Why Did the Ltte Cause the Displacement of Muslim Communities in Sri Lanka During the Civil War?

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES MSC POLITICAL SCIENCE - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

WHY DID THE LTTE CAUSE THE DISPLACEMENT OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN SRI LANKA DURING THE CIVIL WAR?

Author: Luis M. Villafañe Jorge Supervisor: Abbey Steele, PhD Second Reader: Darshan Vigneswaran, PhD Master thesis Political Science-International Relations June 23, 2017

Abstract The purpose of this research is to explain why did the LTTE cause the displacement of Muslim communities in Sri Lanka during the civil war. I argue that the reason was because the Tigers perceived that the displaced people were disloyal to them. I claim that those civilians were considered disloyal because they supported a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals. After examining two cases of displacement of Muslim communities, I found strong support for the abovementioned theory. However, the data demonstrated that military collaboration from Muslims to the LTTE’s rival armed groups also revealed signs of disloyalty. Furthermore, I discovered that the displaced civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity. Finally, I claim that the disloyalty theory explains better the causes of those displacements than the theories based on ethnic hatred or resentment.

Acknowledgments I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Abbey Steele, my dear friends, Alexandre Marcou and Alex L’Huillier, and my beloved parents, Luis and Elsa. This thesis would not have been possible without you. I will always be grateful for all the help and support you gave me during this whole process.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction ...... 1

II. Literature Review ...... 4

III. Theory ...... 8

A. Argument ...... 8

B. Hypothesis ...... 9

C. Assumptions and Scope Conditions of the Theory ...... 9

IV. Methodology ...... 10

A. Dependent Variable ...... 10

B. Independent Variables ...... 11

C. Case Selection and Data ...... 13

V. Background of the War ...... 15

A. General Aspects about the Sri Lankan Civil War ...... 15

B. Rise of Muslim Politics during the War ...... 16

VI. Cases of Displacement ...... 18

A. Variation of Displacement ...... 18

B. Description of the Cases of Displacement ...... 19

1. Northern Muslims ...... 19

2. Mutur Muslims ...... 21

VII. Analysis and Discussion of Data ...... 25

A1. Evidence of Political Support ...... 25

1. North-1990 ...... 25

2. East-2006 ...... 29

A2. Discussion of Evidence of Political Support ...... 32

1. Ethnic Indicator ...... 33

2. Other Possible Causes of the Displacements ...... 34

B1. Evidence of Military Collaboration ...... 35

1. Northern Muslims ...... 36

2. Mutur Muslims ...... 38

C. Discussion of Evidence of Military Collaboration ...... 38

D. Counterfactual Analysis ...... 39

E. Adaptation of Theory ...... 40

VIII. Discussion of Alternative Explanations ...... 43

A. Ethnic Hatred ...... 43

B. Resentment ...... 44

C. Inapplicability of Alternative Explanations ...... 46

D. Why Disloyalty is the Best Answer to the Research Question ...... 46

E. Caveats ...... 48

IX. Conclusion ...... 50

X. Bibliography ...... 53

Introduction The Sri Lankan civil war was a conflict in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the “LTTE” or the “Tigers”) fought the armed forces of the Government of Sri Lanka (the “Government”) to create an independent Tamil State. The war brought dire consequences, not only to the combatants, but also to the civilians. One of them was displacement. The violence perpetrated by both armed groups caused thousands of civilians leave their homes. However, displacement was not merely a by-product of the war. Both the LTTE and the Government intentionally cleansed different areas of Sri Lanka from the population residing in them. As a result, the Sinhalese and the Tamil civilians had to relocate to other parts of the island or outside of the country. Nevertheless, those ethnic groups were not the only ones that were affected. The Sri Lankan Muslims (also known as the Sri Lankan Moors), the second minority group in Sri Lanka, were also displaced from their homes. In particular, the LTTE was responsible for displacing whole communities of Muslim groups in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. The purpose of this research is to investigate the reasons why the LTTE caused the displacement of those Muslim communities. The result of this investigation will be useful because it will help gather more knowledge about all the elements that can influence the violence perpetrated, not only in the Sri Lankan civil war, but potentially in other conflicts. The core grievance of the Sri Lankan civil war is the differences between the two major ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. However, this research will show how other disputes that are not part of the main cleavage, in this case the problems between Muslims and the LTTE, can influence how a war is fought. Also, the results could help complement or supplement theories about violence in ethnic wars. Most of the theories explain the violence committed in those conflicts along ethnic lines. Since the Sri Lankan conflict was an ethnic war, it can be expected that the violence was strictly linked to ethnic elements. However, the results of this research can demonstrate that, although ethnicity could play a role during ethnic wars, other factors (social, political, etc.) can also help dictate when and where armed groups use violence against civilians. To conduct my research, I discuss the theories that address the reasons why armed groups want to cleanse a territory from a particular population and elaborate an argument that is applicable to this investigation. According to Steele (2011), armed groups displace civilians when they want to gain control of a territory and when and where they can infer if the civilians are

1 disloyal or not to them. Among other things, she claims that loyalties are difficult to detect (Steele 2011, 427). However, she explains that election results are one possible source of information about the links between civilians and armed groups that can help the warring parties to infer their loyalties (Steele 2011, 428). Taking her arguments as inspiration, I argue that, when armed groups want to control a territory, they will cleanse the area from those civilians they perceive are disloyal to the warring party. However, I believe that analyzing the possible links between civilians and armed groups is not the only way to determine if a civilian is loyal or not. I claim that loyalties can also be perceived from the relationship the civilians might have with other actors that can influence the outcome of the war, including political parties, even if they are not affiliated with a warring actor. Therefore, one way armed groups might consider that civilians are disloyal to them is when those civilians support a political party whose political objectives are hindering or could be hindering the armed group’s war goals, regardless if the party is affiliated or not to its rivals. Since loyalty can be inferred based on political support, elections results can help armed groups to identify those civilians who are disloyal. In light of this, my hypothesis is that the LTTE displaced Muslims communities that supported a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals because the Tigers perceived that those civilians were disloyal to them. After explaining my theory, I discuss the methods and variables that I used to test my hypothesis. Then, I provide general information about the Sri Lankan civil war, the Muslim politics throughout the conflict, and the variation of displacement of Muslim communities during wartime. Also, I describe in detail the two cases of displacement I chose for my research, one in the Northern Province in 1990 and one in the Eastern Province in 2006. After, I analyze and discuss the evidence related to my argument. There were indicators that confirm the hypothesis that the Muslim communities were displaced because they were disloyal to the Tigers. In particular, there was strong evidence for the claim that the LTTE considered those people disloyal because they supported the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (the “SLMC”), a Sri Lankan political party whose interests conflicted with the LTTE’s goals. However, the data revealed that military collaboration with the rival armed groups of the Tigers, either by joining the rival armed group and/or by attacking the Tamils or the LTTE’s members, was another element that demonstrated that the displaced Muslims were disloyal to the Tigers. Furthermore, the evidence revealed that the LTTE used the Muslim ethnicity to identify and target them. To confirm that

2 disloyalty was the cause of the displacements, I analyzed if other alternatives explanations (ethnic hatred and resentment) could have been the true motives. Finally, this thesis concludes by providing a summary of my findings, explaining the contributions of my results to the existing literature and suggesting some ideas for future investigations.

Literature Review Displacement is one of the terrible consequences of civil wars. Thousands of civilians are forced, or decide, to leave their homes. The violence perpetrated by armed groups can influence that decision. The civilians can or have to decide to flee from a certain area either as a response to a direct attack from the armed groups or to avoid being attacked by the combatants (see Ibáñez 2009, 69). Since armed groups’ violence can be responsible for this outcome, several studies have analyzed how that violence influences the different patterns of displacement during a civil war. A group of investigations have focused on linking levels of violence with levels of displacement. The general conclusion is that higher levels of violence produce higher levels of displacement. For example, Davenport et al. (2003) argue that higher levels of state, dissident or joint state-dissident threats to the personal integrity of civilians produce more displacement. Also, Moore and Shellman (2004) claim that violent behavior from the government, from the dissidents or from the interactions between the armed groups are the main causal factors for displacement. However, not all studies of this type have always found a correlation between levels of violence and levels of displacement. For example, Doocy et al. (2015, 10) found that even in some areas with low levels of violence in Syria there were high levels of displaced people. Therefore, the studies that just analyze the levels of violence do not seem to adequately explain what the causes are behind the displacement. There are more investigations that have demonstrated that displacement is not simply a by-product of the violence. They have asserted that armed groups intentionally cause this outcome. According to Steele (forthcoming), there are three ways in which armed groups target civilians to provoke their displacement. The first one is known as selective targeting. In this case, civilians are attacked based on something they personally did or allegedly did. The second is indiscriminate targeting. Here, the violence is not based on any particular trait. The civilians are targeted indiscriminately when armed groups employ violence randomly to communities or when the civilians become “collateral damage” of the confrontations between armed groups. The third one is collective targeting. It occurs when the violence is directed to members of a civilian group because of a trait or behavior the group share in common. Steele (forthcoming) also explains that each one of these forms of targeting civilians can bring different types of displacement. In this regard, selective targeting is likely to produce the individual escape of the targeted person (if he

4 finds out about the threat in time), indiscriminate violence can provoke mass relocation and collective targeting can lead to political cleansing (Steele, forthcoming). Political cleansing means the expulsion of a civilian group from a particular territory (Steele, forthcoming). Usually the term “cleansing” is linked to ethnic violence. In particular, some studies have stated that an armed group engages in “ethnic cleansing” when it removes people of a certain ethnic group from a territory (see Bulutgil 2015, 578). However, it must be clarified that ethnic cleansing is a subcategory of political cleansing (Steele, forthcoming). The term “political cleansing” refers to the removal of civilian groups from a particular territory, regardless of the element that armed groups use to target them. The literature related to ethnic and/or political cleansing provides some theories that explain why armed groups want to cause displacement of certain groups of civilians. One of the possible explanations that this literature offers is based on ethnic hatred. It has been claimed that tensions and cultural differences between ethnic groups contribute to the violence that is perpetrated against them (Valentino 2014, 92). Taking this in consideration, some scholars have studied how ethnic hate and prejudice increases the likelihood of violence and affect the way armed groups cleanse an area. For example, Fein (1979) found that in territories that were occupied by the Germans during the Holocaust, the Jewish populations had more chance of survival in those areas in which the attitude towards them was friendlier (Bulutgil 2016, 12). Also, Mann (2005, 5) argues that hostilities to an ethnic group increases “when ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process capturing and channeling class-like sentiments towards nationalism”. Another possible explanation of why displacement occurs is due to the wartime experiences of armed groups. It has been claimed that there are events during civil wars that can generate feelings of resentment that can affect the willingness of ethnic groups to cooperate and live with each other (Bulutgil 2015, 581-582). Petersen (2002) alleges that when the ethnic hierarchy is reversed, it fosters resentment from the group that loses status. Also, recent cycles of violence between ethnic groups can bring the desire for revenge. Therefore, scholars have argued that status reversals and collaboration with an enemy can be reasons why armed groups displace those civilians (Bulutgil 2015, 581-582). These two kinds of theories are based on the emotions that ethnic groups have towards each other; either on feelings that are exogenous to the war experience or on sentiments that are developed during the conflict. However, there is another

5 type of theory that help explain why armed groups cause displacement that is based on the assumption that they use violence strategically. Multiple studies have shown that armed groups employ violence to achieve their objectives. For example, it has been claimed that armed groups can use violence against civilians to increase the size of its membership (see Richards 2014). They can abduct children to manipulate and indoctrinate them, so that they can have them eventually fight for their cause (see Haer and Böhmelt 2006, 154). Also, armed groups may use violence to create cohesion between their members. Cohen (2013) argued that warring parties that recruit by force (abduction or pressganging) use rape during wars as a method of socialization between the cadres. Like these methods, political cleansing can also be used to obtain strategic objectives. Scholars have claimed that armed groups use displacement when they want to take control of a territory (Ibáñez 2009, 39-40; Steele 2011, forthcoming). Having control of territories is crucial for armed groups because it can shape the collaboration of the population that will be living in the area after the cleansing, prevent civilian resistant movements, allow the armed group to have access and enjoy the resources available in the place, weaken or divert the sources of the opposing party and other aspects (see Ibáñez 2009, 15-26; Kalyvas 2006, 118-124). Also, scholars have claimed that armed groups displace civilians when and where they can infer if civilians are loyal or not (Steele 2011). Loyalty or lack thereof can be the difference between winning or losing the war (Steele, forthcoming). Disloyal people can actively collaborate with an opposing party and help them to achieve their objectives. They could provide food for the rival groups, inform them where the armed groups are camped or who is working for them among their neighbors, among other aspects (Steele, forthcoming). However, Steele (2011, forthcoming) argues that loyalties can be hard to detect. One way she claims that armed groups can determine if a civilian is loyal or not is by looking at ascriptive clues, e.g., ethnicity (Steele 2011, 428; forthcoming). Nevertheless, in wars where there is no ascriptive clues, one source of information can be election results (Steele, forthcoming). Elections held before or during a war can reveal the loyalties of the population (Steele 2011, 424). For example, in those areas in which civilians voted for a party affiliated with the insurgents, the counterinsurgents can infer that those citizens are disloyal to them (Steele 2011, 424). In light of that, those civilians that are perceived to be disloyal according to the elections results are more likely to be displaced (Steele 2011, 429).

