DOCSLIB.ORG

Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength volume 19, no. 25 Wittgenstein used to say to me, “Go the bloody hard way”; and july 2019 he would write this in letters as well.1 I remember this more of- ten, perhaps, than any other single remark of his. He might have added something like …: “Otherwise you will never be able to do what you want to do. There is … something important in go- ing … against the tendency to seek comfort or stimulus in this Honesty, Humility, or that.” — Rush Rhees2 Wittgenstein writes: “you can’t think decently if you don’t want to hurt yourself …”3 This was … something he said in one way or another to any of his pupils who were close to him … Courage, & Strength: [P]hilosophy for Wittgenstein was a source of suffering… [a] nd… you could not be intimate with him without knowing that 4 Later Wittgenstein on the Difficulties of this was so. — Maurice O’Connor Drury If, at the end, no visible traces of your influence remain in my Philosophy and the Philosophical Virtues thought, which is extremely unlikely, so shall I at least always have to acknowledge that I learnt from you, how difficult phi- losophy must be, if it is to be more than a collection of materi- als for academic controversy and learned conversation. — G.H. von Wright to Wittgenstein (WC:414) One of the things which sets Wittgenstein apart from many other phi- Gabriel Citron losophers is that he does not just try to point out where and in what Princeton University 1. See, for example, WC:371. (A key to all the bibliographic abbreviations can be found at the end of the paper.) 2. Rush Rhees, ‘The Study of Philosophy’, in his Without Answers, London, Rout- ledge & Keegan Paul, 1969, p. 169. This quotation also opens the paper by James Conant which provided the early impetus for my thoughts on these matters (see his ‘On Going the Bloody Hard Way in Philosophy’, in The Possibilities of Sense, ed. John H. Whittaker, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2002, pp. © 2019 Gabriel Citron 85–129). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 3. WC:370. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. 4. Maurice O’Connor Drury, The Selected Writings of Maurice O’Connor Drury on Wittgenstein, Philosophy, Religion and Psychiatry, ed. John Hayes, London, <www.philosophersimprint.org/019025/> Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 212–3 [Letter to Rush Rhees, Spring 1966]; I have silently corrected a typo. gabriel citron Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength ways we go wrong in our thinking, but — like Kant, Nietzsche, and It was likely with this insight in mind that Wittgenstein stressed to Heidegger — he also has a lot to say about why we go wrong in the Maurice Drury in 1930 that “the distinction between a philosopher ways we do. Wittgenstein’s diagnoses of the roots of our philosophical and a very clever man is a real one and of great importance” (F:III:195). missteps usually take a double form: first he identifies a “difficulty of At least one of the things which distinguishes a philosopher from philosophy” which tends to trip us up in our philosophizing, and then someone who is merely very clever is that the good philosopher — in he identifies a way of avoiding this difficulty, usually in the form of addition to various intellectual talents and skills — needs certain core certain qualities which would allow us to overcome the difficulty in virtues of character, which I will call the ‘philosophical virtues.’ It is question. these philosophical virtues — as well as the difficulties of the will that Broadly speaking, Wittgenstein distinguished between two kinds of make them necessary — which will be the subject of this paper. difficulty in philosophy: intellectual difficulties on the one hand, and In insisting upon the central importance of certain virtues of char- difficulties of the will on the other. And he thought that each of these acter in the practice of philosophy, Wittgenstein should be counted kinds of difficulty demands a different kind of quality to overcome it: a notable predecessor to contemporary virtue epistemologists of the the intellectual difficulties must be overcome by various intellectual ‘responsibilist’ variety.6 His approach, however, is both narrower and talents or skills, and the difficulties of the will must be overcome by broader than that of many virtue epistemologists. It is narrower be- various virtues of character. Of these two sets of philosophically helpful cause most of Wittgenstein’s remarks on this topic focus on those vir- qualities, Wittgenstein was clear as to which was the more important. tues relevant to ideal philosophical practice specifically, rather than to As he once said