Cornell Caspian Consulting

CASPIAN BRIEF, NOVEMBER 2000

THE CAUCASIAN CONUNDRUM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF CONFLICT

Dr. h.c. Svante E. Cornell

mong the many trouble- have not yet been the scene of likewise, the geopolitical alignments spots on the Eurasian violent conflict. Furthermore, the have become a major determinant of Acontinent, the Caucasus Caucasian conundrum is the developments of the conflicts. stands out as being the perhaps most complicated by external factors. In intricate and complicated zone of fact, the Caucasus has developed THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT conflict. Whereas in terms of human into a major scene of international The roots of the major conflicts that suffering the Caucasus is bypassed rivalry in the post- era. The have plagued the Caucasus since the by areas such as the Balkans, not to region finds its importance partially late 1980s (the Armenian-Azerbaijani mention , the situation in in its crucial geographic location, conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the the Caucasus presents a considerably squeezed as it is between three Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the higher level of complexity, for regional powers, Turkey, and Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, several reasons. A first factor is that Russia; but also due to the and the Russian-Chechen conflict) as many as five distinct armed hydrocarbon resources of the can to an important degree be conflicts have taken place in the Caspian sea area. These two inter- ascribed to what might be termed region in the last ten years; related items of international the ‘Soviet Legacy’. The perhaps moreover, contrary to the Balkan attention, far from contributing to a main component of this legacy is the situation where most conflicts have solution to the various conflicts of Soviet view of ethnicity and the found some type of solution, none the region, have served to thereto connected territorial of the Caucasian conflicts seem to be complicate conflict resolution. The structure it left behind. The Soviet approaching a lasting solution. Quite conflicts have become a part of the Union was an asymmetric federation to the contrary, tensions are on the geopolitical ‘game’ being played in of ethnically defined territories. Its rise in several parts of the region that the Caucasus and ;

Cornell Caspian Consulting Tel. +46-70-7708182 Topeliusv. 15 Fax. +1-253-5504390 SE-16761 Bromma http://www.cornellcaspian.com Sweden http://www.cornell.nu Caspian Brief, November 2000 primary component units were the Georgia; and Talysh and Lezgins in enthusiasm. In fact, nationalism in 15 union republics, conceived of in Azerbaijan enjoyed no autonomy. many areas succeeded communism theory as independent states with a Conflict broke out between central as the dominant dogma. In the right to secede from the union. governments and three of four Caucasus, given the complexity of Under their jurisdiction were an autonomous minorities; but in no the region’s ethnic map and the additional thirty autonomous case of non-autonomous minorities. existence of unsettled scores republics and provinces (Oblasty) A closer study of the dynamics of between various ethnic groups— with lower levels of nominal self- conflict shows with all clarity the some predating the Soviet era but rule. Despite the fact that these role of autonomy institutions in the most created or deepened during autonomies were never, for practical escalation of conflict.1 Soviet rule—nationalism developed purposes, politically autonomous, unhindered. Nationalist feeling was To this must be added the absence the very institution of ethnic partly directed against the central in the former Soviet Union of federalism was significant for the government, but more often than democratic traditions and democratic ethnic mobilization that occurred not directed against a neighboring political culture. When the union during the union’s dissolution. The ethnic group. In Georgia and dissolved, two parallel processes autonomous regions were Armenia, nationalist forces gained occurred: on the one hand, constructed as quasi-states, with strength since 1987; nationalist communism’s grip on the population legislative, executive and judiciary popular fronts succeeded in seizing faltered, hence weakening the organs; clearly demarcated borders; power through elections in both common civic identity uniting mass media controlled by the republics by 1990. Meanwhile, individuals of various ethnic groups. government; and control over nationalist foment emerged in This in turn sparked an identity education, particularly school Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, quest among large parts of the curricula. All these factors served to primarily Chechnya; yet in union’s population. Having been the strengthen the group identity of the Azerbaijan it can be argued that only permitted distinct identity (with autonomous minorities. Moreover, nationalism developed slowly and the suppression of religious and the institutions and symbols of reactively, in many ways as a tribal/local clan identities), ethnic autonomy were useful tools for response to rising Armenian identity was in an advantageous political entrepreneurs planning nationalism. Communist power position to claim popular allegiance. secessionist movements. They wasn’t toppled until early 1992, Meanwhile, the political atmosphere needed not establish themselves as several months after the country’s of the union liberalized, presenting political leaders through deeds; declaration of independence. the opportunity for new, unorthodox instead, their political position political currents to emerge without granted them a certain legitimacy and fear of reprisals. Liberal or social WARS IN THE CAUCASUS, 1988-1999 freedom of action to further their democratic ideologies did develop, The course of warfare in the political goals. The case of the South but remained mainly confined to the Caucasus is relatively well Caucasus is illustrative: there were in intelligentsia; among the masses, documented.2 Suffice it to note here Soviet times nine compactly settled such political currents caused little minorities, four of which were 2 See Small Nations and Great Powers: for autonomous: Nagorno-Karabakh 1 See Svante E. Cornell, Autonomy in the the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Chapter Armenians in Azerbaijan; Ossetians, Caucasus: A Catalyst for Conflict?, paper 3, pp. 61-141; for the Georgian-Ossetian Ajars and Abkhaz in Georgia. Azeris presented at the Association for the and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, chapter Study of Nationalities 5th annual 4, pp. 142-196; for the war in Chechnya, in Armenia; Azeris and Armenians in convention, New York, April 2000. chapter 6, pp. 197-250; for the Ingush- Available from http://www.cornell.nu. Ossetian conflict, pp. 251-261.

