Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy

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Notes

Introduction

1 . Note that Kant has been central not only to modern philosophy but also to modern theology and religious studies. See Dorrien 2012. 2 . For instance, Hare (2002) uses the theories of Kant and Kierkegaard in order to argue that the ethical requirement, together with our natural capabilities, leads to a need for divine grace. Also, Quinn, one of the central figures within contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, uses Kant and Kierkegaard when dealing with several central topics within the philosophy of religion. Quinn writes: ‘I do ... count myself as a Kierkegaardian of sorts. For example, I greatly admire and have elsewhere tried to defend the divine command ethics in Works of Love . But I also think Kierkegaard is an author whose seductive voice should put us on our guard’ (Quinn 2001, p. 327 referencing Quinn 1996, pp. 29–44). 3 . See Habermas 2005, especially chapter 8 and 2003, pp. 1–15 and pp. 101–115. See also Fremstedal 2009. 4 . Stewart (ed.) 2014. 5 . Cf. Knappe 2004, pp. 2f.; Stewart 2003, pp. 3–32. 6 . Like Knappe (2004, p. 7), I agree with Theunissen’s (1979, p. 24) claim that ‘if system can be understood as developing an uniform theory that is oriented towards completeness, then one ... must assert that the anti-systematic thinker Kierkegaard ... becomes himself the constructor of a system.’ 7 . This is in line with Stewart’s (2010) attempt to undermine the popular view that there is a radical break between German idealism and existentialism. It is also in line with Madore’s (2011) attempt to show that Kant’s later writing has a somewhat neglected existential side. 8 . See Green 1992; Michalson 1990.

1 Methodological Considerations: Contextual and Analytic Approaches to the History of Philosophy

1 . Hatfield 2005, p. 104. 2 . Hatfield 2005, p. 112. 3 . Stewart 2003, p. 36. 4 . See Knappe 2004, p. 5. Cf. Green 1992. 5 . See Stewart (ed.) 2007ff., vols 1–14. For an overview, see http://www.jonstewart. dk/krsrr.htm (2014/04/08). 6 . Green 2007, pp. 179–210. 7 . Nadler 2005, p. 217. 8 . Watson 2002, pp. 525f. 9 . Although Knappe’s (2004) approach resembles the analytic approach, Knappe himself does not explicitly describe it as belonging to analytic history of

241 242 Notes

philosophy. One possible reason for this is that German and Scandinavian terminologies differ from English terminology, typically preferring to use the terms historic and systematic (or thematic) instead of contextual and analytic, respectively. 10 . Knappe 2004, p. 5. 11 . Knappe 2004, pp. 1f. 12 . Knappe 2004, pp. 5f. 13 . Hatfield 2005, p. 91. 14 . Knappe 2004, p. 6. 15 . Knappe 2004, p. 6. 16 . See, for example, Stewart 2003, p. 38. 17 . Regarding Kierkegaard’s conception of philosophy as the cultivation of wisdom and the care of self, see Furtak 2005, pp. 42ff. 18 . Watson 2002, pp. 526f. 19 . Commentators who use Kierkegaard in contemporary debates include Rudd 2012; Davenport 2012, Hare 2002; Evans 2006a; Furtak 2005; Stokes 2010. 20 . Cf. Theunissen 1993, p. 13 and p. 108. 21 . Watson 2002, p. 527. 22 . Kenny (2005, pp. 23f.) writes: ‘Philosophers who read ancient, medieval, or early modern texts without a knowledge of the historical context in which they were written are likely to sin by anachronism . ... The philosopher who ignores the historical background of past classics will gain no fresh light on the issues which concern us today, but merely present contemporary preju- dices in fancy dress.’ What Kenny says about early modern texts here seems to hold even for Kierkegaard. 23 . Stewart 2003, p. 39. 24 . Hannay 2003, p. i. 25 . Stewart 2003, pp. 38f. 26 . Stewart 2003, p. 37. 27 . Stewart 2003, p. 37. 28 . Stewart 2011, pp. 501–518. 29 . Stewart 2003, p. 36. Stewart (2003, pp. 37f.) realizes that the historical material he deals with stands in need of interpretation, but he adds that ‘the parameters of the discussion should, it seems to me, be dictated by it [the historical material] and not by the fantasy of the commentator. Presumably Kierkegaard knew best his own intellectual commitments’. 30 . Stewart 2003, p. 38. 31 . Westphal 2004, p. 11. 32 . Zarka 2005, p. 156. The distinction between historicity and transcendence (trans-historicity) corresponds to Kierkegaard’s distinctions between facticity and ideality, necessity and freedom, respectively. See Chapter 3. 33 . Stewart 2003, p. 39. 34 . Stewart 2003, p. 39. 35 . Cf. Rorty 1998, p. 49; Knappe 2004, p. 5. 36 . As Zarka (2005, p. 149) puts it: ‘[C]ontext always has to be reconstructed. It is never given ... . Just as the text has to be interpreted, so the context has to be reconstructed ... the interpretation of the text (or in any event, of some of its elements) and the historical reconstruction of the context interact. The text is necessary for the reconstruction of the context, and vice versa.’ Notes 243

37 . MacIntyre (1998, p. 39) prefers to speak of antiquarian history of philosophy. 38 . Cf. Kenny 2005, pp. 23f.; Sandis 2009, p. 104; Stewart 2003, p. 39. 39 . Cf. Stewart 2003, pp. 36ff.; Sandis 2009, p. 104. 40 . Grøn (1997, pp. 143–153) shows that Theunissen’s (1993, pp. 85–96) rational reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair ends up being closer to Kierkegaard’s actual view than Theunissen himself thought. Theunissen claims that Kierkegaard says that despair consists of being active, although he should have said that it also consists in passivity (Wiederfahrnis and Erleiden ). However, Grøn argues convincingly that Kierkegaard does in fact say what Theunissen thinks he should have said. 41 . Rorty 1998, p. 53. 42 . Kenny (2005, p. 24) writes: ‘The historian who is unconcerned with the philosophical problems that troubled past writers has not really understood how they themselves understood their thinking.’ 43 . Irwin 2011, vol. 1, p. 9. It might also be argued that history itself does not consist of facts that can be understood when wholly separated from our systematic attempts to understand existence. See Wyller 1996, p. 3. 44 . Nadler 2005, p. 217. There are examples of studies on Kant and Kierkegaard that are both historical and thematic; Kosch (2006) is a case in point. Kosch deals with 19th century European philosophy (Kant, German idealism, and post-idealism) on the one hand and moral agency, autonomy, and evil on the other. While the latter is reminiscent of a thematic (systematic) approach, the former may be seen as thematic and historical at the same time. However, Kosch integrates both in one analysis which shows how themes and problems in Kant (historically and conceptually) form the historical backdrop for the theories of Schelling and Kierkegaard (pp. 3–5). 45 . Some contextual information is provided in virtually all of the chapters, although Chapters 5 and 6 are perhaps the best examples, since these chapters sketch the historical background for the concept of the highest good and the moral argument for the existence of God and immortality. 46 . Westphal 1993, p. 389. 47 . However, commentators have tended to focus on Green’s less important claim that Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant is hidden, because Kierkegaard inten- tionally hid it. See Green 1992, p. xviii, p. 212, and p. 214; Green 2011, p. 2, p. 98, p. 104, p. 109 and p. 112. Green (2011) consists of a compilation of articles from 1985 to 2007. See also Fremstedal (forthcoming b). 48 . Knappe (2004, p. 5) criticizes the historical approach of Green (1992) as follows: ‘One consequence of Green’s focus on these historical matters of fact is that his conceptual analysis does not stand, so to speak, on its own feet. In fact, Green does not really appear to have a very clearly articulated meth- odology. His analysis consists of rather loose comparisons between quotes of Kant and Kierkegaard . ... his interpretation often lacks the conceptual rigour of analytical research. This deficiency is connected with the fact that Green does not develop his analysis in a systematic way.’ 49 . Cf. Verheyden 2000, pp. 157–166 and p. 173; Tjønneland 2004, p. 68. 50 . Westphal 1993, p. 390. Verheyden (2000, pp. 153–177) and others have reached a similar conclusion. See Fremstedal (forthcoming b). 51 . Firestone and Jacobs (2008, pp. 60f.) criticize Green’s interpretation of radical evil and his ‘lack of assistance in placing (and defending) Kant’s introduction 244 Notes

of divine grace.’ This has important consequences for Kant and Kierkegaard, since Green argues that Kant’s doctrine of radical evil introduces problems which Kierkegaard resolves by appealing to divine grace. However, the picture would look quite different if Kant is interpreted differently, if Kant is taken to endorse divine grace. We will see in Chapter 7 that Green’s later work actually stresses that Kierkegaard differs from Kant not so much by seeing grace as necessary as by insisting that grace must be bestowed historically. 52 . It does not seem probable that Kierkegaard read much of the Danish Kantians, since they largely belonged to the earlier period from 1790–1800. However, this need not mean that these Kantians (or the early German reception) were unimportant, or left entirely behind by the 1840s. Many Danish philosophical terms were coined by the Danish Kantians, and the early Kant reception in Denmark and Germany established a picture of Kant that influenced later thinkers (notably the idealists). Cf. Høffding 1909, pp. 26f.; Holm 1967, pp. 33–43; Thuborg 1951, pp. 17f. and pp. 121–149; Koch 2003 and 2004. 53 . Regarding Kierkegaard’s sources, see Stewart (ed.) 2007ff., vols 1–7. Regarding the many different thinkers who reacted against Kant and influenced Kierkegaard, see especially vol. 6, Tomes I–III. 54 . Knappe 2004, p. 5. 55 . Knappe 2004, pp. 2f. 56 . Green 1992, p. 207. 57 . Cf. Knappe 2004, p. 3. Immediately after the quote above, Knappe mentions several articles which present a more balanced view of the Kant-Kierkegaard relation. 58 . Knappe 2004, p. 3. 59 . Cf. Knappe 2004, p. 6. Knappe also limits himself to relatively few works by Kant and Kierkegaard. Although Green deals with more primary sources than Knappe, he nevertheless leaves out Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , Lectures on Pedagogy , and Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion . Also, the Vorlesungen über Anthropologie were not published when Green wrote his book. Unlike Knappe (and Kosch), I deal extensively with Kierkegaard’s upbuilding writings (and to some extent also with the Nachlass ). 60 . See the next chapters for references to relevant literature. 61 . Another work that should be mentioned here is Rapic (2007). Unlike the present work, Rapic focuses on Kierkegaard’s ethicist, not immanent or transcendent religion. Also, Rapic focuses on Kant’s ethics, whereas the present work focuses on Kant’s philosophy of religion. 62 . See Wimmer 1990, p. 27 and pp. 122f.; Rossi and Wreen 1991, pp. ix–x; Anderson-Gold and Muchnik 2010, p. 2; Jacobs and Kain (eds) 2003; Louden 2002; Zammito 2002. 63 . Cf. Koch 2003, pp. 16f., pp. 34–39, pp. 322–328, pp. 343ff.; Thuborg 1951, pp. 9–18 and pp. 180f. 64 . Green 1992, p. xvi. 65 . Cappelørn and Stewart 1997, p. vi. 66 . Another variant is: ‘“Subjectivity is the untruth,” says Kierkegaard (and Climacus),’ something that involves attributing the claim in question to both Kierkegaard and Climacus. By contrast, ‘“X,” says Kierkegaard (Climacus)’ involves attributing ‘X’ to Climacus rather than Kierkegaard. Notes 245

67 . Evans (2006a, pp. 38f.) comments: ‘Where critics such as Poole err is their implicit assumption that if one takes seriously the literary character of the authorship, this makes it impossible to see in it any overall purpose or thrust. The best argument in favor of this possibility is that Kierkegaard himself, while stressing the importance of the pseudonyms, still claims that there is such an overall purpose. He describes his task from beginning to end as an attempt to “reintroduce Christianity into Christendom”. Since Christianity is primarily a way of existing, this required him to explore the meaning of existence, to seek to awaken his contemporaries to the questions of existence. Each pseudonym has its own existential place, as it were, and sees the world from that particular spot. Nevertheless, we can look at them as a whole and get a picture of human existence in its multifariousness.’ 68 . Cf. Kosch 2006, p. 12. 69 . Still, not everything hangs on how you approach the pseudonyms since Kierkegaard published a large number of works under his own name, most of which are known as upbuilding writings or discourses. Unlike much of the Kierkegaard literature, I deal to a large extent with Kierkegaard’s signed works. I do therefore not agree with Sløk (1995, pp. 134f.) and others who suggest that ‘S. Kierkegaard’ – the name found on the upbuilding writings – is a pseudonym, rather than a shorter rendering of ‘Søren Kierkegaard.’ Instead, I agree with Kingo (1995, p. 252), who presents the following reasons for holding that ‘S. Kierkegaard’ is short for ‘Søren Kierkegaard.’ First, several of the upbuilding writings are dedicated to Søren’s father Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard. Second, Kierkegaard writes that he is the ‘inauthentic author’ of the pseudonymous writings but is ‘very literally and directly the author of, for example, the upbuilding discourses and of every word in them’ (SKS 7, 571 / CUP1, 627). Finally, Kierkegaard describes the upbuilding writings as ‘my real and named productivity’ (SKS 28, 43, Letter 21). 70 . SKS 23, 182f., NB17:28 / JP 6, 6597; Pap. X-6 B 68–B 82 / JP 6, 6598–6601; JP 1, 9–12; Evans 2006a, p. 66.

2 Original Sin and Radical Evil: Moral Freedom and Anxiety

1 . See e.g., Vetlesen 2005; Svendsen 2010. 2 . See Firestone and Jacobs 2008; Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (eds) 2010. 3 . Cf. Allison 1995, chapters 2 and 7–9; Muchnik 2009, pp. 5–7 and pp. 30–34. 4 . Cf. Grøn 1997, pp. 278–285. 5 . Frierson 2003, pp. 105–113; Formosa 2007, pp. 236–245. 6 . R 6:23f. 7 . Muchnik 2009, p. 11. 8 . MM 6:381. 9 . Allison 1995, p. 41. 10 . See Benbassat 2012, p. 54. 11 . SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 84. 12 . Davenport 2001, pp. 82–91. Although Davenport focuses on the ethicist, this point appears to hold for Kierkegaard’s views of evil in general. See 246 Notes

Knappe 2004, p. 94. See also Irwin 2011, vol. 3, pp. 288f. and p. 301. Ferreira (2008, p. 94) writes that, ‘on Kantian and Kierkegaardian terms, instinctive responses like erotic desires and feelings of attraction and sympathy are not willed and therefore cannot be subject to moral judgment.’ 13 . This is the human synthesis analyzed in many of the pseudonymous works, notably Sickness unto Death . See Chapter 3 for a more systematic analysis. 14 . Knappe 2004, chapter 3. 15 . R 6:22. Cf. LE 27:302; 29:633. 16 . R 6:22–24, 27. 17 . R 6:23. 18 . R 6:24. 19 . Morgan 2005, pp. 95f. 20 . Firestone and Jacobs 2008, pp. 130f. 21 . R 6:24f. 22 . Frierson 2003, p. 122. Morgan (2005. pp. 96f.) argues that the will could not choose some latitudinarian mixture of good and evil, because such a compromise would be self-defeating: ‘Consider the point of view of the will as pulled against morality. What attracts the will here is its freedom conceived positively, an affirmation of its nature in the rejection of determination by alien causes and a corresponding commitment to autonomy. For the will so minded, humanity acquires a dignity ... and the free wills of others acquire an absolute value placing them on a par with that which one values most highly in oneself. How could such a will take the attitude that it could be acceptable to endorse these ends in part ? For if the will were to compromise on the Categorical Imperative, it would partially affirm its nature and partially affront it. It would partially express its essence and partially violate it, allow itself to be determined sometimes by alien causes, and sometimes take the autonomous agency of itself and others to be of absolute worth, and so on. But in trying to do so, the will would actually fail to achieve in any measure any of the things it half-heartedly attempted to commit to. You do not live up to the demands of your nature at all by committing yourself to do so to a certain extent, and you cannot appreciate the ... dignity of the ideal of humanity if you resolve to respect it only now and then. This would just show that you had failed to grasp the importance of any of these things.’ 23 . SKS 3, 170f., 173 / EO2, 174f., 178. See also Fremstedal forthcoming a. 24 . SKS 8, 139f. / UD, 24. 25 . Cf. Knappe 2004, chapters 3–4; Hannay 1993, pp. 225–227. 26 . Notable exceptions are Green 2011, pp. 77–81 and 1992, pp. 150–156; Hauschild 1982, pp. 41–43. 27 . Cf. SKS 22, 366–368, NB14:41 / JP 2, 1135; SKS 23, 384, NB19:85 / JP 1, 990; SKS 24, 163f., NB22:112 / JP 1, 993. 28 . SKS 4, 342 / CA, 36 (translating ‘Den ethiske Rigorisme ’ as ‘ethical rigor’); SKS K4, 401. Thuborg (1951, pp. 111–120) argues that rigorism was closely associated with Kantian ethics in Denmark. 29 . SKS 4, 323–331 / CA, 16–24. 30 . Both Concept of Anxiety and Fear and Trembling argue that the pre-religious problem of moral guilt motivate the leap into religiousness. Lübcke (2006, p. 411) shows that ‘both Johannes de silentio and Climacus present the transformation from the pre-religious way of life to a religious one by pointing at Notes 247

anomalies [notably the problem of guilt] in the pre-religious person’s interpretation of life.’ 31 . Cf. SKS 4, 459f. / CA, 161. 32 . SKS 24, 390, NB24:112 / JP 1, 998. 33 . SKS 7, 383 / CUP1, 420f. 34 . Cf. Horn 1995, p. 136 and 1998, p. 60, p. 132 and p. 163; Firestone and Jacobs 2008, pp. 174f. 35 . SKS 11, 209, 212 / SUD, 96, 99f. 36 . Cf. Allison 2002, pp. 339f.; Formosa 2007, pp. 222–235. 37 . Allison 1995, pp. 122f. 38 . Muchnik 2009, pp. 9f. 39 . R 6:36. 40 . Knappe 2004, pp. 54f. and pp. 94–97. 41 . SKS 4, 454 / CA, 155. 42 . SKS 4, 368 / CA, 64. Cf. Grøn 2008, pp. 27–33. 43 . SKS 4, 353f. / CA, 48f. 44 . Ideality generally refers to universal (ethical) principles, concepts, or ideas. See Stewart 2003, p. 274, p. 285 and p. 296; Johansen 1988, p. 2, pp. 6ff., pp. 34f., p. 46 and pp. 66ff. 45 . SKS 4, 323f., 326 / CA, 16, 19. 46 . SKS 4, 382 / CA, 79. 47 . Cf. Frierson 2003, p. 189. 48 . Formosa 2009, pp. 204f. Kant writes: ‘All material practical principles are, as such, of one and the same kind and belong under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness’ (CPR 5:22). 49 . Anderson-Gold and Muchnik 2010, pp. 6–11. Wood (forthcoming, p. 6) argues that self-love should be understood a mere place-holder for whatever non-moral incentive might be chosen in preference to those of morality. 50 . Cf. SKS 9, 27 / WL, 19. 51 . William therefore says that the life of the aesthete is never qualified as spirit. SKS 3, 176 / EO2, 181. 52 . SKS 4, 394f. / CA, 91f.; SKS 24, 286f., NB23:168 / JP 4, 4047. 53 . SKS 9, 69f. / WL, 62f. 54 . Vetlesen 2005, p. 128; Kosch 2006, pp. 59–63. 55 . See Formosa 2009, parts 2–3. 56 . See Anderson-Gold and Muchnik 2010, pp. 6f. Caswell and Muchnik argue that diabolic volition does not represent a real alternative. Muchnik (2009, p. 116) summarizes: ‘[T]he diabolic volition represents a self-defeating motivational structure, for it deprives itself of reasons for actions. Even the most brutal acts of cruelty ... could not entice a devilish being. These acts are not fully gratuitous, completely disinterested, as is required from the diabolical agent. We presume in the perpetrators a pleasure in humiliating, in under- mining another human being’s capacity for agency ... in spitefully proving that there is no god and hence everything is permitted . ... None of these motives is ‘devilish’ in the Kantian sense – their wickedness stems from a (perverse) subjective conception of the good, and falls under the aegis of self- love broadly construed.’ See also Caswell 2007, pp. 147–157; Formosa 2009, parts 2–3. 57 . Wimmer 1990, pp. 7ff. and pp. 56f. 248 Notes

58 . SKS 23, 104, NB16:14 / JP 3, 3092. 59 . Cf. R 6:32. 60 . Cf. A 7:331f. 61 . R 6:32f., cf. 35, 38. 62 . A 7:324. 63 . R 6:20. 64 . Cf. R 6:71, 63. 65 . RA 15:541, Reflexion 1230; cf. RA 15:526, Reflexion 1191; R 6:20, 68. 66 . R 6:37. 67 . R 6:28f. 68 . Marina (1997, p. 396) explains: ‘The propensity to evil functions in much the same way as an addiction: one can, through a free act, incapacitate the freedom of the will through the affection of one’s sensibilities; henceforth one craves a particular substance. Analogously, once the incentive of self love has been valued over the moral law, this produces a structuring of desire in the self resulting in the tendency towards self-love that is difficult to hold in check.’ 69 . Cf. Caswell 2006b, p. 656; Allison 2001, pp. 606ff.; Marina 1997. 70 . R 6:39, 42. 71 . Cf. R 6:37; Allison 1995, pp. 157f.; Caswell 2006a, pp. 205f. 72 . Cf. R 6:28f., 24, 34, 37f.; A 7:324 . 73 . Muchnik 2009, p. 142. 74 . Marina 1997, p. 397. 75 . Allison 1995, p. 164. Cf. Marina 1997, pp. 396f. 76 . SKS 4, 346 / CA, 40. 77 . SKS 8, 397 / UD, 303. Cf. SKS 4, 411 / CA, 109. 78 . Allison 1995, p. 164. 79 . SKS 4, 359 / CA, 54. 80 . SKS 8, 380f. / UD, 285f. Cf. SKS 11, 218–220 / SUD, 106–108. 81 . SKS 4, 333f. / CA, 27f.; Puchniak 2008, p. 12. 82 . SKS K4, 390f. 83 . R 6:31. 84 . SKS 7, 481 / CUP1, 529f. 85 . Cf. SKS 8, 380f. / UD, 285f.; SKS 11, 218–220 / SUD, 106–108. 86 . Westphal 1991, pp. 172–174. 87 . Cf. Palmquist 2008, pp. 273–275 and pp. 296f.; Green 2011, p. 204. 88 . Westphal 1991, p. 173. 89 . SKS 7, 480f. / CUP1, 529. 90 . R 6:37, 72. 91 . SKS 7, 480f. / CUP1, 528f. 92 . SKS 4, 355 / CA, 50. 93 . R 6:25. Kant seems to exempt Christ from evil at R 6:80. 94 . R 6:38f. 95 . SKS 23, 104, NB16:14 / JP 4, 4037. 96 . R 6:20, 24–26, 30, 32, 35. Wood (forthcoming, p. 28) comments that the actual proof would be provided by a future empirical anthropologist-historian who successfully follows Kant’s philosophical idea. 97 . R 6:39. Muchnik (2009) represents an exception, claiming that Kant’s proof is misplaced and buried in the Preface to the first edition of the Religion . Notes 249

98 . The two most influential reconstructions come from Wood and Allison. Whereas Wood emphasizes the widespread social and empirical dimen- sion of evil, Allison stresses its noumenal origin (see Anderson-Gold and Muchnik 2010, p. 8). Wood (forthcoming) now argues that Kant did not try to prove radical evil, since he wrote to an audience of Christians who accepted the doctrine of original sin. But it seems strange then that Kant choose to publish the article on radical evil in an enlightenment journal (Berlinische Monatsschrift ) before publishing it Religion . 99 . However, Allison’s reconstruction has some followers (e.g., Caswell 2006b; see also Serck-Hanssen 2005). For other reconstructions, see Morgan 2005; Palmquist 2008, parts 3–4. Morgan (2005, p. 87) admits that his approach (which associates the primacy of self-love with negative freedom) lacks textual support in Religion , and Palmquist’s reconstruction seems question- begging, presupposing religiousness in order to defend radical evil. 100 . Schulte 1991, pp. 84–88. 101 . R 6:32. 102 . Caswell 2006b; Marina 1997; Allison 1995, chapter 8. 103 . Serck-Hanssen 2005; Stern 2012, pp. 77–94. 104 . R 6:29; cf. A 7:265. 105 . G 4:405. 106 . Muchnik 2009, p. 73. 107 . G 4:405; R 6:42. 108 . R 6:4–7; cf. TP 8:278–289; Muchnik 2009, pp. 65–71. 109 . R 6:7. 110 . Muchnik 2009, pp. 71–73. 111 . Cf. R 6:37. 112 . Muchnik 2009, p. 63 and p. 70. 113 . SKS 23, 104, NB16:14 / JP 4, 4038. 114 . The presentation of #1–5, especially #3, draws on Kosch 2006, pp. 162f. 115 . R 6:22. 116 . Cf. SKS 7, 478 / CUP1, 526. 117 . SKS 7, 444 / CUP1, 490. 118 . SKS 7, 448–488 / CUP1, 494–537. 119 . SKS 4, 377f., 410f. / CA, 73–75, 108f. 120 . SKS 8, 301f. / UD, 205–207; SKS 4, 410f. / CA, 108f. 121 . Barrett 1984, p. 312, and pp. 320f. By psychology, Kierkegaard means a descriptive philosophical discipline which is a doctrine of subjective spirit. As descriptive , it involves some type of empirical science or experimental psychology that differs from normative ethics. As subjective , psychology deals with the individual rather than the public or social (cf. SKS 4, 331 / CA, 23; SKS K4, 380f.; SKS K20, 202). Kierkegaard and Haufniensis both agree with Rosenkranz that ‘the subject of which psychology treats must be something in repose that remains in restless repose’ (SKS 4, 329 / CA, 21). Thus, the subject matter ‘must be something that is and remains in a state of transition or a transitional state and as such admits of and calls for psychological observation and description’ (Schulz 2007, p. 185). 122 . SKS 4, 348 / CA, 42. Kant states that fear and anxiety are qualitatively different : ‘Fear concerning an object that threatens an undetermined ill [Übel ] is anxiety [Bangigkeit]. Anxiety can fasten on to someone without his 250 Notes

knowing a particular object for it: an uneasiness arising from merely subjective causes (from a diseased state)’ (A 7:255, cf. 187). Rather than saying that anxiety is a form of fear, Kant is saying at A 7:256 that it is a form of ‘aversion [Abscheues ] to danger,’ namely undetermined danger. 123 . CBH 8:112. Morgan and Muchnik both adopt the Kierkegaardian notion of a leap of volition in order to describe the fall in Kant. See Muchnik 2009, pp. 93f.; Morgan 2005, p. 77. 124 . SKS 4, 366, cf. 327 / CA, 61, cf. 20. 125 . Quinn 1990, p. 238. However, the leap cannot be just temporal since both consciousness and spirit involve something atemporal or eternal according to Kierkegaard (and Haufniensis) (SKS 8, 292 / UD, 195; SKS 4, 389–393 / CA, 86–90). Finally, it is not clear that anxiety is merely an empirical influence or even that empirical influences can affect freedom (spirit) directly without being incorporated by the will. 126 . SKS 4, 349, 366, 377 / CA, 43, 61, 73. For an attempt to stress the role of passivity and seduction in Kant, see Madore 2011, pp. 62–67. 127 . Grøn 2008, p. 21. 128 . Koslowski 2007, pp. 8f. referencing SKS 4, 377 / CA, 73. 129 . SKS 4, 363 / CA, 59. 130 . SKS 4, 352 / CA, 47. 131 . Cf. SKS 4, 378 / CA, 75. 132 . Wood forthcoming, p. 21. 133 . See the critique of Wood (1999, pp. 135–139, pp. 288f. and p. 334) in Allison (2001, pp. 605–610) and Morgan (2005, pp. 110f.). However, Kant speaks not merely of the disposition of the individual, but also of the propensity of mankind. Commentators disagree about whether or not Kant distinguishes between the two. See Muchnik 2010; Firestone and Jacobs 2008, pp. 141–151. 134 . Cf. JP, vol. 4, p. 657 (Hong’s commentary); Schulte 1991, p. 309. 135 . This idea goes back to Augustine (1998, Books 12–13). There appears to be agreement between Kierkegaard and Augustine regarding the relationship between self (as body-soul-spirit) and God as affected by the sinfulness of humanity. See Puchniak 2008, p. 15. At this point I (and Hannay 2006, p. 73) disagree with Benbassat (2012, pp. 62f.) who maintains that Kierkegaard endorses a balance, not a hierarchy, of the different elements of selfhood. 136 . SKS 11, 195f. / SUD, 81. 137 . Cf. R 6:72. 138 . See Chapter 10. 139 . R 6:145, 74. 140 . Cf. SKS 7, 483–485 / CUP1, 532–534. 141 . SKS 11, 202, 207, 209, 213 / SUD, 89, 95f., 101. 142 . SKS 23, 100, NB16:6 / JP 4, 4035; SKS 11, 197 / SUD, 83. 143 . Cf. R 6:47f. 144 . Cf. SKS 20, 325, NB4:78 / JP 5, 6112. Today the usual translation of this biblical expression is ‘hearts and minds.’ However, King James’ Bible has ‘hearts and reins,’ something that comes closer to Kant and Kierkegaard since ‘reins’ means not only the seat of feelings and passions but also ‘kidneys’ like Kant’s ‘Nieren ’ and Kierkegaard’s ‘Nyrer. ’ Notes 251