to Rush Rhees: ideal intellectual conduct across the board. On the other hand his en- gagement is also broader than that of most virtue epistemologists, be- [I]n philosophy character will often make up for a lesser cause in discussing the philosophical virtues he does not take himself degree of intellect and talent — whereas it doesn’t hold to be contributing merely to a particular sub-field of philosophy (viz. the other way: a more powerful intellect but want of char- epistemology), nor to a specific research program (viz. the analysis acter. “God give a man character: it will carry him over all of the concept of knowledge), but rather, to be investigating the pre- sorts of gaps and difficulties.” (WPCR:56–75) conditions of proper engagement in philosophy altogether. Moreover, 5. This relative weighting of character above intellect in the good practice of Wittgenstein’s investigations of the philosophical virtues are intended philosophy accounts for Wittgenstein’s consistent judgement of G.E. Moore to be practical: to guide himself and his students towards becoming as the preferable philosopher over Bertrand Russell (at least in Russell’s later years). Knut Tranøy, for example, recalled that on one occasion Wittgenstein better philosophers, and indeed better people. Thus, in discussing phi- “compared Russell and Moore, saying that although Moore only had a fraction losophy’s difficulties of the will and the virtues needed to overcome of Russell’s intellectual powers, Moore possessed something which Russell them Wittgenstein is addressing himself to all would-be philosophers had lost: sincerity. That is why, he added, one can still profitably discuss with Moore while it has not been possible for many years to do so with Russell” (F:IV:127). More pointedly, F.R. Leavis reported his impression that Wittgen- just how far a good character can genuinely take one in philosophy even in stein had once said to him: “Moore? – he shows you how far a man can go the absence of great talent. who has absolutely no intelligence whatsoever” (F:II:249). When this remark is understood in the context of Wittgenstein’s judgement of the greater im- 6. For an overview of contemporary virtue epistemology — including a sum- portance of character than intelligence in being a good philosopher, it turns mary of the differences between its responsibilist and reliabilist forms — see from a mocking disparagement of Moore’s philosophical achievements, into Heather Battaly, ‘Virtue Epistemology’, Philosophy Compass, 3:4 (2008), pp. a sincere and serious expression of admiration for Moore’s character and for 639–63. philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol. 19, no. 25 (july 2019) gabriel citron Honesty, Humility, Courage, & Strength in the hope of making a genuine difference in their approach to, and his account of the virtues of character that are needed to overcome practice of, philosophy.7 those desires. Section 3 will address our distorting desires regarding Despite being obsessed with the philosophical virtues — and the philosophical form and the virtues needed to overcome them. Section degrees to which he and others did or did not embody them — Witt- 4 will then discuss Wittgenstein’s view of the place of the philosophi- genstein nowhere wrote about them in a systematic manner. Rather, in cal virtues in philosophical pedagogy. And finally, in Section 5, I will order to uncover his understanding of these virtues, we must engage consider how to take seriously the role played in our philosophizing in a speculative reconstruction of his position by gathering together by distorting desires and the philosophical virtues while avoiding the and organizing the many seemingly offhanded remarks which he left danger of having our philosophical disagreements devolve into the scattered throughout his notebooks, diaries, letters, and lectures, and exchange of merely ad hominem moral and psychological attacks. in reports of conversations he had with students and friends. When we do so, we find a small number of recurrent concepts and concerns, 1. Difficulties of the Will Regarding Philosophical Content and the emergence of a remarkably consistent and systematic position. The Big Typescript contains what could probably be considered the lo- The purpose of this paper is to set forth this position. cus classicus for Wittgenstein’s remarks on the difficulties of the will According to Wittgenstein, philosophy’s “difficulties of the will” de- regarding philosophical content: rive from the fact that many of us have strong desires which interfere [The] difficulty of philosophy [is] not the intellec- with our philosophizing and lead us astray. There are many ways that tual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of