MIDWAY: THE BATTLE THAT DOOMED , THE JAPANESE NAVYS STORY PDF, EPUB, EBOOK

Mitsuo Fuchida, | 352 pages | 01 Mar 2001 | Naval Institute Press | 9781557504289 | English | Annopolis, United States Japanese Story of the

Walter Lord used these words to describe the American forces that fought at the Battle of Midway. It appeared that David had, again, slain Goliath. As with many things, the story was not so simple. When Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan was published in by the Naval Institute Press, a translation and expansion of the Japanese version, many embraced it as an important and pivotal addition to the literature of the battle. Unlike Germany, which saw a number of postwar memoirs published by all manner of veterans, the Japanese did not rush to get their stories told after the war. Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully later observed in the differences in the Japanese national culture played an important role, as few had reason to lose face by recounting tales of their own defeats See Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway , Potomac Books, For more than sixty years, the work of Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya on the Japanese side of the Battle of Midway was taken as the authoritative account by the likes Gordon Prange, Walter Lord, and other Western historians. As one of the few surviving officers of the battle, he could offer insights into the command decisions made on the bridge of the Akagi that June morning. This was the battle that the general public in Japan did not learn about until this book was initially published in , the English version appearing in Later books on this battle, specifically "Shattered Sword" published bring to light many inaccuracies in Fuchida's work, but "Shattered Sword" was able to make extensive use of Japanese primary sources, most unavailable to Fuchida Great read from the Japanese side of the battle, from the pilot that led the attack on . Later books on this battle, specifically "Shattered Sword" published bring to light many inaccuracies in Fuchida's work, but "Shattered Sword" was able to make extensive use of Japanese primary sources, most unavailable to Fuchida at the time of his work. My recommendation is to read both, and other works on the battle to get a more fuller view. Jan 22, Sean rated it liked it Shelves: war-history. This wasn't the book I read. I bought a paperback book about the battle of Midway at a school "book fair" when I was in fourth grade. I honestly can't remember much about the book, except that I really liked it at the time. I may still have my copy buried in a box of paperbacks in the loft. I may just read it again if I've still got it. I suspect Fuchida's book is an interesting read, showing that very decisi This wasn't the book I read. I suspect Fuchida's book is an interesting read, showing that very decisive battle from the view of the Japanese navy--instead of the victorious U. View all 3 comments. Oct 24, Peter Galamaga rated it liked it. The Battle of Midway from the Japanese perspective. A bit slow and detail focused for the first half of the book where the lead-up to the battle is described. As a former US Navy officer, I found the battle descriptions fascinating and horrifying. I can't imagine a worse nightmare than being trapped aboard a flaming warship during battle. One significant takeaway that I got from this book - and something that I'm finding as a constant in all of the history accounts I read - is that "experts" are n The Battle of Midway from the Japanese perspective. One significant takeaway that I got from this book - and something that I'm finding as a constant in all of the history accounts I read - is that "experts" are not to be relied upon. This is an adequate read into the Battle of Midway. Unfortunately some information that has been disproven over the years is contained in here such as the Japanese were on the verge of launching their airstrike against the American fleet when their own carriers were struck or the fact that two-phase search patterns should have been used when the concept hadn't yet even been conceived. The language and narrative is easy to read and the Japanese Order of Battle seems quite complete; there is no Ame This is an adequate read into the Battle of Midway. The language and narrative is easy to read and the Japanese Order of Battle seems quite complete; there is no American equivalent provided. Jan 24, Dave rated it it was amazing. A must read for any student of Midway if only to appreciate the view from the Japanese perspective as they handily beat off attack after attack during the epic day and began to feel truly invincible The rest is history as the tide shifted in the war Jan 01, Ronald Roche rated it really liked it. This is a crucial read for anyone who wants to understand not only how, but more importantly why the battle happened the way it did. I have to say, most of the books I've read about Midway have done a good job at using eyewitness accounts from both sides, but since Fuchida was a senior planner for the IJN, his account is redolent with the sort of insights that only an insider can give. Apr 14, Mark Mears rated it really liked it. I am glad I took the time to listen to this book from the Japanese perspective on Midway. I learned some interesting information. I would have liked to hear more personal details and impressions from Mr. Fuchida in regards to his experiences. The criticisms of leaders and the Japanese people as a whole perhaps played well in the climate of the fifties, however analysis would be better. Overall I enjoyed the book. I looked for the 'Japanese Destroyer Captain' book that Natalie just profiled, but no luck at my library. However looking under the Roger Pineau tertiary author name led to this well reviewed 'Midway' book, which I have ordered from the Esquimalt branch of the Greater Victoria Library. Esquimalt is also home to Canada's western naval headquarters. Apr 29, Guy Saults rated it did not like it. I thought this was a great book when I first read it. Now I understand that the book is full of inaccuracies and gives a vey misleading account of the entire campaign. Historians are still scratching their heads wondering about the author's motivations for obscuring the facts for so long I believe the book was never intended for a Westetn audience. Dec 26, Greg Gates rated it it was amazing. The Battle of Midway from the Japanese view-point. Both authors were in the battle, however, it would have been better if this could have been written by them immediately after the battle took place. With information from the American side available after the war some of their conclusions and explanations were biased. Sep 03, Mike Glaser rated it really liked it Shelves: japanese-navy. A great book to read in order to see a familiar campaign through the eyes of the other side. It is an even better book to read on how organizations can fail as the result of too much success. The IJN was a first class fighting organization and though an eventual American victory in the Pacific war was probable, it was in no way guaranteed. This book offered a fascinating Japanese perspective on the Battle of Midway. It pointed out the Japanese fleet's tactical errors, but more interestingly explored some philosophical and cultural causes for those errors. May 27, Robert Snow rated it it was amazing. Commander , who led the first air strike on Pearl Harbor wrote this book in the mid 50's and it is a classic work. I first read this in high school and it taught me to read history from different perspectives. Jan 09, Cedar Bristol added it. Fuchida was in command of the planes that bombed Pearl Harbor, and would have died at Midway but for an emergency appendectomy shortly before the battle. His take on the battle is the best place to start. Jun 05, Susan rated it it was amazing. I was very interested in learning about the Japanese viewpoint at that time in history. It was doubly informative because I met Mitsuo Fuchida in the late 50's after he became a Christian. God surely worked a miracle in his life. He became one of the most gentle of men I have ever met. Good book for fans of World War II history. I have read books on the battle of Midway before, but this is the first one I have read that tells the story from the Japanese prospective. A little too technical in places but I guess that was necessary to get the facts right. Aug 01, Kai rated it really liked it. Oct 08, Richard rated it it was amazing. Excellent account of the battle of Midway from the Japanese side. Jun 04, Corey rated it really liked it Shelves: military-history. If you want to know Midway from the Japanese perspective, from someone who was there, this is the book. Prior to this and subsequent to the take off of the initial attack unit, the fleet had Organization Number 4 ship-based torpedo planes stand by in readiness to act against any enemy surface vessels. It was decided, therefore, that a second attack would be directed against Midway. Orders were issued for the ship-based attack planes to remove their torpedoes and replace them with 80 land bombs. Two subsequent reports concerning the weather and the enemy's course and speed were received but since we had not been advised of details, the plane was ordered to:. Thus, it was definitely established that enemy carriers were operating in the vicinity. We are heading for it. Under orders issued at , the ship-based attack planes were already being re-equipped with 80 land bombs which made immediate take-offs of the ship-based attack planes in Organization Number 4, impossible. It was therefore decided that we would await the return of the Midway attack unit and then carry out a grand scale air attack. The Fleet was advised as follows:. In reply to this CarDiv 1 advised that its ship-based attack planes torpedo equipped would be ready for the take-off at and CarDiv 2 that its ship-based attack planes to be equipped with torpedoes upon their return from the first attack , would be ready for the take-off by from to Subsequent to this, every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. Akagi : 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga : 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu : 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. Soryu : 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. While we were engaged in this, the enemy struck. Communication facilities were knocked out of all damaged ships. There was little likelihood of the fires being extinguished in the immediate future. This task force was operating in waters to the north of the other one. No evidence of fire. No damage to flight deck. Three cruisers and 5 destroyers were in the vicinity. At about , leaving the carrier on the scene, the others proceeded eastward on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots. Each was being directly escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Distance between the two groups, 3 miles; course degrees; speed 12 knots. Course degrees, speed 12 knots. Judging from these reports, it seemed probable that the carrier damaged by torpedoes remained adrift until the following morning. From these evidences, it was possible to estimate that one carrier was sunk by bombing while another was seriously damaged by torpedoes. The damaged carrier was sunk the following day by submarine torpedoes. At , she only had 6 fighters, 5 bombers, and 4 torpedo planes left. The enemy attack unit which carried out a sustained attack from about was almost totally destroyed by friendly cover fighters. Up to , our surface units had suffered practically no damage and the skies were clear of enemy planes. At , the second wave struck. Fourteen enemy torpedo planes, splitting into two groups approached from the northwest. At , enemy torpedo planes were sighted bearing degrees. At a time when all of our surface. Resorting to evasive tactics, every effort was made to avoid the bombs, but one direct hit was sustained on the aft rim of the lift amidship and another on the rear guard of the port flight deck. Neither were fatal hits. Ammunition rooms were immediately ordered flooded, and all hands were ordered to fire-fighting stations. The pump system aboard, however, failed to function and it became apparent that the fire would not be extinguishable in the immediate future. