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Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy

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Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy Notes Introduction 1 . Note that Kant has been central not only to modern philosophy but also to modern theology and religious studies. See Dorrien 2012. 2 . For instance, Hare (2002) uses the theories of Kant and Kierkegaard in order to argue that the ethical requirement, together with our natural capabilities, leads to a need for divine grace. Also, Quinn, one of the central figures within contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, uses Kant and Kierkegaard when dealing with several central topics within the philosophy of religion. Quinn writes: ‘I do ... count myself as a Kierkegaardian of sorts. For example, I greatly admire and have elsewhere tried to defend the divine command ethics in Works of Love . But I also think Kierkegaard is an author whose seductive voice should put us on our guard’ (Quinn 2001, p. 327 referencing Quinn 1996, pp. 29–44). 3 . See Habermas 2005, especially chapter 8 and 2003, pp. 1–15 and pp. 101–115. See also Fremstedal 2009. 4 . Stewart (ed.) 2014. 5 . Cf. Knappe 2004, pp. 2f.; Stewart 2003, pp. 3–32. 6 . Like Knappe (2004, p. 7), I agree with Theunissen’s (1979, p. 24) claim that ‘if system can be understood as developing an uniform theory that is oriented towards completeness, then one ... must assert that the anti-systematic thinker Kierkegaard ... becomes himself the constructor of a system.’ 7 . This is in line with Stewart’s (2010) attempt to undermine the popular view that there is a radical break between German idealism and existentialism. It is also in line with Madore’s (2011) attempt to show that Kant’s later writing has a somewhat neglected existential side. 8 . See Green 1992; Michalson 1990. 1 Methodological Considerations: Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy 1 . Hatfield 2005, p. 104. 2 . Hatfield 2005, p. 112. 3 . Stewart 2003, p. 36. 4 . See Knappe 2004, p. 5. Cf. Green 1992. 5 . See Stewart (ed.) 2007ff., vols 1–14. For an overview, see http://www.jonstewart. dk/krsrr.htm (2014/04/08). 6 . Green 2007, pp. 179–210. 7 . Nadler 2005, p. 217. 8 . Watson 2002, pp. 525f. 9 . Although Knappe’s (2004) approach resembles the analytic approach, Knappe himself does not explicitly describe it as belonging to analytic history of 241 242 Notes philosophy. One possible reason for this is that German and Scandinavian terminologies differ from English terminology, typically preferring to use the terms historic and systematic (or thematic) instead of contextual and analytic, respectively. 10 . Knappe 2004, p. 5. 11 . Knappe 2004, pp. 1f. 12 . Knappe 2004, pp. 5f. 13 . Hatfield 2005, p. 91. 14 . Knappe 2004, p. 6. 15 . Knappe 2004, p. 6. 16 . See, for example, Stewart 2003, p. 38. 17 . Regarding Kierkegaard’s conception of philosophy as the cultivation of wisdom and the care of self, see Furtak 2005, pp. 42ff. 18 . Watson 2002, pp. 526f. 19 . Commentators who use Kierkegaard in contemporary debates include Rudd 2012; Davenport 2012, Hare 2002; Evans 2006a; Furtak 2005; Stokes 2010. 20 . Cf. Theunissen 1993, p. 13 and p. 108. 21 . Watson 2002, p. 527. 22 . Kenny (2005, pp. 23f.) writes: ‘Philosophers who read ancient, medieval, or early modern texts without a knowledge of the historical context in which they were written are likely to sin by anachronism . ... The philosopher who ignores the historical background of past classics will gain no fresh light on the issues which concern us today, but merely present contemporary preju- dices in fancy dress.’ What Kenny says about early modern texts here seems to hold even for Kierkegaard. 23 . Stewart 2003, p. 39. 24 . Hannay 2003, p. i. 25 . Stewart 2003, pp. 38f. 26 . Stewart 2003, p. 37. 27 . Stewart 2003, p. 37. 28 . Stewart 2011, pp. 501–518. 29 . Stewart 2003, p. 36. Stewart (2003, pp. 37f.) realizes that the historical mate- rial he deals with stands in need of interpretation, but he adds that ‘the parameters of the discussion should, it seems to me, be dictated by it [the historical material] and not by the fantasy of the commentator. Presumably Kierkegaard knew best his own intellectual commitments’. 30 . Stewart 2003, p. 38. 31 . Westphal 2004, p. 11. 32 . Zarka 2005, p. 156. The distinction between historicity and transcendence (trans-historicity) corresponds to Kierkegaard’s distinctions between facticity and ideality, necessity and freedom, respectively. See Chapter 3. 33 . Stewart 2003, p. 39. 34 . Stewart 2003, p. 39. 35 . Cf. Rorty 1998, p. 49; Knappe 2004, p. 5. 36 . As Zarka (2005, p. 149) puts it: ‘[C]ontext always has to be reconstructed. It is never given ... Just as the text has to be interpreted, so the context has to be reconstructed ... the interpretation of the text (or in any event, of some of its elements) and the historical reconstruction of the context interact. The text is necessary for the reconstruction of the context, and vice versa.’ Notes 243 37 . MacIntyre (1998, p. 39) prefers to speak of antiquarian history of philosophy. 38 . Cf. Kenny 2005, pp. 23f.; Sandis 2009, p. 104; Stewart 2003, p. 39. 39 . Cf. Stewart 2003, pp. 36ff.; Sandis 2009, p. 104. 40 . Grøn (1997, pp. 143–153) shows that Theunissen’s (1993, pp. 85–96) rational reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair ends up being closer to Kierkegaard’s actual view than Theunissen himself thought. Theunissen claims that Kierkegaard says that despair consists of being active, although he should have said that it also consists in passivity (Wiederfahrnis and Erleiden ). However, Grøn argues convincingly that Kierkegaard does in fact say what Theunissen thinks he should have said. 41 . Rorty 1998, p. 53. 42 . Kenny (2005, p. 24) writes: ‘The historian who is unconcerned with the phil- osophical problems that troubled past writers has not really understood how they themselves understood their thinking.’ 43 . Irwin 2011, vol. 1, p. 9. It might also be argued that history itself does not consist of facts that can be understood when wholly separated from our systematic attempts to understand existence. See Wyller 1996, p. 3. 44 . Nadler 2005, p. 217. There are examples of studies on Kant and Kierkegaard that are both historical and thematic; Kosch (2006) is a case in point. Kosch deals with 19th century European philosophy (Kant, German idealism, and post-idealism) on the one hand and moral agency, autonomy, and evil on the other. While the latter is reminiscent of a thematic (systematic) approach, the former may be seen as thematic and historical at the same time. However, Kosch integrates both in one analysis which shows how themes and prob- lems in Kant (historically and conceptually) form the historical backdrop for the theories of Schelling and Kierkegaard (pp. 3–5). 45 . Some contextual information is provided in virtually all of the chapters, although Chapters 5 and 6 are perhaps the best examples, since these chap- ters sketch the historical background for the concept of the highest good and the moral argument for the existence of God and immortality. 46 . Westphal 1993, p. 389. 47 . However, commentators have tended to focus on Green’s less important claim that Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant is hidden, because Kierkegaard inten- tionally hid it. See Green 1992, p. xviii, p. 212, and p. 214; Green 2011, p. 2, p. 98, p. 104, p. 109 and p. 112. Green (2011) consists of a compilation of articles from 1985 to 2007. See also Fremstedal (forthcoming b). 48 . Knappe (2004, p. 5) criticizes the historical approach of Green (1992) as follows: ‘One consequence of Green’s focus on these historical matters of fact is that his conceptual analysis does not stand, so to speak, on its own feet. In fact, Green does not really appear to have a very clearly articulated meth- odology. His analysis consists of rather loose comparisons between quotes of Kant and Kierkegaard . ... his interpretation often lacks the conceptual rigour of analytical research. This deficiency is connected with the fact that Green does not develop his analysis in a systematic way.’ 49 . Cf. Verheyden 2000, pp. 157–166 and p. 173; Tjønneland 2004, p. 68. 50 . Westphal 1993, p. 390. Verheyden (2000, pp. 153–177) and others have reached a similar conclusion. See Fremstedal (forthcoming b). 51 . Firestone and Jacobs (2008, pp. 60f.) criticize Green’s interpretation of radical evil and his ‘lack of assistance in placing (and defending) Kant’s introduction 244 Notes of divine grace.’ This has important consequences for Kant and Kierkegaard, since Green argues that Kant’s doctrine of radical evil introduces problems which Kierkegaard resolves by appealing to divine grace. However, the picture would look quite different if Kant is interpreted differently, if Kant is taken to endorse divine grace. We will see in Chapter 7 that Green’s later work actu- ally stresses that Kierkegaard differs from Kant not so much by seeing grace as necessary as by insisting that grace must be bestowed historically. 52 . It does not seem probable that Kierkegaard read much of the Danish Kantians, since they largely belonged to the earlier period from 1790–1800. However, this need not mean that these Kantians (or the early German reception) were unimportant, or left entirely behind by the 1840s. Many Danish philosoph- ical terms were coined by the Danish Kantians, and the early Kant recep- tion in Denmark and Germany established a picture of Kant that influenced later thinkers (notably the idealists). Cf. Høffding 1909, pp. 26f.; Holm 1967, pp. 33–43; Thuborg 1951, pp. 17f. and pp. 121–149; Koch 2003 and 2004. 53 . Regarding Kierkegaard’s sources, see Stewart (ed.) 2007ff., vols 1–7. Regarding the many different thinkers who reacted against Kant and influenced Kierkegaard, see especially vol.
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