Evil, the Bodhisattva Doctrine, and Faith in Chinese Buddhism: Examining Fa Zang’S Three Tests

dirck vorenkamp

EVIL, THE BODHISATTVA DOCTRINE, AND FAITH IN CHINESE BUDDHISM: EXAMINING FA ZANG’S THREE TESTS

The seventh century Chinese Buddhist Fa Zang played a key role in systematizing the Huayan school of Chinese Buddhism. Huayan has never been a school noted for its discussions of practice and Fa Zang is no exception in this regard. Furthermore, one of the school’s prin- cipal canonical texts, the Awakening of Faith, focuses more on meta- physics than praxis. As a result it is somewhat surprising to find an extended discussion of proper practice in Fa Zang’s influential Com- mentary on the Awakening of Faith.1 This seems strange until further investigation reveals a connection between two important issues that arise within the context of Huayan thought. As Peter Gregory has pointed out, there is a problem of “theodicy” in the Awakening of Faith.2 If, as the text advocates, everything is One Mind (i.e., Thusness), one is left wondering why there is ignorance and suffering at all. Even further, this problem is compounded by the text’s view that conceptualization as a product of ignorance is characterized by active differentiation. If the unenlightened aspirant is by definition functioning on a basis of deluded conceptualization, how can he be certain the text’s distinctions are not also a function of this delusion? In short, how does the unenlightened individual tell the difference between distinctions regarding ignorance and wisdom? This issue alone is difficult but it finds expression within a Maha ya na tradition that has long espoused the bodhisattva doctrine. One aspect of this doctrine is that in helping others distinguish between ignorance and wisdom, bodhisattvas can and sometimes do take forms that are not conventionally considered good. This idea is important for Huayan thinkers because parts of the school’s other major text, the Huayanjing, espouse a particularly extreme form of this doctrine. Given that the Huayan School took the Awakening of Faith and the Huayanjing as its primary canonical sources, the combination of

DIRCK VORENKAMP,associate professor, Department of Religious Studies, Lawrence University,Appleton,Wisconsin. Specialties: Chinese Buddhist philosophy, Japanese Zen. E-mail:[email protected]. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31:2 (June 2004) 253–269 © 2004 Journal of Chinese Philosophy 254 dirck vorenkamp these two issues created a serious problem for thinkers like Fa Zang. If ignorance and wisdom are One Mind, and if the “good friends” (i.e., bodhisattvas) who help aspirants differentiate between them sometimes appear in evil guise (and vice-versa), how is the practitioner to know whether the message (Dharma) and messengers (bodhisattvas) are not also forms of delusion? Notice too that while the tradition does claim enlightenment solves this dilemma, it must nevertheless deal with the problem for those aspirants whose experiences do not provide an enlightened basis for its consideration. If the unenlightened individual cannot ascertain whether he is being misled, espe- cially by the system and its good friends, then there may be valid reasons to question the message and its bearers and perhaps even reject the system entirely. In light of these factors it is not surprising that Fa Zang devotes energy to the problem. His solution comes in the form of three tests offered as tools that can be employed by practitioners. In order to determine what sort of solution those tests provide, we must ﬁrst digress a bit to provide a brief overview of the pertinent issues within the Awakening of Faith and the Huayanjing.

