The Epistemic Community and China's Revolution in Military Affairs, 1980–2002

THE POWER OF IDEAS: THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY AND CHINA’S REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS, 1980–2002

Kai Liao

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

UNSW Canberra

April 2018 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname/Family Name : Liao Given Name/s : Kai Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar : PhD Faculty. : UNSW Canberra School : School of Humanities and Social Science Thesis Title :

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

This thesis traces the origins and evolution of the ideas and concepts associated with the revolution in military affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics. More specifically, it identifies the group of RMA enthusiasts, tracing their patterns of activities, identifying their communication platforms and channels of influence, and examining their long-term impact on the RMA and ideas associated with it.

It argues that from 1980 to 2002, the policy ideas created and advanced by this RMA epistemic community (RMA EC) were crucial in defining PLA conceptions of the RMA. In the early 1980s, they contributed to the reassessing of the international security environment and shaped the Chinese leadership’s threat perception which eventually led to the shift of PLA strategic thought from preparing for imminent all-out war to peacetime army building. They also advocated a holistic, forward-looking approach to defence studies. In the mid-1980s, they proposed major PLA-wide future war studies initiatives, which resulted in introducing the concepts of local war and high-tech wars into the PLA. This eventually led to the strategy of ‘local war under high-tech conditions’, announced in 1993. In the 1990s, they kept expanding the RMA EC and engaged with military regions and group armies, disseminated their future high-tech war ideas to combat units and helping them create operational concepts. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they played a leading role in identifying the information aspect of warfare as the key of future high-tech wars. This made a significant contribution to updating the PLA’s strategic outlook from ‘local war under high-tech conditions’ to ‘local war under conditions of informationisation’. Moreover, they were among the first to introduce foreign advanced training methods such as computer simulation, realistic combat training and base-ised combat training. In sum, the RMA EC played a leading role in introducing foreign military ideas and adapting them to Chinese contexts, which eventually defined the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

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Kai Liao

Abstract

It argues that from 1980 to 2002, the policy ideas created and advanced by this RMA epistemic community (RMA EC) were crucial in defining PLA conceptions of the RMA. In the early 1980s, they contributed to the reassessing of the international security environment and shaped the Chinese leadership’s threat perception which eventually led to the shift of PLA strategic thought from preparing for imminent all- out war to peacetime army building. They also advocated a holistic, forward-looking approach to defence studies. In the mid-1980s, they proposed major PLA-wide future war studies initiatives, which resulted in introducing the concepts of local war and high-tech wars into the PLA. This eventually led to the strategy of ‘local war under high-tech conditions’, announced in 1993. In the 1990s, they kept expanding the RMA EC and engaged with military regions and group armies, disseminated their future high-tech war ideas to combat units and helping them create operational concepts. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they played a leading role in identifying the information aspect of warfare as the key of future high-tech wars. This made a significant contribution to updating the PLA’s strategic outlook from ‘local war under high-tech conditions’ to ‘local war under conditions of informationisation’. Moreover, they were among the first to introduce foreign advanced training methods such as computer simulation, realistic combat training and base-ised combat training. In sum, the RMA EC played a leading role in introducing foreign military ideas and adapting them to Chinese contexts, which eventually defined the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

