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Spring 1985
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE (NEGOTIATION TACTICS, EGALITARIAN)
DIANE H. COLEMAN University of New Hampshire, Durham
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Recommended Citation COLEMAN, DIANE H., "MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE (NEGOTIATION TACTICS, EGALITARIAN)" (1985). Doctoral Dissertations. 1446. https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/1446
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MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
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University Microfilms International
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
BY
DIANE H. COLEMAN B.A., University of Baltimore, 1975 M.A., University of New Hampshire, 1973
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the University of New Hampshire in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
i n
Sociology
May 1985 This dissertation has been examined and approved.
Dissertation director, Murray A. Straus, Professor of Sociology
Stuart H. Palmer, Professor of Sociology and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts
Sally K. Ward, Assistant Professor of Sociology
Kerst i A. Y11 Assistant Professor of Sociology
Ellen S. Cohn, Associate Professor of Psychology
Date ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation would never have been completed
(finally) without the support provided by a number of people, in a variety of ways, over the course of several years. We all know how many.
Professor Murray A. Straus stuck with me through all forms of trials, tribulations and near disasters. The light was always on in his o ffice. His patience is amazing. My committee was great: Stuart Palmer, Sally Ward, Kersti Yllo and Ellen Cohn.
When it comes down to it though, my committee would have had nothing to read if it hadn't been for my friends.
Pasquale and Lisa taught me how to deal with all the ups and downs of far more than dissertation w riting. Barb and Bruce answered the phone even though they knew it was me. They
let me play with Nicholas. Pat and Ted made sure I ate
lunch. While Durkheim established the fir s t chair of
Sociology, Mark and I established the first table. J.B.,
Dan and Lisa kept things under control at home when I wasn't. Kim and Patty put up with the babble and cigarette smoke that constantly dr 'ted out of my cubicle. Colby typed the thing. Tam, Deena and Kings land knew when to track me down. Danny has been with me through it all and I thank him for not questioning the choices his mother made. He seems to think this is a normal way to live. And in the end there was always Peter.
'Family' has been traditionally defined as those related by birth, marriage, or adoption. The inadequacy of that definition became clear to me in the process of completing the Ph.D. program.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii LIST OF TABLES ...... vii • LIST OF FIGURES ...... ix ABSTRACT ...... x
Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Major Goals of the Research ...... A Integration of Prior Research ...... A Analysis of the Properties of the Marital Relationship ...... 5 Inclusion of Women's Violence ...... 6
I I . POWER, AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT ...... 8 Legitimation of Marital Power ...... 9 Alternatives to Submission ...... 9 The Concept of Marital Power ...... 12 The Concept of Marital Conflict ...... 17 Marital Power, Marital Conflict and Violence .. 19 Marital Power and Negotiation ...... 23 Marital Conflict, Negotiation and Violence .. 26 Hypotheses and Model ...... 27
I I I.METHODOLOGY ...... 29 Source of the Data ...... 29 Marital Power ...... 31 Measurement of the Concept...... 31 Critique of Blood and Wolfe Indicators ...... 32 Index Construction ...... 37 Power Norm Consensus ...... 38 Measurement of the Concept...... 38 Index Construction ...... 39 ! ndex Re I i ab i 1 i ty ...... 40 Use of the Index in Data Analysis ...... 41 Marital Conflict ...... 43 Measurement of the Concept...... 43 Index Construction ...... 43 Index R e lia b ility ...... 44 Tr ichotomization of the Index ...... 44 Negotiation Tactics ...... 45 Measurement of the Concept...... 46 Index Construction ...... 48 I ndex Rel i ab i 1 i ty ...... 50 The Couples' Negotiation Tactics Indices .... 51 Trichotomization of the Indices ...... 53 Marital Violence ...... 53 Measurement of the Concept...... 53 Method of Data Analysis ...... 58 v IV. POWER, CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT ...... 6l The Power Structure of Marital Relationships .. 62 Distribution of Marital Power Types ...... 63 Social Class Differences in Marital Power . . . 64 Stage of the Family Life Cycle...... 66 Wife Employment ...... 70 Marital Power and Conflict ...... 72 Marital Power and Power Norm Consensus ...... 77 Marital Power, Conflict and Consensus ...... 79 Factors Associated with Conflict and Power Norm Consensus ...... 82 Soc i al Cl ass ...... 82 Stage of the Family Life Cycle...... 84 Class Differences in Marital Power, Conflict and Consensus ...... 84 Summary ...... 85
V. MARITAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE ...... 90 Marital Conflict and Violence:The Empirical Relationship ...... 93 The Effect of the Marital Power Structure on the Conf1ict-Violence Relationship ...... 97 Marital Conflict, Negotiation and Violence .... 99 Critique of the Straus et al Analysis ...... 99 Approach to Understanding the Data ...... 101 Negotiation Tactics and the ConfIict-Violence Relation ...... 106 The Use of Reasoning ...... 106 The Use of Withdrawal and Verbal Aggression . 107 The Usefulness of Constructive Tactics ...... 108 Marital Power,Conf1ict.Negotiation and Violence 110 The Cell Size Problem...... I ll Violence Rates ...... 124 Divided Power Marriages ...... 126 Male Dominant Marriages ...... 127 The Direction of Violence and the Aggressor and Victim Use of Negotiation ...... 128 The Importance of Conflict in Reducing Marital Violence ...... 134 Summary ...... 134
VI. CONCLUSIONS ...... 137 Limitations of the Research ...... 139 Major Findings ...... 141 The Power Structure of American Marriages . . . 141 Marital Power and Conflict ...... 142 The Legitimacy of Power and Conflict ...... 144 Marital Power, Conflict and Violence ...... 145 The Use of Negotiation Tactics ...... 147 Implications of the Research ...... 149
APPENDICES ...... 152
REFERENCES ...... 162
v i LIST OF TABLES
3.1. Sample percentages for trichotomized Negotiation Tactics Indexes
A.I. Marital power structure by social class
A.2. Marital power structure by stage of family life cycle
A.3* Marital power structure by husband's percentage of family income
A.A. Marital conflict by marital power structure
A.5* Power norm consensus by marital power structure
A.6. Marital conflict by marital power structure controlling for power norm consensus
A.7. Power norm consensus by social class
A.8. Marital conflict by social class
A.9. Marital conflict by stage of family life cycle
A.10. Marital power structure by marital conflict controlling for power norm consensus and social class
5.1. Percent of minor violence and level of conflict by social class
5.2. H-W minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics
5*3- W-H minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics
5 .A. Couple minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics
> 5-5* H-W minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in female dominant marriages
5.6. W-H minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in female dominant marriages
v i i 5*7« Couple minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in female dominant marriages
5.8. H-W minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in divided power marriages
5*9- W-H minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in divided power marriages
5.10. Couple minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in divided power marriages
5-11. H-W minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in egalitarian marriages
5.12. W-H minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in egalitarian marriages
5.13* Couple minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in egalitarian marriages
5.1A. H-W minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in male dominant marriages
5.15* W-H minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in male dominant marriages
5.16. Couple minor violence by level of conflict and use of negotiation tactics in male dominant marriages
v i i i LIST OF FIGURES
5.1. Marital Violence by Level of Conflict
5- 2. Husband to Wife Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Marital Power Structure
5-3. Wife to Husband Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Marital Power Structure
5.1*. Couple Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Marital Power Structure
5«5a. Percent of Husband to Wife Minor Violence When Conflict is High, Aggressor's Use of Negotiation Tactic is High for Each Power Structure j 5 .5b* Percent of Husband to Wife Minor Violence When Conflict is High, Victim's Use of Negotiation Tactic is High for Each Power Structure
5.6a. Percent of Wife to Husband Minor Violence When Conflict is High, Aggressor's Use of Negotiation Tactic is High for Each Power Structure
5.6b. Percent of Wife to Husband Minor Violence When Conflict is High, Victim's Use of Negotiation Tactic is High for Each Power Structure
5- 7- Couple Minor Violence When Conflict is High, Use of Negotiation Tactic is High by Power Structure
5«8. Couple Minor Violence'When Conflict is Low, Use of Negotiation Tactic is High by Power Structure
ix ABSTRACT
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
by
Diane H. Coleman University of New Hampshire, May, 1985
Conflict theory is used to analyze the relationship between marital power structure, the level of marital conflict and the rate of violence in a nationally representative sample of 2,11*3 American couples. Although previous authors suggestgreater conf1ict in egalitarian relationships, other research demonstrates that there is less vi olence. Given the strong positive association between conflict and violence, a major question addressed in this research concerns this apparent contradiction.
Two explanations of this contradiction were empirically tested: (1) If the power structure is perceived as legitimate, the level of conflict and rate of violence may decrease, regardless of the actual power structure. (2) The negotiation tactics used to settle disputes may mediate the relation between conflict and violence.
The majorfindings of this research suggest that unequal marital power structures are the critical factors in explaining the level of conflict and the rate of violence.
Egalitarian relationships have the lowest levels of marital
x conflict, while male dominant have the highest. Consensus
over the distribution of power does reduce the level of
conflict. However, male dominant relationships continue to
have high levels of conflict even when consensus is high,
and egalitarian relationships have the lowest levels of
conflict even when consensus is low.
The positive association between conflict and violence
is reconfirmed in this research. When this relationship is
examined for each marital power type, there are dramatic
differences in the probability of violence. Egalitarian
relationships have the lowest rate of violence even when
conflict is high. This is not true for the other power
structures, especially the male dominant.
The findings suggest that negotiation tactics play an
important role in the relation between conflict and
violence. Destructive tactics such as withdrawal and verbal
aggression increase the rate of violence, especially when
conflict is high. However, the use of reasoning does not
appear to be an effective tactic to use to lim it violence.
If there is high conflict, there will be more violence,
irrespective of the use of reasoning. The findings strongly
suggest that changing the power structure of marital
relationships so that power is equitably distributed is the most fundamental method of lim iting conflict and violence.
x i Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Maritalviolence has been the focus of considerable
sociological debate and interest since the early1970 's.
In itia lly sociological research began to identify the social
conditions under which violence between cohabitating
partners occurred. Factors such as race, class, community
integration, childhood experiences with violence and
employment status, to name a few, were identified as
affecting the rates of marital violence (Carroll, 1977;
Allen, 1975; Gelles and Straus, 1975; Steinmetz, 197D • As
the issue of marital violence became a more public rather
than private problem, individuals began to question why women remained in abusive relationships. Some research
began to investigate the nature of marriage and family, and
social factors that force women to remain in violent
relationships were identified (Dobash and Doash,1980;
Straus,1977; Steinmetz and Straus,1973). The issue of marital power and women's power outside of marriage was
suggested as a major explanation of marital violence. Page 2
For the most part, however, this approach identified
properties or characteristics of the individuals involved in
violence. The research on resources, power, and violence is
one example. Other work identified characteristics of the
victim and to a lesser extent characteristics of the violent
partner. While an individual approach to the explanation of marital violence is productive, it fa ils to recognize
important facets of marriage and family life . Perhaps the most important aspect of marriage and family that is lost
through an individual approach is the private world that
both partners create through their interaction with one
another over time. This research attempts to tap into the
private world that intimates create by focusing on
properties of the relationship between partners rather than properties any one individual may possess. This research explores how two major characteristics of the marital dyad - marital power and conflict - promote or suppress the rate of marital violence.
The power structure of intimate relationships and the
interaction patterns that develop are two properties that
place boundaries around the relationship. Who has the power within a relationship or how the power is distributed are crucial characteristics of that relationship because so many aspects of the relationship are determined by them. The
interaction patterns, in this research the level of conflict and how that conflict is negotiated, may vary according to the power structure. Both marital power and level of Page 3
conflict are independently associated with marital violence,
yet as Chapter II illustrates, the association is unclear,
especially when the joint effects of power and conflict are cons i dered.
One solution to the issue of marital violence has been
to suggest that when women's power inside and outside of marriage increases, there w ill be less violence. This
solution is rooted in an analysis of the system of sexual
inequality that oppresses women. Relationships of equality, especially intimate ones however, carry with them the necessity of individuals negotiating how and where the power w ill be distributed. Scanzoni (1976) and Whitehurst (197M) have suggested greater conflict in such relationships because of this negotiation process. If this is the case, relationships where one partner dominates the decision making process should have less co n flict. Yet the research on marital violence raises important questions concerning
these hypotheses. Research has consistently demonstrated
less violence in egalitarian relationships and more violence when one partner dominates the decision making process.
Thus the marital violence research is inconsistent with the hypotheses regarding marital power and conflict.
This research examines four power arrangements couples have negotiated: husband dominated, wife dominated, egalitarian and divided power. In divided power marriages
individuals have separate spheres of power over certain decisions that are to be made, yet the power remains equally Page 4 distributed. In egalitarian relationships both partners participate equally in the decision making process as each
issue arises.
While the link between power, conflict, and violence is unclear, the literatu re suggests several avenues for exploration. Scanzoni (1978) suggests that the link between power and conflict may be mediated by how much consensus couples have reached over how the power in the relationship » is distributed. It may be that consensus over power norms and not the power structure of the relationship contributes to the rate of marital violence. The association between level of conflict and violence may be c larified by examining the negotiation tactics couples use to settle conflict.
While this appears to be obvious, some research (Straus,
Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980) has found that negotiation tactics may not alter the positive relation between conflict and violence.
MAJOR GOALS OF THE RESEARCH
There are three major goals of this research which differentiate it from previous marital violence research.
1. Integrat i on of Pr i or Research
Prior research has examined the independent effects of marital power arrangements and violence, conflict and violence, and to a limited extent, negotiation tactics and violence. Because each piece of research dealt with these
issues independently of one another, significant issues were Page 5
overlooked. These become apparent when one attempts to link
prior research into a basic explanatory model. Conflict
theory suggests greater conflict among intimates who share
in decision making. Yet egalitarian relationships have the
lowest rate of violence. A conflict perspective suggests
that the use of rational discussion to settle disputes w ill
result in less violence. Findings from Straus et. a l.'s
(1980) analysis of a representative sample of American couples raises issues regarding this hypothesis. Others
(Klein and H ill, 1975) have suggested that problem solving behavior cannot be examined apart from the power structure of the relationship and have pointed out the lack of
research that considers marital power structure and negotiation tactics. Tallman and Mi Ile r (197^) have stated
that it is not the power arrangements that affect problem solving ability but the inconsistency between actual power and the power norms for relationships that vary by social class. Thus this research attempts to c la rify the jo in t associatiion between factors that have been identified as
important explanations of the rate of marital violence but pose contradictions when linked together.
2. Ana 1ys i s of Propert ies of the Mar i t a 1 Relat ionsh i p
This research focuses on characteristics of the relationship between partners rather than characteristics of the individual. Examining the properties of the marital system and how those properties affect the rate of marital violence is consistent with a systems approach to the Page 6 explanation of dysfunctional behavior (Mi nuchi n, 197*+;
Haley,1976). While the literatu re on marital therapy theory and practice from a relationship perspective has increased enormously in the last ten years, few studies of marital violence examine the properties of the relationship.
3. Inclusion of Women1s Violence
The analytic shift from an individual to a relationship perspective necessitates the inclusion of women's violence in this research. Couple violence has received limited attention in the literature. This is partially because violence against women carries more serious psychological and physical consequences than violence against men.
Because of the structure of society, men have greater ability to end destructive relationships. Another reason for the inattention to violence by women is the belief that acknowledgement of women's violence w ill have serious political repercussions. That is, services to battered women w ill not be provided and the problem of woman abuse w ill not be taken seriously by those individuals - male more often than not - who control the necessary resources and power to p rio ritiz e the issue. Finally, the acknowledgement that women can be and often are violent is at odds with the traditional image of women. While feminist ideology has challenged the traditional view of women, the conception of women as potentially violent individuals is an issue that creates much debate*. Although these considerations are important and should not be ignored, if our purpose is to Page 7 understand violence within the family, it is crucial to consider violence by all family members, including women.
Ignoring the research that indicates women are violent in some circumstances only reinforces that trad itio n al, oppressive image of women. Chapter I I
POWER. AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT
"In the 'real world', conflict, negotiation and power are as intertwined as bonded chemical elements" (Scanzoni, 1978:119)
Power is traditionally defined as "the ability to enforce one's will despite resistence" (Weber,19A 7) . Two characteristics are im plicit in this concept of power: the involvement of at least two individuals and the possibility of conflict between those persons.
Power evolves from the characteristics of the relationship between individuals. Weber clearly recognized the relational aspects of power when he suggested power is
"a characteristic of the relation between leaders and followers rather than an attribute of the leader alone"
(Coser, 19711227) Thus an individual may possess power only in relation to another. When the other consents to that power relation, the individual with power also has authority, or the right to use power. Page 9
LEGITIMATION OF POWER
While the balance of power involves the relationship between superordinate and the subordinate members, conflict may arise if the subordinate members are dissatisfied with
this power distribution. Thus the possession of power carries with it the continual struggle to maintain one's position. The potential for conflict always exists.
One key to the power/conf1ict dilemma is to consider how the position of the superordinate is viewed by the subordinate. Weber's discussion of legitimated authority provides the key to the power/conflict issue. Weber suggests that as long as there is consensus that the superordinate is deserving of this superior status his or her power is legitimated. The individual has the right to
impose his or her w ill upon others. Conflict is minimized or non-existent as long as the superordinate position is perceived as legitimate. Conflict arises when the
legitimacy of the power is questioned.
Alternatives to Submi ss ion
When this legitimacy is questioned, Blau (196*t) suggests four alternatives to submission that the subordinate may use to change the balance of power. One can provide equal services in return, obtain services elsewhere, use physical coercion, or do without the services provided by the other. Avoiding submission then, entails changing the nature of the transaction between super and subordinate. Page 10
The alternatives that Blau suggests are based on a conception of social relationships that endure because of the exchange of services within that relationship. He suggests that individuals establish power over others because of their access to or possession of resources valued by another. The individual can maintain his or her position of power because these resources are in demand. Blau focuses for the most part on resources that provide a degree of social prestige to others but there is a subjective quality to the concept of resources. What is valued by one may not be valued by another. The concept of resources can be broadly interpreted such that physical attractiveness can be as much of a resource as income or education.
Power as a property of the relationship is stressed because it is an important clue to understanding what it is about intimate-relationships that can lead to violence.
Throughout the family life cycle power and control are
issues that are continually negotiated within the major subsystems of the family: the spousal, parental and sibling.
As Blau points out, there are alternatives to submission.
But when we consider the characteristics of marriage and the family it is clear that these alternatives in this context, are not available to a ll members of the family, with the exception of physical violence.
Because of social structural inequalities, women often can not provide equal services in return. The traditional role of women has been that of housewife and mother, roles Page 11 which restrict women from fu ll time participation in the
labor force. Although women who have paid employment also
have greater marital power (Brown, 1980) discriminatory
employment practices have produced a segmented labor market where women are concentrated in those occupations with the
least status, income and job security (Sokoloff, 1981;
Stevenson, 1975; Oppenheimer, 1973)• Thus on the average, women can not provide the same services in terms of wages
and social prestige that a man may provide. The services
trad itio n ally provided by women are not highly valued.
Blau suggests that "any committment to a social
relationship entails a degree of dependence by excluding
alternatives" (196-1*: 1 19) This is especially true when one considers the exclusiveness of marriage and suggests that
the second alternative to submission, obtaining services elsewhere, is contrary to values regarding marriage and
family. While some services can be legitimately accepted from extended kin, such as child care or financial aid during a crisis, kin are under no obligation to provide
them. In fact, the independence of the nuclear family is expected and the contribution of services by extended kin depends on emotional bonds rather than obligation. Thus it would be d iffic u lt for a partner to obtain services normally provided by the spouse from others. In fact, social welfare programs such as AFDC require the documented absence of a spouse before aid is given. Page 12
The third alternative to submission, to do without the
services provided by other, is unrealistic in the context of
marriage and the family. It is unrealistic because it is in
opposition to the meaning of marriage and the family.