Part I: The Problem of Evil in the AWAKENING OF FAITH

As Peter N. Gregory has pointed out, before Maha ya na Buddhism and the Ma dhyamaka interpretation of the Prajña pa ramita -su tras doctrine of emptiness, the origin of evil was not a problem that con- cerned Buddhists.3 In fact, the doctrine of karma would seem to solve the issue before it arises. As Gregory notes, moral evil, the evil committed by men, and natural evil, the problems humans suffer due to nature’s capriciousness, are all easily explained by that doctrine of causation.4 Given that all occurrences are a reflection of the orderly relationship between causes and effects, such events do not happen by accident. To the extent those events are a product of negative causes and conditions, the individual suffers appropriate and propor- tionate negative results. If the issue of evil has not been a problem for Buddhists, then it is this sort of evil that the doctrine of karma explains. Even so, what is not answered by this explanation is why the individual should find himself suffering in the first place.5 The traditional response of pre- Maha ya na Buddhism to this question was twofold. First, we are told that while suffering has an end in nirvan. a, it has no beginning. In short, the world of suffering constitutes the experiential starting point of the soteriological task. Secondly, since that is the case, speculation on the origin of suffering is not only fruitless but also actually harmful examining fa zang’s three tests 255 to the extent it takes one from the pressing soteriological concern at hand. The effectiveness of this response though began to diminish with the development of Maha ya na Buddhism. Through the long and complex development of various concepts such as Buddha-nature, s¢unyata, alayavijña na, and tatha gatagarbha, Maha ya na Buddhists began affirming the idea that everything is “Thusness.” While affirming that everything is “thus” certainly provides an answer regarding the nature of evil in its various forms, it also strongly begs an answer to the question, “Why is there any evil at all in a such a reality?” The Awakening of Faith is clearly, at least in part, an attempt to deal with this problem. The text’s answer lies in its view of the relationship between the “Mind-as-Thusness” (xin zhenru men) and the “Mind-as-sam. sa ra”(xin shengmie men). While there is some dis- agreement on this point, it is possible to read the text as supporting the view that all principles exist in a mutually inclusive relationship with all others.6 For example, at the start of the section devoted to explaining the structure of reality, the text states: As for revealing the correct meaning [of the term Maha ya na—i.e., Thusness], based on the Dharma of the One Mind, there are two aspects. What two? The One Mind-as-Thusness and the One Mind- as-samsåra.These two aspects each wholly encompass all dharmas.7 The author then continues by addressing the Mind-as-Thusness and starts the section noting: The Mind-as-Thusness is the One Dharmadha tu, the great universal characteristic of all things, and the essence of the gate of the Dharma.8 Even further, the text tells us all aspects of reality, just as they are, are “thus.” For example it states, “...Thusness lacks any characteristics that can be put aside because all dharmas are thus.”9 And also: If you know that although all dharmas are spoken of, there is neither that which can speak of them nor that which is spoken of; though conceptualized, there is neither that which conceives nor that which is conceived, that is called “conforming to Thusness.” And if you free yourself from [erroneous] conceptualizations [concerning self- existent phenomena], then that is called “acquiring entry.”10 It is also significant here that Fa Zang views the text as advocating just this sort of relationship. For example, in his Commentary Fa Zang says the “One Dharmadha tu” referred to by the Awakening of Faith “interfuses universally with all things”11 and also: As for this One Dharmadha tu, its whole essence is completely constituted as the Mind-as-sam. sa ra and also completely constituted as the Mind-as-Thusness.12 256 dirck vorenkamp

Even further, in his explanation of the Awakening of Faith’s warning us about the limitations of words concerning Thusness, he says: [This point] clarifies that conceptualization is non-conceptualization, and [Thusness] is not destroyed in conceptualization. Because it is not destroyed in conceptualization, it is denoted by [the phrase in the Awakening of Faith] “though conceptualized”....Furthermore, though Thusness is found in those words and thoughts about Thus- ness, you can consider the fact that these same thoughts and words are always without any essence that can conceive or be conceived.13 Three points emerge from these passages. First, the Awakening of Faith and Fa Zang are clearly affirming the typical Maha ya na view that everything, including ignorance, is Thusness. Accordingly, there is good reason to view the text and certainly Fa Zang not only as not advocating any sort of a transcendental Thusness, but in fact quite the contrary. The Awakening of Faith maintains the identity of the tatha gatagarbha and alayavijña na and tells us that ignorance is actually an aspect of the One Mind in the form of the Mind-as-sam. sa ra. Secondly, while this view does explain the nature of ignorance, it does not address the question of why there should be suffering at all in such a reality. The text’s solution to this problem apparently lies in its description of the way ignorance functions. The pure Dharma of Thusness is actually lacking in any impurity. It is just that perfumed by ignorance, it then has the characteristics of impurity...Because [there is this] perfuming, there is then the deluded mind. Because there is the deluded mind, it [further] per- fumes ignorance. Because it does not comprehend the Dharma of Thusness, unenlightened conceptualization arises, manifesting the objective realm of delusion.14 The key point here is the text views ignorance as actively “perfuming” pure Thusness and thereby producing the deluded mind. This process manifests the One Mind as a dynamic interplay between the relative and dependent states of essence and characteristics, enlightenment and delusion. Accordingly, in a certain sense then ignorance plays the essential soteriological function of providing the starting point from which the process of enlightenment proceeds. Here we should understand enlightenment not as a move toward a transcendent level, but rather the extension of awareness to Thusness in essence (ti) as reflected in and through Thusness in all its characteristics (xiang). This means then the text’s apparent answer to the question of why there is suffering in a reality that is entirely Thus is both because interdependent arising (Thusness) entails it (i.e., there is no Mind-as-Thusness without a Mind-as-sam. sa ra) and also, therefore, because enlightenment would be impossible without ignorance. examining fa zang’s three tests 257