145 . Westphal (1991, p. 89) has argued that if ‘the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds is that between the ways one world appears to God and to us, then the Kantian dualism is fundamental to Kierkegaard’s epistemology too.’ Unfortunately, Westphal does not discuss revelation in this context. See also Chapters 4 and 8 of the present monograph. 146 . SKS 27, 297–310, Papir 306. 147 . Lübcke 2006, p. 411. 148 . SKS 23, 100, NB16:5 / JP 4, 4034. 149 . Lübcke 2006, pp. 411f. 150 . SKS 21, 163, NB 8:39 / JP 1, 493. 151 . R 6:37. 152 . R 6:72. 153 . LE 27:665; cf. LE 29:620. 154 . R 6:25, 31. 155 . SKS 8, 379–381 / UD, 283–286. 156 . SKS 11, 208 / SUD, 95. 157 . SKS 4, 459f. / CA, 161. 158 . See SKS 24, 118, NB22:25 / JP 2, 1533. 159 . SKS 8, 366ff. / UD, 269ff. 160 . SKS 24, 415, NB24:143 / JP 2, 1535. 161 . SKS 18, 304f., JJ:495 / JP 2, 1528. 162 . R 6:74f.; Quinn 2006, pp. 244–246. 163 . CBH 8:115f. Kant stresses this as regards war (CBH 8:123). 164 . CBH 8:123, cf. 121. 165 . R 6:40ff. 166 . SKS 23, 103, NB16:13 / JP 2, 1530; SKS 23, 100, NB16:5 / JP 4, 4034. 167 . CBH 8:123; R 6:40, 97f., 126. 168 . SKS 4, 333, 337, 339, 342–344 / CA, 26, 31–33, 35–38. 169 . Horn (1995, p. 36) argues that Augustine maintains that sin is inherited in order to defend that all are under sin, although he realizes that it involves a category mistake in which nature (hereditary) is confused with freedom (sin). 170 . Axt-Piscalar 2007, p. 149. 171 . Still, Journal entries from 1850 suggest that Kierkegaard may have changed his mind, siding with Augustine and Luther. See SKS 23, 103, NB16:13 / JP 2, 1530; SKS 23, 104, NB16:15 / JP 4, 4038. But this traditional approach leaves unclear how we could be responsible for evil when it is inherited rather than self-inflicted. See Quinn 2006, chapter 10. 172 . R 6:22, cf. 32, 38, 42f. 173 . Cf. R 6:31. 174 . Allison 2002, p. 341. 175 . Formosa 2007, p. 233. 176 . Formosa 2007, p. 233. 177 . Muchnik 2009, p. 108. 178 . Allison 1995, pp. 140–142. 179 . SKS 1, 161 / CI, 107f. 180 . SKS 23, 116, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093. 181 . SKS 23, 116, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093. Cf. Axt-Piscalar 2007, pp. 155f. 182 . SKS 23, 117, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093. 252 Notes

183 . Cf. Barrett 1984, pp. 228f. 184 . SKS 7, 383 / CUP1, 420f. 185 . Westphal 1991, p. 173. Westphal does not reference Kant here. 186 . Cf. SKS 4, 224 / PF, 15. 187 . R 6:37, cf. 45. 188 . Cf. Marina 1997, pp. 386f. 189 . R 6:119. 190 . Allison 1995, p. 170. Kant argues that the germ of good and self-respect is ineradicable in man. See R 6:36–38, 45f., 49f., 57, 144f. 191 . Cf. R 6:50f., 74, 117; A 7:294, 324. 192 . R 6:82f. 193 . See Chapters 7–8. 194 . SKS 20, 88f., NB:125 / JP 3, 3089. 195 . Cf. SKS 20, 89, NB:125 / JP 3, 3089. 196 . SKS 6, 142 / SLW, 152; SKS 19, 139–143, NB4:11f. / KJN 3, 139–142; SKS 19, 167, NB4:44 / JP 2, 2252; SKS 19,170, Not4:46 / KJN 3, 167; SKS K19, 218; SKS 20, 229, NB2:235 / JP 2, 2236; SKS K20, 223f.; SKS 22, 215, NB12:121 / JP 3, 3558; SKS K22, 287f.; SKS 23, 117, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093; SKS 27, 390, 415, Papir 365:2, 369 / JP 1, 649, 654. 197 . Cf. R 6:21. Kierkegaard appears to have been aware of this inscrutability. In 1841 he says that Kant places the evil that cannot be grasped by thought outside of thought, handing it over to imagination as a myth (SKS 1, 161 / CI, 107f.). Presumably what cannot be grasped by thought is the inscrutable choice of evil. Kant actually goes as far as saying that ‘revelation is useful in making up the theoretical deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has (in the questions, for example, of the origin of evil, the conversion from evil to good, man’s assurance that he has become good, etc.)’ (CF 7:9). 198 . SKS 4, 323f. / CA, 16f.; SKS 23, 70f., NB15:101 / JP 4, 4030f. See also Knappe 2004, p. 100. 199 . SKS 11, 209, 230f. / SUD, 97, 119. 200 . SKS 20, 89, NB:125 / JP 3, 3089. 201 . Green 1992, p. 161, cf. p. 17. Obviously, Kierkegaard’s approval (and reser- vation) does not preclude him from supplementing Kant’s approach with a psychological account of anxiety. 202 . Green 1992, p. xiv. However, Green elsewhere makes more general points about how Kierkegaard wrestles with Kant’s treatment of evil and grace in Religion and Conflict of the Faculties . See Green 2011, pp. 167–173. 203 . Kierkegaard 1994, p. 334 (editor’s note). 204 . Axt-Piscalar 2007, p. 149. Kierkegaard was clearly familiar with Müller’s response to Kant’s radical evil. Although Kierkegaard possibly read Müller’s The Christian Doctrine of Sin before writing Concept of Anxiety, this cannot be proven (Axt-Piscalar 2007, pp. 153f.). But, as we have seen, Kierkegaard does reference Kant’s radical evil in 1841 and later, even praising Kant while criticizing Müller. This suggests that Kant is a more likely source than Müller. 205 . Regarding the latter, see Wood (forthcoming), pp. 18f.; Madore 2011, p. 134. 206 . See Stewart (ed.) 2007ff., vol. 6, Tomes I–II. 207 . Green (1992, p. xiv, pp. 17f. and pp. 156–166) argues that Kierkegaard was familiar with Religion . As Green (2007, pp. 196–206) shows, Kierkegaard also owned many secondary sources dealing with Kant. Notes 253

208 . Cf. Wimmer 1990, pp. 122f.; Schulte 1991, part 2. 209 . Cf. Stokes 2010, pp. 7f.; Grøn 1997, pp. 35ff., pp. 101ff. and pp. 137ff. 210 . Grøn 1997, p. 227.

3 Anthropology and Morality: Facticity and Moral Character

1 . Notably, Grøn (2008, p. xiv) has claimed that the idea of choosing oneself is one of Kierkegaard’s most important contributions to modern thinking in general and existentialism in particular. Regarding Kierkegaard’s theory of the human (anthropological) synthesis, selfhood, and personal identity, see Theunissen 1979, pp. 67f.; Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 216–232; Rudd 2012, chapters 1–2. 2 . Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 216–218; Schulte 1991, pp. 278f. and p. 119; Evans 2006a, p. 56; Stewart 2010, p. 7 and pp. 168–171; Benbassat 2012, p. 54, p. 60, and p. 63. 3 . Allison 1995, p. 137. 4 . The very discipline of anthropology was founded by Kant, Platner, and Herder in the 1770s. Kant’s anthropology was not only central to his immediate successors in Germany and Denmark; it has also gained renewed interest today, although this is hardly reflected in the existing literature on the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. Cf. Thuborg 1951; Koch 2003; Zammito 2002; Jacobs and Kain 2003. 5 . Regarding moral character, see Munzel 1999. More references are provided below. 6 . Although some commentators have dealt with Kant’s anthropological views in Book 1 of Religion (the doctrine of radical evil), the other anthropological writings are omitted. Even Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 217f. and Schulte 1991, pp. 112–119, who deal with the revolution whereby one becomes moral, focus on Religion and therefore do not deal with the other anthropological writings, writings that make it clear that this revolution consists in the establishment of moral character. 7 . Raffoul and Nelson (eds) 2008, especially Raffoul and Nelson 2008, pp. 2–5; Kisiel 2008, pp. 41–68 (on Fichte, Lask, and Heidegger). Regarding Kierkegaard and Heidegger, see Theunissen 1979, pp. 67f. See also Rudd 2012, chapters 1–2 about the relevance of Kierkegaard’s notion of facticity for analytic discussions of moral agency. 8 . See Green 1992, p. 221 and pp. 92–97; Connell 1992, pp. 56–67; Irwin 2011, vol. 3, pp. 304–309. 9 . Green 2007, pp. 189f. See Chapter 11 of the present monograph for a discussion. 10 . Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 216–218. 11 . Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 217f., pp. 230f. and p. 237. Also, commentators have contrasted facticity with Kant. See Raffoul and Nelson 2008, p. 9; Østerberg 1994, p. 11. 12 . Fahrenbach 1979, especially p. 220. 13 . My interpretation of the human (anthropological) synthesis and selfhood is in line with work of Theunissen and Fahrenbach, except I emphasize 254 Notes

the concept of facticity. Although Kierkegaard follows the ethicist in using the concept of double existence (SKS 8, 49 / TA, 49f.), he (and Haufniensis, Climacus, and Anti-Climacus) elsewhere talks about the synthesis, rather than using the ethicist’s terminology of choosing oneself. Unfortunately, the reason for the difference in terminology is not clear. Fahrenbach and Theunissen both deal with double existence as simply a variant of the more general synthesis structure, something which seems plausible. It should also be noted that Kierkegaard scholarship often interprets the synthesis structure in terms of selfhood, whereas Kant scholarship often uses anthropological terms. It seems clear, however, that Kierkegaard’s synthesis structure covers not just selfhood in a narrow sense but also human nature or anthropology. 14 . SKS 3, 207, 172 / EO2, 215f., 176. Although it has not received much atten- tion, Kierkegaard makes essentially the same point in his signed writings, see SKS 5, 167 / EUD, 168; SKS 8, 49 / TA, 49f.; SKS 8, 219ff. / UD, 117ff. 15 . SKS 3, 98 / EO2, 95. 16 . SKS 8, 75, 91 / TA, 77f., 96; SKS 20, 90, NB:129 / JP 5, 5975. 17 . SKS 1, 316 / CI, 281; SKS 11, 152 / SUD, 36. 18 . SKS 1, 312 / CI, 276. 19 . SKS 7, 356 / CUP1, 391; SKS 11, 151 / SUD, 35. 20 . SKS 20, 90, NB:129 / JP 5, 5975; SKS 1, 258 / CI, 213. 21 . SKS 1, 312 / CI, 276. 22 . SKS 3, 171 / EO2, 175; SKS 8, 49 / TA, 49f. 23 . SKS 3, 239 / EO2, 250f. 24 . Furtak 2005, pp. 58–66. 25 . SKS 3, 170ff., 244, 248f. / EO2, 174ff., 255f., 261f. 26 . SKS 3, 248f., 251, 276f., 285 / EO2, 261–264, 292f., 302. 27 . SKS 19, 57; Not1:7. 28 . See Chapters 2 and 11. 29 . A 7:294, LA 25:1384–1392. Character itself is understood as ‘the aptitude [Fertigkeit ] of acting according to maxims’ and ‘the use of our power of choice to act according to rules and principles’ (LP 9:481; LA 25:630). 30 . R 6:47. 31 . Kuehn (2001, p. 150) writes that Kant ‘draws a definite parallel to the religious conversion described by the Pietists’ and that Kant’s account of the moral rebirth ‘reveals an intimate understanding not only of the Pietist doctrine of rebirth, but also of orthodox Christianity.’ 32 . Wood 1999, pp. 205f. translating Naturell ‘individual nature.’ 33 . SKS 3, 239, 170 / EO2, 250f., 174. 34 . A 7:285; LA 25:1367f. Sinnesart or ‘empirical character’ belongs to the phenomenal realm and is the sensual schema ( sinnliche Zeichen ) of man’s ‘intelligible character,’ his noumenal Denkungsart . Wimmer 1990, p. 101, p. 130, pp. 151f., and p. 188; Munzel 1999, p. 75, pp. 91–93, p. 98, p. 123, and p. 155. 35 . A 7:119, 285, 292; Vorlesungen über Anthropologie , Ak 25:1125f. 36 . A445 / B473. This conception gets contrasted with facticity in Raffoul and Nelson 2008, p. 9. 37 . Schmidt (2007, pp. 167f.) says that Kant seems to be identifying ‘physi- ology’ as a biological discipline in Anthropology (but not in the first and third Critique s). Notes 255

38 . ‘Of the Different Races of Human Beings,’ in Anthropology, History, and Education , Ak 2:431, 434, 436, 438–443; ‘Determination of the Concept of a Human Race,’ in Anthropology, History, and Education , Ak 8:104f.; ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,’ in Anthropology, History and Education , Ak 8:167f.,173f.; A 7:313. 39 . In the context of Kant’s view on gender, Louden (2002, p. 83) says that Kant does not always bother to stop and ask whether what he sees as a natural difference is perhaps only a contingent, socially constructed one. Kant’s prej- udices about gender, nationality, race, religion, and the deaf seem to rely on false empirical data. 40 . A 7:303–321, 159f. 41 . A 7:319; cf. 313–315; LA 25:654f. 42 . Wood 1999, pp. 205f. 43 . According to Schmidt (2007, p. 166), Foucault (2014) argued that ‘Kant implicitly extends the domain of his critical philosophy in the Anthropology by recognizing the finitude and historicity of the human transcendental subject, especially in his discussion of temporality and language.’ 44 . LP 9:455, 486, 449f.; A 7:323f.; CPJ 5:431f. 45 . LP 9:449f. 46 . Wood 2003, pp. 52f. 47 . Similarly, Kleingeld (1999, p. 66) writes that ‘later individuals need to appropriate the skills and knowledge acquired by previous generations.’ 48 . A 7:329. 49 . A 7:236; cf. CPR 5:94, 97f. 50 . This is in line with the roots of the concept of facticity found in Augustine’s concept of facticius . Augustine contrasts facticius – that which is unnatural, artificial, and made by man – with nativus , that which is natural and created by God. See Agamben 2008, p. 93. 51 . R 6:50f.; A 7:324. 52 . CPJ 5:434. 53 . R 6:5. 54 . See, however, Marty 1992, p. 55. 55 . For the claim that Kant bans the anthropological contingencies, see Zammito 2002, p. 298 and pp. 225f. It could, of course, be argued that a more comprehensive analysis of Kant’s corpus would give more information about how Kant views facticity in a socio-historical context. Promising texts include historical and political writings, including Rechtslehre and the third Critique. It nevertheless seems clear, however, that it is first Kierkegaard who makes facticity into a key notion for a systematic understanding of the human condition. 56 . Regarding facticity and idealism, see Østerberg 1994, p. 11. Regarding Kant, see Frierson 2003, chapter 1. 57 . SKS 11, 151–153, 146–148 / SUD, 35–37, 30–33. 58 . SKS 3,171 / EO2, 175. 59 . SKS 3, 239 / EO2, 250f. 60 . SKS 3, 250 / EO2, 262. 61 . SKS 3, 249f., 261 / EO2, 262f., 274f. 62 . A 7:324f.; MM 6:471–473, 469; Vorlesungen über Anthropologie, Ak 25:369, 897; LA 25:847, 1198, 1426; RA 15:897, Reflexion 1524. 256 Notes

63 . Wilson 2006, chapter 4 64 . SKS 3, 239 / EO2, 250f. 65 . SKS 3, 207 / EO2, 216. 66 . SKS 3, 207 / EO2, 216. 67 . SKS 3, 208f. / EO2, 217f. 68 . Habermas 1989, chapter 10, part IV. 69 . SKS 3, 207 / EO2, 216. 70 . See Chapter 2. 71 . SKS 11, 153–157, 149–151 / SUD, 37–42, 33–35. 72 . R 6:68f., cf. 77, 184f.; A 7:186; LE 27:656f. 73 . See Chapter 2, Section 13. 74 . See Chapter 7 for an analysis of divine grace. 75 . See Chapter 2. 76 . Theunissen 1993, pp. 22f., pp. 41f., p. 56; Grøn 1997, pp. 125–132. 77 . R 6:47f. 78 . R 6:51. 79 . Denis 2006, pp. 511–513. 80 . Denis 2006, p. 513. 81 . Munzel 1999, pp. 13f., pp. 135–137, pp. 141–144, pp. 156f.; Allison 1995, chapter 9; Caswell 2006a, p. 203. 82 . This appears to have gone unnoticed. Cf. Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 217f. 83 . SKS 3, 170f., 173 / EO2, 174f., 178; cf. Chapter 2 of the present monograph. 84 . Wood forthcoming, p. 25. 85 . See A 7:324, 331f.; Louden 2002, pp. 132–139; Munzel 1999, chapter 3; Frierson 2003, chapter 5; Muchnik 2009, chapter 4. 86 . Theunissen 1979, pp. 67f. 87 . SKS 11, 151 / SUD, 35. 88 . Lübcke 2007, pp. 1–12; Kosch 2006, p. 209. 89 . Pattison 2005, pp. 143–145. 90 . SKS 4, 226, 228 / PF, 17–20; SKS 10, 24 / CD, 12. 91 . R 6:47f. 92 . MM 6:409. 93 . Cf. R 6:77; CF 7:83; TP 8:308f. 94 . Verstrynge (2004, p. 478) makes a plea for interpreting the Kierkegaardian self in regulative, Kantian terms as an endless striving tending towards rest or completion as an endpoint that cannot be reached in this life. See also Chapters 4–5 of the present monograph. 95 . A 7:294; cf. LA 25:654; RA 15:769, Reflexion 1497. 96 . A 7:201. 97 . R 6:47f., 66f., 122. 98 . MM. 6:409; cf. A 7:234f. 99 . R 6:48; Wimmer 1990, p. 151. 100 . Green 2011, p. 3. 101 . SKS 8, 124–126 / UD, 9f. Kierkegaard’s dualism seems Platonic-Christian rather than Kantian. See, however, Chapter 6 regarding immortality. 102 . SKS 8, 292 / UD, 195; SKS 4, 392f., 389f. / CA, 89f., 86f. 103 . SKS 15, 257f. / BA, 101. 104 . SKS 24, 524, NB25:110 / JP 3, 3201. 105 . R 6:47f., cf. 122, 31. Notes 257

106 . Allison 1995, p. 169. 107 . R 6:47–51; A 7:324. 108 . Marina 1997, p. 397. 109 . MM 6:477. 110 . LE 27:725. 111 . LP 9:445. 112 . MM 6:479. 113 . CPR 5:145, 113; LE 27:549; CPJ 5:452. 114 . A 7:295. 115 . SKS 3, 239 / EO2, 250f. 116 . Evans 2006a, pp. 91–99 and p. 107. 117 . SKS 3, 171 / EO2, 175. 118 . A 7:294, cf. 285ff. 119 . CF 7:37. 120 . R 6:48, cf. LP 9:481. 121 . Green 2007, pp. 182f.; 1994, pp. 173–175. See also Chapters 8 and 11 of the present monograph. 122 . Frierson 2003, p. 2, p. 31, pp. 57–67, p. 76, pp. 95f., pp.133–135, and p. 164. 123 . Kleingeld 1999, pp. 61–67. 124 . LE 27:521. 125 . A 7:292; cf. CPR 5:152. 126 . LP 9:487. 127 . R 6:47f. 128 . CPR 5:145, 113; LE 27:549; CPJ 5:452. 129 . CPR 5:127ff.; R 6:97ff., 139. 130 . However, the ethicist seems to believe that the choice of oneself leads not only to happiness but also to oneself becoming part of civil society. This belief appears to rest on the assumption that the world-order is rational (SKS 3, 277, 305 / EO2, 292, 323; SKS 6, 145 / SLW, 155), a quasi-Hegelian assumption neither Kierkegaard nor Kant shares. 131 . SKS 22, 215, NB12:121 / JP 3, 3558; SKS K22, 287f.; SKS 22, 435, NB14:150 / JP 1, 1057; SKS K22, 549f.; SKS 19, 139f., Not4:11 / KJN 3, 139; SKS 4, 319 / CA, 11. 132 . Cf. Jackson 1987, p. 82. Like the late Schelling, Kierkegaard uses this Kantian distinction to criticize Hegel. Cf. Pinkard 2010, p. 320, pp. 327f., and p. 353. 133 . Stewart 2003, p. 274, p. 285, and p. 296; Johansen 1988, p. 2, pp. 6ff., pp. 34f., p. 46, and pp. 66ff. 134 . SKS 12, 138 / PC, 134; SKS 7, 175f. / CUP1, 190–192; SKS 20, 119, NB:201 / JP 3, 3665; SKS 22, 364, NB 14:35 / JP 1, 982. 135 . Describing Kant’s ethics as abstract-universal, Fahrenbach (1979, pp. 217f., pp. 230f., p. 237) sees the synthesis of finitude and infinitude as over- coming the Kantian dualism between freedom and nature, reason and sensibility. However, Fahrenbach (1979, pp. 222f.) himself shows that, in Kierkegaard, the different elements of the synthesis are opposites standing in a highly tense relationship with each other, something which suggests that the dualism between finitude and infinitude, freedom and necessity, cannot be fully overcome in this life. Although Fahrenbach does not say so, 258 Notes

the dualism between freedom and necessity in Kierkegaard thereby resembles Kant’s dualism between freedom and nature (cf. Kulak 2012, pp. 94f.). Indeed, Kierkegaard himself associates this dualism with Kant. 136 . Cf. Marina 2000, pp. 343–345. 137 . Knappe 2004, chapters 1–2; Jackson 1987, p. 82. See also Chapters 4 and 11 of the present book. 138 . Allison 1995, p. 137. 139 . Cf. Schulte 1991, p. 119 and pp. 278f.; Stewart 2010, p. 7 and pp. 168–171. 140 . Wood 1999, pp. 205f.; Kleingeld 1999, p. 66. 141 . Notably, Heidegger 1993, p. 383. 142 . Hannay (2006, p. 25) remarks that the elements of the synthesis are Hegelian and Aristotelian. 143 . Regarding Kant, Herder, and Platner, see Zammito 2002, p. 238, p. 246, pp. 221f., p. 292, p. 331.