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to bring the fire under control but it became increasingly evident that there would be little hope of success. In accordance with this order, the ship was scuttled at , in position N, W. Against enemy torpedo plane attacks which were carried out after , AA fire and evasive action proved completely successful. While still engaged in evasive action at about against the persistent enemy torpedo planes, 9 enemy dive bombers were suddenly sighted among the clouds at Every effort was made to counter these through evasive action and AA fire cover. These efforts were successful against the first, second, and third bombs, but 4 hit starboard, aft, while 7 was a direct hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Glass on the bridge was shattered and because of the smoke from the bombs, visibility from that point was reduced to zero. The captain ordered emergency steering apparatus put in operation. Bomb 8 hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Practically nothing of the bridge remained after this hit. All persons who were on the bridge at the time, including the captain, were killed in action. Bomb 9 also hit amidship. The situation became hopeless by and all hands were ordered to abandon ship. The fire on board spread to both the forward and aft fuel tanks by , causing two great explosions and the ship's sinking. Fire broke out as a result of dive-bombing attacks by 13 enemy dive bombers at From then until she resorted to evasive action under battle speed 1, while efforts were made to escape from the battle area and to fight fires. The flames could not be brought under control, however, and the fires killed one man after another in the engine rooms until further operation of the ship became impossible. Telephone communications with the engine rooms were maintained until the last. The manner in which the engine room personnel from Engineer Commander Kunizo Aimune down to the last man, carried on in the face of death which finally overtook them, can only be described as heroic. At , it seemed as if the fires might be brought under control, but at that time there was another induced explosion and the fierce fires were rekindled. It became evident that further fire-fightng operations were useless and all hands were ordered to prepare to abandon ship at This was followed by expressions of reverence and respect to the Emperor, the shouting of Banzai's, the lowering of the battle flag and command flag. The transfer of portrait and men was completed at After completion, of the transfer operations, the Division Commander and Captain remained aboard ship. They waved their caps to their men and with complete composure joined their fate with that of their ship. Three hits were scored on her at , , and By , the fires quickly spread and caused induced explosions from the bomb-storage room, torpedo-storage room, AA and machine-gun- ammunition rooms as well as from gasoline tanks. Fires enveloped the entire ship in no time. By both engines had stopped. At , attempts were made to steer her, but with the entire ship in flames, she was helpless. While most of the officers and men, including the Executive officer, had congregated on deck, having been forced to leave their posts due to the flames, a terrific explosion occurred. The explosion sent them flying into the water. Every effort was made to pick these men up and put them on the forward deck. Medical aid was given those needing it there. As soon as the fires broke out aboard ship, the captain, Ryusaku Yanagimoto, appeared on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. He took command from this post and pleaded that his men seek shelter and safety. He would allow no man to approach him. Flames surrounded him but he refused to give up his post. He was shouting "Banzai" over and over again when heroic death overtook him. Fires died down somewhat by about , and the air officer who was the acting commander, organized fire fighters with the intention of reboarding the ship. Therefore, the following order was issued at "We are now going to attack. At , the enemy changed its course to 90 degrees and the opportunity for battle seemed to be close at hand. It was deemed that if under these conditions, the enemy chose to strike, we would be at a distinct disadvantage in that we would be unable to carry out a decisive battle. We, therefore, turned about and proceeded westward, with the expectation of destroying the enemy in a night encounter. After destroying enemy striking force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. That meant that while all four of our carriers had been lost, the enemy had at least one. Moreover, as long as we were in the operational radius of their shore-based air, we would be at a very distinct disadvantage. By , the enemy began to retreat to the east on course 70, speed 20 knots, which further reduced our hopes for a night engagement. However, we still were determined to carry it out. At , the commander of DesDiv 4 ordered the destroyers under his command to stand by the various carriers assigned to them and to protect them from enemy submarines and task forces. This was the first inkling we had of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's carrier strength. Since we were not able to maintain contact with this task force after sundown, our hopes of a successful night engagement were further reduced. The enemy task force has retired to the east. Its carrier strength has practically been destroyed. Course 90 degrees, speed 20 knots. It was evident that the above message was sent as a result of an erroneous estimate of the enemy, for he still had 4 carriers in operational condition and his shore-based air on Midway was active. Therefore, the following message was sent:. Speed 18 knots. Although we had already reported the existing situation, we again sent the following despatch at All the carriers of our force have become inoperational. We plan to contact the enemy with float reconnaissance planes tomorrow morning. Type of the other two are unknown," was sent. We were not in contact with the enemy at that time and our destroyers had been assigned to the damaged carriers. Moreover, the enemy was approximately miles away which made a night engagement by us almost out of the question. Neither could sight the target, so it is assumed that she had sunk. She fought well without any support from any other units, and managed to down 4 of the enemy planes. Method one will be employed in. Search distance, miles and 60 miles to the left. Times of take-offs will be ordered later. The following revisions made for antisub air patrol for tomorrow, the 5th:. For three hours and 30 minutes following the first wave's take-off, the fleet will proceed on course degrees, speed, 24 knots. Thereafter, if the prevailing winds are from the east, course will be 45 degrees, speed 20; if west winds prevail, course will be degrees, speed, 20 knots. Change in plans may be necessitated by enemy actions. Bear this in mind in making preparations for assembling and taking aboard the air control units. Unless otherwise specified, the search units will take off at the same time as the attack units. Maintain 26 knot momentary stand-by and maximum battle speed 20 minute stand-by from , 5th. Allocation: For Watches 1 and 3, one plane each from all ships of CruDiv 8. For Watches 2 and 4, one plane each from all ships of BatDiv 3. Take off times from Watch 1 through Watch 5 in order : , , , , CruDiv 8 to Comdr. Mobile Force : "Lost enemy planes in direction bearing degrees. About 10 planes. Plan movements for west winds. Sight two surfaced enemy submarines in position bearing degrees, distance 80 miles from my take-off point. Subs' course, degrees. Sight enemy planes bearing 50 degrees to port 90 degree direction , distance Mobile Force : "We have completed our attack and are homeward bound. Mobile Force : " 1. Because of bad weather, I am returning. Position miles from point of origin Bearing 11 degrees from Midway There is need for a second attack wave. Assumed battle speed 5, heading into the above mentioned planes. Enemy torpedo planes divide into two groups. Counters with AA machine gun fire. Enemy machine gun strafing seriously injures two men manning the 3 AA gun. Revolving mechanism of said gun damaged repaired about half an hour later. Both transmitting antennas cut. Unable to use port Noted one torpedo to starboard, two to port of which one exploded automatically on parallel courses, and other which crossed astern. Three planes heading for this ship, bearing degrees to starboard, elevation 10 degrees. Re-equip yourselves with bombs. Enemy planes cut to three. Elevation 0. Friendly fighter takes after it. Main gun ammunition expended: No casualties to men or machines. Ammunition box attached to her 2 machine gun damaged by machine gun fire. Emergency repairs completed in about 10 minutes. Mobile Force : " 3. Sight what appears to be 10 enemy surface ships, in position bearing 10 degrees distance miles from Midway. Course degrees, speed over 20 knots. Recedes, gradually. Total of six enemy flying boats sighted of which five were shot down. Leave torpedoes on those attack planes which have not as yet been changed to bombs. Ascertain ship types, and maintain contact. Message from Comdr. Bombs dropped bearing 0 degrees. Mobile Force : " 5. At , the enemy is on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots. She assumes 5 battle speed. Carrier-based planes. These were the first carrier-based planes noted by this ship. Main guns, AA guns and machine guns commence firing. Mobile Force : "Enemy is composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers. Mobile Force : "The enemy is composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers. These immediately disappear in the clouds. Mobile Force : "The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier. No bomb hits. Evasive action. Speed, 30 knots. Equip yourselves with kilogram bombs. Mobile Force : " 8. Sight two additional enemy cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Course, degrees, speed, 20 knots. No hits. Friendly fighters engaged in air combat with the enemy. I am now homeward bound. Landing operations halted, and evasive action at top battle speed started. Mobile Force : " 2. Course degrees, speed 20 knots. Mobile Force : "Sight what appears to be two additional enemy cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Mobile Force : "I am now homeward bound. Go on the air with your long wave transmitter. After completing homing operations, proceed northward. We plan to contact and destroy the enemy task force. Plane 5 launched Enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers sighted at 5 A. Use your long wave transmitter. AA action readied. Several enemy planes sighted in position bearing 66 degrees to starboard, elevation 2 degrees; distance 20, meters. Smoke screen laid down. Kaga 's fighters take off. I am breaking off the contact and am returning home. My fuel supply is running low. I am breaking off the contact and returning home. Countered immediately with depth charges, but results unknown. Course 70, speed I am breaking off contact and returning Two directional salvos. About 32 enemy flying boats already brought down. Noted that 10 of the torpedo plane group were brought down by friendly fighters Akagi. We are on a northerly course, speed 24 knots. This attack is followed up with dive bombing attacks. Friendly surface units are heading into the enemy planes and engaging them with starboard main gun fire. Fail to sight enemy. I am in position bearing 20 degrees, distance miles from Midway Carried out air attack of AF Midway at Many enemy shore-based planes attacked us subsequent to We have suffered no damages. At , enemy composed 1 carrier, 7 cruisers and 5 destroyers sighted in grid position TO SHI RI 34, on course southwest, speed 20 knots. After destroying this, we plan to resume our AF Midway attack. Our position at is grid HE E A 00, course 30 degrees, speed 24 knots. Goes into evasive action to starboard then opens directional firing with her main guns. Wigwag from ComDesRon 10 to all units: "Sight a dozen or more planes bearing 60 degrees. Fighters ordered to take off as soon as readied. Then, seeing that she was about to be dive bombed, she makes maximum reverse turn. At about meters altitude, bombs were loosed. First was a near miss about 10 meters abeam of the bridge; second hit near the elevator amidship fatal hit ; third hit the flight deck on the portside, aft damage: several holes to after deck, 1 emergency personnel killed. The forward groups were successfully flooded immediately, but because of valve damages to those in the aft sections, none