vi Table of Contents

...... i Table of Contents ...... vii Acknowledgments ...... ix List of Abbreviations ...... x Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Objectives of This Study ...... 1 1.2 Literature Review ...... 12 1.3 Outline of Arguments ...... 29 1.4 Analytic Framework ...... 31 1.5 Methodology ...... 43 1.6 Scope and Limitation ...... 44 1.7 Summary of Chapters ...... 45 Chapter 2: Emergence of the RMA Epistemic Community ...... 47 2.1 Circumstances Under Which the Epistemic Community Emerged ...... 47 2.2 In Uncertain Times: The End of Cultural Revolution and Leadership Transition ...... 48 2.3 Emergence of the RMA Epistemic Community ...... 57 2.4 Conclusion ...... 68 Chapter 3: The RMA Epistemic Community and Its Core Beliefs...... 69 3.1 The RMA Epistemic Community ...... 69 3.2 Advocating a Holistic, Forward-looking Approach to Defence Studies ... 78 3.3 Conclusion ...... 92 Chapter 4: In Search of a Framework for Peacetime Defence Planning (1985–1993) ...... 93 4.1 In Uncertain Times: The 1985 Strategic Shift ...... 94 4.2 Exploring Future Local Wars and High-tech Wars ...... 98 4.3 In Search of a Framework for Peacetime Defence Planning ...... 108 4.4 In Uncertain Times: The Gulf War ...... 125 4.5 The Strategic Guidelines for the New Period ...... 132 4.6 The RMA Epistemic Community, 1985–1993 ...... 134 4.7 Conclusion ...... 144 Chapter 5: Using Operational Methods to Guide China’s Army Building (1993–1996) ...... 147 5.1 A Requirement-driven Approach to China’s Army Building ...... 148 5.2 Disseminating Ideas to and Collecting Feedbacks from Combat Troops ...... 151 5.3 Operational Methods and Operational Requirements for Future Wars ... 158 5.4 The RMA Epistemic Community, 1993–1996 ...... 172 5.5 Conclusion ...... 178 Chapter 6: The Institutionalisation of the RMA (1996–2002) ...... 179 6.1 In Uncertain Times: The Two Transformations ...... 179 6.2 Introducing the RMA ...... 181

vii 6.3 Key RMA Challenges and the PLA’s Response ...... 187 6.4 Training as a Way to Ensure the Implementation of the RMA ...... 194 6.5 Institutionalisation of the RMA ...... 206 6.6 The RMA Epistemic Community, 1996–2002 ...... 207 6.7 Conclusion ...... 210 Chapter 7: Conclusion ...... 212 7.1 Summary of Major Findings ...... 212 7.2 Significance of Results ...... 214 7.3 Implications of Findings for Future Chinese Reforms ...... 215 Bibliography ...... 217

viii Acknowledgments

I have benefited from the assistance and support of many people in completing this thesis. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Jian Zhang, for his patience and unwavering support over the years, even when it looked like I might not finish. I am also grateful to UNSW for its generous grants toward tuition, and UNSW Canberra for providing living stipend and medical insurance for my whole family.

I would like to thank Dr. Ned Dobos for securing the funding for thesis editing; staff members of our School, Bernadette McDermott, Marilyn Anderson-Smith and Shirley Ramsay, for solving numerous problems I had encountered; Elvira Berra of the Research Student Unit, for assisting me with extension of thesis submission and scholarships. I also want to give thanks to Capstone Editing, who provided copyediting and proofreading services, according to the guidelines laid out in the university-endorsed national ‘Guidelines for Editing Research Theses’.

To my family, I own debts that are beyond expression. My wife supported me throughout these years. My children, their love and affection attenuated the burdens of writing. Above all else, however, this work is dedicated to my parents for their extraordinary unconditional love and for their faith in me. (献给我的父母).

ix List of Abbreviations

AMS Academy of Military Science

BIISS Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies

BINDES Beijing Institute for National Defence Economic Studies

C3I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

CMC Central Military Commission

CCP Chinese Communist Party

COSTIND Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National

Defence

DFB Designing the Future Battlefield

GLD General Logistics Department

GSD General Staff Department

MR Military Region

MTD Military Training Department

NDDS National Defence Development Strategy

NDU National Defence University

PLA People’s Liberation Army

R&D Research and development

x RMA Revolution in military affairs

RMA EC RMA epistemic community

xi Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Objectives of This Study

In the 1990s, the concept of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) was fashionable to the extent that ‘Almost any topic could carry the RMA label found a ready sponsor’.1 But after 20 years, it is no longer even mentioned in its country of origin, the United States (US). In other once RMA-enthusiastic countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, it has almost completely disappeared. However, the RMA has been used as a framework to guide China’s military modernisation since the early 2000s. That has often been referred to as the RMA with Chinese characteristics.2 Most studies argue that China’s RMA has yielded impressive results and that China is the only potential adversary that could militarily challenge US global dominance.3 According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, ‘an emerging consensus among long-time PLA observers, including within the U.S. intelligence community, is that the Chinese military has successfully achieved a far-reaching qualitative advancement in its warfighting capabilities since the beginning of this decade [2000s]’.4 Moreover, the