4 History and Morality: The Moral Structure of the World

1 . CPR 5:146f. 2 . LPDR 28:1083f. 3 . CPR 5:146f. Note that acting from fear and hope represents legality rather than morality. Cf. LE 29:627f. 4 . LPDR 28:1084; CPR 5:146. 5 . Watkins (2009, p. 86) faults Kant for not making this clear. 6 . Timmermann 2013, pp. 674f. 7 . Timmermann 2013, pp. 672f. 8 . Metaphysik in Ak 18:198f., Reflexion 5495. In the thought-experiment God functions as a judge who rewards virtue and punishes vice. Kant’s analysis implies that God must be hidden and that we must remain ignorant about God as a judge. Watkins 2009, pp. 83–93. 9 . A similar but not identical dilemma is found in the moral argument for God’s existence: LM 29:777f. Cf. LE 27:249–252. 10 . LM 29:777; cf. LPDR 28:1072. 11 . Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie in Ak 28:1151 translated in Kain 2005, p. 134. 12 . Cf. CPR 5:147. 13 . LPDR 28:1081f. 14 . Cf. LPDR 28:1090, 1072f. As we saw in Chapter 2, it is possible to infer a maxim from actions, albeit without certainty. 15 . CPR 5:114f.; Wimmer 1990, pp. 97–108; Beiser 2006, p. 601. 16 . CPR 5:147. 17 . LPDR 28:1072–1090.; M 8:257, 261; CPR 5:113–115, 128, 145; LE 27:302; LM 29:777; A811 / B839. 18 . CPR 5:145, 113; cf. LE 27:549; CPJ 5:452. 19 . SKS 19, 141; Not4:12 / KJN 3, 141. 20 . See Chapter 3. 21 . Beiser 2006, pp. 620–622; Kleingeld 2001, pp. 211–216. 22 . Neiman 2004, p. 68. 23 . Neiman 1997, pp. 178f. 24 . MM 6:386–388. Notes 259

25 . See Beiser 2006, p. 599, pp. 602–604, pp. 621f., and p. 628; Caswell 2006a, pp. 185–188. 26 . Westphal 1991, p. 89 referencing Westphal 1968, pp. 118–141; cf. Green 1992, pp. 121–146; Brunner 1924, pp. 33–35; Verstrynge 2004, p. 487; Benbassat 2012, p. 54; Helms 2013. 27 . See Chapter 6. 28 . See Chapter 3, Section 5. 29 . SKS 1, 194 / CI, 144; SKS 4, 319 / CA, 11; SKS 7, 502 / CUP1, 552f.; SKS K7, 357; SKS 18, 44f., EE:118 / JP 2, 2234; SKS 18, 204, JJ:202 / JP 2, 1334; SKS K18, 325; SKS 18, 343, KK:4 / JP 3, 2747; SKS K18, 503; SKS 19, 139f., Not4:11 / KJN 3, 139; SKS K19, 198f.; SKS 19, 331, Not11:20 / KJN 3, 329; SKS K19, 464; SKS 22, 435, NB14:150 / JP 1, 1057; SKS K22, 549f. 30 . See SKS 6, 142 / SLW, 152; SKS 19, 170, Not4:46 / KJN 3, 167; SKS K19, 218; SKS 20, 229, NB2:235 / JP 2, 2236; SKS K20, 223f.; SKS 22, 215, NB12:121 / JP 3, 3558; SKS K22, 287f.; SKS 27, 390, 415, Papir 365:2, 369 / JP 1, 649, 654. See also SKS 19, 139–143, NB4:11f. / KJN 3, 139–142; SKS 19, 167, NB4:44 / JP 2, 2252; SKS 23, 117, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093. 31 . Cf. Welz 2008, pp. 14–17, pp. 83–87, and pp. 176–178; Neiman 2004, pp. 18–36 and pp. 61–111. 32 . Verstrynge 2004, p. 493. See also chapter 5 of the present monograph. 33 . Knappe 2004, chapters 3–4; cf. Hannay 1993, pp. 225–227. 34 . Green 1992, p. 107. 35 . E.g., Zapffe 1996, pp. 63–69, pp. 202–215, and pp. 478–489. 36 . Green (1992, pp. 133–135) here speaks of a striking affinity between Kierkegaard’s thinking and Kant’s thought-experiment (quoting CPR 5:146f.). 37 . SKS 7, 103 / CUP1, 106 (italics removed); cf. SKS K7, 166. 38 . SKS 5, 267 / EUD, 272. 39 . SKS 7, 367, 385, 387, 546 / CUP1, 403, 423, 426, 602; Evans 2006a, p. 94; Irwin 2011, vol. 3, pp. 315f. Eudaimonism was a matter of much dispute in post-Kantian Danish philosophy and theology. Many refused to accept Kant’s critique of eudaimonism. Koch 2003, pp. 96–99, pp. 123–127, and pp. 279ff.; Thuborg 1951, chapter 8. Those defending eudaimonistic virtue ethics today often claim that eudaimonistic ethics is egoistic in a formal sense only; its content can be as other-regarding as that of other systems of ethics. Annas 1993, pp. 127f.; Horn 1998, pp. 202–224; Irwin 2011. 40 . SKS 7, 126f. / CUP1, 135f. Cf. SKS 7, 270f., 125f., 129ff., and 144 / CUP1, 296f., 134f., 138ff., and 155. 41 . SKS 7, 36 / CUP1, 29f. 42 . SKS 4, 123 / FT, 27. 43 . SKS 4, 123, 156 / FT, 27, 63. 44 . SKS 7, 126 / CUP1, 134. 45 . Westphal 1991, pp. 161–165. 46 . SKS 7, 366 / CUP1, 402. Cf. SKS 5, 326–328 / EUD, 337–339. 47 . Cf. Westphal 1996, p. 161. 48 . SKS 8, 220 / UD, 119. 49 . SKS 12, 170 / PC, 167. 50 . Cf. SKS 8, 138–184, 220, 319–431 / UD, 24–79, 119, 217–341; SKS 7, 367, 385, 387, 546 / CUP1, 403, 423, 426, 602; SKS 12, 170 / PC, 167. 51 . SKS 25, 370, NB29:107 / JP 3, 2908. 260 Notes

52 . SKS 13, 307 / M, 251. 53 . Cf. Sløk 1980, pp. 7f., pp. 98–113, pp. 121–127, pp. 135–137; Theunissen 1993, p. 155; Furtak 2005, p. 186. Kierkegaard is hostile towards the body, sexuality, and women, and suggests that humanity ought to extinguish itself (cf. SKS 13, 307 / M, 251; SKS 25, 349–351, NB29:92 / JP 4, 4998; SKS 26, 375f., NB35:14 / JP 4, 3970). Kant appears less extreme, although he also expresses negative views on the body, sexuality, and women. See CF 7:40; Zammito 2002, pp. 118–132 and pp. 403f. 54 . SKS 18, 20, EE:43 / JP 2, 1313; SKS K18, 37. 55 . SKS 4, 251 / PF, 46f. 56 . Cf. Sløk 1980. 57 . SKS 23, 116, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093. 58 . Cf. Beiser 2006, p. 603; Hannay 2006, p. 171. 59 . CPR 5:146; G 4:394. 60 . SKS 7, 36 / CUP1, 29f. 61 . A 7:234f, cf. 238; cf. R 6:27; RA 15:235, Reflexion 536. 62 . LPDR 28:1081. 63 . Himmelmann 2003, pp. 15ff. and p. 184. 64 . LPDR 28:1080. 65 . Verstrynge 2004, p. 478. 66 . Verstrynge 2004, p. 493. 67 . SKS 19, 140, Not4:11 / KJN 3, 139, cf. 539. 68 . R. 6:135. 69 . Løkke and Waaler 2009, p. 58. 70 . SKS 10, 215–221 / CD, 207–213. 71 . CPJ 5:430ff.; MM 6: 394, 405. Some interpreters stress the role of suffering in this context. According to Despland (1973, p. 171), ‘On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy’ (1791) constitutes the decisive turning point where evil appears as something ‘that must be suffered and borne by man, Job-like in patience and faith.’ 72 . SKS 5, 116ff. / EUD, 110ff. 73 . SKS 10, 159f., 163, 230–235 / CD, 151f., 155, 222–228. 74 . SKS 10, 164 / CD, 156f. 75 . SKS 4, 459 / CA, 160. 76 . SKS 10, 272 / CD, 258. 77 . SKS 10, 117–124 / CD, 106–113. Cf. Grøn 1997, pp. 143–153. 78 . SKS 10, 120 / CD, 109f. 79 . R 6:48. 80 . Denis 2006, pp. 511–513. 81 . LPDR 28:1088; cf. LE 27:320. 82 . G 4:394. 83 . Yovel (1979, p. 169) argues convincingly that Kant’s philosophy of history deals not only with the theoretical question of what I can know but also with the practical question of what may I hope, since history is not merely an object of knowledge but also something we stand within when trying to realize our moral ends and practical interests. More references are provided below. 84 . Cf. Rossi 2005, pp. 43–65; Beiser 2006. 85 . Beiser 2006, p. 621. 86 . Beiser 2006, p. 623 (referencing CPJ 5:446, §86). Notes 261

87 . Anderson-Gold 1995, p. 693. 88 . R 6:5. 89 . Cf. CPJ 5:396. 90 . CPJ 5:175f. 91 . O’Neill 1997, p. 282 (first half of quote) and pp. 287f. 92 . Zerman Scutt 2010, p. 623. 93 . Friedman 1984, p. 337. 94 . Cf. Kleingeld 1999, pp. 74–76. 95 . CPJ 5:452–459; R 6:192, 201; LE 27:310, 320f. 96 . CPJ 5:196. 97 . There are two types of the latter, one corresponding to hypothetical impera- tives (and our technical predisposition) and another corresponding to the categorical imperative (and our moral predisposition). See Wilson 1997, p. 93 and p. 96. 98 . G 4:438. I am indebted to Wilson (1997, pp. 93–96) here. Wilson argues convincingly that Kant believed there was a link between teleological judgment and the actualization of morality. 99 . G 4:436. 100 . Wilson 1997, p. 93 and p. 95. 101 . Marina 2000, pp. 350f. 102 . Some see Kant’s philosophy of history as only dealing with progress towards legality, whereas others see it as including moral progress. For discussion, references, and evidence that Kant was concerned with moral progress, see Louden 2002, pp. 144ff.; Kleingeld 1999, pp. 59–61 and p. 77; McCloughan 2003, chapters 1 and 7–8. 103 . McCloughan (2003, p. 70) argues that Kant’s historical writings only refer to moral progress, not progress towards the highest good. But Kant clearly refers to progress towards the highest good as the hope that humanity can reach its ‘final destination [endlichen Bestimmung]’ (TP 8:312). In this context, the highest good is described as the ‘final end of creation’ (CF 7:89) and ‘the objective final end of the human race’ (PP 8:361, cf. 370). 104 . Regarding progress towards the highest good, see Yovel 1979, chapters 1–2 and p. 181; Kleingeld 1999, pp. 59–80; Kleingeld 2006, pp. 490–494; Kleingeld 2001, pp. 211–216; Lindstedt 1999, pp. 129–147; Caswell 2006a, pp. 208f. 105 . Louden 2007, pp. 11f. 106 . Kleingeld 1999, p. 59. Cf. I 8:18f. 107 . Louden 2007, pp. 11f. Cf. I 8:17–19, 29; CPJ 5:398. 108 . Kleingeld 1999, pp. 60–62, pp. 67–70, and p. 74 and 2006, pp. 490f. 109 . SKS 20, 389, NB5:42 / KJN 4, 390. 110 . Wilson 1997, p. 90. 111 . Cf. G 4:453. 112 . Cf. Svendsen 1979, p. 71, pp. 146–148, and pp. 359–367.

5 The Highest Good: Virtue, Happiness, and the Kingdom of God

1 . Regarding Kant, see Rossi 2005, pp. 43–65. 2 . The Silber-Beck controversy over the highest good developed over several years with many participants on both sides. Some of the controversy was 262 Notes

anticipated in the German literature on Kant’s philosophy of religion; e.g., the critique of Kant found in Schopenhauer and neo-Kantians such as Herman Cohen. Cf. Beiser 2006, pp. 614–628; Caswell 2006a, pp. 185–188. 3 . SKS 5, 250–268 / EUD, 253–273. 4 . Earlier literature has not compared Kierkegaard’s highest good to Kant in any detail. See Green 1992; Knappe 2004; Kosch 2006; Rapic 2007; Hannay 1993. 5 . Many different Danish philosophers and theologians of the era discussed the highest good and eudaimonism, drawing on Kant, German rationalism, and empiricism. Many refused to accept Kant’s critique of eudaimonism, the dominating position before Kant entered the philosophical scene. See Thuborg 1951, chapters 8–11 and 14; Koch 2003, pp. 96–99, pp. 123–131, p. 140, pp. 279–307, pp. 312–324. 6 . See SKS 19, 141–143, Not4:12 / KJN 3, 140–142. Like the Critique of Practical Reason and Lectures on Ethics , Kierkegaard uses the highest good when discussing the Stoics. At this point Kierkegaard relies on a history of philosophy by the Kantian Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (SKS 19, 397f., Not13:29 / KJN 3, 395f.). Regarding Tennemann, see Green 1992, pp. 115f. 7 . Beiser 2006, p. 593. Cf. Irwin 2011, vol. 1., pp. 417f. 8 . See Schönberger 1998, pp. 593–598; Spaemann 1974, pp. 973–976. 9 . Cf. Annas 1993, chapter 1. 10 . Augustine 1998, Books 19–20. Cf. Hare 2009, p. 80; Irwin 2011, vol. 1. 11 . Kant says that whereas the ancients directed their moral investigation entirely to the determination of the concept of the highest good, it has gone out of use, or become a secondary matter, among the moderns. CPR 5:64f.; cf. Schönberger 1998; Spaemann 1974; Beiser 2006, pp. 593f. and p. 625. 12 . Annas 1993, p. 33. 13 . See Chapters 2–3. 14 . Beiser 2006, p. 594. 15 . Wood 2014a, p. 1 references G 4:393; CPR 5:21–27, identifying the Cambridge Platonists, particularly Ralph Cudworth, as Kant’s forerunners. See also Irwin 2011, vol. 2, pp. 364f., pp. 549f., and p. 814. 16 . Spaemann 1974, pp. 974f.; Copleston 1994, chapters 4, 7–8 and 11; Oppy and Trakakis (eds) 2009, chapters 1–5. 17 . Hegel distanced himself both from Kant and the concept of the highest good in general, using the concept in a historical sense only. J. G. Fichte favored Kant’s highest good in his early writings but went on to dismiss Kant’s dualism of morality and happiness later on, reinterpreting the highest good as self-agreement. Düsing 1973, pp. 53–90; Spaemann 1974, pp. 974f.; Wimmer 1990, p. 6; Tuschling 1991, pp. 181–205. 18 . In On the Highest Good (1789), Schleiermacher dismissed Kant’s highest good and his postulates for the existence of God and immortality. However, Schleiermacher later (1816) reintroduced the highest good, reinterpreting it as a unity of reason and nature while criticizing Kant’s dualism and his incompatibilism concerning causal determinism and freedom. Düsing 1973, pp. 61ff.; Di Giovanni 2005, p. 272 and p. 292; Forster 2008. 19 . Westphal 1991, p. 22, cf. p. 97. 20 . Westphal follows the Swenson translation of Fragments . See Burgess 1994, pp. 112f. 21 . Burgess’ (1994, p. 120) survey of Kierkegaard’s authorship concludes that ‘the term Fornuft [reason] is simply not part of the working technical Notes 263

vocabulary of his published works during the early period when Fragments were written. Moreover, when he does begin to use it – late in religious works [in 1848–1850], and rarely – it appears to be synonymous with Forstand [understanding].’ 22 . Westphal 1991, p. 89. 23 . SKS 4, 131, 141 / FT, 36, 46. Although it is Johannes de silentio who says this, this appears to be a point that holds in general and that can therefore be attributed to Kierkegaard himself. Cf. Westphal 1991, p. 89. 24 . Cf. Evans 2006a, pp. 79f. 25 . Westphal 1991, p. 113; Green 1992, pp. 77f. and 1994, p. 179; Verheyden 2000, p. 157; Tjønneland 2004, pp. 88f. and p. 95; Pinkard 2010, p. 348. Westphal, Green, Verheyden, Tjønneland, and Pinkard all see chapter 3 of Fragments (especially PF, 37) as linked with Kant’s conception of rationality (especially A vii). Although Verheyden (2000, pp. 158ff.) accuses Green of ‘over-Kantianizing’ Kierkegaard’s sources, he nevertheless agrees with Green at this point. 26 . SKS 4, 243 / PF, 37. 27 . SKS 4, 249 / PF, 44. 28 . A vii. 29 . See the references to Westphal, Verheyden, Green, Tjønneland, and Pinkard in note 25 above. 30 . Cf. CPJ 5:448. 31 . CPR 5:108. 32 . Denis 2005, pp. 34f. 33 . Evans 1999, pp. 224f.; Westphal 1991, p. 113. Cf. Green 1994, p. 179. 34 . A670ff. / B698ff. The ‘Dialectic’ of the first Critique argues that we end with antinomies, paralogisms, and amphibolies unless we put the principles of reason to a regulative rather than a constitutive use. See Beiser 2006, p. 613. 35 . McCloughan 2003, p. 27. 36 . Cf. A644f. / B672f. 37 . A327 / B384. 38 . Cf. A647 / B674, A663 / B691, A509 / B537; McCloughan 2003, p. 32. Walker (2006, p. 247) comments: ‘The ideas of pure reason are concepts of unity and completeness that extend beyond what any amount of experience can exhibit, and their deduction does not seek to show that the world actually contains these kinds of unity and completeness ... . Instead, it aims to show that we are justified in proceeding as if it did, and indeed that we must believe (or “presuppose”) that it does ... we have no other way to think: that is, if we are to think consistently and coherently.’ 39 . Cf. CPR 5:379, 396, 404; Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 , Ak 4:350. 40 . Wood 1970, p. 8, pp. 148ff. and p. 250. 41 . Beiser 2006, p. 618. 42 . CPR 5:135. This is related to the fact that, unlike practical reason, theoretical reason has no authority to produce objects but only to cognize objects (CPR 5:55). 43 . Beiser 2006, pp. 618–620 referencing B838f. See also Hare 2002, pp. 73ff. 44 . Verstrynge 2004, p. 486. See also Pattison 1997, pp. 70–84; Bubbio 2012, pp. 691–723. 264 Notes

45 . See Tjønneland 2004, pp. 84–95. 46 . SKS 19, 139–143, Not4:11f. / KJN 3, 139–142, 539, especially SKS 19, 140, Not4:11 / KJN 3, 139. 47 . SKS 17, 270, DD:176 / JP 2, 2257; cf. SKS K17, 476; SKS 1, 311 / CI, 275; SKS 4, 86 / R, 219; SKS 11, 226 / SUD, 115; cf. SKS K11, 237f. 48 . Cf. Verstrynge 2004, especially p. 494. 49 . Cf. Verstrynge 2004, p. 487 referencing SKS 7, 221, 223 / CUP1, 243, 245. 50 . SKS 7, 444f. / CUP1, 490f.; SKS 4, 242–444, 249, 252f. / PF, 37–39, 44f., 47. Postscript uses ‘the Absolute’ as a technical term in post-Kantian philosophy, see SKS K4, 624. 51 . Beiser 2006, p. 610; Milz 2002, pp. 328–331. 52 . CPR 5:107–148, especially 107. 53 . Cf. SKS 7, 125f., 181 / CUP1, 134, 197f. 54 . SKS 7, 444f. / CUP1, 490f.; SKS 4, 242–244, 249, 252f. / PF, 37–39, 44f., 47. 55 . See especially Chapters 6–9. 56 . Cf. R 6:138. 57 . Furtak 2005, pp. 45–47. 58 . See Chapter 8. 59 . SKS 4, 249,251 / PF, 44, 46f. In this context, Kierkegaard (and Climacus) also alludes to Kant’s critique of the ontological proof for the existence of God. See SKS 4, 245 / PF, 40, 190; SKS K4, 240; Pap. V B 5, 3; Green 1992, pp. 14–16. 60 . Westphal (1991, p. 97) explains: ‘it is clear that his [Kierkegaard’s] theory of the limits of human understanding is a theological theory like Augustine’s. Not just Kantian finitude and Hegelian historicity ... but, above all, Augustinian sinfulness stands between human reason and the truth.’ 61 . Westphal 1991, p. 23. 62 . Westphal (1991, p. 27) argues that it is against this background we must understand Kierkegaard’s call for the absurd and paradoxical in Christian faith. Although Knappe (2004, pp. 118–120 and pp. 80f.) and others have read Kierkegaard as an irrationalist, specialists now seem to approach a consensus that Kierkegaard is not as irrational as he appears. Scholars have discussed whether key Kierkegaardian concepts are above or against reason, and whether they involve formal (logical) contradictions or mere incon- gruities. The most discussed concepts are the absurd, the paradox, and the incarnation (as finite and infinite, temporal and eternal). If Kierkegaard is an irrationalist, then his theory obviously differs radically from Kant’s. However, Kierkegaard clearly indicates that the paradox is above reason, not against it (SKS 23, 23f., NB15:25 / JP 1, 7; SKS 19, 390f., Not13:23 / JP 3, 3073; Løkke and Waaler 2009, pp. 55–59). And religiousness is said to be absurd and paradoxical only to non-believers (SKS 23, 182f., NB17:28 / JP 6, 6597; Pap. X-6 B 68–B 82 / JP 6, 6598–6601; JP 1, 9–12). Finally, interpretative principles such as the anticipation of perfection and the principle of charity tend to favor the non-irrationalist reading because it is preferable to avoid attributing contradictions to others. 63 . MM 6:386; cf. R 6:6. 64 . G 4:415. 65 . Hare 2002, pp. 71f.; cf. CPR 5:124. See also Himmelmann 2003, p. 13, p. 151, p. 198, and pp. 215–217. 66 . SKS 2, 40 / EO1, 31. Notes 265

67 . Wood (2014a, p. 11 and p. 20) makes a similar claim about Kant. 68 . Cf. Tjønneland 2004, pp. 84–95. Similarly, Verstrynge (2004, pp. 492f.) argues that the dynamic character of the Kierkegaardian subject, its infinite striving towards rest or completion, implies a regulative God-idea that is Kantian. 69 . MM 6:381; Benbassat 2012, p. 54. 70 . R 6:4; cf. 4–7; TP 8:278–289. 71 . Muchnik 2010, p. 135. 72 . However, it does not preclude there being other ways to conceive of happiness. One way to conceive of happiness is to see it as consisting of pleasure and enjoyment or as satisfying inclinations. This is a conception found both in Kant and Kierkegaard. The ethicist attributes this hedonistic view to A (SKS 3, 32, 175 / EO2, 24, 179f.). Kant occasionally understands happiness as (the idea of maximum) physical wellbeing (A806 / B834; LPDR 28:1089, 1080; G 4:399, 418f.), pleasure (cf. CPR 5:22f.), or contentment (MM 6:387; G 4:393). However, this type of happiness can be seen as a special case of getting one’s will according to which one’s will (maxim) consists of satisfying inclinations, seeking pleasure or enjoyment. Although A’s concept of happiness or enjoyment does not preclude hedonism, it does not necessarily imply it either. Rather than being a hedonist, the aesthete A relies on a pre-moral understanding of happiness that overlaps with Kant’s notion of happiness as a mere concept of nature. However, the ethicist mistakes A for a hedonist, and the same tendency is often found in commentaries. Cf. SKS K4, 371. 73 . SKS 3, 175 / EO2, 180; SKS 2, 32 / EO1, 23. 74 . See Chapters 2 and 10. 75 . Marina 2000, pp. 344f. 76 . Marina 2000, p. 347. 77 . CPR 5:93. 78 . Wood 2014a, p. 21. See also Himmelmann 2003, pp. 206f. 79 . CPR 5:22. 80 . Muchnik 2009, pp. 63–70. 81 . Muchnik 2010, p. 138; Caswell 2006a, p. 188. 82 . Caswell (2006a, p. 204) argues that the promotion of the highest good is necessary and sufficient in order to effect a revolution in way of thinking. 83 . CPR 5:25. 84 . LE 29:599; cf. CPR 5:110. 85 . Denis 2005, p. 25; cf. Guyer 2000, pp. 339–345 and pp. 386–388. 86 . Zerman Scutt 2010, p. 621. 87 . Marina 2000, p. 348. 88 . CPR 5:124. Cf. Kleingeld 1995, p. 107. 89 . Cf. CPR 5:113–115. 90 . SKS 11, 158 / SUD, 43. 91 . SKS 8, 138–184, 220, 319–431 / UD, 24–79, 119, 217–341; SKS 7, 367, 385, 387, 546 / CUP1, 403, 423, 426, 602. Regarding eudaimonism in the Danish context, see Thuborg 1951, chapter 8; Koch 2003, pp. 96–99, pp. 123–127, and pp. 279ff. 92 . Regarding Kierkegaard, see Manis 2006, p. 181; Evans 1999, pp. 142–147; cf. Davenport 2008a, p. 199 and p. 207. 93 . Regarding Kant, see Beiser 2006, pp. 615f.; Wood 1970, chapter 3; Yovel 1979, chapter 1. 266 Notes

94 . SKS 7, 388 / CUP1, 426f. 95 . Evans 1999, p. 147. 96 . Cf. Hare 2002, pp. 75–85. 97 . SKS 8, 151 / UD, 39. 98 . SKS 8, 153 / UD, 41. 99 . Cf. SKS 5, 264 / EUD, 268. 100 . CF 7:67. 101 . CPR 5:127ff.; R 6:97ff., 139. 102 . Rossi 2005, pp. 3–9 and chapters 4–5. 103 . R 6:94. 104 . Rossi 2005, pp. 3–9 and chapters 4–5. 105 . CF 7:59; cf. R 6:122; A808/B836; Rossi 2005, chapter 5. 106 . R 6:96, 100; cf. Rossi 1983, p. 100. The evil band appears to be the conceptual counterpart to the ethical commonwealth. 107 . Cf. MM 6:438f. 108 . Wood 1991, p. 4; Louden 2002, p. 128. 109 . Bonaunet 2004, p. 36. 110 . Cf. Barth 1959, p. 175. In the context of 19th and 20th century Protestant thought, Michalson (1999, p. 4) writes: ‘Whenever theologians spoke hope- fully about a “kingdom of heaven on earth,” Kantian influence was not far removed.’ 111 . Beiser (2006, pp. 597f.) explains: ‘The Stoic and Epicurean conceptions were fundamentally flawed because they never really considered the question of the distribution of the highest good. They saw the highest good as the virtue or happiness of the individual alone, of the solitary wise man, as if he could achieve it by his own efforts alone. But if this were so, the wise man could achieve the best life even in an unjust world! For Kant, as for Augustine, this was the reductio ad absurdum of all pagan conceptions.’ See also Chapter 8 of the present monograph. 112 . CPR 5:127f. 113 . SKS 8, 306 / UD, 212. 114 . SKS 8, 121 / UD, 5. 115 . See Schulz 2009, p. 320; Dorrien 2012, p. 297. 116 . This is also suggested by a search for ‘høieste gode ’ and ‘ Guds Rige ’ in the elec- tronic edition (SKS-E) at http://www.sks.dk/zoom/search.asp (2012/1/4). 117 . Glenn 1997, pp. 260f. 118 . SKS 9, 240 / WL, 239; Glenn 1997, p. 261. 119 . SKS 24, 324, NB24:7 / JP 1, 600. 120 . Brandes 1877. 121 . E.g., Søltoft 2000; Grøn 1997, chapter 5. 122 . SKS 7, 356 / CUP1, 391. 123 . SKS 8, 303f. / UD, 208f. See also SKS 8, 306 / UD, 212. 124 . SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 258f.; SKS 10, 65 / CD, 56. 125 . SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 259. 126 . See Chapter 7. 127 . Cf. SKS 20, 325, NB4:78 / JP 5, 6112. 128 . SKS 9, 141 / WL, 139. Kierkegaard’s 1854–1855 ‘Attack on Christendom,’ however, arguably involves a growing dissatisfaction with such a stark inner versus outer divide. The kingdom of God is not yet, and no temporal Notes 267

institution is redemptive as such, but the Danish church, like the singular individual, must be responsible to and for the salvific truth of the Gospel here and now. 129 . SKS 4,131, 115f. / FT, 56, 19f.; SKS 12,183 / PC, 183; SKS 20, 392, NB5:48 / JP 1, 481. See also Chapter 7 of the present monograph. 130 . Cf. Augustine 1998, Book 19. 131 . SKS 5, 19–21, 24f. / EUD, 9–11, 14f.; SKS 10, 209 / CD, 200. 132 . SKS 7, 354ff., 368, 560 / CUP1, 389ff., 405, 617; SKS 10, 230–235 / CD, 222–228. Cf. SKS 10, 219 / CD, 211; SKS 8, 329 / UD, 228. 133 . SKS 5, 19–21, 24–25, 250–268 / EUD, 9–11, 14–15, 253–273. 134 . SKS 7, 354ff., 368, 560 / CUP1, 389ff., 405, 617; SKS 10, 219, 230–35 / CD, 211, 222–28. 135 . Wimmer 1990, pp. 70f. and 196f. 136 . Regarding Kierkegaard, see Glenn 1997, pp. 258f. Regarding Kant, see Marina 2000, pp. 330–341. Marina (2000, p. 331) argues that ‘we cannot really make sense of the highest good [in Kant] as immanent without referring to its transcendent sense. The highest good in the world has meaning only insofar as it refers to its ultimate telos , itself standing outside the world of sense; this implies that the highest good as transcendent is its principle and more important sense.’ 137 . Marina 2000, pp. 330–341. Schelling criticized Kant’s notion of empirical happiness and his view that morality is constitutive of the highest good, see Düsing 1973, p. 62. 138 . This has long been a matter of controversy. Johann Heinrich Abicht, a Jena theologian contemporaneous with Kant, was ‘vehemently opposed to Kant’s distinction between virtue and happiness [in the second Critique ]. He considers the two as naturally connected’ (Di Giovanni, 2005, p. 314). Cf. Himmelmann 2003, p. 32, p. 86, pp. 88–92. Kant himself writes: ‘For practical purposes we can be quite indifferent as to whether we shall live as pure spirits after death or whether our personal identity in the next world requires the same matter that now forms our body, so that our soul is not a distinct substance and our body must be restored to life. For who is so fond of his body that he would want to drag it around with him for eternity, if he can get along without it?’ (CF 7:40). 139 . Beiser 2006, p. 599 referencing Augustine 1998, Book 20. For the assumption that these realms are exclusive, see Schwarz 2004, pp. 83ff. and pp. 125–159. 140 . Cf. Wimmer 1990, pp. 70f. and pp. 196f. 141 . Evans 1999, pp. 146f. 142 . Cf. R 6:5f.; LE 27:470f. Yovel (1979, p. 181) stresses that ‘the highest good is not only the supreme end of man but also the only teleological justification that the world itself can be given.’ Cf. Pinkard 2010, p. 77. 143 . Cf. SKS 7, 524, 353f. / CUP1, 502, 387f. Many of Kierkegaard’s predecessors also interpreted the highest good as man’s telos or vocation. Cf. Koch 2003, p. 96; Thuborg 1951, p. 57 and p. 119. 144 . Regarding Kant (and partially Kierkegaard), see Wimmer 1990, pp. 2–27 and pp. 57–77. 145 . R 6:97; cf. LE 27:470f. 146 . Zammito 2002, pp. 164–170; Di Giovanni 2005, pp. 7–10 and pp. 30f. 268 Notes

147 . Cf. SKS 5, 91 / EUD, 84; SKS 19, 255, Not 9:1 / JP 5, 5514. 148 . SKS 4, 148 / FT, 54; SKS 7, 354–359, 388 / CUP1, 389–394, 426f. Kierkegaard himself describes eternal bliss as the one thing necessary (SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 258f.). 149 . Cf. Hannay 1993, pp. 211–213. 150 . SKS 7, 522, 529 / CUP1, 574, 581. 151 . SKS 7, 560 / CUP1, 617. Cf. SKS 7, 25 / CUP1,15f. For this idea, see also Augustine 1998, Book 19.1. 152 . SKS 7, 25 / CUP1, 16. 153 . SKS 7, 355, 524 / CUP1, 389f., 577. 154 . SKS 7, 25 / CUP1, 16. Postscript adds that it is presumably (vel ) impossible for someone who has lost sense of eternal bliss to become eternally blessed (CUP1, 16 translates ‘ vel ’ as ‘certainly,’ but it can also mean ‘presumably’ or ‘arguably’). 155 . LE 27:247f. 156 . Marina 2000, pp. 346f. Marina (2000, p. 344) also says that ‘were following the moral law (as a merely formal principle) to have the consequence that happiness could not be achieved ... this would imply that the moral law was a mere deception.’ 157 . Marina 2000, p. 347. 158 . Beiser 2006, p. 597. 159 . SKS 4, 123 / FT, 27. 160 . Hare 2002, pp. 78–88. See also Hare 2001, pp. 42–46. 161 . Assumptions #4–6 are developed in Hare 2001, pp. 42–46, while the rest is developed in Hare 2002, pp. 78–88. Assumptions #7–11 are social analogues to assumptions #1–5. 162 . Hare 2002, pp. 73ff. 163 . Cf. Fremstedal 2005. 164 . For example, SKS K17, 104. 165 . See Chapter 11.