these various desires could be categorized, but one helpful option is to a change of attitude. Resistance of the will must be divide them into two classes: desires regarding philosophical content, overcome: … [P]hilosophy … require[s] a resignation, and desires regarding philosophical form. The former class covers de- but one of feeling, not of intellect. And maybe that is sires to affirm particular philosophical positions or kinds of positions, what makes it so difficult for many… (…What makes a and the latter class covers desires to philosophize in particular styles subject difficult to understand… is the antithesis between or to undertake particular kinds of philosophical projects.8 Section 1 of understanding the subject and what most people want to what follows will sketch Wittgenstein’s understanding of our distort- see.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • EARLY MODERN WOMEN WRITERS and HUMILITY AS RHETORIC: AEMILIA LANYER's TABLE-TURNING USE of MODESTY Thesis Submitted to the Co
    EARLY MODERN WOMEN WRITERS AND HUMILITY AS RHETORIC: AEMILIA LANYER’S TABLE-TURNING USE OF MODESTY Thesis Submitted to The College of Arts and Sciences of the UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of Master of Arts in English By Kathryn L. Sandy-Smith UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON Dayton, Ohio August 2013 EARLY MODERN WOMEN WRITERS AND HUMILITY AS RHETORIC: AEMILIA LANYER’S TABLE-TURNING USE OF MODESTY Name: Sandy-Smith, Kathryn Louise APPROVED BY: ________________________ Elizabeth Ann Mackay, Ph.D. Committee Co-chair ________________________ Sheila Hassell Hughes, Ph.D. Committee Member __________________________ Rebecca Potter, Ph.D. Committee Co-chair ii ABSTRACT EARLY MODERN WOMEN WRITERS AND HUMILITY AS RHETORIC: AEMILIA LANYER’S TABLE-TURNING USE OF MODESTY Name: Sandy-Smith, Kathryn L. University of Dayton Advisor: Elizabeth Mackay, Ph.D. 16th and 17th century women’s writing contains a pervasive language of self-effacement, which has been documented and analyzed by scholars, but the focus remains on the sincerity of the act, even though humility was often employed as a successful rhetorical tool by both classic orators and Renaissance male writers. Aemilia Lanyer’s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum has been read in this tradition of sincere humility, and even when it has not, scholars have focused on the dedicatory paratext, thus minimizing Lanyer’s poetic prowess. I argue that Lanyer’s poem-proper employs modesty as a strategic rhetorical device, giving added credibility and importance to her work. By removing the lens of modesty as sincerity, I hope to encourage a reexamination of the texts of Renaissance women and remove them from their ‘silent, chaste and obedient’ allocation by/for the modern reader.
    [Show full text]
  • Transformative Change: Honesty Responsibility Courage Humility
    Transformative Change: Honesty Responsibility Courage Humility Michael C. Misja, Ph.D. JoAnn Streeter Shade, D.Min. Gracednotes Ministries 425 East Walnut Street Ashland, Ohio 44805 [email protected] Copyright © 2014 Michael C. Misja and JoAnn Streeter Shade Unless otherwise indicated, all scripture quotations are from the ESV® Bible (The Holy Bible, English Standard Version®), copyright © 2001 by Crossway, a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers. Used by permission. All rights reserved. Scripture quotations marked MSG are taken from The Message. Copyright © 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002. Used by permission of NavPress Publishing Group. Scripture quotations marked NLT are taken from the Holy Bible, New Living Translation, copyright ©1996, 2004, 2007, 2013 by Tyndale House Foundation. Used by permission of Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., Carol Stream, Illinois 60188. All rights reserved. Scripture quotations marked AMP are taken from the Amplified Bible, Copyright © 1954, 1958, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1987 by The Lockman Foundation. Used by permission. ISBN – 13:978-1500393571 ISBN – 10:1500393576 Printed in the United States All rights reserved. CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter 1 The Invitation 5 Chapter 2 Groundwork 23 Chapter 3 Life in Deception 37 Chapter 4 Ruthless Honesty 55 Chapter 5 The Shame Pit 83 Chapter 6 The Blame Game 99 Chapter 7 Responsibility: Freedom to Love 117 Chapter 8 Petrified by Fear 133 Chapter 9 A Profile in Courage 153 Chapter 10 Pride 173 Chapter 11 Humility 189 Chapter 12 Toward Maturity 211 About the Authors 221 In dedication to those who seek after truth, personal responsibility, courage and humility, and who have allowed us to share the journey with them.