Bulutgil (2015, 581) also addresses how strategic objectives can lead to cleansing. She argues that armed groups remove people from certain areas when the warring parties believe those citizens are hindering or are anticipated to hinder their war efforts. On one hand, she alleges that when a minority group in a host state is part of the majority group in a neighboring enemy state, it will have more probabilities to experience ethnic cleansing. She claims that this relationship might lead the host state to believe that the minority group “would join the enemy forces or aid them behind front lines” (581). One the other hand, Bulutgil also claims that ethnic groups that collaborate militarily with an enemy state or rise in rebellion during war can also be considered risky and, therefore, are more likely to experience ethnic cleansing. She argues that the presumed motivation behind ethnic cleansing in these cases is “to prevent the ethnic group from undermining the war effort by indirectly diverting resources from the front line or directly increasing the strength of the enemy” (Bulutgil 2015, 581). It is important to take into account all these theories when analyzing in general the causes of displacement. However, as explained in the next chapter, some of them are more suitable than others to account for the reasons why the LTTE displaced Muslim communities during the Sri Lankan civil war.

Theory A. Argument After examining the relevant literature related to political cleansing, I reject the ethnic hatred and resentment theories, and claim that armed groups are more likely to cause displacement strategically. Although some combatants may be driven by those sentiments in the way they attack other civilians and/or cause displacement, in general, armed groups tend to employ violence more strategically than emotionally (see Stanton 2009). Wars are costly (see Fearon 1995). Armed groups cannot just use the resources they have motivated by their personal feelings. They have to be cautious about how they utilize what they have available. Therefore, armed groups will likely use violence to achieve particular objectives during the conflict that may help them to eventually win the war (Bulutgil 2015, Stanton 2009). Taking inspiration from Steele’s theory, I argue that armed groups cause displacement of civilians in territories they want to control when they perceive that those civilians are disloyal to them. The literature about strategic cleansing discussed in the previous chapter mentions different elements that can reveal if civilians are disloyal or not. However, most of the literature ties the loyalty of civilians to the armed groups (e.g., groups that are the ethnic kin of an enemy state in war can face a higher risk of ethnic cleansing, or counterinsurgents can perceive that people who voted for insurgent-affiliated party are disloyal). I agree that analyzing the possible connections between the civilians and armed groups can certainly allow us to assess the loyalties of the civilians. Nonetheless, those links are not the only ones that can help in this endeavor. Although armed groups are the main parties in a civil war, there could be other actors that are not affiliated with them but could still affect the possibilities that a particular armed group has to achieve its objectives and win the war. I argue that armed groups might also consider disloyal civilians who support those other groups that are hindering or could hinder their war efforts. Political parties are some of the actors that can affect the outcome of the conflict. If they are supported by the population they can have access to the government and they can implement, or at least try to implement, their policies. If those political ideas are against the objectives of a particular armed group, that warring party would be constrained in achieving its war goals if the policies are eventually implemented, regardless if the political parties are linked or not to its rivals. With all of this in consideration, I claim that armed groups will categorize as disloyal those civilians that are supporting a political party whose political objectives are hindering or

8 might hinder the armed group’s war goals, even when the political parties are not affiliated with a specific armed group. Since loyalty can be assessed based on political support, I also claim that elections results can help identify those that might be disloyal or not to an armed group.

B. Hypothesis My hypothesis is that: the LTTE caused the displacement of Muslim communities that supported a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the Tigers’ war goals. That support led the LTTE to believe that those civilians were disloyal to the Tigers.

C. Assumptions and Scope Conditions of the Theory There are some assumptions and scope conditions related to the applicability of my theory. First, the research focuses on the form of displacement known as political cleansing. Therefore, from now on, whenever I use term “displacement” I may be referring specifically to political cleansing depending on the context of the information provided. Second, I will restrict the application of my theory to cases of displacement of Muslim communities in Sri Lanka, which means the displacement of communities integrated mostly by civilians identified with the Sri Lankan Moor ethnic group. Third, I assume that armed groups fight for the control of territories and that they use different types of violence to achieve that goal. Since wars are costly, I assume that armed groups assess the costs and risks of their actions before executing them and that they use the type of violence they believe is more effective to control a territory at the moment they implement their tactics.

Methodology In order to test my argument, I will use the case study and process tracing methods. On one hand, I will perform an in-depth study of the Sri Lankan civil war. I will focus in variation over time in regards to the displacement of Muslim groups caused by the LTTE. I will analyze the circumstances surrounding the occasions in which the LTTE caused said displacement since the war started in July 23, 1983 until it ended in May 18, 2009. However, I will also take in consideration variation across space. I will examine the different conditions surrounding the displacement that occurred in distinct provinces in Sri Lanka, particularly between the Northern and Eastern provinces. On the other hand, in regards to each situation of displacement the LTTE caused, I will use process tracing to analyze the sequence of events related to each one of those displacements to find evidence that will me allow to identify the causal mechanisms that led to the political cleansing.

A. Dependent Variable As explained before, I will focus on the form of displacement known as political cleansing and, specifically, on the displacement of Muslim communities from a particular region of Sri Lanka. For the purpose of this research, the term “region” refers to a town, a district or a province of that country and the term “community” refers to a group of civilians living in a particular region of the island. Not all members of the community had to leave the region, but the majority of them. Also, there are several elements that I will take into account while measuring my dependent variable to confirm that the displacement was caused by the LTTE, either in total or in part. First, the LTTE had to express to the Muslim group that it had to leave the region. Although the LTTE could have used other methods to demonstrate that it wanted a Muslim community to leave a certain area, its intentions might have not always been clear. For example, a Muslim group might have left a certain region because of several killings the LTTE carried out there. However, the intention of the LTTE could have been just to kill certain people that it believed was disloyal to them, not to cause the displacement of all the civilians from the whole area. If the LTTE expressed that it wanted those Muslim groups to leave the region that they eventually evacuated, then we have a clear indicator that the LTTE actually wanted that displacement to happen.

Second, the displacement must have occurred within three months since the LTTE sent the message. This element helps to control the effect of other factors that might also influence the displacement. During a war, there can be several reasons why people decide to leave their homes. For example, they could decide to leave because of poor economic conditions in the area and not necessarily because of the armed groups’ violence (see Adhikary 2013). Although the Muslim communities that were displaced during the Sri Lankan civil war could have decided to leave for various reasons, the time frame provided will allow me to infer that the LTTE’s attacks caused the displacement at least partially. This time period is short enough to causally link the LTTE’s violence with the displacement, but also sufficiently ample to let me examine the additional tactics (besides ordering the groups to leave) that the LTTE could have used to cause the displacement. Both of these factors will demonstrate that the displacement was not just a by-product of the violence that occurred during the war or that it was caused solely by other elements not related to the LTTE’s attacks and intentions.

B. Independent Variables In terms of the independent variable, there are also several factors that will allow me to infer if a Muslim community from a particular region was disloyal to the LTTE or not. According to my argument, a group of civilians can be regarded as disloyal if it supported a political party whose political interests are opposed to the LTTE’s goals. To measure that support, the most important element that I will take into consideration are elections results. For this analysis, I will focus particularly on the Sri Lankan parliamentary elections. The reason is that, unlike other elections that were not celebrated in all parts of Sri Lanka during the conflict, the parliamentary elections were held in all districts and provinces during the whole war period. Nonetheless, I will also use other election results as long as they can help clarify the data obtained from the parliamentary elections. I will consider that a Muslim community supported a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s goals, if that group was located in a district in which the party gathered enough votes to gain at least one seat in the Sri Lankan Parliament. Also, I will determine that a Muslim community supported that political party, even though it did not win a seat in the Parliament, if the party had the second highest number of votes in the district where the Muslim community was located or if it gathered enough

11 votes to at least qualify to compete for seats in the Parliament according to the Constitution of Sri Lanka (more than 5% of the total votes in the district) (Parliament of Sri Lanka 2015, 76). The reason why I will use that threshold is because, although the majority of Muslims in a region might have supported a rival party, sometimes their votes were probably not going to be enough to grant that party a seat in the Parliament. For example, according to the 1981 Census in Sri Lanka, there were 12,598 Muslims living in the Jaffna district from a total population of 830,552 (Department of Census and Statistics–Sri Lanka [DCSSR] 2015, 144). During the 1989 Parliamentary Elections, 239,855 people casted a valid vote in that area (Election Commission of Sri Lanka [ECSR] 2017b, 11). If the political party that Muslims supported wanted to qualify to compete for seats in the Parliament, they needed at least 11,993 votes in their favor, i.e., 95% of the Muslim population in general would have had to vote for them (regardless if they were able to participate in the election process or not). With this minimum threshold, I take in consideration those smaller Muslim groups. Although elections results are a crucial factor to determine if a Muslim community supported a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals, these are not the only aspects that I will take in consideration. I will also examine if there were: 1) campaigns in favor of the political party in the districts where Muslim communities were located; 2) protests against the LTTE in the strongholds of the political party; 3) possible common political interests between the communities affected by displacement and the political party; 4) communications from the LTTE or the political party against each other; 5) LTTE’s communications indicating that the displacement was caused because the displaced people voted for the political party; and other relevant factors. None of these elements will be enough by themselves to determine if a Muslim community supported the party or not. To make that inference, I will analyze all of them. The more elements I can identify, the more likely it will be that a community supported the political party. After considering these aspects, if I find that a displaced Muslim community was supporting a political party whose political interests hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s goals, then I will infer that the Muslims groups were displaced because the Tigers believed they were disloyal to them. While examining if my argument answers the research question or not, I will also analyze if the other two major possible explanations that the literature about ethnic and political cleansing discusses apply to my case. First, I will examine the ethnic hatred theory. To establish that the

12 displacement was caused because the LTTE hated the Muslim ethnic group in Sri Lanka, I would expect to see: 1) disputes between the Tamils and the Muslims before the war; 2) communications from the LTTE or Tamils against Muslims based on ethnic differences or prejudice against them, raised before or during the war; 3) discriminatory treatment from the LTTE to the Muslim community based on ethnic differences between Tamils and Muslims; and 4) unwillingness from the LTTE and/or Tamils to collaborate with Muslims. Second, I will verify if revenge against Muslims was the cause of the displacement. To measure this variable, I will look for: 1) attacks by Muslims against the LTTE in the areas that the displacement occurred before it happened; 2) attacks by Muslims against the LTTE in other areas before the displacement occurred; 3) communications from the LTTE expressing that the displacement occurred because of those attacks; and 4) unwillingness of the LTTE to collaborate with Muslims groups. Although the first three elements are also going to be considered to determine if the reason why the LTTE displaced Muslim communities was because they were loyal or not, there are some differences between them. When analyzing if disloyalty was the cause or not for the displacement, these elements play more of a strategic role rather than a revenge role. According to my argument, I would expect to see that armed groups used that information not necessarily to make the Muslims pay for what they did, but to determine the tactics they should use that may allow them to gain control of a territory and achieve its objectives. Therefore, to infer that resentment played a role in the displacements, the communications from the LTTE about the cleansing have to be based on what and how the Tigers suffered because of the Muslim attacks and not based on the threats they want to prevent that could affect the LTTE’s war goals. It is important to state that the displacement that is caused by any of the possible motives that I discussed in this section is different from the one that is just a by-product of violence. In all of them, the LTTE’s violence could have caused the displacement of Muslims communities. However, if the reason behind it was disloyalty, ethnic hatred or resentment, I expect to see that the elements that account for any of those explanations were revealed before the LTTE’s violence that triggered the displacement occurred.