6 The Moral Argument for the Existence of God and Immortality: Natural Theology and Divine Revelation

1 . R 6:138f.; Schwarz 2004, pp. 48ff. 2 . Beiser 2006, p. 603 referencing R 6:72–76. 3 . Cf. CPR 5:125; CPJ 5:455; Beiser 2006, p. 603. 4 . Beiser 2006, pp. 602f. referencing TP 8:308–312. 5 . CPR 5:113–119; Wood 1970, pp. 104–116 and pp. 124–129. 6 . Milz 2002, pp. 328–331; Beiser 2006, pp. 601–603. 7 . Cf. Quinn 1998, pp. 349ff.; Hare 2002, Parts I and III; Evans 2006a, p. 49 and p. 82; Stern 2012, p. 206. 8 . Hare 2009, p. 83 quoting Augustine 1948, vol. 1, p. 16 and p. 32. 9 . SKS 7, 366 / CUP1, 402. Cf. SKS 5, 326–328 / EUD, 337–339. 10 . SKS 9, 252, 261 / WL, 252, 262; SKS 10, 117–124 / CD, 106–113. 11 . See Chapter 9. Cf. Grøn 1997, pp. 143–153. 12 . Cf. LPDR 28:1076. Kant and his commentators tend to rely on a conceptuali- zation of despair in this context, although Kant does not offer a systematic Notes 269

analysis of despair (cf. Marina 2000, p. 354; Kuehn 2001, p. 313; Henrich 2008, p. 102). Wood (1970, p. 160) claims that the second antinomy of practical reason (i.e., that morality does not result in happiness) corresponds concretely to the attitude of moral despair. Wimmer (1990, p. 68, pp. 156–159 and p. 206) takes Kant to say that unbelief qualifies as despair at the noumenal level, adding that this is despair in the Kierkegaardian sense. 13 . SKS 19, 141–143, Not4:12; KJN 3, 140–142; SKS 18, 343, KK:4 / JP 3, 2747; SKS K18, 503. 14 . Kierkegaard was influenced by the 1837 article reprinted in Møller 1842; cf. SKS 7, 159 / CUP1, 172; SKS 17:134, BB:41 / JP 5, 5201; Marks 2010. Regarding Kant’s Danish reception and its discussion of the moral argument, see Thuborg 1951, pp. 150–169; Koch 2003, p. 96, p. 99, pp. 125f., p. 131, p. 140, pp. 290–324. Regarding the German reception of the moral argument, see Düsing 1973. 15 . See Chapter 4. See also Hare 2002, p. 91; Wimmer 1990, pp. 97–108. 16 . CPR 5:114f.; Beiser 2006, p. 601. 17 . Cf. CPJ 5:451. 18 . Cf. Guyer 2000, pp. 347–351; A823f. / B851f.; CPR 5:143. 19 . Cf. CPR 5:132, 143. The postulates of God and immortality state conditions of possibility for the highest good, whereas the postulate of freedom states a condition of possibility for acting at all (cf. CPR 5:3–5, 29–31; G 4:447f.). The following transcendental argument appears to be implicit: We should promote the highest good. God and immortality (as concepts with non-empirical origin) are necessary conditions for this. Therefore, we must postulate God and immortality. 20 . Cf. LPDR 28:1083; LE 27:531; Beiser 2006, p. 604; Wood 1970, pp. 28f., and p. 106. 21 . LM 29:777f.; cf. LPDR 28:1072. 22 . See Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. 23 . CPR 5:111f.; LM 29:777f. 24 . CPR 5:127, cf. LPDR 28:1072. 25 . Cf. Himmelmann 2003, chapter 6; Marina 2000, pp. 334–340. 26 . Marina (2000, p. 350) provides an example: ‘[M]y ability to interact with others depends on a certain level of my own health as well as theirs; a certain level of physical well-being is a precondition for the ability to carry out any projects at all. And it is undeniable that some needs (the satisfaction of which go under the name of happiness) must be met if we are to be able to continue to progress at all. Moreover, the realization of goals designed to facilitate positive interaction among persons or groups also depends on factors outside my control, some of which have to do directly with nature itself (for instance, a hurricane can destroy a hospital) and others which have to do with the dynamics of human interaction.’ 27 . LM 29:777, cf. LPDR 28:1072. 28 . Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie in Ak 28:1151. 29 . CPR 5:144, cf. A811 / B839; LPDR 28:1116f. 30 . CPR 5:114f.; cf. LE 27:483. 31 . LE 27:313. 32 . LPDR 28:1072. 33 . Regarding objective reality, see CPJ 5:396; Beiser 2006, p. 619. 270 Notes

34 . Green 1992, p. 53 (original italics). 35 . See Chapter 5. 36 . Cf. Himmelmann 2003, chapter 8. 37 . Beiser 2006, p. 623 referencing CPJ 5:446, §86. 38 . Cf. Denis 2003, pp. 198–219. 39 . CPR 5:125. 40 . Guyer 2000, pp. 345–371. 41 . MM 6:482; cf. CPR 5:130. 42 . CPJ 5:469f. Without following all the technicalities of Kant’s argument, Hare (2002, pp. 91f. and pp. 270f.) concludes that the moral gap or antinomy leads to the postulation of a moral world order or providence rather than God. We need extra-human assistance, but cannot conclude that God is the only solution unless we examine whether there are other ways to accomplish the same result. 43 . CPR 5:125. 44 . R 6:5f., 138f. 45 . CPJ 5:444; LPDR 28:1012; A814f. / B842f.; CPR 5:140. 46 . CPR 5:137. Zerman Scutt (2010, p. 633) comments: ‘Kant’s emphasis that such postulation from practical reason must be viewed as being established merely from “a practical point of view” ... is intended to ward off the mistake of interpreting these postulations as providing determinate understanding of how concepts relate to their objects [i.e., “considerations that determine this object as it is in itself”], which critical philosophy restricts to the activity of theoretical reason.’ 47 . Habermas (2005, p. 235) suggests that God can be replaced by luck or success, something Christoph Schulte has also suggested to the present author. 48 . R 6:94. 49 . Beiser 2006, p. 607. 50 . SKS 7, 183 / CUP1, 200. 51 . O 8:136. 52 . Evans (1982, pp. 9–13, pp. 74–83, pp. 165–180) argues convincingly that Kant and Kierkegaard both rely on the following structure: God is a possible object of rational belief, but theoretical reason is inadequate for resolving the issue of religious truth. It is impossible to be indifferent or neutral towards religious truth. Religious truth can be justified on practical and subjective grounds. Note that Kierkegaard cannot speak of the primacy of pure practical reason like Kant does (cf. CPR 5:119–121, 206) since he lacks a concept of pure practical reason. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard (and the pseudonyms) seems committed to something which might be called the primacy of practical interests, or even the primacy of ethics. However, the idea of the primacy of practical reason is hardly uniquely Kantian since this idea represented a popular trend already at the beginning of 18th-century philosophy. Besides Rousseau, representatives of this trend are Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). See Henrich 2008, pp. 54f. 53 . SKS 7, 502 / CUP1, 552f.; SKS K7, 357; SKS 1, 194 / CI, 144; SKS 22, 435, NB14:150 / JP 1,1057; SKS 18, 44f., EE:118 / JP 2, 2234; SKS 18, 204, JJ:202 / JP 2, 1334; SKS 18, 343, KK:4 / JP 3, 2747; SKS K18, 503; SKS 19, 331, Not11:20 / KJN 3, 329; SKS K19, 464; SKS 19, 139, Not4:11; KJN 3, 139; SKS 4, 319 / CA, 11. 54 . SKS 7, 183 / CUP1, 200. Notes 271

55 . Smail Rapic (2007, p. 43) appears to overlook this, since he takes this note to dismiss Kant’s doctrine of the postulate of God’s existence without explaining why the postulate is problematic. 56 . CPR 5:11. 57 . CPR 5:11; Düsing 1973, p. 61 and p. 83. 58 . SKS 7, 129 / CUP1, 138f. 59 . SKS 7, 129 / CUP1, 139. 60 . SKS 11, 195f. / SUD, 81. 61 . Cf. Verstrynge 2004, p. 492 referencing SUD, 71. 62 . Cf. Theunissen 1993, pp. 22f., pp. 41f., and p. 56; Grøn 1997, pp. 125–132. 63 . R 6:37. See also Chapter 2. 64 . See Chapters 2–3 and 7. 65 . See Chapter 3 and SKS 11, 153–157, 149–151 / SUD, 37–42, 33–35. 66 . SKS 7, 366, 392ff. / CUP1, 402, 431ff. 67 . SKS 7:390f. / CUP1, 429f. 68 . Cf. Grøn 1997, pp. 227–277. See also Chapter 9 of the present monograph. 69 . Rapic (2007, p. 43) reads it as a comment on Kant, whereas Green (1992, p. 139) says that Kierkegaard follows Kant in postulating God’s existence. However, Green hardly offers evidence for this controversial claim. 70 . Pap. VI B 40, 23. For Kant’s reference to Hemsterhuis, see e.g., C 10:455, letter 275 from 1786. 71 . SKS K7, 213 references Hemsterhuis 1782–1797, vol. 2, pp. 127f., pp. 185–188, pp. 216–218, and pp. 236–239 (ASKB 573–575). 72 . Hemsterhuis 1782–1797, vol. 2, pp. 217–219. 73 . SKS 7, 502 / CUP1, 552f. 74 . Møller 1842, p. 162, p. 164, p. 176, and p. 210. 75 . CPR 5:132, 128. 76 . Green 1992, p. 20. For a discussion of Kierkegaard’s source and whether he read Kant’s second Critique , see Chapter 11 of the present monograph. 77 . SKS 3, 257 / EO2, 270. 78 . SKS 3, 265 / EO2, 279. 79 . This transformation is traditionally associated with the second coming of Christ. See Chapter 5, Section 8; Beiser 2006, p. 599. 80 . Wimmer 1990, pp. 70f. and pp. 196f. Cf. R 6:96. 81 . SKS 10, 230–235, 219 / CD, 222–228, 211. Nevertheless, several commentators deny that Kierkegaard believes in personal immortality and resurrection. See the criticism of Harrison Hall, Don Cupitt, and Dewi Z. Phillips in Marino 2001, pp. 61–76. Cf. Marks 2010, p. 145 and pp. 169–171. 82 . SKS 10, 215–221 / CD, 207–213. Compare Kant’s claim that we can see how things really are after we are dead: those who are virtuous see themselves as being already in heaven. LM 28:445; cf. D 2:363. 83 . SKS 10, 221, 214 / CD, 212f., 205; SKS K10, 190; SKS 20, 289, NB4:5 / JP 5, 6096. 84 . SKS 10, 122; CD, 111. 85 . SKS 8, 329 / UD, 228. Cf. SKS 7, 355 / CUP1, 389. 86 . LM 29:778. 87 . SKS 18, 309f., JJ:508 / JP 1, 890. 88 . CPJ 5:458. 89 . CPJ 5:452f., 458f. 272 Notes

90 . I 8:18. 91 . ‘On the Philosopher’s Medicine of the Body,’ in Anthropology, History, and Education , Ak 15:951; ‘Gedanken bei dem frühzeitigen Ableben des Herrn Johann Friedrich von Funk,’ Ak 2:40. 92 . SKS 4, 112 / FT, 15. 93 . SKS 4, 123f. / FT, 27. 94 . SKS 4, 123 / FT, 27. 95 . SKS 4, 112 / FT, 15. 96 . Camus 1975, pp. 42f. 97 . Beiser 1987, pp. 120–122. 98 . CPR 5:143, cf. 121; LE 27:321, 727. 99 . LE 27:718, cf. 549f. 100 . Cf. Evans 1982, chapters. 1–3 and 5–6. 101 . SKS 18, 296, JJ:469 / JP 2, 1117. 102 . SKS 8, 364f. / UD, 268. Andic (2005, p. 210) takes the latter statement to mean that God exists because I want it, something which reminds one of Kant’s claim that ‘I will that there be a God’ and a life after death (CPR 5:143). Cf. Welz 2008, pp. 177f. 103 . Neiman 1997, p. 154. 104 . O 8:137. 105 . Neiman 1997, p. 154. 106 . O 8:139. 107 . O 8:139. Adams (1987, p. 154) argues convincingly that (1) practical (pragmatic and moral) arguments should be employed only on questions that cannot be decided on theoretical grounds. (2) The question to be decided by practical arguments should be urgent and of practical importance. (3) It would be irrational to accept a belief on the ground that it gives you a reason for doing something you want to do. Adams (1987, p. 144) concludes that ‘Moral arguments were the type of theistic argument most characteristic of the 19th and early 20th century. More recently they have become one of philosophy’s abandoned farms. The fields are still fertile, but they have not been cultivated systematically since the latest methods came in.’ 108 . Henrich 2008, p. 102. 109 . However, Kuehn (1985, p. 168) misinterprets Kierkegaard when he writes the following (as a critique of Wood): ‘Kant’s faith is entirely different from Kierke- gaard’s . ... Kierkegaard’s faith cannot be justified. The very intention to justify is contradictory to Kierkegaard’s project, and, in so far as Kant wants to justify he is already opposed to Kierkegaard. If we then consider that Kant’s faith is meant to be rational, the opposition becomes even stronger. But this is not all: Kant makes also very clear that he is on the side of the common man or commonsense. He is with “the crowd,” opposed to a “salto mortale ” into faith.’ My view is that Kierkegaard gives a negative argument for religious faith and is in accord with the common man (den Enfoldige) but not with the crowd (the two latter should not be equated or confused). Cf. Chapters 5 and 7. 110 . Cf. A631f. / B659f.; LPDR 28:999–1012. 111 . SKS 25, 476, NB30:112 / JP 3, 2551. 112 . Cf. Kosch 2006, p. 139. 113 . SKS 7, 506, 521 / CUP1, 556f., 573; SKS 4, 258 / PF, 55. 114 . SKS 7, 503, 519, 390f. / CUP1, 554, 571f., 429f. Notes 273

115 . See Chapters 2 and 11. Westphal (1991, p. 174) says that Postscript seems to take infinite guilt as a necessary and sufficient condition of the religious. 116 . Cf. Irwin 2011, vol. 1., pp. 417f.; Beiser 2006. 117 . Kant’s lectures contain some interesting passages that anticipate the Postscript (and Kierkegaard’s Socrates): ‘If something is very weighty [erhe- blich ] for us and of very great importance, so that a great part, indeed, the greatest part of our peace of mind [ Gemüths-Ruhe ] and of our external well-being and happiness [äu βeren Wohlseyns, und Glückseeligheit ] depends upon it, then in this case the mind [Gemüth ] is just not free enough to consider the matter indifferently and impartially from both sides, to weight grounds for it on one side and the grounds for its opposite on the other side, to hold the importance of all these various grounds up against one another properly, and to pronounce on their advantage; instead the minds, and often even our understanding, are chained, as it were, and restricted, so that we immediately and readily approve what is advantageous to us and grant it our approval. And, on the other hand, [we] soon reject and disapprove what could cause us harm or sickness.’ (LL 24:158f.; cf. D 2:349f.) And: ‘[N]o more miserable condition for man can be thought ... than the condition that leaves us undecided [ unentschloβen ] ... when it affects our interests. Everything that holds us up and makes us inactive, leaves us in a certain kind of inaction, is quite opposed to the essential determinations of the soul’ (LL 24:203). Finally: ‘Even in the context of utter uncertainty in speculation there can be complete decisiveness in action. Socrates was uncertain whether there was another world, but he acted as if he were certain’ (Ak 24:433 translated in Zammito 2002, p. 277). 118 . This passage is from Kierkegaard’s 1837 notes from the lectures of Martensen. In the case of Kant’s philosophy of religion, Kierkegaard’s notes overlap considerably with the notes from Martensen’s lectures penned by an unnamed student (found among Kierkegaard’s papers). This suggests that Kierkegaard reports Martensen’s view of Kant, instead of expressing his own ideas. Nevertheless, the lecture notes sketch a critique of Kant that appears to be consistent with Kierkegaard’s mature thought (with the probable exception of criticizing the moral argument for egoism). For the notes of the unnamed student, see Pap. XII, 284–294. For a very similar interpretation of Kant, see Bornemann 2009, pp. 80–83. 119 . SKS 19, 142f., NB4:12 / KJN 3, 141f. 120 . The notes from the unnamed student also stress that Kant’s approach to God is anthropomorphic (Pap. II C 25 in Pap. XII, 287, 290). Kant criticizes dogmatic anthropomorphism for trying to expand our cognition beyond its limits, but seems to see symbolic anthropomorphism as necessary for heuristic (regulative) purposes. Byrne (2007, pp. 64–71, pp. 147f., p. 172, pp. 125–131) argues Kant sees the concept of God as a symbol which is based on analogy with human agents and that his concept grace is pictorial and imaginative. 121 . Martensen is reported to have described Kantians who find room for divine revelation as ‘half Kantians’ that are ‘quite inconsistent’ (Pap. XII, 290). At this point, Kierkegaard may have agreed with Martensen. Cf. Pap. II C 25 in Pap. XII, 284–297; SKS 19, 141–143, Not4:12 / KJN 3, 140–142. 274 Notes

122 . See Chapters 7–8 of the present dissertation and Green 2007, pp. 181–192. 123 . Cf. LPDR 28:999ff. 124 . Kierkegaard here seems to deviate from the unnamed student attending Martensen’s lectures. See Pap. II C 25 in Pap. XII, 284–294. 125 . Cf. Evans 1982, chapters 1–3 and 5–6. Düsing (2010, p. 69) argues convincingly that Kant’s moral argument is incompatible with a Feuerbachian view of religion as something based on human projections and wishful thinking since Kant conceives of God as necessary, not illusory. This Feuerbachian view is also criticized by Kierkegaard (Climacus), as Marks (2010, p. 172) shows. 126 . Cf. Gouwens 1996, p. 166 and p. 232. 127 . Cf. SKS 7, 366 / CUP1, 402. See also Chapter 4 of the present monograph. 128 . SKS K6, 204; SKS K22, 287f. For references to honest Kant, see Chapter 11, Section 5. 129 . Cf. Tillich 1973, pp. 8–11; cf. SKS 19, 126, 129f., Not4:3, 5 / KJN 3, 125–129. See also Kingo 1995, pp. 13–20, pp. 85–139, and pp. 231–318; Grøn 1995, pp. 267–290. 130 . Grøn (1997, pp. 296–299, pp. 230–232, p. 364, and p. 407) points to a similar duality in Sickness unto Death. Kierkegaard (Anti-Climacus) argues that different positions can fail either on their own terms or on Christian terms. 131 . Cf. SKS 10, 199 / CD 189; SKS 15, 110, 221–225 / BA, 24f. 132 . Cf. A631f. / B659f.; LPDR 28:999–1012; CPJ 5:436. 133 . In this respect Kierkegaard comes closer to Møller and I. H. Fichte than Kant. Regarding I. H. Fichte’s influence on Møller and Møller’s view of the Christian tradition and the role of personal experience, see Koch 2004, pp. 259–264. Regarding I. H. Fichte’s (minimal) influence on Kierkegaard, see Rosenau 2007, pp. 60f. For an analysis of divine revelation, see Chapter 8 of the present monograph. 134 . See Section 1 of Chapter 5 on Schleiermacher, I. G. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

7 Religious Faith and Divine Grace: Human and Divine Agency

1 . Krishek (2009, p. 143) points to similarities between Fear and Trembling and Postscript but concludes that there is still need for more research on the relation between these works. Davenport (2008b, p. 880) says that ‘“the holy grail” remains finding a single consistent understanding of “religiousness” that makes sense of what is said about resignation and faith in Fear and Trembling while also explaining what is said about religiousness A and B in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. ’ 2 . See especially Hare 2002, p. 37 and p. 262, cf. p. 219 and p. 197. Green (1992, p. 221) says that Kant never fully made the transition from the ethical stage to the religious stages. 3 . Knappe 2004, p. 127, cf. pp. 97–100 and pp. 134–138. Knappe stresses Kierkegaard’s conception of Christian faith, but leaves out Kant’s account of moral faith and divine grace, thereby giving a somewhat unbalanced view of the conceptual relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. Notes 275

4 . Green 1992, pp. 167–175, pp. 178f., p. 204, and p. 221. Firestone and Jacobs (2008, p. 61) speak of ‘Green’s lack of assistance in placing (and defending) Kant’s introduction of divine grace.’ However, in his later work Green (2007, pp. 181–191) stresses that Kierkegaard differs from Kant not so much by seeing grace as necessary, as by insisting that grace must be bestowed historically. 5 . Note that Kierkegaard tends to describe himself as a ‘religious author’ rather than a Christian theologian. 6 . CPR 5:113–115, 127ff.; R 6:97ff. 7 . Wimmer 1990, pp. 11f. 8 . R 6:138f., 97–99; NF 18:456, Reflexion 6107. 9 . R 6:139. 10 . E.g. Beiser 2006, p. 603; Rossi 2006, p. 114; Firestone 2009, pp. 142–144. 11 . R 6:66f., cf. 48; CPR 5:132, 128. This holds both for progression in this life (R 6:66f., 48) and possible progression in the afterlife (CPR 5:132, 128). 12 . Wood 1970, pp. 120f., cf. pp. 232ff.; Allison 1995, p. 174. 13 . Allison 1995, p. 171, referencing MM 6:446. 14 . See R 6:72. 15 . Marina 1997, p. 390; cf. Barth 1959, p. 184. Barth (1959, p. 181) says that the doctrine of radical evil leads to problems with regard to justification, forgive- ness and (vicarious) atonement. 16 . R 6:75. 17 . R 6:75f. 18 . R 6:76. 19 . Allison 1995, pp. 174f., cf. p. 173; see also Wood 1970, pp. 236–248, referencing R 6:75. 20 . Marina 1997, pp. 396–399, cf. pp. 390f.; see also Byrne 2007, p. 147; Wood 1970, p. 230. 21 . R 6:44. 22 . CF 7:43, cf. 58f., 44. 23 . LE 27:148f.; Marina 1997, p. 383. 24 . LPDR 28:1085f., cf. 1294. 25 . We will deal with the ethicist in more detail in Section 4 of the present chapter. 26 . Cf. R 6:109. Barth (1959, pp. 186f.) argues that Kant’s reinterpretation of justification is non-reformatory and leads to a Roman Catholic understanding, in particular to the Catholic church of the 2nd and 3rd centuries, to the Greek fathers, and the Franciscan scholasticism of the late Middle Ages. 27 . CPR 5:123, cf. 127. 28 . CPR 5:127, cf. 127–129. 29 . Cf. Zammito 2002, pp. 117–119 and p. 134. 30 . For an interpretation of the relation between belief and hope, see Chapter 9, Section 10. 31 . Cf. R 6:132f., 120, 190f., 201f. 32 . Cf. R 6:97f. 33 . Kant describes deficiency as Mangel or Mangelhaftigkeit , and renunciation as Entsagung , Resignation , or Ergebenheit . As we will see, Kierkegaard uses resignation in a similar manner. 34 . Cf. R 6:163, 50f. 35 . Cf. R 6:67f., 117f., 139f., 144f., 201f. 276 Notes