1 Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (Routledge, 2004), 1. 2 Bingyan Chen and Changwei Qiu, "Promoting the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics: Innovate the Concepts and Desigin the Future (推进有中国特色军事变革:创新观念

设计未来)," The People's Liberation Army Daily, 8 April 2003.; Jacqueline Newmyer, "The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," The Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010).; Bingyan Li, "Promoting the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics (奋力推进中

国特色军事变革)," Military Journalist (军事记者), no. 11 (2003).; Aisu Gao, Weirong Zou, and Bingyan Li, "Make Contributions to the Rma with Chinese Characteristics (建功中国特色军事变革

主战场)," PLA Daily, 16 December 2005. 3 Barry Watts, "A Wake-up Call on Defense," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/a-wake-up-call-on-defense/article/2555455. 4 Ellis Joffe, " Shaping China’s Next Generation of Military Leaders: For What Kind of Army?," in The "People" in the Pla : Recruitment, Training, and Education in China's Military., ed. Roy Kamphausen,

1 importance of the RMA has been repeatedly emphasised by top Chinese military leaders. It gained even greater prominence under President Xi Jinping. In August 2014, Xi once again called for more military innovation during a Politburo RMA study session.5 Recent organisational changes since 2013 within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 6 could be considered a further step towards China’s own RMA. The creation of a separate headquarters for its ground forces and reorganisation of the military regions (MRs) into theatre commands, and the change of the organisations of the Central Military Commission (CMC) are reminiscent of the RMA proposals in the 1990s.7 In the last five years, Xi, as the new chairman of the CMC, implemented three pieces of military reform which significantly altered the organisation of the PLA. Western analysts have noted that ‘Chinaʼs military has been according greater, if not decisive, importance to the information dimension of regional or local conflicts fought below the nuclear threshold under high-tech conditions’.8

What exactly is the RMA with Chinese characteristics? In its 2004 Defence White Paper, China officially defined the RMA with Chinese characteristics, as ‘building an informationised force and winning an informationised war…the RMA

Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner ([Carlisle, PA]: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 385.; Jane's, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 4 April 2005. 5 Adrian Wan, "President Xi Jinping Calls for Technical and Strategic 'Innovations' by Military," South China Morning Post, 31 August 2014. 6 "The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Cpc Central Committee: Deepening Reforms of the Military Organisations and System.( 十八届三中全会：深化军队体制编制调整改革)," Sina.com, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-11-12/190328690984.shtml.; Feng Ding, "Deepening National Defence and Military Reforms: A New Milestone in China’s Reform (中国深化国防和军队改革：

里程碑意义的变革)," Oriental Outlook Weekly ( 瞭望东方周刊), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/04/c_1117360403.htm. 7 For example, Jixian Liu, "Accelerating Organisational Reforms (加速推进编制体制改革)," PLA

Daily, 29 April 1997.; Zhaoyin Zhang, "Organisational Changes Increase Combat Capbilities (结构调整出战斗力)," ibid., 22 April.; Zhenyu Mi; Qingrong Wang; Chaoying Qin; Yichang Liu; Xuehui Chen; Jixian Liu; Weimin Chen; Fang Chen; Yanyan Li; Ning Yi; Lumin Lan; Yide Gong; Xizhi Wu; Jinsheng Xiao; Miao Li, Concepts for China’s National Defence (中国的国防构想), National

Defence & the Future (国防与未来丛书) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1988). 8 Watts, "A Wake-up Call on Defense".