Cornell Caspian Consulting The Caucasian Conundrum and the Geopolitics of Conflict that the outcome of the four major under way. Although politically the simple revenge. To this must be conflicts were fairly similar: vastly conflict remains unresolved, it is added, in the Georgian and inferior by number, the autonomous gradually made obsolete by events Azerbaijani cases, the existence of minorities succeeded in achieving on the ground. By contrast, the hundreds of thousands of displaced military victories and established de conflict in Abkhazia remains in a people from the conflict areas, who facto independence.3 These victories deadlock, even briefly returning to typically form the most militant were generally speaking not achieved violence in May 1998. The Nagorno- segments of the population. The single-handedly. In fact, the Abkhaz, Karabakh conflict, which is Caucasian states were all weak at South Ossetian, and Nagorno- potentially the conflict with the independence; however the armed Karabakh Armenian minorities largest international ramifications conflicts made the weakness of these enjoyed strong political, economic given the direct involvement of two states chronic. and military backing from abroad. independent states, during 1999 In addition to the open conflicts, a Armenia’s direct intervention in showed signs of moving towards a number of potential conflict areas support of the Karabakh Armenians solution. Nevertheless, the exist. Two cases in particular deserve was as decisive for the outcome of destabilization of the Armenian mention. First, the Javakheti area of that conflict as was Russia’s support political scene caused by the murder southern Georgia, predominantly in the case of Abkhaz and South of the country’s Prime Minister and Armenian-populated and the locus Ossetian war efforts. Only in the parliament speaker in October 1999 of a Russian military base. Tensions case of Chechnya was large-scale obliterated any chance for an between local Armenians and the foreign intervention absent, although imminent solution.4 In particular, Georgian government have Chechen rebels enjoyed covert conflicts have served as an excuse fluctuated during the course of the financial support by mostly private for the continuation or strengthening 1990s. The issue of the Russian groups in the Islamic world. The of authoritarian practices in the military base is currently assuming consequences of the wars were also name of stability, hence working as increasing importance. From the fairly similar: beyond the economic an impediment to democratization. perspective of many local and human disasters caused by More profoundly, the military Armenians, the base is not only a warfare, the conflicts also seriously defeats of Georgia, Azerbaijan and guarantee for their security—given damaged the body politic of the Russia at the hands of substantially that a third of officers and up to two states involved. None of the smaller opponents have created a thirds of private soldiers serving in conflicts has been solved, instead sense of national humiliation that the base are locally recruited—but remaining frozen along cease-fire affect especially the young also the main source of employment lines of varying stability. Most generation, and whose possible and social services in the region. A promising is the situation in South consequences are difficult to assess. withdrawal of the base or even Ossetia, where a movement of For example, the current war in debates to that effect may hence reconciliation at grassroots level is Chechnia is, on the part of the serve to destabilize the region Russian armed forces, to a certain further.5 Secondly, tensions have 3 There were less than 120,000 degree dependent on a desire for Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh (80% been building during the last two of the region’s population) compared to years between the Karachai and Azerbaijan’s population of 7 million; 4 See Svante E. Cornell, “Armenia’s Cherkess communities in the there were 67,000 Ossetians in South Political Instability and Caucasian Ossetia; (66% of the region’s Security“, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia population) and there were 100,000 (Washington, D.C.) 12 April 2000. Abkhaz in Abkhazia, forming only 17% (available at 5 See eg. IWPR Caucasus Reporting of Abkhazia’s population. http://www.cacianalyst.org/archives) Service, 8 September 2000.