    [Show full text]
  • Unit 13 Emotivism: Charles Stevenson*
    Emotivism: Charles UNIT 13 EMOTIVISM: CHARLES Stevenson STEVENSON* Structure 13.0 Objectives 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Definition 13.3 The Significance of Emotivism in Moral Philosophy 13.4 Philosophical Views 13.5 Let Us Sum Up 13.6 Key Words 13.7 Further Readings and References 13.8 Answers to Check Your Progress 13.0 OBJECTIVES This unit provides: An introductory understanding and significance of emotivism in moral and ethical philosophy. Many aspects of emotivism have been explored by philosophers in the history of modern philosophy but this unit focuses Charles Stevenson’s version of emotivism. 13.1 INTRODUCTION Emotivism is a meta-ethical theory in moral philosophy, which was developed by the American philosopher Charles Stevenson (1908-1978). He was born and raised in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1908. He studied philosophy under G E Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and was most influenced by the latter. From 1933 onwards, and continuing after the war, he developed the emotive theory of ethics at the University of Harvard. Stevenson’s contributions were largely in the area of meta-ethics. Post-war debates in the field of ethics were charceterised by ‘the linguistic turn’ in philosophy, and the increasing emphasis of scientific knowledge on philosophy, especially under the influence of the school of Logical Positivism. Questions such as, do ‘scientific facts’ play a role in ethical considerations? how far feelings and emotions influence our understanding of morality?, became significant. Therefore, to respond to these and related issues, philosophers developed different ethical theories. Stevenson was one of the philosophers who developed the theory of emotivism against this backdrop, and defended his theory to justify how feelings and non-cognitive attributes constitute our understanding of morality and moral judgments.
    [Show full text]
  • Healing Through Humility: an Examination of Augustine's Confessions Catherine Maurer [email protected]
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Northern Michigan University: The Commons Northern Michigan University NMU Commons All NMU Master's Theses Student Works 7-2018 Healing through Humility: An Examination of Augustine's Confessions Catherine Maurer [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.nmu.edu/theses Part of the Biblical Studies Commons, Catholic Studies Commons, and the Christianity Commons Recommended Citation Maurer, Catherine, "Healing through Humility: An Examination of Augustine's Confessions" (2018). All NMU Master's Theses. 561. https://commons.nmu.edu/theses/561 This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at NMU Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All NMU Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of NMU Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. HEALING THROUGH HUMILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF AUGUSTINE’S CONFESSIONS By Catherine G. Maurer THESIS Submitted to Northern Michigan University In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Office of Graduate Education and Research July 2018 © 2018 Catherine G. Maurer SIGNATURE APPROVAL FORM Healing through Humility: An Examination of Augustine’s Confessions This thesis by Catherine G. Maurer is recommended for approval by the student’s Thesis Committee and Department Head in the Department of English and by the Interim Director of Graduate Education and Research. __________________________________________________________ Committee Chair: Dr. Lynn Domina Date __________________________________________________________ First Reader: Dr. David Wood Date __________________________________________________________ Second Reader (if required): Date __________________________________________________________ Department Head: Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • An Upward Spiral Between Gratitude and Humility