2 with Chinese characteristics with informationalisation at the core’.9 It further specified its aim of the RMA as, ‘to win local wars under informationised conditions’.10 China’s 2015 Defence White Paper, while arguing that ‘the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars’, acknowledges that ‘The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage…The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization’.11 Thus, the white paper updated one element of the RMA with Chinese characteristics from ‘winning local war under informationised conditions’ to ‘winning informationised local wars’. 12 In short, the most recent definition of the RMA with Chinese characteristics is, ‘winning informationised local wars, and building an informationised military.13 This definition comprises various elements (concepts): informstionisation, local war, informationised military.

The PLA’s adoption and the definition of the RMA presents a series of puzzles. First, for over two decades, the issue of the Chinese RMA generated numerous studies, a vast amount of literature, considerable debate and various results. Most research on the Chinese RMA and military innovation focused on the question of what the causes of the RMA were, with explanations centred on external threats. Many studies suggest that it was the Gulf War that forced China to embrace the RMA. The majority of the literature examines structural factors, such as the nature of the international system, while a few approaches examine the impact of domestic politics and individual personalities. While many of these approaches identified a number of reasons for China embracing the RMA, they did not explain why did China responded to the threat posed by the US by embracing the RMA instead of other countering measures—for example, by strengthening its nuclear deterrence, as the US has recently begun.14 More

9 Information Office of the State Council, "China’s National Defense in 2004," (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004). 10 Ibid. 11 Information Office of the State Council, "China’s Military Strategy," (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 United States Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review," (Federation of American Scientists, 2018).

3 importantly, why did China chose the aforementioned combination of concepts to define its own RMA? The concepts of the RMA, and those concepts associated with the Chinese RMA (i.e., informatisation, local war and informationised military), are imported from either the US or the Soviet Union (USSR). But it is the unique combination of those concepts that is considered Chinese characteristics. Adler argues, ‘Creativity or innovation does not involve new ideas but new combinations of ideas’.15 How did the PLA achieved this innovation and what the rationale is behind this new combination of ideas remains unanswered. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining the evolution of a Chinese defence epistemic community, its ideas and its influence on the Chinese RMA. It addresses the questions of why China adopted the RMA and why China choose to adopt this combination of concepts as its own version of the RMA.

Tracing the origins and the evolution of the concept of the Chinese RMA and ideas associated with it is important for several reasons. Theoretically, the Chinese RMA offers an expansion on the literature on military innovation. The existing literature on military innovation tends to depict military changes or innovation as necessarily a top-down process.16 Most models consider senior leaders as the key to military innovation. This study presents an alternative model to explain the causes and evolution of military changes. It also contributes towards an understanding of the role that a community of experts and their ideas play in military policymaking.

Empirically, there are many studies on the causes of the Chinese RMA, but no systemic examination of the origins and evolution of the ideas associated with it. By tracing the role of a defence epistemic community in the current RMA, this study contributes towards a better understanding of why China adopted the aforementioned combination of concepts for its own version of the RMA. Moreover, the study of the role of the epistemic community has implications beyond the current RMA—it will

15 Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation : National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," International organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 123. 16 Eliot A Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (2004). Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," ibid.29, no. 5 (2006).

4 also provide us with a better understanding of PLA decision-making and predict future policy development. For example, helping to predict how China would respond to the ongoing automation revolution and the US third offset strategy.

This thesis adapts the epistemic communities framework to trace the origins and evolution of the ideas and concepts associated with the Chinese RMA. It recognises the role of international variables (e.g., technology and external threats) in causing the RMA. It also recognises the role of domestic variables (e.g., the end of the Cultural Revolution and the rise of Deng) in creating an intellectual climate for the emergence of defence intellectuals. However, this study does not accept that international factors or domestic factors, alone or together, are sufficient to explain the development of the Chinese RMA over time. An additional variable is necessary for a complete explanation of why China embraced the RMA and adopted certain concepts and ideas as the main elements of the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

This thesis argues that, first, there exist an epistemic community that has been a major force advocating the RMA and ideas associated with it since the early 1980s; second, this community was at the front of the learning curve studying foreign military theories and ideas, and introduced those RMA-related concepts to China and adapted them to the Chinese context; third, this community addressed uncertainties caused by various policy changes and international crises and successfully seized them as opportunities to adopting their ideas into Chinese contexts, and raised importance of those concepts by associating them with official Chinese policies; and fourth, this community was skilful in exploiting all channels and platforms available to influence policymaking and disseminating their ideas to the whole PLA.