One consequence of this view is the text’s categories become useful conventions that are not less valid in denoting ultimate truth because they are such conventions, but actually valued for it because Thusness finds expression in, through, and as those very same conventions. In short, according to the Awakening of Faith, understood correctly all dharmas, including words (e.g., the text’s conventional level expres- sions), and all conceptualizations (e.g., the conceptualized principles advocated by the text) become immediate and direct evidence of the nature of Thusness. We might say then the entire text is an affirma- tion of the utility of words and conceptualizations not simply as provisional, conventional level truths that can only suggest what is transcendent, but rather as fully giving form and expression to the manifesting activity that is Thusness.15 If this is accurate it means the text’s views now raise a different problem—namely, if the deluded conceptualizations produced by ignorance are also Thusness, and if as the text states those conceptualizations give rise to particular forms of the objective world, how can such an individual discern the difference between objects as products of ignorance or wisdom? In essence the Huayan aspirant needs to know how one tells the difference between the active perfuming of delusion as essential to the conceptualized manifestation of various phenomenal characteristics and therefore, properly understood as reflecting Thusness, and on the other hand its inevitable concomitant effect of obscuring the self-same Thusness it manifests and therefore, improperly understood, as perpetuating delusion. Third, this is not an easy question to answer because once ignorance has been made an essential part of reality’s operation the unenlightened may not be able to differentiate delusion and the products of delusion from wisdom and its products. The Awakening of Faith makes this clear in the fourth section, the section titled “Faith and Practice.”

Sentient beings who lack the power of good roots are those confused by Ma ra the tempter, heterodoxies, and ghosts or spirits. Some [of those evil influences] will manifest a fearsome form while you are sitting in meditation, or even falsely appear as upright men and women, or other [forms having] more neutral characteristics.... Some manifest the form of heavenly beings, Bodhisattvas, and also the form of the Tatha gata, replete with all the marks.16 Notice that the text has actually only raised one potential problem—the possibility of evil in the disguise of good. In answer, the reader is told to remain mindful of the fact that everything is “mind only.” But this does not really solve the problem because the very advice given by the text might be an example of just the sort of evil it warns against. Since deluded conceptualization 258 dirck vorenkamp constitutes the ground from which the aspirant begins, why should he believe this message is other than a product of that delusion? As a result the Huayan aspirant might reasonably ask, “Why trust this message”? One answer endorsed by Maha ya na Buddhism generally and Huayan specifically holds the message is trustworthy if the messenger is trustworthy. In short, if the messenger is a good friend, or bodhisattva, then the message is valid. Good friends, presumably like the author of the Awakening of Faith, help steer the aspirant down the right path. In light of the text’s acknowledgement that evildoers may appear as bodhisattvas and Tatha gatas, complete with all the appropriate marks of such individuals, differentiating good friends from bad presents obvious and immediate difficulties. Unfortunately for Huayan practitioners though, their other major canonical source, the Huayanjing, espouses a form of this doctrine that further compounds the problem.

Part II: The Bodhisattva Doctrine in the HUAYANJING

The Huayanjing is a large text and bodhisattvas play a key role in its narrative. In that role they occasionally appear in forms that seem to violate the Dharma’s norms of good behavior. A striking example of this occurs in the final chapter of the work. In that chapter the aspirant, Sudhana, is sent by the Bodhisattva Mañjus¢ rı to visit a series of teachers. While those good friends are there to help Sudhana progress toward enlightenment, not all of them appear legitimate at first sight. For example, in the following section Sudhana visits King Man-tzu (Skt: Anala?) and is confronted with a horrifying scene: Sudhana asked where King Anala was and a person replied, “He’s presently at the palace of regulation practicing the King’s dharma teaching the multitudes. Those who should be assisted, he assists, those who should be punished, he punishes.” Then Sudhana saw at a distance that the King occupied a diamond lion throne...[Around the King] there were ten thousand brave generals and guards holding weapons. Then Sudhana saw numberless beings who had trans- gressed the King’s law. Their bodies had been covered and they were bound five times over. Some were having their hands and feet sliced off, some their ears and noses cut off, some had both their eyes plucked out, some their heads cut off, some were tossed into boiling lime, and some were being repeatedly softened up with hot oil then set on fire. The King’s men were torturing all of them in this fashion with numerous fires and acids. At that time, contemplating this, Sudhana thought, “I learn a Bodhisattva’s actions and cultivate the Bodhisattva Path for the sake of all sentient beings. Now, however, seeing this King practicing such examining fa zang’s three tests 259

great evil, this perverse, immoral dharma,I know he is the most evil of individuals.” While thinking this celestial beings from the heavens called to Sudhana saying, “Sudhana! You must remember the teaching of the...good friend Jayos¢ mayatana—[He had previously advised Sudhana in an earlier and similar situation that these individuals, contrary to appearances, really are good friends]. Sudhana raised his eyes and looked at the sky while answering, “I always keep it in mind.” The celestial beings then replied, “If you do remember, why are you suspicious and act strange? Sudhana, a Bodhisattva’s skillful means are inconceivable, a Bodhisattva’s knowledge is inconceivable ...”17

Clearly Sudhana is facing an individual who does not appear to be acting in accord with the Dharma. He concludes this person is not a good friend and given the context, this seems both reasonable and morally correct. Of course at just that moment celestial guides remind Sudhana a high level bodhisattva’s skillful means are so profound things may not be as they appear. In fact, given the extreme nature of the King’s business in the above example, a good friend may even be engaged in actions considered “evil,” “perverse,” and “immoral.” This idea certainly opens the door for dramatically extending the compassionate activities of bodhisattvas and the whole notion of upa ya, but it does so at the cost of clear criteria for sorting good friends from bad.