C. Case Selection and Data To identify the cases that I analyzed for this research, I examined different reports that

13 discussed the displacement in general that occurred in Sri Lanka. In those articles, I found two cases of displacement of Muslim communities that the LTTE allegedly caused, one in the Northern Province in 1990 and one in the Eastern Provinces in 2006. To test my hypothesis in those cases, I gathered data from several reports of different organizations and agencies, investigations of different scholars and other reliable sources that describe in detail the events that occurred before and after the war started that are related, directly or indirectly, to the relationship or interactions between the LTTE and the Muslims during wartime. First, I analyzed the particular events that occurred during each case of displacement. I started by gathering information from the moment in which the LTTE sent the message to the Muslim communities that they have to leave their homes until the displacement process was completed. However, I also collected data about events that happened before and after the displacements occurred. I evaluated the violence perpetrated from the LTTE or the Tamils against the Muslims and vice versa, the relationship in general among those groups, the way the Muslim communities voted in the elections held before and during the war, and other events that will help clarify any possible doubts regarding the motives behind the displacements. To understand better the analysis of the events related to the cases of displacement that I selected to test my theory, I provide next a background on the Sri Lankan civil war. I included some aspects about the conflict in general and about the Muslims politics during wartime.

Background of the War A. General Aspects about the Sri Lankan Civil War During 25 years, Sri Lanka was the center of an ethnic war. The main grievance of the conflict was the divisions between the two major ethnic groups in the country: the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils (Uppsala Conflict Data Program [UCDP] 2017b). The problems with these two groups started around 1948 when Sri Lanka gained its independence from India (UCDP 2017b). By that time, the Tamils were worried that the Constitution of the new country was not going to include adequate protections to this minority group against possible discriminatory policies that may be implemented by the Sinhalese (UCDP 2017b). Those divisions intensified when the Constitution of Sri Lanka was enacted in 1972. It established that the religion of the Sinhalese, Buddhism, was going to have the “foremost place” among other religions of the island and that Sinhala, the language of the majority ethnic group, was going to be official language of Sri Lanka (Parliament of Sri Lanka 2015, 3, 10). Also, Tamils suffered from discriminatory policies from the Sinhalese government in terms of their education and other aspects that led to their distrust of national politics (UCDP 2017b). As a result, Tamils started claiming non-discriminatory treatment and equal status for their culture and language (UCDP 2017a). “These demands became radicalized over the years, transforming into Tamil demands for self-government and independence in the areas where they are a dominant community” (UCDP 2017a). In May 14, 1976, the main Tamil political party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (the “TULF”), approved the Vaddukoddai Resolution which stated that the Tamils are a distinct and separate nation apart from the Sinhalese (Bandarage 2009, 19; UCDP 2017b). It called for the creation of the State Tamil Eelam, which was going to be comprised by the people living in the Eastern and Northern Provinces of the country, and demanded the guarantee of full rights to all Tamil speaking people living in Sri Lanka and Tamils of Eelam origin living in other parts of the world (Bandarage 2009, 19, 71). Also, it urged the Tamil population to fight until they achieve this goal (Bandarage 2009, 19; International Crisis Group [ICG] 2012, 3n15). From these nationalist objectives, the LTTE was born. It was an armed group created in May 1976 by Vellupillai Prabhakaran which had the same platform as the Vaddukoddai Resolution and which initiated an insurgency in Sri Lanka to obtain the goals established in said document (UCDP 2017b).

Initially, the LTTE committed only some military attacks and political assassinations (UCDP 2017b). However, the civil war formally started in 1983 when the Tigers killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna Town in the Northern Province (ICG 2006, 3; Spencer 2008, 611, 615-616; UCDP 2017b). The war lasted 25 years and was mainly fought between the LTTE and the armed forces of the Government (Höglund 2011, 229; UCDP 2017b). During the war, there were several periods of ceasefire in which the warring parties tried to reach or enforce agreements between them to put an end to the war (see UCDP 2017b). As part of the efforts to settle the conflict, the Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged temporarily into one (Shashtri 1992, 725; United Nations Peace Maker [UNPM] 2017, sec. 2.2). Also, a provincial council was established for the newly created province (UNPM 2017, sec. 2.2). Moreover, India deployed a peacekeeping force aimed to oversee the enforcement of some of those possible solutions (UCDP 2017b). However, those efforts were unsuccessful. Eventually the North-Eastern Province was demerged in 2006 and the parties were not able to reach a final agreement between them (DeVotta 2009, 1038; UCDP 2017b). The war finally ended in 2009 with the victory of the Government against the LTTE (UCDP 2017b).

B. Rise of Muslim Politics during the War Despite the tensions between the two major ethnic groups before the war, most of the time Tamils and Muslims lived peacefully after the independence of Sri Lanka, particularly the Northern and Eastern Muslims during the 1960s and 1970s (Imtiyaz 2009, 410). The Muslim politicians commonly worked with other parties to try to achieve their interests. The Muslims from the South usually maintained cooperation with the major Sinhalese parties that controlled the government, the United National Party (“UNP”) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (“SLFP”) (Imtiyaz 2009, 418). However, Muslims politicians from the North and the East usually contested under the Federal Party which was dominated by Tamils (Imtiyaz 2009, 418). During the early 1980s, some members of the Muslim community, particularly from the East, started to feel isolated from national politics (SLMC 2017b). This led to creation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (“SLMC”) (SLMC 2017b). It was originally a social movement formed on September 11, 1981 in Kattankudy town located in the Batticaloa district, whose goal was to fight for the rights of the Muslim community, particularly the ones from the Eastern Province (SLMC 2017b). It was not until 1986 that the SLMC officially became a party (SLMC 2017b).

After that, the SLMC participated in the Provincial Council Elections of 1988 where it won, among others, 17 seats in the Eastern Province (Matthews 1989, 231). The SLMC also contested the Parliamentary Elections of 1989 and won three seats thanks to the votes it obtained in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and one seat for the votes it received in total during the elections (ECSR 2017b). After the Provincial Council Elections of 1988, “the SLMC almost monopolized Muslim politics in the East and also emerged as one of the major forces in Sri Lankan national politics too” (Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011, 382-383). Among other aspects, the SLMC advocated for the protection of Muslims against the violence from the Tigers during the war (INFORM Human Rights and Documentation Center [INFORM] 1992b). Also, it objected to the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and demanded a separate Muslim provincial council in the east area of Sri Lanka (Johansson 2016, 113-114).

Cases of Displacement During the civil war, more than 800,000 people were displaced in Sri Lanka, either to other areas within the island or to other countries (Brun 2003, 381; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center [IDMC] 2014). Among them there were thousands of Muslim civilians (IDMC 2014). It has been argued that the violence perpetrated during the war caused the displacement of Muslim communities. For example, reports have claimed that Muslims abandoned several villages located in the Batticaloa district of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka1, which resulted in the displacement of 500 families (University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) [UTHR] 1993a, chap. 5). Although several Muslim communities were displaced during the conflict, there are two cases of displacement that appear to be the most obvious ones that the LTTE wanted to cause. I chose them to test my theory to be sure to analyze cases that have all the elements to account for my dependent variable and, therefore, to be able to answer my research question adequately. I will proceed now to explain first the spatial and temporal variation of my dependent variable within Sri Lanka and then I will describe the details of each case of displacement.

A. Variation of Displacement Sri Lanka is a country that is divided in nine provinces: Northern, Eastern, Western, Southern, Central, North Western, North Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa (DCS 2013). Each of those provinces is divided as well in districts that incorporate several towns and villages (DCS 2013). From all of those provinces, two of them seem to had cases of displacement caused by the LTTE: the Northern Province and the Eastern Province (UTHR 1991a, chap.3; UTHR 2006a). Although there were other Muslim communities in other parts of the country during the war, e.g., in Kandy town in the Central Province (Mayilvaganan 2008, 834), the LTTE do not seem to have caused displacements of Muslim communities in the other seven provinces, or at least, the reports and studies that were analyzed do not appear to reflect the contrary. In terms of time, the Sri Lankan civil war was divided into four periods: 1) from July 1983 to July 1987 (“Eelam War I”); 2) from June 1990 to January 1995 (“Eelam War II”); 3) from April 1995 to February 2002 (“Eelam War III”); and 4) from July 2006 to May 2009

1 The villages that Muslims allegedly abandoned were: Illuppadichchenai, Kasar-Kudah, Kokku-Thangia-Madu, Komparchenai, Kooththuchchenai, Koppaveli, Mavadi-Odai, Oorugamam, Pavatkodichchenai, Rugam, Sillikudiaru, Sivaththa-Bokkadi, Thumpavan Cholai and Veppa-Vedduwan (UTHR 1993, chap. 5). 18

(“Eelam War IV”) (Destradi 2012, 66). Each of those stages were separated by ceasefire periods (Castellano 2015, 131; UCDP 2017b). The LTTE apparently caused displacement at least two times during the war: one in 1990, four months after Eelam War II started, and one in 2006, one month after Eelam War IV began (UTHR 1991a, chap. 3; UTHR 2006a). In particular, the Tigers caused the displacement of Muslims communities in the Northern Province in 1990 and in the Eastern Province in 2006 (UTHR 1991a, chap. 3; UTHR 2006a). Even though there were Muslim communities living in those two provinces and in other provinces of Sri Lanka at other stages during the war, the LTTE do not seem to have caused displacement during other periods of the conflict.

B. Description of the Cases of Displacement 1. Northern Muslims The first case of displacement of Muslim communities occurred in 1990 between the months of October and November (Jeyaraj 2015; UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). During that period, more than 60,000 Muslims had to leave their homes located in the five districts (Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu) within the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (IDMC 2014). According to some reports, the LTTE transmitted the expulsion order in the following dates and areas: 1) on October 21, 1990 in Chavakachcheri Town in Jaffna; 2) on October 23, 1990 in the Marichukkatty village in Mannar, 3) on October 24, 1990 in Mannar Island in Mannar; 3) on October 23, 1990 in Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi; and 4) on October 30, 1990 in Jaffna Town in Jaffna (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011, 229; Jeyaraj 2015; UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). These orders were delivered in at least four of the five districts of the Northern Province. However, reports claim that some Muslims from the Vavuniya district were also asked to leave around that period (Jeyaraj 2015). The Muslims that were ordered to evacuate the region were given less than a week to move out of the area (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011, 229; Jeyaraj 2015; Shanmugaratnam 2000, 7; UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). In places like Mannar, the LTTE used loudspeakers to transmit its order for expulsion against the Muslims (Jeyaraj 2015; Shanmugaratnam 2000, p. 7; UTHR 1991b). The messages transmitted by the LTTE not only ordered them to leave those districts; they also notified those civilians that they need to seek permission and clearance from the Tigers before leaving and that the LTTE was going to decide their exit route (UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). In other

19 places, like Jaffna, the LTTE gathered the whole Muslim community first and then told them that they needed to leave. For example, on October 30, 1990 at 7:30 a.m., the Tigers announced through loudspeakers that all Muslims living in Jaffna had to assemble at the Jinnah Stadium in the Osmania College located in the same district (Jeyaraj 2015). Also, some LTTE members did a house-to-house announcement about the assembly (Jeyaraj 2015). During the meeting, two LTTE leaders, Prabhakaran and Anjaneyar, told the Muslims that they only had two hours to leave (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2006, 15; Jeyaraj 2015; UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). The Muslims were released at 10:00 a.m. and had to report at 12:00 p.m. at different check points established across the town (UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). However, a lot of them were checked before they even left their homes (UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). The Muslims that were leaving the Northern Province were ordered to queue up at Ainthumuchanthi (Jeyaraj 2015). When the civilians arrived, the LTTE ordered them to give the Tigers all their belongings (Jeyaraj 2015). The Muslims were only allowed to carry 150 rupees and one set of clothes (ICG 2006, 15). The reports do not mention if the LTTE expressly said that it wanted to control those areas. However, their acts after the displacement might lead us to believe that this was its goal. After the Muslims left those zones, the LTTE allegedly sold Muslim houses, lands and vehicles to Tamils (Jeyaraj 2012; ICG 2007, 8). Also, the Tigers established administrative organisms in some parts of Sri Lanka, including areas in the north (Stokke 2006, 1022). As we can see, the displacement of Muslims in the Northern Province was not a byproduct of the LTTE’s violence. The Tigers clearly wanted to cause the displacement of those civilians. The LTTE ordered them to leave the different districts, the cleansing occurred less than a week after the Muslims were told to evacuate the area and the LTTE controlled the displacement process. It is important to also clarify that this displacement was not the only one that the LTTE was apparently trying to instigate around that time in Sri Lanka. While the displacement of the Northern Muslims was occurring, the Tamils were also generally attacking other communities in the East and more specifically targeting the Muslim population. On August 3, 1990, two months before the displacement of 1990, the LTTE allegedly entered into two Muslim mosques in the Kattankudy town in the Batticaloa district and killed the worshippers (Ali 2014, 377; ICG 2006, 15; UTHR 1990a, chap. 9). In those attacks, the LTTE apparently assassinated at least 120 Muslims and wounded 75 of them (UTHR 1990a, chap. 9).