1.1.1 Concepts

This section discusses key concepts relevant to this study. Those concepts include, military innovation, revolution in military affairs, strategic guidelines, strategic principle, the RMA with Chinese characteristics, and the relations between those concepts.

Military Innovation

5 The study of RMA often lies in the literature of military innovation studies. Rosen defines a major military innovation as, “a change that forces one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions. Such innovations involve a new way of war, with new ideas of how the components of the organisation relate to each other and to the enemy, and new operational procedures conforming to those ideas. They involve changes in the critical military tasks, the tasks around which warplans revolve.”17 Isaacson et al. define it as, “For a specific military, innovation is manifested by the development of new warfighting concepts and/or new means of integrating technology. New means of integrating technology might include revised doctrine, tactics, training, or support.”18

According to Mahnken’s, military services often achieve military innovation in three distinct but often overlapping phases: speculation, experimentation, and implementation. As will be discussed section 1.6, this study examines mainly the speculation phase, and to a lesser extent, the experimentation phase. Table 1 illustrates key indicators of innovation.

Table 1: Potential Indicators of Military Innovation 19 Phase 1 Speculation Publication of concept papers, books, journal articles, speeches, and studies regarding new combat methods. Formation of groups to study the lessons of recent wars. Establishment of intelligence collection requirements focused upon foreign innovation activities. Phase 2 Experimentation Existence of an organization charged with innovation and experimentation.

17 Stephen Peter Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," International Security 13, no. 1: 134. 18 Jeffrey A Ilsaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, "Predicting Military Innovation," (RAND ARROYO CENTER SANTA MONICA CA, 1999), 8. 19 Thomas Mahnken, "China's Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective," Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 3 (2011): 304.

6 Establishment of experimental organizations and testing grounds. Field training exercises to explore new warfare concepts. Wargaming by war colleges, the defense industry, and think-tanks regarding new warfare areas. Phase 3 Implementation Establishment of new units to exploit, counter innovative mission areas. Revision of doctrine to include new missions. Establishment of new branches, career paths. Changes in the curriculum of professional military education institutions. Field training exercises to practise, reﬁne concepts.

The revolution in military affairs.

The revolution in military affairs has generally been considered as a type of military innovation but with much greater scale and magnitude than military innovation. For example, Gray defines the RMA as, “a radical change in the character or conduct of war.”20 Similarly, Marshall also emphasises on the magnitude, arguing that, “Military revolutions are generally understood to be changes in military technology, concepts of operation, and military organisations which, over the course of perhaps two or three decades, transform the conduct of war and make possible order-of-magnitude gains in military effectiveness.”21 “What is revolutionary is not the pace of change but the character of the change and the degree of improvement in military capability obtained.” 22 Jiang Zemin argues that, “the new revolution in military affairs will spur a complete transformation of the army and fundamental

20 Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History, 4. 21Andrew Marshall, "Introduction," in The Revolution in Military Affairs : Warfare in the Information Age, ed. Keith Thomas (Canberra: Canberra : Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1997), 3. 22Andrew W Marshall, "Rma Update," Office Of The Secretary Of Defense, Director Of Net Assessment (1994).

7 changes in the way the wars are fought.”23 In this study, RMA will be defined as changes in military technology, operational concepts, and military organisations together make a significant change in the conduct and the nature of warfare.

In short, military innovation and the RMA are two similar concepts. The major difference between the two concepts is that military innovation is a more general term, including military innovations at tactic, operational and strategic levels, while the RMA is of a much greater magnitude and scale.

The RMA with Chinese Characteristics

The term ‘RMA with Chinese characteristics’ is the PLA’s official expression, which essentially means China’s RMA. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, all elements of the ‘RMA with Chinese characteristics’ are adopted from foreign militaries. For example, the concept of informationisation is essentially the same with the U.S. concept of network-centric warfare. Local war doctrine was learned from the U.S and the USSR.

