Project on Nuclear Issues A Collection of Papers from the 2012 Conference Series EDITORS Stephanie Spies Sarah Weiner JUNE 2013 Project on Nuclear Issues A Collection of Papers from the 2012 Conference Series EDITORS Stephanie Spies Sarah Weiner AUTHORS Eric Auner Ned Wogman Jacob Benz Matthew Fargo Paul Booker Eli Jacobs Benjamin McDonald Egle Murauskaite Jay Brotz Chantell L. Murphy Justin Fernandez Kory W. Budlong Sylvester Casey L. Deering Joseph F. Pilat Laura Schmidt Denlinger Robert Reardon Jana Fankhauser Daniel Salisbury Travis Gitau Rachelle Smith Ron Omberg Jake Thompson Chris Toomey Wilbert van der Zeijden ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS— 50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofi t or ga ni za tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affi liated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to fi nding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive offi cer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specifi c policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2013 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data CIP information available on request. ISBN: 978- 1- 4422- 2507- 7 (pb); 978- 1- 4422- 2508- 4 (eBook) Center for Strategic and International Studies Rowman & Littlefi eld 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 202- 887- 0200 | www.csis.org 301- 459- 3366 | www.rowman.com Contents Introduction 1 Stephanie Spies U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and Deterrence in the Twenty- First Century 2 Eric Auner Verifi cation Challenges at Low Numbers 14 Jacob Benz, Paul Booker, and Benjamin McDonald The Benefi ts and Challenges of Active Monitoring in Support of Future Arms Control Initiatives 28 Jay Brotz and Justin Fernandez Achieving Disarmament and Permanent Threat Reduction by Eliminating Nuclear Materials 37 Casey L. Deering Technical Cooperation with India and Pakistan as a Confi dence- Building and Transparency Measure 49 Laura Schmidt Denlinger, Jana Fankhauser, Travis Gitau, Ron Omberg, Chris Toomey, and Ned Wogman The Future of Strategic Stability in Eu rope 60 Matthew Fargo Debating Zero: The Danger of Biological Weapons 68 Eli Jacobs From Paradox to Paradigm Shift in Nuclear Pakistan: Understanding the Proliferation Challenges 76 Egle Murauskaite Prioritizing Acquisition Pathways with State-speci fi c Factors in the State- level Concept 95 Chantell L. Murphy, Kory W. Budlong Sylvester, and Joseph F. Pilat | III Containing Iran: Why the Taboo Policies of Engagement and Containment Are the Right Ones 107 Robert Reardon Partnerships with the Private Sector: Addressing the Illicit Procurement of Proliferation- Sensitive Goods 120 Daniel Salisbury The Intrinsic Value of the Triad 132 Rachelle Smith The Growth of an Indian Nuclear Navy 140 Jake Thompson Breaking the NATO “Tactical” Nuclear Deadlock 146 Wilbert van der Zeijden IV | STEPHANIE SPIES AND SARAH WEINER Introduction Stephanie Spies he Center for Strategic and International Studies launched the Project on Nuclear Issues T(PONI) in 2003 in order to revitalize and strengthen a community of nuclear weapons experts whose training and background increasingly emphasize multidisciplinary exper- tise, especially among younger generations. In support of this goal, the PONI conference series was created to provide a forum for facilitating new and innovative thinking on how to address the evolving role of nuclear weapons in international security and to gather people from across the policy and technical communities to discuss key issues. The confer- ence series continues to place a strong emphasis on featuring the ideas of rising experts in the fi eld, who are uniquely positioned to advance new thinking and who represent the next generation of leaders from across the nuclear enterprise. The 2012 conference series included events at Pacifi c Northwest National Laboratory in April, Los Alamos National Laboratory in June, and the Center for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies in October before concluding with a Capstone Conference at Offutt Air Force Base, home of the U.S. Strategic Command, in March. The papers included in this volume are a collection of some of the pre sen ta tions delivered at the Capstone Conference. Span- ning a wide range of technical and policy issues, these selected papers hope to further discussion in their respective areas, as well as contribute to the success of the greater nuclear community. | 1 U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and Deterrence in the Twenty- First Century Eric Auner1 There is an emerging consensus in the United States that some form of limited ballistic missile defenses can advance U.S. national security goals. Missile defenses are justifi ed in part on the grounds that they help to deter certain twenty- fi rst century threats. As the United States seeks to deter the full range of threats, a nuanced understanding of what missile defenses can, and cannot, deter will be crucial. This paper assesses some of the mechanisms through which missile defenses might enhance deterrence. It concludes that missile defenses may strengthen deterrence and extended deterrence in some contexts as part of a full suite of current and emerging capabilities, including by pre- serving and enhancing the deterrent value of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. The effect of defenses on deterrence is likely to be marginal and ambig- uous, however, and applies to a relatively narrow spectrum of threats. he United States has undertaken efforts to protect against ballistic missile strikes since T the dawn of the missile age.2 After decades of technological progress, a series of systems have been developed and deployed, and missile defense capabilities are becoming more integrated into U.S. strategic thinking. The decisions this year to augment homeland defenses in response to North Korean provocation and to deploy— together with Germany and the Netherlands— Patriot batteries to reassure Turkey are two recent examples of how policy- makers are increasingly relying on missile defense as a tool of statecraft. This shift in U.S. strategic thinking is undergirded by a growing politi cal consensus about the desirability of some form of defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, mostly from outlier regimes with relatively unsophisticated (though in some cases numerous) missile forces.3 1. Eric Auner is a se nior analyst at Guardian Six Consulting and an inde pendent con sul tant and re- searcher. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent those of Guardian Six or any other or ga ni- za tion. He can be reached at [email protected]. Ari Kattan provided research and editorial assistance. 2. For a timeline of missile defense developments, see “Missile Defense, 1944– 2002,” PBS, http:// www .pbs .org /wgbh /pages /frontline /shows /missile /etc /cron .html. 3. Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Ellen Tauscher told 2 | Although many politi cal leaders in the United States and elsewhere have agreed that missile defenses may be desirable to develop and deploy, major questions about the impact of these systems remain, with which advocates and opponents continue to struggle. To mention only a few: how much is enough, and how much money is it worth? Can U.S. systems be expected to work under operationally realistic conditions, including against enemy countermea sures? What mix of sea-, land-, and space-based assets is appropriate? This paper deals with one such question, specifi cally the contribution of missile defense to current U.S. deterrence goals. Much of the current discussion of defenses deals— appropriately, given the serious and demanding task these systems are intended to perform—with the question of whether systems will work in combat. But if we are to assess the contributions of missile defense to deterrence, however, we need to think not about what happens after the enemy makes the decision to launch (will it work?) but rather about how these systems affect everything that happens before that decision is made. The effect of defenses (or, in some cases, the effect of the possibility that they could be deployed) during the Cold War has been studied at length.4 An opponent’s defenses raised the prospect that one’s own ability to retaliate might not be assured in all circumstances. Both the United States and Soviet Union built up signifi cant strategic forces, armed with countermea sures designed to frustrate defenses. Accordingly, from 1972 until 2002 the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, which restricted each side to defending two sites (later re- duced to one), limited deployments and forbade nationwide defensive systems.5 The effect of defenses on deterrence in a post– Cold War world with more numerous regional missile powers is far less clear.6 Iran and North Korea lack the resources, scientifi c know- how, and industrial capacity to produce large numbers of sophisticated systems capable of quickly and confi dently striking targets around the world with nuclear warheads.