On August 12, 1990, the LTTE went to the town of Eravur in the Batticaloa district and attacked Muslim civilians (UTHR 1990b, chap. 1, chap. 2). Specifically, approximately 200 Tigers went to the Muslim villages of Saddam Hussein Village, Pooaikadu and Kalawaichnai in the Muslim division of Eravur electorate and killed around 122 Muslim civilians who were mostly decapitated (Bandarage 2009, 153; UTHR 1990b, chap. 2). Moreover, some reports claimed that the LTTE issued warnings to all Muslims to vacate their homes in the North and the East (INFORM 1990b, 8). This demonstrates that the LTTE also wanted to displace Muslims in other areas. However, it was not successful in this endeavor. One key difference between the Northern and Eastern Provinces was the amount of Muslim population. According to the last census performed before the displacement of 1990, the Muslims were only 5% of the total population in the Northern Province (see DCSSR 2015, 144). Nevertheless, the Sri Lanka Muslims were around 32% of the total population in the Eastern Province (see DCSSR 2015, 144). In the East, there were more Muslims than Sinhalese, the major ethnic group in the whole Sri Lanka, who only made up 25% of the ethnic demography (see DCSSR 2015, 144). In terms of the amount of people, there were 50,841 Muslims in the North compared to 315,436 Muslims in the East (see DCSSR 2015, 144). The fact that Muslims were almost one third of the total population of the Eastern Province could have helped them resist the LTTE’s violence. However, the reasons why these people did not leave their homes is beyond the scope of this research. For this investigation, the only event around 1990 that seems to account for my dependent variable is the displacement of Muslims in the Northern Province.

2. Mutur Muslims The second case of displacement of Muslim groups that the LTTE caused was in 2006 when the Muslim community living in Mutur Town located in the Trincomalee district of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka fled the area (IDMC 2007, 10; UTHR 2006a). The way the displacement occurred there was different in some aspects from the one that occurred in the Northern Province. However, it still has all the elements that demonstrate that the LTTE wanted to cause that displacement. Around June 2006, just weeks before Eelam War IV started, the LTTE sent threats to the Muslims in Mutur Town ordering them to leave (UTHR 2006a). At that time, the Muslim community did not seem to have evacuated the abovementioned place or, at least, the documents

21 that were revised do not mention that they did. Nonetheless, the LTTE perpetrated a series of attacks in the following two months that eventually led those civilians to flee Mutur. After a period of four years of ceasefire in Sri Lanka, on July 20, 2006 the LTTE closed the Mavil Aru sluice gates which provided water to more than 15,000 families in territories which, at that point, were controlled by the Government (IDMC 2007, 10; ICG 2007, 16; UTHR 2006a). As a consequence, the Government retaliated against the LTTE and heavy conflict occurred between both armed groups in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts (IDMC 2007, 10). While those attacks happened, on August 1, 2006 the LTTE regrouped in Mutur Town (IDMC 2009, 41; UTHR 2006a). Around 11:30 p.m. the Tigers cut the power supply (Mohideen 2012; UTHR 2006a). Then, a couple hours later, one of the LTTE leaders called a Muslim community leader in Mutur and informed him that the Tigers were going to battle for the control of the town (UTHR 2006a). Consequently, the LTTE started attacking several camps in the area (UTHR 2006a). As a result of those attacks, the Government started to shell Mutur constantly from outside of the region causing the death of several Tamils and Muslim civilians in the area (UTHR 2006a). It has been claimed that the LTTE was firing from civilian positions to allegedly provoke the Government to fire against those locations (UTHR 2006a). On August 3, 2006, the LTTE fired rockets at the Government and then stood close to the Arabic College where thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge (UTHR 2006a). Air Force helicopters were flying overhead (UTHR 2006a). It is believed that the LTTE soldiers could have been spotted since they were standing outside wearing their uniforms (UTHR 2006a). The Government then started shelling the Arabic College causing the death of 36 people (UTHR 2006a). After two days of constant exchange of attacks between the LTTE and the Government, on August 4, 2006 the LTTE leaders took the decision to evacuate Mutur (UTHR 2006a). As a result, more than 25,000 Muslims left the town (ICG 2007, 16). The Muslims first walked towards the 64th Mile Post, but then the LTTE made them take a detour through Kinanthimunai because the Tigers said that the road was mined (UTHR 2006b). As the crowd approached the place, LTTE members that were hidden started to come out (UTHR 2006b). The Muslim men had to walk past some hooded men who allegedly were screening people to identify supporters of LTTE’s enemies (UTHR 2006b). However, the process was interrupted by the Government. At about 1:00 p.m., it started shelling the checkpoint and the civilians that were there ran away in

22 different directions (UTHR 2006b). Despite the thousands of civilians that were displaced, around 3,000 people stayed in Mutur (UTHR 2006b). The LTTE gained control over that city, but not for long. By Saturday August 5, 2006, the Government reclaimed the town (UTHR 2006b). After that, the Government started to bring back to Mutur the Muslims that were displaced (UTHR 2006b). However, on September 22, 2006, the LTTE ordered again the Muslims to leave the city temporarily so that they could regain control of it (INFORM and Center for Policy Alternatives [CPA] 2006, 1; UTHR 2006b). The Muslim community started to leave again for the towns of Kinniya, Kantalai and Trincomalee, but the Government forced the civilians to turn back (INFORM and CPA 2006, 1; UTHR 2006b). Nonetheless, on that same day more than 800 Muslim families eventually reached Kinniya (UTHR 2006b). The events discussed in the preceding paragraphs are relevant to measure the dependent variable that is the object of this research. The displacement that occurred in August 4, 2006 has all the elements that are necessary to consider it as one of the cases of displacement of Muslim communities caused by the LTTE. On June 2006, the LTTE sent a message to the Muslim group living in Mutur asking them to leave the area. Two months later, those Muslims left the abovementioned town. In addition, the LTTE was in charge of the displacement. It authorized the movement, controlled the exit route the Muslims took and screened the Muslims that were living before they could go settle in a new place. The LTTE even reinstated its intentions to cleanse the area from the Muslim community when it distributed leaflets on September 22, 2006 asking the residents from that ethnic group to, once again, leave Mutur. At the beginning of Eelam War IV, the LTTE was also using violence in other parts of Sri Lanka. For example, on August 11, 2006, the LTTE attacked the government forces in the Jaffna Peninsula located in the Northern Province (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2007, 21). Another example is when the LTTE battled the Government for the control of Sampur which is close to Mutur Town on August 2006 (“Sri Lankan troops take key town” 2006). Many civilians in general allegedly fled because of the violence perpetrated in those areas (“Sri Lankan troops take key town” 2006), but it does not look like the LTTE caused any other act of displacement of Muslim communities around that time. The event that seems to account for my dependent variable during that period is the displacement that occurred in August 4, 2006. The

23 circumstances surrounding it clearly reveal that it was in fact caused by the LTTE and, therefore, that it was not a by-product of the violence.

Analysis and Discussion of Data In the previous chapter, I discussed the two events of displacement which I focus on in this research, one that occurred in 1990 in the Northern Province and the other that occurred in 2006 in Mutur Town. As I am going to explain in more detail in this section, the analysis of the events related to those cases demonstrate that the Tigers caused the displacements because they perceived that those civilians were disloyal to them. There is strong evidence that show that support for a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals allowed the Tigers to infer that the displaced civilians were disloyal. However, the analysis also reveals another source of disloyalty. Military collaboration with the LTTE’s rival armed groups, either by joining their forces or by attacking the LTTE or the Tamils, allowed the Tiger to assess the loyalties of the displaced civilians. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that the LTTE used the Muslim ethnicity to target those that it considered disloyal.

A. Evidence of Political Support There are several elements related to those cases of displacement and the events that occurred during the war in general that I expect to observe in order for those incidents of political cleansing to be the ideal cases to test my theory. I expect to see evidence of support to a political party whose interests are against the LTTE’s goals in the areas the displaced civilians used to live. Also, I will be looking for signs that lead me to believe that the LTTE knew the displaced civilians were supporting that political party. Moreover, I hope to find data about several clashes between the LTTE and the political party, as well as its leaders or its supporters during the war.

1. North-1990 There are some elements that demonstrate a strong political support from the displaced Muslims to a political party who interests hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals. Before 1989, the parliamentary elections in the Northern Province were dominated by Tamil political parties (De Silva 1998, 39). Only on two occasions did the main ruling Sinhalese political party in Sri Lanka, the United National Party, win a seat in the Parliament on its own (De Silva 1998, 39). The first one was in 1952 with a Tamil candidate and the second one in 1954 with a Muslim candidate (De Silva 1998, 39). The seats in the Northern Province were usually shared by the Tamil Congress, the Federal Party and, its successor, the TULF (De Silva 1998,

39). Moreover, in the Parliamentary Elections of 1977 (the last elections before the war started) all the seats in the Northern Province were won by the TULF (ECSR 2017a, 20-21). However, things changed in the Parliamentary Elections of 1989. At least one member of the SLMC won a seat in one of the two electoral districts in the Northern Province (ECSR 2017b). In the Vanni electoral district, which included the administrative districts of Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu, the SLMC won a seat with 32.82% percent of the total votes (ECSR 2017b, 12). The votes for the SLMC were not enough to grant that party a seat in the Jaffna electoral district, which covered the Jaffna and Killinochi administrative districts (ECSR 2017b, 11). The SLMC did not even receive the minimum threshold of 5% required to qualify for a seat in the Parliament (ECSR 2017b, 11). However, the SLMC ended up being the party with the second highest number of votes in the Jaffna electoral district with 8,439 votes, which was 3.52% of the total amount (ECSR 2017b, 11). Besides elections results, there are other factors that reveal that support for this party was the reason the LTTE displaced Muslim communities in the Northern Province. First, the SLMC was a party whose political interests conflicted with the LTTE’s objectives. The Tigers wanted to create a separate Tamil state comprised of the Northern and Eastern Provinces (UCDP 2017b). However, the SLMC obstructed the achievement of this goal (see INFORM 1990a; Johansson 2016, 113-114). After the Northern and Eastern Provinces were temporarily merged, the SLMC claimed for a separate administrative division for Muslims in the Eastern Province where this ethnic group represented one third of the total population (INFORM 1990a, 3). It argued that the Muslim group living in the north were only 5% of the total population in that area and, by merging the Eastern and Northern Province, the Muslims were still going to be a minority in the new state proposed by the LTTE (Johansson 2016, 113-114; SLMC 2017a). Second, the SLMC started claiming security measures against the LTTE’s violence before the displacement occurred. On September 28, 1990, the SLMC requested the Sri Lankan government to increase the intake of Muslim Home Guards in order to protect the Muslim communities (“Situation in East Sri Lanka Complicated, Says Minister” 1989; INFORM 1990a, 2, 11). In regard to this, the Sri Lanka Government implemented a Home Guard system in the Sinhalese and Muslim communities in 1985 (Silva 2010, 31). This was designed to be a civil force to protect areas that were threatened or attacked by the LTTE (Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights[OHCHR] 2015, 31; Silva 2010, 31-32). In general, their tasks

26 included “protecting vulnerable villages, manning sections of forward defence lines, protecting suspected LTTE targets such as Buddhist temples in border villages, manning check points on roads and monitoring any suspected events or movements of people in and out of the villages” (Silva 2010, 32). The Home Guards, mostly adult males, were put into service after 48 hours of training by the Police Department (Civil Security Department of Sri Lanka [CSDSR] 2017; Silva 2010, 31; UTHR 1990b, chap. 1).2 The Government gave them “12 bore shotguns and brown colored uniforms”, and assigned them to a local police station (CSDSR 2017; Silva 2010, 33). Muslims were part of the Home Guard system. The Sri Lankan Government apparently started recruiting them on or before September 1990 to provide protection to Muslim villages in the East (see INFORM 1990a, 2; UTHR 1990b, chap. 1). By the time the displacement in the Northern Province occurred, some Muslim Home Guards were deployed in places like Trincomalee and Batticaloa towns located in the eastern districts of the same names (UTHR 1990b, chap. 1). Fourth, the SLMC contested elections that the LTTE were boycotting. In particular, the LTTE boycotted the 1989 provincial council elections (“Nomination for provincial council election in Sri Lanka ends” 1988). The Tigers even threatened, through posters and handbills, the people in the north and the east that were going to take part in the elections (“Preparations for PC Elections in North-East Sri Lanka Faces Standstill” 1988). Although several parties decided not to participate, the SLMC contested them and won 17 seats in the Eastern Province (Lewer and Ismail 2011, 122). Fifth, the LTTE tried to restrain the support for the SLMC. In regards to the parliamentary elections that were held in 1989, the LTTE started banning political activities from the SLMC in the areas it controlled in the north and the east of Sri Lanka (UTHR 1990a, chap. 7). Also, around January 1990, some news emerged that the LTTE again warned the SLMC to halt any political activity in the north-east (“Tamil Militants Warn Muslim Political Activity in Sri Lanka” 1990). Finally, without mentioning the SLMC specifically, the LTTE alluded to the complaints of the political party about the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces while explaining the reasons why the displacement occurred in the North (UTHR 1991b, chap. 6). Among other aspects, during a speech that the former LTTE political spokesman, Yogaratnam Yogi, delivered at the University of Jaffna after the expulsion, he mentioned that the Eastern Muslims claimed that they were losing privileges in the new province (UTHR 1991b, chap. 6).