36 . PP 8:362; cf. LE 27:294f., 304. 37 . R 6:120, cf. 171; C 10:180; LE 27:320f., 317f. 38 . Cf. R 6:178, 118 39 . TP 8:312; cf. R 6:100f., 185. 40 . LL 9:69. 41 . R 6:67f. 42 . Marina 2000, p. 350. 43 . Cf. Denis 2005, p. 54. 44 . Cf. LE 27:319, 395, 645f., 366–368; LPDR 28:1112. 45 . Kosch 2006, p. 139. 46 . Hare (2002, p. 9, p. 219, and p. 37) points out that the ethicist is ‘under the law and not under grace,’ and that ‘the ethical agent is forced to rely on her own strength.’ 47 . SKS 7, 234 / CUP1, 257. Cf. SKS 7, 263, 519 / CUP1, 288, 572. 48 . SKS 6, 439 / SLW, 476. Cf. SKS 3, 207ff., 215 / EO2, 216ff., 224. 49 . SKS 2, 21 / EO1, 14, my translation. 50 . SKS 3, 277, 305 / EO2, 292, 323; SKS 6, 145 / SLW, 155. 51 . SKS 3, 305 / EO2, 323. 52 . Cf. SKS 3, 257, 265 / EO2, 270, 279. 53 . Similar points about the ethical in Fear and Trembling are made by Westphal 1991, pp. 76f. See also Furtak 2005, pp. 92–96 54 . SKS 3, 170f., 173 / EO2, 174f., 178. 55 . Cf. SKS 3, 253, 262 / EO2, 265, 275f. 56 . R 6:72. 57 . See Chapter 2. 58 . Cf. SKS 7, 391, 421 / CUP1, 430, 463. 59 . Cf. SKS 7, 390f. / CUP1, 429f.; SKS 5, 267f. / EUD, 272f.; SKS 10, 228 / CD, 220f.; SKS 24, 190f., NB22:159 / JP 2, 1482. 60 . Kierkegaard thus opts for an intermediate position between Pelagianism and predestination. See SKS 22, 415, NB14:123 / JP 4, 4551; Fremstedal and Jackson forthcoming. 61 . SKS 20, 69, NB:79 / JP 3, 2461; SKS 21, 285, NB10:55 / JP 4, 4018. 62 . This does not hold true for Abraham in Fear and Trembling , since he is without guilt or sin (Fremstedal 2006c and 2008). Nevertheless, there is a more general problem which precedes resignation and faith, namely, the problem of real- izing the highest good. Interestingly, Hare (2002, pp. 22–24 and p. 35) argues that Kant’s ethics replicates the structure of Creation, Fall, and Redemption found in the Christian tradition. 63 . SKS 4, 129–145, 167, 189f., 197, 203 / FT, 34–52, 75f., 99–101, 109, 115. 64 . Cf. SKS 4, 136 / FT, 41f. 65 . Cf. Johansen 2002, p. 267. 66 . Cf. Hannay 1993, p. 77; Fremstedal 2006c, p. 94. 67 . My interpretation of the double movement of faith is in basic agreement with the interpretation defined by Davenport (2008a, pp. 196–233), although Davenport does not deal explicitly with the double movement. 68 . SKS 4, 163 / FT, 71. 69 . SKS 4, 148 / FT, 54. 70 . SKS 4, 116f., 127 / FT, 20f., 31f.; Hannay 1993, pp. 77f.; Fremstedal 2006c, pp. 93f. 71 . SKS 4, 123f. / FT, 27. Notes 277

72 . A recent exception is Krishek 2009, chapters 2–3. Sløk (1980 and 1995, p. 135, pp. 164f., and p. 231) is another exception, but his interpretation is not as thorough or systematic as Krishek’s. While I interpret the object of faith as the highest good , Krishek interprets it as love , and Sløk as the earthly . Krishek’s account necessitates resignation, since the object can potentially be lost. On my reading, resignation is necessary because we actually lack the ability to realize the highest good. 73 . E.g., SKS 7, 371f., 264 / CUP1, 408f., 290. 74 . See SKS K2–3, 69. 75 . Law 1995, p. 254. 76 . SKS 3, 331f. / EO2, 353. 77 . SKS 4, 409, 457 / CA, 107, 158; cf. SKS K4, 479; Mt 10:39; Lk 17:33. 78 . SKS 4, 459f. / CA, 161. 79 . SKS 4, 324f. / CA, 17. 80 . SKS 4, 188f. / FT, 98f. 81 . Lübcke (2006, p. 411) argues convincingly that ‘both Johannes de silentio and Climacus presents the transformation from the pre-religious way of life to a religious one by pointing at anomalies in the pre-religious person’s interpretation of life.’ This means that both Concept of Anxiety and Fear and Trembling present arguments to the effect that the pre-religious problem of moral guilt motivates the leap into religiousness. 82 . SKS 6, 383f. / SLW, 413f. 83 . SKS 7, 372 / CUP1, 409. Davenport (2008b, p. 882 and pp. 899–902) has argued quite convincingly that there is a single unified conception of religious faith in Fear and Trembling and Postscript . Krishek (2009, pp. 70ff.), argues that there is a unified conception of faith in Fear and Trembling , ‘Ultimatum,’ and Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses . 84 . For example, SKS 7, 238ff. / CUP1, 261ff. 85 . Cf. SKS 7, 370f. / CUP1, 407f. 86 . SKS 7, 390f. / CUP1, 429f. 87 . SKS 7, 503, 519 / CUP1, 554, 571f. 88 . Cf. SKS 10, 20, 30, 95, 126 / CD, 9, 17f., 87, 115f.; SKS 8, 348f. / UD, 250f. 89 . Cf. SKS 10, 205f., 209, 187 / CD, 195ff., 200, 176; Andic 2005, pp. 218f. 90 . SKS 10, 189 / CD, 178f. Cf. SKS 25, 152f., NB27:39 / JP 2, 1433; SKS 15, 268 / BA, 112f. 91 . Pap. X-6 B 81 / JP 1, 12. The translation leaves out ‘ vel ,’ a word which can be translated ‘presumably,’ ‘arguably,’ or ‘certainly.’ 92 . However, as indicated by the previous chapter, Kierkegaard takes Judaism and Christianity as offering different interpretations of the highest good: Judaism (including Abraham in Fear and Trembling ) interprets the highest good as this-worldly, whereas Christianity sees this life is an ordeal that prepares the realization of the highest good in the afterlife. 93 . Det Danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab 1918–56, vol. 2, pp. 598–605. Cf. SKS 3, 317 / EO2 337 where ‘attitude’ is explained in terms of Bevægelse and ‘position.’ 94 . Theunissen (1991, p. 346) holds that the double movement of faith belongs to Kierkegaard’s Christian religiousness. However, Davenport, (2008a, p. 214, p. 222, and p. 233; and 2008b pp. 905–907) argues that Kierkegaard gives a single unified conception of faith which describes the subjective attitude of faithful persons in many different religions (including religiousness A and B, as 278 Notes

well as the belief of Zoroastrians and Socrates). Earlier, I came to much the same conclusion as Davenport, saying that the double movement of faith is found in religiousness A as well as B (Fremstedal 2006a, pp. 138f. as well as 2006b, p. 224; and 2006c, p. 92). However, the textual evidence presented in this chapter indicates that Kierkegaard himself held the double movement of faith to be exclusive to Judaism and Christianity. Nevertheless, Davenport’s interpretation and my earlier work may be considered rational reconstructions rather than exegesis. 95 . As we have seen in Chapter 4, Kierkegaard also thinks that only the Christian accepts suffering freely. See SKS 12, 170 / PC, 167. 96 . SKS 24, 190f., NB22:159 / JP 2, 1482. 97 . Cf. SKS 7, 242f., 383 / CUP1, 266f., 420f. 98 . Lübcke 2006, pp. 411f. 99 . Cf. Knappe 2004, p. 125; Kosch 2006, p. 7, p. 139, and p. 182. 100 . SKS 7, 103 / CUP1, 106. 101 . SKS 7, 234, 238 / CUP1, 258, 262. 102 . SKS 7, 210 / CUP1, 230. 103 . Cf. SKS 10,199 / CD, 189; SKS 15, 110, 221–225 / BA, 24f. 104 . Kosch 2006, p. 182. Kosch does not mention the highest good here. 105 . Cf. LE 27:309f. For examples of scholars who deny that Kant endorses faith based on supernatural revelation, while still maintaining that belief in divine grace belongs to Kant’s moral faith, see Wood 1970, pp. 232ff. and 2002, pp. 97–99; Byrne 2007, pp. 139–169. 106 . LE 27:310. 107 . R 6:174, cf. 171. 108 . R 6:138f. 109 . R 6:191. 110 . SKS 10, 281–283 / CD, 265–267; SKS 17, 52f., AA:51 / JP 4, 3994. 111 . LE 27:309f. 112 . SKS 7, 25 / CUP1, 16. Cf. SKS 7, 560 / CUP1, 617. 113 . Cf. CPR 5:107–148. Kant’s interpretation of Christianity will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. 114 . Green (2007, p. 182 and p. 180) sees Kant as epitomizing the Socratic (immanent) viewpoint while admitting that grace is rationally acceptable on Kant’s account. For Kierkegaard, however, the Socratic viewpoint represents the first ethics, whereas grace is exclusive to the second ethics. 115 . Cf. Green 2007, pp. 181–191.

8 Divine Revelation and Christianity: Rationalism and Supernaturalism

1 . Examples include Karl Reinhold, Johann Heinrich Abicht, Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk (the editor of the Kant-edition Kierkegaard owned), and the Tübingen school. Cf. Di Giovanni 2005, p. 55, pp. 236–238, pp. 270–272, p. 296, and p. 313; Düsing 1973, pp. 55ff.; Dorrien 2012, chapters 1–2, 5–6, and 8–9; Hinske, Lange and Schröpfer (eds) 1995; Beiser 1987, pp. 210–214. 2 . Wimmer 1990, p. 183. 3 . Except Michalson 1990, p. 121, pp. 129f., and pp. 158f. Notes 279

4 . R 6:171. 5 . My translation of ‘Reflexionen zur Religionsphilosophie,’ in Handschriftlicher Nachlaß , Ak 19:644, Reflexion 8101. 6 . Cf. Wimmer 1990, pp. 172–177. 7 . A 7:128, 219; cf. A820f. / B848f.; D 2:334, 349; O 8:145f. 8 . Wood 1970, p. 202; cf. R 6:108f. Since the German ‘ mittheilen ’ can mean to ‘share with others,’ Kant may be read as demanding universal shareability rather than communicability (cf. Kulenkampff 1978, p. 191). This does in itself not necessarily amount to religious judgments being redeemed discur- sively. For instance, religious narratives may be communicable without being argumentative. However, arguments must also be communicable or shareable. O’Neill (1997, p. 276) explains: ‘The minimal, modal requirement that reasons be followable by others, without being derivative from other standards, is Kant’s entire account of the authority of reason. Yet mere nonderivative lawlikeness has considerable implications for the organiza- tion of thought and action: in the domain of theory it amounts to the demand that reasons be intelligible to others; in the domain of action it amounts to the requirement that reasons for action be ones that others too could follow.’ 9 . Wood 1991, pp. 15f. Cf. R 6:155, 174f.; D 2:267, 348; LE 27:726. 10 . Cf. D 2:348. 11 . R 6:155, cf. 142; Wood 1991, p. 11. 12 . LPDR 28:1119. 13 . R 6:189. 14 . Wood 2002, pp. 98f.; Palmquist 1992, p. 137; Hare 2002, pp. 42–47. 15 . R 6:154f. However, Conflict of Faculties says that feeling the immediate influence of God is self-contradictory since the idea of God lies only in reason (CF 7:58). A direct revelation of God stating that your sins are forgiven you would be a supersensible experience, and this is impossible (CF 7:47). Rather than ruling out revelation as such (i.e., naturalism) these two passages rule out direct or immediate access to it in experience. 16 . Quinn (2006, pp. 261–263) says that the latter reading is supported by Kant’s discussion of Christianity, something Hare (2002, pp. 41–45) seems to agree with. Hare argues that pure rationalism is consistent with accepting special revelation as necessary for some but not all rational agents. Cf. CF 7:37; R 6:110, 115, 104; LPDR 28:1118f.; O’Neill 1992, pp. 109f. 17 . The Danish debate started when Bishop Mynster argued that the law of excluded middle must hold true, and that the revelation of Christ is therefore either supernatural as the supernaturalists maintain or not supernatural as the rationalists maintain. Stewart 2003, pp. 78f.; Stewart (ed.) 2009. 18 . CF 7:63; R 6:86–88, 187ff. 19 . CF 7:63. 20 . CF 7:46. 21 . Green 2011, p. 187. 22 . Green 1992, pp. 10f. and chapters 4–5. For a discussion of Kierkegaard’s relation to Conflict of Faculties , see Chapter 11 of the present monograph. 23 . Cf. SKS 4, 126 / FT, 30. Knappe (2004, pp. 81f.) argues that Kierkegaard tries to think against the Kantian paradigm. 24 . Cf. SKS 10, 199 / CD 189; SKS 15, 110, 221–225 / BA, 24f. 280 Notes

25 . Evans 2006b, chapter 14, especially pp. 245–253. Kierkegaard’s critique of Adler’s purported revelation was itself criticized by Schrempf (1927–1928, vol. 1, pp. 127ff.). Schrempf argues that receiving a revelation need neither lead one to hold certain beliefs nor to live in a certain way (although Kierkegaard claims so). And it is not up to Kierkegaard to decide to whom God can reveal himself (Kierkegaard suggests that Adler was too confused to receive a revelation). 26 . Evans 2006b, p. 248. 27 . See Fremstedal 2006c and 2008. 28 . Irwin (2011, vol. 3, p. 77) concludes that ‘Kierkegaard would be wise to agree with Aquinas’ claim that grace completes nature.’ 29 . Ferreira 2001, p. 11 and p. 20; SKS 25, 51f., NB26:47 / JP 1, 709; SKS 25, 279, NB28:82 / JP 1,711; SKS 21, 296f., NB10:76 / JP 3, 2481. 30 . SKS 22, 194, NB12, 97 / JP 6, 6467. 31 . See Section 3 of the present chapter and Chapter 2. 32 . Cf. Gouwens 1996, p. 166 and p. 232. 33 . See Chapters 4–5. 34 . Verstrynge 2004, p. 487 referencing SKS 7, 221, 223 / CUP1, 243, 245. 35 . See Chapter 2. Cf. Westphal 1991, pp. 89–97 and pp. 108–114. 36 . Kosch 2006, pp. 180f. and p. 199. 37 . However, if revealed faith is dispensable, then the argument is only quasi- transcendental since a transcendental argument would require that it is indispensable. 38 . LE 27:538, 714; LPDR 28:999. 39 . SKS 4, 222, 270, 299 / PF, 13, 69f., 92f. The Danish term ‘Autopsi ’ means seeing for yourself (selvsyn ), cf. http://ordnet.dk/ods_en/dictionary-1?query=autopsi (2011/11/03). 40 . SKS 4, 269f., 297f. / PF, 68f., 100f. 41 . SKS 4, 300f. / PF, 104. 42 . Cf. SKS 10, 24 / CD, 12. 43 . SKS 8, 414 / UD, 322. 44 . SKS 4, 226–228 / PF, 17–19. Cf. SKS 12, 145f. / PC, 142f. 45 . SKS 9, 69f. / WL, 62f. 46 . R 6:156, 122, 163; CF 7:66f. 47 . Cf. R 6:104, 115; CF 7:49; Wood 1991, p. 14. 48 . Savage 1991, p. 59 and p. 61; cf. Wood 1991, p. 16. 49 . Kosch 2006, p. 180, p. 183, and p. 199, respectively. 50 . However, it is not clear that humans can be in the same situation as Abraham, since Fear and Trembling presupposes that Abraham is infallible and without guilt and sin. Fremstedal 2006a and 2008. 51 . Kosch (2006, p.181) says it is mysterious how and whether Kierkegaard could have actually thought this. 52 . LPDR 28:1117. 53 . Kant suggests that inner revelation is identical to the moral law or moral perfection. Cf. G 4:408f.; R 6:119. 54 . A632 / B660. 55 . Kain (2005, p. 131) comments: ‘Theological morality, as Kant conceives of it, does not merely suggest that theology should be epistemologically prior to moral philosophy; it maintains that theology’s object is conceptually or Notes 281

metaphysically prior to moral philosophy’s: that theology must precede moral philosophy because the content of the moral law or our motive for obeying it depends on God’s will.’ 56 . Cf. A631f. / B659f.; LPDR 28:999ff.; CPJ 5:436. 57 . R 6:102–104, 115, 119ff., 129ff., 153f., 165–167, 176ff.; CF 7:36f. 58 . CF 7:37 . 59 . LE 29:627, cf. R 6:104f. Kant thinks we can infer what obligations we have from the action itself. Cf. Kain 2005, p. 131; Wood 2000, p. 500. 60 . R 6:104; cf. CF 7:36f. 61 . LE 29:627f.; cf. R 6:104, 99. 62 . LE 29:627f. 63 . R 6:115f.; cf. CF 7:51; MM 6:484; LA 25:1390. See also the first part of Chapter 5 of the present monograph. 64 . Byrne 2007, p. 128; cf. Hare 2002, p. 219. 65 . R 6:153f.; cf. LE 27:334. 66 . Hare 2002, pp. 152f., p. 218, and p. 270. 67 . R 6:85, 101, 104, 121, 135. 68 . Cf. R 6:109–114, 130; CF 7:48; O’Neill 1992, pp. 107–110; Wimmer 1990, p. 169. 69 . Kant thus anticipates Bultmann’s demythologization or existential interpretation of Scripture. Bayer 2007, pp. 161–168. 70 . ‘Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft,’ in Handschriftlicher Nachlaß, Ak 23:95; Wimmer 1990, p. 94; Firestone and Jacobs 2008, p. 197. 71 . PP 8:367. 72 . Palmquist 1992, p. 133. 73 . CF 7:47, 50, 65; R 6:111f.; LE 27:313; Wimmer 1990, pp. 168f. Rather than criticizing the content of religion, The Metaphysics of Morals demands that religion be moral in form . The material aspect of religion can contain duties that are known only through experience since religion is purely moral in form only. MM 6:487; cf. Hare 2002, p. 45; Despland 1973, p. 245 referencing Troeltsch 1904, p. 40. 74 . R 6:103, 115; Rossi and Wreen 1991, p. xi; Wood 1991, p. 3. 75 . R 6:192, cf. 157f. 76 . R 6:65; cf. CPJ 5:351–353; A137–147 / B176–187. 77 . CPR 5:68. 78 . Redding 2009, pp. 96f. referencing CPR 5:68; MM6:468; CPJ §59. 79 . CPJ 5:351–354. For this theme in Kierkegaard, see Tjønneland 2004, pp. 84–95. 80 . Redding 2009, p. 102. Michalson (2010, p. 67) writes: ‘The schematism of analogy provides Kant with a means of “representing” what otherwise remains purely rational and non-empirical, enabling us to “make supersensible characteristics comprehensible to us” without actually moving “outside” the “boundaries of mere reason” (R 6: 65n.). Kant’s chief example is Jesus, understood as the “personified idea of the good principle” – that is, the historical embodiment of a moral disposition wholly pleasing to God (R 6: 60).’ Cf. Collins 1967, p. 164. 81 . Bubbio 2012, p. 694. Similarly, Louden (2002, pp. 126f.) argues that Kant points to the need of human understanding for images ( Bilder ) and symbols found in visible churches and historical faiths. 282 Notes

82 . Byrne 2007, pp. 69–75. 83 . CF 7:9. 84 . C 11:76. 85 . CF 7:37, cf. 68f. 86 . LPDR 28:1118f. 87 . Wood 1999, pp. 56f. referencing A1 / B1. 88 . Kant criticizes temporal revelation, but tends to overlook claims about extratemporal revelations. Lübcke (2006, pp. 406f.) says that in Kant ‘the a posteriori is identified with the empirical, while the possibility of a revelation qua non-empirical a posteriori experience is not even considered ... . Just as Kant, in his theoretical philosophy, differentiated between das Ding an sich and the intersubjective world of appearances governed by transcendental synthetic a priori universal principles, the religious person distin- guish between God’s will and the intersubjective ethical world governed by ethical principles. And just as Kant, in his theoretical philosophy, criti- cised the tendency to use transcendental principles on das Ding an sich, the religious person now denies that one has a right to use ethical principles to judge God’s will.’ However, Mynster and Martensen ‘assume the existence of exactly that kind on non-empirical a posteriori access to das Ding an sich , which is excluded by Kant’s transcendental idealism and Hegel’s absolute idealism. In this way, they are in agreement with the religious person discussed by Johannes de silentio. But in strict opposition to him, they do not look upon revelation as something absurd or paradoxal ’ (Lübcke 2006, p. 408). 89 . See Chapters 2, 4, 6, and 11. 90 . SKS 23, 143, NB16:70 / JP 2, 2239, cf. SKS K23, 231f.; Green 1992, pp. 10f. As we will see in Chapter 11, the passage that Kierkegaard quotes also occurs in Towards Perpetual Peace, although Kierkegaard’s source appears to be Conflict of the Faculties . 91 . Green 2007, pp. 182f.; Green 1994, pp. 173–175. 92 . CF 7:37; SKS 4, 230ff. / PF, 23ff.; Green 1992, p. 118. 93 . Tjønneland 2004, pp. 84–96. 94 . The distinctiveness of Kierkegaard’s whole thought has been said to be determined by this tension between visible symbols and images on the one hand and transcendent ideas and ideals on the other (Pattison 2002, pp. 122–133). Winkel Holm (1998, pp. 135–137, pp. 319f.) takes Kierkegaard to rely on Kantian aesthetics, particularly the capacity of productive imagination. 95 . R 6:12f.; cf. ‘Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft,’ Ak 23:95. 96 . R 6:135. 97 . Louden (2002, pp. 129f.) quoting Wood (1970, p. 196) at the end. 98 . Wood 1991, p. 4; Louden 2002, p. 128 99 . Bonaunet 2004, p. 36. 100 . R 6:103, 115; Rossi and Wreen 1991, p. xi; Wood 1991, p. 3. 101 . Baumgartner 1992, pp. 162f.; Despland 1973, p. 219, cf. p. 226. 102 . Wood 1999, pp. 135–139, chapter 9 and p. 334. See also Chapter 2, Section 7 in the present monograph. 103 . R 6:94. 104 . R 6:192, cf. 157f., 195. 105 . Hare 2002, pp. 264f. Notes 283

106 . Rossi 2005, pp. 3–9 and chapters 4–5. 107 . R 6:109. 108 . R 6:158, cf. 159, 125. 109 . ‘Vorarbeiten zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft,’ Ak 23:108 translated in Despland 1973, p. 199. 110 . R 6:82f. 111 . Michalson 1990, p. 121 referencing R 6:82f.; cf. Despland 1973, pp. 198f.; Marina 1997, pp. 395–398. 112 . Byrne 2007, p. 159 referencing R 6:82. Byrne (2007, p. 159) adds that ‘This is one of the ways in which Kant attempts to rebuild bridges between the a priori truths of true religion and the contingent and historical features of ecclesiastical faith.’ Despland (1973, pp. 199–201) writes: ‘[T]the example of Jesus is significant because it does assure us that the archetype is realizable in this life and thus a crucial and perhaps decisive kind of encouragement ... . [It] open[s] the prospect of a permissible influence of his [Jesu] disposition upon ours, thus departing from the usual picture of morally undertaken active imitation on our part. The same point reappeared the next year at the end of ... The End of All Things (1794) where Christianity is ... worthy of love and elicits in us love as “the free reception [ Aufnahme ] of the will of another person into one’s maxim” [EAT 8:338]. Such longing salvific influence in this case does not appear to be heteronomy ... Kant ... moved beyond the scheme of deism: Jesus gained a victory over evil, he exercised a decisive historical influence and he still exercises an influence on us.’ Despland (1973, p. 201) suggests that this makes Kant’s theory unstable, stressing the problem of how a conversion, as an eternal decision in time, is possible within Kant’s framework. As we have seen in Chapters 2–3, this problem is also central to Kierkegaard. 113 . Except Michalson 1990. 114 . Notably Green 2007, pp. 190–192. 115 . Michalson 1990, pp. 129f. 116 . See Chapter 2. 117 . Allison 1995, p. 170. 118 . See Chapters 6–7 of the present monograph and Green 2007, pp. 181–192. 119 . Hare (2009, p. 135) says that Kant does not tell us whether he believed in the historical resurrection of Christ. Kant says that we cannot draw anything practical from the mystery of the incarnation (CF 7:39). See Quinn 2006, pp. 264f. 120 . SKS 20, 69, NB:79 / JP 3, 2461; SKS 21, 285, NB10:55 / JP 4, 4018. 121 . See Chapter 7. 122 . SKS 9, 373 / WL, 380. My italics. 123 . Kim 2009, pp. 87–107. 124 . Cf. Kim 2009, p. 83 and pp. 101–107. See also Evans 2006a, p. 211. 125 . See Chapter 7. 126 . Regarding Kant, see Section 7; Kain 2005, p. 131; Wood 2000, p. 500. 127 . Cf. Knappe 2004, chapter 3. 128 . R 6:155f. 129 . R 6:155f., cf. C 11:321. 130 . Byrne 2007, pp. 154–169; cf. Palmquist 1992, p. 137. 131 . Cf. SKS 10, 199 / CD 189; SKS 15, 110, 221–225 / BA, 24f. 132 . CPJ 5:469. 284 Notes

133 . Referring to Kant’s interpretation of the kingdom of God as the church, Barth (1959, p. 175) says that Kant gives a picture of the Christian conception of the church which shows no lack of careful study. Barth (1959, p. 189) concludes that Kant’s conception of religion seems to show a ‘strong relationship to the “statute” of the positively historical, the Christian religion’. 134 . CPR 5:86; cf. CPJ 5:471f. Cf. Forschner 1992, pp. 85ff. 135 . R 6:31. Wood (forthcoming) argues Kant wrote for an audience of Christians who accepted the doctrine original sin when he introduced the doctrine of radical evil. 136 . LPDR 28:1123. Similarly, Kierkegaard (Haufniensis) claims that Greek ethics always contain an aesthetic element. Referencing Aristotle, he says that for the Greeks virtue is not sufficient, since earthly goods are also needed (SKS 4, 324 / CA, 16f.). Elsewhere, Kierkegaard follows the Church Fathers in describing pagan virtues as ‘glittering vices’ (SKS 9, 60 / WL, 53; SKS K9, 136; Puchniak 2008, p. 13). This suggests that both Kant and Kierkegaard saw Greek ethics as eudaimonistic and Christian ethics as anti-eudaimonistic. 137 . Stern 2012, p. 244. 138 . LE 29:604. 139 . Forschner 1992, pp. 85ff.; Beiser 2006, pp. 590–604 and pp. 625f. 140 . CPR 5:129. 141 . Cf. R 6:158. 142 . CF 7:44, cf. 61, 63–65. 143 . C 11:10; Despland 1973, pp. 221f. 144 . Recently, Habermas (2005, chapters 5 and 8) has tried to develop some of Kant’s approach further. See Fremstedal 2009. 145 . R 6:107; PP 8:367. 146 . Wood 1970, p. 200; Louden 2002, p. 130. 147 . RA 15:789, Reflexion 1501, translated in Louden 2002, p. 130. 148 . R 6:167; cf. 193f. 149 . R 6:124. 150 . R 6:125. 151 . EAT 8:339. Cf. Louden 2002, pp. 129–132. 152 . R 6:51f., cf. 157–163. 153 . CF 7:9. See also C 11:429, C 10:180, CF 7:44. 154 . CF 7:6. 155 . Wimmer (1990, p. 92) says that Religion investigates whether the concepts of religion and belief in Critique of Practical Reason can be found in Christianity. 156 . Despland 1973, p. 240; cf. Troeltsch 1904. 157 . Wimmer 1990, p. 93. 158 . Collins 1967, pp. 164f. Kant was important in establishing philosophy of religion as a philosophical discipline. See Rossi (2011), especially the supplement section ‘The Influence of Kant’s Philosophy of Religion’. 159 . Despland 1973, p. 244. Despland (1973, p. 226) follows Troeltsch (1904) in arguing that Kant’s turn to history anticipates 19th-century theology. 160 . Despland 1973, pp. 223–225; Yovel 1979, pp. 271–280. 161 . Habermas 2005, pp. 236f. 162 . Kleingeld 1999, pp. 62f. 163 . Dorrien 2012, chapters 1–2, 5–6, and 8–9. Notes 285