could be automatically flooded except the ammunition room for 2 main turret. They were finally flooded two and half hours later. She goes into a maximum turn and settled on course 0. Engines stopped all hands ordered to fire fighting station. By this time, the only guns which could keep up defensive fire were the first and second machine gun groups and 1 AA gun. Pumps ordered into action. Engine room ordered to put ship under full speed. Sight 5 additional cruisers and 5 destroyers in position bearing 10 degrees, distance miles from point of origin. They are on course degrees, speed 24 knots. Turns about and commences evasive maneuvers. In the mean-. These were immediately lost in the clouds. Lead the attack unit to it. Advise position of enemy carriers. The enemy is in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles from our fleet's position. Sight an enemy air force in position bearing 4 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Second wave composed of 18 bombers and 5 fighters has taken off. Plan to have an additional 9 ship-based attack planes and 3 fighters take off in one hour. Proceeding to port. Amount of clouds, 5; altitude of clouds, to 1,; wind direction, 85 degrees; wind velocity, 5 meters; visibility, 30 miles. Despatching one destroyer to each of the damaged carriers, and to proceed towards the Main Force. Effect measures to maintain contact with the enemy carrier by employment of float recco planes. Fires have broken out aboard them, and they are unable to participate in any operations. After attacking the enemy, I plan to lead my forces to the north. Grid position: HE I A Fierce fires raging on flight deck. These are accompanied by 22 destroyers. Fires have broken out making the ships inoperational. My position is grid : HE I A 00 We are going to attack the enemy. My position is TO U N Course 50 degrees, speed 28 knots. We are heading for the Mobile Force We are attacking the enemy carrier. Received Fires break out on carrier. The enemy was in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles at Sight what appears to be two large enemy cruisers in position bearing 15 degrees, distance miles from my point of origin. In addition, I see what appears to be 1 carrier and 1 destroyer. Course, north; speed 20 knots. All forces will attack the enemy in the AF Midway area in the following manner:. SubRon 3 and SubRon 5 will assume position along dispersal lines C. We are going to the attack of the enemy. Course 0 degrees. All safe except on flight deck. Every effort being made to fight the fires. Enemy carrier is burning. I see no friendly planes in range of visibility. I am homing. In addition, 6 cruisers and about 10 destroyers. Yorktown , accompanied by 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers, acting independently of the others. Patrolling along a north-south course ever since. There were no capital ships in Pearl Harbor up to 31 May. Prisoner had been training at base, and was not cognizant of capital ship movements. Course, 0 degrees. Position of enemy at Bearing degrees, distance miles of the point of origin MI. He is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. And bearing 2 degrees, distance miles from same. Course and speed same as above. Received : "Have float recco's of supporting force search between 0 degrees and 90 degrees, to a distance of miles. Reliability of report, excellent. I am in position bearing degrees, distance 30 miles from the. Scope of search, from 40 to degrees to a distance of miles. Advise revised position of enemy concentration. Bearing 20 degrees, distance miles from point of origin. Course , speed 24 knots. Enemy changed course to 90 degrees. According to report from planes, the enemy's position at is bearing 85 degrees, distance 90 miles from us. It is composed of 5 large cruisers and 1 carrier burning fiercely. The Emperor's portrait has been safely brought aboard this ship. Advise strength of enemy. It is composed of 5 large cruisers and 5 carriers; the latter were burning. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story | Semantic Scholar

It placed the reader alongside the participants in those crucial moments. Historians and readers were, for the first time, able to see the battle through the eyes of the Japanese. Given the importance placed on the Battle of Midway during the Pacific War it is little surprise the book was so devoured by Americans. The narrative supported American preconceptions about the battle and added a number of its own. Therein lies the problem of the book. This information did not make it to the United States because, even today, only a few of the volumes have been translated into English. This is not to say that Midway does not have a place in the historiography of the battle. It is still an important source and provides a unique view of the decisions that influenced the outcome of the battle. But, it must be balanced against, and augmented by, the scholarship of the Japanese and the recent work of John Lundstrom and Craig Symonds. The Battle of Midway was still an incredible victory for the Americans, just not in the manner that Fuchida relayed all those years ago. Your email address will not be published. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. In the spring of , convinced that the U. He was surprised to find his former flight engineer, Kazuo Kanegasaki, whom all had believed had died in the Battle of Midway. When questioned, Kanegasaki told Fuchida that they were not tortured or abused, much to Fuchida's surprise, and then went on to tell him of a young lady, Peggy Covell, who served them with the deepest love and respect, but whose parents, missionaries, had been killed by Japanese soldiers on the island of Panay in the . For Fuchida, this was inexplicable, as in the Bushido code revenge was not only permitted, it was "a responsibility" for an offended party to carry out revenge to restore honor. The murderer of one's parents would be a sworn enemy for life. He became almost obsessed trying to understand why anyone would treat their enemies with love and forgiveness. Extensive research of archives in Japan and the US resulted in no findings of anyone named Kazuo Kanegasaki. The same group researched newspaper articles, employment records and family letters related to Peggy Covell. Army Air Forces staff sergeant and bombardier , told his story of imprisonment, torture and his account of an "awakening to God. In September , after reading the Bible for himself, he became a Christian. In May , Fuchida and DeShazer met for the first time. In , Fuchida, along with a colleague, published an account of the Battle of Midway from the Japanese side. Fuchida remained dedicated to a similar initiative as the group for the remainder of his life. From Pearl Harbor to Calvary , and a expansion of his book Midway , a. Dillon and Gordon W. In , Fuchida was among a group of Japanese visiting the tour of U. Fuchida recognized Tibbets and had a conversation with him. Tibbets said to Fuchida that "[y]ou sure did surprise us [at Pearl Harbor]" in which he replied "what do you think you did to us [at ]? You did the right thing. You know the Japanese attitude at that time, how fanatic they were, they'd die for the Emperor Every man, woman, and child would have resisted that invasion with sticks and stones if necessary Can you imagine what a slaughter it would be to invade Japan? It would have been terrible. The Japanese people know more about that than the American public will ever know. According to Fuchida's son, his father had a green card allowing permanent residence in the U. This is contrary to the assertions of several authors. Fuchida died of complications caused by diabetes in Kashiwara , near on 30 May at the age of Fuchida was the author of three books: one on the Battle of Midway , one a memoir , and one on his conversion to Christianity. Fuchida was an important figure in the early portion of the Pacific War, and his written accounts, translated into English and published in the U. This process began in Japan in , with the publication of the Japanese official war history volume on the Battle of Midway , which explicitly contradicted Fuchida's version of events. Willmott and Haruo Tohmatsu in their Pearl Harbor , dismissed Fuchida's rendition of having demanded a third-wave against Pearl Harbor's fuel tanks as "blatant and shameless self-advertisement" regarding "an episode which never took place. Pearl Harbor In the film Tora! The map had previously been owned by Malcolm Forbes. The map was purchased by the Jay I. Kislak foundation, who then donated it to Miami-Dade Library. The library then sold it to the in From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Christian evangelist Author. This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. July Learn how and when to remove this template message. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Retrieved September 3, Originally published in , The Japanese Navy in World War II was virtually the only thing available that looked at the Pacific war as experienced by the Japanese officers who helped plan, command, and fight it. As such, the book quickly becoming an essential read for anyone interested in the naval war in the Pacific, and a revised and expanded second edition appeared in , which is the edition under review here, available in paperback for the first time. Willmott, Pearl Harbor , pp. The Republic. Columbus, Indiana. Archived from the original on 13 December Retrieved 13 December Retrieved Agawa, Hiroyuki : Kodansha International. Naval War College Review. Archived from the original on 31 March Retrieved 13 July Bennett, Martin Summer Archived from the original on 10 October Mitsuo Fuchida — ". Beyond the Movie: Pearl Harbor. National Geographic Society. Archived from the original on 13 October Coffman, Elesha 8 August Christian History. Christianity Today. Georgia Southern University. Archived from the original on 19 July Reader's Digest. Mitsuo Fuchida - Wikipedia

I knew enough of the details of the battle itself, that this book really didn't add much as far as that goes. So the fact that it may be inaccurate in some of the "hardware" aspects of the battle and of their deployment, aren't particularly of issue with me. What it did do was provide some fascinating insights into the background and the tableau of the war itself, into Japanese attitudes and planning of the war from the outset, and the abominable manner in which the civilian and military leadersh I knew enough of the details of the battle itself, that this book really didn't add much as far as that goes. What it did do was provide some fascinating insights into the background and the tableau of the war itself, into Japanese attitudes and planning of the war from the outset, and the abominable manner in which the civilian and military leadership, besotted with a twisted quasi-religious fervor much akin to Naziism in Germany, dragged the Japanese military and the Japanese people at large - both of which nevertheless share in the culpability for the war - into the destruction of their nation. There's a lesson in that for all nations which, while never explicitly stated in the book, nevertheless comes through loud and clear. The Japanese - and the Germans, for that matter - seem never for a moment to have questioned whether their obsessive expansionism was justified, but only whether a particular means of achieving it was wise, and that also is made more than obvious. Also, they go into Japanese psychology, and the incredible hubris of the Japanese at that time which led them to ignore the ominously prescient outcomes of their military "board games" - a story which I'd heard of, but never read in such detail. I think they spend a bit too much time in self-recrimination and mournful regret, which detracts somewhat from the impact of the book, but, it was written for Japanese, and not Americans, so Oct 11, Liberty rated it liked it Shelves: reading. Very interesting book on the Battle of Midway from the Japanese perspective. Mitsuo Fuchida the man who led the and later became a great friend of America does not in anyway try to make excuses for the failure, but instead quite thoroughly lays out the facts, details, and statistics of the battle; sparing no pains as he explains the purpose of the battle, the plans, and why it was such a catastrophic failure to the Japanese Navy. Interestingly enough, Fuchida himself was Very interesting book on the Battle of Midway from the Japanese perspective. Interestingly enough, Fuchida himself