The one alternative which remains is physical force.
Since power and conflict are viewed as recurring issues
within the family system, violence remains a means of
maintaining or gaining a position of power. It is one
alternative to submission that every family member can use,
although not all can use it with egual success.
This chapter begins with a quote from John Scanzoni
concerning the relation between power, conflict and
negotiation. It is of particular relevance in the context
of marital relationships because such relationships develop
a history and content that sets them apart from other more
transitory small groups. It is those characteristics of
married life that magnify the need to negotiate issues of
power and conflict.
THE CONCEPT OF MARITAL POWER
The conceptualization and measurement of power
relations between husband and wife and within the larger
family system in general has been the focus of debate for
several decades. Chaper III addresses the methodological
issues raised by the use of Blood and Wolfe type indicators
of marital power. This section reviews the larger
theoretical issues involved in the conceptualization of marital power and its use in the family sociology 1i terature.
One of the problems that has plagued marital power research is conceptual c la rity regarding definitions of power and authority (Safi1ios-RothschiId, 1970; Rollins and
Bahr, 1976; McDonald, 1?80) While distinctions in this research are made between concepts such as power and authority, that has not been the case in much of the marital power lite ra tu re ,. The terms family power, power structure, decision making, family authority and influence have been used interchangeably (Safi1ios-Rothschi1d, 1970)
However, much of the debate over empirical research that examines the issue of marital power stems from the use of a measure of power originally developed by Blood and
Wolfe (I960) and modified by others to explore the resource theory of marital power. The original measure that Blood and Wolfe developed asked the respondent who had the final say on decisions such as what car to purchase, how much money to spend on food, and what job the husband should take. A likert additive index was constructed from the questions to reflect husband dominant, wife dominant and egalitarian power structures. Although Safi1ios-Rothschi1d
(1970) indicates the major problems with this type of measure are methodological, several important points regarding the concept of marital power are raised in her review of the literatu re. She points out that Blood and
Wolfe measures of power only measure one aspect of power, that of decision making, but that decision making has been discussed as if it encompasses all aspects of power. She suggests that decision making is a process and that it is the process that is significant because of the influence and authority one may use rather than who makes the final decision. A person who delegates the power to make decisons to another is by no means powerless, yet 'who decides who decides' is not necessarily captured by a Blood and Wolfe measure. Cromwell and Olson (1975) identify three domains of power: process power, outcome power and power bases.
They suggest, consistent with S a fi1ios-RothschiId (1970), that the majority of research has focused on power outcomes rather than process power or power bases. Sprey (1972), in fact, questions the theoretical usefulness of even knowing who wields the power in the family and introduces the concept of 'powering', suggesting a dynamic model that focuses on the organizational principles that underly negotiation process in marriage. In a later article,
S a fi1ios-RothschiId (1976:339) discusses two types of power: orchestration power and implementation power. Orchestration power refers to "the power of individuals to make only the
important and infrequent decisions that do not infringe on their time but that determine the family life style and the major characteristics and features of their family".
Implementation power is power derived from carrying out those decisions and is limited by the decisions made by the more powerful 1 spouse. Johnson, (1976) develops a theory of sex role stereotyping and power use. She suggests that Page 15 because women have less access to concrete resources and competence, the use of indirect, personal and helpless modes of influence are necessary.
Although S a fi1ios-Rothschi1d, Cromwell and Olson, and
Sprey raise important points concerning the use of the concept of marital power, Dair G illespie's (1971) a rtic le forces us to reconsider the individual level of analysis im plicit in their work. She identifies properties of the social structure that systemmatically block women as a class from gaining power in marriage that is equal to that of their husband's and suggests that the egalitarian family as a norm, is a myth.
McDonald (1980:8A2) , in his decade review of the family power literatu re lists several areas where there appears to be consensus: 1. power is the a b ility to achieve desired goals or outcomes, 2. power is a system property rather than the personal attribute of an individual 3* power is dynamic rather than static, and involves reciprocal causation, 1». power always involves asymmetrical relations although it may appear to be egalitarian when all interest spheres are considered, 5* power is both a perceptual and behavioral phenomenon and, 6. power is multidimensional
including socio-structural, interactional and outcome components.
The model this research proposes views power relations beetween intimates as the point from which analysis of conflict and violence proceeds. Power and conflict are Page 16 conceptualized as inherent in any social relationship and especially those that have a history such as the family.
This view differs from that of Rollins and Bahr (1976:621) who argue that "power and control are relevant constructs in marriage only when conflict exists between marriage
partners". They take this position because they suggest
that "the power of one person as a basis of control over
another is meaningless if the other person would have behaved in the same manner if the power was absent"
(1976:621). Our position differs from theirs because
intimate relations are analyzed from a conflict perspective.
Power relations can function to suppress conflict (Foss,
1980), shape the family system (McDonald, 1980) determine
interaction patterns (Kramarae, 1 9 81) and provide definitions of situations for family members (Sprey, 1972)
There is a distictio n between marital power and marital authority that is recognized in this research. While marital power refers to the a b ility to change the behavior of a partner, marital authority refers to the norms
regarding power, or who should have the right to influence behavior. In this research both actual power and normative power are measured by decision making outcome and are
included in the analysis because they are viewed as distinct concepts that are related to conflict and violence. Page 17
THE CONCEPT OF MARITAL CONFLICT
Although the conceptualization and measurement of marital power has created much debate within the discipline, the conceptualization and measurement of marital conflict appears to be less prob1emmatic. There are contradictory views on the question of whether conflict is "good" or "bad" within marriage and the family that depend on ones theoretical perspective.
Conflict theorists (Simmel, 1908; Coser, 1956;
Dahrendorf, 1959; Sprey, 1969; Scanzoni, 1972) hold that conflict is an inevitable part of all social relationships and that without the changes that conflict can lead to, any social unit is at risk of collapse or stagnation. The expression of conflict is viewed as increasing group solidarity because it results in less accumulated h o s tility .
The suppression of conflict results in a failu re to adapt to changed circumstances.
When marriage and the family are considered, the inevitability of conflict is clear. Simmel (1908) for example, discusses the unstable nature of the dyad. He views it as unstable because it takes the efforts of both parties to maintain it, but the dyad its e lf can be ended by the withdrawal of only one of the parties. A triad, on the other hand, has a built in conflict generating property because of the a b ility to form coalitions of two parties against the third. Although the propensity for conflict is greater, the triad is more stable because coalitions can Page 18 shift among the three parties (Caplow, 1968).
Other characteristics of intimate groups that increase the probability of conflict are the high frequency of
interaction and total personality involvement of group members (Coser, 1956; Foss, 1980), the greater number of opportunities for conflict that arise because of the wide range of a ctiv itie s and interests of the members, the power structure, or presumed right of family members to influence other family members, age and sex differences that lead to d ifferent interests, the assignment of family roles and tasks based on sex and age rather than competence and
interest and the involuntary nature of family life (Straus and Gelles, 1977)•
The definition of marital conflict found most often in the literature and used in this research, follows that of
Coser1s (1956) distinction between "conflict of interest" or
"conflict situation" and "conflict". A conflict situation or conflict of interest refers to a situation in which the
interests of the parties are objectively at odds because of differing values and goals. "Conflict", on the other hand, refers to a kind of action or behavioral strategy.
In this research, the measure of marital conflict is synonomous with conflict of interest and is derived from the conflict of interests defined by Coser, or those situations that inevitably arise in small groups where individuals d iffe r in their values and opinions on a range of issues.
These could be how the family income is used or how Page 19
affection and sexual relations are managed. The measure of
the Index of Marital Conflict is described in Chapter I I I .
Conflict, according to Coser (1956). Straus, (1979).
and Foss, (1 980), refers to the means used to resolve a
conflict of interest or conflict situation. It refers to
the specific negotiation tactics or actions taken when a
conflict of interest arises. In this research, this concept
is termed negotiation tactic. Measures of three types of
negotiation tactics, reasoning, withdrawal and verbal
aggression are developed in Chapter III that represent
progressively less constructive means of settling disputes.
They are the operationalizations of the means, actions or behavioral strategies used when there is conflict of
i nterest.
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
Explanations of marital violence frequently focus on
the balance of power within relationships. In general,
research has fa ir ly consistently demonstrated that in marriages where one partner dominates the decision making
process, the likelihood of violence increases. The highest
rate of marital violence occurs in relationships that are
husband dominant. The least amount of violence occurs in
relationships with a more egalitarian decision making process, whether it is shared or equally divided. These findings are used to support demands for a change in the
inequitable systems of sexual s tra tific a tio n that oppress women. It has been suggested that the rate of wife abuse Page 20 w ill decrease when women gain more power within marriage and more alternatives to marriage (Schuyler, 1976; Pogrebin,
197*0 •
However, changing the social relations between men and women may increase the frequency of abuse, at least in the short run (Straus, 1976). One reason suggested for the likelihood of greater abuse is that men are not ready to give up or share their power and thus may respond to their wife's increased independence with violence. Whitehurst
097*0 argues that most of the gains women have achieved in terms of education and employment opportunities, equal wages, greater legal rights, etc. are perceived by men as reducing their a b ility to control their wives. He suggests that men have no culturally approved way of coping with this loss of control and may resort to violence to regain control. Toby (197*0 suggests a 'compulsive masculinity' hypothesis to account for the use of violence when
"symbolic" masculine power is lacking. He hypothesizes greater violence by men when they are prevented from exercising the traditional symbols of male power. Yllo
(1980:1*10 points out that "as the traditional symbols of masculinity diminish and the status of women increases, males may turn to violence to assure themselves and others of their masculinity".
There are also characteristics of marriage and the family that may lead to more conflict and violence.
Scanzoni (1976) has suggested that egalitarian relationships Page 21 may have greater conflict because individuals must negotiate the power distribution rather than follow a pattern that is normatively imposed. Blood and Wolfe (1060) found that marital intimacy increases when more decisions are shared by the couple, yet we also know that the more intimate social relations are, the more likely they are to lead to conflict
(Coser, 1956; Sprey, 1972) Brown concludes that "marital conflict can be expected to increase when marital partners share more aspects of life " (1980:183). The work by Blood and Wolfe (i960) and Brown ( 1980) suggest that egalitarian relationships w ill have greater intimacy because of the increased sharing of decisions and responsibilities. When the hypotheses of conflict theory are considered, the process of deductive reasoning leads to the hypothesis that egalitarian relationships will have greater conflict because of the greater intimacy. Paradoxically then, there may be greater conflict in egalitarian relationships, while the research indicates the least amount of violence in such marr i ages.
Foss's ( 1980) a rtic le extending the work of Coser to include an analysis of conflict within the family makes the important point that while the structure of the family may increase the likelihood of conflict, equally important mechanisms are at work to suppress h o s tility . She point out that in addition to affective investment, family relationships also include instrumental dependencies that may increase members' fear of dissolution and thus lead to Page 22 the suppression of h o s tility . H o s tility , however, differs from both conflict of interest, the objective condition, and conflict, the means or tactics used when a conflict of interest arises. Hostility refers to an affective state that if expressed is done so through means or tactics.
Foss's conception of instrumental dependency is based on a more macro-level analysis of the family as a group where membership is involuntary and where the structure of society provides no positively valued alternatives to marriage. She recognizes, too, that fear of dissolution may be based in part on practical considerations such as the ability of single women with small children to provide adequate financial support. Implicit in her analysis then is the link between the power structure of the marital relationship and the expression of conflict.
Kalmuss and Straus (1982) focus more directly on the concept of instrumental dependency and its link with marital violence. They found greater violence in relationships where women were more dependent on their partner. They conclude that women who are economically dependent on their husbands are more likely to tolerate severe abuse because there are no alternatives available to them.
It is evident that the link between the power structure of intimate relationships, the level of conflict and the rate of violence is not clearly understood. Alford (1982) states that the relation between intimacy and conflict is virtually untested so it is not clear that egalitarian Page 23 relationships have more conflict than marriages with other power structures. However, the research also indicates a strong positive association between conflict and violence
(Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, 1980) There are several possible explanations for these contradictory findings.
There may be less violence in egalitarian relationships because there is less conflict, which would suggest that the relation between intimacy and co n flict is not as hypothesized. If intimacy and conflict are related as hypothesized, it would suggest that the low rates of violence in egalitarian marriages need explanation, given the positive association between conflict and violence. One explanation of the relation between conflict and violence is to examine the negotiation tactics couples use to settle d i sputes.
Mar ? ta 1 Power and Neqot i at i on
Few studies have examined how power differences between men and women and between men and women in the family in particular, affect the types of negotiation and communication patterns each use to settle conflict
(Kramarae, 1 9 81). The anecdotal and popular literature however, presents a clear picture of gender differences in what Steinem (1983) terms ta 1k-p o litic s . Men are presented as cool and rational speakers, women as emotional manipulators. It is only recently that traditional scholarship has begun to look at conversational styles as functions of power and environment and even then the focus Page 2k
is rarely on marital interaction in part because it is not considered theoretically interesting (Kramarae, 9 1 81). Some evidence suggests that because of their greater social power, men interrupt women more often than women interrupt men, and generally determine the appropriate topics of conversation (Steinem, 983 1 ) Fishman 0977« 1978) did analyze general conversations between middle class married couples and found differences in speech styles. She found
that men controlled conversations partly through silence, by not responding to topics introduced by the woman, that women
tended to use more prefacing remarks indicating a request for permission to speak such as "Do you know what?". Rausch et. a l. (197^) used a laboratory setting to study couples during a simulated conflict. They found no sex differences between the responses of husband and wife and concluded that they respond in the same way to each other's act.
Research has frequently focused on the resources
individuals bring to a relationship as determinants of their power and thus ability to resolve conflict in their own
interest. While the concept of resources is not u tilized as a direct indicator of negotiation tactics, the implication
is clear that individuals with the greatest resources will use those resources as a means to settle conflict.
The Ultimate Resource Theory of Violence (URT) states that violence w ill be used when individuals lack other resources to legitimate their position. Allen and Straus
(I98O) tested the URT and found evidence to support it Page 25 within working class families but not within middle class fam ilies. Thus resources may play some role in the negotiation procedures couples use to resolve conflict but other factors are clearly important.
The importance of the power structure of a relationship as a key variable in explaining family problem solving behavior is found in the work of Tallman and M iller (1971*) •
They suggest that the consistency between power structure norms and actual power structure influence problem solving effectiveness. They predicted that in white collar families egalitarian actual power would increase problem solving effectiveness whereas in blue collar families, husband dominant actual power was predicted to increase effect i veness.
Turner's (1970) decision making theory examines how the competence of those participating in problem solving is evaluated. He does not, however, recognize that age and gender affect the evaluation of competence, leading Klein and H ill (1975) to suggest that role segregation and centralization of family power structure need to be included in any examination of problem solving effectiveness. The work of both suggest that power structure and norms regarding power structure affect the a b ility to negotiate conflict. Klein and H ill state " It is tempting to conclude that all propositions regarding verbal capacity or communication have l i t t l e or no merit in a theory of family problem solving effectiveness and that power and especially Page 26 conformity to norms about power play a more important role".
Mar i tal Conf1ict, Neqot iat ion and Violence
The means by which couples attempt to settle disputes may explain the relation between level of conflict and violence, and explain why violence rates are low in egalitarian relationships. According to conflict theory, conflict is beneficial if constructive means are used to settle disputes. Thus it is plausible to suggest that even in relationships with a high level of conflicts the violence rate will be low if constructive means are used to settle the co n flict. This makes good sense in tu itively and is consistent with the principles of conflict theory. However, some research does not support it. The greater the use of reasoning to settle conflict, the greater the rate of violence, even when the amount of conflict is controlled
(Straus, 1980:165). Violence is also high in those relationships where verbal aggression is used to settle conflict. Thus there is some evidence to suggest that negotiation procedures are irrelevant to the relation between conflict and violence: that regardless of how couples try to manage conflict, if there is frequent conflict, violence will also occur more often.
One reason for these confusing findings may be that
Straus does not consider the power structure of the relationship or whether there is consensus over the balance of power. Their analysis may be too simplistic given the complexity of intimate relations. As Weber suggested, it is Page 27
necessary to consider whether those in subordinate positions
perceive the power distribution as legitimate. Family
violence research often cites violence rates which are
highest in one-person dominant relationships. The
explanation of this finding is usually the Ultimate Resource
Theory, or how husbands use violence to maintain their
position of superiority. But, if we consider whether this
power in husband dominant relationships is legitimized by
the wife, the explanation of violence as the ultimate
resource may not hold up. It is necessary to examine
negotiation tactics, levels of conflict and rates of
violence within the context of the power structure and
whether that structure is perceived as legitimate.
HYPOTHESES AND MODEL
Two factors may be important in the relation between
power, conflict and violence. First, we suggest that the
link between the power structure of the relationship and the
level of conflict is contingent upon whether the power
distribution is legitimized by both partners. It will be
possible to examine the idea of consensus within four types
of power structures, husband dominant, wife dominant,
egalitarian and divided power and analyze the effect of
consensus on the power and conflict association. It w ill be
possible to test the hypothesis regarding intimacy and
conflict and determine if egalitarian relationships do in
fact have greater conflict. We may find no difference between power types: that there are high levels of conflict Page 28 in relationships where consensus over the distribution of power is low. Second, it is suggested that the relation between conflict and violence needs further analysis. The negotiation tactics couples use to settle conflict is hypothesized as an important factor in understanding the conflict - violence relation. Although Straus's study cited previously suggests that reasoning is not useful, his findings are inconclusive for several reasons. It is important to compare negotiation tactics such as reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression across varying levels of conflict to determine if constructive means of settling conflict reduce the rate of violence. If conflict is beneficial, as the theory suggests, the use of reasoning should result in lower violence rates when compared to verbal aggression. Finally, it is suggested that the rate of violence isa function of the jo in t effects of the power structure of the relationship, consensus over this structure, level of conflict and the negotiation tactics couples use. The following model is proposed.
Power Norm Negot i at i on Consensus Tact ics
Power Structure ^ Level of Rate of of Relationship ------— ^ Conflict Violence Chapter I I I
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the source of the data for this
research, how the major variables of interest are measured, and the approach that is taken to explore the relationships between the variables. The methodological issues raised by
the use of self-report data and the constuction of Likert additive indices to measure marital power are addressed.
Marital volence was measured in this research by the
Conflict Tactics Scale developed by Straus (1979)*
SOURCE OF THE DATA
This research analyzes data originally collected to study physical violence in American families, as part of a project funded by NIMH and conducted by the UNH Family
Research Lab. A national area probability sample was designed by Response Analysis Corporation of Princeton,
N.J., who carried out the interviewing of 21^3 respondents.
Specifics of the sampling procedure are described in detail
in Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980). B riefly, the procedures included prior specification of location, household and the individual to be interviewed. Page 30
To be included in the sample, respondents had to be
living with a member of the opposite sex but not necessarily
married to them. A random half of the respondents are male
and half are female. Interviews with the respondents lasted
approximately one hour and anonymity was assured. The
completion rate was 65%. Since one half of the respondents
were men and one half were women, the data in this research
involves women reporting on their own behavior and that of
their partner in one half of the sample, and men reporting
on their own behavior and that of their partner in the other
half of the sample.