2 After 2006, the guards were grouped into a separate troop known as the Civil Security Force under the direction of the CSDSR (CSDSR 2017; Silva 2010, 33). 27

Although these circumstances can lead us to infer that the LTTE perceived that the Northern Muslims that were displaced were disloyal because they supported the SLMC, there are other events, or lack of them, that may weaken this inference. First, before the 1990 displacement occurred, apparently there were no direct attacks against political leaders of the SLMC in the Northern Province or in the rest of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the documents that were examined also did not mention that the LTTE specifically attacked SLMC supporters. These elements are important because they show the Tigers’ perception towards the SLMC and what their knowledge about the loyalty of the displaced community was when the political cleansing occurred. The absence of this type of violence put into question if, at the time of the displacement, the LTTE believed that the SLMC hindered or was hindering its war goals or if the LTTE knew that the displaced community supported the SLMC. Second, it does not seem that the SLMC represented the interests of the Northern Muslims when they were displaced. In fact, it discriminated against them when it claimed a separate provincial council for the Eastern Muslims. Therefore, the interests of the Northern Muslims might not have been the same as the ones from the SLMC. Third, it does not seem that the Northern Muslims were actually involved much in political campaigns in favor of the SLMC. The elections results revealed support for the SLMC in those areas, which could have been the factor that the LTTE ultimately took in consideration to determine if the civilians living there were disloyal or not, but the Northern Muslims did not seem to have shown that support in other ways before the elections. Fourth, when the LTTE told the Muslim communities that they had to leave, they did not mention the support to the SLMC as one of the reasons. In fact, the orders to evacuate the areas were not directed to the SLMC supporters or to a particular community regardless of the ethnicity of the civilians that were living there. The messages sent through loudspeakers mentioned the Muslims in general without making any other distinction (Jeyaraj 2015; UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). Finally, the discrepancies regarding the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces were not the only aspects that the LTTE alluded to as part of the reasons why the Northern Muslims were displaced. Yogi also mentioned in his speech that 2,000 Tamils were killed in the East by Muslim Home Guards, that 70,000 Tamils were displaced in the Eastern Province, that Muslims joined the government forces and that LTTE members were worried that a Muslim jihad organization was going to develop in the North (UTHR 1991b, chap. 6). Although these elements at first seem to weaken the inference that political support was a source

28 of disloyalty, they still do not refute my theory. In Section A1 of this chapter, I will discuss how the election results, the LTTE’s position towards the SLMC and its supporter and the events that the LTTE claimed were the reasons to displace the Northern Muslims, still demonstrate that political support to the SLMC influenced that displacement.

2. East-2006 The analysis of the events that occurred in Mutur shows stronger indicators that the Muslims in that town could have been perceived as disloyal because of their support to a political party whose interests could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals. Besides the seat it won from the Vanni electoral district in the Northern Province, the SLMC also won two additional seats in the Eastern Province during its first parliamentary elections in 1989. It won one of the seats in the Ampara district, formerly known as Digamadulla, and the other in the Batticaloa district (ECSR 2017b, 33). The SLMC did not win any seat for the third eastern district, Trincomalee, where Mutur Town is located. However, the SLMC won 17.61% of the vote in that district which would have allowed them to at least compete for a seat in the Parliament (ECSR 2017b, 15). Over the years, the SLMC kept winning seats in the parliamentary elections it contested (ECSR 2017c, 2017d, 2017e). On the last election before the displacement in Mutur, the SLMC won one seat in the Trincomalee district with 35.64% of the vote, one seat in the Batticaloa district with 17.87% of the vote and two seats in the Ampara/Digamadulla district with 26.37% of the vote (ECSR 2017e, 99, 105, 108). Although these elections results reflected support in general from the Eastern Province to the SLMC, the particular results from the Mutur polling division, where Mutur town was located, demonstrated an even stronger support for that political party. In its first parliamentary elections, the SLMC obtained the highest number of votes in the Mutur polling division with 10,804 votes (28.96%) (ECSR 2017b, 15). The support kept growing over time to the point that in the Parliamentary Elections of 2004, the SLMC obtained 45,523 votes (69.58%) in that polling division, showing an increase of 321% of the total number of votes (CPA 2007, 85n101; ECSR 2017e, 107). Apart from the elections results, there were other events that occurred in Sri Lanka in general that demonstrate that the Mutur Muslims may have been displaced because they were supporting the SLMC. After the displacement in the Northern Province, the SLMC continued demanding protection for the Muslims. It alleged the lack of security of the Muslim communities

29 and kept requesting the recruitment of Muslims as Home Guards (INFORM 1990b, 3; 1992b, 2). Also, the SLMC even called on the Muslim community to take arms against the LTTE. On July, 1992, various SLMC leaders expressed that Muslims should declare jihad on the LTTE (INFORM 1992b, 10). In regards to this, Mohammed Hussain Mohammed Ashraff, one of the cofounders of the referred political party, provided the following statement: If the LTTE is killing us, if the LTTE is leaving us out of our homes, simply because we happen to be Muslims, simply because we say “La ilaha illallahu, Mammmdur-Rasoolullah” because of our belief in Allah and Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) … if that is the only reason, it is the commandment of the Holy Quran that we should declare Jihad against them and kill every LTTEer. We shall now intend to slaughter every LTTEer including Mr. Prabhakaran. In a personal note, I will be the happiest if I can die in battle at the time of slitting the neck of this bloody Prabhakaran.

(Imtiyaz 2009, 411).

Moreover, the SLMC also called for a day of protest against the LTTE atrocities to be held on October 23, 1992 (“Sri Lanka Muslim Party Declares Oct. 23 as Black Friday” 1992). Furthermore, on November 1, 1992 the SLMC informed that it planned to submit a petition to the UNHCR with a list of the atrocities committed by the LTTE since 1990 (INFORM 1992c, 1). On its part, the LTTE attacked SLMC leaders and its supporters after the 1990 displacement. Reports emerged that an LTTE hit gang in Colombo was targeting Muslims and Tamil politicians, among them, Mr. Ashraff (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011, 228; INFORM 1992c, 5). He died eventually in September 16, 2000 in a helicopter accident that apparently was not related to the LTTE (Associated Press 2000). However, the Tigers targeted other SLMC leaders. First, the LTTE tried to kill a candidate known as Mahamood Lebbe Alim Mohamed Hizbullah in the Batticaloa district somewhere around late September 2000 (Jayasinghe 2000a, 2000b). According to the police, one of the vehicles on his convoy was attacked (Jayasinghe 2000a, 2000b). Nevertheless, he was able to escape (Jayasinghe 2000a, 2000b). Then, on October 3, 2000, the LTTE killed an SLMC candidate known as Mohammed Baithulla (Jayasinghe 2000a, 2000b). Not only did the LTTE assassinate this politician, but the armed group killed him during one of his campaign rallies celebrated in Mutur Town along with, at least, other 18 people that were present (Jayasinghe 2000a, 2000b). Furthermore, on April 4, 2004 the Senior Deputy Leader of the SLMC, A. Abdul Majid, claimed that he and his family were facing constant threats to their lives from the LTTE since 1999 (Weerasinghe 2004).

In regards to the LTTE’s goals for a separate state in the Eastern and Northern Provinces, the SLMC was still obstructing the permanent merger of those regions after the displacement in the Northern Province. The SLMC kept claiming for a separate provincial council for the Muslim community (INFORM 1992b, 2). Also, after the LTTE declared unilateral ceasefire in 2002, the Tigers tried to amend ties with the Muslim community and the SLMC (Innes-Ker 2002). On April 13, 2002, the LTTE and the SLMC signed an agreement (the “Memorandum of Understanding”) to establish solutions to some of the problems that the Northern and Eastern Muslims suffered because of the LTTE (Johansson 2016, 186). Among other aspects, the armed group agreed to stop collecting taxes from the Muslim communities in LTTE controlled areas and to allow displaced Muslims to return back home, including the ones displaced in the north in 1990 (ICG 2007, 9; Innes-Ker 2002; Johansson 2016, 186). Around that time, most of the Northern Muslims were living in camps located in the Puttalam and Kurunegala districts in the North-Western Province, and in the Anuradhapura district in the North Central Province (IDMC 2003, 19, 57, 60). The LTTE even apologized for that displacement and said that it was a “political blunder” (ICG 2007, 9). However, the LTTE kept facing problems from the SLMC to achieve its goals. In 2003, the LTTE dropped its claim for a separate state and proposed an interim self-governing administration (the “ISGA”) comprised of the eight districts located in the Northern and Eastern provinces, which was going to be mostly dominated by the LTTE, to have time to work on a permanent solution (ICG 2006, 8). The SLMC was opposed to this because it thought that the ISGA was not amenable to Muslims interests (Jeyaraj 2016). Instead, the SLMC said that it was going to release alternative power-sharing proposals that take in consideration the Muslim community (Jeyaraj 2016). As explained before, the SLMC wanted a separate provincial council for the Muslims, originally in the East. Nonetheless, it was not until July 25, 2006, i.e., one week and a half before the displacement in Mutur town occurred, when the SLMC formally presented its request which also included some parts of the Northern Province (Aliff 2010, 206; Iran News Agency 2006; Yusof, Hussin and Sarjoon 2014, 29). Moreover, the SLMC seems to have represented the interests of the Mutur Muslims. The SLMC advocated for the interests of the Muslims of the Eastern Province in general. Since Mutur town is located in that province, it seems that they could have also benefitted from the SLMC’s objectives. Although all these elements show a connection between the displacement and the support to the SLMC, there is one circumstance that may weaken this relationship.

Like in the displacement in the Northern Province, the LTTE again did not target the supporters of the SLMC in Mutur Town. When the LTTE tried to displace the people living in Mutur in June 2006 and in September 2006, the evacuation orders were addressed to the whole Muslim community (INFORM and CPA 2006, 1; UTHR 2006a, 2006b). Also, even though during the displacement process the LTTE allegedly used hooded men to help them pick and arrest those Muslims who apparently supported the jihad or the Karuna faction, which is another armed group that emerged briefly during the war created by an LTTE defector, (UTHR 2006a, 2006b), the reports did not mention that the LTTE were also targeting people who voted for the SLMC. Therefore, it seems more that they were targeting the Muslim community in general and not the SLMC supporters.

