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Jurisdiction 2 Section 3: Jurisdiction Article 4: Territorial Jurisdiction The criminal legislation of [insert name of state] applies to any person who com- mits a criminal offense within its territory. Commentary Article 4 expresses a principle that is common to all legal systems: criminal laws apply to persons who commit criminal offenses in the territory of a state. This is an undis- putable and universally recognized ground of jurisdiction based on the premise that territorial jurisdiction over criminal offenses is an aspect of a state’s sovereign powers. Reference should be made to Article 1(12), on the meaning of territory, and its accom- panying commentary. The application of this ground of jurisdiction is generally straightforward. How- ever, an issue may arise with regard to the application of territorial jurisdiction in cases in which one element of the criminal offense was committed in one state and another element was committed in another state. In such a case, and according to Article 14 of the MCC (“a criminal offense is committed where one of its elements was commit- ted”), two states may have territorial jurisdiction over a criminal offense. Reference should be made to Article 14 and its accompanying commentary. The Report on Extra- territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, drafted by the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (page 11), observes that when faced with a sce- nario like the one just described, “the question is approached from the pragmatic point of view that the actions associated with the principle act form an indivisible whole with that act and that the unity of the offense leads to a unity of jurisdiction and pro- cedure.” The report notes that many states resort to such a construction even where both states have a considerable claim to jurisdiction. In addition, the principle of external ne bis in idem, or double jeopardy, set out in Article 8 of the MCC, may also act as a control mechanism for such clashes. Reference should be made to Article 8 and its accompanying commentary. IOP573A_ModelCodes_Part1.indd 42 6/25/07 10:13:12 AM 2 Article • 43 Article 5: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction . The criminal legislation of [insert name of state] also applies: (a) to a ship flying the flag of [insert name of state] at the time the criminal offense is committed; (b) to an aircraft registered in [insert name of state] while in flight, regard- less of its location at the time of commission of a criminal offense; (c) with regard to unlawful seizure of aircraft, under Article 149, and unlaw- ful acts against the safety of ciil aiation, under Article 150, to an air- craft leased without crew to a lessee who has his or her principal place of business or his or her permanent residence in [insert name of state]; or (d) with regard to unlawful seizure of aircraft, under Article 149, and unlaw- ful acts against the safety of ciil aiation, under Article 150, to any air- craft on board which the criminal offense of unlawful seizure of aircraft or unlawful acts against ciil aiation is committed when the aircraft lands in the territory of [insert name of state] with the alleged perpetrator still on board. 2. The criminal legislation of [insert name of state] applies to any national or any stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in [insert name of state] and commits a criminal offense outside the territory of [insert name of state], where the offense is also criminalized in the second state. The criminal legislation of [insert name of state] applies to any person who commits a criminal offense against a national of [insert name of state] out- side the territory, where the offense is also criminalized in the second state. In relation to offenses against internationally protected persons, under Article 152, the criminal legislation of [insert name of state] applies to any person who commits a criminal offense against an internationally protected person, as defined by Article 152(2), who enjoys his or her status by virtue of func- tions that he or she exercises on behalf of [insert name of state]. Commentary Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a much more controversial area of criminal jurisdiction than is territorial jurisdiction. Although many states have introduced criminal legisla- tion providing for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, many other states have not. Recent law reforms show a movement toward the inclusion of extraterritorial jurisdic- IOP573A_ModelCodes_Part1.indd 43 6/25/07 10:13:12 AM 44 • General Part, Section tion in domestic criminal legislation, particularly where states are battling transna- tional criminal offenses such as organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorist acts, and trafficking in persons. A state asserts extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over a person when the crimi- nal offense occurs outside of its “territory.” Reference should be made to Article 1(12), on the meaning of territory, and its accompanying commentary. For a state to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, there must be some link between the state and the person who committed the criminal offense, the state and victim, the state and the criminal offense, or, in the case of Paragraph 1, the state and a vessel (an aircraft or ship). As mentioned in the commentary to Article 4, territorial jurisdiction is based on the fact that a state has a sovereign right to prosecute criminal offenses committed in its territory. To justify extraterritorial jurisdiction as a valid ground of jurisdiction, it is vital to demonstrate a link to the state’s sovereignty that consequently gives the state a valid interest in prosecuting the criminal offense. In the case of crimi- nal offenses committed by a national of the state (Paragraph 2), the national is consid- ered to be an aspect of the state’s sovereignty, and therefore there is enough of a nexus to assert jurisdiction. The same reasoning applies to a situation where a criminal offense is committed against a national of the state (Paragraph 3). Under Paragraph 2 of Article 5, a person who is habitually resident in a state is deemed to have “func- tional” nationality and is covered in the same manner as a national. The nexus between the vessels discussed in Paragraph 1 and the state’s sovereignty is based on the “flag principle,” discussed below, under which the vessels flying the flag of a state are con- sidered to be part of that state’s sovereignty, although they are technically outside its territory as defined in Article 1(12) of the MCC. The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction will often occur in a situation where two states have jurisdiction over the same criminal offense. This clash may be dealt with in the manner discussed in the commentary to Article 4. The principle of exter- nal ne bis in idem, set out in Article 8, may also act as a control mechanism for such clashes. Reference should be made to Article 8 and its accompanying commentary. Articles 5(2) and 5(3) require that the criminal offense for which extraterritorial jurisdiction is asserted is also a criminal offense in the state in which the criminal offense occurred. According to the Report on Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction (paragraph 14) drafted by the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, this provision is a common feature of legal systems that assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over all criminal offenses. In the course of drafting the MCC, the drafters considered whether to introduce another ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction, one based on the “security principle.” This provides a court with jurisdiction over acts that threaten the security of the state or the population of that state even if they occur outside its territory. The drafters did not include this principle because of reservations as to its validity as a ground of juris- diction under public international law. Additionally, this ground is somewhat ill defined in terms of meaning and how it would be interpreted and applied in practice. The drafters also considered the “effects principle” as a possible ground of extraterri- torial jurisdiction. Under this form of jurisdiction, a state may prosecute a criminal offense based on the injurious effects the offense had on the state. This form of juris- IOP573A_ModelCodes_Part1.indd 44 6/25/07 10:13:13 AM Article • 45 diction was not included in the MCC for the same reasons that prompted the exclusion of the security principle of jurisdiction. Paragraph 1: This paragraph sets out the “flag principle” under Paragraphs (a) and (b) and an extended form of the principle under Paragraphs (c) and (d). The flag principle is recognized in numerous international conventions as a ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction that states must assert over the criminal offenses covered in the relevant conventions. The extended form of flag principle jurisdiction found in Paragraphs (c) and (d) is unique to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air- craft, Article 4(1)(c), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Article 5(1)(d), as mandatory grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction that states parties to both conventions should assert over the criminal offenses of unlawful seizure of aircraft (Article 149) and unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (Article 150). Under the flag principle, criminal jurisdiction may be asserted over offenses com- mitted on board ships or aircraft flying the flag of the state. All states claim jurisdic- tion over their domestic vessels or aircraft. The only issue that may arise is competing claims of jurisdiction—for example, when a ship flying the flag of one state is sailing in the territorial waters of another state. According to the Report on Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction (paragraph 11), drafted by the Council of Europe Select Com- mittee of Experts on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, “There is no evidence of general international law rules for allocating competence among states, one of whom claims flag jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction on the basis of the flag principle is commonly found in many international conventions.
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