Cornell Caspian Consulting Caspian Brief, November 2000 in the northwestern Caucasus. The despite being vaguely aware of them; ascertain whether a well contains oil long-awaited transition from Soviet moreover, given the existence of oil or gas and its quality, were élites that stayed in power until 1999 in Siberia and the Urals that could be undertaken during the Soviet period. in the republic rapidly took on the exploited at a significantly lower Proven reserves are hence shape of competition along ethnic cost, exploiting the Caspian comparatively low, at the range of 25 lines; at present, a predominantly resources was not a priority. This billion barrels. Potential reserves, Karachai élite is ruling the republic, changed with the dissolution of the however, have variously been whose stability remains precarious. Soviet Union. As Azerbaijan, estimated to between 100 and 200 Moreover the situation in and , most billion. Most analysts in the oil Karachaevo-Cherkessia is likely to notably, gained independence, the industry, significantly, estimate the deeply impact the neighboring export of oil and gas was envisaged final amount of recoverable republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, to become a major source of income resources to ca. 100 billion barrels. whose main ethnic groups are akin for these countries. Oil companies As such, Caspian oil represents in to those in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. were interested in gaining a share of the order of 5-10% of world In sum, the regional turmoil and lack this new, hitherto closed market. petroleum resources. Clearly, of economic development worsen Caspian oil nevertheless suffers from comparing the Caspian to the the situation in areas not yet the a major limitation: it is among the Persian Gulf, containing up to 65% scene of conflict; meanwhile, most expensive sources of oil in the of world resources, is misplaced. governments have little resources to world. Whereas a barrel of Saudi The importance of Caspian oil allocate to conflict prevention crude costs approximately $3 when nevertheless does not lie in its schemes in these areas. reaching world markets, a barrel of quantity, or even its quality—Gulf North Sea oil costs ca. $10-12 on oil is typically of higher quality than average, accounting for large GEOPOLITICS OF THE CASPIAN: Caspian oil. The geopolitical variations between individual oil THE OIL FACTOR importance of Caspian oil lies in its fields. Unlike North Sea oil, As war was raging throughout the location. Western states, in particular however, Caspian oil is not under Caucasus in 1991-94, another the U.S., are increasingly dependent the seabed of an ocean, from where development of major significance upon imported oil for their economies. it can be transported cheaply by sea was unfolding: the ‘discovery’ by As the share of imported oil once taken to the surface. It lies multinational oil companies of the increases, so does the share of under what in fact amounts to a largely untapped oil and gas Persian Gulf oil. Politically, this gigantic lake, the Caspian Sea, and resources of the Caspian Sea. means western economies are must hence be brought to markets dependent on political stability in the The Caspian, notably the Apsheron through expensive pipelines. By the Persian Gulf for their own economic peninsula hosting Azerbaijan’s time it reaches world markets, it stability. It thereby becomes an capital Baku, has been an oil- costs its producer in the order of imperative to seek to diversify oil producing area for centuries. Indeed, $14. imports to the highest degree it is estimated that over 50% of the Secondly, the amount of oil under possible. This is where the Caspian world output of oil in 1900 was the Caspian Sea, though subject to fits into the picture. A new source of produced in and around Baku. heavy debate, has all too often been oil imports, it enables western states However, the Soviet Union lacked overestimated. This is the case as no to alleviate dependence on the Gulf. advanced technology to fully explore comprehensive geological survey, the Caspian seabed’s resources much less the drillings necessary to