Part III: The Problem

The Huayan aspirant might very well ﬁnd himself in a severe spiritual crisis at this point. The Awakening of Faith makes ignorance an essential feature of reality as conventionally misunderstood. Since by context the aspirant does misunderstand, he cannot be sure the message itself represents wisdom rather than delusion. Accordingly, to the extent the text’s truth claims do not accord with rules of reason equally accessible to the unenlightened and the enlightened alike, the veracity of the message remains in question and must be assumed in light of the messenger’s authority. The reasonable aspirant might then ask himself whether the messenger can and should be trusted. The typical form of the bodhisattva doctrine always allowed for a resolu- tion of this problem based upon established criteria of judging action—that is, is it in accord with the letter and spirit of the rules of proper conduct? But at this point the problem is more difﬁcult for not only must the aspirant recognize the possibility that evildoers may disguise themselves as “good friends,” but also, according to the 260 dirck vorenkamp

Huayanjing, sometimes good friends disguise themselves as evildoers. Clearly Huayan thinkers like Fa Zang would have had strong reasons to solve this problem and in the end the question that must be answered for (and by) the Huayan aspirant is simply, “Who should one trust and why?”

Part IV: Fa Zang’s Three Tests

Fa Zang addresses this problem in his commentary on the passage from the Awakening of Faith mentioned earlier. As we recall, the passage states: Sentient beings who lack the power of good roots are those confused by Ma ra the tempter, heterodoxies, and ghosts or spirits. Some [of those evil influences] will manifest a fearsome form while you are sitting in meditation, or even falsely appear as upright men and women, or other [forms having] more neutral characteristics.... Some manifest the form of heavenly beings, Bodhisattvas, and also the form of the Tatha gata, replete with all the marks.18 In answer the text tells the reader to remain mindful of the fact that everything is “mind only.” In his Commentary,Fa Zang has an interlocutor pose the following question: Question: If they [i.e., evil influences] can apparently manifest the images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and even expound the profound Dharma, some perhaps even being the same as what good roots from past lives will produce, then how are we to select and decide [between] the evil and the true? Answer: This is a truly difficult matter. The reason is that if they are what Ma ra has created, that is to say, those apparently good characteristics, and your mind does become attached to them, then you will fall into a net of evil. On the other hand, if they really are objects produced from good roots, namely those that are for freeing yourself from the deeds of Ma ra and mental doubts, and [you reject them,] you will regress, lose the [benefits of those] good roots and in the end, not make progress. For this reason, it is truly difficult select- ing between the evil and true ones.19 In this section Fa Zang establishes the problem and sets the context for his answer that follows. His questioner gets right to the heart of the matter because regardless of the form the problem takes—evil as good or good as evil, the key issue is how to distinguish between them. Fa Zang acknowledges the difficulty by noting it may not be clear which choice is correct or even how to choose. Of course the system maintains enlightenment solves these problems so the answer Fa Zang is about to provide is certainly not aimed at Buddhas. Since that examining fa zang’s three tests 261 is the case, we might ask whether his tests do provide a viable solution for aspirants. In answering this question it will be helpful to remember the Huayanjing’s story of Sudhana’s troubles. That story clearly indicates these problems can cause difficulty at any point during the aspirant’s progress. In light of that it will be useful to distinguish between two hypothetical aspirants. In the first instance we can imagine an individual who has decided to entertain the possibility of engaging in Huayan practice. This hypothetical individual has no prior Buddhist training and will make his decision regarding Huayan practice on the basis of a reasonable skepticism. Secondly, we might also consider the case of an aspirant who has already invested in Huayan and has some prior experience. This is a person who, like Sudhana (and unlike the potential beginner), has a certain amount of faith and training to draw upon when evaluating the system’s demands and suggestions. With this distinction in mind, to what degree do Fa Zang’s three tests present a viable solution for such individuals? In answer Fa Zang begins by saying:

Here though we can rely on [techniques] bequeathed [from our] predecessors. Briefly, you can use three different methods to verify them. First, you can use sama dhi to grind away at them. Second, you can rely on a foundation to cultivate a corrective. And finally, third, you can use wisdom to examine them. This is just like the [Maha - parinirvan. a] sutra says: “If you want to determine [if a piece of metal] is true gold, test it with three methods, i.e., heat it, beat it, and grind it. Practitioners should also [employ methods] like these.” It is difficult to differentiate [good teachers from bad,] so if you want to distinguish between them, then follow the three tests. First [though] you must work together with them [in order to observe their actions]. If you work with them and still do not know, then you should long reside with them. If you long reside with them and still do not know, then use wisdom to examine them.20 As Fa Zang begins his explanation of the tests, it appears there may actually be four methods.The discussion of the first test,using sama dhi to grind away at evil apparitions, is preceded by the short explanation of how to determine a teacher’s value based on observation. Fa Zang tells us the aspirant might try working with the person, living, or perhaps just spending time with them. If that is not possible,he suggests using wisdom to examine the individual. This is a traditional Buddhist solution to the problem and as long as the individual is good, or evil in good disguise, closely observing the extent to which their actions accord with the Dharma and the traditional rules of conduct does provide a certain basis for determining their trustworthiness. We might note though this advice assumes evil in the guise of good either cannot or will not act so consistently as to defy detection. Given 262 dirck vorenkamp

Buddhism’s insistence on the idea that intentions are intricately tied to words and actions, from the system’s perspective the activities of an evil person pretending to be good would be influenced at some point and in some manner by impure motivations. If so, evildoers of this sort must always reveal themselves. Accordingly, from the aspirant’s perspective consistently good actions by a potential teacher could be considered prima-facie evidence of his status as a good friend. Of course since the essential requirement for a positive conclusion (i.e., the individual is in fact a good friend) is consistency of action, the aspirant must determine how long to suspend judgment while observing the potential teacher. Certainly some period of time must be involved, but how long? No answer is provided here and perhaps none that would serve in every case could be provided. Even further, if the individual determines a satisfactory solution to the above problem, effectively differentiating between good and apparently good, or bad and apparently bad behavior requires some criteria for judging actions. Accordingly, the application of this test assumes some preliminary commitment to the system’s norms. The standards Fa Zang implies when he suggests observing the prospec- tive teacher’s activities are the traditional criteria for evaluating a person’s actions—that is, the Dharma and its rules of conduct. Whether such criteria are ultimately worthy of consideration as models of spiritual behavior though is a matter the potential beginner must decide first. Even allowing for the argument that some Bud- dhist doctrines are empirically verifiable, and therefore accessible to any reasonable individual, given the relationship between certain forms of practice (conduct) as the means required to verify doctrinal claims (i.e., achieve enlightenment), and the fact that particular understanding (enlightenment) serves as a basis for advocating certain practices, practice becomes a means to verify a truth that can only proceed on some assumption of that truth. This suggests the potential aspirant will not have access to the method (“right” practice) without some initial commitment to the system. If this is the case, why make such a commitment? One traditional Maha ya na approach to this problem is to empha- size the need for faith as the starting point of practice and understanding.21 This view is typical of Maha ya na literature and Fa Zang’s works are no exception. For example, consider the following com- ments from his commentary on the Huayanjing where he discusses requirements for hearing the Dharma.

At the beginning is faith....It is due to arousing faith and an internal desire [for enlightenment] that one is externally able to draw near to good friends in order to attain the skillful means of Dharma.22 examining fa zang’s three tests 263

There is no surprise here of course as Maha ya na advocates have long acknowledged the importance of faith in the bodhisattva path. Even so, if the individual does decide to trust the traditional criteria, that is, to “have faith,” what sort of faith can that be and is it accessible to our hypothetical aspirants? Generally speaking, Maha ya na notions of faith fall to one of three specific types. While the bhakti cult certainly had an impact on the development faith in Buddhism, the three most frequently used terms in Maha ya na literature are prasa da (jingxin), adhimukti (jiexin), and s¢raddha (wenxin).23 Prasa da connotes “being firmly seated in a state of clearness and tranquility.”24 The relationship between faith and that state of mental clarity is not clear in the term’s usage. It may be that faith produces the clarity, or vice-versa. Sung Bae Park has suggested it means “faith by purification.”25 Assuming he is correct, then prasa da seemingly refers to strengthening an already existent faith through proper practice. Given the relationship mentioned above between practice and wisdom, presumably faith is strengthened in response to and as a function of the clarity produced by practice. In contrast to prasa da, adhimukti means “confidence” and refers to a type of faith that is a function of, or concomitant with, understanding.26 One aspect of adhimukti is the notion that faith is justified by and deepened through understanding. In short, it conveys the idea that comprehending aspects of the system’s truth claims can provide a confident basis for faith in those claims. As it turns out, the Awak- ening of Faith seeks to promote adhimukti through its explanations of the Dharma.27 While it appears both prasa da and adhimukti might provide some help for the experienced practitioner who has already committed to the system, it is equally clear they will not work for the potential beginner. Our skeptical potential aspirant is still trying to decide whether the norms advocated by the system should be trusted and will note that in these cases, as above, the reasonableness of the views is at least partially dependent upon accepting some aspect of the system as axiomatic. Accordingly, if at this point the individual believes those claims, apparently he must choose that belief despite these problems and the associated reasonable doubts. This problem leads directly to a different type of solution. S¢raddha refers to a form of faith rooted in the “unconditional acceptance of words and teachings.”28 Sudhana’s case from the Huayanjing is a good illustration of this form of faith. Even as he questions the status of the King, Sudhana never doubts the Dharma. In fact, he maintains his faith in the Dharma even as it becomes clear that very Dharma may require him to associate with individuals like the King. Similarly, even as they vouchsafe questionable actions, 264 dirck vorenkamp