was sick the entire battle from a recent appendicitis surgery. The book, though very thick content-wise, is probably a good idea for anyone interested in the Battle of Midway. Besides understanding the tactical errors of the Japanese, through their own eyes, it is a good reminder, that even our enemies are still human. Jun 10, Nick Hawkins rated it liked it Shelves: war-studies , military-history. For many decades this was the only English language account of the battle from a Japanese perspective. Unfortunately we were mislead by Fuchida, more recent work has revealed that this book is deliberately in error on several key points see Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway for details. It's still a good read but more as a historical novel than a record of history. Jun 10, Phrodrick rated it liked it. Authors Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya had been present for at the Battle, serving in positions that would have given them access to events in the battle for events in the carries fleet, and had served on the team that conducted the official Japanese after a When originally published in America, By the US Naval Institute, Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the 's Story became the source for the Japanese view of the "Incredible Victory" that was the battle of Midway. Authors Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya had been present for at the Battle, serving in positions that would have given them access to events in the battle for events in the carries fleet, and had served on the team that conducted the official Japanese after action study. Spruance Classics of Naval Literature and a forward by Admiral Raymond Spruance Commander American task forces at Midway is testimony to the importance given to this book. I am not sure that the errors in the Fushida book end its utility. The major controversy seems to be based Fuchida's claim that during fatal 5 minutes wherein the Japanese Carriers were taken by surprise and fatally damaged their decks were loaded with a strike force armed but not yet ready for take off. A closer review of the logs suggest that the decks were busy dealing with the combat air patrol. My read of the Fuchida book had me confused on this point, but it is likely that there would have been strike planes, armed and in the hanger decks, along with other improperly stored bombs and torpedoes. This is the kind of point that the serious historians like to fight over, it is not fatal from the point of view of the more general reader. I do not see Parshall's comments as to the location of, and status of this strike force. If these aircraft were in the Hanger decks, they would have been closer to where the American Bombs exploded and the damage inflicted by cooking off their ordinance would be if anything more fatal. A more serious claim is that Fushida is highly critical of Admiral Nagumo's failure to use a two plane search tactic. If it is correct that the Fleet had not yet adopted this tactic or that Fushida could not have known about it at the time of Midway, this is a serious charge of revisionism against Fushida. There may be other errors in the details of Fuchida's account, but I am leery of the suggestion that his account is designed to clear the author's reputation. He would have had no face to save in the larger scheme of events. His major hypothesis was that decision to enlarge their war by attacking the western nations was that for Japan, the war was started by those with no understanding of war at sea, and fought by those with no understanding of aerial warfare. Fuchida amply defends his hypothesis. For the more general reader, or a history hobbyist, Midway: The Battle that Doomed is readable and a rare chance to read history as written by the defeated. Perhaps some face saving is to be expected when you are present on the losing side. Every reader should be aware that reading this text is , for good reason, no longer the best source for the Japanese analysis of Midway. At the risk of a spoiler, there is a very important paragraph at the end of the book, it deserves consideration by any with opinions about the use of armies. Our want of rationality often leads us to confuse desire and reality and thus to do things without careful planning. For the record, my copy was bought by me at the National Museum of the Pacific Fredericksburg, Texas. A worthy place for your support and education. It gives a chilling sensation to read the words of the man, who led the first wave of attack on Pearl Harbor. Most notably: Kido Butai carrier decks full of aircrafts It gives a chilling sensation to read the words of the man, who led the first wave of attack on Pearl Harbor. Most notably: Kido Butai carrier decks full of aircrafts-minutes away from launching a strike when the US dive bombers pounced on them. But the recent works, siting the flight logs, reveal the IJN carriers were handling only CAP aircrafts at that moment and not ready for launching its own strike. Despite the few anomalies, the book gives a good general narrative of the battle from the Japanese perspective. It is highly recommended that this books is followed up by reading the Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway and not to be read as a standalone history. May 02, Curtis Taylor rated it really liked it Shelves: military-history , historical , wwii. This was a very interesting book. I have always been fascinated with the Battle of Midway long before I was stationed and served twice on the USS Midway which was named after the great battle. In this book you hear from the powerful Japanese Navy's view. The author takes you into the mindset of the planners, leaders, and the overall Japanese Military's perspective. The Japanese Military was victorious in every battle they fought for the last few decades leading up to the war. This belief of undefeatable was a major factor in the many mistakes the Japanese Naval Leadership made going into this battle and one that cost them so much. Truly a good book. Aug 28, Diane rated it really liked it Shelves: world-war-ii , japan-japanese. A very interesting account of the battle of Midway told after the war from a Japanese point of view — but very critical of how the battle was carried out. Parts of the book were way beyond my knowledge level descriptions of ships and planes and most of the battle maneuvers , but there are many other sections that were totally captivating. Wonderful footnotes - that A very interesting account of the battle of Midway told after the war from a Japanese point of view — but very critical of how the battle was carried out. Wonderful footnotes - that are required reading - bring information up-to-date or comment on conflicting points of view. Apr 12, Jeffrey rated it really liked it Shelves: history-military. It's always fascinating to read about battles from the viewpoint of the other side, and this book is a great view of the Japanese campaign in the Pacific - from Pearl Harbor through Midway - from the perspective of one of their own officers. It was a revelation to the Japanese people when it was first published in the early 50s, as they had never been told the truth about much of the war. Much of it will seem "old news" to modern Western audiences, but the insights about Admiral Yammamoto's stra It's always fascinating to read about battles from the viewpoint of the other side, and this book is a great view of the Japanese campaign in the Pacific - from Pearl Harbor through Midway - from the perspective of one of their own officers. Much of it will seem "old news" to modern Western audiences, but the insights about Admiral Yammamoto's strategic shortcomings as well as the amazing heroics of many of the Japanese aviators and sailors makes for compelling reading. Great read from the Japanese side of the battle, from the pilot that led the attack on Pearl Harbor. This was the battle that the general public in Japan did not learn about until this book was initially published in , the English version appearing in Later books on this battle, specifically "Shattered Sword" published bring to light many inaccuracies in Fuchida's work, but "Shattered Sword" was able to make extensive use of Japanese primary sources, most unavailable to Fuchida Great read from the Japanese side of the battle, from the pilot that led the attack on Pearl Harbor. Later books on this battle, specifically "Shattered Sword" published bring to light many inaccuracies in Fuchida's work, but "Shattered Sword" was able to make extensive use of Japanese primary sources, most unavailable to Fuchida at the time of his work. My recommendation is to read both, and other works on the battle to get a more fuller view. Jan 22, Sean rated it liked it Shelves: war-history. This wasn't the book I read. Fires died down somewhat by about , and the air officer who was the acting commander, organized fire fighters with the intention of reboarding the ship. Therefore, the following order was issued at "We are now going to attack. At , the enemy changed its course to 90 degrees and the opportunity for battle seemed to be close at hand. It was deemed that if under these conditions, the enemy chose to strike, we would be at a distinct disadvantage in that we would be unable to carry out a decisive battle. We, therefore, turned about and proceeded westward, with the expectation of destroying the enemy in a night encounter. After destroying enemy striking force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. That meant that while all four of our carriers had been lost, the enemy had at least one. Moreover, as long as we were in the operational radius of their shore-based air, we would be at a very distinct disadvantage. By , the enemy began to retreat to the east on course 70, speed 20 knots, which further reduced our hopes for a night engagement. However, we still were determined to carry it out. At , the commander of DesDiv 4 ordered the destroyers under his command to stand by the various carriers assigned to them and to protect them from enemy submarines and task forces. This was the first inkling we had of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's carrier strength. Since we were not able to maintain contact with this task force after sundown, our hopes of a successful night engagement were further reduced. The enemy task force has retired to the east. Its carrier strength has practically been destroyed. Course 90 degrees, speed 20 knots. It was evident that the above message was sent as a result of an erroneous estimate of the enemy, for he still had 4 carriers in operational condition and his shore-based air on Midway was active. Therefore, the following message was sent:. Speed 18 knots. Although we had already reported the existing situation, we again sent the following despatch at All the carriers of our force have become inoperational. We plan to contact the enemy with float reconnaissance planes tomorrow morning. Type of the other two are unknown," was sent. We were not in contact with the enemy at that time and our destroyers had been assigned to the damaged carriers. Moreover, the enemy was approximately miles away which made a night engagement by us almost out of the question. Neither could sight the target, so it is assumed that she had sunk. She fought well without any support from any other units, and managed to down 4 of the enemy planes. Method one will be employed in. Search distance, miles and 60 miles to the left. Times of take-offs will be ordered later. The following revisions made for antisub air patrol for tomorrow, the 5th:. For three hours and 30 minutes following the first wave's take-off, the fleet will proceed on course degrees, speed, 24 knots. Thereafter, if the prevailing winds are from the east, course will be 45 degrees, speed 20; if west winds prevail, course will be degrees, speed, 20 knots. Change in plans may be necessitated by enemy actions. Bear this in mind in making preparations for assembling and taking aboard the air control units. Unless otherwise specified, the search units will take off at the same time as the attack units. Maintain 26 knot momentary stand-by and maximum battle speed 20 minute stand-by from , 5th. Allocation: For Watches 1 and 3, one plane each from all ships of CruDiv 8. For Watches 2 and 4, one plane each from all ships of BatDiv 3. Take off times from Watch 1 through Watch 5 in order : , , , , CruDiv 8 to Comdr. Mobile Force : "Lost enemy planes in direction bearing degrees. About 10 planes. Plan movements for west winds. Sight two surfaced