    Article Social Psychological and Personality Science 1-10 An Upward Spiral Between Gratitude ª The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permission: and Humility sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1948550614534700 spps.sagepub.com Elliott Kruse1, Joseph Chancellor2, Peter M. Ruberton2, 2 AQ 1 and Sonja Lyubomirsky Abstract In two experiments and one diary study, we examined the relationship between self- and other-oriented processes by considering AQ 2 how gratitude can influence humility and vice versa. Humility is characterized by low self-focus, secure sense of self, and increased valuation of others. Gratitude is marked by a sense that one has benefited from the actions of another. In the first experiment, participants who wrote a gratitude letter showed higher state humility than those who performed a neutral activity. In the second experiment, baseline state humility predicted the amount of gratitude felt after writing a gratitude letter compared to a neutral activity. Finally, in a 14-day diary study, humility and gratitude mutually predicted one another, even after controlling for the other’s prior level. Our results suggest that humility and gratitude are mutually reinforcing. Keywords humility, gratitude, self-focus, upward spiral That the self is embedded in a network of social relationships is may be grouped together (e.g., as facets of a larger factor) and one of the oldest social psychological observations (Mead, rarely teased apart. 1934). Over the past century, researchers have theorized how perceptions of others can influence self-perceptions (Cooley, 1902; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner, 1985), and how Humility self-perception can drive person perception (Cronbach, 1955; Humility is a hypoegoic state (Leary & Guadagno, 2011) the- Robbins & Krueger, 2000).
    [Show full text]
  • 'Solved by Sacrifice' : Austin Farrer, Fideism, and The
    ‘SOLVED BY SACRIFICE’ : AUSTIN FARRER, FIDEISM, AND THE EVIDENCE OF FAITH Robert Carroll MacSwain A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. Andrews 2010 Full metadata for this item is available in the St Andrews Digital Research Repository at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/920 This item is protected by original copyright ‘SOLVED BY SACRIFICE’: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith Robert Carroll MacSwain A thesis submitted to the School of Divinity of the University of St Andrews in candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The saints confute the logicians, but they do not confute them by logic but by sanctity. They do not prove the real connection between the religious symbols and the everyday realities by logical demonstration, but by life. Solvitur ambulando, said someone about Zeno’s paradox, which proves the impossibility of physical motion. It is solved by walking. Solvitur immolando, says the saint, about the paradox of the logicians. It is solved by sacrifice. —Austin Farrer v ABSTRACT 1. A perennial (if controversial) concern in both theology and philosophy of religion is whether religious belief is ‘reasonable’. Austin Farrer (1904-1968) is widely thought to affirm a positive answer to this concern. Chapter One surveys three interpretations of Farrer on ‘the believer’s reasons’ and thus sets the stage for our investigation into the development of his religious epistemology. 2. The disputed question of whether Farrer became ‘a sort of fideist’ is complicated by the many definitions of fideism.
    [Show full text]
  • Kreisel and Wittgenstein
    Kreisel and Wittgenstein Akihiro Kanamori September 17, 2018 Georg Kreisel (15 September 1923 { 1 March 2015) was a formidable math- ematical logician during a formative period when the subject was becoming a sophisticated field at the crossing of mathematics and logic. Both with his technical sophistication for his time and his dialectical engagement with man- dates, aspirations and goals, he inspired wide-ranging investigation in the meta- mathematics of constructivity, proof theory and generalized recursion theory. Kreisel's mathematics and interactions with colleagues and students have been memorably described in Kreiseliana ([Odifreddi, 1996]). At a different level of interpersonal conceptual interaction, Kreisel during his life time had extended engagement with two celebrated logicians, the mathematical Kurt G¨odeland the philosophical Ludwig Wittgenstein. About G¨odel,with modern mathemat- ical logic palpably emanating from his work, Kreisel has reflected and written over a wide mathematical landscape. About Wittgenstein on the other hand, with an early personal connection established Kreisel would return as if with an anxiety of influence to their ways of thinking about logic and mathematics, ever in a sort of dialectic interplay. In what follows we draw this out through his published essays|and one letter|both to elicit aspects of influence in his own terms and to set out a picture of Kreisel's evolving thinking about logic and mathematics in comparative relief.1 As a conceit, we divide Kreisel's engagements with Wittgenstein into the \early", \middle", and \later" Kreisel, and account for each in successive sec- tions. x1 has the \early" Kreisel directly interacting with Wittgenstein in the 1940s and initial work on constructive content of proofs.