Sudhana never doubts the word of the heavenly beings. Clearly, Sudhana is both reasonable and acquainted with the various ethical aspects of the path, but when his reasonable doubts conflict with his trust in the message and/or its messengers, he suspends the doubts. This suspension of doubt, or perhaps more accurately, this lack of doubt due to an “unconditional acceptance” of the message is the key functional component of s¢raddha. Of course in avoiding the issue of this very aspect of s¢raddha as a way to proceed does not solve the immediate problem any more than the previous two forms of faith. The skeptic may note the very texts and messengers advocating such “unconditional acceptance” might be evildoers. In fact one might immediately question how reasonable it is for a system to require suspending reasoned application of its own guidelines precisely when they seem most pertinent. Though Huayan and Fa Zang consistently assure the uncommitted such a move is wise, the promised clarity is predicated upon taking the first, perhaps unreasonable step. Given the intractable nature of the problem, it is not clear whether a definitive and absolutely reasonable answer is possible. Of course, this is precisely why s¢raddha offers a solution where the other two forms of faith do not, and as it turns out, this is also why s¢raddha is essential for successful application of Fa Zang’s test. This point is clear when we note Fa Zang’s suggestion to apply traditional criteria for determining good friends from bad does not deal with the particular form of this difficulty experienced by Sudhana. Sudhana, a faithful and experienced practitioner, applied just these sorts of criteria to the King’s behavior and apparently did so consistently and reasonably. In fact, we might judge his initial response to the King as one motivated by and grounded in an adhimukti type of faith. In light of his understanding of and confident faith in the Dharma to that point, he is certain the King is wrong. Even so he mis- judged and only heavenly help saved him from a mistake. Of course, Huayan Buddhists might argue cases such as Sudhana’s are special for any number of reasons and those situations aside, the standard guidelines for conduct do provide a sound basis for determining whether an individual is a good friend. Even so, the lesson seems to be that advanced levels of understanding, and the adhimukti and prasa da forms of faith that mature in light of that understanding, do not completely eliminate the need for an unconditional acceptance of a messenger and message. Even further, given the way these problems immediately raise questions about the nature of Fa Zang’s advice, problems for either hypothetical practitioner that may not be resolved by reason or application of the first two forms of faith, it appears s¢raddha is essential to employ Fa Zang’s method. This point examining fa zang’s three tests 265 naturally leads one to wonder whether the other tests also require s¢raddha. Fa Zang continues his explanation by saying:

Now then you [can also] avail yourself of this idea to test the evil and the true. That is to say, as in sama dhi when characteristics of objects arise such that the evil and true are difﬁcult to distinguish, deeply enter sama dhi so that in regards to those objects the mind neither grasps at nor discards them-just impartially and steadfastly remain [noncommittal]. If the objects are what good roots have produced, then the power of your sama dhi will be greatly enhanced and good roots thoroughly aroused. On the other hand, if they are something Ma ra has created, then before long they will self-destruct.29