Most Chinese analysts understand the RMA as a by-product of a broader social and technological transformation. They believe that, in the history, the nature of warfare has gone through five stages: from barehanded era, cold weapons, hot weapons era, mechanised (or nuclear) weapons era, to high-tech (or informationised) weapons era. Corresponded with social and industrial developments from stone age to information age.24 For example, Zheng Wenhan argues that, “In the history of war, the development of weapons and equipment can be divided into several stages, namely cold weapons, hot weapons, nuclear weapons, and high-tech weapons. The magnificent development of weapons and technical equipment and their

23 Zemin Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 3 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2010), 571. 24 For example, Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000); Yonggang Fang, "The World Revolution in Military Afairs and the Leap——Ahead Development of Pla Modernization," China Military Science 17, no. 1 (2004).; Jijun Li, "Notes on Military Theory and Military Strategy," in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (DIANE Publishing, 1997), 225.

8 applications to the army promote the development and change of military organisation, war patterns, and operational ways and methods.” 25 Zhang Qinsheng’s definition was slightly different from him by adding bare-handed battles, saying that, “After going through the stages of bare-handed battles, cold steel weapons, hot steel weapons, and mechanisation, military operations are now entering the information age. These five major military revolutions corresponded with five industrial revolutions.”26

The Chinese understanding of the current RMA is associated with the new technological revolution they began to discuss in the early 1980s, heavily influenced by Toffler’s The Third Wave, and John Naisbitt’s Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives. 27 Both authors focusing on the social development and anticipating an information age. For example, Qian Xuesen argues that, “The world has entered a period of new military revolution, which is a reflection of social, economic, and scientific and technological changes in the military field. Information technology is the nucleus and foundation of this military revolution.”28 As will be discussed in the following chapters, since the 1980s, some EC members had been arguing that information technology is at the core of the new RMA.29 However, the PLA high command realised that the essence of high-tech warfare is informationised warfare in 1998.30

25 Wenhan Zheng, "Categories of Military Science," in Chinese Wiews of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (DIANE Publishing, 1994), 207. 26 Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (DIANE Publishing, 1997), 405-06. 27 Bingyan Li, A New Analysis of Sun Zi (孙子谋略新论) (The PLA Publishing House, 2014), 415. 28 Qinsheng Zhang, "Military Conflicts in the New Era (时代特征与新时期军事斗争)," PLA Daily, 16 July 1996. 29 Weiguang Shen, "The Nucleus of the Current World Revolution in Military Affairs — an

Introducation to Information Warfare (当今世界军事革命的重心— 信息战研究导论)," ibid., 7 November 1995; Feilong Jiang, "Shen Weiguang—the Father of Information Warfare (信息战之父沈

伟光)," Memories and Archives (档案春秋), no. 4 (2005).; Xiaoming Zhang, Brain Power of China

(中国高层新智囊) (Beijing: Guangming Daily, 2006), 394. 30 Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 3, 570.

9 Since the late 1980s, Chinese scholars and officials have been referring to the RMA as a new world-wide RMA, 31 considering it as a world trend. China was simply responding to the world RMA, or the challenges posed by the new world RMA.32 Although official PLA documents refer to ‘winning informationised local wars, and building an informationised military’, as the RMA with Chinese characteristics. They should be more accurately understood as China’s RMA, since all those elements (informationised local wars, informationised military) are adopted from foreign militaries.

Strategic guidelines (战略方针, zhanlue fangzhen)

Strategic guidelines is the highest-level national military guidance in China. According to China’s first Minister of National Defence, Marshal Peng Dehuai, the strategic guidelines has tow main components, relating to “the fundamental nature of army building, troop training, and war preparations.” 33 Former Chairman of the CMC, Jiang Zemin defines it as, “a systematic review of long-term experiences of our army in combat and army building, and provides scientific thinking and principles for strategic guidance.”34 Some Western analysts understand it as the “general principles and general programs for guiding the overall situation of military struggle”.35 While

31 Ibid., 568.; Bingyan Li, "Military Prospect Publishes a Long Article—the Current World Rma and

Our Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period (当今世界军事革命和我军新时期战略方针)," PLA Daily, 11 April 1995.; Feng Zhang; Bingyan Li, "A Report on “Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ”迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈

会”评述)," ibid., 2 January 1996.; Shen, "The Nucleus of the Current World Revolution in Military Affairs—an Introducation to Information Warfare (当今世界军事革命的重心— 信息战研究导论)."