    [Show full text]
  • THE UNIVERSITY of WESTERN ONTARIO DEPARTMENT of PHILOSOPHY Graduate Course Outline 2016-17
    THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY Graduate Course Outline 2016-17 Philosophy 9653A: Proseminar Fall Term 2016 Instructor: Robert J. Stainton Class Days and Hours: W 2:30-5:30 Office: StH 3126 Office Hours: Tu 2:00-3:00 Classroom: TBA Phone: 519-661-2111 ext. 82757 Web Site: Email: [email protected] http://publish.uwo.ca/~rstainto/ Blog: https://robstainton.wordpress.com/ DESCRIPTION A survey of foundational and highly influential texts in Analytic Philosophy. Emphasis will be on four sub-topics, namely Language and Philosophical Logic, Methodology, Ethics and Epistemology. Thematically, the focal point across all sub-topics will be the tools and techniques highlighted in these texts, which reappear across Analytic philosophy. REQUIRED TEXT A.P. Martinich and David Sosa (eds.)(2011) Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. [All papers except the Stine and Thomson are reprinted here.] OBJECTIVES The twin objectives are honing of philosophical skills and enriching students’ familiarity with some “touchstone” material in 20th Century Analytic philosophy. In terms of skills, the emphasis will be on: professional-level philosophical writing; close reading of notoriously challenging texts; metaphilosophical reflection; and respectful philosophical dialogue. COURSE REQUIREMENTS Twelve weekly “Briefing Notes” on Selected Readings: 60% Three “Revised Brief Notes”: 25% Class Participation: 15% COURSE READINGS Language and Philosophical Logic Gottlob Frege (1892), “On Sense and Reference” Gottlob Frege (1918), “The Thought” Bertrand Russell (1905), “On Denoting” Ludwig Wittgenstein (1933-35 [1958]), Excerpts from The Blue and Brown Books Peter F. Strawson (1950), “On Referring” H. Paul Grice (1957), “Meaning” H. Paul Grice (1975), “Logic and Conversation” Saul Kripke (1971), “Identity and Necessity” Hilary Putnam (1973), “Meaning and Reference” Methodology A.J.
    [Show full text]
  • Meek, Humble, Yet Assertive?
    ROTARY DISTRICT 5440 PEACEBUILDER NEWSLETTER WINTER 2018 NUMBER 6 MEEK, HUMBLE, YET ASSERTIVE? William M. Timpson and Bob Meroney Fort Collins Rotary Club and Lindsey Pointer, 2017 Rotary Global Grant Recipient Peacemaking is everyone’s business, but it is not easy and requires commitment, passion, love, and thoughtfulness. Our hope is that this newsletter will provide new ideas, suggestions and possibilities for all Rotarians to participate. We welcome your ideas on how to promote and encourage conflict resolution. In this 6th newsletter we contrast how being both assertive and yet meek and humble contribute to better relationships. WHO ARE THE BEST PEACEMAKERS? William M. Timpson Professor of Education, Colorado State University Member of the Fort Collins Rotary Club Many of the skills of peacemaking have emerged from work with at-risk populations. Assertiveness training can help anyone—students, teachers, parents, community and business leaders, professionals and average citizens and others—distinguish between actions that are aggressive and those that could be considered submissive. These differences can be important when considering actions and attitudes that are, instead, driven by ego, for example. Here is where humility and meekness, together with a commitment to assertive communication, offer an alternative to power, control and violence. Invariably, it is when people let their emotions fuel their aggressive tendencies that violence can erupt. Unfortunately, it can also be true that retreating to a submissive state can undermine a democratic process that benefits from everyone’s participation. Humility and weakness married to assertiveness can help people take the necessary initiative to address real problems and move toward sustainable solutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Paul's Humility