enemy submarines in position bearing degrees, distance 80 miles from my take-off point. Subs' course, degrees. Sight enemy planes bearing 50 degrees to port 90 degree direction , distance Mobile Force : "We have completed our attack and are homeward bound. Mobile Force : " 1. Because of bad weather, I am returning. Position miles from point of origin Bearing 11 degrees from Midway There is need for a second attack wave. Assumed battle speed 5, heading into the above mentioned planes. Enemy torpedo planes divide into two groups. Counters with AA machine gun fire. Enemy machine gun strafing seriously injures two men manning the 3 AA gun. Revolving mechanism of said gun damaged repaired about half an hour later. Both transmitting antennas cut. Unable to use port Noted one torpedo to starboard, two to port of which one exploded automatically on parallel courses, and other which crossed astern. Three planes heading for this ship, bearing degrees to starboard, elevation 10 degrees. Re-equip yourselves with bombs. Enemy planes cut to three. Elevation 0. Friendly fighter takes after it. Main gun ammunition expended: No casualties to men or machines. Ammunition box attached to her 2 machine gun damaged by machine gun fire. Emergency repairs completed in about 10 minutes. Mobile Force : " 3. Sight what appears to be 10 enemy surface ships, in position bearing 10 degrees distance miles from Midway. Course degrees, speed over 20 knots. Recedes, gradually. Total of six enemy flying boats sighted of which five were shot down. Leave torpedoes on those attack planes which have not as yet been changed to bombs. Ascertain ship types, and maintain contact. Message from Comdr. Bombs dropped bearing 0 degrees. Mobile Force : " 5. At , the enemy is on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots. She assumes 5 battle speed. Carrier- based planes. These were the first carrier-based planes noted by this ship. Main guns, AA guns and machine guns commence firing. Mobile Force : "Enemy is composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers. Mobile Force : "The enemy is composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers. These immediately disappear in the clouds. Mobile Force : "The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier. No bomb hits. Evasive action. Speed, 30 knots. Equip yourselves with kilogram bombs. Mobile Force : " 8. Sight two additional enemy cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Course, degrees, speed, 20 knots. No hits. Friendly fighters engaged in air combat with the enemy. I am now homeward bound. Landing operations halted, and evasive action at top battle speed started. Mobile Force : " 2. Course degrees, speed 20 knots. Mobile Force : "Sight what appears to be two additional enemy cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Mobile Force : "I am now homeward bound. Go on the air with your long wave transmitter. After completing homing operations, proceed northward. We plan to contact and destroy the enemy task force. Plane 5 launched Enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers sighted at 5 A. Use your long wave transmitter. AA action readied. Several enemy planes sighted in position bearing 66 degrees to starboard, elevation 2 degrees; distance 20, meters. Smoke screen laid down. Kaga 's fighters take off. I am breaking off the contact and am returning home. My fuel supply is running low. I am breaking off the contact and returning home. Countered immediately with depth charges, but results unknown. Course 70, speed I am breaking off contact and returning Two directional salvos. About 32 enemy flying boats already brought down. Noted that 10 of the torpedo plane group were brought down by friendly fighters Akagi. We are on a northerly course, speed 24 knots. This attack is followed up with dive bombing attacks. Friendly surface units are heading into the enemy planes and engaging them with starboard main gun fire. Fail to sight enemy. I am in position bearing 20 degrees, distance miles from Midway Carried out air attack of AF Midway at Many enemy shore-based planes attacked us subsequent to We have suffered no damages. At , enemy composed 1 carrier, 7 cruisers and 5 destroyers sighted in grid position TO SHI RI 34, on course southwest, speed 20 knots. After destroying this, we plan to resume our AF Midway attack. Our position at is grid HE E A 00, course 30 degrees, speed 24 knots. Goes into evasive action to starboard then opens directional firing with her main guns. Wigwag from ComDesRon 10 to all units: "Sight a dozen or more planes bearing 60 degrees. Fighters ordered to take off as soon as readied. Then, seeing that she was about to be dive bombed, she makes maximum reverse turn. At about meters altitude, bombs were loosed. First was a near miss about 10 meters abeam of the bridge; second hit near the elevator amidship fatal hit ; third hit the flight deck on the portside, aft damage: several holes to after deck, 1 emergency personnel killed. The forward groups were successfully flooded immediately, but because of valve damages to those in the aft sections, none could be automatically flooded except the ammunition room for 2 main turret. They were finally flooded two and half hours later. She goes into a maximum turn and settled on course 0. Engines stopped all hands ordered to fire fighting station. By this time, the only guns which could keep up defensive fire were the first and second machine gun groups and 1 AA gun. Pumps ordered into action. Engine room ordered to put ship under full speed. Sight 5 additional cruisers and 5 destroyers in position bearing 10 degrees, distance miles from point of origin. They are on course degrees, speed 24 knots. Turns about and commences evasive maneuvers. In the mean-. These were immediately lost in the clouds. Lead the attack unit to it. Advise position of enemy carriers. The enemy is in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles from our fleet's position. Sight an enemy air force in position bearing 4 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Second wave composed of 18 bombers and 5 fighters has taken off. Plan to have an additional 9 ship-based attack planes and 3 fighters take off in one hour. Proceeding to port. Amount of clouds, 5; altitude of clouds, to 1,; wind direction, 85 degrees; wind velocity, 5 meters; visibility, 30 miles. Despatching one destroyer to each of the damaged carriers, and to proceed towards the Main Force. Effect measures to maintain contact with the enemy carrier by employment of float recco planes. Fires have broken out aboard them, and they are unable to participate in any operations. After attacking the enemy, I plan to lead my forces to the north. Grid position: HE I A Fierce fires raging on flight deck. These are accompanied by 22 destroyers. Fires have broken out making the ships inoperational. My position is grid : HE I A 00 We are going to attack the enemy. My position is TO U N Course 50 degrees, speed 28 knots. We are heading for the Mobile Force We are attacking the enemy carrier. Received Fires break out on carrier. The enemy was in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles at Sight what appears to be two large enemy cruisers in position bearing 15 degrees, distance miles from my point of origin. In addition, I see what appears to be 1 carrier and 1 destroyer. Course, north; speed 20 knots. All forces will attack the enemy in the AF Midway area in the following manner:. SubRon 3 and SubRon 5 will assume position along dispersal lines C. We are going to the attack of the enemy. Course 0 degrees. All safe except on flight deck. Every effort being made to fight the fires. Enemy carrier is burning. I see no friendly planes in range of visibility. I am homing. In addition, 6 cruisers and about 10 destroyers. Yorktown , accompanied by 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers, acting independently of the others. Patrolling along a north-south course ever since. There were no capital ships in Pearl Harbor up to 31 May. Prisoner had been training at base, and was not cognizant of capital ship movements. Course, 0 degrees. Position of enemy at Bearing degrees, distance miles of the point of origin MI. He is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. And bearing 2 degrees, distance miles from same. Course and speed same as above. Received : "Have float recco's of supporting force search between 0 degrees and 90 degrees, to a distance of miles. Reliability of report, excellent. I am in position bearing degrees, distance 30 miles from the. Scope of search, from 40 to degrees to a distance of miles. Advise revised position of enemy concentration. Bearing 20 degrees, distance miles from point of origin. Course , speed 24 knots. Enemy changed course to 90 degrees. According to report from planes, the enemy's position at is bearing 85 degrees, distance 90 miles from us. It is composed of 5 large cruisers and 1 carrier burning fiercely. The Emperor's portrait has been safely brought aboard this ship. Advise strength of enemy. It is composed of 5 large cruisers and 5 carriers; the latter were burning. According to reports from our carrier-based bombers, there are three enemy carriers along a north-south line approximately 10 miles long. After destroying the enemy task force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. Apparently there are carriers in the vicinity. Sight submerged enemy submarine in position bearing 90 degrees, distance 40 miles, on course degrees. There are three carriers. Make the distance between ships long for the enemy. Fierce fires rage on forward and middle decks. See large enemy force in position bearing degrees, distance miles from point of origin. It is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. He was on course 65 degrees, speed 26 knots. Ascertain ship types. The enemy has 6 cruisers as its nucleus and is accompanied by 6 destroyers. About 20 miles ahead of. After definitely establishing contact with our type 13 Experimental ship based bomber, we plan to direct our entire remaining power 5 bombers, 5 torpedo planes, and 10 fighters to attack and destroy the remaining enemy forces in a dusk engagement. The above carrier and 5 large cruisers were the only ships sighted at the time of the attack, but according to reports from Type Experimental Ship Based Bombers, there are two additional carriers about 10 miles away. Six out of 18 of our ship-based bombers and one out of nine of our ship-based fighters returned. The second attack wave took off at , and the third 6 ship-based bombers and 9 ship-based fighters are at present preparing to take off. Fail to sight enemy on search line assigned to me. Prepare to engage enemy surface ships. Advise enemy situation. After destroying the enemy task force to the east, we plan to proceed north. Plan to rendezvous with the Landing Unit at Sight what appears to be 6 enemy cruisers in position bearing 94 degrees, distance miles from my take off point. Enemy is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. Enemy is composed of two carriers which are accompanied by two destroyers. Make every effort to retire to the northwest, escorting the damaged ships. Go forth together. I am being pursued by the enemy and am forced to retire. I am homeward bound. From our returning air men's reports, the enemy is apparently composed of 3 carriers, 5 large cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Our attacks accounted for 2 carriers damaged. Third Attack wave will take off at to engage the enemy at dusk. Please have a float recco plane maintain contact with the enemy carriers. BatDiv 3 and CruDiv 8 will prepare to make dawn searches tomorrow. Search to the east of the enemy. Coordinating various reports, the large enemy force is apparently composed of 2 carriers, 6 large cruisers accompanied by about 8 destroyers. Two float recco planes have been sent to obtain more intelligence. Report progress of attacks on Midway particularly whether or not friendly units will be able to use shore bases on Midway tomorrow, and. Two additional carriers were sighted about 10 miles away. We are making preparations for the third attack wave 6 ship-based bombers and 6 ship-based attack planes. What should I do? Carrier referred to earlier is seriously damaged. This ship opens fire with her main and AA batteries on planes heading in from 90 degrees to port. Sight enemy composed of one carrier and three cruisers in position bearing degrees from point of origin. Since all hands were ordered to abandon ship, we have taken all personnel