A1. Discussion of Evidence of Political Support After analyzing all the data related to the political support of the Muslim population in the areas that were cleansed, there is strong evidence that the LTTE could have displaced the Muslims communities in the North and East because they were supporting a political party whose interests hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s goals. The SLMC is a party whose policies were opposed to the LTTE. It obstructed the permanent merger and separation of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, raised security concerns of the Muslim population, requested the establishment of more Muslim Home Guards and incited the Muslim people to fight against the Tigers. On the other side, the LTTE was attacking the SLMC. They killed or attempted to kill leaders of the SLMC, tried to ban the abovementioned political party in the North and the East and threatened those involved in political activity related to the SLMC. Also, in regards to the communities, they were located in provinces that included districts that were strong supporters of the SLMC and that consistently voted for that party throughout the war in the parliamentary elections. There are other elements that could led us believe that political support did not contribute to the events of displacement, particularly in regards to the displacement of the Northern Muslims. Allegedly, the LTTE did not attack directly the SLMC leaders or its supporters before 1990, the Northern Muslims did not share the same political goals as the SLMC and the LTTE did not mention the support to the SLMC as a reason why the Muslim communities were displaced. All these aspects put into question whether the LTTE actually knew or took in

32 consideration the support of the Muslim communities to the SLMC at the time of the displacement or whether some of those communities actually supported the SLMC in the first place. However, there are other factors that can counteract the effect of these elements. First, although there were no direct attacks to SLMC political leaders in the North or in Sri Lanka in general before the 1990 displacement, there were still other types of violence against the SLMC. The LTTE targeted the party and its supporters by banning political activity of the SLMC in the North and the East and by threating the people that were participating in its campaigns even though the SLMC just recently started to contest the parliamentary elections when the displacement occurred. Second, it does not matter if the SLMC could have been discriminating against the Northern Muslims, if those civilians were not involved in political campaigns in favor of the SLMC or if they were not showing any other sign of support. The people living in the areas that were cleansed still voted for that party. Other reports and testimonies could emerge later claiming that, before the Parliamentary Elections of 1989, the people that were displaced vehemently demonstrated that they rejected the SLMC and its objectives. Moreover, the reports could even state that those Muslims actually supported the idea of an independent Tamil state in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Nonetheless, at the end, the election results showed support for the SLMC. Again, the votes from the Northern Province were enough to grant the SLMC a seat for one of the electoral districts and to allow them to come in second place in the other district. Finally, even if the LTTE did not specifically say that they were displacing the Northern Muslims because they supported the SLMC, the Tigers mentioned the complaints the political party presented about the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces. As we can see, the support to the SLMC seemed to have contributed to the displacement of Muslims communities in 1990 and 2006. However, the data revealed that additional elements played or might have played a role in the political cleansing.

1. Ethnic Indicator First of all, the LTTE seemed to have used another indicator of disloyalty to target the civilians that were displaced. The displacement was directed to the Muslims in general that were living in the areas that were cleansed. Therefore, it did not matter if they voted or not for the SLMC, all Muslims were forced to leave. Nevertheless, that does not mean that support from the SLMC did not play a role in this displacement. The SLMC became the voice of the Muslim

33 community (see McGilvray and Raheem 2007, 19). Even though they were more focused on the Muslims in the Eastern Province than in the rest of Sri Lanka, they did not seem to advocate much for the rights of the Sinhalese and Tamil communities (see Aliff 2010, 202; SLMC 2017b). Instead, the SLMC relied on the Sri Lankan Muslim ethnicity in general as part of their platform (see McGilvray 2011, 55-56; McGilvray and Raheem 2007, 19; SLMC 2017b). Also, the LTTE considered the SLMC as the official representatives of the Muslim community (Johansson, 186; UTHR 2002). Not only did the LTTE express it, but they demonstrated it. When the LTTE tried to establish a peace process within Muslim and Tamil communities in 2002, the arrangements were made through the SLMC (ICG 2007, 9; Innes-Ker 2002; “Sri Lanka Muslims in landmark peace talks with Tigers” 2002). In light of all this, it seems that the LTTE tied the Muslim ethnicity with the SLMC and its interests.In that way, the LTTE could have displaced the Muslims groups because they perceived Muslims in general as supporters of the SLMC or its objectives, which conflicted with the LTTE’s goals. It does not mean that ethnicity was in fact completely effective in targeting SLMC’s supporters or that it was the best indicator the LTTE could have used. Of course, ethnicity was not the best indicator because there could have been Muslims that did not vote for the SLMC and did not agree with its objectives. However, ethnicity was an easy way for the LTTE to target people that were against its ideals or that were supporting parties that were opposed to its goals. Since the SLMC seemed more concerned about Muslims than Tamils or Sinhalese, their support was probably going to come mostly from the Muslim community. Therefore, the LTTE could have thought that by getting rid of the Muslim groups, they were also getting rid of SLMC’s supporters.

2. Other Possible Causes for the Displacements Second, support to a political party whose interests are in conflict with the LTTE’s goals does not seem to be the only reason why the LTTE displaced Muslims communities in 1990 and 2006. On one hand, in the speech he delivered after the displacement of the Northern Muslims, Yogi said, among other things, the following: “The expulsion of Muslims from the North has resulted in immense shock and amazement among the Tamil people. Why did we expel the Muslims 4000 Tamils were killed in the Eastern Province, of which 2000 were killed by Muslim goons and home guards. Muslims claim that they are neither Sinhalese nor Tamils, but are Arabs. They use this in pursuit of their selfish aims.... They are Tamils. They

study in Tamil at Tamil schools. Their culture is not Arab. If it were so their women will be wearing purdah, which is not done here...”

“The Muslims form 35% of the East and 5% of the North. In Sri Lanka they are 7%. In the merged North-East they form 17%. The Muslims of the East claim that they are losing privileges due to 35%. Why cannot they see that 5% Muslims in the North are obtaining privileges owed to 17% [sic] Thus those who would receive 2% privileges in the whole of Sri Lanka would receive 17% in the merged North-East. But the Muslims in the East do not see this.”

[…]

“Some are worried whether a Muslim Jihad organisation would also develop in the North. Premadasa will not tolerate a third armed power...”

“We made several promises to the Muslims. We promised them 35% of jobs in the North-East. We promised them the Deputy Chief Ministership. We promised that the allocation of land will be in proportion to the ethnic ratios in the District. The Muslims did not listen. On the contrary, they joined forces with the Sinhalese army and the Sri Lankan state and set about destroying us.... [sic]”

(UTHR 1991b, chap. 6). From this speech, we can see that the LTTE at least expressed that it also displaced the Northern Muslims because: 1) 2,000 Muslims were killed by “Muslim Home Guards and goons” in the East, 2) the LTTE was worried that a Muslim jihad organization was going to develop in the North, and 3) the Muslims were joining the government forces. Taking Yogi’s speech in consideration alone is not enough to establish that there were other causes for the 1990 displacement. However, it raises the question of whether Muslim communities in the North or in other areas of Sri Lanka could have been displaced because the LTTE perceived that Muslims were collaborating or could have collaborated later with its rivals. As we explained during the literature review, collaborating with a rival armed group also reflects disloyalty to the armed group that causes the displacement. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate if military collaboration with a rival armed group was one of the reasons why the Northern and Eastern Muslims were displaced.

B. Evidence of Military Collaboration According to my argument, armed groups use displacement strategically in territories they want to control when they perceive that they civilians that are living there are disloyal to them. In

35 sections A and A1, I discussed how political support can reveal if a group of civilians is loyal or not. However, support to a political party whose interests hinder or may hinder the armed groups’ war goals is not the only way that civilians can be disloyal. They can also be perceived as disloyal when they militarily collaborate with a rival armed group. For the purpose of this research, I consider that a civilian militarily collaborates with the rivals of an armed group, when he joins the armed forces of the rivals or when he attacks the members of the armed group or the ethnic group identified with the armed group. Through these acts, the civilians are decreasing the human sources that the armed group has available and increasing the ones that the rival armed groups can use. A series of events related to the war in general that occurred before each case of displacement might have led the LTTE to believe that the people that were living in those communities were collaborating or were going to collaborate with its enemies.

1. Northern Muslims Originally, the Muslim community in general had a very good relationship with the LTTE (Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011, 378-379; UTHR 1990a, app. 3). Muslim youth even decided to join the Tigers and fight for their cause (Imtiyaz 2009, 410; UTHR 1990a, app. 3). Nevertheless, their relationship later started to sour. Some authors claimed that the cordiality between them ended in 1985 when the LTTE apparently gunned down three Muslim worshippers in Mannar (Imtiyaz 2009, 410). Although the relationship between the Tamils and the LTTE with the Muslims in the Northern Province was considered exceptional by some authors after the 1985 riots, it was not the same case in the East (see Imtiyaz 2009). There are several elements that demonstrate that Muslims were collaborating with the Tigers’ rivals and being disloyal to the LTTE. First, the Muslim youth started defecting from the LTTE (Imtiyaz 2009, 410-411). When the relationship between them became strained, the Muslims abandoned the group (Imtiyaz 2009, 410-411). After the riots of 1985, some Muslims decided to side with the Government. They started being enlisted in order to help the LTTE’s rivals win the battle against the insurgent group (UTHR 1990b, chap. 1). Second, Muslim Home Guards started attacking the LTTE and the Tamils. Allegedly those guards were responsible for certain acts of violence committed against Tamils and members of the LTTE in the East (UTHR 1990b, chap. 2; 1991b, chap. 1). For example, on August 6, 1990, Muslim Home Guards shot a Tamil mother and her child in the

36 town of Akkaraipatu in the Ampara district the same day that they received new weapons (UTHR 1990c). Also, some reports explained that when the LTTE attacked a Muslim village, often the Muslim Home Guards did not react immediately but rather decided to wait a couple days to attack Tamil villages, allegedly with the aid of the Government (UTHR 1992). For example, in September 20, 1990, after the LTTE killed four Muslim fishermen, Muslim Home Guards armed by the government went to the Tamil village of Puthukkudiyiruppu in the Mullaitivu district and killed 17 Tamils (UTHR 1991c). Moreover, there were other clashes between Tamils and Muslims in the Ampara and Batticaloa districts (INFORM 1990a, 2). For example, on September 25, 1990, two Tamil youths allegedly were killed by Muslim Home Guards in Batticaloa Town (INFORM 1990a, 2). Apart from these circumstances, there were some events that occurred in the Northern Province that could have led the LTTE to believe that they were or could have been collaborating with the rival armed groups. First, the Tigers found arms in Muslim houses. Somewhere between late September and early October of 1990, the LTTE was investigating an incident of violence that happened between Muslims (Jeyaraj 2015). During the investigation, the Tigers discovered some swords in a butcher’s house (Jeyaraj 2015). In light of this situation, the LTTE decided to conduct a search through Muslim homes and businesses and found 74 swords in a shop of a prominent Muslim trader (Jeyaraj 2015). Apparently, the LTTE suspected that the Government was using Northern Muslim businessmen that were traveling frequently to Colombo to become their spies and to sabotage the Tigers’ plans (Jeyaraj 2015). The discovery of those arms allegedly triggered an alarm about the possible disloyalty of those people (Jeyaraj 2015). Second, before the displacement occurred, the LTTE conducted some arrests in the Northern Province against Muslims based on suspicions that they were traitors. In particular, on October 22, 1990, some Muslims were arrested in the town of Marichukkatty in the Mannar district for allegedly having conducted illegal trades with the Government (Jeyaraj 2015). Also, on that same day, some Muslims were arrested in Neeravipity, Mullaitivu based on the suspicion that they were providing information to the rival armed forces about the LTTE (Jeyaraj 2015). Third, the Tigers mentioned the enlistment of Muslims in the government forces, the attacks the Tamils suffered in the East from Muslims and the possibility that the Northern Muslims might be betraying them as part of the reasons why the Northern Muslims were displaced (UTHR 1991b, chap. 6).

2. Mutur Muslims There are also other events that occurred between the displacement in the Northern Province and the displacement of the Muslim community in Mutur Town that could have led the LTTE to believe that Muslims were disloyal to them. First, after the displacement of 1990, Muslims continued attacking the LTTE and the Tamils (UTHR 1991b, chap. 8). For example, after the Tigers massacred 55 Muslims in the village of Alanchipotana in Batticaloa on April 29, 1992, the next day Muslims killed 25 Tamils in the Welikanda village close to Alanchipotana (INFORM 1992a, 4, 7). Also, Mutur Town was the scene of that violence. On June 21, 1992, Muslims allegedly attacked the LTTE Mutur Office (UTHR 2002). Second, it has been claimed that Muslims were aiding the Government in providing information about LTTE supporters. Allegedly, Muslims provided lists or identified people to be killed particularly in the Ampara district (UTHR 1990c). Finally, when the LTTE was displacing the Muslims in Mutur they were screening them to try to identify supporters of rival armed groups (UTHR 2006b). During that event, the LTTE arrested some Muslims they thought were part of a jihad or that were aiding the Karuna faction (UTHR 2006b).