Following his suggestion to directly observe a potential teacher, Fa Zang tells us the rest of this test involves using sama dhi as a means of practicing nonattachment to objects. In this case where the object of potential attachment is a teacher and in line with typical Maha ya na views concerning the interdependent relationship between subjects and objects, there is a sense in which the form and characteristics of the object reflect the subject’s karmic tendencies. By providing a meditative basis for contemplating objects apart from the usual associated subjective mental and emotional factors that con- tribute to and perpetuate particular conceptualizations of an object, sama dhi offers a technique for developing a growing awareness of the object’s and subject’s true nature (s¢unyata). From the system’s perspective, such growing awareness strengthens positive karmic tendencies. Though he does not specifically say this, one implication of Fa Zang’s advice is there are no bad teachers. So-called “bad teachers” represent a conceptualization arising from roots of delusion. Approached from this basis, any object can be considered from a perspective that simultaneously diminishes negative karmic influences while enhancing positive ones. Simply put, within this context the Buddhist will never get in trouble by practicing nonattachment. One ethical point does present itself here though. While the practitioner may not generate further negative karma by practicing mental nonattachment, is this also the case regarding what might seem a moral imperative to act? That is to say, in practicing nonattachment of that sort one may not be guilty of a “sin” of commission, but what about the possibility of a “sin” of omission? It is certainly not typical to portray mentally detached bodhisattvas as physically disengaged from the world and Fa Zang may not be suggesting as much above. But there is still the issue of whether, when, and why one will act when approaching the world from a basis of nonattachment. If nonattachment results in a failure to act when action is required, at the very least the individual has missed an opportunity 266 dirck vorenkamp to create positive karmic conditions. To the extent such a failure is rooted in confusion over the matter, it may also perpetuate delusion. Given the particular difficulties posed by Sudhana’s situation, the fact that even well-intentioned mistakes may have some negative conse- quences is apparent. Even further, Sudhana’s confusion suggests this problem remains a possibility well into an aspirant’s development. In any case, the key point here is once again this is not an approach accessible to the potential beginner. The earlier reasons apply as well as the fact that being able to achieve sama dhi is something the tradition tells us requires skill and practice. If one cannot determine whether such practices are correct to begin with, or at least have a sense that they are, then one cannot acquire the skill required to employ the technique. Even more problematic, Fa Zang tells us skepticism and disbelief are obstructions to attaining sama dhi.30 Given that, as well as the need for and nature of s¢raddha as detailed above, it would appear “healthy skepticism” is an oxymoron for practitioners in this situation. On the other hand, given the problems we have been discussing it is uncertain how one can avoid such unhealthy skepticism in order to generate s¢raddha and possibly develop a facil- ity with techniques such as sama dhi. Fa Zang continues his explanation with the second test. As for the second method, relying on a foundation to cultivate a corrective, if from the beginning you cultivate the meditation of contemplating impurity, then now you can rely on that foundation to contemplate impurities. If you cultivate it, and objects are sharpened, then they are not a deception. But if by using this foundation to cultivate a corrective the objects are gradually extinguished, then you know they are evil.31 Essentially, the same problems mentioned above are also present with the second alternative. This technique may be of use to the experienced practitioner, but certainly not for the beginner. Furthermore, even for the experienced practitioner this is advice that either assumes a proper start at some time in the past, or seems to imply a developmental period sufficient to strengthen the “foundation.” For the practitioner who has already been utilizing this method Fa Zang’s advice provides immediate help. Those who have not have either already missed the opportunity to do so or will have to put in the time necessary to acquire the skills. In the latter case, this method will provide no immediate benefit to the practitioner. Finally, in regard to the third and final method, Fa Zang concludes with: As for the third test, using wisdom to examine them, contemplate the characteristics aroused and consider their origin. You do not have to observe the circumstances of their production, just deeply know that examining fa zang’s three tests 267

they are emptiness and make sure your mind does not remain attached to them. The evil ones will self-destruct while the true ones will become more self-evident. This is just as the act of heating genuine gold will actually enhance its brilliant color while if it is fool’s gold, it will be scorched to destruction. You should know the false and true among these are also like this. Sama dhi is metaphorically like grinding or polishing it. Relying on a foundation as a corrective is like beating it. And ﬁnally, using wisdom to examine them will classify them just like heating [sepa- rates genuine and fool’s gold]. By means of these three texts, you can come to differentiate the evil ones from the true ones.32 The third test reads like a variation of the ﬁrst. This time though instead of utilizing sama dhi the practitioner is advised to remain unat- tached by keeping in mind that everything is fundamentally empty of a self-nature. While the ability to attain sama dhi and a proper “foundation” both presuppose some skill as a meditator, this test amounts to an injunction to remember that everything is empty and to remain noncommittal for that reason. In this sense the test appears to be the one that would prove most useful to the beginning, but already practicing Huayan Buddhist. If this third test is accessible to a lower level novice, it is also clear it will not help our hypothetical would-be beginner any more than the others and for the same reasons.