There are several major advantages of using this data
set to explore marital power, conflict, and violence in
intimate relationships. It is a national representative
sample of American marriages, allowing the generalization of
findings to the total population. It includes interviews with 960 men and 1183 women and avoids the limitations of
previous studies that only interview women. The findings
from this research are clearly not an example of wives'
family sociology (Safi1ios-RothschiId, 1969)- Because the
data comes from a representative sample, the measures of marital violence are significant improvements over the rates
available from o ffic ia l sources. Abuse rates that come from official sources are limited in their interpretation because
they rely upon reported cases of abuse. There are, however, certain limitations. It is possible that the rates of violence are underestimates of the true rate for several Page 31
reasons. The CTS, from which the rates of violence are
estimated, has been criticized because it asks respondents
about a limited number of violent acts that may have
occurred over the prior year and frames the question about
the use of violence in the context of a conflict between
spouses (Straus, 1981). In addition, the methodology
required self-report data on violence, and respondents may
not have revealed all acts that actually occurred. Despite
the possibility of underreporting acts of violence, these estimates remain superior to others.
MARITAL POWER
Measurement of the Concept
Marital power is measured in this research through a modified version of the index developed by Blood and
Wolfe(1960). It involves asking the respondent who has the final say in decision making on a number of issues that arise in intimate relationships. They are: buying a car, having children, what house or apartment to take, what job either partner should take, whether a partner should go to work or quit work, and how much money to spend each week on food. The respondent is asked to state to what degree each partner has the final say on each issue. The range of possible reponses for each issue is husband only, husband more than wife, husband and wife the same, wife more than husband, wife only. Page 32
Cr i t ique of Blood and Wolfe Indicators
The Blood and Wolfe Index of Marital Power has received considerable criticism . As previously suggested, both theoretical and methodological issues have been raised. The major methodological controversies concern the r e lia b ility and v alid ity of this type of index to measure the concept of marital power • (Safi1ios-RothschiId,1970; Gi1lespie,1971;
Cromwell and Olson,1975)* The criticisms have been examined
in a number of empirical studies to be reviewed in in this chapter.
Safi1ios-Rothschi1d (1970) identifies potential lim itations of the measure: the number and content of the
items varies across studies, the specificity of the items varies across studies, and the equal weighting of the items
in index construction suggests that all decisions are of equal importance. In addition, she points out the sensitivity of an average index score to the effects of outliers, and that the reliance on the wife as respondent may reflect only her perception of the marital power di stribution.
The larger issue of the appropriateness of using self report questionaires rather than observation to study power is also explored by Safi1ios-RothschiId and others
(Bahr,1972; Olson and Cromwel1,1975)• Olson and
Cromwel1 (1975) describe the problems encountered when a respondent is required to decide who exercises power in the family. They suggest that the marital interaction that Page 33 precedes decision making interferes with the ability to recall who made the final decision. Respondents may know what was decided, but not who decided it . They underscore the need to study the power process rather than power outcomes. Self-report questionnaires generally require a respondent to recall past events, and accurate recall can be problematic. In addition, Olson and Cromwell suggest that social d esirab ility is an important factor when questions concern marital power because of the normative expectations regarding egalitarian decision making in marriage. They describe studies where an unusually high percentage of couples report an egalitarian power structure and suggest that social desirability factors produce such results.
01son(1969). however, found social desirability factors led husbands to over estimate their power while wives under estimate their power.
Apart from the question of what methodologies are appropriate to use in the study of marital power, the literatu re suggests it is the equal weighting of items in the original Blood and Wolfe index that has generated the most discussion. Safi1ios-RothschiId (1970) and
Gellespie (1971) for example, point out that some of the decisions in the Blood and Wolfe scale are more important, but made less frequently; while other decisions are less important but are made more often. Thus they suggest different weights for each decision. A second approach
(Bahr, Bowerman and Gicas, 197^) is to weight items by the Page 34
amount of conflict generated in the decision-making process.
The issue of who decides how to weight the decisions is also
raised and it is suggested that respondent should make the decision by rating their importance.
The methodological issues raised by S a fi1ios-RothschiId
have been empirically examined in a number of studies with
fa irly mixed results. They are reviewed by McDonald (1980)
in his assessment of the research published on family power during the 1970's. He lists five areas of concern reflected
in the literature during that period: 1) the comparability of different measures of power and decision-making; 2) the
need to develop indicators for a wider range of power dynamics than decision-making outcomes; 3) the degree of
sim ilarity of husband-wife responses; 4) the development of observational measures of family power dynamics; and 5) the problems with existing Blood and Wolfe type decision-making outcome measures (McDonald,1980:845)•
The question of how representative items are that comprise the Blood and Wolfe type indices, and thus may bias
the results in the favor of one spouse over the other, is addressed in several studies. Centers, Rowen and
Rodrigues (1971) increased the number of items in the index
so that it was more representative of the normatively prescribed decision areas for both spouses. Their index
> reliability was not significantly different from the original Blood and Wolfe index. However, since they added decision areas generally prescribed to the wife, wives Page 35
tended to score higher, and thus had more power than
previous measures indicate. Bahr (1973) tested the internal
consistency of the Blood and Wolfe index and concluded that
it is a reliable measure of decision-making, however his
findings are challenged by Cromwell and Weiting(1975)•
Price-Bonham (1976) examined the effect of weighted and
unweighted scores and concluded that there is l i t t l e
difference between spouses unweighted final say scores and a
small difference when items are weighted by importance.
Benson (1976) does not agree, and in fact her research
demonstrated reverse effects. Allen and Straus1985 ( )
designed a study to test the r e lia b ility of final say measures using both external criterion validation and
analysis of item removed alpha coefficients (SPSS, 19 81).
They examined conflict weighted, item importance weighted,
and unweighted itemsacross five samples gathered in the
U.S. and India. Their research is thus an improvement over
past studies because of the addition of external criterion analysis and cross-cultural validation. The major finding
from this study demonstrate that the final say measure has cross-cultural validity, that the reliability of the measure
is not increased when items are weighted by the level of conflict generated, or by importance, and that husbands' and wives' responses have equivalent validity.
In this research, a Blood and Wolfe type indicator was used to in itia lly measure marital power and then to derive
the four power types — male dominant, female dominant, Page 36 egalitarian and divided power. The decision to use this method to measure marital power is made for the following reasons:
1. Despite the methodological and theoretical controversies over this measure, its use by family sociologists continues (McDonald,1 980). Because of the controversy over its use, the strengths and weaknesses of the measure are wel1 known and thus research using such a method can be more clearly evaluated within the discipline.
2. The specific characteristics of the Blood and Wolfe index used in this research and with this sample of respondents have been examined by Allen and Straus ( 1985)• Their findings show it to be a reliable and valid measure of marital power. The alpha coefficient of reliability, a measure of internal consistency of an index, is .Al.
3 . In this sample, social desirability does not appear to have as large an impact on self-report measures of marital power as Olson and Cromwel1 (1975) predict. When the four power types are developed from the Blood and Wolfe measure, no large percentages of egalitarian relationships are found. In fact, the egalitarian power group represents only 2 8 . 7% of the total sample.
A. The use of this index provides a means to examine the legitimation of the power structure that is hypothesized as an important intervening variable in the relation between marital power and conflict. The parallel set of questions that ask who should have the final say provide the means to assess the legitimation of power.
The central issue of concern in this research is to examine how various power arrangements effect the level of conflict and the amount of violence. Marital power in this research is thus an independent variable and the starting point from which our analysis of intimate relationships Page 37
proceeds. The Blood and Wolfe index provided the development of four types of power arrangements that capture, at least at one point in time, strikingly different patterns of relationships.
Index Construction
The measures of husband-dominant, wife dominant, egalitarian and divided power relationships began by constucting an index that measures the percent of decisions shared by the partners and an index that measures who has the balance of power. The power typologies are identified by combining the Percent of Shared Power Index and the
Balance of Power Index.
To measure percent of decisions that are shared equally by the couple,each response of "husband and wife the same" was given a score of one. The resulting index has a range of 0 - 6 . The second index, the Balance of Power Index, used the same set of questions and is a Likert additive index. Points are assigned to each response category and summed. Low scores on the Balance of Power Index indicate the wife is dominant in decision-making, while high scores indicate the husband is dominant in decision-making.
Couples that earned at least 67% on the Shared Power
Index are defined as having an egalitarian power structure.
Couples who earned less than 65% on the Shared Power Index and less than 33% on the Balance of Power Index are defined as having a wife dominant relationship while couples that earned less than 65% on the Shared Power Index and more than Page 38
66% on the Balance of Power Index are defined as husband dominant. Couples that scored less than 65% on the Shared
Power Index but between 3^~65% on the Balance of Power Index
are defined as having an divided power relationship.
POWER NORM CONSENSUS
The importance of legitimated power structures was
clearly recognized by Weber(19^7) as a factor c ritic a l to
the development of co n flict. According to Weber, conflict would be less likely to appear in relationships where the subordinate confered the right to make decisions on the superordinate. The concept of legitimation incorporated
into the proposed model of this research is an important
intervening variable in the relation between power and conf1ict.
Measurement of the Concept
To measure the agreement couples have reached over the distribution of power, the parallel set of response categories were used from the Blood and Wolfe index of marital power that asks the respondent who should make the decisions about a specific issue and asks the respondents how their partners would respond to the same question. Of
interest in this research was the development of an index of consensus over how the power is distributed so that it be compared to the Marital Power Index of how power is actually distributed. Page 39
Index Construction
The simple assignment of points to the responses to each of six questions, a basic Likert indexing methodology, posed a d iffic u lty because we were interested in a measure that would reflect the magnitude of the differences between the responses. That is, we needed a measure that would reflect the magnitude of the difference between whom the respondent believed should make the decisions and how the respondent believed his or her partner would respond to the same question. If we merely assigned points to the response categories for each question that comprised the index and subtracted the husband's responses from the wife's responses, the result is both positive and negative integers. Since the next step to creating the index is to sum those integers for each question, the positive and negative integers cancel each other out. To avoid this problem we took the absolute value of the difference between husband and wife response to each question and summed those scores to create the overall index of power norm consensus.
The problem of missing values for each question was also of concern to the overall index construction process. We chose to substitute the mean of the score for each question.
However, when the index was created, the missing value substitution process was only used if there was only one question that had a missing value substitution. Page kO
The Index of Power Norm Concensus has a theoretical
range of 0 to 2k, but the actual index ranges from 8, the
least amount of consensus to 2k or complete consensus. With
a mean of 21.8 and a standard deviation (SD) of 2.3 it is an
extremely skewed distribution.
Index R eliabi1i ty
Confidence in the re lia b ility of an index is an
important methodological concern in any research. There are
several necessary steps to evaluate the re lia b ility of an
index. The procedure to evaluate the Index of Power Norm
Consensus is also used in the evaluation of subsequent
indices developed for this study. The basic rules are
outlined here.
The item to item correlation matrix provides empirical
information on how well the items are related to one another
and on the direction of the relationship. If any
correlations are too low it suggests that deletion of that
item from the index should be considered. The correlation matrix for the Index of Power Norm Consensus reveals fa irly
low overall item to item correlation coefficients that range
from .16 to .31 with a mean of .21. In general, one might
consider deleting items with a correlation of less than .20
however this also depends on the number of items in the
index that one could sacrifice. All items that comprise the
Index of Power Norm Consensus are included because, despite
low correlations, in general they are consistent. That is, one item is not correlated significantly lower than any Page 41 others. Thus one criterion for reliable indexing, that the items selected on a theoretical basis as a measure of a concept also correlate on an empirical basis is met. A second consideration are the item to index correlation coefficients that provide additional guidelines for evaluating whether to include an item in the index. The size of corrected item to total correlation coefficients for the Index of Power Norm Consensus range from .32 to .42 which fall well within an acceptable range.
The third consideration is the size of the alpha coefficient, an overall measure of the internal consistency re lia b ility of the index, and also the corresponding change in alpha if any items are deleted from the index. The index of Power Norm Consensus coefficient of r e lia b ility is .61, and it decreases when items are deleted. Thus the Index of
Power Norm Consensus meets each of the empirical c rite ria for evaluating the re lia b ility of an index and provides ju s tific a tio n for suggesting that it is a reliable measure of consensus over how the power is distributed in a relationship.
Use of the Index i n Data Analys i s
Although the Index of Power Norm Consensus is an ordinal variable, for purposes of this research it was trichotomized into low, medium and high groupings.
There are two guidelines one can use to decide how to trichotomize an ordinal variable: the Edwards twenty-seventh percentile c rite ria , or by examination of the frequency Page 42 distribution for the particular variable and identifying substantial breaking points in the distribution.
Examination of the cumulative percentage of the frequency distribution for this index revealed major breaking points in the distribution which did not coincide with the percentile c rite ria . It was decided to base the trichotomi2ation on the breaks in the distribution. Couples who earned 8-20 total points on this index (24.2% of the sample) are grouped into the low consensus group. Couples who scored 21-23 points (39*8% of the sample) are grouped into the medium consensus group. Couples who scored 24 points ( 33-7% of the sample) are grouped into the total consensus group. The basic rationale behind the selection of these cutting point, in addition to the characteristics of the frequency distribution, involved consideration of how couples earned the scores for this index. If we use a couple who earned 20 points on the index as an example, there are several ways they could have responded to gain those 20 points. They may agree completely on five out the six issues asked, but would have to disagree completely on one issue. That represents 16% disagreement on all decisions couples make (as measured by this index) and that is a fairly large percent. The more likely scenario is that they lost the four points that would mean total consensus by disagreeing to some degree on four questions. Disagreement on 66.6% of the questions asked can be interpreted as a low degree of consensus on how the power should be distributed. Page A3
MARITAL CONFLICT
Measurement of the Concept
The Index of Marital Conflict used in this research was constructed from the responses to a set of five questions concerning issues that couples may have agreed or disagreed on during the prior year. The questions asked the respondent how often during the past year s/he agreed on: managing the money, cooking, cleaning or repairing the house; social activities; affection and sexual relations; and things about the children. There were five possible response categories that range from always to never.
Index Construction
Points ranging from one to fiv e were assigned to each response category. For example, couples who never disagreed on a specific question were given one point and couples that always disagreed on that question were assigned five points.
The index was then created by summing the scores for the five questions. The problem of missing values for each question was solved in the same manner as the Index of Power
Norm Consensus by substituting the mean for each question.
The Index of Marital Conflict has a theoretical range of 5 to 25 but an actual range of 5 to 2A, indicating that few couples in the sample to ta lly disagreed on every issue.
For c la rity it should be pointed out that while high scores on the Index of Power Norm Consensus indicate high consensus, high scores on the Index of Marital Conflict Page k k indicate high conf1ict. The Marital Conflict Index has a mean of 10.0 and a SD of 3*^*
1ndex Reli abiIi ty
As with the Index of Power Norm Consensus, three factors provide information suggesting that the Index of
Marital Conflict is a reliable measure. The correlation matrix of all items suggests that the questions chosen for inclusion in the index are positively correlated with each other. Coefficients ranged from a low of .32 to a high of
.46. The corrected item to total correlation coefficients are also substantially similar to one another and fa ll within an acceptable range of around .5 suggesting that no items should be deleted from the index. The alpha reliability coefficient for the Index of Marital Conflict is
•77 and the deletion of any item from the index does not increase the r e lia b ilit y coefficient.
Tr ichotomization of the Index of Mar i tal Conf1i ct
One of the major relationships this research examines is between the distribution of marital power and the level of marital co n flict. As pointed out previously, marital power as measured in this study is a nominal variable, and the same data analysis limitations that were discussed in relation to the Index of Power Norm Consensus apply here as well. The Index of Marital Conflict is similarly trichotomized into low, medium, and high conflict groups. Page 45
Theselection of cutting points from a frequency distribution so that data is grouped in a way that is theoretically and empirically meaningful can be a d iffic u lt decision. The rationale behind the grouping of data in the
Index of Marital Conflict was based on the naturally occurring break points inthe cumulative frequency distribution and the measures of central tendency. Couples that scored 5“ 8 points ( 2A.4%) on the index are grouped into
\T the low conflict group; couples that scored S~]2 on the index (44.1%) are grouped into the medium conflict group; and those that scored 13 or more points (30.0%) are in the high conflict group.
NEGOTIATION TACTICS
The empirical relationship between marital conflict and violence is examined by Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980) and clearly demonstrates a strong positive association between the two variables: the greater the co n flict, the greater the probability of violence.
Straus et. a l . (1980) further examine the confIict-violence connection in relation to the assumptions of conflict theory by suggesting that if conflict is negotiated through the use of reasoning, the rate of violence should decrease. How conflict is negotiated becomes a major intervening variable in the relation between conflict and violence. Straus compares how the use of reasoning effects the association between conflict and violence, and finds a relationship that is unexpected: Page 46 couples that have high levels of conflict and whose use of reasoning is high, have the highest rates of violence. The opposite is also true: couples who have low levels of conflict and use reasoning the least often, have the lowest rates of violence (Straus,1980: 165)• The results of his analysis suggest that it might be misleading to state that conflict is beneficial to intimate relationships when constructive means are used to resolve that conflict, a * major assumption of conflict theory.
The data also suggest that there is little hope of avoiding marital violence when there is conflict: a conclusion that would wreak havoc on those whose business is marital therapy. Clearly, the link between conflict, violence, and negotiation needs further analysis. It could be thatwhen reasoning is compared to other less constructive negotiation tactics, such as withdrawal and verbal aggression, even higher rates of violence result; or that violence is used as a ‘last resort' when constructive means of settling disputes have apparently failed.
Measurement of the Concept
The Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) is a well known and frequently utili2ed measure that asks respondents to report how often in the past year s/he and their partner used various means to resolve differences. It is composed of 18 types of tactics that may have been used and range from rational forms of conflict resolution such as use of reasoning to the use of physical violence. Although the CTS Page h i was originally developed to get at the issue of physical violence in intimate relationships (Straus,1978) it provides valuable information on other types of negotiation tactics too. Of particular interest is how the use of less constructive means of settling disputes, such as sulking or crying or insulting the partner effects the conf1ict-violence association. This research develops three indices of negotiation tactics from the CTS.
There were several issues that had to be addressed when the three indices were constructed. Because we are
interested in how marital power relations affect negotiation tactics, we wanted to retain some information on how each partner used negotiation tactics within the four power types. We were curious to see if, for example, men in male dominant relationships negotiated conflict differently than men in egalitarian relationships, or what tactics women in female dominant relationships used. But of equal concern was the development of a measure of negotiation tactics that reflected the marital relationship, rather than any one person in that relationship. Thus there are three versions of the Reasoning Index, the Withdrawal Index, and the Verbal
Aggression Index: one for husbands, one for wives, and one for the couple.
The Reasoninq Index is constructed from items that
> measure how often the respondent and the partner discussed the issue calmly, got information to support their side of the discussion, and brought in or tried to bring in another Page 1+8 person to help settle a dispute. The Wi thdrawal Index uses the items that measure the frequency of sulking or refusing to talk about the issue, stomping out of the room, and crying. The Verbal Aggression Index includes insulting or swearing at the partner, and doing or saying something to spite the other.
An underlying assumption concerning negotiation tactics is that there is an escalation process that may precede the use of violence which includes a continuum of progressively less constructive means of settling disputes. Alford's
(1982) article on intimacy and disputing styles similarly supports the assumption of a continuum. Conceptually, the three indices re flec t that assumption, with the reasoning index tapping the most constructive dimension and the verbal aggression index tapping the least constructive dimension of negotiation tactics. Violence, then, is not specifically included as a negotiation tactic in this research, rather it is conceptualized as a result of many factors that this study examines, one of which is the use of negotiation to mediate the relation between conflict and violence.
Index Construct ion
There are seven possible response categories for each of the items that are used to construct the indices and they range from 0 (never) to 6 (more than 21 times). In prior research, these items were recoded to more accurately reflect the frequency with which each tactic is used and the midpoints of the response categories are used. The fir s t Page 49
step in this research was to sum the scores for the items
included in each index and divide by the number of items in
each index. The indices for wives and husbands use of
reason, withdrawal, and verbal aggression have a range of 0
to 25 while the couple measure of the same tactics has a
range of 0 to 50.
Examination of the husband, wife, and couple frequency distribution for each tactic suggests there are few differences in how often tactics are used by each partner.
