The concise argument J Med : first published as 10.1136/medethics-2014-102111 on 18 March 2014. Downloaded from Freedom and moral enhancement doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102111 Michael J Selgelid, Associate Editor

This issue of Journal of decide to smoke, drink, or shoot up–but determine what the overall implications of includes a pair of papers debating the if he thereby ends up an addict we would moral enhancement for freedom would implications of moral bioenhancement for not want to say that the state of addiction be. human freedom–and, especially, the ques- is fully free (in of the free choice A reason to worry about reliance on tion of whether moral enhancement that led to addiction). Similar things voluntary moral bioenhancement, in any should potentially be compulsory. In might be said about one freely selling case, is that those most likely to commit earlier writings Ingmar Persson and Julian herself into slavery. The point here is that heinous acts with catastrophic conse- Savulescu (P&S) argue that compulsory one can freely chose to give up his quences are probably not especially likely moral bioenhancement may be necessary freedom and/or freely choose to do things to volunteer for moral enhancement. to prevent against catastrophic harms that that will result in its compromise. Freely Assuming, for the sake of argument, that might result from immoral behaviour.1 In chosen moral enhancement would thus mandatory moral enhancement would “Voluntary moral enhancement and the not necessarily make moral enhancement involve a net cost for those who survival-at-any-cost bias” Vojin Rakic compatible with freedom. are enhanced (and this is dubious if man- agrees with P&S that moral bioenhance- According to P&S, questions about datory enhancement in effect prevents the ment is important, but he argues that moral enhancement only arise if there is a destruction of human life) this would not bioenhancement interventions should be sense in which we lack freedom to begin necessarily mean that mandatory enhance- voluntary rather than compulsory (see with–because “if our will is indeterministi- ment would be morally unacceptable. page 246). cally free by nature, we cannot make it First, a net loss of liberty does not entail a Both Rakic and P&S disagree with determined that we will behave morally, complete loss of liberty. Under a regime Harris, who denies that moral enhance- which fully effective moral bioenhance- of mandatory enhancement, people would ment could involve interventions beyond ment requires” (see page 251). While it maintain wide-ranging freedom of cognitive enhancement. Moral enhance- may be correct that a fully causally deter- conduct. A net loss of freedom need not ment would essentially involve cognitive mined world would be required for fully entail that “freedom would no longer be enhancement, according to Harris, effective moral bioenhancements, a intact”–a net loss of freedom might because moral behaviour requires ability remaining question is whether moral simply mean that some freedom is lost to distinguish right from wrong–ie, aware- bioenhancements might not be partially (while overall freedom remains largely ness and rational capacity.2 While Harris effective if the world is not fully causally intact). As noted by P&S, freedom is a admits that those who know what is right determined. It seems theoretically possible matter of degree. might not always do what is right, he that moral bioenhancements might make Second, as also noted by P&S, freedom argues that we could not altogether us less likely, though still ultimately free is not the only thing that matters morally. http://jme.bmj.com/ prevent people from doing what is wrong (in an indeterminstic sense), to act immor- We sometimes rightly infringe on people’s (via moral enhancements) without ally–and this might be enough to prevent freedoms in order to promote achieve- destroying freedom essential to their the catastrophic consequences that P&S ment of other societal goals such as utility moral agency. are ultimately worried about. (ie, aggregate well-being). The ethical According to Rakic, however, the fact Without getting too bogged down in a acceptability of mandatory moral that people who know what is right might perplexing discussion of the metaphysics enhancement thus largely depends on the not always do what is right reveals that of , let us focus on the question magnitude of benefits–e.g., in terms of on September 24, 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. mere cognitive enhancement would be of whether or not compulsory moral utility–that mandatory moral enhance- inadequate to prevent immoral behavior– enhancement might be ethically appropri- ment is likely to have. If the utility gains because much immoral behaviour results ate. Though compulsory intervention by of mandatory moral enhancement are from weakness of will. Because people definition involves compromise of some likely to be enormous, then the net liberty could freely chose to undergo moral freedom(s), compulsion need not involve loss (if any) might be justified. If the enhancement, furthermore, according to a net loss of freedom. Compulsory bioen- utility gains are likely to be nil or only Rakic, “our freedom will not be curtailed hancements remove the freedom to very minor, on the other hand, then the by it”. Presumably Rakic here supposes choose whether or not to be morally liberty costs might not be justified. that if a person freely choses to be in enhanced–but they might sometimes The ethical acceptability of moral State A (e.g., more altruistic, with less result in a net gain of freedom for those enhancement thus turns on key, unre- weakness of will, and morally better coerced. Those made less likely to commit solved empirical and philosophical ques- motives, etc.) then State A is necessarily criminal actions, for example, will be less tions. The empirical questions concern compatible with–and a reflection of–her likely to end up in jail. The freedom the magnitude of liberty loss from manda- human freedom. Forcing a person to be in enabled by law-abiding life might thus tory enhancement and the magnitude of State A, on the other hand, would obvi- outweigh the freedom costs of mandatory utility gain that might be expected from ously involve freedom infringement. intervention. This, and the discussion mandatory moral enhancement. As noted While this latter point is surely correct, it about free action leading to addiction and by P&S, the extent of utility gain that is not obvious that a person’s free choice so on, raises difficult questions about how might be expected from mandatory to be in some state entails that the state in freedom should be measured. We need a enhancement partly depends on how safe question is a free one. One might freely metric of freedom in order to and effective moral enhancements turn