Cornell Caspian Consulting The Caucasian Conundrum and the Geopolitics of Conflict

GEOPOLITICS OF THE CASPIAN: strategic importance of the region.6 bases in Georgia or Azerbaijan in the Safeguarding the true independence not too distant future. Clearly, the of the Caucasian states has become lack of predictability of American However important it might be, oil is an important policy objective for policy is not a stabilizing factor in by no means the sole reason for Washington as well as some of its the region.7 international interest in the Caucasus NATO allies, including Great or the Caspian. Indeed, the region Britain. For this purpose, millions of would have attracted substantial REGIONAL ALIGNMENTS dollars and pounds have been international interest even had it not In the latter half of the 1990s, a clear poured into the Georgian military, possessed any oil whatsoever. Its trend towards the emergence of whereas in the case of Azerbaijan, location between three regional opposing strategic alignments in and Turkey has taken the lead in assisting powers (Russia, Turkey and Iran) is around the Caucasus was discernible. in restructuring and bringing to one element of its importance. Among the three regional states, the NATO standards the Azerbaijani Another is the fact that it forms one basic division was in terms of threat military. The regimes of these two of the few available routes for perceptions. Georgia and Azerbaijan countries have been propped up and western influence in Central Asia, a both viewed the immediate threats supported in international forums. region of vast future strategic to their security as stemming from The OSCE Istanbul meeting of importance simply due to its secessionist movements attempting November 1999 is a case in point: geographic location. Neither Russia, to dismember the two states. President Clinton presided over the China, Iran or Afghanistan are likely However, the main source of this signing of a formal agreement to conduits for the west to this region; threat was identified as originating in construct the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Turkey and the Caucasus hence by Moscow’s attempts to regain while western pressure was crucial in default become attractive routes, as in the Caucasus. Russian forcing Russia to agree to withdraw witnessed by the large EU- resurgence was seen as the root of two of its four military bases in sponsored TRACECA (Transport the regional problems, and in Georgia. Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) addition Iran was viewed, particularly project aiming at making the However, the U.S. has failed to by Azerbaijan, as a factor of Caucasus practically a bridge openly declare what type of instability. Armenia, however, between Europe and Asia. Oil is commitment it is ready to make to analyzed the regional situation in a only one part of this scheme. the Caspian region. In so doing, different manner. From Yerevan’s Washington has allowed a plethora As concerns American influence in perspective, the region’s problems of speculations to emerge on how the Caucasus, it is often assumed to were due to the refusal to rectify far it is actually ready to go in be heavily dependent on oil. As what was perceived as past injustices engaging the region. Where some important as oil has been to increase and accord the right of full self- analysts claim Washington will not American attention to the region and determination to minorities, in risk its relations with Moscow over to legitimize U.S. involvement there, particular the Armenians of the Caucasus, others have predicted it has been established that U.S. Nagorno-Karabakh. For Armenia, the establishment of U.S. military governmental interest in the 7 See Svante E. Cornell, “U.S. Policy in Caucasus emerged around 1994 6 See Small Nations and Great Powers, Caspian-Asia: Imperatives of Strategic among military circles, unrelated to chapter 10; and Stephen Blank, U.S. Vision“, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, oil, but very much related to the Military Engagement in Transcaucasia and (Washington, D.C.) 27 July 2000. Central Asia, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army (available at War College, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.cacianalyst.org/archives) 2000.