Similar measures of central tendency and dispersion are
reported for the husband and wife Reasoning indices and the husband and wife Verbal Aggression indices. The Wives'
Reasoning Index has a mean of 5-8 and a SD of A.8; for
Husbands' Reasoning Index the*mean is 5*2 and the SD is A.8.
The Wives' Verbal Aggression Index has a mean of 3.1 and a
SD of 5.2; for Husbands' Verbal Aggression Index the mean is
2.9 and the SD is 5*2. When the Withdrawal indices for husband and wife are compared, however, some important gender differences are apparent. The Wives' Withdrawal
Index has a mean of 3-1 and a SD of 4.5; for
Husbands1Withdrawal Index the mean is 1.8 and the SD is 3.2.
The data from this index suggests that wives use withdrawal as a negotiation tactic more often than their partner.
The Couple Indices are additive responses from what the women in the sample report about themselves and their partners and what the men in the sample report about themselves and their partner. The mean and SD for the Page 50
Couple Reasoning Index are 10.6 and 9.1. The mean and SD for the Couple Withdrawal Index are A.9 and 6.8. The mean and SD for the Couple Verbal Aggression Index are 5*9 and
9.6.
Index Reli ab?1i ty
The size of the inter-item correlations for the questions used to construct the d ifferent indices are more disparate than has been encountered in the construction of other indices developed in this research. This pattern holds for each of the individual indices that measure husbands' negotiation tactics and wives' negotiation tactics. The couples' indices w ill be considered below.
The inter-item correlations of the items used in the
Reasoning Index suggest that of the three items, discussing the issue calmly and bringing in others to help settle an argument are not highly correlated (.09 for husbands; .08 for wives), although the correlations are s ta tis tic a lly significant. The size of the correlations between the other
items are positive and relatively high.
When the inter-item correlations for the Withdrawal
Index are examined a clear sex difference in tactics is apparent. The question that measures use of crying as a tactic is not as highly correlated with the other items used
in the husbands' Withdrawal Index as it is in the wives'
Withdrawal Index. The correlation between crying and sulking is .13 for husbands and .39 for wives. Page 51
These low correlations within the two indices suggest
that deletion of those items should be considered. However,
there are only three items that comprise the Reasoning Index and the Withdrawal Index. The item pool is not large enough
to delete an item without compromising the concept of
i ndexi ng.
The following alpha coefficients are reported for the husband and wife versions of the indices:
Husband's Reasoning Index . A 8
Wife's Reasoning Index .k~l
Husband's Withdrawal Index .51
Wife's Withdrawal Index .67
Husband's Verbal Aggression Index .7**
Wife's Verbal Aggression Index .71
The Couples' Neqotiation Tactics Indices
In addition to the procedure described above, computation of the couples' indices required examining the correlation coefficients between husbands' and wives' use of each tactic. This set of correlations was examined to provide empirical support for an index that is a measure of a relationship between intimates rather than an individual
level measure such as the husbands' Reasoning Index. The husbands' and wives' correlation coefficients for the couples' Reasoning Index are high with a range of .65 to
.8A. The couples' Verbal Aggression correlation coefficients are also sizable (.6A). The lowest Page 52
Table 3-1- Sample Percentages for Trichotomized Negotiation Tactics Indexes
Negot i at ion Tactics Husbands Wives Couples
A. Reasoning Index Low 34-3 32.8 41.7 Med i um 28.7 28. 1 26.3 High 35.0 37-1 29-1
N 2102 2099 2080
Withdrawal Index None A7-6 31-3 25-7 hed i um 36.1* 1*0.6 1*1*.2 High 14.8 26.8 28.0
N 2118 2115 2099
Verbal Aggression Index None i*i*.8 *5.1 37-8 Med i um 30. A 29-2 27-7 High 23-7 21*. 8 33-0
N 2120 2121* 2113 Page 53 correlations between husbands' and wives' tactics are from the items that comprise the Withdrawal Index. These coefficients ranged from .22 to 38. . One explanation of the size is that they are reflective of gender differences in the expression of emotionality.
The alpha re lia b ility coefficients for the couples' indices are quite consistant with the alphas for the husbands' and wives' indices. They are:
Couples' Reasoning Index .US
Couples' Withdrawal Index .73
Couples' Verbal Aggression Index .76
Tr ichotomi zation of the Neqoti ation Tacti cs Indi ces
Each type of the Negotiation Tactics Index is trichotomized into low, medium and high groups using similar procedure to those used in the trichotomiztion of the consensus and conflict indices. Table 3-1 shows the percent of the sample in each group by tactic.
MARITAL VIOLENCE
Measurement of the Concept
Violence is defined as "an act carried out with the intention of, or perceived intention of, physically hurting another person" (Gelles and Straus,1979)♦ Violence is measures in this research by those items of the Conflict
Tactics Scale that involve the use of physical force to settle co n flict. The CTS is described by Straus (1979) and Page S 1*
is reevaluated in light of a number of criticisms in
Straus(1981) .
Use of the CTS allows the development of several
indices to measure intra-family violence that take into
account the sex of the victim and the severity of the violence. This research is limited to those items that measure Minor Violence. The Minor Violence Index measures
acts, of physical force that include pushing, slapping and
throwing objects.
The measures of husband to wife and wife to husband minor violence are not, however, mutually exclusive measures of marital violence. They do not measure those incidents where on!y the husband or only the wife is violent. The
index reflects relationships where there is, for example,
husband to wife violence (N=>246) , but includes times where only the husband is violent and times where the husband is violent and the wife may have responded with violent acts of
her own. This is also true of the measure of wife to
husband violence (N=231).
The measure of minor couple violence (N=326) used in
this research is not restricted to relationships where both
partners are violent. it is an additive measure of the
number of times in the last year that either the husband was violent, the wife was violent or both were violent.
The use of mutually exclusive measures of minor violence was explored because such measures provide for better conceptual clarity. Four distinct typologies of Page 55 marital violence could be developed using this approach:
couples where there is no reported violence (N=1768); where only the husband was violent (N=95) ; where only the wife was violent (N=80) and where both partners were violent (N=151) •
The cost of conceptual c la rity , however, is the creation of
such serious methodological problems because of the small
sample size that preclude the analysis of the relationship o fjn te r e s t in this research. These problems are discussed
in the following section.
The decision to lim it the analysis to acts of minor violence was made for both theoretical and practical
reasons. The major focus of this research is to examine the
relation between the marital power structure, conflict and violence in light of several prediction from conflict
theory. Egalitarian relationships are of particular
interest because of the contradictions in theory and
research. A focus on the rates of minor violence rather
than the more severe forms that violence may take, such as wife or husband beating, provides a more accurate picture of how power and conflict are related to phenomena that occur
relatively frequently in marriage.
It is important to recognize the meaning that even minor violence has in an intimate relationship. It implies
that physical force will be used when it is perceived as
'necessary'. Although it is minor in the sense that there
is less chance of physical harm, what islearned by the victim is that they are at risk if they do not acquiesce to Page 56
the partners' demands. There is also no quarantee that minor acts of violence' w ill remain minor. Minor violence is often a prelude to more severe violence.
ft is also important to remember that children learn appropriate behavior by observing the actions of their parents. Seeing parents engaged in the use of even minor violence is a powerful lesson in how one is to behave in
intimate relationships.
It is suggested that examination of marital power and conflict and how each explain the occurrence of minor violence is a sufficient test of the predictions of conflict
theory because they w ill help explain fa ir ly typical marital behavior. Inclusion of the more severe forms of violence would have provided additional information but would also have resulted in an excessive number of tables, approximately 81 in Chapter V, when the relation between conflict, negotiation tactics and violence is examined. The
Minor Violence Index is computed to measure husband-wife, wife-husband, and couple violence.
METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS
The central focus of this research is to test a number of hypotheses derived from conflict theory concerning the
relationship between marital power, conflict, and violence.
Egalitarian relationships are of particular interest because
the empirical findings from past research are at odds with what is expected from a conflict framework. The major concern that guides the analysis of the data is a comparison Page 57
of egalitarian relationships with male dominant, female dominant, and divided power structures on the issues of conflict and violence. While comparison of the power types throughout this study is central, it creates its own set of limitations on the statistical procedures most appropriate to analyze the data.
Marital power, as used in this research, is a nom inal level variable. Power norm consensus, marital conflict and negotiation tactics are ordinal in their original form, and trichotomized for major analyses. The decision to trichotomize these indices was made because the focus of the research is on comparing groups that have high levels of conflict, consensus, and use of negotiation tactics.
Trichotomization of the indices permits comparing the violence rates for each of the groups, as well as the rates resulting from the cross classification of these independent var i ables.
G iven th e p r o p e r t ie s o f th e s e v a r ia b le s , some statistical techniques are ruled out. For example, the measure of marital violence is extremely skewed, making the use of multiple regression inappropriate. In light of these limitations, cross-tabular analysis and chi square were selected as the statistical tools that would provide the most informative results when the relation between marital power, consensus and conflict is examined. Page 58
The approach taken to analyze the data is to first examine the relationship between marital power, power norm concensus and marital conflict. The level of conflict reported for each marital power type is examined, and how that relationship is mediated by the consensus over the power distribution is then examined. Chapter IV presents the findings on how egalitarian relationships compare to the other types and thus examines the relationship between power and conflict that is predicted by a conflict perspective.
How conflict and violence are related is a second issue of this research. Again, from a conflict perspective, how couples go about settling disputes should play a role in the relation between conflict and violence. Chapter V presents the findings on the relation between conflict and violence and how that relationship is mediated by the negotiation tactics couples use — reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression. The question of how the marital power distribution effects the relation between conflict, negotiation tactics and violence is also examined.
The analysis of the data that considers the relation between conflict, negotiation tactics and violence utilizes one-way analysis of variance from the SCSS Breakdown procedure. One-way ANOVA statistically tests whether the means of the subsample differ significantly from one another by computing the F ratio, the between groups mean square divided by the within groups mean square. One-way ANOVA also provides the eta squared coefficient, a descriptive Page 59
statistic that is a measure of the proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable by the independent v a r i a b le .
The decision to use one-way ANOVA was made because the eta squared statistic provides a means to compare how much of the variance in the dependent variable — the rate of minor violence — is explained by each of the independent variables — conflict and negotiation tactics.
To explore if the marital power structure changes the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence, the
/select option in SCSS was used to select each marital power type. The relation between conflcit, negotiation and violence was then examined as before, but within each marital power structure using one-way ANOVA.
The relation between conflict, negotiation and violence was also examined using the mutually exclusive measures of marital violence. It was quite reasonable to expect that operationalizing the concepts of marital violence so that the measures were mutually exclusive measures of violence would show different relationships between the variables.
All analyses of the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence presented in Chapter V were run using the mutually exclusive measures. The results of the runs showed that the use of either measure — the mutually exclusive or the non mutually exclusive — produced generally parallel relationships between conflict, negotiation and violence, except that using mutually Page 60 exclusive measures led to:
1. cell sizes that were drastically reduced
2. smaller and less often significant etas
3- a number of instances of cells without any cases, which precluded the testing of hypotheses.
4. some instances in which the interpretation of the data more strongly supported the interpretation made with the non mutually exclusive measures and, as with the original measures, a few instances which produced uninterpretable results.
In view of the above, one can have more confidence in the analysis using the more adequate sample size (i.e . the analysis based on the non mutually exclusive measures) and that is what is presented in this dissertation. However, to illustrate the parallel findings, and because the results are intrinsically interesting, findings using the mutually exclusive operationalizations of couple violence are described where appropriate in the text, and the actual data is presented in Appendix A. C h a pte r IV
POWER. CONSENSUS. AND CONFLICT
Marital power is a concept that consistently appears in the family sociology literature and is of central importance
in this research. Sprey's (1975575). review of the family power and family process literature noted that as often as power is used as the focus of family research, its use as such is not explained. The basic assumption is that the
importance of power to the explanation of family behavior is both self explanatory and obvious. He suggests that knowledge of the family power structure would be more useful
if its impact on family process were identified.
This criticism is due, in part, to his dissatisfaction with the power research at the time, which identified the resources individuals possessed and measured their corresponding level of power in the family. Power was treated as a dependent variable, and thus the impact of power relations on family process was not examined.
This research begins with an analysis of the marital power structure because power is seen as an essential part of the theoretical explanation of family process. The following chapter examines the impact of the marital power Page 62 structure on two aspects of marital process: consensus over how the power is distributed and the level of marital conf1ict.
THE POWER STRUCTURE OF MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS
How power is distributed within the marital system is an issue that couples frequently address without fu ll realization of the issue or its implication. It is an ongoing aspect of their relationship long before the relationship is socially recognized by a marriage ceremony.
Traditionally, men have had more power than women and especially in marital relationships. As Gillespie (1971) points out, power is linked with one's degree of involvement in the economic opportunity system. Since women's involvement in this system has been limited, so has their marital power. On the other hand, the predominant value regarding marital power is that it should be egalitarian: women should have a greater voice in decision making than they have had in the past. Blood and Wolfe (1960) for example, begin their chapter on marital power by.stating:
No change in the American family is mentioned more often than the s h ift from one-sided male authority to the sharing of power by husband and wi fe (I960: 1 1).
The data from this research indicate that in general, relationships are less often dominated by one partner, but perhaps not as egalitarian as one might expect. Page 63
Pi str ibut ion of Mar i tal Power Types
A l i t t l e over one-half (53-5%) of the couples had a
strict division of decision making and were classified as
divided power relationship. He has his area of power and
she has her area of power, but they do not share in decision making. This will be called a "divided power" relationship
or power structure. in some sense a divided power structure
resembles a traditional power structure where the man and woman had authority over specific areas of decision making,
but where the male had granted the female authority to make
certain decisions. There is a difference then between these
couples, who on the surface appear to be egalitarian because
each partner makes the same number of decisions, and those who share in each decision who is to be made. These
eqalitarian couples, in the sense of couples who share in at
least two thirds or more of the decisions, comprise 28. 7% of
the sample. We expected to find some relationships where one partner dominates the decision making process. What is
surprising is that there are almost as many female dominant
relationships as there are male dominant. Female dominant
relationships make up 7*5% of the couples, while male dominant make up 9.3%*
In total, the data indicate that there are several ways
in which the power is distributed in intimate relationships and that egalitarian relationships occur far less frequently
than those in which there is a clear division of labor.
Although simple percentages give us a picture of how power Page 61+
is distributed in the U.S. population, other factors such as social class, stage of the family lif e cycle, and wives' employment status may effect the balance of power in relationships.
Social C1 ass D? fferences i n Mar i tal Power
Scanzoni (1970), Komarovsky (1962) and Blood and Wolfe
(I960) have suggested that there are social class differences in marital power. Blood and Wolfe (i960) found that, in general, husband's power increases with social status. But this did not hold for the lowest status husbands, who tended to have greater power than higher status blue collar husbands. They account for this by suggesting that lower class blue collar males have stronger patriarchal attitudes than higher status blue collar males.
As social class increases and wives have more education, they expect to participate in marital decision making.
Komarovsky (1 962) found essentialy the same relationship between social class and power: that within blue collar marriages the lower status men held more power. Scanzoni
(1970) suggests that it is an over simplification to state that husbands' power increases with social status. Their research indicated that lower class men exercised greater power than did upper class men, but they extend the analysis of power and class by also measuring husbands' and wives' attitudes about who should have the "final say" in decision making. They find considerable class differences. This is
important when we consider consensus concerning power norms. Page 65
Table 4.1. Marital Power Structure by Social Class
Marital Power Social Class S tr u c t u r e ------Blue Collar Wh i te Col 1ar
Female Dominant 7.0 8.1 Divided 52.4 55.7 Egali tar i an 29.1 29.1 Male Dominant 11.5 7.1*
N 1129 935
* X**—11.3 d . f .=1 P< .0008 Page 66
One problem with the Scanzoni study, however, is that only families where the husband provides the major or only source of income are considered. This is an important problem since marital power is closely linked to the economic opportunity system.
It may be important to know that husbands' power increases with status relative to other husbands, but it seems more important to know how class affects the husband's power in relation to his wife's power. Scanzoni's research te lls us only how husband's power varies with status when the wife does not work.
The data in Table 4.1 indicate that the only class differences are in male dominant relationships and that they occur more often in blue collar marriages. There do not appear to be any social class differences in female dominant, egalitarian, or divided power relationships. It is especially interesting that no class differences in egalitarian relationships were found since prior research has indicated they occur more often as status increases
(Scanzoni,1976) .
Stage of the Fami1y Li fe Cycle
A second factor hypothesized as affecting the balance of marital power is the stage of the family life cycle. The number of years a couple has been married was divided into three categories that reflect three major stages in family development: the fir s t two years of marriage, the childbearing years, and the post parental. While the fir s t Page 67
Table 4 .2 .Marital Power Structure by Stage of Family Life Cycle II u 1 X ^ l l 1!
Marital Power Years Married or Together Structure 0-2 3-21 22-55 d . f .
Female Dominant 8.1 7.2 7-9 .ko 2 D ivided 51.3 53.9 55-0 •9 2 Egali tar i an 30.5 28.8 28.8 .2 2 Male Dominant 10.2 10.1 8.3 2.0 2
N 197 1 ii»g 773
* no relationships statistically significant Page 68
two years of marriage are when power issues are initially addressed, both partners frequently hold outside employment, which should affect the wife's level of power in particular.
The second group, those married 3 to 21 years reflects the norm concerning birth of the first child, which generally occurs, at the end of the second year. Blood and Wolfe(1960) suggest that wives' power decreases with the addition of children to the family because having a young child creates needs for the wife which lead her to depend on her husband for help, financial support, and decision making. It is more likely that wives' power decreases with young children in the home because of the difficulties she encounters in continuing to participate in the economic opportunity system. These include the lack of adequate day care, the prohibitive cost of day care when available, the responsib; o f household duties despite full time employment, and the norms regarding "working mothers".
Women that combine career and parenthood play a double role with full responsibility for each. It is not surprising that women's participation in the labor market is erratic and interm ittent. The third category, married more than 22 years, reflects the end of child rearing years for women and their potential return to the labor market, thus increasing their marital power.
T a b le k.2 indicates that there are no differences in marital power at any stage of the family life cycle. If we assume that these data, though cross sectional, can be Page 69
T a b le k.3. Marital Power Structure by Husband's Percentage of Family Income.
Percent of Husband's Contribution Marital Power S t r u c t u r e 0 1-1+0 1+1-60 61-99 100
Female Dominant 13.0 10.8 8.6 7.9 6.5 D iv id e d 5^-3 52.9 51.8 57-3 53.1 Egali ta r i an 15.2 30.4 33-3 29-9 27.8 Male Dominant 17.2 5-9 6.3 1+.8 12.6
N 1+6 102 255 518 971
* Xfe=l+1.12 d . f . = 12 P< .0000 interpreted as longitudinal, it suggests that once the power structure of the relationship is determined in the early years of marriage, it remains stable over time.
Wi fe Employment and Mar i tal Power
Table 4.3 examines the relationship between the percent of the family income earned by the husband and the power structure of the relationship. While social class and family life cycle stage showed little if any relation to marital power, the amount of money the spouses contribute to the family income illustrates how closely together power and money are tied.