J Med Ethics April 2014 Vol 40 No 4 215 The concise argument J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/medethics-2014-102111 on 18 March 2014. Downloaded from out to be. As noted by Rakic, the extent mandatory and voluntary interventions, this might detract from freedom to refrain of the expected utility gain also depends we should recognize that possible inter- from taking incentivised action–just as the on the extent to which moral enhance- ventions range from those that are most threat of being told you will be shot if ment reduces likelihood of catastrophe. strongly encouraged (at one end of the you don’t do something detracts from the Philosophical questions (that have a spectrum) to those that are most strongly freedom not to do it. The greater the bearing on some of the empirical ques- discouraged (at the other end of the spec- costs of not doing something, the less free tions) concern how liberty and utility (and trum). Degrees of encouragement are a we are to do otherwise. Forgone rewards any other values at stake) should be mea- function of the strength of the incentive count as costs.) We might conclude that sured. Assuming we had good metrics for provided–ie, we could provide greater or the strength of encouragement to be liberty and utility, and that we could smaller financial incentives for people to morally enhanced–or the strength of dis- accurately predict what the liberty costs be morally enhanced. Degrees of discour- couragement to remain unenhanced– and utility gains would be in the case of agement are a function of the strength of should be proportional to the utility gains mandatory moral enhancement, the the disincentive provided–ie, we could expected to result from moral enhance- million dollar philosophical question con- pose weaker (small fine) or stronger ment. Moral enhancement should thus be cerns how we should strike a balance or threats (larger fine or, stonger still, impris- mandatory–or voluntary–to an appropri- make trade-offs between these two kinds onment) to discourage enhancement ate degree. Welcome to scalar … of in cases of conflict–ie, how great refusal. Thinking in terms of degrees of would expected utility gains need to be in encouragement and discouragement facili- order for liberty costs of a given magni- tates thinking about freedom in terms of REFERENCES fi 3 – 1 Persson I, Savulescu J. The Perils of cognitive tude to be justi ed? degree ie, one is free to do something to enhancement and the urgent imperative to ehhance It is worth noting that the question the degree that she is not (strongly) dis- the of humanity. J Appl Philos “Should enhancements be mandatory or couraged from doing so, or to the degree 2008;25:162–77. voluntary?” (as though there were an that she is not provided with strong incen- 2 Harris J. Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics 2011;25:102–11. either-or distinction to be made) might tives to do otherwise. (Rakic suggests the 3 Selgelid MJ. A moderate pluralist approach to public ultimately be a red herring. Rather than possibility of incentivising moral enhance- health policy and ethics. Public Health Ethics appealing to a binary distinction between ment, but he fails to acknowledge that 2009;2:195–205. http://jme.bmj.com/ on September 24, 2021 by guest. Protected copyright.

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