    1 True Mother Kang Hyun Shil Paul’s Humility May 4, 2017 Bible Reading: 1st Timothy 1:15 15 This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief. Good morning everyone, Today I will be speaking to you on the topic: The Humility of Paul. You all know very well that Paul was a very famous person. Paul wrote thirteen books in the Bible, and their content is enough to really inspire us and to deeply resonate within our hearts every time we read them. He was a very prominent person even in his time. His parents were Jews and he studied under Gamaliel. He was an apostle and there was no sin which anyone could detract from him. In the beginning he was strongly opposed to Jesus and to the Gospels. But he changed his faith as the result of a voice that came to him from Heaven. In the midst of his strong persecution against Christianity, one night on the road, he heard a voice from Heaven. It was the Lord’s and it said, “I am Jesus whom you have been persecuting so much!” and that is how he became an Apostle. Paul witnessed the martyrdom of Stephen, who was the first martyr, and at the scene he praised it; he raised both hands in praising it. He converted to Christianity and over the next decades he did a tremendous amount of work for it. His age is said to have been three years younger than Jesus.
    [Show full text]
  • Read the Litany of Humility
    LITANY OF HUMILITY We often forget that Christ loved to be silent. He set out for the desert, not to go into exile, but to encounter God. And at the most crucial moment in his life, when there was screaming on all sides, covering him with all sorts of lies and calumnies, when the high priest asked him: “Have you no answer to make?” Jesus preferred silence. It is a case of true amnesia: Catholics no longer know that silence is sacred because it is God’s dwelling place. How can we rediscover the sense of silence as the manifestation of God? This is the tragedy of the modern world: man separates himself from God because he no longer believes in the value of silence. Without silence, God disappears in the noise. And this noise becomes all the more obsessive because God is absent. Unless we rediscover silence, we are lost. We are rushed into nothingness, without silence. Time before the Blessed Sacrament. (Not recorded on Activity Reports.) This is more prevalent on some, who in my opinion need to sit with Jesus and discern their future more closely. The diaconate and ordination is not a prize to be won or a personal goal to be achieved. It’s not about authority, it’s about abandonment. Robert Cardinal Sarah’s book, “The Power of Silence” had only one aim, which is summed up in this thought: “Silence is difficult, but it makes man able to allow himself to be led by God. Silence is more important than any other human work.
    [Show full text]
  • A Defence of Emotivism
    A Defence of Emotivism Leslie Allan Published online: 16 September 2015 Copyright © 2015 Leslie Allan As a non-cognitivist analysis of moral language, Charles Stevenson’s sophisticated emotivism is widely regarded by moral philosophers as a substantial improvement over its historical antecedent, radical emotivism. None the less, it has come in for its share of criticism. In this essay, Leslie Allan responds to the key philosophical objections to Stevenson’s thesis, arguing that the criticisms levelled against his meta-ethical theory rest largely on a too hasty reading of his works. To cite this essay: Allan, Leslie 2015. A Defence of Emotivism, URL = <http://www.RationalRealm.com/philosophy/ethics/defence-emotivism.html> To link to this essay: www.RationalRealm.com/philosophy/ethics/defence-emotivism.html Follow this and additional essays at: www.RationalRealm.com This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sublicensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms and conditions of access and use can be found at www.RationalRealm.com/policies/tos.html Leslie Allan A Defence of Emotivism 1. Introduction In this essay, my aim is to defend an emotive theory of ethics. The particular version that I will support is based on C. L. Stevenson’s signal work in Ethics and Language [1976], originally published in 1944, and his later revisions and refinements to this theory presented in his book, Facts and Values [1963]. I shall not, therefore, concern myself with the earlier and less sophisticated versions of the emotive theory, such as those presented by A.
    [Show full text]