B1. Discussion of Evidence of Military Collaboration All these elements demonstrate that Muslims were or could have been militarily collaborating with rival armed groups of the LTTE. Muslims killed Tamils and LTTE members. Also, they joined the government forces and helped them to identity potential LTTE supporters. The Tigers also found arms in some Muslim houses and conducted arrests based on suspicion of treason and illegal dealings with rival armed groups. These events confirm the additional reasons Yogi mentioned of why the Northern Muslims were displaced and the events that occurred during the displacement of the Mutur Muslims. Therefore, these aspects strongly support the argument that the LTTE displaced Muslims because it perceived that they could have been militarily collaborating with the rival armed groups. In this case, the LTTE also used ethnicity as an indicator of the disloyal people. The Tigers did not make an effort to displace only the people that were collaborating with the rival armed groups and not the civilians that were loyal to them. While displacing the Mutur Muslims, the LTTE indeed screened them to take away potential traitors. However, those that were not arrested were still displaced (see UTHR 2006b). The report do not mention that the LTTE

38 allowed the rest of the civilians to come back. At the end, all Muslims that were targeted were supposed to leave in both events of displacement. However, military collaboration still was the real reason why they were displaced. Again, ethnicity was not the best indicator of collaboration because not all Muslims were collaborating with rival armed groups. Nevertheless, it seems that the LTTE preferred to be cautious and target Muslims in general to avoid any potential threat to the Tigers that could have hindered their war efforts.

C. Counterfactual Analysis The data provided evidence for two possible sources that help explain why the LTTE caused the displacement of Muslims communities in 1990 and 2006. To verify if both of them played a role in that outcome, I analyzed if the LTTE would have caused those displacements had the Muslims not militarily collaborated with the LTTE’s rival armed groups and had the SLMC not existed. If the Muslims had not collaborated with the rival armed groups, they would not have attacked and killed the Tamils or the LTTE. The SLMC could have been pushing for a separate provincial council for the Muslim community and could have helped to intensify the divisions between them and the Tamils. However, in terms of violence, the relationship between these groups would have been cordial. Even if the Muslims were concerned in achieving their own goals, since the Muslims were not aiding the Government, the LTTE could have seen them as neutral in terms of the fight or at least could have disregarded them as a threat to their safety. Therefore, they could have chosen to let them stay in their homes and work with them as they did in other areas and in other times during the war. However, the attacks demonstrated that a lot of Muslims were not neutral and that, at least those that aided the Government or other rival armed groups, did not want to or were not helping the LTTE to win the fight. Said collaboration threatened the Tigers’ wellbeing and reduced their resources. Keeping those disloyal people that were or could have been helping the enemies in the areas that the LTTE wanted to control, could have jeopardized their ability to win the war. The LTTE knew about these attacks and feared that they could be attacked again in the future. Therefore, this confirms that military collaboration was one of the reasons why Muslims were displaced. In regards to the SLMC, the Muslims’ attacks against the LTTE would still have occurred if that political party did not exist. The turning point in the good relationship between the

Muslims and the LTTE was not when the SLMC was formed in 1981. It was when the LTTE killed three members of the Muslim community in 1985. If the SLMC did not exist, the Government would have still tried to break the Muslim-Tamil good relationship. The Government was still going to appoint Muslim Home Guards that could have attacked Tamils and the LTTE. Also, the Government would have still tried to use Muslims to identify potential supporters of the LTTE and to attack them. Since that violence against the LTTE was going to probably happen anyway, the LTTE would have still perceived Muslims as disloyal. However, that does not mean that support for the SLMC can be excluded as one of the reasons for the displacements. The SLMC helped to strengthen the divisions between the Muslims and the Tamils. Before that political party was formed, the Muslim interests were pursued through the other Sinhalese and Tamil political parties in the government (Haniffa 2008, 349-350; Imtiyaz 2009, 410; UTHR 1990a, chap. 7). Therefore, if the SLMC did not exist, the Muslims could have also decided to keep trying to work with the other parties in a peaceful way to achieve their goals. However, the SLMC intensified the Muslim identity and the idea that the interests of this ethnic group were not being adequately served in the government. Also, the Sri Lankan government was not the only one that wanted Muslim Home Guards. The SLMC constantly requested their appointment. Moreover, the SLMC encouraged Muslims in general to fight against the LTTE atrocities. It is uncertain what the actual effect the support of the SLMC would have had on the attacks, but what is certain is that the SLMC not only encouraged Muslims to rebel against the LTTE, but also gave them a reason to fight. The idea of a separate provincial council for Muslims was something that was very unlikely that the Sinhalese Government was going to propose. Also, not only were Muslims aiding the Government, but SLMC activists particularly helped in identifying supporters of the LTTE (UTHR 1990a, chap. 8). Therefore, this analysis confirms that the support to the SLMC was another reason why the LTTE displaced Muslims in 1990 and 2006.were

D. Adaptation of Theory After analyzing the events related to the displacements of 1990 and 2006, it appears that my main hypothesis has been confirmed. The LTTE displaced those Muslims communities because it perceived that they were disloyal to the Tigers. Also, it confirms my theory that the LTTE thought they were disloyal because they supported a political party, the SLMC, whose

40 political objectives could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals. However, political support was not the only element that the LTTE considered to determine if they were loyal or not. Military collaboration with a rival armed group was also another motive. Therefore, both elements contributed to the displacement of the Northern and Eastern Muslims. Furthermore, while displacing those people from areas the LTTE wanted to control, this armed group used the Sri Lankan Muslim ethnicity as the indicator of the disloyal people who had either one or both of these characteristics. Therefore, all of these aspects confirm that disloyalty was the reason why the LTTE caused the displacement of Muslims communities in Sri Lanka. The timing of the displacement events also supports the applicability of this theory. As I mentioned before, the LTTE caused the displacement of Muslim communities in 1990 and 2006. Between those years, Muslims kept suffering from the LTTE’s violence. For example, on July 1997, the LTTE abducted 35 Muslims, along with 4 Sinhalese villagers, in Irrakandy located in the Trincomalee district (Amnesty International 1998, 314). However, from the reports I examined, it appears that the LTTE did not cause any other event of displacement of Muslim communities during those years or, at least, the causal conditions related to other possible events of political cleansing are not as clear as the ones that I analyzed. A possible reason for this situation is that it seems that, after the 1990 displacement, the LTTE still hoped to work together with the Muslims. In 1994, one the leaders of the LTTE expressed that Muslims were part of the territories they claimed. In an interview that Velupillai Prabhakaran gave to the BBC in September 1994 he said: “This is a historical fact. The areas that consist of North-East province had been the homeland of Tamil speaking people. That includes the Muslims” (Bandarage 2009, 162). Moreover, in 2002 the LTTE signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the SLMC to try to bring peace between the Muslim and Tamil groups (ICG 2007, 9; Innes-Ker 2002; Johansson 2016, 186; “Sri Lanka Muslims in landmark peace talks with Tigers” 2002). Therefore, the Tigers could have decided not to remove other Muslim communities between 1990 and 2006 to avoid hurting their chances of eventually working again with them. These aspects might give us an idea of why the LTTE apparently did not cause any other event of displacement of Muslim communities, but the true motives are still uncertain. What is certain is that the displacements of 1990 and 2006 occurred after the elements that demonstrated the disloyalty of the people that were displaced emerged. According to the events discussed in previous sections, the political cleansing acts happened after the elections results were favorable for the SLMC in

41 the areas that were cleansed and after the Muslims started to militarily collaborate with the LTTE’s rivals. It does not matter if at certain moments during the war the LTTE wanted to collaborate or not with Muslims. The last election results held before the displacements, and the requests for a separate provincial council and for stronger security measures for Muslims that the SLMC presented close to the events of political cleansing, revealed that the displaced Muslims could have been disloyal to the LTTE at the moment the displacements occurred. Furthermore, the attacks the Muslims perpetrated against Tamils and the LTTE between 1990 and 2006 reflected signs of disloyalty. Therefore, at the times that the LTTE decided to displace those Muslim communities, it had available all the elements that were necessary to infer that those civilians were disloyal to the Tigers.

Discussion of Alternative Explanations According to the arguments explained in the preceding chapter, there is strong evidence to support the argument that the LTTE caused the displacement of Northern and Eastern Muslims because the Tigers perceived that those civilians were disloyal. There are other two other theories that also explain the reasons why arm groups cause displacement. However, none of them are applicable to my cases.

A. Ethnic Hatred As I discussed previously, it has been argued that armed groups may cleanse a particular territory from people belonging to a particular ethnic group based on prejudices and dislike to that ethnicity. For that theory to hold in Sri Lanka, I would have expected to observe problems between Tamils and Muslims before the war that solidified during the conflict, messages from Tamils and the LTTE expressing ethnic prejudice against Muslims, different treatment from the LTTE to the Tamils and Muslims, and lack of willingness of the LTTE or Tamils to work or cooperate with the Muslims. Although some of these elements were present during the war, the overall picture about the relationship between the Muslims and the Tamils/LTTE reveals that this theory cannot explain the cleansing. On one hand, there were some land issues between Tamils and Muslims in the East allegedly two decades before the war started. Apparently, during the 1960s Tamils were losing their properties to Muslim landlords (UTHR 1990a, app. 3). Tamils alleged that Muslims were taking these lands with the help of the police who they believed were anti-Tamil (UTHR 1990a, app. 3). Also, the LTTE discriminated against Muslims in some occasions during the war. For example, some Muslims brought to the LTTE some vigilantes that were attacking them. The Tigers did not help those Muslims. Instead, the LTTE told them: “You are a minority. Those who beat you up are from the majority community. It is therefore not appropriate for us to take action against them” (UTHR 1991a, chap. 3). On the other hand, the problems that the Muslims and Tamils could have had in regards to the lands that were allegedly confiscated in the 1960s or to any other possible controversy between them before the war began did not seem to play a role during the acts of political cleansing. First, the land problem was not an issue raised by the LTTE during the war. The Tigers did not even mention it as a reason to displace the Muslims (UTHR 1991b, chap. 6). Second,

43 even if there were some issues between them, their relationship was good, not only before the conflict began, but also during part of the war. The Muslims shared some of their grievances with the Tamils (Imtiyaz 2009, 410; Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011, 378-379). They were also affected by the discriminatory policies of the Sri Lanka government that favored the interests of the Sinhalese (see Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011, 378-379). Moreover, the Muslims even joined the LTTE during the initial stages of the war to fight against the Government (Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011, 379). Furthermore, even though the Sri Lanka Muslims was recognized as a separate ethnic group in that country, the LTTE apparently considered them as Tamils (Ali 2014, 376; UTHR 1991b, chap. 6). In regards to the displacement of the North, the Muslims and Tamils in the Northern Province lived peacefully together before that event (Imtiyaz and Iqbal 2011, 378). Also, some Muslims communities in the East had a good relationship with the LTTE. For example, the Muslims living in Sammanthurai in the Ampara district welcomed the Tigers when the IPKF left the area (UTHR 1990c). Although eventually there were problems between the Tigers and the Muslims in that city, initially those groups worked well together (UTHR 1993a, chap. 5). Even after the displacement of 1990, the LTTE was willing to collaborate with the Muslims. The Tigers demonstrated this in 2002 when they signed the Memorandum of Understanding and when they asked the Northern Muslims to come back home (ICG 2007, 9; Innes-Ker 2002, “Sri Lanka Muslims in landmark peace talks with Tigers” 2002). In regards to Mutur Town, although there were several attacks between Muslims and Tamils during the war in that city, they apparently were amicable to each other in the beginning. Allegedly, Mutur was considered a safe haven for Tamil militants during part of the conflict (see UTHR 1993b, chap. 4). As we can see all these elements demonstrate that ethnic hatred was not the reason for the displacements. Although there were problems between Muslims and the LTTE/Tamils, there were times during the war in which there was a good relationship between them and in which the LTTE was willing to work with the Muslims.