aboard. If by the above time, we obtain no intelligence of the enemy, we plan to sweep eastward in search of the enemy. Speed 24 knots. She goes into evasive maneuvers and several bombs drop meters astern of her. Enemy's speed 24 knots, course 70 degrees. The enemy is retiring to the east. Enemy's course 70 degrees, speed 20 knots. No change in enemy situation. Sight one enemy carrier. Sight 5 enemy destroyers. They are in position bearing degrees, distance 85 miles from my take off point. Their course is degrees, speed 12 knots. Would she be operational if her fires were brought under control? No damage sustained. See chart. Three enemy cruisers on course 70 degrees, speed 20 knots. No hits out of three. All planes forced to retire. These were immediately forced back. Bombs drop in position bearing 90 degrees to port, distance meters from her. B retires. All survivors have been taken aboard. All survivors have been transferred to destroyer. Engage the enemy in closed formation much in the manner of a daylight encounter by taking advantage of moonlight. No damage. Continue to guard the carriers assigned to you. There is no hope of her navigating under her own power. All survivors have been taken aboard this ship. She commences battle speed 2. They approach her and she retaliates with her main and AA guns. Sight enemy composed of 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers in position bearing 95 degrees, distance miles from my take off point. He is on course degrees. Sight 3 enemy cruisers in position bearing 95 degrees, distance miles from my take off point. Bombs fall 1, meters astern. Am breaking off contact. It is the hope and dream of every naval officer some day to fly his own flag. There were almost one hundred such flags in the Japanese Navy at this time, and four of them were flying in this very force. Suddenly the ship's loudspeakers blared: "Passage through strait completed. Stow gear. Restore normal condition of readiness! Some twenty communications men, their watch just completed, appeared on deck, doffed their shirts and began to exercise. A classmate of mine at the Naval Academy, he was also an aviator, and our friendship was of long standing. He sat down beside me on a folding chair, lit a cigarette, and said, "I heard that you were ill back at Kagoshima. Are you all right now? Anyway they told me to quit drinking for a while. Pretty rough! But my fliers are in good shape. They didn't have much time for training, but they are ready and confident. I suppose you've been busy, too, preparing for the sortie. We were supposed to wind up the southern operations and get ready for this one at the same time. We really had no time to study this operation thoroughly. Why, the Chief of Staff was still running around trying to put through promotions for the fliers killed in the Pearl Harbor operation! Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the nine men who lost their lives there in midget submarines had promptly been promoted two ranks and glorified as national war heroes. The First Air Fleet had endeavored to obtain similar promotions for the 55 airmen lost in the attack, but the authorities had disapproved them on the ground that there were too many. And that's obviously ridiculous, because there was an oiler moored outboard of Arizona , so a submarine torpedo couldn't possibly have scored on her. Furthermore, the big explosion in Arizona came immediately after Kaga 's second squadron of high-level bombers got two direct hits. They certainly did their part. But the morale of the air units has to be considered too. After all, they are the backbone of the Fleet. And their morale would be much higher right now if the airmen's promotions had been granted before this sortie. Soryu 's air officer, Commander Kusumoto, has been saying that the top echelons in Tokyo seem to be deliberately trying to discourage us. Our own Chief of Staff seems to be the only one really sticking up for us; and, instead of that, he ought to have been devoting himself exclusively to studying this operation. We just swallowed the Combined Fleet plan down whole and rushed out. The trouble is that there are several things in it that just don't add up. But then, I think the Nagumo Force can handle this operation all by itself. The other forces can operate as they please. Everybody seems to know of it. One officer I know was getting a shave the other day and was surprised to hear his barber remark, 'You're going out on a big one this time, aren't you? Also, some of our forces were rather obviously being fitted out for cold weather. With summer practically here, any fool could guess that northern operations were in prospect. That way, we might have kept the enemy guessing longer as to where and when we intended to strike. The result is that they will never budge from them an inch. To ensure the safe passage of our powerful task force, their entire strength had been assigned to sweep the channel and hunt out enemy submarines. But there were no alerts from either ships or planes. By noon we had passed through the eastern channel of Bungo Strait into the deep blue waters of the Pacific, and the destroyers had spread out for a swift antisubmarine sweep before assuming their positions in a ring formation. At the center of the formation four carriers steamed in two columns, Akagi and Kaga on the right, Hiryu and Soryu on the left. Surrounding them were two circles of screening ships. The inner circle consisted of heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma , disposed diagonally forward of the carriers, and battleships Haruna and Kirishima diagonally to the rear.

Midway: the Battle That Doomed Japan by Mitsuo Fuchida

Since there seemed little likelihood of the fog's lifting, the radio was used as a last resort at on the 3d long wave to give change of course. Shortly after this, the fog lifted somewhat, making visual signals barely possible. By the morning of the 4th visibility on the surface improved greatly, but there were scattered clouds overhead. There is some element of doubt in the reported sighting. All hands were immediately ordered to battle stations. There is considerable doubt as to the reliability of this sighting. Tomonaga, Organization 5 composed of 36 ship-based fighters, 36 ship- based bombers, and 36 ship-based torpedo planes, took off to attack Midway. Shortly after taking off, the attack unit was contacted by enemy flying boats. When about 30 miles short of the target on Midway, the above mentioned flying boats suddenly dropped illumination bombs over our attack plane units to attract overhead cover fighters. Thereafter, while engaging in bitter air combats, bombs were dropped on military installations on Midway between about and Fires resulted. All but 2 ship-based fighters, 1 ship-based bomber and 3 ship-based torpedo planes returned to their carriers by about After our attack unit had taken off, enemy flying boats maintained contact with us. At about the first enemy wave attacked. From then until about , the enemy attacked almost continuously. We counter attacked with fighters and AA fire and were able to bring most of the attackers down by Prior to this and subsequent to the take off of the initial attack unit, the fleet had Organization Number 4 ship-based torpedo planes stand by in readiness to act against any enemy surface vessels. It was decided, therefore, that a second attack would be directed against Midway. Orders were issued for the ship-based attack planes to remove their torpedoes and replace them with 80 land bombs. Two subsequent reports concerning the weather and the enemy's course and speed were received but since we had not been advised of details, the plane was ordered to:. Thus, it was definitely established that enemy carriers were operating in the vicinity. We are heading for it. Under orders issued at , the ship-based attack planes were already being re-equipped with 80 land bombs which made immediate take-offs of the ship-based attack planes in Organization Number 4, impossible. It was therefore decided that we would await the return of the Midway attack unit and then carry out a grand scale air attack. The Fleet was advised as follows:. In reply to this CarDiv 1 advised that its ship-based attack planes torpedo equipped would be ready for the take-off at and CarDiv 2 that its ship-based attack planes to be equipped with torpedoes upon their return from the first attack , would be ready for the take-off by from to Subsequent to this, every effort was made to expedite completing preparations for the take-off of Organization Number 4. Akagi : 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based attack planes. Kaga : 3 ship-based fighters; 27 ship-based attack planes. Hiryu : 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. Soryu : 3 ship-based fighters; 18 ship-based bombers. While we were engaged in this, the enemy struck. Communication facilities were knocked out of all damaged ships. There was little likelihood of the fires being extinguished in the immediate future. This task force was operating in waters to the north of the other one. No evidence of fire. No damage to flight deck. Three cruisers and 5 destroyers were in the vicinity. At about , leaving the carrier on the scene, the others proceeded eastward on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots. Each was being directly escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. Distance between the two groups, 3 miles; course degrees; speed 12 knots. Course degrees, speed 12 knots. Judging from these reports, it seemed probable that the carrier damaged by torpedoes remained adrift until the following morning. From these evidences, it was possible to estimate that one carrier was sunk by bombing while another was seriously damaged by torpedoes. The damaged carrier was sunk the following day by submarine torpedoes. At , she only had 6 fighters, 5 bombers, and 4 torpedo planes left. The enemy attack unit which carried out a sustained attack from about was almost totally destroyed by friendly cover fighters. Up to , our surface units had suffered practically no damage and the skies were clear of enemy planes. At , the second wave struck. Fourteen enemy torpedo planes, splitting into two groups approached from the northwest. At , enemy torpedo planes were sighted bearing degrees. At a time when all of our surface. Resorting to evasive tactics, every effort was made to avoid the bombs, but one direct hit was sustained on the aft rim of the lift amidship and another on the rear guard of the port flight deck. Neither were fatal hits. Ammunition rooms were immediately ordered flooded, and all hands were ordered to fire-fighting stations. The pump system aboard, however, failed to function and it became apparent that the fire would not be extinguishable in the immediate future. Subsequent to this, every effort was made to bring the fire under control but it became increasingly evident that there would be little hope of success. In accordance with this order, the ship was scuttled at , in position N, W. Against enemy torpedo plane attacks which were carried out after , AA fire and evasive action proved completely successful. While still engaged in evasive action at about against the persistent enemy torpedo planes, 9 enemy dive bombers were suddenly sighted among the clouds at Every effort was made to counter these through evasive action and AA fire cover. These efforts were successful against the first, second, and third bombs, but 4 hit starboard, aft, while 7 was a direct hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Glass on the bridge was shattered and because of the smoke from the bombs, visibility from that point was reduced to zero. The captain ordered emergency steering apparatus put in operation. Bomb 8 hit in the vicinity of the forward elevator. Practically nothing of the bridge remained after this hit. All persons who were on the bridge at the time, including the captain, were killed in action. Bomb 9 also hit amidship. The situation became hopeless by and all hands were ordered to abandon ship. The fire on board spread to both the forward and aft fuel tanks by , causing two great explosions and the ship's sinking. Fire broke out as a result of dive-bombing attacks by 13 enemy dive bombers at From then until she resorted to evasive action under battle speed 1, while efforts were made to escape from the battle area and to fight fires. The flames could not be brought under control, however, and the fires killed one man after another in the engine rooms until