The percentage of husband's contribution to the family income is grouped into 5 categories: 0%, 1-40%, 41-60%,
6l~99% and 100%. These categories were selected for several reasons. First, the frequency distribution was extremely skewed, with 980 or 45% of the husbands contributing 100% to the family income. However, at the other extreme were 48 or
2.1% of the husbands who contributed 0% to the family income. These two categories, 0% and 100%, represent interesting groups for comparison purposes, since money, status and power are so interwoven. The other categories,
1-40%, 41-60%, and 6l~99%« were also chosen because of the frequency distribution groupings and to allow for examination of those relationships where spouses contribute about equal amounts of money to the family income. Page 71
The data in Table 4.3 indicate a statistically
significant relation between husband's contribution to the
family income and marital power. it suggests that power and money are associated in d ifferent ways depending upon the
type of power structure under consideration. It appears
that female dominant relationships are more frequent when
the wife contributes a significant portion of the family
income. The percentage of female dominant relationships
decreases as husband's contribution to the family income
increases. While wives' earnings appear to be of particular
importance in female dominant relationships, male dominant marriages do not appear to be related to earnings. The
percentage of male dominant relationships is highest where
the male contributes no money and where he contributes 100%
of the income. When husband and wife share equally in the
contribution to the family income, the data indicate they
also more often share equally in decision making.
However, the data in Table 4.3 suggest that women's
employment does not automatically guarantee an increase in marital power. The data on husband dominant relationships
and divided power relationships appear to suggest that money
and power can operate independently of one another.
Earlier, it was suggested that divided power relationships may be similar to traditional power structures where the male granted the female authority over a certain set of decisions. The data on husband's contribution to the family
income may provide some additional evidence of this, since Page 72 no matter how l i t t l e or how much she contributes, the percentage of relationships with this power structure remains fairly stable. What the data clearly indicate is that in those relationships where the woman exercises any degree of power — in egalitarian and female dominant — it
is in part tied to their a b ility to contribute to the family
i ncome.
The effects of social class, family life cycle stage, and wife's employment on the balance of marital power were examined because each factor may give us a more complete understanding of marital power. We found that there are class differences in male dominant relationships, that the power structure appears to be determined in the early years of the relationship and remains stable over time, and that wives' contribution to family income increases her power only in female dominant and egalitarian relationships.
MARITAL POWER AND CONFLICT
A major question this dissertation addresses is the link between marital power and marital conflict. In a previous chapter, the paradox of egalitarian relationships was identified. An analysis of marriage from a conflict perspective leads to the expectation that egalitarian relationships will have greater marital conflict. Such relationships are expected to have greater conflict because of greater intimacy (Coser, 1969; Sprey, 1970. the necessity to negotiate the distribution of power
(Scanzoni,1975; Verhoff and Fields, 1970), greater "arousal Page 73 of women's power goals" (Verhoff and Fields, 1970:33^)* and
less dependence (Foss, 1980). The paradox of egalitarian relationships is that while they may have greater conflict, empirical research has demonstrated that less violence occurs.
One factor which appears in the lite ra tu re , but which
is rarely empirically tested, is that of consensus over how the power is distributed. Scanzoni (1975). Sprey (1971).
Verhoff and Fields (1970) and Brown (1980) each suggest that consensus over how the power is distributed is an important factor in decreasing the probability of marital conflict.
Scanzoni and Scanzoni (1976) measured both actual power and norms concerning who should have the power. They found that as social class increases, wives believe their husbands should be the head of the house. At the lower status levels, wives were less ljkely to accept patriarchal beliefs. On the other hand, men at all social status levels believed they should have the final say, however upper status men were more likely to solicit their wives' opinions during decision making. Scanzoni and Scanzoni attribute these findings to the resources men at different status levels have available to them and the corresponding legitimacy to make decisions that their spouses attribute to them because of these resources. However, as previously noted, these findings come from research where the husband is the primary or only bread winner and thus does not consider how employed women view norms about marital power. It does point out the difference in men's and women's perceptions of who should have the power.
Brown (1980) d irectly addresses the issue of power norms in egalitarian relationships. He suggests employment of the wife leads to increased resources of the wife and increased power. This leads to conflict between the wife's egalitarian authority expectations and the husband's male superiority norms. If the husband accepts the egalitarian authority structure it w ill increase the intimacy in the marital relationship and therefore increase conflict because more aspects of life are shared. Thus conflict in egalitarian relationships can occur over both the difference in power norm expectations and, even if husbands accept the negotiated structure, due to greater intimacy. Sprey
(1971) . states there w ill be less conflict if spouses accept the prescriptive power norms associated with marital roles.
The literature that considers marriage from a conflict perspective very clearly indicates that more conflict will be found in egalitarian relationships because of the need to negotiate the distribution of power and because of increased intimacy and sharing. We should expect then that relationships dominated by one person, particularly male dominant ones w ill have less conflict. Less conflict is predicted for husband dominant relationships because they are consistent with the social norms that support male dominance in the family. Divided power relationships should have less conflict than egalitarian, but more than husband Page 75
Table k.k. Marital Conf1i ct by Marital Power Structure (*)
Marital Power Level of Mar i t a 1 Conf1i ct Structure N Low Medium High
Female Dominant 160 23-6 *♦3-3 33-1 Divided 1146 20.5 J»5-7 33-8 Egali tar ian 616 32.5 47.0 20.5 Male Dominant 200 2k.J 36.1 39-2
^ = 5 ^ - 0 3 d.f.=6 P< .0000 Page 76
Table 4.5* Power Norm Consensus by Marital Power Structure (%)
Marital Power Level of Consensus S tr u c t u r e ------N Low Med i um High
Female Dominant 160 35-7 }8.2 26.1 Divided 1146 24.9 44.4 30.7 Ega1i tar i an 6l6 15-2 37-0 47.8 Male Dominant 200 43.7 34.2 22.1
X ^l 12.70 d.f . =6 P< .0000 dominant because the husband is asked to share some, but not all, of his power. It also seems reasonable to expect that female dominant relationships will have a high level of conflict because they are at odds with the norms for male superiority in the family.
We have been led to expect not only greater conflict in egalitarian relationships but also to expect that one source of conflict is consensus over how the power is distributed.
The data in Table k .h show the association between the power structure of the relationship and the level of conflict. Examination of the data from the 'high conflict1 column suggests that egalitarian relationships have the
least amount of conflict and that husband dominant relationships have the greatest amount of conflict. Divided power and female dominant relationships have about the same amount of conflict and fall between the two groups. It is also important to note that male dominant relationships are almost twice as likely to have high conflict as compared to egalitarian relationships. 39*2% of the male dominant relationships fall into the high conflict category while o n ly 20.5% of the egalitarian couples are represented. This suggests that marital equality and sharing of decision making does not automatically lead to greater conflict.
Mar i tai Power and Power Norm Consensus
The data in Table k.S show the relationship between the power structure and the level of power norm consensus. It appears to indicate that egalitarian relationships have the Page 78
Table 1*.6. Marital Conflict by Marital Power Structure Controlling for Norm Consensus
Marital Power Level of Marital Conflict N Low Med i urn H i gh
A. Low Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 55 16.4 1*3 • 6 1*0.0 Divided 280 21.1 1*2.1 36.8 Ega1i tar i an 88 28.1* 1*1*. 3 27.3 Male Dominant 81 9.9 35.8 51*. 3
X"=17.1 d .f. =6 P<.009
B. Medium Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 60 21.7 1*3.3 35.0 Divided 1*97 16.5 1*6.7 36.8 Egali tar i an 191* 26.8 50.1* 22.8 Male Dominant 62 25.8 1*1.9 32.3
2. X =19.7 d.f. =6 P<.003
C. High Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant AO 37-5 1*5.0 17.5 Divided 3^2 25.1 1*8.2 26.6 Egali tar i an 282 39.0 41*.3 16.7 Male Dominant A2 50.0 28.6 21.1*
X^lt.l d.f. =6 Pc.0005 highest level of consensus over how the power is distributed and male dominant have the least consensus. It is also important to note that the percentage of egalitarian relationships that have high consensus (l*7-8%) is substantially larger than the percentage for any of the other power structure types and especially higher than the male dominant (22.1%).
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT AND POWER NORM CONSENSUS
The data from the bivariate relationship between power structure and level of conflict and power structure and level of consensus do not support a conflict analysis of egalitarian marriage. The data reveal the opposite of what is predicted, however it is also necessary to examine how consensus over the power distribution is associated with the relation between power and conflict.
The data in Table A.6 indicate that consensus over how the power is distributed in a relationship is associated with the level of c o n flict. If we compare the high level of conflict data where consensus is low with the high level of conflict data where consensus is high, substantial decreases in conflict are evident for all power typ.es. Comparison of the same data indicates that agreeing on how the power is distributed is especially important to decreasing conflict in male dominant marriages. There is almost a 33% decrease in the level of conflict in male dominant relationships when consensus is high. However, egalitarian relationships have the lowest levels of marital conflict regardless of their Page 80
Table k.l. Power Norm Consensus by Social Class
Consensus Over Social Class Power Norms ------Blue Collar Wh i te Col 1ar
Low 26.7 22. i» Med i urn 36.8 **5-3 High 36.5 32.A
N 1108 930
X ^ 1 5 -18 d . f . =2 P< .0005 r= -O.Olt P<.035 Page 8 l
Table A.8. Marital Conflict by Social Class
Level of Social Class Mar i t a l C o n f1 i c t ------Blue Collar White Collar
Low 27.1 22.1 Med i urn A3 * 3 A6.8 H igh 29-6 31.1
N 111A 938
X^=7-01 d . f . - A P< .03 r= 0.00A P<.023
T a b le A.9- Marital Conflict by Stage of Family L i f e C ycle sssBSSBBSBBSBCsssssessrsssrsssasesssssssnsassBssss
Level of Years Married or Together
I'lCU 1 L d 1 U U I I 1 1 1 U L 0-2 3-21 22-55
Low 26.5 20.7 30. A Med i urn A5.0 A5.3 A3.9 H igh 28.5 3A.0 25.7
N 200 11A8 759
.A d.f.=A P< .0000
> level of consensus.
Factors Assoc i ated wi th Conf1i ct and Power Norm Consensus
The factors previously associated with the balance of
power — social class, stage in the family life cycle, and
employment by the wife — may sim ilarly affect the level of
consensus and of co n flict.
Soci a 1 Cl ass
The data in Table k.~] that shows the relationship between social classand level of consensus are
inconclusive. Table A.7 reveals that blue collar
relationships have both lower (26.7%) and higher (36.5%)
consensus over power norms as compared to white collar
relationships. The correlation coefficient (-.OA) suggests
there is more consensus in blue collar relationships,
however the size of the coefficient is very small. The data
in Table A.8, the relation between social class and level of
conflict, suggest greater conflict in white collar
relationships, which supports our hesitant conclusion that
there is less consensus in white collar relationships.
Again, however, the correlation coefficient for the association between social class and level of conflict is very low but statisticsa11y significant.
Wi fe Employment
The percent of earnings contributed to the family
income by the woman is not related to consensus over the balance of power or to the level of conflict. Page 83
Table 4.10. Marital Power Structure by Marital Conflict Controlling Power Norm Consensus and Social Class
Marital Power Level of Mar i tal Conf1i ct Structure Low Medium High Cl ass Class Cl ass BC WC BC WC BC WC
A. Low Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 18.5 14.8 44.4 44.4 37.0 40.7 Divided 24.8 16.8 46.0 36.3 29.0 46.9 Egali tar i an 25.6 32.5 41.9 47.5 32.6 20.0 Male Dominant 7.7 14.8 34.9 37.0 57.7 48.1
BC: X^=16.2 d. f.=6 P<.01 WC: xfc-n .26 d. f .=6 P<.08
B. Medium Power Norm Consensus
Female Dominant 30.8 12.5 42.3 43.8 26.9 43.8 Divided 17.2 15.4 46.0 47.9 36.7 36.7 Egali tar i an 29.2 23.2 47.5 53.9 23.3 23.2 Male Dominant 26.2 27.8 42.9 38.9 31.0 33-3
BC: X ^ IO .8 d. f.=6 P<.09 WC: X^=9. 9 d .f. =6 P< .12
C. High Power Norm Consensus •
Female Dominant 43.5 31.3 34.8 56.3 21.7 12.5 Divided 26.0 23.7 45-9 52.6 28.1 23-7 Egali tar i an 44.6 31.8 39-9 49.6 15.5 18.6 Male Dominant 50.0 50.0 25.0 33-3 25.0 16.7
BC: X2^ 18-9 d . f . =6 P<.004 WC: X2^7.2 d . f . =6 P<.3 Page 84
Stage of the Fami1y Life Cycle
The stage of the family lif e cycle is not related to consensus, but it is related to conflict. The data in Table
4.9 indicate that there is more conflict in the early years of the relationship. An alternative explanation of the relation between conflict and family life cycle stage is that those couples with high conflict tend to get divorced more often than those with less conflict, and thus are not represented in the sample.
CLASS DIFFERENCES IN POWER, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS
Social class is the only factor s ta tis tic a lly related to each variable in the model which suggests there may be important class differences in the relation between power, consensus, and co n flict. Table 4.10, shows the relation between power, consensus and conflict for blue collar and white collar marriages. However, because of the number of variables in this model, cell size is reduced in some instances that make interpretation unreliable. If we can assume the cell percentages are reliable, the data reconfirm our interpretation of Table 4.6, where it is suggested that consensus over the power balance decreases the level of conflict. Table 4.6 also indicates that consensus is especially important in decreasing marital conflict in male dominant marriages. The data in Table 4.10 indicate this is true for both blue collar and white collar marriages. Page 85
Including social class in the analysis of the relation
between power, conflict and power norm consensus does
provide additional insight. The data suggest that in
general, it is white collar relationships that benefit the
most from agreement over the distribution of power. When
consensus over the power distribution is high, conflict
decreases substantially in white collar marriages as
compared to blue collar. Egalitarian relationships,
however, have low levels of conflict even when there was
disagreement over how the power should be distributed. For
egalitarian relationships, power norm consensus has the
greatest effect on reducing conflict in blue collar
marr i ages.
E arlier, we tried to determine if social class was
related to the level of consensus or to the level of
co n flict. The data for those analyses were ambiguous.
Table 10 appears to clear up that confusion to some degree.
It appears to indicate that there are important class
differences in conflict when the level of consensus varies
but that they are only apparent when the marital power
structure is included in the analysis.
SUMMARY
This chapter examined the fir s t three variables in the model that explores the link between the power structure of
the relationship, the level of co n flict, and the rate of marital violence. We focused upon the balance of marital
power, the level of conflict, and how the level of conflict is mediated by consensus over the distribution of power.
The results of the analysis that considers the level of
conflict in different power structures are not as predicted
from a conflict perspective. Egalitarian relationships are
by far less conflictual than other power arrangements and
have greater consensus over the distribution of power,
especially when compared to husband dominant relationships.
In addition, egalitarian relationships have the lowest
levels of conflict regardless of the amount of consensus
over how the power should be distributed.
Consensus over the distribution of power does play a major role in the reduction of marital conflict. Agreement
over who should make the final decision reduces conflict in
each marital power structure. It is particularly important
to lim iting conflict in husband dominant relationships.
It appears that eqalitarian relationships in blue
collar marriages, while still having less conflict than
other power structures, may be more difficult to maintain
than in white collar marriages. There are no overall class
differences in egalitarian relationships, but conflict in
blue collar marriages is higher when there is disagreement
over the power structure than in white collar marriages with
th e same le v e l o f d is a g re e m e n t. T h is may in d ic a t e th a t working class families that do share in decision making are
at odds with the normative prescriptions for power
distribution within the working class. Tallman and
M i l l e r (197*0 suggest that consistency between power Page 87
structure norms and actual power, influence problem solving
effectiveness. They predict that egalitarian relationships
in white collar marriages w ill have greater ability to solve
problems. The data in Table 1*.10 support this hypothesis in
the case of egalitarian relationships but not in the case of
husband dominant. Conflict in husband dominant
relationships is higher in blue collar than in white collar
fami 1i e s.
Although egalitarian relationships have less conflict,
it also appears that for women to gain power they must
contribute a substantial portion of earnings to the family
income. Both egalitarian and female dominant relationshhips
appear to be contingent upon her a b ility to earn money.
Contrary to the assertion by Blood and Wolfe, (i960)
female dominant relationships do not appear to be wife led
by default any more so than husband led' are by default.
They occur in the population almost as often as husband
dominant. As with egalitarian, the woman's power appears to
depend on her a b ility to earn money. Female dominant
relationships have less conflict than husband dominant, a
finding which holds when class and level of consensus are
are included in the analysis. Partners in female dominant
relationships are also in greater agreement over how the
power should be distributed than in male dominant
relationships. In fact, when consensus is high, they have
the lowest level of conflict in white collar relationships,
and one of the lowest levels in blue collar fam ilies. Even Page 88 when consensus is low, female dominant relationships have
20% less conflict than male dominant relationships in blue
collar marriages, and it is within the working class that
power norms strongly favor male dominance.
The evidence overwhelmingly indicates there is less consensus and greater conflict in husband dominant
relationships. The level of conflict in this power
structure appears to be more dependent on consensus than in
the other power structure types. To reduce conflict in male dominant relationships, partners must agree that husbands
should make the majority of decisions.
Consideration of the first three variables in the model
that links power, co n flict, and violence has provided only
limited support for an analysis of marriage from a conflict perspective. Specific hypotheses regarding level of consensus and level of conflict within varying power structure are not supported by the data. However, the data strongly suggest that how the power is distributed and the
legitimacy of the distribution are important sources of conflict in all marriages. Although Coser(1956) states that the closer the relationship, the more intense the conflict, he also notes that "frequent occasions for conflict do not necessarily eventuate in frequent conflict" (1956:73) because the affective attachments of participants may lead to the avoidance of co n flict. This chapter has considered how the power structure arrangements themselves can alter the level of conflict in marital relationships. The Page 89 following chapter examines how close relationships that vary in their power structure can lead to marital violence. C hapter V
MARITAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
This chapter examines the relationship between the
level of marital conflict and "ordinary" marital violence,
i.e., acts of pushing, slapping and shoving that often occur
in intimate relationships. Violence by husbands, violence by wives and violence where each participate are examined to provide greater detail on the conflict and violence connection. The power structure of the marital relationships is then introduced into the analysis to determine if different marital power structures suppress or promote the rate of violence.
The second section of this chapter examines hypotheses that derive from conflict theory regarding the use of constructive negotiation tactics in the relation between conflict and violence. Of interest is whether the violence rates change when progressively less constructive negotiation tactics are used to settle disputes. Reasoning, withdrawal, and verbal aggression are introduced into the association between conflict and violence. Page 91
27 25 23 21 19 Percent of 17 Minor Violence 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1
Low High Level of Conflict
Figure 5.1 Minor Violence by Level of Conflict Page 92
Table 5*1* Percent of Minor Violence and Level of Conf1i ct by Social Class
Level of Conflict
Social Class Low Med i um High x2* d. f .
Husband to Wi fe Minor Violence
Blue Collar 5-1 13.0 23.8 44.86 2 Whi te Collar 1-5 7-6 16.0 32.95 2
N 18 95 123
Wife to Husband Minor Violence
Blue Collar 5-1 11 .3 20.7 35-^3 2 Whi te Col 1ar 3.1* 8.6 15.0 19.45 2
N 22 91 110
Couple Minor Vi olence
Blue Collar 7-6 16.8 29.1 48.45 2 Whi te Col 1ar 3-4 11 .4 21 .4 35-86 2
N 29 129 151*
* All relationships significant at P< .0000 Page 93
Finally, the power structure of the relationship is
included in the analysis of the relation between conflict,
negotiation and violence to determine if the power structure
changes the nature of the relationship between conflict,
negotiation and violence.
MARITAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP
Figure 5*1 plots the relationship between the level of
conflict and the rate of minor violence for husband to wife
violence, wife to husband violence and couple violence. The
data clearly demonstrate a strong positive relationship
between conflict and minor violence for each dyad and each
is s ta tis tic a lly significant at the .000 level. The data
also indicate that the greatest increases in the amount of
violence occur when conflict increases from medium to high.
For example, the husband to wife violence rate increases
5 -7% when conflict increases from low to medium, but 10. 2% when conflict increases from medium to high.