Cornell Caspian Consulting Caspian Brief, November 2000 the main threat perception stemmed gas from the region must perceives itself as vulnerable, from the fact of having two hostile imperatively be avoided; instead a positioned between two hostile Turkic neighbors to its west and east. westward pipeline route must be Turkic neighbors to its east and west, The main military threat to Armenia established. This has resulted in a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh was Turkey, not Russia or Iran. direct U.S. backing for the conflict would lead not only to the Quite to the contrary, Moscow and economically ambiguous Baku- normalization of Armenian- Tehran were viewed as strategic allies Ceyhan pipeline that aims to export Azerbaijani relations but in all in the quest to minimize Turkish Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to likelihood also of Armenian-Turkish influence in the region. the Turkish Mediterranean coast. relations. In other words, the perceived Turkic threat to Armenia As far as the regional powers are While the dichotomy of interest would diminish significantly. This concerned, perceptions are equally among the great powers is would in turn imply the reduced varied. Russia quite openly claims straightforward, the strategic choices importance for Yerevan of military the Caucasus as its sphere of made by Caspian states is by no ties to Moscow. Undoubtedly, Russia influence, and seeks to minimize means uncomplicated. In particular, will remain an important partner and Turkish and American influence in Armenia has found it difficult to ally; but Armenia’s security would no the region. In these matters Moscow reconcile its desire for closer political longer be exclusively dependent on and Tehran have realized a and economic links to the west with Moscow, given that the imperative commonality of interest, including its strategic partnership with Russia of counterbalancing especially the aim of preventing Azerbaijan and Iran. Indeed, Armenian policy- Turkey through military ties to from freely utilizing its economic makers are often credited for their Russia would be reduced. Armenia potential by exporting its oil ability to walk a thin rope between could then to a much greater extent westward. For Iran, the existence of Washington, Tehran and Moscow. partake in the establishment of the a large, perhaps 20 million strong Likewise, by aligning itself east-west transport corridor from Azeri minority on its territory, was unequivocally with the west, Georgia which it is largely isolated. As a actualized by the creation of the has been forced to pay a high price result, Russia’s influence in the independent state of Azerbaijan. The in terms of deteriorating political and Caucasus would diminish further. advent to power of a nationalist economic relations with Moscow. leadership that scarcely concealed its Yet, in contrast to Central Asia It follows naturally that from the anti-Iranian character made matters where geopolitical alignments remain perspective of more imperial-minded worse, resulting in Tehran blurred and unclear, the strategic circles in Russia, peace in the counterbalancing Azerbaijan by ever map of the Caucasus has for most Caucasus is not in Russia’s interest. closer relations with Moscow and practical matters been drawn, and The alternative, an unstable Yerevan. remains relatively stable despite—or Caucasus which no one can control, perhaps even due to—the instability is preferable. To the extent that By contrast, Turkey and the United of the region. Indeed, the event that forces subscribing to this view States agree on the imperative of would most alter the political chart dominate the decision-making supporting the independence of of the Caucasus is peace. Lasting process in Russia, peace in the Caspian states, and enabling them to peace, in particular between Armenia Caucasus will remain elusive. fully partake in the globalized world and Azerbaijan, would fundamentally economy and gradually integrate into alter the threat perceptions of both Euro-Atlantic structures. For this countries, especially Armenia. purpose, Russian and/or Iranian Whereas Armenia presently monopoly over the export of oil and

Cornell Caspian Consulting The Caucasian Conundrum and the Geopolitics of Conflict