B. Resentment The second alternative theory establishes that feelings of resentment and vengeance can bring armed groups to cleanse a territory from a particular ethnic group, when the ethnic group experiences an upgrade in their status or when it collaborates with enemy forces. There are some

44 elements from that theory that were present during the war. After 1985, Muslims started to leave the LTTE and joined the Government (Imtiyaz 2009, 410-411). Also, there were several attacks from Muslims against the Tigers before the displacements occurred. Moreover, the LTTE mentioned in several occasions, at least in regards to the displacement of the Northern Muslims, that the attacks the Muslims committed in the East against them were part of the reasons why they were displaced. However, the resentment theory still does not apply to cases of displacement analyzed in this thesis. If the Eastern Muslims were the ones attacking the LTTE, then I would have expected that the Tigers were going to displace the Muslims from that area. Since the Northern Muslims were amicable towards the LTTE, there were no feelings of resentment from the Tigers against that segment of the population. Second, even if Yogi mentioned the attacks that occurred in the Eastern part in regards to the displacement of 1990, he did not mention expressly that the LTTE was trying to make those Muslims pay for what happened. On the contrary, Yogi spoke about the fears the LTTE had about a jihad organization forming in the North and the possible formation of a third armed group. Therefore, this message reflects that, instead of displacing the Northern Muslims to satisfy their urge for revenge for what occurred in the East, the Tigers might have done it to prevent the threats that could have arisen in the North against the LTTE’s goals. Again, considering Yogi’s statement alone is not enough to conclude that the LTTE in fact displaced the Northern Muslims because it feared the possible formation of a jihad organization in that area. However, there are other elements that can help us infer that it was one of the reasons for the political cleansing. Before that displacement, there were some allegations that a jihad organization was establishing in the East (UTHR 1990b, chap. 9). It was claimed that the jihad consisted of Muslim home guards trained by the government (UTHR 1990b, chap. 9). However, some reports claimed there was not enough reliable information that could confirm the formation of these organizations (ICG 2007, 25). In spite of that, the LTTE apparently believed in those allegations. Around January 1990, the LTTE allegedly arrested some Muslims in the Kalmunai town because they suspected they were part of the jihad (Athas 1990a, 1990b). Also, the Tigers searched the houses in the predominantly Muslim town, looking for possible weapons (Athas 1990a). Although the suspicions were originally about the formation of a jihad organization in the Eastern Province, around one month before the 1990 displacement, the LTTE found arms in Muslim houses and shops in the Northern Province. The discovery of those arms, combined with the suspicions of a

45 jihad in the East, could have led the LTTE to fear that a jihad organization could develop in the North. The way the LTTE acted in the East in regards to the allegations of a jihad organization in that area, the arms that the Tigers discovered in the Northern Province and the statement about the LTTE fears of a possible jihad organization in the North let us infer that Yogi’s allegations could have been true. Therefore, these aspects support the argument that the LTTE displaced the Northern Muslims strategically to avoid future threats against them. Third, at least in regards to the displacement in Mutur Town, the political cleansing did not occur during or soon after Muslim’s attacks. Before that displacement, there was a 4-year ceasefire period. During the war, there were attacks from Muslims against Tamils and the LTTE. However, the most recent official attack committed by a Muslim against the Tamils before the 2006 displacement, according to the reports examined, was on August 4, 2003 (UTHR 2003). Therefore, it was three years before the displacement of 2006. Finally, it is important to restate that, during and after the displacements occurred, the LTTE kept working with the Muslim communities to solve their differences. Therefore, the LTTE had the willingness to live and cooperate with the Muslim groups. In light of all this, resentment and vengeance were not the reasons why the LTTE caused the displacement of the Northern Muslims.

C. Inapplicability of Alternative Explanations As we can see none of the alternative explanations apply in this case. However, I must clarify that this does not mean that ethnic hatred and resentment did not play a role in the violence that the LTTE or some of its members committed against the civilians. The LTTE perpetrated reprisals against Muslims short after they attacked Tamils or LTTE members. Also, I do not deny, nor claim, that some members of the LTTE that could have been participating in displacement processes were trying to cleanse the area from the Muslim population because of ethnic hatred. However, in regards to the two cases of displacements that I analyzed, it does not look like the reasons the LTTE had to displace the Muslim communities could be explained by either of the alternative explanations.

D. Why Disloyalty is the Best Answer to the Research Question After analyzing the events that led to the displacements of 1990 and 2006 with the

46 different theories that could have explained this outcome, I consider that the theory that armed groups cause displacements in territories they want to control when they perceived that civilians are disloyal to them (the “disloyalty theory”) best accounts for the cases of displacement that the LTTE caused in Sri Lanka. This theory covers the aspects that the other theories are not able to support. First, it better explains the timing and locations of the displacements. The ethnic hatred theory is not suitable to account for either of these aspects. If the LTTE hated the Sri Lanka Muslim ethnic group we would have expected the displacement to occur at any time during the war and at any place where Muslim communities were located. However, the displacements occurred specifically in 1990 and 2006, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, respectively. The ethnic hatred theory cannot explain why the displacements happened where and when they did in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, the revenge theory could have explained the timing, but not the location of the displacements. There were some factors that could have led us infer that the political cleansing occurred as a form of revenge from the LTTE after being recently attacked by Muslims. However, the resentment theory does not explain why the LTTE caused displacement in certain locations and not in others or, at least, why it put more effort in displacing certain people than others. The disloyalty theory can cover both aspects. It accounts for the spatial variation of the dependent variable by explaining that the areas cleansed were territories that the LTTE wanted to control and that they were located in provinces that demonstrated a strong support for the SLMC. Also, it accounts for the timing variation by demonstrating that the LTTE caused the displacement at some point after they knew or believed that the displaced Muslims were disloyal to them. Second, the disloyalty theory can still account for the acts of displacement regardless of the variation over time of the relationship between the Muslims and the LTTE. On one hand, ethnic hatred cannot explain the times that the LTTE and the Muslims worked together and had good relationship. On the other hand, the resentment theory covers those times when the good relationship between those groups turned into a bad one, but cannot account for the moments they were able to still work with each other during the war after some of the attacks between them. The disloyalty theory can still apply even if the relationship between Muslims and the LTTE or the Tamils changed during the war. It is not based on the feelings of the members of the armed groups, but on the tactics that can help them achieve their objectives. Therefore, the disloyalty

47 theory demonstrates that, regardless of how the relationship was between the Muslims and the LTTE or the Tamils at other times and/or at other places, the LTTE displaced Muslim communities in 1990 and 2006 because, at the place and the time the armed group did it, the LTTE perceived that those groups were disloyal to the Tigers and that they were hindering or could have hindered their war goals.

E. Caveats In light of all these arguments, the data that was examined and the rest of the analysis of all the variables tested, I conclude that the LTTE caused the displacement of Muslim communities in 1990 and 2006 because the armed group perceived that those civilians were disloyal to the Tigers. However, there are several elements that could affect my conclusion. First, the results are drawn upon information from reports and studies that I considered true and accurate. If I later find out that part of that information was false or that it did not truly depict the events it describes, my conclusion could change. For example, discovering that the SLMC unconditionally supported the ISGA the LTTE proposed will put into question if the Tigers took in consideration the political support to that political party to determine if the displaced civilians from Mutur town were disloyal or not. The reason is that, after completely supported the ISGA, the SLMC probably could not have been considered as a party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals. Second, finding additional information that can allow me to gather more observations about my variables could also make me reconsider my analysis. For example, using other methods such as interviews to LTTE members who participated in the displacement processes could reflect more elements about feelings of resentment or revenge the Tigers wanted to satisfy. Third, my information is based on the assumptions I mentioned in the theory chapter, i.e., that armed groups fight for the control of territories, that they use different types of violence to achieve that goal and that they will use the most effective strategies to control an area after assessing the risks and costs of their tactics. If for some reason one or more of them is not applicable in my case, it could affect my conclusion. As long as my results do not change, they can be generalized to other cases of political cleansing in civil wars. All of the results could fully apply in situations where armed groups cause displacement of a certain group of civilians in a civil war, regardless if the conflict can be classified as an ethnic or non-ethnic war according to the main cleavage. It is important to clarify

48 that, although the LTTE used the Muslim ethnicity as an indicator of the disloyal people, the results are not limited to cases in which armed groups target ethnic groups. First, the argument that states that armed groups displace civilians in territories they want to control because they perceive they are disloyal to them could still apply in other cases of displacement that armed groups caused in civil wars as it has been demonstrated in other studies (see Steele 2011). Second, the claim that armed groups perceive that civilians are disloyal to them because they supported a political party whose political objectives hindered or could have hindered the armed group’s goals and because they were militarily collaborating with their rivals can also apply in other cases of displacement that armed groups caused in civil wars. These arguments are applicable even if the armed groups used another trait to target the disloyal people besides ethnicity. However, the political support element cannot help assess the loyalties of civilians and, therefore, help explain why an armed group cleansed a particular region when the election results are not detailed enough to identify how that region voted. Steele (2011, 428) explains that in order for displacement to be effective, “an armed group must be able to direct sustained violence against a precise civilian group within a region or city”. The elections results that are too ample do not allow the armed groups to discern between the civilian groups that are disloyal or not in a particular area (see Steele, forthcoming). Also, the military collaboration aspect will not be useful to help explain why armed groups caused the displacement of a certain group when there is no identifiable common trait that can link the people that were displaced with the people that are allegedly militarily collaborating with the armed group’s rivals.

Conclusion The LTTE caused the displacement of Muslim communities in Sri Lanka during the civil war. I argued that the reason why the LTTE did it was because those communities supported a political party whose political objectives were hindering or could have hindered the LTTE’s war goals. I claimed that this political support allowed the LTTE to perceive that the displaced people were disloyal to them. After evaluating all the relevant circumstances that lead to displacements in 1990 in the Northern Province and in 2006 in the Eastern Province, I found strong support in favor of the theory that disloyalty was the reason why the LTTE displaced those Muslim communities. There was strong evidence that showed that the LTTE knew or believed that those civilians supported the SLMC which was a political party that protested against the LTTE, obstructed the permanent merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, frequently requested the appointment of more Muslim Home Guards and encouraged Muslims to fight against the Tigers. The displaced people were located in provinces that included districts that allowed SLMC politicians to gain seats in the Sri Lanka Parliament or, at least, to put them closer to gain access to the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, the Mutur Muslims came from a town that seemed to be one of the SLMC strongholds. However, the data demonstrated that political support was not the only reason why the LTTE considered that the displaced people were disloyal. It also reflected that military collaboration from Muslims in general to the LTTE’s rival armed groups (by joining their forces and/or by attacking LTTE’s members or Tamils) was another reason. After analyzing what could have happened if one of those elements was not present during the war, the findings demonstrated that both aspects played a role in the displacements. Regardless if both aspects had an equal role or if one of them was more salient than the other, they still demonstrate and confirm the theory that the LTTE displaced Muslim communities because the armed group perceived they were disloyal. This conclusion still holds after testing the alternative explanations. Although there were elements in favor of those theories, they still do not account for my cases. In regards to ethnic hatred, there were certain problems between the Muslims and the Tamils before the war and there were some occasions in which LTTE discriminated against Muslims during the conflict. However, the good relationship these groups had in certain periods of the war demonstrated that ethnic hatred was not the cause of the events of political cleansing. Ethnicity indeed was an

50 element that was part of the displacements because the LTTE targeted the displaced civilians based on the ethnic group they belonged to. However, the Tigers did not displace those Muslims because they hated that ethnicity, they did it because they thought those civilians were disloyal to them for the reasons I discussed in the preceding paragraph. On the other hand, attacks from Muslims to the LTTE and Tamils close to the events of displacement and reprisals from the LTTE for those attacks tipped the scale in favor of the resentment theory. Nevertheless, there were times that the Tigers worked with Muslims or were willing to solve their disputes during and after the displacements. Moreover, the whole circumstances demonstrated that the LTTE wanted to displace those civilians, not necessarily to get revenge for what happened, but to prevent what could have happened in the future that could have affected its war goals. Therefore, neither ethnic hatred nor resentment seemed to explain my dependent variable. Instead, the disloyal theory appears to be the better explanation to account for the reasons why the LTTE displaced Muslim communities in the Northern and Eastern provinces during the Sri Lankan civil war. These results have contributed to the literature about political cleansing and displacement. First, they help sustain the theories that claim that displacement is not simply a by-product of war and that armed groups use violence against civilians strategically. Second, they help demonstrate that even in ethnic wars, armed groups can rely on other factors besides ethnicity to guide the way they politically cleanse a certain territory. Therefore, it demonstrates that researchers have to go beyond the mere traits that armed groups use to target civilians and delve deeper into the underlying elements that are actually guiding their actions to really explain the causes of the displacements. Finally, they expand the theories that state that election results can reveal the loyalties of civilians. They show that support to political parties can help armed groups to determine if a certain group is loyal or not even in cases when the political parties are not affiliated to any of the warring actors. For future investigations, scholars can analyze if the disloyalty theory can also be applied to other instances of displacement that the LTTE and the Government allegedly caused to the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. Particularly, it would be interesting to see if it applies when the displaced communities are from the same ethnic group as the member of the armed groups causing the political cleansing, e.g., when the LTTE allegedly displaced the whole Tamil community of Jaffna in 1995 (UTHR 1995). Also, other investigations can focus on the reasons

51 why some Muslims were not displaced even though the LTTE targeted them and wanted them to leave the areas. Those investigations will help expand our understanding of the armed groups’ violence during the Sri Lanka civil war and its effects on the civilians.

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