Part V: Conclusion

In the end then, we see the effectiveness of Fa Zang’s tests varies greatly depending on the aspirant’s level of practice. One thing is certain though—none of them provides a complete solution for the skeptical potential beginner. Because the system itself acknowledges the distinctions perceived by the deluded are products of that delusion, the distinctions that constitute the message are immediately suspect by the system’s own views. The traditional solution to that problem, trusting an appropriate teacher even as the message is not always clear, is itself immediately suspect for the same reason, but also because the system further complicates matters by insisting it is not always apparent who to trust. The committed practitioner will have a range of experiences and some amount of faith available to sort through these problems. In contrast, lacking such background the skeptical potential beginner may ﬁnd these facts alone sufﬁcient reason for rejecting the practice. Of course, one might argue that Fa Zang’s Commentary on the Awakening of Faith does not read like a text written to provide skep- tics with reasons for becoming Huayan Buddhists, and the nature of the tests certainly indicates he is speaking primarily to committed 268 dirck vorenkamp practitioners. However, he does say that the Awakening of Faith was composed so that “...those who do not believe yet are prompted to produce faith.”33 And in line with this, he also says out of “compas- sion for all the deluded” his Commentary is intended to shed light on meanings of the Awakening of Faith that are “remote.”34 Taking Fa Zang at his word, in light of the above it is clear his tests cannot completely accomplish the task without the individual’s acceptance of a s¢raddha form of faith. Accordingly, in the end it appears a Huayan practitioner’s contin- ued spiritual growth requires balancing three approaches to determine the moral value of a message and messenger. That is to say, the aspirant is encouraged to apply traditional criteria of proper conduct, consider doubts that arise in light of their application, and also nurture an unconditional faith. It is clear there may arise situations when these alternatives produce mutually contradictory solutions. In those circumstances, suspending reasonable doubt in favor of an unconditional acceptance may provide the only viable basis for pro- ceeding with Huayan practice.

LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY Appleton, Wisconsin

Endnotes

1. Fa Zang, Commentary on the Awakening of Faith (Dacheng qi xin lun yi ji), Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo (hereafter “T.”), ed. Takakusu Junjiro and Watanabe Kaigyoku (Tokyo: Taisho Issaiko Kankokai, 1924–32), vol. 44, pp. 240c–287b. For his discussion of the three tests, see pp. 284b–285a. 2. Peter N. Gregory, “The Problem of Theodicy in the Awakening of Faith,” Religious Studies 22:63–78. 3. Ibid, p. 70. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid, pp. 70–71. 6. According to Gregory (and correctly I believe), the problem with Ma dhyamaka (and perhaps we should specify “Pra san˙ gika Ma dhyamaka”) formulations of ultimate (parama rtha) level truth is that it is “altogether beyond the ken of language”(p. 66). As Gregory notes, this results in an “absolute disjunction between ultimate and conventional truth” (p. 66). In Gregory’s view, the Awakening of Faith’s division of the “One Mind” into the “Mind-as-Thusness” and the “Mind-as-sam. sa ra” (Gregory translates “Mind as subject to birth and death”—same term) reﬂects the same “disjunction” found between the two levels of the Ma dhyamaka two truths theory. 7. The Awakening of Faith,T.32, p. 576a. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Commentary on the Awakening of Faith,T.44, p. 252a. 12. Ibid, p. 252b. 13. Ibid, p. 253b. 14. The Awakening of Faith,T.32, p. 578a. examining fa zang’s three tests 269

15. This is why the text tells us both aspects of the One Mind fully and completely encompass each other and also why, rather cryptically perhaps, it also says there is a “dharma/Dharma” that can awaken faith. T. 32, p. 575b. 16. The Awakening of Faith,T.32, p. 582b. 17. Huayanjing,T.44, p. 284c. 18. The Awakening of Faith,T.32, p. 582b. 19. Commentary on the Awakening of Faith,T.44, p. 284c. 20. Ibid. 21. For example, at T.9, p. 543a the Bodhisattva Diamond Treasury initially remains silent rather than speak of the Dharma to those without faith. In his commentary, Fa Zang says “Diamond Treasury desired to expound...but he feared the assembly did not believe...”T.35,p.288b. 22. Fa Zang, Huayanjing tan xuan ji,T.35, p. 282b. 23. Minoru Kiyota, A Survey of Pure Land Buddhism: India, China and Japan, unpub- lished manuscript, p. 44. 24. For further, see Sung Bae Park, Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1983), p. 15ff. 25. Ibid, p. 15. 26. Park says adhimukti “means ‘trust’ or ‘conﬁdence’” (pp. 15–16). For more on the “understanding” component of this form of faith, see Foxue da cidian (Xianggang: xianggang fo jing liu tong qu yinhang) vol. 2, p. 1649. 27. For an extended discussion of this, see Dirck Vorenkamp, Hua-yen Buddhism: Faith and Time in Fa-tsang’s Thought, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997. Chapter 6. 28. Kiyota, p. 12. Also see Park, p. 15 and Foxue da cidian vol. 2, p. 1649. 29. Commentary on the Awakening of Faith. T. 44, p. 284c. 30. Ibid., p. 283c. 31. Ibid., p. 284c. 32. Ibid., p. 284c–285a. 33. Ibid., p. 241b. 34. Ibid., p. 241a.

Chinese Glossary

Dacheng qi xin lun yi ji Fa Zang Ti Huayan Wenxin Huayanjing Xiang Jiexin Xin shengmie men Jingxin Xin zhenru men