9 Religious Hope: Moral Agency and the Expectancy of the Good

1 . Eliott (ed.) 2005; Pettit 2004, p. 152; McGeer 2004, p. 101. 2 . However, there are several minor studies of Kant’s account of hope (e.g., Rossi referenced below). 3 . Grøn 1997, pp. 74–78 and chapter 3. 4 . SKS 11, 133f., 153 / SUD, 18, 37f.; Grøn 1997, p. 151; cf. Hannay 2006, p. 142. 5 . Note that hope can concern both the future and the past . For instance, it gives meaning to say ‘I hope you did well at your exam yesterday.’ This suggests that (specific) hopes can refer to a past event if the outcome is uncertain . Cf. Muyskens 1979, pp. 15f.; Spinoza 1996, p. 106 (IIID12). 6 . SKS 9, 249 / WL, 249. 7 . SKS 10, 117–124 / CD, 106–113. Cf. SKS 11, 153f. / SUD, 38f. 8 . SKS 10, 117–124 / CD, 106–113. Cf. Muyskens 1979, pp. 15–17. 9 . SKS 8, 214ff. / UD, 112ff. 10 . SKS 13, 99, 103f. / FSE, 77, 82f. 11 . This is a standard distinction in literature on hope (especially in medicine and nursing studies) that may help us assess whether hopes are justifiable. It is commonplace to demand that hopes must be realistic, but there is little agreement about which hopes are realistic and therefore justified. Cf. Kylmä and Vehviläinen-Julkunen 1997, pp. 364–371. 12 . Pap. VI B 53, 13 / JP 2, 1668. 13 . Cf. SKS 2, 55ff. / EO1, 47ff.; SKS 17, 117, BB:25 / JP 4, 4398. 14 . Cf. SKS 7, 483 / CUP1, 531. The Hongs translate ‘Forstandighet ’ as ‘common sense.’ 15 . Cf. SKS 5, 100f. / EUD, 94f. 16 . Cf. SKS 9, 258 / WL, 258f. 17 . SKS 9, 252, 261 / WL, 252, 262. See also Chapter 2 of the present monograph. 18 . SKS 10, 117–124 / CD, 106–113. 19 . SKS 10, 124 / CD, 113. 20 . Grøn 1997, pp. 143–153. 21 . SKS 5, 250–268 / EUD, 253–273. 22 . Cf. SKS 9, 261, 252 / WL, 262, 252. 23 . See Chapter 5. 24 . Regarding Christian theology, see Link 1974, p. 1160; Moltmann 2002, pp. 202–209 and pp. 309–316. 25 . Moltmann tries to show that although the Christian tradition stresses human sinfulness and guilt, this is not the only issue at stake. Moltmann (2004, pp. 53–61) stresses that there must be justice for victims and that this concern is found in the Christian tradition. This certainly seems plausible if we include the discussion over theodicy. Finally, Moltmann (2002, pp. 206f. and pp. 309ff.) stresses that we must hope for the kingdom of God. 26 . SKS 5, 247 / EUD, 249; SKS 5, 427 / TD, 52; SKS 21, 99, NB7:47 / JP 4, 4855; SKS 21, 116, NB7:75 / JP 4, 4370. 27 . SKS 13, 102–104 / FSE, 81–83. Cf. SKS 5, 100f. / EUD, 94f. 28 . Cf. SKS 9, 261, 252 / WL, 262, 252. 286 Notes

29 . Verstrynge 2004, p. 492 referencing SUD, 71. 30 . SKS 21, 116f., NB7:75 / JP 4, 4370. 31 . Cf. SKS 4, 113 / FT, 16f. 32 . SKS 5, 427 / TD, 52. 33 . SKS 5, 247 / EUD, 249. 34 . SKS 10, 121f. / CD, 110f. 35 . SKS 10, 121–123 / CD, 110–112. Cf. SKS 8, 214ff. / UD, 112ff. 36 . SKS 13, 102–104 / FSE, 81–83. Cf. SKS 5, 100f. / EUD, 94f. 37 . Pap. VI B 53, 13 / JP 2, 1668. 38 . SKS 8, 372f. / UD, 276f. 39 . SKS 8, 373 / UD, 277. 40 . SKS 8, 373 / UD, 277. 41 . Cf. SKS 8, 372f. / UD, 276f. 42 . SKS 3, 141 / EO2, 143. 43 . CUP1, 389 / SKS 7, 355; SKS 8, 329 / UD, 228. 44 . Cf. Roberts 2003, pp. 192f. and pp. 200f. 45 . A804f. / B832f.; bold characters removed. 46 . O’Neill 1997, p. 293, cf. pp. 284–288 and p. 303. Cf. O’Neill 1992, pp. 104f. 47 . A804f. / B832f.; cf. Kant 1992, p. 635. 48 . ‘What am I entitled to hope’ is suggested by Yovel 1979, p. 59. 49 . A809 / B837. 50 . A805 / B833. 51 . A808f. / B836f. 52 . R 6:67f., 117f., 139f., 144f., 201f. 53 . Cf. Kleingeld 1995, p. 100. 54 . E.g., LE 29:627f.; R 6:115f. 55 . LL 9:25; C 11:429; LA 25:1198; LM 28:533f. 56 . However, scholarship has tended to overlook the central role of hope in Kant’s theory. O’Neill (1997, p. 281 and p. 283) offers the following explana- tion: ‘It is easy to miss the central place that hope has in Kant’s philosophy, and in particular in his philosophy of religion, because his discussion of religion often focuses on faith rather than on hope . ... Kant ... interprets religious trust or commitment fundamentally as a mode of hope: religious faith cannot be a matter of knowledge, and must be a matter of taking a hopeful view of human destiny’ (Cf. Muyskens 1979, p. xi.). The focus on faith rather than hope could also be due to the interests of Kant commentators as well as philosophers in general. 57 . Rossi (1982, p. 230) says this ‘insofar as (1) It [hope] has a foundation in reason through freedom; (2) It has a proper form – expectation – for repre- sentations of reason’s interests in totality and its unconditioned ground; and (3) It has objects – the highest good, God and immortality – appropriate to its form of representation.’ 58 . O’Neill 1997, p. 292; cf. Norheim 2004, pp. 117–120. 59 . O’Neill 1997, p. 287. 60 . Rossi 1983, pp. 91f.; cf. Rossi 1982, p. 235. 61 . Cf. CPR 5:108; Ricoeur 1974, p. 416. 62 . CPR 5:107–148. 63 . Cf. Ricoeur 1974, p. 415. Notes 287

64 . R 6:7. 65 . R 6:4. 66 . Muchnik 2010, p. 135. 67 . Regarding the latter, see Caswell 2006a, p. 190; Marina 2000, p. 346. 68 . R 6:5. 69 . Regarding the latter, see Denis 2003, p. 200. 70 . O’Neill 1997, p. 282 (first half of quote, referencing A807f. / B836f.; CPJ 5:470, 472) and pp. 287f. (second half, commenting on TP 8:309). 71 . See Chapters 2–6 and Marina 2000, p. 350. 72 . MM 6:482; cf. CPR 5:130; CPJ 5:469f.; Guyer 2000, pp. 345–371. 73 . Marina 2000, p. 351. 74 . EAT 8:337. 75 . See the end of Chapter 4 (Section 5). 76 . Kleingeld 1999, p. 74 referencing I 8:30; cf. McCloughan 2003, pp. 65f. 77 . Kleingeld 2006, p. 490. 78 . MM 6:355. 79 . Guyer 2000, pp. 335f. Rossi (2005, pp. 89–93) argues convincingly that perpetual peace is a precondition for the ethical commonwealth (rather than the other way around). 80 . MM 6:354f. Cf. PP 8:386. 81 . CF 7:88. McCloughan (2003, pp. 124ff.) argues convincingly that Kant discusses moral progress in this text, not just republicanism and the French revolution. However, Kant also refers to the ‘final end of creation’ here (CF 7:89), something that is a reference to the highest good. 82 . LP 9:444. 83 . CF 7:83–85. 84 . TP 8:309f. Shortly before this Kant argues from advances in culture to the assumption of moral progress (TP 8:308f.), referencing both morality and the highest good (our ‘final destination [endlichen Bestimmung]’; TP 8:308–310, 312). 85 . TP 8:309f.; MM 6:354. 86 . Wood 2002, p. 91; cf. I 8:30f. 87 . CF 7:83. 88 . I 8:30. 89 . McCloughan (2003, pp. 65f.) goes on to quote a passage supporting this interpretation (I 8:30, Paragraph 9). See also Kleingeld 1999, p. 74. 90 . D 2:349f. 91 . LL 24:158f. 92 . D 2:350, 373. 93 . CPR 5:143. Cf. CPR 5:121; LE 27:321, 727, 718, 549f.; O 8:137–139. Cf. Chapter 6, Section 6 of the present monograph. 94 . Cf. CPR 5:132, 145f., 142f., 125, 121; O 8:137–139. 95 . R 6:117f., cf. 171f.; PP 8:386. 96 . R 6:123. 97 . Cf. CPJ 5:396; PP 8:380; Beiser 2006, pp. 618f. 98 . Cf. Kleingeld 1999, pp. 73f. and 2001, pp. 216f.; McCloughan 2003, p. 117, cf. pp. 114–116. 99 . Cf. Wood 1970, p. 8 and pp. 158ff., cf. p. 250 and pp. 148f. 288 Notes

100 . Cf. A327 / B384. 101 . Cf. R 6:123; A327–329 / B383–386; A644f. / B672f. 102 . RA 15:541, Reflexion 1230; cf. RA 15:526, Reflexion 1191; R 6:20, 68. 103 . Nevertheless, Kant himself may have been inclined to believe that we have been making moral progress historically. Kleingeld 1999, p. 60 and p. 70 and 2006, pp. 490f. 104 . Wood 1970, p. 160. Although Wood focuses on moral faith rather than hope, this point can be extended to cover hope. 105 . R 6:144f. 106 . Adorno 1998, vol. 6, p. 378. 107 . Cf. Descartes 1999–2005, vol. 1, pp. 350f. and p. 389 (XI:375, 456, 459); Hume 1978, pp. 439–444. 108 . Cf. McGeer 2008, pp. 237–254. 109 . A similar point about hope is made in Moltmann 2002, pp. 3f. 110 . Cf. O’Neill 1997, p. 284. The views of Kant and Kierkegaard on the importance of hope for moral agency are confluent with much of the recent literature on hope. Cf. McGeer 2008, pp. 244–246; McGeer 2004, p. 103; Tillich 1990, pp. 1064–1067. 111 . TP 8:307f. 112 . CF 7:81f. 113 . TP 8:308–310, 312; Kleingeld 1999, pp. 73f. and 2001, pp. 216f.; McCloughan 2003, p. 117, cf. pp 114–116. 114 . McCloughan 2003, p. 110. 115 . Kleingeld 2001, pp. 211f., cf. p. 216. 116 . MM 6:354f. 117 . MM 6:354f. This point can probably be extended to include progress towards the highest good in general, suggesting that our very freedom is closely tied to our ability to hope. 118 . SKS 11, 133f. / SUD, 18. The Hongs render ‘sidste Haab ’ ‘ultimate hope.’ 119 . Grøn 1997, pp. 133–135. 120 . Hannay 2006, p. 143. Cf. Pinkard 2010, p. 352. 121 . ‘Essay on the Maladies of the Head,’ in Anthr opology, History, and Education , Ak 2:268. 122 . Cf. LPDR 28:1076; I 8:30; R 6:71; A 7:258f. 123 . Similar points about hope (but not Kant and Kierkegaard) are made in Marcel 1951, pp. 38f.; Moltmann 2004, p. 153. 124 . Cf. Rossi 1983, p. 100. O’Neill (1997, pp. 306f.) goes a step further by suggesting that if there are shared duties, then our (shared) hopes will have to be connected to shared activities and institutional structures. This suggests that in this world religious, social, and political hopes must be closely connected. 125 . See Chapter 5. 126 . Cf. SKS 9, 253–256 / WL, 254–256. 127 . Regarding this dependency, see Søltoft 2000, chapter 8; Grøn 1997, chapter 5. 128 . SKS 9, 253–256 / WL, 254–256. 129 . SKS 9, 253f., 248 / WL, 253f., 248. Cf. SKS 5,127 / EUD, 122. 130 . SKS 9, 259 / WL, 260. 131 . SKS 9, 248 / WL, 248. Notes 289

132 . The type of love that hope depends on is commanded love. Kierkegaard writes: ‘Only when it is a duty to love, only then is love ... eternally and happily secured against despair’ (SKS 9, 36 / WL, 29). 133 . Cf. Denis 2005, p. 54. 134 . SKS 9, 248, 253f. / WL, 248, 253f. 135 . A similar conclusion is reached in Roberts 2003, p. 195. 136 . Kierkegaard’s views at this central point converge with much of the recent literature on trust and some of the recent literature on hope. Regarding recent literature on trust: McGeer 2008; regarding recent literature on hope: Pettit 2004, pp. 163–165. 137 . SKS 9, 23f. / WL, 16. 138 . Cf. Søltoft 2000, chapter 8; Furtak 2005, pp. 124f. 139 . Logic Nachlaß , Ak 16:509, Reflexion 2783. 140 . LL 24:246; Logic Nachlaß , Ak 16:499, Reflexion 2755. 141 . SKS 9, 256 / WL, 257; cf. SKS 9, 31 / WL, 23. 142 . Cf. LPDR 28:1072, 1116f.; LE 27:313. 143 . SKS 9, 31 / WL, 23; Welz 2008, p. 163. 144 . Kierkegaard’s (Anti-Climacus’) claim that sin or despair is opposed to faith appears to take faith in a wide sense which includes hope (and probably also love). When opposing faith to despair, he refers to Paul’s letter to the Romans, a letter which has been interpreted as taking faith in exactly this wide sense (SKS 11, 195f. / SUD, 81; SKS K11, 215). Cf. Green 1973, p. 74. Basically the same point is made by authors such as Peter Kreeft. 145 . Such attempts are interesting in their own right, but dealing with these lies outside the scope of this chapter. See however Rahner 1975, pp. 224–239. 146 . Cf. Rossi 1982; Beiser 2006, pp. 618–620. 147 . Cf. Puchniak 2008, p. 14. 148 . Regarding the latter, see SKS 8, 329 / UD, 228; SKS 7,355 / CUP1, 389. 149 . Green 1973, p. 72. A newer representative of this view is O’Donovan (1986, p. 253), who writes: ‘When we hope, we begin from the problematic character of the present, from its ambiguity and unsatisfying incompleteness, and turn gratefully to the future judgement of God which perfects the imperfections of the present and promises completion. In faith we move in the opposite direction. Beginning from the final judgement with its affirmation of man’s created life and love, we turn gratefully back to the present.’ 150 . See Chapter 2. 151 . Evans 2006b, p. 61. 152 . See Chapters 6–8. 153 . Muyskens (1979, p. 17) distinguishes hoping from wishing as follows: ‘(1) One can wish (counterfactually) that he had not taken a particular job or that he had chosen a different profession. But, logically, one cannot hope counterfactually . ... Hoping has a possibility condition that wishing does not have. (2) Hoping has a closer relation to action or dispositions to act than does wishing. The person who hopes that p acts as if p were true . ... An inclination to act as if one believed that p is not entailed by wishing that p (since one may wish counterfactually). (3) If hoping and wishing are both analyzed in terms of desire, wishing covers a much larger range than hoping. One can wish for things that he would not desire on balance. Yet one does 290 Notes

not hope for such things.’ It might be added that, contrary to what one wishes for, what one hopes for is the object of the overriding desire. 154 . Cf. Green 1973, p. 72. 155 . Cf. LE 27:727, 320f., 317f.; R 6:68; CPR 5:127–129. 156 . Norheim (2004, p. 119) says that faith as trust or confidence is included in Kant’s reasoned hope. However, Wimmer (1990, p. 67) says that hope, as something that cannot be given up, is supported by faith in God’s existence (otherwise it would be unfounded). Norheim suggests that hopefulness includes trusting God, whereas Wimmer suggests that hopefulness is supported by assent to doctrine (belief in God’s existence). See also Yovel 1979, pp. 107f. 157 . Davenport (2008a) describes faith in Fear and Trembling in terms of hope, something the book itself tends to do (e.g., Abraham is said to be great by the hope whose form is madness). Davenport describes faith in terms of trust in the hereafter or as being committed to hope for eschatological redemption (p. 233). Faith is said to consist of the conviction that God’s revealed promise will be fulfilled. Faith, as the highest good, is a kind of ‘expectancy’ (p. 199) or hopeful trust in the final vindication of ethical goodness by divine power and intervention (p. 200). 158 . Fendt 1990, p. 168. 159 . Kierkegaard references Kant’s question ‘What may I hope?’ (SKS 19, 140, Not 4:11 / KJN 3, 139, 539; SKS K19, 198f.). But it is not clear that Kierkegaard was familiar with the central role this question plays in Kant’s critical philosophy or Kant’s ambitious attempt to answer it (although Kierkegaard was familiar with Kant’s related views on religious faith). It seems that Kierkegaard’s account of hope hardly responds directly to Kant’s, although there is some important overlap between their accounts. This overlap is a result of their belonging to a common Christian tradition rather than Kierkegaard following Kant. Although Kierkegaard was familiar with the question ‘What may I hope?’ in Kant, it is not clear that he had knowledge of Kant’s account of hope. Kierkegaard developed a Christian account of hope which involves some distinctly Lutheran elements, notably a radical notion of hope against hope. The very fact that both Kant and Kierkegaard see religion as something which concerns hopefulness is quite typical of the Judeo-Christian tradition (cf. Moltmann 2004, p. 87 and 2002, pp. 82–89). This is especially clear in the case of Kierkegaard since he so strongly stresses the Pauline notion of hope against hope. Cf. SKS 19, 140, Not 4:11 / KJN 3, 139, 539; SKS K19, 198f. Kierkegaard also owned secondary sources dealing with Kant’s account of hope. See Ast 1807, p. 453 (ASKB 385).

10 Religion and Metaethics: Divine Commands and Autonomy as the Source of Moral Obligations

1 . Except Stern 2012. This chapter partially includes different material than Stern does and partially gives a different interpretation of Kant and Kierkegaard. 2 . G 4:421, cf. 402; original emphasis. 3 . Hare 2002, pp. 10f. and p. 151. 4 . Cf. SKS 8, 139f. / UD, 24. Notes 291

5 . Knappe (2004, pp. 77–86) shows that the ethical is identified with the universal in Fear and Trembling , claiming that this implies a Kantian conception of ethics and rationality. But Knappe is aware that it could also refer to Hegel’s ‘concrete universal’ (not to mention Fichte). Cf. Lippitt 2003, pp. 82–89 and pp. 142–145; Irwin 2011, vol. 3, pp. 304–309. 6 . SKS 3, 248–251, 276f., 285 / EO2, 261–264, 292f., 302. 7 . Green 1992, pp. 94ff.; Baeumler 1925, pp. 185f. 8 . Cf. Manis 2006, pp. 148–158. 9 . Evans 2006a, p. 15. 10 . SKS 8, 85 / TA, 67. 11 . Brandes 1877, p. 186; Adorno 1998, vol. 2, pp. 147ff. 12 . Schmitt 1934, p. 22; Fremstedal 2006c, pp. 103f. 13 . Cf. Buber 2002, p. 46, p. 60, pp. 64ff.; Hannay 2006, pp. 94–104. 14 . Cf. Manis 2006, pp. 148–158. 15 . Evans 2006a, p. 15 and p. 24; Hare 2002, pp. 152f., pp. 200–204 and p. 218. 16 . Brandes (1877, p. 186) takes Kierkegaard to endorse Abraham in Fear and Trembling , something Søltoft (2000, pp. 209–218) denies. 17 . Cf. Baeumler 1925, pp. 185f.; Green 1992, pp. 94ff. However, Benbassat (2012, p. 71) goes to the other extreme by suggesting that even Kierkegaard’s ethical stage involves moral particularism. 18 . Stern 2012, pp. 16f. 19 . SKS 23, 45, NB 15:66 / JP 1, 188. 20 . SKS 8, 389f. / UD, 294f. 21 . SKS 23, 45, NB 15:66 / JP 1, 188. 22 . SKS 23, 45, NB 15:66 / JP 1, 188. 23 . Stern (2012, p. 13) discusses this problem independently of Kierkegaard, quoting Larmore (2008, p. 44): ‘when we do impose principles on ourselves, we presumably do so for reasons . ... Self-legislation ... is an activity that takes place in the light of reasons that we must antecedently recognize, and whose own authority we therefore do not institute but rather find ourselves called upon to acknowledge.’ 24 . Lübcke 2007, pp. 1–12. Kosch (2006, p. 209) thinks that this phenomenon indicates that the self is neither normative self-sufficient nor its own ontological basis (the latter seem seems to entail the former): ‘There does need to be something independent of the self and its activity from which norms can come, and this something must also be a plausible source of value, but something can fill those conditions without being the causal source of the agent’s existence . ... the theological voluntarist model is not the only one to fit the constraints, even though it is clearly the one that Kierkegaard has in mind. This account of the structure of the self, by making the self dependent and oriented towards an outside source of norms, makes structurally possible a genuine alternative: turning away from that source and turning towards it.’ 25 . Rudd (2012, pp. 91–95, pp. 112–116, and p. 141) defends robust or strong moral realism. 26 . Anscombe 1958, p. 2 and p. 11. 27 . Anscombe 1958, p. 2. 28 . Anscombe 1958, p. 1 and pp. 4f. 29 . Anscombe 1958, p. 5. 30 . Ameriks 2006, p. 48. 292 Notes

31 . See the selections from Novalis, F. Schlegel, and Schleiermacher in Beiser (ed.), 1996, pp. 55f., p. 132, pp. 155f., and pp. 174f. See also Pinkard (2010, pp. 59f., p. 115, p. 137, pp. 161–163, and pp. 187f.) about the ‘Kantian paradox’ of autonomy in Kant, Fichte, Schlegel, and Schelling. Cf. Wood 2014b, p. 6. 32 . Wood 2014c, p. 27 and p. 45. Cf. Kangas 2007, pp. 81–85; Lippitt 2003, pp. 85–88. 33 . SKS 10, 133 / CD, 122. 34 . SKS 23, 45, NB 15:66 / JP 1, 188. 35 . Evans 2006a, p. 15. 36 . Cf. Stern 2012, pp. 204–207 and pp. 215f. 37 . Regarding the former, see Kosch 2006, pp. 3–7, pp. 121–125, pp. 137–141, and pp. 169f. 38 . Cf. Allison 1995, p. 95 and pp. 133f. 39 . Kosch 2006, pp. 65–67, pp. 87f., pp. 169–173, and p. 179. 40 . MM 6: 417f., 438. 41 . MM 6:418. 42 . Cf. Chapter 5. 43 . Cf. SKS 12, 162 / PC, 158. 44 . Regarding Kant, see Winter 2010, p. 92. 45 . G 4:433f. 46 . Schneewind 1998, p. 510. 47 . Michalson 1999, p. 119. 48 . Regarding the latter, see G 4:434. 49 . MM 6:439. 50 . Formosa 2013, p. 170; Stern 2012, chapters 1–3; Galvin 2011, pp. 16–36; Bagnoli 2011, part 2 (Kantian Constructivism). 51 . Formosa 2013; Stern 2012. Formosa (2013, p. 170) characterizes an earlier work by Stern as realist, but Stern later stresses that Kant is not a realist all the way down, although Stern’s (2012, pp. 27–32 and p. 46) reading is still closer to realism than Formosa’s, particularly regarding the status of persons. 52 . Cf. Formosa 2013, pp. 172–174; Bagnoli 2011, part 2.2 (Procedural Realism) and part 4 (Humean Constructivism). 53 . G 4:432. 54 . A310–320 / B366–377. 55 . A318f. / B375. 56 . Wood 2014b, p. 6 referencing MM 6:417f. 57 . Wood 2014c, pp. 10f. 58 . Wood 1999, p. 157 and pp. 374f. referencing Boyd 1988, pp. 181–228. 59 . Kosch 2006, p. 23 referencing Wood 1999. 60 . Allison 2001, p. 602 referencing Korsgaard 2000, pp. 35–37. 61 . Formosa 2013, p. 172. 62 . Rudd 2012, p. 149; cf. Ameriks 2006, p. 48. 63 . Cf. Lübcke 1991, pp. 95–102; Jackson 1987, p. 77. 64 . Rudd 2012, chapters 4–6. 65 . Cf. Stern 2012, pp. 7ff.; Formosa 2013, p. 6. 66 . Formosa 2013, pp. 174f. 67 . G 4:428. 68 . Formosa 2013, p. 174. Stern (2012, pp. 27–32 and p. 46) argues that there are good textual grounds for attributing realism about rational nature (‘value realism’) to Kant. Stern (2012, pp. 28f.) thinks that the worth of persons Notes 293

underlies the categorical imperative, giving it content and explaining our commitment to it. Formosa, however, rejects that the value of persons is independent of the moral law, although he still thinks that the content and authority of the moral law is laid out independently of actual acts of willing by those bound by the law. Formosa (2013, pp. 184f., cf. pp. 190f.) argues that ‘human dignity is not an independently preceding value that grounds the categorical imperative but is rather a value that is contained in the rational demand that we act only on universal valid laws . ... we start with a conception of practical rationality, show that a conception of the absolute worth of persons is built into these rational requirements, and then derive reasons (in the case of the obligatory) and test whether other considerations can count as reasons (on the case of the permissible) by drawing on this standard of rationality.’ 69 . Stern 2012, p. 90. 70 . Serck-Hanssen 2005, pp. 77–94. 71 . Regarding Kant, see Hare 2001, p. 11. Stern (2012, p. 218 referencing WL, 375) writes that ‘just as Kant’s conception of the holy will opens up a perspective from which the moral demand no longer appears to the agent as a demand, so John’s words [“Beloved, let us love one another”] indicate [for Kierkegaard] a similar relation to God, who would no longer have to require love of us; but this is a position we can hardly hope to reach’. 72 . Stern 2012, p. 90. 73 . LE 27:283. 74 . MM 6:227. 75 . ‘Moral Mrongovius II,’ Ak 29:633 translated in Kain 2004, p. 283. Cf. LE 27:544. 76 . Kain 2004, p. 276 and p. 284. 77 . Hare 2000, pp. 461f. and pp. 473f.; Kain 2005, p. 128; Winter 2010, pp. 92f. 78 . Hare 2001, p. 96. Cf. Kain 2004, p. 276. 79 . Hare 2001, p. 96. 80 . Formosa 2013, pp. 175–182; Stern 2012, p. 25 and p. 36. Wood (1999, pp. 46f. and pp. 111–115) holds that autonomy is based on dignity. 81 . Formosa 2013, p. 189; Kain 2004, p. 290. Formosa (2013, p. 189) comments: ‘The central assumption of this line of critique is that constructivism bases its fundamental account of normativity on contingent choice (Willkür ) and not on practical reason itself (Wille ). This critique does not, however, apply to the not “all the way down” constructivism defended here [though it applies to “at least some ‘all the way down’ constructivists”]. The adoption of law-like maxims and permissible ends is indeed the adoption of a positive law since its basis is a contingent act of willing (Willkür ). But the constitution itself of self-legislating being, that is, the categorical imperative, along with the practical laws and the objective ends which it grounds are not positive laws. Their basis is in practical reason (Wille ) and not a contingent act of willing (Willkür ). What we self-legislate is maxims, not the rational law of self-legislation itself . ... realist-sounding talk about the moral law being grounded in the “nature of practical reason” or “rational nature” means more or less the same thing as constructivist-sounding talk about the “constitution” or rational “construction procedure” of a self-legislating being.’ 82 . Formosa (2013, pp. 186f.) concludes that Kant is a ‘detectivist’ about uncon- ditional ends and a ‘projectivist’ about conditional ends. 294 Notes

