The Dogmatic of Article 101 TFEU and Information Exchanges
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UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID TESIS DOCTORAL The Dogmatic of Article 101 TFEU and Information Exchanges Autor: José Mª Baño Fos Director: Prof. Dr. D. Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real Madrid, 2015 I. INTRODUCCIÓN ......................................................................................... 7 A. La necesidad de una exégesis dogmática del artículo 101 TFUE ... 8 B. Estructura .................................................................................... 14 C. Nuestras conclusiones ................................................................. 17 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 23 A. The need for a dogmatic exegesis of Article 101 TFEU ............... 24 B. The structure of this dissertation .................................................. 29 C. Our submissions .......................................................................... 32 PART ONE - THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS ARTICLE 101 TFEU .............. 38 II. A LITERAL AND SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU .......................................................................................... 38 A. Article 101 TFEU: An imperative but general clause ................... 38 B. Article 101 TFEU: the distinction between administrative sanctions and administrative measures ................................................................. 44 C. Article 23.2.a) of Regulation 1/2003: a forwarding provision ...... 47 D. Article 101 TFEU under the light of Article 2.2 of Regulation 2988/95: an administrative irregularity not an administrative sanction .. 49 E. A comparative law check: the U.S. Distinction between section 1 of the Sherman act and section 5 of the FTC act ................................... 51 III. A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU ............... 55 A. The drafting of Article 101 TFEU (85 TEC): a general clause aimed at dismantling “public cartels” in Europe ................................... 55 B. Regulation 17/62: a missed opportunity to develop detailed administrative rules .............................................................................. 64 2 C. The Consten judgment: the beginning of the theoretical confusion 70 D. Regulation 1/2003: a missed opportunity to conceptualize the system and develop adequate rules ....................................................... 76 PART TWO - INFORMATION EXCHANGES: A GREY ZONE OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU .......................................................................................... 82 IV. THE ECONOMIC THEORY ON INFORMATION EXCHANGES: A PANOPLY OF POSSIBILITIES ......................................................................... 85 A. Understanding collusion and what information exchanges tell us (hypothetically) about its possible existence ......................................... 87 B. The cons: how do information exchanges “facilitate” collusion? . 90 1. Focal point of coordination ...................................................... 91 2. Internal stability of coordination .............................................. 94 3. External stability of coordinated outcomes ............................... 97 C. The pros: How can information exchanges improve the market? . 98 D. The general conclusion: no conclusion beyond general guidelines as to their likely danger ....................................................................... 102 1. High risk ................................................................................ 104 2. Medium risk ........................................................................... 106 3. Low risk ................................................................................. 108 E. When are information exchanges dangerous? The structural elements ............................................................................................. 111 F. Information exchanges and market foreclosure .......................... 114 G. Summary ................................................................................... 115 3 V. INFORMATION EXCHANGES: ITS DIFFICULT FITTING WITHIN THE TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU ...... 118 H. The historical evolution of information exchanges under the Commission’s Notices and Guidelines ................................................ 120 I. Information exchanges as self-standing agreements: a “rara avis” 125 1. The meaning of agreement under the case law of the European Courts: why should it be quite rare that self-standing information exchange agreements amount to a finable anticompetitive infringement 125 2. Information exchange agreements as anticompetitive infringements: UK Tractors, Asnef-Equifax and some recent national decisions ......................................................................................... 127 3. Self-standing information exchange agreements: prohibition rather than punishment .................................................................... 130 J. The evolution of the concept of concerted practices jointly with that of information exchanges and why they have become almost synonyms 134 1. The original meaning of concerted practices: Dyestuffs ......... 135 2. Blurring the meaning of concertation and the distinction between agreements and concerted practices: Suiker and Hüls ..................... 142 3. Blurring the meaning of causality: a presumption of presumptions: Anic a step forward from Hüls ................................. 150 4. Blurring the meaning of reciprocity: from exchanges to disclosure, and from concerted practices to “a” practice: Cimenteries and British Sugar ............................................................................ 152 5. The culmination of the distortion: T-Mobile ........................... 154 4 K. Information exchanges as infringements by object or effect ...... 164 1. Information exchanges, cartels and infringements by object ... 168 2. A critical reading of Bananas: just a cartel case ...................... 171 3. The need for proper legal rules confirmed .............................. 175 L. Information exchanges under Article 101.3 ............................... 176 PART THREE - OUR PROPOSAL................................................................... 178 VI. A DOGMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR A COHERENT APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION ...................................................................................................... 178 A. Competition as a legally protected value or “Rechtsgutsbegriff”, understanding supra-individual values deserving legal protection and their mechanisms of protection ........................................................... 180 B. Competition law infringements as a continuum of “endangering” behaviors, the usefulness of the distinction between harm and risk ..... 183 1. Article 101 TFEU under the criminal law lens: a typology of offences .......................................................................................... 188 2. The problem of enforcing principles rather than rules ............ 190 C. The limits to the protection of competition: culpability, harm and legality, three key safeguards. ............................................................. 192 1. The culpability principle ........................................................ 192 2. The harm principle ................................................................. 195 3. Legality and legal certainty .................................................... 197 4. “Concertation” under these principles .................................... 199 D. The degrees of protection: attempting to endanger..................... 202 VII. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 204 5 VII. CONCLUSIONES ..................................................................................... 210 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 218 6 I. INTRODUCCIÓN A continuación se expone lo que comenzó siendo un trabajo sobre los intercambios de información y ha terminado siendo un estudio sobre las bases dogmáticas y teóricas del artículo 101 TFEU. En principio, podría parecer que estas dos cuestiones no guardan ninguna conexión entre sí. No obstante, como el lector comprenderá, existe un nexo lógico entre ambas. Tradicionalmente, los intercambios de información se configuraron como prácticas facilitadoras de los cárteles y, como tales, permitían extraer conclusiones y mayores indicios sobre la existencia de los mismos. No obstante, con el paso del tiempo, la Comisión Europea ha ido ampliando su relevancia, llegando a concluir que los intercambios de información pueden constituir, por sí mismos, una infracción del Derecho de la competencia. Esta nueva figura se conoce como los intercambios autónomos de información. A grandes rasgos, el reconocimiento de esta infracción supone, de hecho, una anticipación considerable de la frontera de protección del bien jurídico protegido “competencia”. Ya no es necesario demostrar la existencia de un cártel, sino que es suficiente demostrar que el intercambio podría llevar, con toda lógica, a la formación de dicho cartel. Ello plantea a nuestro modo ver tres grandes cuestiones (con sus múltiples derivadas) que se tratan en la presente tesis: si existe una base económica para ello, si es razonable jurídicamente ampliar la frontera de protección y, por último, si ello tiene cabida dentro del artículo 101 TFEU. Este último precepto liga los tres elementos.