with- kosovo-counterpart-09-07-2018/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 34: Morina, D., 2017. ‘Serbia Accuses Kosovo of Planning Attack on Train’, Balkan Insight, 14.01.2017. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2017/01/14/serbian-pm-kosovo-tried-to-provoke- conflict-01-14-2017/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 35: ‘Serbia and Kosovo Sign ‘Landmark’ Agreement’, BBC, 26.08.2015. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34059497 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 36: Delauney, G., 2017. ‘Train Row Almost Pulls Kosovo and Serbia off the Rails’, BBC, 18.01.2017. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world- europe-38666279 (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 37: Balkan Policy Research Group, No date. The Association of Serb Municipalities: Understanding conflicting views of Albanians and Serbs.

Available at: https://balkansgroup.org/en/infographics/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 38: ‘Berlin Summit Fails to Restart Stalled Kosovo-Serbia Talks’, Balkan Insight, 30.04.2019. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2019/04/30/berlin-summit-fails-to-restart-stalled- kosovo-serbia-talks/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 39: Russel, M., 2019. Serbia-Kosovo relations: Confrontation or normalisation?, Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635512/EPRS_B RI(2019)635512_EN.pdf (Accessed: 20 May 2020) Source 40: ‘Serbia Accused of Provoking Kosovo Over Train’. Balkan Insight, 16.01.2017. Available at: https://balkaninsight.com/2017/01/16/serbia- accused-of-provoking-kosovo-over-train-01-16-2017/ (Accessed: 20 May 2020)