83 . CPR 5:129; cf. CPJ 5:444–446; R 6:5–7, 98f., 139–141, 152–155; A814; G 4:439; LE 27:308f.; MM 6:486ff. 84 . ‘Reflexionen zur Religionsphilosophie,’ Ak 19:643, Reflexion 8101, cf. MM 6:443f. Kant elsewhere says that we have duties regarding God (not towards God) but that these are merely passive, that is, they are duties determined through the power of choice of another. NF 19:232, Reflexion 7038. 85 . CPR 5:129; R 6:153. 86 . Wood 2000, p. 498. 87 . SKS 9, 145, 370 / WL, 143, 377; SKS 7, 144 / CUP1, 155. Like Paul, Kierkegaard holds that the requirements of the law are written in our heart and that our conscience also bears witness to it. SKS 5, 91 / EUD, 84. 88 . SKS 9, 145 / WL, 143. 89 . SKS 9, 370 / WL, 377. 90 . SKS 10, 232 / CD, 224. 91 . SKS 25, 186, NB27:72 / JP 3, 2823. 92 . Evans 2006a, p. 88 referencing CUP1, 244, cf. SKS 7, 222f. 93 . Verheyden (2000, pp. 165ff.) argues that there is a long tradition of over two and a half centuries prior to Kant and Kierkegaard that emphasizes that God is encountered inwardly in moral experience. 94 . R 6:105. 95 . Kain 2005, p. 131; Wood 2000, p. 500. 96 . MM 6:487. See also Chapter 8 of the present monograph. 97 . Wood 2000, p. 501. 98 . MM 6:438f. 99 . LE 27:306–309, cf. 277f., 297. 100 . Kain 2005, p. 148 and p. 139, respectively. Kain criticizes the social interpretation of divine commands in Wood 2000. Kain concedes that his interpretation is insufficient for assessing the contemporary significance of Kant’s theory of divine commands. 101 . ‘Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie,’ Ak 19:300, Reflexion 7272; ‘Moral Mrongovius II,’ Ak 29:634f. 102 . See Chapter 6. 103 . Cf. Stern 2012, p. 34 and p. 62. 104 . Firestone and Jacobs 2008, p. 196. 105 . LE 27:277f., 308f., 312; cf. 530f., LM 29:777; ‘Moral Mrongovius II,’ Ak 29:634f. Denis (2005, p. 54) comments: ‘The passages that portray belief in the highest good as ... motivational supplement ... acknowledge that because of radical evil, humans are susceptible to temptation by their inclinations. Moreover, Kant’s suggestion that we should cultivate “further incentives” to right action does not conflict with his view that we have a duty to foster purity of moral motivation; rather it recognizes the usefulness of a variety of springs as tools in the struggle towards moral perfection.’ 106 . SKS 19, 141, Not4:12 / KJN 3, 141. 107 . SKS 4, 160 / FT, 68. 108 . SKS 4, 160 / FT, 68. 109 . Fahrenbach 1968, p. 124. Green (2011, p. 8) claims that ‘the characteriza- tion of the ethical, as the supreme telos and as involving no duties to God, involves ideas almost uniquely associated with Kant.’ 110 . FT, 348f. (Hongs’ note); Rapic 2007, pp. 234f.; Knappe 2004, pp. 80f. Notes 295

111 . Rapic 2007, p. 235. Cf. Green 2011, p. 8. 112 . MM 6:241; cf. LE 27:709; CPR 5:83. 113 . However, different variants of divine command theory differ on how moral obligations depend on divine commands. Manis 2006, chapter 3; Evans 2006a, p. 3 and pp. 119f.; Quinn 2006, chapters 2–3. 114 . Quinn (1996, pp. 29–44 and 2006, pp. 65–68 and pp. 82–91), Evans (2006a, pp. 117f.), and Stern (2012, chapter 7) claim that Kierkegaard has a divine command theory of moral obligations, something that is denied by Ferreira (2001, pp. 40–42 and pp. 243f.), Roberts (2008, pp. 72–92 and pp. 256f.), and Manis (2006, chapter 3 and 2009, pp. 289–307). 115 . Or, if God (counterfactually) commands something, then it would be obligatory. Manis 2009, p. 290 and p. 300. 116 . Manis 2006, pp. 150f. Wyller (1999, p. 196) and Quinn (2006, pp. 60ff.) take Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac to mean that morality depends on God’s will, something Davenport (2008a, pp. 206ff.) denies follows from Fear and Trembling . 117 . Evans 2006a, pp. 122f.; Quinn 1996, p. 30 and pp. 42–44. 118 . Evans 2006a, p. 123. 119 . SKS 9, 28 / WL, 20. 120 . Manis 2006, p. 127. 121 . SKS 11,161, 163f. / SUD, 46, 48f. 122 . Cf. Quinn 1998, p. 374. 123 . SKS 23, 182f., NB17:28 / JP 6, 6597; Pap. X-6 B 68–B 82 / JP 6, 6598–6601; JP 1, 9–12. 124 . SKS 8, 151 / UD, 39. 125 . I am indebted to Manis (2006, chapter 3) here. 126 . Ferreira 2001, p. 41 127 . Manis 2006, pp. 137–141. 128 . SKS 9, 118 / WL, 115. 129 . SKS 9, 66f. / WL, 60. 130 . SKS 9, 94 / WL, 88f. 131 . SKS 9, 219ff. / WL, 216ff. 132 . Manis 2006, p. 140, p. 183, and p. 214. By contrast, Evans (2006a) maintains that we have only pre-moral obligations without divine commands. 133 . Manis 2006, pp. 148–158. 134 . R 6:153f.; cf. MM 6:438f. 135 . Cf. Davenport 2008a, p. 233. Manis (2006, p. 234) argues that God’s nature imposes restrictions on his actions. 136 . Evans 2006a, pp. 137f.; Manis 2006, pp. 137–141, pp. 170ff., p. 181, and pp. 186ff. 137 . Manis 2006, p. 183. Cf. Hare 2001, pp. 75f. 138 . Manis 2006, p. 181; Evans 2006a, p. 21 and p. 136; cf. Davenport 2008a, p. 199 and p. 207. 139 . SKS 11, 132 / SUD 16; SKS 20, 57f., NB:69 / JP 2, 1251. 140 . Stern 2012, pp. 222–229. 141 . Grøn 1997, p. 275; Evans 2006a, p. 26 and p. 151; Manis 2006, p. 229. 142 . SKS 9, 272 / WL, 274. 143 . SKS 9, 46 / WL, 38f. 144 . SKS 9, 46 / WL, 38. 296 Notes

145 . SKS K9, 130. 146 . See Chapter 5. 147 . Hare 2001, p. 115 and 2000, p. 471 and pp. 463f. 148 . Cf. SKS 8, 364, 151, 153 / UD, 268, 39, 41. 149 . Evans 2006a, pp. 122f.; Quinn 1996, p. 30 and pp. 42–44. 150 . Wyller 1999, p. 196. Cf. Wisdo 1987; Quinn 2006, pp. 67f.; Bloch 2007, p. 6. 151 . A818f. / B846f.; R 6:154, 185; LE 27:262; LP 9:450f. 152 . For an example of the latter type of position, see Hare 2000, p. 464. 153 . Evans 2006a, p. 3 and pp. 119f. Regarding supervenience, see Hare 2001, pp. 65–78. 154 . Cf. SKS 8, 364, 151, 153 / UD, 268, 39, 41; SKS 7, 133, 143 / CUP1, 142, 153f.; SKS 6, 439 / SLW, 476; SKS 4, 160 / FT, 68; Rudd 2012, pp. 45f. and p. 143; Evans 2006a, p. 88, p. 105, and p. 183. 155 . Wisdo 1987, p. 222. 156 . Wisdo 1987, pp. 222f. Wisdo merely says that Kierkegaard probably opts for the second alternative or that he suggests it. Wyller (1999, p. 196) and Quinn (2006, pp. 60f. and pp. 82ff.) also take Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac to suggest that God is the source of obligations. 157 . SKS 5, 49 / EUD, 41. 158 . SKS 5, 49f. / EUD, 41. 159 . See especially Bloch 2007; Stern 2012; Wisdo 1987. 160 . Cf. Bloch 2007, p. 3. 161 . Stern (2012, pp. 221f.) here refers to recent discussions of the Euthyphro dilemma showing that the dilemma has limited effectiveness, as it only really bites against radical, fully voluntarist versions of divine command theories. See also Manis 2006, pp. 148–158; Bloch 2007, pp. 6f.; Hare 2000, pp. 463–466. 162 . Regarding the goodness of creation, see SKS 18, 20, EE:43 / JP 2, 1313; SKS K18, 37. 163 . SKS 4, 251 / PF, 46f. 164 . Cf. Hare 2001, p. 11. See also Section 5 of the present chapter and Chapter 2. 165 . Cf. SKS 8, 364 / UD, 268. 166 . SKS 9, 161 / WL, 160. 167 . Evans 2006a, p. 103, pp. 110f., pp. 146ff., and p. 161. See also Irwin 2011, vol. 3, pp. 313–324; Stern 2012, p. 223.

11 Closing Discussion: Overlap and Influence

1 . See the extensive bibliography in Green 2007, pp. 196–210. 2 . Cf. Green 1992, p. 207; Knappe 2004, pp. 2f. 3 . Westphal (1993, p. 390) comments that ‘themes that Kierkegaard may have read in Kant are often not distinctively Kantian and were available to him from other sources as well, especially the pietistic Lutheranism to which both he and Kant were heirs and the larger Augustinian tradition to which it belonged.’ 4 . Horn 1995, p. 136 and 1998, p. 60; Annas 1993, p. 83, pp. 405f., and p. 430. Notes 297

5 . Cf. Annas 1993, pp. 125–128, pp. 225–227, and pp. 260ff.; Horn 1998, pp. 202–224; Hare 2001, pp. 78ff. 6 . Chapters 4–5 have argued that Kierkegaard’s criticism of eudaimonism belongs to a Danish context where Kant was highly influential. In the Danish context, Kierkegaard sided with the Kantians about eudaimonism and the highest good. However, Kant was hardly the first to criticize eudaimonism; such criticism can also be found in Scotus, Shaftesbury, and the French Quietists (cf. Irwin 2011, vol. 1, chapters 25–26 and vol. 2, pp. 364f., pp. 549f., and p. 814). However, it seems clear that neither Scotus nor Shaftesbury exercised any identifiable influence on Kierkegaard’s anti-eudaimonism (cf. Stewart (ed.) 2007ff.), except perhaps for Scotus’ indirect influence on Lutheranism and Kantianism. Finally, recent scholarship has shown that Kierkegaard ‘touched only superficially upon [the French Quietist] Fénelon’s central doctrine of pure [or disinterested] love’ (Šajda 2009, pp. 142f.). 7 . See Chapters 2 and 10. 8 . Fahrenbach 1979, pp. 216–218. For more references, see Chapter 3, especially note #2. 9 . One of the bestselling books of the 18th century was Johann Johachim Spalding’s (1714–1804) Die Bestimmungen des Menschen, a book that was printed at least ten editions after it first came out in 1748. As Spalding himself explains, the book reflected the mode of thought of the first half of the 18th century and tried to determine the nature and purpose of human existence. Both Kant and Fichte picked up on this project later on; Fichte even borrowed Spalding’s title for his 1800 book. See Di Giovanni 2005, pp. 7ff. and p. 302. 10 . Rossi 2005, p. 6. 11 . R 6:47; A 7:294; Kuehn 2001, p. 150. Horn (1998, p. 60, p. 12, pp. 204f., and pp. 223f.) traces the idea of rebirth or revolution at the level of character back to the Stoics. 12 . See Chapter 3, including references to Grøn. 13 . See Chapter 3, including references to Allison 1995; Schulte 1991; Stewart 2010. 14 . Cf. Beiser 2006; Hare 2002; Firestone and Jacobs 2008; Furtak 2005, p. 107 and p. 183; Puchniak 2008, pp. 12–16. 15 . Cf. Schönberger 1998; Augustine 1998, Books 19–20. 16 . Hare 2009, p. 80. 17 . Irwin (2011, vol. 3, pp. 315f.) also contrasts Kierkegaard and Augustine when it comes to eudaimonism. 18 . SKS 4, 409, cf. 457 / CA, 107, cf. 158. See also SKS K4, 479; Mt 10:39; Lk 17:33. 19 . CPR 5:127. See also Chapter 7 of the present monograph. 20 . See Chapter 4 about how Kierkegaard appears to follow Kant in rejecting theoretical theodicy and viewing theodicy as a practical and moral problem. Additionally, Chapter 8 argued that Fear and Trembling’s description of Abraham incorporates a criticism stemming from Kant. Cf. Green 2011, p. 187. 21 . SKS 1, 194 / CI, 144; SKS 4, 319 / CA, 11; SKS 7, 502 / CUP1, 552f.; SKS K7, 357; SKS 18, 44f., EE:118 / JP 2, 2234; SKS 18, 204, JJ:202 / JP 2, 1334; SKS K18, 325; SKS 18, 343, KK:4 / JP 3, 2747; SKS K18, 503; SKS 19, 139f., Not4:11 / KJN 3, 139; SKS K19, 198f.; SKS 19, 331, Not11:20 / KJN 3, 329; 298 Notes

SKS K19, 464; SKS 22, 435, NB14:150 / JP 1, 1057; SKS K22, 549f. Kierkegaard suggests that Kant breaks with Greek, scholastic, and rationalistic philosophy here, something that seems plausible. 22 . See the previous note. 23 . Green 1992, pp. 114–119. See also Habermas 2005, pp. 240f. and p. 244; Wyller 1999, p. 161 and p. 171. 24 . Ak 24:433 translated in Zammito 2002, p. 277. See also Chapter 6, note #117. Regarding Kant and Socrates, see Hinske 1995, pp. 241–243; Beiser 1987, pp. 23ff. 25 . SKS 7, 503, 519, 390f. / CUP1, 554, 571f., 429f. 26 . Tjønneland 2004, pp. 67–69 and pp. 79–95. 27 . Verheyden 2000, pp. 164–170. 28 . Many 18th- and 19th-century thinkers developed ideas about how restricted our knowledge is, including several skeptics. See, e.g., Henrich 2008; Koch 2003 and 2004; Beiser 1987, pp. 214–217 and chapters 9–10. 29 . Knappe (2004, chapters 1–2) concludes that Kierkegaard is more of an empir- icist than a Kantian idealist. However, Kierkegaard hardly views sense impres- sions as separate entities like classical Humean empiricists do (Knappe does not discuss this). 30 . Ameriks (2012, pp. 46f.) argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism need not affect the most fundamental features of Kant’s ethics because basic normative concepts such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ can remain what they are irrespec- tively of how space and time are classified metaphysically. 31 . Pereboom (2009) writes: ‘Among Kant’s most influential contributions to philosophy is the notion of transcendental argument. In Kant’s conception, an argument of this kind begins with an uncontroversial premise about our thought, experience, or knowledge, and then reasons to a substantive and unobvious necessary condition of this premise. Typically, this reasoning from uncontroversial premise to substantive conclusion is intended to be priori in some sense, either strict ... or more relaxed ... . Often, but not always, the conclusion of the argument is directed against skepticism of some sort. Targets of Kant’s transcendental arguments include skepticism about the applicability of concepts not derived from experience to the world of experience, and skepticism about the existence of objects external to us in space. Many of Kant’s most famous transcendental arguments are found in the Critique of Pure Reason ... . There are many others; for instance, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Critique of the Power of Judgment , and in the Opus Posthumum [Postumum ]’. 32 . See Chapters 2, 6, and 8 respectively. 33 . Green 2011, p. 16, p. 21, and chapter 8. I have suggested that transcendental arguments and transcendental deductions share the same basic structure. Commentators occasionally see the latter as part of the former. See Pereboom 2009. 34 . Green 2011, p. 197. As Green explains, the second Critique can be seen to signal the difference between an epistemological and a moral deduction. Kant notes that a deduction relating to pure practical reason is more difficult than one dealing with the principles of pure theoretical understanding. The latter concerns knowledge of the properties of objects which can be given to reason from some other source (e.g., sensible intuition), whereas the former Notes 299

concerns knowledge insofar as itself can become the ground of the existence of objects. Since they result from rational willing, the objects of pure practical reason are not given in experience but are brought into being by willing. Any deduction referring to them therefore proceeds from the structure and content of that willing and not from a given datum of sense experience (Green 2011, p. 204). 35 . This legal tradition originated as a way of providing legal justifications for territorial claims and settling succession disputes between rulers of the Holy Roman Empire. See Henrich 1989, p. 32; Green 2011, p. 198. 36 . Green 2007, pp. 189f. Note that Green takes the ideality of ethics to include rigorism. 37 . Cf. Lippitt 2003, pp. 82–89, pp. 142–145, p. 151, pp. 186f., pp. 193f., and p. 199. 38 . Cf. Stern 2012, p. 204 and p. 244–252. Note that Kierkegaard appears to have had virtually no knowledge of utilitarianism. I do not want to deny that utilitarianism can be highly demanding or that Hegelian ethics involves modern egalitarianism. 39 . LPDR 28:1123; SKS 4, 324 / CA, 16f.; SKS 9, 60 / WL, 53. Knappe (2004, pp. 78f.) argues that Kierkegaard’s conception of ethics is closer to Kant than Greek ethics. Irwin (2011, vol. 3, pp. 304–309) argues that a Kierkegaard’s defense of the ethical outlook seems to need Kantian rationalism about will and morality. See also Evans 2006a, pp. 86ff. 40 . Regarding Hegel, see Schulte 1991, pp. 247–268. 41 . Cf. Hare 2002, Parts 1 and 3; Stern 2012, p. 206; Evans, 2006a, p. 49 and p. 82; Quinn 1998, pp. 349ff. 42 . Cf. Verheyden 2000, pp. 162–170, especially p. 167. 43 . Evans 2006a, pp. 91–99 and p. 107. 44 . Cf. Koch 2003, pp. 16f., pp. 34–39, pp. 322–328, pp. 343ff.; Thuborg 1951, pp. 9–18 and pp. 180f. 45 . Cf. Zammito 2002; Jacobs and Kain (eds) 2003. 46 . Green 1992, p. xvi. 47 . E.g., Bornemann 2009, pp. 80–83. 48 . If Kant’s anthropology did influence Kierkegaard, he is likely to have drawn on contemporary secondary sources. Kierkegaard owned at least one book dealing explicitly with Kant’s anthropology (including Sinnesart and Denkungsart , good and evil character), namely Schmid 1980, reprint of 4th ed., Jena: Cröker 1798 (ASKB 770), pp. 62f., pp. 146f., pp. 306–308, pp. 129–131. Regarding Schmid, see Schröpfer 1995, pp. 47–56. 49 . Cf. Stewart (ed.) 2007ff., vol. 6, Tomes I–II; Verheyden 2000, pp. 157–177; Schulte 1991, part 2; Düsing 1973; Thuborg 1951; Høffding 1909, pp. 26f.; Holm 1967, pp. 33–43. 50 . Alternatively, Kant’s philosophy of religion can be considered rationalized Augustinianism or enlightenment Augustinianism when it comes to original sin and the highest good. Cf. Beiser 2006, pp. 593–599; Hare 2002; Firestone and Jacobs 2008. 51 . Tennemann 1798–1819 (ASKB 815–826). Tennemann’s work is left out in Green’s (2007, pp. 196–206) comprehensive 11-page bibliography over primary and secondary Kant sources owned by Kierkegaard, although it is included in Green 1992, pp. 115f. 300 Notes

52 . See note 1 of Chapter 8. 53 . Pap. XII, 290. 54 . Green (2007, p. 195) concludes that Kierkegaard uses Kantian elements to reinforce his own Christian conviction, something I agree with. I would add, however, that Kierkegaard partially reinterprets Christian and Lutheran views by making use of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy and theology (something Green would probably agree with). 55 . See Chapters 5–9. 56 . Hauschild (1982, pp. 41–43) argues that Kierkegaard did not see how close he was to Kant because he relied on a Hegelian understanding of Kant. This seems partially plausible, although it arguably overestimates the importance of Judge William in Either / Or II while underestimating the importance of other idealists and post-Kantian thinkers (e.g., Fichte and Schelling). 57 . Cf. Green 1992, chapter 1. 58 . See Chapter 1 of the present monograph. 59 . SKS 23, 143, NB16:70 / JP 2, 2239. 60 . Pap. X-2 A 539 (note); JP 2, p. 612; Green 1992, pp. 10f.; SKS K23, 231f. 61 . PP 8:369; CF 7:28. 62 . Regarding the latter, see Kuehn 2001, pp. 378–382 and pp. 404–406. 63 . Green 1992, pp. 10f. 64 . Green 1992, pp. 11–13. Regarding Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, see SKS 18, 198, JJ:179; SKS K18, 312; JP 5, 5702. Regarding ‘What Is Enlightenment?,’ see SKS 23, 129, NB16:48; SKS 23, 130; NB16:50; SKS K23, 212–214; JP 2, 2237f. 65 . D 2:350, 373. 66 . See Chapters 6 and 9. 67 . With the exception of Conflict of the Faculties mentioned above, Green (1992, pp. 13–28) also includes these works (as well as others for which evidence seems very weak). 68 . Green (1992, pp. 13–16) and Tjønneland (2004, p. 88f. and p. 95) argue that Kierkegaard very likely read the first Critique . Green’s argument is largely based on the critique of proofs for God’s existence rather than the natural dialectic of reason or the distinction between regulative and constitutive notions. Tjønneland’s argument is based on Kant’s transcendental ideals and symbols. Evans (1999, pp. 222–225) says that Kierkegaard (Climacus) may very well have been influenced by Kant’s analysis of the natural dialectic of reason. And as we saw in Chapter 5, Tjønneland, Verheyden, Westphal, Pinkard, and Green all see chapter 3 of Fragments as evoking the opening lines of the first Critique . 69 . See Chapter 2 and Green 1992, p. xiv, pp. 17f., and pp. 156–166; Di Giovanni 2005, p. 329; Benbassat 2012, p. 63. 70 . SKS 19, 57, Not1:7. 71 . See Chapter 2; Green 1992, p. xiv, pp. 17f., and pp. 156–166. 72 . Also, two secondary sources that Kierkegaard owned appear promising since they deal with Kant’s philosophy of religion in some detail. Baur 1838 (ASKB 423) deals with Kant’s philosophy of religion (pp. 565–614), focusing on the highest good (pp. 571ff.), radical evil, and Christology (pp. 575ff.). Particularly Baur’s discussion of Kant’s Christology, including Book 2 of Religion , is relatively detailed. Ast 1807 (ASKB 385) deals with Kant’s philosophy of religion (pp. 440–457), including hope (p. 453), morality (pp. 454f.), Notes 301

the highest good, and the moral argument (pp. 456f.). Thus, many of the topics dealt with in Chapters 2 and 5–9 of this monograph are covered by Baur and Ast. 73 . Green 1992, p. 20. A passage Green does not reference (SKS 19, 141–143, Not4:12, KJN 3, 140–142) strongly suggests that Kierkegaard was familiar with this argument (although his knowledge may rely on secondary sources such as Ast and Baur). 74 . Thuborg 1951, p. 60. 75 . Cf. Marks 2010. 76 . Møller 1842, pp. 247–249. Møller has been said to have found his final philosophical position in I. H. Fichte (cf. Koch 2004, p. 261). 77 . See SKS 17, 41f., AA:22 / JP 2, 1190; ASKB 505; Rosenau 2007, pp. 60f. Still, Rosenau (2007, p. 60) concludes that ‘There are hardly any explicit comments of Kierkegaard concerning I.H. Fichte.’ Although there are vague similarities between I. H. Fichte and Kierkegaard when it comes to criticizing Hegel, there are substantial differences concerning anthropology, Christology, and eschatology (p. 60). 78 . Cf. Chapters 2 and 4–10 of the present monograph; Dorrien 2012, chapters 1–2, 5–6, and 8–9; Rossi 2011, especially the supplement section ‘The Influence of Kant’s Philosophy of Religion.’ 79 . For references to honest Kant, see SKS 6, 142 / SLW, 152; SKS 19,170, Not4:46 / KJN 3, 167; SKS K19, 218; SKS 20, 229, NB2:235 / JP 2, 2236; SKS K20, 223f.; SKS 22, 215, NB12:121 / JP 3, 3558; SKS K22, 287f.; SKS 27, 390, 415, Papir 365:2, 369 / JP 1, 649, 654. See also SKS 19, 139–143, NB4:11f. / KJN 3, 139–142; SKS 19, 167, NB4:44 / JP 2, 2252; SKS 23, 117, NB16:33 / JP 3, 3093. 80 . Cf. SKS K22, 287f. The description of Hegel’s philosophy as theocentric, and Kant’s as anthropocentric, comes from I. H. Fichte, see SKS K6, 204. 81 . See Chapters 4–6. 82 . Stern 2012, p. 252. 83 . Cf. CPR 5:113ff. 84 . See Chapters 6–9. 85 . One notable exception is Green (1992, p. 211) who goes as far as saying that ‘Kierkegaard’s repudiation of Kant rests on a platform of ethical-religious insight constructed by Kant,’ something that seems partially convincing. 86 . Hare 2002, pp. 22–24 and p. 35. 87 . Hare 2002, part 2. 88 . See Chapter 6. 89 . See Chapters 5–6; Beiser 2006, pp. 602f. 90 . Stokes (2010, pp. 7f.) says that ‘Kierkegaard represents a more fully developed description of moral experience than any other “philosophical” writer of his era. Equally, though, his work is clearly still philosophical in character; his project allows him to conceptualize his description of existence such that concepts, not empirical data, structure and develop his observa- tions. The result of this fusion of psychological acuity and dialectical rigor are impressive in their scope and thoroughness . ... if the pictures he paints of such phenomena [as anxiety and despair] are convincing then it is significant that these accounts are always structured by an underlying ontology that describes the symptoms of these maladies in terms of their diagnoses.’ 302 Notes

91 . See, e.g., Roberts 2006; Svendsen 2010; Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (eds) 2010; Madore 2011; Copjec (ed.) (1996). 92 . This has also been suggested by others. Cf. Kosch 2006; Roberts 2006. 93 . Cf. Rudd 2012; Davenport 2012; Stokes 2010; Furtak 2005. 94 . Cf. Grøn 1997; Theunissen 1993. 95 . Cf. Stokes 2010, pp. 7f.; Hannay 2006, p. 4; Grøn 1997, pp. 137–142; Westphal 1996, pp. 44f.; Marino 2001, p. 96. 96 . Cf. Stern 2012; Evans 2006a; Galvin 2011; Hare 2001; Quinn 2006; Furtak 2005; Rudd 2012; Davenport 2012. 97 . Cf. Habermas 2005; Quinn 2006; Hare 2002; Dorrien 2012. 98 . See Chapters 8, 5, and 4, respectively. 99 . See Chapters 4, 7, and 8, respectively.