further operation of the ship became impossible. Telephone communications with the engine rooms were maintained until the last. The manner in which the engine room personnel from Engineer Commander Kunizo Aimune down to the last man, carried on in the face of death which finally overtook them, can only be described as heroic. At , it seemed as if the fires might be brought under control, but at that time there was another induced explosion and the fierce fires were rekindled. It became evident that further fire-fightng operations were useless and all hands were ordered to prepare to abandon ship at This was followed by expressions of reverence and respect to the Emperor, the shouting of Banzai's, the lowering of the battle flag and command flag. The transfer of portrait and men was completed at After completion, of the transfer operations, the Division Commander and Captain remained aboard ship. They waved their caps to their men and with complete composure joined their fate with that of their ship. Three hits were scored on her at , , and By , the fires quickly spread and caused induced explosions from the bomb-storage room, torpedo-storage room, AA and machine- gun-ammunition rooms as well as from gasoline tanks. Fires enveloped the entire ship in no time. By both engines had stopped. At , attempts were made to steer her, but with the entire ship in flames, she was helpless. While most of the officers and men, including the Executive officer, had congregated on deck, having been forced to leave their posts due to the flames, a terrific explosion occurred. The explosion sent them flying into the water. Every effort was made to pick these men up and put them on the forward deck. Medical aid was given those needing it there. As soon as the fires broke out aboard ship, the captain, Ryusaku Yanagimoto, appeared on the signal tower to the starboard of the bridge. He took command from this post and pleaded that his men seek shelter and safety. He would allow no man to approach him. Flames surrounded him but he refused to give up his post. He was shouting "Banzai" over and over again when heroic death overtook him. Fires died down somewhat by about , and the air officer who was the acting commander, organized fire fighters with the intention of reboarding the ship. Therefore, the following order was issued at "We are now going to attack. At , the enemy changed its course to 90 degrees and the opportunity for battle seemed to be close at hand. It was deemed that if under these conditions, the enemy chose to strike, we would be at a distinct disadvantage in that we would be unable to carry out a decisive battle. We, therefore, turned about and proceeded westward, with the expectation of destroying the enemy in a night encounter. After destroying enemy striking force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. That meant that while all four of our carriers had been lost, the enemy had at least one. Moreover, as long as we were in the operational radius of their shore-based air, we would be at a very distinct disadvantage. By , the enemy began to retreat to the east on course 70, speed 20 knots, which further reduced our hopes for a night engagement. However, we still were determined to carry it out. At , the commander of DesDiv 4 ordered the destroyers under his command to stand by the various carriers assigned to them and to protect them from enemy submarines and task forces. This was the first inkling we had of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's carrier strength. Since we were not able to maintain contact with this task force after sundown, our hopes of a successful night engagement were further reduced. The enemy task force has retired to the east. Its carrier strength has practically been destroyed. Course 90 degrees, speed 20 knots. It was evident that the above message was sent as a result of an erroneous estimate of the enemy, for he still had 4 carriers in operational condition and his shore-based air on Midway was active. Therefore, the following message was sent:. Speed 18 knots. Although we had already reported the existing situation, we again sent the following despatch at All the carriers of our force have become inoperational. We plan to contact the enemy with float reconnaissance planes tomorrow morning. Type of the other two are unknown," was sent. We were not in contact with the enemy at that time and our destroyers had been assigned to the damaged carriers. Moreover, the enemy was approximately miles away which made a night engagement by us almost out of the question. Neither could sight the target, so it is assumed that she had sunk. She fought well without any support from any other units, and managed to down 4 of the enemy planes. Method one will be employed in. Search distance, miles and 60 miles to the left. Times of take-offs will be ordered later. The following revisions made for antisub air patrol for tomorrow, the 5th:. For three hours and 30 minutes following the first wave's take-off, the fleet will proceed on course degrees, speed, 24 knots. Thereafter, if the prevailing winds are from the east, course will be 45 degrees, speed 20; if west winds prevail, course will be degrees, speed, 20 knots. Change in plans may be necessitated by enemy actions. Bear this in mind in making preparations for assembling and taking aboard the air control units. Unless otherwise specified, the search units will take off at the same time as the attack units. Maintain 26 knot momentary stand-by and maximum battle speed 20 minute stand-by from , 5th. Allocation: For Watches 1 and 3, one plane each from all ships of CruDiv 8. For Watches 2 and 4, one plane each from all ships of BatDiv 3. Take off times from Watch 1 through Watch 5 in order : , , , , CruDiv 8 to Comdr. Mobile Force : "Lost enemy planes in direction bearing degrees. About 10 planes. Plan movements for west winds. Sight two surfaced enemy submarines in position bearing degrees, distance 80 miles from my take-off point. Subs' course, degrees. Sight enemy planes bearing 50 degrees to port 90 degree direction , distance Mobile Force : "We have completed our attack and are homeward bound. Mobile Force : " 1. Because of bad weather, I am returning. Position miles from point of origin Bearing 11 degrees from Midway There is need for a second attack wave. Assumed battle speed 5, heading into the above mentioned planes. Enemy torpedo planes divide into two groups. Counters with AA machine gun fire. Enemy machine gun strafing seriously injures two men manning the 3 AA gun. Revolving mechanism of said gun damaged repaired about half an hour later. Both transmitting antennas cut. Unable to use port Noted one torpedo to starboard, two to port of which one exploded automatically on parallel courses, and other which crossed astern. Three planes heading for this ship, bearing degrees to starboard, elevation 10 degrees. Re-equip yourselves with bombs. Enemy planes cut to three. Elevation 0. Friendly fighter takes after it. Main gun ammunition expended: No casualties to men or machines. Ammunition box attached to her 2 machine gun damaged by machine gun fire. Emergency repairs completed in about 10 minutes. Mobile Force : " 3. Sight what appears to be 10 enemy surface ships, in position bearing 10 degrees distance miles from Midway. Course degrees, speed over 20 knots. Recedes, gradually. Total of six enemy flying boats sighted of which five were shot down. Leave torpedoes on those attack planes which have not as yet been changed to bombs. Ascertain ship types, and maintain contact. Message from Comdr. Bombs dropped bearing 0 degrees. Mobile Force : " 5. At , the enemy is on course 80 degrees, speed 20 knots. She assumes 5 battle speed. Carrier-based planes. These were the first carrier-based planes noted by this ship. Main guns, AA guns and machine guns commence firing. Mobile Force : "Enemy is composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers. Mobile Force : "The enemy is composed of 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers. These immediately disappear in the clouds. Mobile Force : "The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier. No bomb hits. Evasive action. Speed, 30 knots. Equip yourselves with kilogram bombs. Mobile Force : " 8. Sight two additional enemy cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Course, degrees, speed, 20 knots. No hits. Friendly fighters engaged in air combat with the enemy. I am now homeward bound. Landing operations halted, and evasive action at top battle speed started. Mobile Force : " 2. Course degrees, speed 20 knots. Mobile Force : "Sight what appears to be two additional enemy cruisers in position bearing 8 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Mobile Force : "I am now homeward bound. Go on the air with your long wave transmitter. After completing homing operations, proceed northward. We plan to contact and destroy the enemy task force. Plane 5 launched Enemy composed of 1 carrier, 5 cruisers, and 5 destroyers sighted at 5 A. Use your long wave transmitter. AA action readied. Several enemy planes sighted in position bearing 66 degrees to starboard, elevation 2 degrees; distance 20, meters. Smoke screen laid down. Kaga 's fighters take off. I am breaking off the contact and am returning home. My fuel supply is running low. I am breaking off the contact and returning home. Countered immediately with depth charges, but results unknown. Course 70, speed I am breaking off contact and returning Two directional salvos. About 32 enemy flying boats already brought down. Noted that 10 of the torpedo plane group were brought down by friendly fighters Akagi. We are on a northerly course, speed 24 knots. This attack is followed up with dive bombing attacks. Friendly surface units are heading into the enemy planes and engaging them with starboard main gun fire. Fail to sight enemy. I am in position bearing 20 degrees, distance miles from Midway Carried out air attack of AF Midway at Many enemy shore- based planes attacked us subsequent to We have suffered no damages. At , enemy composed 1 carrier, 7 cruisers and 5 destroyers sighted in grid position TO SHI RI 34, on course southwest, speed 20 knots. After destroying this, we plan to resume our AF Midway attack. Our position at is grid HE E A 00, course 30 degrees, speed 24 knots. Goes into evasive action to starboard then opens directional firing with her main guns. Wigwag from ComDesRon 10 to all units: "Sight a dozen or more planes bearing 60 degrees. Fighters ordered to take off as soon as readied. Then, seeing that she was about to be dive bombed, she makes maximum reverse turn. At about meters altitude, bombs were loosed. First was a near miss about 10 meters abeam of the bridge; second hit near the elevator amidship fatal hit ; third hit the flight deck on the portside, aft damage: several holes to after deck, 1 emergency personnel killed. The forward groups were successfully flooded immediately, but because of valve damages to those in the aft sections, none could be automatically flooded except the ammunition room for 2 main turret. They were finally flooded two and half hours later. She goes into a maximum turn and settled on course 0. Engines stopped all hands ordered to fire fighting station. By this time, the only guns which could keep up defensive fire were the first and second machine gun groups and 1 AA gun. Pumps ordered into action. Engine room ordered to put ship under full speed. Sight 5 additional cruisers and 5 destroyers in position bearing 10 degrees, distance miles from point of origin. They are on course degrees, speed 24 knots. Turns about and commences evasive maneuvers. In the mean-. These were immediately lost in the clouds. Lead the attack unit to it. Advise position of enemy carriers. The enemy is in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles from our fleet's position. Sight an enemy air force in position bearing 4 degrees, distance miles from Midway. Second wave composed of 18 bombers and 5 fighters has taken off. Plan to have an additional 9 ship-based attack planes and 3 fighters take off in one hour. Proceeding to port. Amount of clouds, 5; altitude of clouds, to 1,; wind direction, 85 degrees; wind velocity, 5 meters; visibility, 30 miles. Despatching one destroyer to each of the damaged carriers, and to proceed towards the Main Force. Effect measures to maintain contact with the enemy carrier by employment of float recco planes. Fires have broken out aboard them, and they are unable to participate in any operations. After attacking the