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND process of resolution by allowing pact: the three regional states, LONG-TERM STABILITY actors to ‘shop around’ for better Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; terms. This was particularly clear the three regional powers, Turkey, As the above discussion has during the efforts to achieve a cease- Iran and Russia; and non-regional highlighted, two major interrelated fire in the Armenian-Azerbaijani interested parties, the US and the but distinct security issues can be conflict. At present, three powers EU. identified in the Caucasus: first, the share the chair of the OSCE Minsk ethnopolitical conflicts still plaguing The arrival of the concept of a Group responsible for the settlement the region; second, the geopolitical stability pact should not be seen as of that conflict: Russia, the United alignments currently in development. an instant solution to the problems States, and . In this case as in The interrelationship between these of the Caucasus. However, the fact the Georgian-Abkhaz case, the two spheres is significant and will to that all major actors have voiced presence of a mediator widely a large extent dictate the future of their support for the idea points to perceived has having been a party in the region. At the outset it should be an understanding of the regional the conflict as much as a mediator, noted that the conflicts antedated dimension of the Caucasian conflicts the composition of the mediation the geopolitical ‘game’. All conflicts and, more importantly, of the need force more than occasionally creates find their origin in the late Soviet era, for a future in cooperation. skepticism regarding the sincerity when no foreign power was and impartiality of the actions and significantly involved in the region. CONCLUSION proposals of the mediators. However, geopolitics have become Given the complexities of the inextricably attached to conflict At the same time, geopolitical players political situation in the Caucasus, resolution in the Caucasus. This is are in the Caucasus to stay, and no especially the intricate links between the case primarily because the conflict resolution process can be different conflicts and between geopolitical environment dictates the imagined without their involvement. conflicts and geopolitics, a coherent calculations and future prospects of There is increasing awareness that peace in the near future is not to be the parties involved. The existence the different conflicts of the expected. This pessimist conclusion of a multitude of foreign actors Caucasus cannot be considered must nevertheless not be taken to pursuing their interests in the region totally apart from each other and the mean that the Caucasus is doomed presents the regional states with geopolitical environment. Rather, to eternal conflict and despair. opportunities to increase their own there is an increasing trend toward a Indeed, war weariness is increasing status compared to that of their more holistic approach to conflict among the population of the region, antagonists. The prospect of resolution in the region. During the and the wave of nationalism initiated attracting powerful allies, and last year, the concept of a ‘Caucasus in the late 1980s and early 1990s thereby altering the balance of power Stability Pact’ inspired by the Balkan seems, in many parts of the region, in the conflict, obstructs conflict equivalent has surfaced and been to be on the decline. Grassroots resolution by inciting actors to put given great importance by political interaction between conflicting off a compromise solution in scientists as well as regional leaders. parties is increasing in spite of the anticipation for better terms in the At this point, there is still a great discouraging attitude of future. In addition, the existence of divergence in the interpretations of governments. South Ossetia is only parallel tracks of negotiation—in the the concept that different actors one example; encouraging examples Caucasus, typically a ‘Russian’ path espouse; yet there seems to be a are also appearing in the low-level and an ‘international’ path—serves gradual convergence on the relations between Armenia and the same purpose, complicating the membership of 8 actors in a future

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Azerbaijan. Politically, moreover, insecurity exists in both countries and their level of competition in the Armenia seems gradually to be regarding what political forces will region, will determine whether the returning to stability, meaning that take over from leaders who, despite Caucasus will move toward peace or the leadership may be able to focus their flaws, have been able to remain trapped in the situation of its efforts on conflict resolution once stabilize their countries and build ‘no peace, no war’ that is reigning at again, rather than its own political their true independence and present. survival. international standing. The Caucasus may be heading the The prospects for peace in the right way; however time may be Caucasus are hence unclear. Whereas short. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan excessive optimism is unwarranted, will, due to the sheer age of their the conditions for lasting peace are respective presidents and their gradually emerging in the region. In Svante E. Cornell is CEO of Cornell paternalistic style of leadership, the final analysis, the international Caspian Consulting. This article was experience the problem of political atmosphere and the importance originally published in the Marco Polo succession in the next five to ten accorded the region by international Magazine, no. 4-5, 2000. years. A considerable amount of actors, especially the great powers

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