Table 5*1 presents data to examine the effects of
social class on the conf 1ict-violence relationship for each
dyad. This data indicate that although the violence rates
are higher in blue collar relationships, the association
between conflict and violence is the same for both classes:
the greater the co n flict, the greater the rate of violence.
Again, the relationship between conflict and violence for
both blue collar and white collar marriages is s ta tis tic a lly
significant at the .000 level. Page 94
35 33 31 29 27
Percent of 25 Husband to 23 21 Wife Minor 19 Violence 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1
— r " Low Medium High Level of Conflict Figure 5.2 Husband to Wife Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Marital Power Structure Page 95
Percent of c? d o m
Wife to 19 Husband Minor 17
Violence
Low Medium High Level of Conflict
Figure 5.3 Wife to Husband Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Marital Power Structure Page 96
45 43 41 39 37 35 33 31 29 27 25 Percent of 23 Couple Minor 21
Violence 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 « '»------Low Medium High Level of Conflict
Figure 5.4 Couple Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Marital Power Structure Page 97
The Effect of Mar i tal Power Structure on the Conf1ict-Violence Relationship
When the power structure of the marital relationship is
included in the analysis of the association between conflict
and violence, important differences in the rate of violence
are apparent. Figures 5*2, 5-3 and 5.^ present data on the
level of conflict and percent of minor violence. Each
figure focuses on one of the aggressor-victim dyads, i.e .,
husband to wife violence, wife to husband violence, etc, and presents data on the conf1ict-violence relation for each power structure this research considers. The data in each figure overwhelmingly demonstrate the impact of power structure on the conf1ict-violence relation. While Figure
5 . 1. the bivariate relation between conflict and violence, appears strongly linear, examining this same relation for egalitarian, male dominant, female dominant and divided power relations shows that by not including the power structure important differences in the rate of violence one may experience at d ifferent levels of conflict are hidden.
One of the hidden differences is that egalitarian relationships have less violence than any of the other power structures, and more importantly, there is relatively1 i ttle
increase in the violence rate when conflict increases from medium to high. This is especially true for husband to wife and couple violence. Egalitarian relationships appear to be quite different from both divided power and wife dominant in this respect because there are dramatic increases in the violence rate as conflict increases from medium to high Page 98
within these power structures. Husband dominant, on the
other hand, more closely resemble the in itia l bivariate
relationship between conflict and violence, in that there
are consistent increases in the violence rate as conflict
i ncreases.
The data also suggest there may be a 'breaking point1
or a 'tolerance level' for how much conflict some power
structures can integrate before events escalate out of
control. Examination of all figures shows that the violence
rates for wife dominant and divided relationships are about
the same at medium levels of conflict, but that at higher
levels of co n flict, violence rates increase substantially.
Husband to wife violence in wife dominant relationships
increases from about 9% to 30%, while divided power
relationships increase from about 9% to 20%. The increases
are even higher when couple violence is considered. The
data suggest that egalitarian relationships can tolerate
higher levels of conflict without a correspondingly large
increase in the violence rate. There are several possible
explanations for this finding. It may be that there are low
levels of conflict and thus violence because of the nature
of the power distribution. Since power is more equitably
distributed, there are fewer sources of conflict. It is
also possible that the negotiation tactics used in
> egalitarian relationships mediate the relation between
conflict and violence. This hypothesis is explored in the
following section. Page 99
The data indicate the importance of including the power
structure of intimate relationships into an analysis of the
relation between conflict and violence. Although the
bivariate relationship between conflict and violence
provides a clear indication of a strong positive association between the two variables, the addition of power provides a more complete understanding of which power relationships are
at a greater risk of violence and when that risk is more
1ikely to occur.
MARITAL CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND VIOLENCE
Cr? tique of the Straus et. a l . (1980) Analys i s
E arlier, Straus et. a 1 .1s (1980) study that examines
how the use of reasoning is associated with the rate of violence was reviewed because the findings are so unexpected, and the opposite of that predicted from a conflict perspective. Straus et. al. examined the level of co n flict, the amount of reasoning used and the resulting
rate of violence. If the tenets of conflict theory are correct, there should be less violence in those
relationships that use the most reasoning to settle conflicts. However, .th e data from the Straus et. al. study do not support this. The violence rate for couples who have high levels of conflict and rarely or never use
reasoning is about 13% while the violence rate for couples with the same high level of conflict but who use reasoning the most often is about 44%, or the exact opposite of what the rates should be for the data to support the theory. Page 100
Straus et. a l. further examined those couples who report
l i t t l e or no co n flict. This group, according to conflict
theory, should have higher rates of violence because the suppression of conflict w ill lead to such an accumulation of hostilities and tensions that major disputes will occur.
However, when this low conflict group is considered, those
that use reasoning least often have violence rates of less
than 1%. Again, the data do not support the theory. Straus et. a l . conclude:
No doubt even the above fa ir ly complicated analysis does not really do justice to the subtleties of conflict theory. We continue to believe that this theory describes an important aspect of what goes on in all groups, including fam ilies. At the same time, a theory cannot remain "promising" forever. At some point, hypotheses based on the theory w11i have to be demonstrated or the theory abandoned 1980 ( : 166).
There are problems, however, in interpreting the
Straus, et. al. data. First, the data are cross-sectional and thus the causal order can be questioned. It may be, for example, that because there is violence, partners use a lot of reasoning in an attempt to avoid more violence. A second d iffic u lty in interpretting the meaning of Straus1 conclusion is that the focus of their analysis is on the violence rate when varying amounts of reasoning are used,
rather than a comparison of the violence rates for reasoning with less constructive means of settling disputes. Finally,
the data in their study do not actually address the- benefits
that the theory predicts w ill occur. The data only measure violence in intimate relationships rather than benefits such Page 101 as group cohesion (Coser, 1956) or change in social organization (Dahrendorf, 1959)* However, despite the limitations of their study, the findings suggest an intriguing relationship that deserves further attention.
This research further explores the idea that when constructive means are used to settle arguments violence w ill decrease by comparing the violence rates at different levels of conflict and with progressively less constructive negotiation tactics. The violence rates associated with the use of reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression at varying levels of conflict are compared.
Approach to Understandinq the Data
It is possible to make several types of comparisons with this data that test the hypotheses of conflict theory.
First, the violence rates within each type of negotiation tactic can be examined. If the high conflict groups are considered, the violence rate should be higher for those who use less reasoning than for those who use high levels of reasoning. For the measure of withdrawal, again examining the high conflict group, those who withdraw less often from settling an argument should have lower violence rate than those who withdraw most often. For the measure of verbal aggression, s t ill focusing on the high conflict group, those who use verbal aggression less often should have violence rates lower than those who frequently use verbal aggression. Page 102
A second analysis of the data and perhaps a more accurate test of how the use of types of negotiation tactics are associated with the conf 1ict-violence relation compares the rate of violence at high levels of conflict for each negotiation tactic. For the data to support the hypotheses the rate of violence should increase as negotiation tactics become less constructive.
The approach to understanding the data is based on the assumption that the causal order of the variables has been correctly specified. As pointed out, this research, like the Straus et. a l . {1980) study, is based on a cross sectional study of American marriages. Although the model used in this research conceptualizes conflict as an independent variable, violence as a dependent variable and negotiation tactics as an intervening variable, the causal order can be questioned because the research is based on data collected at one point in time.
Alternative explanations of the findings are possible.
When violence occurs in a relationship, it may change the negotiation skills used tosettle conflict. Individuals may often use reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression because of the violence. On the other hand, the view of marriage proposed here seems equally re a lis tic , given the theoretical perspective of this research. Conflict is viewed as an inevitable aspect of all social relationships.
Because it is inevitable, various negotiation tactics are required to resolve conflict. If conflict is not Page 103
Table 5*2: H-W Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct Is: Negot i at ion Tact ics Low Med i um High Eta Squared
A1. Reason i ng by H Reasoning =.0013 Low 2.8 9.4 20.1 Conflict =.04*** Med i um 3-6 9-7 17-8 High 3-8 11.4 23-8
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoni ng =.0015 Low 2.5 8.9 20.4 Conflict =.04**ft Med i um 5-3 10.7 18.5 High 3-7 11.1 23-1
Bl. Withdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = . 098**ft Low 1 .4 4.4 6.1 Conflict =.04*ft* Med i um 6 .1 12.0 19.2 High 19.1* 26.0 40.9
B2. Withdrawal by W W i thd rawa1 =. 08*** Low .4 2.4 3.7 Conf1ict =.04*** Med i um 4.0 8.9 17.8 High 13-2 22.0 30.7
Cl. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.15*** Low .6 2.2 1.8 Conflict =.04*** Med i um 2.9 1 1 .2 11.8 High 21.7 25.8 41.8
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.ll*ft* Low .6 3.1 5-6 Conflict =.04*ft* Med i um 2.8 12.8 12.8 High 19-4 20.9 39-2
* p<.05 ** pc.Ol ft** p<.001 Page 1 Oi+
Table 5*3: W—H Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct 1 s: Negotiation Tactics Low Med i um High Eta Squared
A l. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning =.003* Low 3-3 8.8 15-3 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 5-5 9-4 17.2 High 4.3 11.5 22.9
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.004** Low 2.9 6.8 16.2 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 6.1 11.8 16.5 High 4.7 11.2 22.2
B1. Wi thdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = .085*** Low 2.5 4.8 5.1 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 6.0 10.4 17-3 High 18.8 26.1 37.3
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = .094*** Low .8 1.4 • 9 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 5.1 8.6 12.3 High 1U.5 21.9 32.7
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.13*** Low .9 1.4 2.4 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 6.9 10.7 12.8 High 19.7 26.3 34.9
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.13*** Low .6 1.4 2.8 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 8.3 11.4 8.8 High 16.4 24.2 39.0
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 Page 105
Table 5*^s Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics
Violence Rate When Conf1ict Is: Negotiation ------Tactics Low Medium High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.008** Low 4.1 11.3 22.4 Conflict =5.045*** Med i um 10.9 19.0 25.9 High 4.9 13.8 32.2
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal®.14*** Low .4 • 5 2.6 Conflict =.045*** Med i um 6.0 10.4 17.0 High 23.8 32.8 41.9
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.17*** Low 1.0 1.7 .8 Conflict =.045*** Med i um 6.8 11.5 11.4 High 21.4 31.3 44.0
* p<.05 ** p<.01 Mei: p<.001 Page 106
successfully resolved, it may lead to destructive behaviors.
One destructive behavior that may result is violence, which
the data in this research address. However, the issue of causality is an important one to keep in mind, and a
lim itation of the research.
NEGOTIATION AND THE CONFLICT-VIOLENCE RELATION
The data in Tables, 5*2 to show the relation between conflict and violence when reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression are used as negotiation tactics. Table
5.2 considers husband to wife violence and husband's use of
negotiation tactics; and wife's use of negotiation tactics.
Table 5*3 consider wife to husband violence, by husband's use of negotiation tactics and wife's use of tactics
respectively. Table 5-^ examines couple violence and couple's use of negotiation tactics.
The Use of Reasoni ng
Turning fir s t to the use of reasoning in the relation between conflict and violence for husband to wife, wife to husband and couple violence, Part A of Tables 5*2 to
the findings suggest that the use of reasoning is not an
important factor in the relation between conflict and violence. In general, the violence rates increase when the
level of conflict and the use of reasoning increase.
Although the data indicate that in some limited situations such as couple violence, Table 5*^. increases in the use of
reasoning are associated with less violence, the data more Page 107 strongly suggest a linear increase in the rate of violence as both conflict and the use of reasoning increase. This is especially true when conflict is high.
The eta squared coefficients show that it is the level of conflict that explains more of the variance in the violence rate than the use of reasoning. The size of the eta squared coefficients for reasoning are quite small as compared to the size of the same coefficient for conflict.
The findings suggest that reasoning is an insufficient negotiation tactic to use to prevent violence. Regardless of how much or how l i t t l e reasoning is used, when conflict is high, violence is more likely to occur.
The Use of Wi thdrawal and Verbal Aggress ion
When the less constructive tactics are considered - withdrawal and verbal aggression - a very d ifferent picture is evident. The rates of violence reported for those who withdraw from an argument, in effect refusing to deal with the issue, are significantly higher when withdrawal is used frequently compared to when it is used less often as indicated by the data in Part B of Tables 5-2 to 5-^*
Regardless of the level of conflict, violence increases as the level of withdrawal increases. The violence rates are remarkably high when withdrawal is used most often.
A similar pattern is evident when verbal aggression is considered, Part C of Tables 5-2 to 5***- The data indicate there are significant increases in the rates of violence as the use of verbal aggression increases at each level of Page 108
c o n f 1 i c t .
Examination of the eta squared coefficients for both withdrawal and verbal aggression suggests a very different pattern than was found when the use of reasoning was considered. The eta squared coefficients show that more of the variance in the violence rate is explained by the negotiation tactic than by the level of conflict. For husband to wife, wife to husband and couple violence, withdrawal and verbal aggression account for more of the variance in the violence rate than does the level of conflict. This is the reverse of the pattern found for the use of reasoning where it was the level of conflict that accounted for increases in the violence rate. The data here suggest that while conflict is important and related to the rate of violence, the use of destructive negotiation tactics accounts for greater increases in the violence rate than does the level of conflict.
The Useful ness of Constructive Tact i cs
Analysis of the data within each negotiation tactic has demonstrated that violence rates do increase when the use of withdrawal and verbal aggression increase. However, this analysis does not fully answer the question of how useful constructive means are to reduce the frequency of violence.
To address this issue it is necessary to compare violence rates for reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression.
Although conflict theory does not state that high conflict is necessarily beneficial, it seems appropriate to focus on Page 109 the violence rates of the high conflict/high use of specific negotiation tactic as a powerful test of the hypothesis.
Examining the data for each of these cells for husband to wife violence, Table 5*2 , wife to husband violence,
Table 5*3t and couple violence, Table 5***> clearly indicates substantial increases in the violence rates as less constructive means are used to settle disputes. The largest
increases in the violence rates occur when withdrawal and verbal aggression are used, compared to the use of reasoning. For example, when husband's use of tactics in husband to wife violence are considered, the violence rate is 23.8% for reasoning, 40.9% for withdrawal and 41.8% for verbal aggression.
While the data clearly indicate that violence increases when withdrawal and verbal aggression are used to settle disputes, it seems important to consider whether this provides support for the hypothesis that when constructive means are used to settle disputes, violence w ill decrease given that reasoning appears to have a limited association to conflict and violence.
In one sense it. does support the hypothesis because violence rates increase when less constructive tactics are used. On the other hand, the data suggest a somewhat curious picture of how to deal with conflict. While it clearly shows that withdrawal and verbal aggression are inappropriate, it also indicates that reasoning w ill not help reduce the rate of violence when there is conflict. Page 110
The implication seems to be that reducing the rate of violence is contingent on the level of conflict and not using destructive tactics except in the limited circumstances of wife to husband and couple violence where both partners use reasoning and only where conflict is low or medium, as indicated in Part A of Tables 5*3 and 5-1*, and
Table A .1 in Appendix A.
The findings appear to explain how to increase the rate of violence, by arguing frequently and using poor negotiation s k ills , but do not provide any evidence on what negotiation tactic to use to avoid violence.
MARITAL POWER, CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND VIOLENCE
However, before any further implications of these findings can be explored, it is necessary to incorporate the power structure of the relationship into the analysis of the association between conflict and violence when differing tactics are used. The importance of including power became evident when the relation between conflict and violence was reanalyzed for the four marital power types. Clear differences in the rate of violence and likelyhood of violence at different levels of conflict were obvious. Thus it may be equally important to examine the relation between conflict, negotiation, and violence within husband dominant, wife dominant, divided and egalitarian power structures. Page 111
The Cel I Size Problem
This is easier said than done. When the relation
between conflict, negotiation and violence was analyzed, the
problem of expected cell frequencies decreasing to less than
5 arose. That problem was certain to increase when the
relation was analyzed within each marital power type because
of the smaller subsample size for each power type. In
anticipation of this problem, the low and medium use of each
tactic was collapsed into one category. The high use of the
tactic was unchanged. An alternative strategy one could use when the reduction of variable categories is necessary is to
dichotomize the variable at the median, so that scores
fa llin g below the median take on one value and scores
fa llin g above the median take on another. The advantage of
this strategy is that it results in equal cases for each value. The disadvantage is that there is not always
theoretical justification for dichotomizing a variable at
the median. In this research, the option was taken to
collapse only the low and medium categories into one, and maintain the original high group because it would be more
theoretically meaningful to compare the high group to the
newly created lower group.