enemy, I plan to lead my forces to the north. Grid position: HE I A Fierce fires raging on flight deck. These are accompanied by 22 destroyers. Fires have broken out making the ships inoperational. My position is grid : HE I A 00 We are going to attack the enemy. My position is TO U N Course 50 degrees, speed 28 knots. We are heading for the Mobile Force We are attacking the enemy carrier. Received Fires break out on carrier. The enemy was in position bearing 70 degrees, distance 90 miles at Sight what appears to be two large enemy cruisers in position bearing 15 degrees, distance miles from my point of origin. In addition, I see what appears to be 1 carrier and 1 destroyer. Course, north; speed 20 knots. All forces will attack the enemy in the AF Midway area in the following manner:. SubRon 3 and SubRon 5 will assume position along dispersal lines C. We are going to the attack of the enemy. Course 0 degrees. All safe except on flight deck. Every effort being made to fight the fires. Enemy carrier is burning. I see no friendly planes in range of visibility. I am homing. In addition, 6 cruisers and about 10 destroyers. Yorktown , accompanied by 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers, acting independently of the others. Patrolling along a north-south course ever since. There were no capital ships in Pearl Harbor up to 31 May. Prisoner had been training at base, and was not cognizant of capital ship movements. Course, 0 degrees. Position of enemy at Bearing degrees, distance miles of the point of origin MI. He is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. And bearing 2 degrees, distance miles from same. Course and speed same as above. Received : "Have float recco's of supporting force search between 0 degrees and 90 degrees, to a distance of miles. Reliability of report, excellent. I am in position bearing degrees, distance 30 miles from the. Scope of search, from 40 to degrees to a distance of miles. Advise revised position of enemy concentration. Bearing 20 degrees, distance miles from point of origin. Course , speed 24 knots. Enemy changed course to 90 degrees. According to report from planes, the enemy's position at is bearing 85 degrees, distance 90 miles from us. It is composed of 5 large cruisers and 1 carrier burning fiercely. The Emperor's portrait has been safely brought aboard this ship. Advise strength of enemy. It is composed of 5 large cruisers and 5 carriers; the latter were burning. According to reports from our carrier-based bombers, there are three enemy carriers along a north-south line approximately 10 miles long. After destroying the enemy task force to the east, we plan to proceed northward. Apparently there are carriers in the vicinity. Sight submerged enemy submarine in position bearing 90 degrees, distance 40 miles, on course degrees. There are three carriers. Make the distance between ships long for the enemy. Fierce fires rage on forward and middle decks. See large enemy force in position bearing degrees, distance miles from point of origin. It is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. He was on course 65 degrees, speed 26 knots. Ascertain ship types. The enemy has 6 cruisers as its nucleus and is accompanied by 6 destroyers. About 20 miles ahead of. After definitely establishing contact with our type 13 Experimental ship based bomber, we plan to direct our entire remaining power 5 bombers, 5 torpedo planes, and 10 fighters to attack and destroy the remaining enemy forces in a dusk engagement. The above carrier and 5 large cruisers were the only ships sighted at the time of the attack, but according to reports from Type Experimental Ship Based Bombers, there are two additional carriers about 10 miles away. Six out of 18 of our ship-based bombers and one out of nine of our ship-based fighters returned. The second attack wave took off at , and the third 6 ship-based bombers and 9 ship-based fighters are at present preparing to take off. Fail to sight enemy on search line assigned to me. Prepare to engage enemy surface ships. Advise enemy situation. After destroying the enemy task force to the east, we plan to proceed north. Plan to rendezvous with the Landing Unit at Sight what appears to be 6 enemy cruisers in position bearing 94 degrees, distance miles from my take off point. Enemy is on course degrees, speed 24 knots. Enemy is composed of two carriers which are accompanied by two destroyers. Make every effort to retire to the northwest, escorting the damaged ships. Go forth together. I am being pursued by the enemy and am forced to retire. I am homeward bound. From our returning air men's reports, the enemy is apparently composed of 3 carriers, 5 large cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Our attacks accounted for 2 carriers damaged. Third Attack wave will take off at to engage the enemy at dusk. Please have a float recco plane maintain contact with the enemy carriers. BatDiv 3 and CruDiv 8 will prepare to make dawn searches tomorrow. Search to the east of the enemy. Coordinating various reports, the large enemy force is apparently composed of 2 carriers, 6 large cruisers accompanied by about 8 destroyers. Two float recco planes have been sent to obtain more intelligence. Report progress of attacks on Midway particularly whether or not friendly units will be able to use shore bases on Midway tomorrow, and. Two additional carriers were sighted about 10 miles away. We are making preparations for the third attack wave 6 ship-based bombers and 6 ship-based attack planes. What should I do? Carrier referred to earlier is seriously damaged. This ship opens fire with her main and AA batteries on planes heading in from 90 degrees to port. Sight enemy composed of one carrier and three cruisers in position bearing degrees from point of origin. Since all hands were ordered to abandon ship, we have taken all personnel aboard. If by the above time, we obtain no intelligence of the enemy, we plan to sweep eastward in search of the enemy. Speed 24 knots. She goes into evasive maneuvers and several bombs drop meters astern of her. Enemy's speed 24 knots, course 70 degrees. The enemy is retiring to the east. Enemy's course 70 degrees, speed 20 knots. No change in enemy situation. Sight one enemy carrier. Sight 5 enemy destroyers. They are in position bearing degrees, distance 85 miles from my take off point. Their course is degrees, speed 12 knots. Would she be operational if her fires were brought under control? No damage sustained. See chart. Three enemy cruisers on course 70 degrees, speed 20 knots. No hits out of three. All planes forced to retire. These were immediately forced back. Bombs drop in position bearing 90 degrees to port, distance meters from her. B retires. All survivors have been taken aboard. All survivors have been transferred to destroyer. Engage the enemy in closed formation much in the manner of a daylight encounter by taking advantage of moonlight. No damage. Continue to guard the carriers assigned to you. There is no hope of her navigating under her own power. All survivors have been taken aboard this ship. She commences battle speed 2. They approach her and she retaliates with her main and AA guns. Sight enemy composed of 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers in position bearing 95 degrees, distance miles from my take off point. He is on course degrees. Sight 3 enemy cruisers in position bearing 95 degrees, distance miles from my take off point. Bombs fall 1, meters astern. Am breaking off contact. Each ship will stand by the carrier assigned to her and screen her from enemy submarines and task forces. Should the enemy task force approach, engage him in hit-and-run tactics and destroy him. This enemy force was westward bound. Shortly after sighting it, our plane was pursued by enemy carrier-based fighters, and lost it. This plane forced back by the ship's machine gun and AA gunfire. Course Come home on the radio beam. Position at bears degrees, distance 36 miles from position at Course degrees. Come home on the beam. We estimate that the enemy is in position bearing degrees, distance miles from us at It is presumed that the two which failed to return were lost in air combat. Prepare for torpedo action, 50 degrees to port. CruDiv 7 will carry on after The details will be decided by ComCruDiv 8. Battle speed 1. The total strength of the enemy is 5 carriers, 6 cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Make preparations and when completed, advise. Classes and speeds of the others undetermined. Captain and Exec. These are steaming westward. None of our carriers are operational. We plan to contact the enemy with float recco planes tomorrow morning. I submit my opinion for whatever it is worth. The 2 others to the north of the former are of undetermined classes and speeds. BatDiv 3 will assume position approximately 10 kilometers behind CruDiv 4. Course 65 degrees, speed 24 knots. Thereafter, we plan to head for the enemy task force. I plan to be in the vicinity of grid position FU RA RI 55 by tomorrow dawn, and will be prepared to attack the enemy in coordination with the other forces. Body of message reported above. I am turning about. We are charting our course so as to rendezvous with the Main Unit, while making preparations for a night engagement. Mobile Force 's Battle Report. She is still burning. There is danger of her sinking. One destroyer is in the vicinity. Advise of developments and position. Three cruisers and 5 destroyers were in her vicinity. At about , all departed from the scene with the exception of the carrier, on course 80 degrees. Distance between the two units was about 3 miles. At , 2 additional carriers of undetermined class escorted by 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers were sighted in position about 4 miles south of the other group. These were in single file, on course degrees, speed 12 knots. The 2 plane was on course degrees from about and sighted the above-mentioned groups consecutively, so there is no likelihood of sighting the same group twice. Moreover, the carriers mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, were definitely sighted from altitudes of meters, under the cloud ceilings. However, there is no objection to having the instant stand by planes' crew taking a rest if it is in the vicinity of their planes. By going into maximum battle speed evasive action, no damages were sustained. Ammunition expended: Main batteries, 74; AA guns, ; machine guns, 8, One type-0 plane 5 plane. Apparently intercepted by enemy fighters while trying to maintain contact with the enemy. Failed to return. Unlike Germany, which saw a number of postwar memoirs published by all manner of veterans, the Japanese did not rush to get their stories told after the war. Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully later observed in the differences in the Japanese national culture played an important role, as few had reason to lose face by recounting tales of their own defeats See Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway , Potomac Books, For more than sixty years, the work of Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya on the Japanese side of the Battle of Midway was taken as the authoritative account by the likes Gordon Prange, Walter Lord, and other Western historians. As one of the few surviving officers of the battle, he could offer insights into the command decisions made on the bridge of the Akagi that June morning. What actually happened during the morning hours of 4 June on the bridge of the Japanese flagship Akagi? Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan added details that caused subsequent authors to ascribe such adjectives to the battle. The book created its own mythos, adding to the already fair amount from the American side that colored the history of the battle until recent scholarship, on both sides of the Pacific, showed Fuchida to have been less than honest in his retelling of the engagement. Midway offered a unique look at the Japanese side of the battle, from the genesis of the battle plan to the analysis of the defeat. It placed the reader alongside the participants in those crucial moments. Historians and readers were, for the first time, able to see the battle through the eyes of the Japanese. Given the importance placed on the Battle of Midway during the Pacific War it is little surprise the book was so devoured by Americans. The narrative supported American preconceptions about the battle and added a number of its own.

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