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Index

action, 23–25, 28, 29, 31–32, 34, Aristotle/Aristotelian, 28, 55, 95, 226, 36–37, 39, 44, 46–48, 70, 72–73, 230, 258, 284 76–78, 83–84, 89–93, 99, 103, Ast, Friedrich D., 290, 300–301 114, 119–120, 141, 162, 164, Augustine of Hippo, 33–34, 46, 183–185, 206–207, 247, 258, 95–96, 115, 118, 124, 132, 195, 273, 279 224–225, 226, 250, 251, 255, Adams, Robert M., 272 262, 264, 266, 267, 268, 268, Adler, Adolph Peter, 161, 280 297 Adorno, Theodor W., 191, 288, 291 Augustinian, 14, 15, 28, 33–34, 101, Agamben, Giorgio, 255 109–110, 118, 132, 170, 220, agency 224–228, 232, 264, 296, 299 divine, see divine grace autonomy/self-legislation, 1, 67, 174, human, 1, 24, 26, 38, 48, 55, 199–212, 215, 219, 223, 232, 57–58, 91, 103, 107, 113, 115, 235, 246, 292–293 137–141, 143, 144, 151, 171, Axt-Piscalar, Christine, 251, 252 191–192, 203, 239–240 moral, 1, 2, 4, 26, 53, 56–57, 74, Baader, Franz X. von, 41, 52, 227, 232 79, 91, 125, 184, 191, 194, 198, Baeumler, Alfred, 291 209, 231, 246, 247, 253, 288 Bagnoli, Carlo, 292 see also character Barrett, Lee C., 249, 252 Allison, Henry E., 23–24, 33, 46–47, Barth, Karl, 266, 275, 284 55, 138–139, 245, 247, 248, Baumgartner, Hans Michael, 282 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 256, Baur, Ferdinand Christian, 300, 301 257, 258, 275, 283, 292, 297 Bayer, Oswald, 281 Ameriks, Karl, 204, 207, 291, 292, 298 Beiser, Frederick C., 14, 89, 95, 99, Anderson-Gold, Sharon, 244, 245, 111–112, 114, 117–118, 258, 247, 249, 261, 302 259, 260, 262, 263, 264, 265, Andic, Martin, 272, 277 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, Annas, Julia, 96, 259, 262, 296, 297 273, 275, 278, 284, 287, 289, Anscombe, Elizabeth, 3, 203–204, 291 292, 297, 298, 299, 301 anthropology, philosophical, 2–4, Benbassat, Roi, 245, 250, 253, 259, 16–19, 36–38, 55–56, 59–60, 265, 291, 300 62, 64, 66–67, 71, 74–75, 224, Bloch, David, 296 227–228, 231–232, 253–255, Bonaunet, Ketil, 266, 282 299 Bornemann, Johan Alfred, 271 antinomy of practical reason, 4, Boyd, Richard N., 292 100–101, 117–119, 125–126, Brandes, Georg, 109, 266, 291 133, 184, 189, 235, 237–238, Brunner, Emil, 259 269 Bubbio, Paolo Diego, 165, 263, 281 see also moral gap Buber, Martin, 291 anxiety/angst, 29, 33, 39–41, 51, Burgess, Andrew J., 262 53–54, 239–240, 249–250, Byrne, Peter, 273, 275, 278, 281, 282, 252, 301 283

319 320 Index

Camus, Albert, 129–130, 272 egalitarian/egalitarianism, 3, 56, 70, Cappelørn, Niels Jørgen, viii, 19, 244 74, 230, 231, 299 Caswell, Matthew, 105, 247, 248, 249, emotions/feelings, 101, 246, 250 256, 259, 261–262, 265, 287 eternal happiness/eternal bliss, see character, human or moral (good or highest good evil), 1, 25–27, 31–34, 37–45, eudaimonism, 4, 81, 82, 95–96, 106, 47, 49, 51, 55–57, 59–60, 62, 115, 225–228, 231, 259, 262, 64, 66–68, 70–73, 96, 113, 213, 265, 297 226, 253–254, 297, 299 see also happiness Collins, James, 175, 281, 284 Evans, C. Stephen, 107, 112, 156, Copjec, Joan, 302 200–201, 216, 219, 220, 222, Copleston, Frederick, 262 242, 245, 253, 257, 258, 263, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 272, Davenport, John J., 24, 242, 245, 265, 274, 280, 283, 289, 291, 292, 274, 276, 277, 290, 295, 302 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 302 Denis, Lara, 256, 260, 263, 265, 270, evil 276, 287, 289, 294 human or moral or radical evil, Denmark/Danish context of 1–4, 11, 18, 22–57, 61, 64–69, Kierkegaard’s authorship, 6, 78, 81, 85, 87–88, 94, 105, 108, 16, 18–19, 52, 95, 97, 102–103, 117, 120, 122, 124–125, 132, 106, 115, 148, 155, 157, 227, 136–143, 160, 162–163, 165, 228, 230, 231, 233, 235, 244, 168–170, 173–174, 178, 193, 246, 253, 259, 262, 265, 267, 205, 207, 210, 215, 226–233, 269, 279, 280, 297 235–239, 243–244, 246–253, Descartes, René, 191, 288 260, 275, 283, 284, 294, 299, despair/hopelessness, 26, 56, 62, 300 65–67, 85, 88, 99, 103, natural evil, 80, 81, 85 114–115, 118–119, 123–125, problem of evil, 80 129–131, 148, 151, 177–182, existentialism/existentialist, 2, 3, 184–186, 189–195, 200, 235, 17, 55, 74, 130–131, 207, 223, 240, 268–269, 289, 301 225–226, 241, 253 Despland, Michel, 260, 281, 282, 283, 284 Fahrenbach, Helmut, 56–57, 73, 225, divine commands/theological 253, 256, 257, 294, 297 voluntarism, 42–43, 52, fear, 39, 51, 77, 157, 162, 178, 215, 199–201, 204–206, 212–216, 225, 249–250, 258 218–223, 241, 294–296 Fendt, Gene, 197–198, 290 divine grace, 27, 29, 30, 48–49, 65, Fénelon, François, 270, 297 124, 136–151, 160, 169–170, Ferreira, M. Jamie, 17, 246, 280, 295 217, 222, 230, 240, 241, 244, Fichte, Immanuel Hermann, 274, 301 275, 276, 278 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 96, 204, 223, divine revelation, 42–43, 65–66, 101, 232, 235, 253, 262, 291, 292, 131–136, 147–148, 150–167, 297, 300 170, 172–176, 198, 214, 217, Firestone, Chris L., 243, 245, 246, 247, 222, 240, 252, 273, 278–280 250, 275, 281, 294, 297, 299 see also theology Formosa, Paul, 30, 46–47, 207, 209, Dorrien, Gary, 241, 266, 278, 284, 245, 247, 251, 292, 293 301, 302 Forschner, Maximilian, 284 Düsing, Klaus, 262, 267, 269, 271, Forster, Michael, 262 274, 278, 299 Foucault, Michel, 255 Index 321

Fremstedal, Roe, viii, 241, 243, 246, Hauschild, Friedrich, 246, 300 268, 276, 278, 280, 284, 291 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 2, 6, Friedman, R. Zev, 91, 261 10, 11, 17, 20, 85, 96, 97, 176, Frierson, Patrick R., 26, 245, 246, 247, 230, 236, 239, 257, 262, 274, 255, 256, 257 299, 301 Furtak, Rick Anthony, 242, 254, 260, Hegelian, 28, 74, 81, 84, 101, 133, 264, 276, 289, 297, 302 155, 230, 232, 233, 236, 257, 258, 264, 300 Galvin, Richard, 292, 302 Heidegger, Martin, 56, 258 Giovanni, George Di, 262, 267, 278, Hemsterhuis, Frans, 125–126, 135, 297, 300 228 Glenn, John D., Jr., 109, 266, 267 Henrich, Dieter, 130–131, 269, 270, Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 27, 52 298, 299 Gouwens, David J., 17, 274, 280 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 52, 75, Green, Ronald M., 4, 6–8, 11, 12, 227, 253, 258 15–17, 19, 50, 74, 81, 121, 136, highest good/eternal happiness, 1–4, 170–171, 227–228, 230–231, 38, 44, 72–73, 76, 78, 80–96, 234–235, 241, 243–244, 246, 98–101, 104–122, 124–130, 248, 252, 253, 256, 257, 259, 137, 140–153, 168, 173–174, 262, 263, 264, 270, 271, 274, 180, 182–196, 206, 219–220, 275, 278, 279, 282, 283, 289, 224–229, 231–234, 236–238, 290, 291, 294, 295, 297, 261, 262, 265–269, 284–288, 298–299, 300, 301 294 Grøn, Arne, 40, 219, 243, 245, 247, kingdom of God/church/ethical 250, 253, 256, 260, 266, 268, commonwealth, 1, 44, 49, 84, 271, 274, 285, 288, 297, 302 87–88, 94, 96, 107–111, 115, Guyer, Paul, 207, 265, 269, 270, 287 118–119, 121, 122, 125, 126, 129, 137, 150, 153, 160, 162, Habermas, Jürgen, 1, 3, 56, 64, 176, 165, 167–170, 173–174, 180, 204, 207, 270, 284, 298 185, 190, 193, 194, 196, 206, Hannay, Alastair, viii, xi, 10, 193, 246, 220, 225, 226, 235, 237–238, 250, 258, 259, 260, 262, 268, 266–267, 275, 281, 284, 285, 276, 285, 291, 302 287 happiness, 1–2, 36–38, 60–61, 72–73, Himmelmann, Beatrix, 260, 264, 265, 76–89, 91, 96–97, 100, 102–117, 267, 269, 270 119–129, 137, 140–143, 149, Høffding, Harald, 244, 299 176, 179–180, 182–183, Holm, Søren, 244, 299 185–186, 189–190, 212, Hong, Howard V. and Edna H. 225–226, 247, 257, 265–269, (translators), viii, x–xi, 250, 273 285, 288, 294 prudence, 30, 60, 63, 68, 77–78, 81, hope, 1–2, 4, 65, 69, 77, 78, 80, 82, 86, 94, 131, 183, 215, 217 85, 90, 99, 109, 110, 119, 120, see also highest good 121, 124, 126–127, 139–141, Hare, John E., 3, 4, 114–115, 118, 136, 153, 159, 160, 162, 163, 169, 140, 152, 168, 211, 237–238, 177–198, 213, 215, 225–226, 240, 241, 242, 262, 263, 266, 234, 240, 258, 260–261, 268, 269, 270, 276, 279, 281, 285–286, 288–290, 300 283, 290, 291, 293, 295, 297, Horn, Christoph, 247, 251, 259, 296, 296, 297, 299, 302 297 Hatfield, Gary, 6, 8 Hume, David, 55, 191 322 Index ideality of ethics, see rigorism 262, 272, 276, 278, 280, 291, image of God/divine creation, 85, 181, 292, 302 218, 219, 222, 296 Koslowski, Peter, 41, 250 immortality/afterlife/hereafter, 68, Krishek, Sharon, 274, 277 72, 81, 84, 85, 88, 95–96, 99, Kuehn, Manfred, 254, 269, 272, 300 110, 112, 115, 119–121, 123, Kulak, Avron, 258 126–129, 141, 182, 185–186, Kulenkampff, Jens, 279 189, 193, 196, 215, 226–228, Kylmä, Jari and Katri Vehviläinen, 285 233, 234, 237, 262, 269, 271, 273, 275, 277, 286, 290 Larmore, Charles, 204, 291 inwardness, 58, 68 Law, David, 277 see also character leap, 22, 40–41, 43, 48, 149, 246, 250, Irwin, Terence, 243, 246, 253, 259, 262, 277 273, 280, 291, 296, 297, 299 Leibniz, Gottfried W./Leibnizian, 28, 55, 81, 96 Jackson, Timothy P., 257, 258, 276, Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 82 292 Lindstedt, David, 261 Jacobs, Brian and Patrick Kain, 244, Link, Hans-Georg, 285 299 Lippitt, John, 291, 292, 299 Jesus Christ (christology), 49–50, Løkke, Håvard and Arild Waaler, 260, 85, 111, 132, 147, 159–161, 264 165–167, 169–170, 174, 204, Louden, Robert B., 167, 244, 255, 256, 222, 248, 264, 271, 281, 283, 261, 281, 282, 284 300–301 Lübcke, Poul, 43, 67, 149, 203, 246, Johansen, Kjell Eivind, viii, 247, 257, 251, 256, 277, 278, 282, 291, 276 292 Luther, Martin, 46, 131, 251 Kain, Patrick, 207, 212, 214, 243, 244, Lutheran, 15, 131, 134, 157, 176, 258, 280, 281, 283, 293, 294, 231, 236, 296, 297 299 Kangas, David J., 292 McCloughan, Meade J. B., 98, 188, Kenny, Anthony, 242, 243 261, 263, 287, 288 Kim, David Yoon-Jung, 283 McGeer, Victoria, 285, 288, 289 Kingo, Anders, 245, 274 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 12, 243 Kisiel, Theodore, 253 Madore, Joël, 250, 252, 302 Kleingeld, Pauline, 74, 92, 186, 192, Manis, Zachary, 219, 265, 291, 295, 255, 257, 258, 261, 265, 284, 296 286, 287, 288 Marcel, Gabriel, 288 Knappe, Ulrich, 6–8, 12, 17–18, 136, Marina, Jacqueline, viii, 104, 111–114, 241–242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 139, 186, 248, 249, 252, 257, 252, 258, 259, 262, 264, 274, 258, 261, 265, 267, 268, 269, 278, 279, 283, 291, 294, 296, 275, 276, 283, 287 298, 299 Marks, Tamara Monet, 269, 271, 274, Koch, Carl H., 244, 253, 259, 262, 301 265, 267, 269, 274, 298, 299, Martensen, Hans L. (Bishop), 157, 301 233, 273, 282 Korsgaard, Christine, 207, 292 Marty, Francois, 255 Kosch, Michelle, 142, 150, 161, 203, Michalson, Gordon E., Jr., 4, 169–171, 243, 244, 245, 247, 249, 256, 206, 241, 266, 278, 281, 283, 292 Index 323

Milz, Bernhard, 264, 268 Paul, the Apostle, 127, 160, 180, 182, Møller, Poul Martin, 125–126, 135, 231, 289, 294 228, 235, 269, 271, 274, 301 Pauline, 97, 231, 290 Moltmann, Jürgen, 285, 288, 290 Pereboom, Derk, 298 moral constructivism, 202, 205, 207, Pettit, Philip, 285, 289 209–210, 212, 223, 292–293 Phillips, Dewi Z. and Timothy Tessin, moral gap, 4, 118–119, 124, 139, 143, 271 205, 228, 230, 237–238, 270 philosophy see also antinomy of practical reason analytic, 1, 5–7, 9, 12–14, 237, moral law/categorical imperative, 240–243, 253 25–26, 28, 30–33, 36, 43–44, contextual history of philosophy, 46–47, 49, 61, 63, 66, 68, 5–8, 10–14 70–73, 76–77, 91–92, 104–106, Continental/European/German, 2, 113–114, 117, 120–122, 130, 3, 56, 239–240, 243 156, 162, 164–165, 183, philosophy of history, 17, 18, 92–93, 204–206, 208–215, 225, 246, 186–187, 224, 260, 261 268, 280–281, 293 historical progress, 80, 92–93, moral realism, 205, 207–210, 223, 291 174–176, 186–187, 193 Morgan, Seiriol, 25, 246, 249, 250 Pinkard, Terry, 257, 263, 267, 288, Muchnik, Pablo, 36, 38, 47, 103, 244, 292, 300 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, Platner, Ernst, 75, 227, 253, 258 256, 265, 287, 302 pseudonyms (Kierkegaard’s Müller, Julius, 43, 46, 47, 51, 52, 226, pseudonyms), 20–21, 245 227, 232, 252, 303 aesthetes, 21, 30, 58, 102, 104, 112, Munzel, G. Felicitas, 253, 254, 256 143, 145, 179, 230, 247, 265, 284 Muyskens, James K., 285, 286, 289 Anti-Climacus, 21, 24, 28, 42, 50, Mynster, Jacob P. (Bishop), 157, 279, 58, 62, 66–67, 87, 106, 124, 282 129, 177, 179, 192, 203, 246, 254, 274, 289 Nadler, Steven, 14, 241, 243 Climacus, Johannes, 21, 27–28, neighbor-love, 2, 30, 109, 160, 171, 34–35, 42, 45, 48, 58, 66, 67, 172, 194–195, 198, 215–216, 82–86, 94, 97–98, 100–101, 106, 218, 220, 222–223 107, 109–110, 112–113, 118, Neiman, Susan, 80, 258, 259, 272 122–127, 129, 131–136, 142, Norheim, Brynjulv, Jr., 286, 290 143, 145–149, 158–160, 161, Novalis (Hardenberg, Georg P. F. von), 166, 182, 217, 228, 246, 254, 232, 292 262–264, 268, 273–274, 277, 300 De silentio, Johannes, 20–21, 83, O’Donovan, Oliver, 289 86, 110, 114, 128, 129, 131, O’Neill, Onora, 90, 182–183, 185, 261, 133–134, 136, 140, 144–151, 279, 281, 286, 287, 288 156, 161, 199–201, 215–217, Oppy, Graham and Nick Trakakis, 262 236, 246, 263, 274, 276–277, Østerberg, Dag, 253, 255 280, 282, 290–291, 295 ethicist (Judge William), 16, 21, 26, Palmquist, Stephen R., 248, 249, 279, 28, 55–59, 62–66, 70–71, 104, 281, 283 126, 136, 140, 142–143, 152, passion, 83, 85, 86, 97–98, 100–101, 182, 200, 201, 205, 216, 225, 123, 128, 149, 250 235, 245, 254, 257, 265, 274, Pattison, George, 256, 263, 282 276, 291, 300 324 Index pseudonyms (Kierkegaard’s rigorism, moral or ethical/ideality of pseudonyms) – continued ethics, 22–23, 25–28, 32, 34, Haufniensis, Vigilius, 18, 20–22, 56–57, 65–66, 69, 74, 75, 124, 27–29, 30, 33, 35, 39–42, 44, 132, 138, 143, 148, 225, 227, 46, 48, 66, 67, 88, 146, 148, 228, 230, 246, 299 226, 246, 249, 250, 252, 254, Romanticism, German, 199, 204, 223, 277, 284 228, 232 psychology, 2, 39, 239, 240, 249 Rosenkranz, Johann, K. F., 249 moral psychology, 2, 4, 53, 55, 74, 225, 240 salvation/soteriology, 67, 82, 84, 94, Puchniak, Robert, 248, 250, 284, 289, 107–110, 124, 138–146, 160, 297 167, 171, 180, 196, 205, 275 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 56, 202 Quinn, Philip L., 3, 40, 216, 241, 250, Schelling, Friedrich von, 52, 96, 205, 251, 268, 279, 283, 295, 296, 227, 232, 243, 257, 267, 274, 299, 302 292, 300 Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich, Raffoul, François and Eric Sean 52, 204, 232, 292 Nelson, 253, 254 Schlegel, Friedrich, 204, 232, 292 Rahner, Karl, 289 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 52, 96, 204, Rapic, Smail, 244, 262, 271, 294, 295 223, 232, 262, 274, 292 rationality/reason, 2–4, 25, 28, 30, 37, Schneewind, Jerome B., 206, 292 45–46, 68, 70–73, 76–81, 90–92, Schönberger, Rolf, 262, 297 96–101, 103, 105, 107–108, Schrempf, Christoph, 280 114, 117–119, 130–134, Schröpfer, Horst, 278, 299 139–141, 151, 155–158, Schulte, Christoph, viii, 36, 249, 250, 160–169, 172–176, 182, 184, 253, 258, 270, 297, 299 187–192, 203, 205–208, Schulz, Heiko, 249, 266 211–212, 214–216, 229–230, Schwarz, Gerhard, 267, 268 240, 262–264, 270, 279, 293, Scotus, Duns, 297 298–300 selfhood, 24, 55–75, 87, 203–205, 231, paradox/absurdity, 21, 47, 49–50, 239–240, 248, 250, 253–254, 291 98, 100–101, 120, 149–150, see also agency and character 156–157, 217, 222, 264 self-love/self-interest/sensuousness/ see also antinomy of practical egoism, 23, 28–30, 32–33, 37, reason 41–42, 51, 57, 59, 61, 72–73, Redding, Paul, 164, 281 105, 133, 173, 212, 238, religion/religiousness 247–249, 273 Christian/transcendent, 11, 21, 53, Serck-Hanssen, Camilla, 249, 293 65, 110, 131–135, 155, 198, Shaftesbury, Anthony A.-C., 3. (the 216, 222, 274, 277–278, 284 3rd. Earl of Shaftesbury) Kant’s typology of, 162–163 Earl of, 297 natural/immanent, 42, 50, 84, 112, Sløk, Johannes, 17, 245, 260, 277 131–133, 147–151, 155, 166, Socrates/Socratic, 50, 74, 82, 132, 133, 172, 228, 232, 233, 238, 274, 160, 166–167, 170, 228, 232, 277–278 235–236, 273, 278, 298 see also theology Søltoft, Pia, 266, 288, 289, 291 repetition/doubling/reduplication, Spaemann, Robert, 262 72–73, 202 Spinoza, Benedict de, 285 Index 325

Stern, Robert, 201, 207, 209–210, Tillich, Paul, 274, 288 221–222, 226, 249, 268, 284, Timmermann, Jens, 77, 258 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, Tjønneland, Eivind, 243, 263, 264, 296, 299, 301, 302 265, 281, 282, 298, 300 Stewart, Jon, viii, 6, 10–12, 14, 19–20, Troeltsch, Ernst, 281, 284 242, 243, 244, 247, 252, 253, Tuschling, Burkhard, 262 257, 258, 273, 279, 297, 299 Stoics/Stoicism, 28, 95, 108, 120, 174, upbuilding writings (Kierkegaard), 67, 204, 225, 262, 266, 297 177, 244, 245 Stokes, Patrick, 242, 253, 301, 302 suffering, 45, 80, 82–86, 118–120, Verheyden, Jack, 243, 263, 294, 298, 124, 127, 132–133, 147, 158, 299, 300 260, 278 Verstrynge, Karl, 87, 158, 180, 256, summum bonum, see highest good 259, 260, 263, 264, 265, 271, Svendsen, Lars Fredrik H., 245, 302 280, 286 Svendsen, Paulus, 261 Vetlesen, Arne Johan, 245, 247 symbols, aesthetic and religious, 100, virtue/moral virtue, 31, 66–70, 76–91, 154, 164–166, 190, 229, 235, 94–95, 104–108, 111–115, 273, 281–282 117–122, 124–129, 137–145, 148–150, 168, 179–180, 183, Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, 228, 185, 194, 197–198, 225–226, 233, 262, 299 237–238, 266–267, 284 theistic proofs/arguments for the see also moral law existence of God, 3, 95, 117–135, 189, 226, 227, 228, Walker, Ralph, 262, 294 233, 236, 237, 264, 272 Watkins, Eric, 258 theodicy, 81, 84, 231, 285, 297 Watson, Richard A., 9, 241, 242 theological voluntarism, see divine Welz, Claudia, 259, 272, 289 commands Westphal, Merold, 11–12, 15, 34, theology 96–97, 101, 242, 243, 248, 251, Christian, 131–135, 153, 176, 180, 252, 259, 262, 263, 264, 273, 236, 275, 285 276, 280, 296, 300, 302 Enlightenment, 53, 93, 135, 176, 236 will/volition/choice, 23–29, 31–34, liberal, 157, 176, 232, 236 36–37, 39–41, 43, 46–51, 55, natural/rational/philosophical, 3, 4, 57–59, 61–64, 66, 68–74, 79–80, 130–135, 153, 155, 229, 231 82, 84, 89, 91, 93, 102–106, neo-orthodoxy, 176, 236 111, 113–115, 118, 119, 121, Protestant/Reformed, 1, 4, 97, 260 124, 129, 130, 139, 141–143, see also Lutheranism under Luther 162, 168, 170, 181, 183–184, rationalist, 133, 155, 236, 279, 298 190, 200, 202–221, 223, Roman Catholic, 275 225–226, 246, 248, 250, 252, supernaturalist, 155, 279 257, 265, 272, 281–283, 293, see also religion 295, 299 Theunissen, Michael, 17, 57, 241, 242, Wille (practical reason), 25, 207, 243, 253, 254, 256, 260, 271, 212, 293 277, 302 Willkür (power of choice), 23–25, Thomasius, Christian, 270 29, 34, 66, 69, 73, 207, Thuborg, Anders, 244, 246, 253, 259, 211–212, 254, 293, 294 262, 265, 267, 269, 299, 301 Wilson, Holly L., 13, 92, 256, 261 326 Index

Wimmer, Reiner, 153, 244, 258, 262, Wyller, Egil A., 295, 296, 298 267, 268, 271, 275, 278, 279, Wyller, Truls, 243 281, 284, 290 Winkel Holm, Isak, 282 Yovel, Yiraishu, 260, 261, 265, 267, Winter, Aloysius, 292, 293 284, 286, 290 Wisdo, David, 221, 296 Wood, Allen W., 59, 61, 74, 105, 166, Zammito, John H., 244, 253, 255, 207, 208, 213, 247, 248, 249, 258, 260, 267, 273, 275, 298, 250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 299 262, 263, 265, 266, 268, 269, Zapffe, Peter W., 259 272, 275, 278, 279, 280, 281, Zarka, Yves Charles, 11, 242 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 292, Zerman Scutt, Marie, 90, 261, 265, 293, 294 270