In itia l analysis of the data under these conditions
indicated there was not a substantial improvement in the
expected cell frequency problem. Expected cell frequencies were less than 5 and the percentage of cells involved was
too large. The remaining option was to also collapse the Page 112
Table 5-5: H - W Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Female Dominant Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct Is: Negotiation Tacti cs Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning =.01 Lower 6.2 35-3 Conflict =.08** High 13.2 23.5
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.005 Lower 8.5 37-5 Conflict =.08*** High 9-5 21.1
B1. Wi thdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = . 16*** Lower 2. A 22.9 Conflict =.08** H i gh 38.9 50.0
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = . 06** Lower 3.8 28.6 Conflict =.08*** High 25.0 3^.8
Cl. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.22*** Lower 2.It lit.8 Conflict =.08** High 31.8 50.0
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.08** Lower A. 1 25.O Conflict =.08** High 20.7 39-1
* p<.05 ** p<.01 * ** p<.001 Page 113
Table 5*6: W-H Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Female Dominant Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct i s: Negoti at i on Tacti cs Low High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning =.02 Lower 6.3 23-5 Conflict =.10*** H i gh 10.5 47-1
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.007 Lower 6.8 25.0 Conflict =.10*** High 9-5 A2.1
B1. Wi thdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = .26*** Lower 2 .it lJt-3 Conflict =.10*** High 33.3 68.8
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = .16** Lower 2.6 lit.8 Conflict =.10*** High 25.0 50.0
Cl. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.23*** Lower 3.7 7*1* Conflict =.10*** High 22.7 58.A
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.21*** Lower 2.7 7-* Conflict =.10*** High 20.7 58.3
* p<.05 ** p<.01 * * * p<.001 Page 11k
Table 5 -7 s Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Female Dominant Marriages
Violence Rate When ConfIict Is: Negotiation ------Tactics Low High Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.02 Lower 8.8 37-5 Conflict = . 13*** High 18.8 70.0
B1. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawa 1 = .24*** Lower 2.7 23.1 Conflict = . 13*** High 37-0 66.7
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg. = .2lt*** Lower 2.8 15-8 Conflict = .13*** High 32.3 61.3
* p<.05 ** pc.Ol * * * p<.001 Page 115
Table 5*8: H-W Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Divided Power Marriages
Vi olence Rate When Conf 1i ct Is: Negotiation Tact i cs Low High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning =.007* Lower 6.4 17.1 Conflict =.04** High 9-9 27.6
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.006* Lower 6.9 17.5 Conflict =.04*** High 9-1 26. A
B1. Wi thdrawal by H W? thdrawal = .09*** Lower 6.0 14.0 Conflict =.04*** High 20.2 42.2
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = .08*** Lower 4.2 13.4 Conflict =.04*** H i gh 20. A 32.6
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.16*** Lower 3-7 6.9 Conflict =.04*** H i gh 23-6 42.4
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.12*** Lower 4.6 7-9 Conflict =.04*** High 19-6 40.8
* p<.05 ** p<.01 ft** p<.001 Page 116
Table 5•9s W-H Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Divided Power Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1ict Is: Negotiation ------Tactics Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning = .00A Lower 7.6 15-2 Conflict =.02*** High 9-2 21.9
A2. Reason i ng by W Reasoning =.007* Lower 8.1 14.6 Conflict =.02*** High 8.3 22.1
B1. Wi thdrawal by H Wi thdrawal®.08*** Lower 5.7 12.A Conflict =.02*** High 25-9 3UA
B2. Wi thdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = . 10*** Lower A. 2 8.7 Conflict =.03*** High 22.0 32.2
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.11*** Lower 3*7 9.2 Conflict =.02*** High 25-5 31.0
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.14*** Lower 3-9 6.2 Conflict =.03*** High 2A.3 35.6
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 Page 117
Table 5 .10: Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Divided Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1ict Is Negotiation Tactics Lower H i gh Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.007* Lower 11.5 22. 4 Conflict =.04*** High 10.6 33-0
B1. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal = . 13*** Lower 5-5 11*.3 Conflict ss. 04*** H i gh 30.9 41.6
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.17*** Lower 4-5 6.8 Conflict s=.o4*** High 28.8 42.3
* p<-05 ** pc.Ol **s'e p<,001 Page 118
Table 5*1 Is H-W Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Egalitarian Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct Is: Negot i at i on Tacti cs Lower H i gh Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by H Reasoning =.002 Lower 7-9 11.3 Conflict =.02** Hi gh 5-3 13.3
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.003 Lower 7.8 13.7 Conflict =.02** High 5-3 8.9
81. Withdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = .08*** Lower 5-1 7-2 Conflict =.02** High 27-0 29.2
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = .05*** Lower It.A 7-7 Conflict =.02** High 18.3 19-0
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.10*** Lower b.5 5.3 Conflict =.02** Hi gh 22.7 3A.6
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.06*** Lower k.l 6.1 Conflict =.01 High 19.0 3A.8
* p<.05 ** p<.01 * ** pc.001 Page 119
Table 5-12: W-H Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Egalitarian Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct Is: Negotiation Tactics Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning =.004 Lower 7-2 11.3 Conf1i ct =.01* High 7.0 18.2
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.009 Lower 7-1 12.3 Conf1i ct =.01 * H i gh 7.0 15-9
B1. Wi thdrawal by H Wi thdrawa1 = .06*** Lower 5.8 10.3 Conflict =.01* High 21.6 26.1
B2. Wi thdrawa1 by W Wi thdrawa1 = .06*** Lower 5.2 7.7 Conf1i ct =.01* High 15.9 2k.k
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.11*** Lower k.5 l.k Conf1i ct =.01* High 22.7 3 k. 6
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.11*** Lower J*.3 6.2 Conflict =.01* High 20.3 1*1.7
* p<.05 * * pc.Ol * ** p<.001 Page 120
Table 5 - 13s Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Egalitarian Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct 1s: Negotiation Tacti cs Lower Hi gh Eta Squared
A1. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.02** Lower 11.6 13.0 Conflict =.02** H i gh 6.3 22.9
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawa1 = . 11*** Lower 5-7 8.2 Conflict =.02** High 28. it 26.7
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.12*** Lower 5-2 5.1 Conflict =.02** High 25.2 35.0
* p<.05 ** p<.01 rtrtrt p<.001 Page 121
Table 5*14: H-W Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Male Dominant Marriages
Vi olence Rate When Conf 1ict Is: Negotiation Tact i cs Lower High Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by H Reasoning =.003 Lower 13-2 27.8 Conflict =.05* High 12.8 23.8
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoni ng =.007 Lower 10.8 23.5 Conflict = .04* High 17-6 36. 4
B1. Wi thdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = .09*** Lower 12.3 16.7 Conf1i ct =.04* High 27-3 44.4
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = . 08*** Lower 9-3 16.2 Conflict =.05* H i gh 19-5 36.8
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.12*** Lower 9.6 12.1 Conflict = .04* High 31.8 39.0
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.10*** Lower 8.6 l8.it Conflict = .04* High 33.3 36.1
* p<.05 ** pc.Ol * ** p<.001 Page 122
Table 5*15: W-H Minor Violence by Level of Conflict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Male Dominant Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1ict Is: Negot i at ion Tact ics Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoni ng by H Reasoning =.02 Lower 7 . ft 23-6 Conflict = . 0 5 ** Hi gh 1A.9 19.0
A2. Reasoning by W Reasoning =.03 Lower ft.5 23.1 Conflict = .04* Hi gh 19-6 22.7
Bl. Withdrawal by H Wi thdrawal = .05** Lower 11.3 12.2 Conflict = .0A* High 9.1 ft0.7
B2. Withdrawal by W Wi thdrawal = . 10*** Lower 5.3 8.1 Conflict =.05** High 19-5 35.9
C l. Verbal Agg. by H Verb. Agg.=.13*** Lower 7 . ft 5.9 Conflict =.03* High 27-3 3ft.1
C2. Verbal Agg. by W Verb. Agg.=.10*** Lower 8.5 5-1 Conf1i ct =.0ft* Hi gh 20.8 3.8.9
* p<.05 ** p<.01 * * * p<.001 Page 123
Table 5*16: Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Male Dominant Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf 1i ct Is: Negoti ation Tact i cs Lower High Eta Squared
A1. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.01 Lower 13-7 36.8 Conflict =.07** High 21 .!» 31.3
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawa1 =.16*** Lower 7-9 13.3 Conflict =.07** High 32.5 1*8.9
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.20*** Lower 6.3 7-7 Conflict =.05** High 1*0.5 1*7-9
* p<.05 ** p<.01 fcftrt pc.001 Page 121* low and medium c o n flic t categories into one, and leave the high conflict group as is. Thus the following analysis that compares conflict, negotiation and violence for each marital power structure is more exploratory than definitive. The problem of expected cell frequencies and the percent of cells involved is problemmatic for some marital power types, particularly female and male dominant, which had small sample sizes. However, what is of interest in this analysis of how or if the power structure changes the relation between co n flict, negotiation and violence are the general patterns that the data indicate.
Table 5*5 to 5*16 present the data on conflict, negotiation and violence for each marital power structure.
Table S-5 to 5*7 consider this relation in female dominant relationships; Tables 5-8 to 5*10 in divided power, Tables
5-11 to 5-13 for egal.i tar ian, and Tables 5-1^ to 5.16 for male dominant. As in prior analyses, the violence rates for husband to wife minor violence for husband's use of negotiation tactics and for wife's use of negotiation tactics, violence rates for wife to husband minor violence for husband's use of tactics and w ife's use of tactics, and couple minor violence for couples' use of tactics are presented for each marital power type..
Violence Rates
Examination of the data in Table 5.5 to 5 .16 in general suggests that the power structure of the relationship does not alter the relation between co n flict, negotiation tactics Page 125 and violence. Overall, the findings are quite consistent with the prior analysis. When the data on reasoning are examined, Part A of Table 5*5 to 5*16, it is evident that the level of conflict explains more of the variance in the violence rate than does the use of reasoning, regardless of the marital power structure. This is clear when the eta squared coefficients are examined. The coefficient for level of conflict is much larger than the same coefficient for reasoning and always s ta tis tic a lly significant, while the significance level of the coefficient for reasoning is inconsistent. When this relation is examined using the mutually exclusive measure of couple violence, Part A of
Table A.2 to A.5 in Appendix A, the same results are evident.
On the other hand, the data in Part B and Part C of
Table 5-5 to 5*16, which address the use of withdrawal and verbal aggression, show that it is the negotiation tactic that explains more of the variance in the violence rate than the level of conflict. The eta squared coefficients for withdrawal and verbal aggression are much larger than the same coefficient for level of conflict. This is consistent with the prior analysis.
In addition, when the violence rates are considered, the data indicate that the lower rates of violence are associated with the use of reasoning and that the violence rate increases when withdrawal and verbal aggression are used. This is also consistent with the prior analysis. Page 126
Divided Power Marr i ages
There are, however, some important exceptions to this overall pattern within each marital power structure. Within the divided power marriages, reasoning appears to be related to the violence rate but only under certain conditions. The data indicate that only for husband to wife, Table 5-8, and couple violence, Table 5*10, when both partners use reasoning, there are statistically significant differences in the violence rate. But again, contrary to the expectations of conflict theory, the violence rate increases when higher levels of reasoning are used. Previous analyses suggested that reasoning played no role in the suppression of violence, that if conflict was high violence would also increase. The data on the divided power marriages show that at least' under some circumstances, most notably high co n flict, the use of reasoning is associated with increases in the probability of violence. This finding also holds when the mutually exclusive measure of couple violence is used, Table A.3 in Appendix A, however the eta squared statistic is not statistically significant.
It is only within the divided power group that there is any consistent evidence to indicate that reasoning has any impact on the violence rate, and even then, the data indicate an increase, not a decrease, in violence when
> reasoning is high. Page 127
Maie Oomi nant Marr i ages
Male dominant relationships present a curious picture of how negotiation affects violence rates at different
levels of conflict. In general, the data support previous findings that the more destructive the tactic and the greater the co n flict, the greater the probability of violence. However, ther are certain inconsistencies in male dominant relationships that are more explainable than others. If we consider husband to wife violence and wife's use of negotiation the data very strongly suggest that no matter what tactic she uses to negotiate conflict, if conflict is high, violence is likely. In fact, if the violence rates for high conflict are examined, it is clear that even when withdrawal and verbal aggression are often used the is no change in the rate of violence. All rates are 36% regardless of what tactic is under consideration.
Other oddities in the data occur for wife to husband violence in male dominant relationships but the sex of the tactic user and the type of tactic vary too often for any real explanation to be offered. At high conflict, the pattern identified throughout this research holds: reasoning is not associated with the violence rate, while withdrawal and verbal aggression are associated with higher frequencies of violence. Page 128
The D i rect i on of Violence and the Aggressor and Victim Use of Negotiation
This research examines how aggressors (e.g. the husband's use of negotiation in husband to wife violence) and victims (e.g. wife's use of negotiation in husband to wife violence) use negotiation tactics. In addition, couple violence and the couples combined use of negotiation tactics are examined.
The decision to examine the data in this way was made for several reasons. First, both husband to wife and wife to husband violence are included in the analysis because to adequately assess how the power structure of the relationship affects the level of conflict and the rate of violence, violence by both parties needs to be considered.
The inclusion of both types of violence allows the data to be used to explain couple violence rather than individual violence. When both partners are violent, it may represent distinctly different marital dynamics than when there is a single aggressor and victim .
Second, the inclusion of husbands and wives use of negotiation tactics provides a means to examine how the use of progressively less constructive tactics is associated with the relation between conflict and violence. It is possible, for example, that very different associations between the variables can emerge when a victim uses a certain tactic compared to the aggressor's use of the same t a c t i c . 70
60
Percent of 50
Husband to 40 Wife Minor
Violence 30
20
10
. ,------Reason Withdrawal Verbal Reason Withdrawal Verbal Aggression i • Aggression
NEGOTIATION TACTICS NEGOTIATION TACTICS
Figure 5.5a Percent of Husband to Wife Figure 5.5b Percent of Husband to Wife Minor Violence when Conflict is High, Minor Violence when Conflict is High, Aggressor's Use of Negotiation Tactic Victim's Use of Negotiation Tactic is is High for each Power Structure High for each Power Structure 70
W in
Percent of
Wife to W m e c n i.-for/r-n
» W | irt O' Cic^i , Husband - \tJ T)iV;fl
Minor
Violence
10
1------g------1------j------,------j------Reason Withdrawal Verbal Reason Withdrawal Verbal Aggression Aggression
NEGOTIATION TACTICS NEGOTIATION TACTICS
Figure 5.6a Percent of Wife to Husband Figure 5.6b Percent of Wife to Husband Minor Violence when Conflict is High, Minor Violence when Conflict is High, Aggressor's Use of Negotiation Tactic Victim's Use of Negotiation Tactic is is High for each Power Structure High for each Power Structure Page 131
Figures 5*5 and 5*6 illu s tra te the changes in the
violence rate when the aggressor uses the negotiation tactic
and when the victim uses the same tactic. These figures
provide a means to compare the violence rates by who is the
aggressor and who is the victim . Figure 5 -5 shows this
relation within each power structure in husband to wife
violence where the level of conflict and use of negotiation
tactic are high. Figure 5*6 presents the same data for wife
to husband violence.
The relationship shown in Figure 5*5 suggests a fa irly
consistent pattern for husband to wife violence. The
violence rates increase as the less constructive tactics are
used, and the violence rates are somewhat lower when women,
the violence victims, use reasoning, withdrawal and verbal
aggression compared to when men, the aggressors, use the
same tactic. This finding holds for each power structure.
The data in Figure 5*6 indicate a different pattern for wife to husband violence, where men are the victims. It
suggests that, for a ll but the egalitarian relationships, withdrawal is associated with more violence than verbal
aggression. There are dramatic increases in the violence
rate when men use withdrawal as a negotiation tactic in
female dominant, male dominant and divided power structures.
The findings suggest that there are gender differences in
the type of negotiation tactic that is associated with
increases in the violence rate. It appears to indicate that women will resort to violence more often when men refuse to Page 132
deal wi th conf1i ct.
There are several plausible explanations of this finding if the meaning of withdrawal is considered in the context of marital conflict. Withdrawal may imply that the partner discounts the importance of the issue to the spouse, that the issue is not considered worthy of discussion. The findings by Fishman ( 1977 . 1978) suggest that men use silence and non response to control conversations with their wives. The data in this study suggest that violence may be used by women in reaction to their husband's withdrawal, perhaps as a way to draw attention to the importance of the issue to them, or to just get their husband's attention.
This explanation is consistent with the data in Figure
5.6 that shows a decrease in the violence rate when verbal aggression is used by the husband. Even though verbal aggression is not a constructive negotiation tactic, it at least indicates that the husband is responding in some fashion to the conflict. In addition, it is clear that withdrawal by men in egalitarian relationships does not appear to be as highly associated with violence compared to other power structures. The data in these Figures report only the relationship at high levels of conflict. It is important to keep in mind how level of conflict is associated with the rate of marital violence. 70 70
’**• 9 dorn 60 60 Percent of Couple 50 50 Minor Violence
30
20
10 '///
p— r------r- Reasorung With. Verbal Agg. Reasoning With. Verial Agg.
Negotiation Tactics Negotiation Tactice 133 Page
Figure 5.7 Couple Minor Violence when Figure 5.8 Couple Minor Violence when Conflict is High & Use of Negotiation Conflict is Low & Use of Negotiation Tactic is High by Pcwer Structure Tactic is High by Pcwer Structure Page 13^
The Importance of Conf1i ct to Mar i tal Violence
Figures 5-7 and 5*8 suggests the importance that the
level of conflict plays in the association between
negotiation and violence for each power structure. Figure
5-7 shows the rate of couple minor violence for each power
structure when conflict is high and when the use of each
negotiation tactic is high. Figure 5*8 shows the dramatic decrease in the violence rate under the same conditions except that the level of conflict is low.
The findings summarized in Figures 5*7 and 5-8 suggest
that the level of conflict and the power structure of the
relationship are both important in explaining marital violence. The findings suggest that reducing the level of conflict will result in less violence, but that egalitarian relationships have the lowest rate of marital violence regardless of the level of conflict.
SUMMARY
This chapter has focused • on examining the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence, and how the power structure of the relationship affects that association. Perhaps the most important finding is the necessity of incorporating the power relations between
intimates into any analysis of marital interaction. The power structure of the relation has a significant impact on the relation between conflict and violence. Egalitarian relationships not only have the least amount of violence but this low rate of violence remains even when conflict is Page 135
high. Other marital power structure do not have this
property. For all but the egalitarians, there are large
increases in the violence rate when conflict increases from medium to high. One property of egalitarian marriages that
this research identifies, and that is c ritic a l given the
nature of marriage and the family, is that when power is
equitably distributed the structure can tolerate conflict without especially large increases in violence.
Second, the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence was reexamined to consider how progressively less constructive means of settling disputes affect the rate of violence. Prior work by Straus et. al. (1980) was extended to include withdrawal and verbal aggression as negotiation tactics so that the rate of violence when those
tactics are used could be compared to the violence rate when
reasoning is used. The inclusion of these tactics provides a stronger analysis of how negotiation tactics are associated with conflict and violence. This research clearly demonstrated that the rates when withdrawal and verbal aggression are used are much higher than when
reasoning is used.
Although violence rates progressively increase as less constructuve negotiation tactics are used, for the most part, the use of reasoning does not reduce the relation between conflict and violence, which is consistent with the work by Straus et. a l.. Their work and this research show
that no matter how much reasoning is used, if there is high Page 136 conflict the frequency of violence increases. This suggests that many of the conflict resolution s k ills taught by marital therapists that rely on reasoning may be problemmatic. This research suggests that while teaching conflict resolution skills is important, a more fruitful means of reducing conflict and thus violence is to alter the power structure of the relationship.
In fact, when the power structure of the relationship is included in the analysis of the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence, two points are clear: the relation is fairly consistent for all marital power structures and even when there is deviation from this pattern, the data indicate that regardless of the tactic used, if there is high conflict there w ill be increases in violence. This is even stronger evidence to support the suggestion that to reduce violence, it is the power structure of the relationship that must change, and not only the means used to settle arguments. Chapter VI
CONCLUSIONS
This research began with three major goals: to
integrate prior research on power, conflict and violence, to focus on properties of the relationship between partners rather than characteristics of any one individual, and to
include violence by women. It is important to recognize how
interrelated these goals are despite the fact that each is stated separately.
To integrate research and theory on power, conflict and violence necessitated the measurement of concepts at the relationship level of analysis not the individual level of analysis. The focus of research was not on the husband's resources that enable him to hold power, but on who makes the final decisions on a number of items relative to the other partner. In that sense power as used in this research
is a measure of relationship power.
The measure of conflict is sim ilarly a measure of those areas of the intimate relationship that cause problems for both partners. Although the measures of violence designate different aggressor-victim dyads, as in husband to wife violence or wife to husband violence, it is a measure of a Page 138
property of the relationship because it requires the presence of both partners. This should not be interpreted as suggesting that the victim of violence is an active participant in the violence, but that for a violent act to occur both parties must be physically present. Violence becomes a property of the relationship between intimates because of the consequences that violence has on the relationship. Like power, it shapes and defines the boundaries of the relationship.
To understand how power, conflict and violence are related demanded the inclusion of womens' violence in the analysis. To restrict the research to only husband to wife violence would not have provided an appropriate test of the hypotheses. The conclusions would have necessarily been
limited to explaining husband to wife violence when in fact the purpose of the research was to analyze marital violence.
However, the most significant contributions of this research evolved from the goal of integrating prior research on power, conflict and violence. The model that has guided this research from both a theoretical and methodological perspective firs t examined the relationship between power and conflict and how that association was mediated by the legitimation of the power structure. The second phase of the analysis examined the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence and whether the power structure altered that relation. The need to integrate these concepts into one explanatory model was evident because of the Page 139 contradictions in empirical research and theoretical pred i ct i ons.
A recurring critique of the marital power literature has been the use of power as a dependent variable, prompting
Sprey (1972) to ask what theoretical contribution is made by knowing who wields the power. MacDonald (1980) has asked what are the costs of power, both for the person in power and the target of that power. This study used the marital power structure as the starting point from which analysis proceeds and identifies the theoretical contributions that are made by knowing who wields the power, and the cost of that power.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
It is important, however, to keep in mind the limitations of this research. The major limitation is that the data come from a sample of individuals that were interviewed at one point in time. Statementsof causal inference need to be made with caution when data are cross-sectional.
This is a particular problem in the analysis of the relationship between conflict, negotiation and violence. As suggested previously, there is good reason to base the analysis on the causal order this research specifies, because conflict is viewed as inevitable in social relationships. The inevitability of conflict establishes its causal relation to negotiation and violence. Page 140
It is more d ifficult to establish the causal order for negotiation tactics and violence. It could be, as was noted before, that the use of reasoning, withdrawal and verbal aggression is a response to the violence. On the other hand, it is also plausible to suggest that when conflict arises, individuals use negotiation tactics to address that conflict. In some cases the tactics successfully resolve the conflict. In other cases, there is no resolution and violence occurs.
The limitations of this research also suggest future directions for research. One of the major findings discussed below concerns the use of reasoning as a tactic.
The findings suggest that reasoning is an insufficient negotiation tactic to use to prevent violence. Future research may want to focus on this curious picture of how to deal with conflict. The need for additional research in this area is apparent if we consider that marital therapy often focuses on teaching communications skills to clients experiencing marital conflict. The findings from this research suggest that this focus may be inappropriate.
Therapies that take a more feminist perspective and teach assertiveness and empowerment skills may p ro v id e a more useful approach because the importance of the power structure of relationships is recognized. Page lAl
MAJOR FINDINGS
The Power Structure of Amer i can Marr i ages
The findings from this research confirm the diversity
in the power structure of American marriages, as measured by who has the final say in decision making. This study found that 53.5% of the sample had a power structure that reflected a division of decision making such that one partner makes the decisions on some issues, and the other partner makes the decisions on another set of issues. Only
28. 7% of the sample can be described as egalitarian, where both partners participate in decision making on the same
issues at least two-thirds of the time. On the other hand, the percentages of female and male dominant marriages are fa ir ly sim ilar. 7*5% are female dominant and 9*3% are male domi nant.
Blood and Wolfe (i960) , Komaravsky (19&2) and Scanzoni
(1981) suggest there are social class differences in power structure. Except at the lowest status levels, the husband's power generally increases with social status.
This study found that the only class differences were in male dominant marriages, which tend to occur more often among blue collar marriages.
Although for different reasons, Blood and Wolfe (1960) and Gillespie (1971) suggest that the stage of the family life cycle is related to women's power in marriage. That relationship was not found in this research. The stage of the family life cycle, measured by number of years married Page H2 or together, was examined for each marital power type and no statistically significant differences were found. The findings suggest that the power structure remains stable over the course of the life cycle.
The relation between wife employment and power was examined. Consistent with the work by Brown 1980 ( ), the data suggest that a woman's a b ility to exercise power in the relationship is closely tied to her a b ility to earn a substantial portion of the family income. Egalitarian and female dominant relationships occur more often when the wife contributes a large percentage of earnings to the family
income. In this study, the exercise of male power does not appear to be as closely tied to earnings. Male dominant relations occured more often when the man earned0% of the family inome than when he earned100 % of the family income.
This is consistent with the feminist critique of the family
literature that identifies social structural properties that prevent women from exercising more marital power because of their limited participation in the workplace and the lack of social status attached to the job of housewife. (Gillespie,
1971; Oakley, 1972; Acker, 1973; Thorne, 1982).
Mar i ta 1 Power and Conf1i ct
A major concern of this research was to examine the relation between the marital power structure and the level of conflict. This was the fir s t step to understanding the seeming contradictions between theories which state that egalitarian marriages have more conflict, and theories (and Page 1^3 also research findings) which indicate that egalitarian families are less violent. How can such families have both a higher level of conflict (which is known to be associated with violence) and a lower level of violence? Two explanations were offered: 1. egalitarian relationships do not have more conflict, or 2. egalitarian relationships have greater conflict but resolve conflict more constructively and thus avoid violence.
More conflict in egalitarian relationships is predicted because of the necessity of negotiating the power distribution (Scanzoni, 1978; Whitehurst, 197*0 because of greater intimacy in egalitarian marriages due to increased sharing (Blood and Wolfe, I960; Brown, 1980) and because men are unlikely to w illin g ly give up the power that has been ascribed to them (Toby, 197**; Straus, 1980; and Yllo, 1982)
Contrary to these views, the results of this study clearly demonstrates that egalitarian relationships have the
1 east amount of conflict and male dominant relationships have the highest levels of conflict.
One reason there may be lower levels of conflict in egalitarian relationships is simply because the power is equitably distributed. As pointed out previously, conflict arises if subordinants are dissatisfied with the balance of power, especially if the balance is perceived as illegitimate. In egalitarian relationships, neither partner is subordinant to the other, and as the following discussion indicates, egalitarian relationships have the highest level Page IM of agreement over how the power is distributed. Two sources of conflict in intimate relationships — inequitable power distributions and the perceived legitimacy of the power distribution — are minimized in egalitarian relationships.
The Legi timacy of Power and Conf1i ct
An importat criticism of much of the marital power literatu re is the variety of definitions of marital power and the confusion of power with authority (Safilios
Rothschild, 1970; Cromwell and Olson (1975) MacDonald
(1980). Tallman and M iller (1979) state that it is not the power structure but the inconsistency between actual power and power norms that effect the ability to resolve conflict.
It is important to d ifferen tiate the two concepts because if the use of power by one person in the dyad is legitimated by the other, that person is viewed as having authority, or the right to make decisions. A decrease in conflict is predicted when the power structure of "a relationship is viewed as legitimate (Scanzoni and Scanzoni, 1981; Brown,
1980; Scanzoni, 1970; Sprey, 1971; Raven and Kruglanski,
1970; Verhoff and Fields, 1970).
This study examined how the power structure was associated with the consensus over the power distribution.
The Index of Power Norm Consensus showed that 1*7-8% of the egalitarian couples had high agreement on how the power was distributed but only 22.1% of the male dominant couples agreed to that distribution. Page 145
When the association between marital power structure, power norm consensus, and level of conflict was examined, the findings suggest that consensus is an important factor
in reducing the level of conflict for all marital power structures. However, the findings also showed that regardless of the level of consensus, egalitarian relationships continue to have the lowest levels of conflict. Consensus had the largest effect on reducing the level of conflict in male dominant relationships and to a lesser extent on female dominant relationships. The findings from this study confirm the importance that legitimacy of power, or authority, has on reducing the level of conflict, but also point out that it is not consensus over the power distribution that explains the low level of conflict in egalitarian relationships. This suggests that for egalitarian relationships it is the properties of that power structure, the sharing in decision making, that is associated with the low levels of conflict. The findings suggest that the level of conflict is more contingent on the basic power structure than on the legitimation of any existing structure.
Mar i ta 1 Power. Conf1i ct and Vi olence
Although the data indicate a strong linear association between conflict and violence, the power structure of the relationship was shown to have a substantial impact on that relation. When the relation between conflict and violence is examined for each power type, it is clear that conflict Page 1A6 in some power structures produces a greater risk of violence than in others. The findings suggest that for all power structures but the male dominant, there may be a tolerance level for conflict: it is only when conflict is at its highest levels that dramatic increases in the violence rate occur. This is especially true for the divided power structure and the female dominant. It also appears that egalitarian relationships can tolerate more conflict before violence occurs than other power structures. Although the data in this research only consider the impact of conflict on the rate of violence, it seems reasonable to suggest that since egalitarian relationships can tolerate higher levels of conflict without a substantial increase in the rate of violence, they may also be capable of avoiding other destructive behaviors that effect the strength of the marital relationship when there is conflict.
It has been suggested (Straus, 1980; Goode, 197**;
Whitehurst, 197*0 that one way to reduce the rate of violence is to change the power relations between men and women so they are more equitable. However, the same authors also state that equitable power relations may have, the short term effect of increasing violence because there may be greater conflict when power is equitably distributed. The findings from this research suggest this caution may be unnecessary. The lowest rates of conflict and violence are found in those relationships where there is an equitable distribution of power, and these relationships also have the Page 1A7
highest levels of consensus.
The Use of Neqot iat i on Tact ics
Measures of three negotiation tactics are developed to
explore the effect of different negotiation tactics on the
association between conflict and violence. Indices that
measure the use of reasoning, withdrawal and verbal
aggression were computed from the Conflict Tactics Scale
(Straus, 1978) for the husband, the wife, and the couple.
The findings suggest that negotiation tactics are
related to the level of marital violence. The violence rate
is lowest when reasoning is used compared to the violence
rates when withdrawal and verbal aggression are used.
Although the violence rates increase when withdrawal and
verbal aggression are used, the use of reasoning as a
negotiation tactic to avoid, violence appears to be
insufficient. The analyses very strongly suggest that it is
the level of co n flict, not the amount of reasoning used,
that explains increases in the violence rate. When withdrawal and verbal aggression are considered, the
findings demonstrate that although violence is very likely
to increase, the level of conflict continues to be an
important factor, related to increases in the violence rate.
When the relation between conflict, negotiation and
violence was examined for each marital power type, the data
indicate that the basic relation does not change. For each
marital power structure, the violence rates are lower when
reasoning is used and higher when withdrawal and verbal Page 1A8 aggression are used. However, even though violence rates are lower when reasoning is used, the basic relationship between conflict and violence remains: the greater the level of co n flict, the higher the rate of violence, regardless of how much or how l i t t l e reasoning is used.
Overall, the findings for the analyses that examine the relation between conflict, negotiation and violence and the analyses that examine this same relation for each marital power type suggest that the use of destructive tactics, such as withdrawal and verbal aggression, and high levels of conflict are important explanations of the increase in the rate of marital violence. On the other hand, since reasoning does not appear to decrease the violence rate, the findings also suggest that if violence is to be limited, it
is the level of conflict that must decrease. The findings
in this research suggest that such a reduction in conflict
is most likely to be achieved if the percentage of egalitarian families were to increase from the 29% found among this sample. That is, the implication appears to be that changing the power structure of the relationship so that power is more equitably distributed will limit conflict and thus violence. This conclusion is supported by Scanzoni and Scanzoni (1 981:i*67) * who state that "clear communication
in itself is no guarantee that conflict will cease...two parties have to work at changing the situation so that grievances and inequities are removed". Page 149
IMPLICATION OF THE RESEARCH
MacDonald, (1980) in reviewing a decade of the family power literature suggests several areas for future research.
He states that "one of the primary tasks is to systematically investigate the interrelationship between power and conflict, especially how conflict is handled in terms of the power differen tials" (1980:850) and that
"although the potential of conflict theory has often been argued, it is now necessary to incorporate it into family power research" (1980:851).
This study has taken in itia l steps in those directions.
It has demonstrated that although power and conflict are inherent in any social relationship, the amount of conflict and at least one way that conflict may be handled, that of violence, are related to the distribution of marital power.
In terms of conflict theory, the results of this research suggest support for the general orientation of the theory, but not for several of the more specific hypotheses.
The findings do not support the hypothesis that the greater the intimacy, the greater the conflict, as tested in this study. It has been suggested that egalitarian relationships are more intimate and thus greater conflict is predicted.
The results of this research do not support this.
A second hypothesis suggests that conflict w ill be beneficial if constructive means are used to settle disputes. The data in this research does not directly address this hypothesis because there are no measures of the Page 150 benefits of co n flict. However, it does show that the use of destructive tactics increases the frequency of violence, which can be interpreted as consistent with a general conflict perspective. On the other hand, the results suggest that the use of reasoning does not help reduce the frequency of violence. Since reasoning is a constructive tactic to use, some decrease in the violence rate is expected.
A more general interpretation of conflict theory focuses on how inequality leads to conflict. The findings in this research clearly demonstrate the relation between marital inequality and conflict, and thus supports the overall perspective of the theory.
The more important finding, however, is the relation between power, conflict and violence. The implication for social policy decisions concerns the fear that abandoning the idea of the husband as the 'head1 of the family w ill produce chaos and co n flict, and services, programs and ideologies that increase the social power of women will have a detrimental effect on the family. In fact, the results of this research suggest the opposite: the empowerment of women leads to substantially less conflict and violence in the fami 1y.
This conclusion is consistent with feminist social theory which sets the explanation of marital violence in the patriarchal social structure that condones violence towards women. This research has focused on the marital power Page 151 structure of intimate relationships. Although it seeks an explanation for violence from a micro rather than macro perspective, the conclusion is the same. A major explanation of the level of conflict and violence is rooted in power d iffe re n tials between men and women. Appendix Page 153
Table A .l: Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct 1 s: Negotiation Tactics Low Med i um High Eta Squared
A l. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.01*** Low 1.3 4.8 10.2 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 4.7 10.9 18.2 High 1.9 5.8 18.1
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal=.10*** Low Conflict =.03*** Med i um 2.6 4.3 7.4 High 9-4 19-0 28.5
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.12*** Low • 3 Conflict =.03*** Med i um 1.8 5.2 . 3-7 High 12.0 17.5 29-5
* p<.05 ** p<.01 Page 15A
Table A .2: Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Female Dominant Marriages
Vi olence Rate When Conf1ii ct Is: Negotiation Tact i cs Lower High Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.0001 Lower A.6 2A.2 Conflict =.09*** Hi gh 7.1 AO.O
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal = . 13*** Lower 1 .A 13-0 Conflict =.09*** H i gh 19.0 A6.7
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl1 Verb. Agg.=.19*** Lower 1 .A - Conflict =.10*** High 16.0 A5-5
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001
> Page 155
Table A.3 : Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Divided Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct 1s: Negotiation Tact i cs Lower High Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.0001 Lower 5-5 12.8 Conflict =.03*** High 3-6 19.8
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal®.1 1*** Lower 2.0 5.1 Conflict =.03*** High 17.0 29.7
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.12*** Lower 1.3 1.8 Conflict =.03*** H i gh 16.1 28.2
* p<.05 ** pc.Ol * * * p<.001 Page 156
Table A.A : Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flic t and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Egalitarian Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1ict Is: Negotiation Tact i cs Lower High Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by Cpl Reasoning =.0008 Lower 5.3 9.5 Conflict =.01** High 3.2 12.9
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal=.06*** Lower 2.7 ^•3 Conflict =.01** H i gh 1^.7 19.5
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.05*** Lower 2.5 3.8 Conflict =.008* High 12.5 23-5
* p<.05 * * p c .o i p<.001 Page 157
Table A.5 : Couple Minor Violence by Level of C o n flict and Use of Negotiation Tactics in Male Dominant Marriages
Violence Rate When Conf1i ct 1s: Negotiation Tact i cs Lower High Eta Squared
Al. Reasoning by Cp1 Reasoning =.0000 Lower 6.0 20.0 Conflict =.03** High 10.8 15-h
Bl. Withdrawal by Cpl Wi thdrawal = . 12*** Lower 1 .A 3-7 Conflict =.03** High 20.6 30.3
Cl. Verbal Agg. by Cpl Verb. Agg.=.20*** Lower Conflict =.02 High 29-0 30.6
* p<.05 ** p<.01 p<. 001 Appendix B Page 159
Q65 & Q66 Power Norm Consensus Index
067 Marital Power Index
14
Every family has decisions to make — such as where to live, whether or not to buy. a c a r, and so on. We would lik e to fin d out how you and your (w ife /p a rtn e r) make t . some of these kinds of decisions.
HAND RESPONDENT CARD C
65. Let's start with buying a car. Who do you think should have the final say on buying a car? — — Q. 65 Q. 66 Q. 67 RESPONDENT WIFE/PARTNER OPINION _ ___OPINION WHO HAS FINAL SAY
» . U l * 9 £ O If 2 uj - I 3 | _jae oc g g 9 9 at 2 5 * 3 Sc 3 »- § 2 1 I I I u j ui oa a tu • H I Lti ffl ffl CO • 1 4 u, tn in yi Z Ik U» V* ^ sc 3 3 3 £ 3 S
Buying a car 1 2 3 4 5 X 1 2 3 4 5 X
Having children 1 2 3 4 5 X 1 2 3 4 5 X
What house or apartment to take 1 2 3 4 5 X 1 2 3 4 5 X 1 2 3 4 5 X
What job you should take 1 2 3 4 5 X 1 '2 3 4 5 X 1 2 3 4 5 X Whether your w ife should go to work or q u it work 1 1 2 3 4 5 X How much money to spend on food per week 1 1 2 3 4 5 X 1
66. How about your (wife/partner)? Who does she think should have the fin a l say on buying a car? ------
67. Now, in your family, who actually does have the fin a l say? " ------
TAKE BACK CARD C Page 160
Q68 Marital Conflict Index 15
HAND RESPONDENT CARD D
68. I am going to read a l i s t o f things that couples do not always agree on. For each of them, please t e ll me how often you and your (w ife/p artn er) agreed during the past year. First, take managing the money. Did you and your (wife/partner) always agree, almost always agree, usually agree, sometimes agree, or never agree about managing the money?
ALMOST DON'T ALWAYS ALWAYS USUALLY SOMETIMES NEVER KNOV a. Managing the money 1 2 3 4 ' 5 X b. Cooking, cleaning, or repairing the house 1 2 3 4 5 X c. Social activities and entertaining 1 2 3 4 5 X d. Affection and sex relations 1 2 3 4 5 X
IF RESPONDENT HAS CHILDREN AT HOME OR NOT AT HOME, ASK: e. Things about the children 1 2 3 4 5 X
TAKE BACK CARD D •
69. Every couple has th e ir ups and downs, and surveys 1 YES like this have shown that at some time or other, 2 NO most people wonder about whether they should X NO ANSWER continue their (marriage/relationship). What about in your case? Have you ever thought about this?
IF "YES1' ON Q. 69,~~ASK: 70. How much have you thought about it? 1 ONCE Was it once, a few times, or a lot? 2 A FEW TIMES 3 A LOT X NO ANSWER
71. When you thought about it , did you 1 YES ever actually separate? 2 NO X NO ANSWER P age 161
Conflict Tactics Scale
18 •
HAND RESPONDENT CARD A
78. No matter how well a couple gets along, there are times when they disagree on major decisions, get annoyed about something the other person does, o r ju s t have spats o r fig h ts because the y're 1n a bad mood o r tire d o r fo r some other reason. They also u s e many different ways of trying to settle their differences. I'm going to read a 11st o f some things th a t you and your (w ife/partner) might have done when you had a dispute, and would f i r s t 11he you to t e ll m fo r each one how often you did I t In the past year. 0. 78 i-Zi EVER RESPOHOEHT-IN PAST YEAR WIFE/PARTNER-1N PAST YEAR HAPPENED
i I - I s i if i- I 8 I i 3 I I I I I i 5 3 I Is I J . 1 a. Discussed the Issue calmly 2 3 2 b. Got Information to back up (your/her) side of things 2 3 c. Brought In or tried to bring In someone to help settle things d. Insulted o r swore a t the other one e. Sulked and/or refused to ta lk about I t 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 4 5 6 X f . Stomped out o f the room or house (o r yard) 2 3 S 6 X 0 1 2 4 5 S X g. Cried 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 4 S S X h. Did o r said something to spite the other one 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 4 5 6 X 1. Threatened to h it or throw something at the other one 0 2 3 4 S S X 1. Pushed, grabbed, o r shoved the other one 0 2 3 4 5 6 X 0 1 2 4 5 6 X m. Slapped the other one 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 4 S 6 X n. Kicked, bit, or hit with a f i s t 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 4 5 6 X o. Hit or tried to hit with something 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X Beat up the other one 2 3 S 6 X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X Threatened w ith a knife o r gun 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X Used a knife o r gun 2 3 5 6 X 0 1 .2 3 4 S 6 X Other (PROBE): ______2 3 S 6 X 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 X 79. And what about your (wife/partner)? Tell me how often she (ITEM) in the past year. FOR EACH ITEM CIRCLED EITHER "NEVER" OR “DON'T KNOW FOR BOTH RESPONDENT AND PARTNER. ASK: [SO. Did you o r your (w ife/partner) ever (ITEM)? —------IF ANY BRACKETED ITEMS HAPPENED IN PAST TEAR. GO TO NEXT PAGE. IF NO BRACKETED ITEMS IN PAST YEAR, SKIP TO q. 82. TAKE BACK CARD A REFERENCES Acker, Joan 1973 "Women and social s tra tific a tio n : A case of intellectual sexism." American Journal of Sociology 78: 936-9**5. Alford, R. D. 1982 "Intimacy and disputing styles." Journal of Family Issues s3.36l-s3.371*- Allen, Craig M. and Murray A. Straus 1980 "Resources, power and husband-wife violence." In M.A. Straus and G. 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