32 Li, "A Report on “Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ”迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)."; Qinsheng Zhang, "Facing

Challenges and Thinking About Countermeasures (面对挑战思考对策)," ibid., 16 January. 33 Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity.47; Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan [Peng Dehuai’s selected works on military affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988), p. 587. 34 Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 3, 570. 35 M. Taylor Fravel, "The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanlüexue," in China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the

10 Western scholars mostly use the term Strategic guidelines, 36 and treat it as equivalent to U.S. concept of military strategy.37 PLA official documents also refer to it as Strategic Principle.38 In this study, I will stick to the concept of ‘strategic guidelines’.

The relations between the RMA and strategic guidelines is that, the Military strategic guidelines are most definitive Chinese military documents (doctrine), when the RMA and related concepts were included in the strategic guidelines, they are considered as officially adopted by the PLA. For example, Jiang Zemin in 2003 mentions that, the 1993 strategic guidelines “correctly evaluated the development trends in the new world revolution in military affairs that emerged at that time. This principle [the 1993 strategic guidelines] plays an extremely important guiding role for future military preparedness and modernisation.” 39 In other words, in 1993, the PLA had already done a thorough assessment of the world RMA, although had not decided how to respond to it. The evolution of the PLA’s local war doctrine, from winning a local war under high-tech conditions, to winning local war under informationised conditions, then to winning an informationised local war, suggests that the RMA and ideas associated with it, are an ongoing process since the 1990s, not even concluded by now.

The remainder of this chapter is organised into the following four sections. Section 1.2 discusses the existing military innovation literature and explanations for the Chinese RMA, highlighting the insufficiency of these explanations. Section 1.3

Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, ed. James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (RAND Corporation, 2002), 84. 36 David M. Finkelstein, "China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the “Military Strategic Guidelines”," in Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Cntours of China's Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, 2007); Fravel, "The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanlüexue." 37 Finkelstein, "China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the “Military Strategic Guidelines”."; Fravel, "The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanlüexue." 38 Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 3, 569. 39 Ibid.

11 presents the main arguments of this study while Section 1.4 outlines the analytical framework. Section 1.5 introduces the research methodology and Section 1.6 outlines the thesis structure.

1.2 Literature Review

In this section, existing explanations for Chinese military reforms are discussed and the insufficiency of these explanations highlighted. While the contributions of those explanations are acknowledged, it is argued that we require a new approach to study the intellectual aspect of the Chinese RMA development.

The literature on military innovation identifies various driving factors behind major military reforms or innovations. They fall roughly into three categories (although there is a degree of overlap between all three), defined by Kenneth Waltz as ‘three images of analysis’ or ‘three levels of analysis’: the system level (international system), the unit level (domestic) and individual level.40

1.2.1 International Level

This level of analysis assumes that the international system is anarchic and states are unitary actors seeking to advance national interests and maximise power. The international security environment is composed of many factors that are not under the control of any governments or military but that constrain or create opportunities for the military. For example, the changing balance of power, technological developments and geography.

1.2.1.1 Balance of Threat

Neorealists would expect military reforms as a result of changes in the balance of power between states. According to balance of power theory, balancing behaviour

40 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War : A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). J David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 14, no. 01 (1961).

12 occurs when threats appear greater or war appears probable. 41 Therefore, a state changes its military strategy when facing foreign threats or perceiving a change in an adversary’s war plans.42 Zisk takes the interaction between opponents as a zero-sum game, arguing that when one state believes that its military innovation enhances its own security, its opponents will perceive this military innovation as a threat to its national security. This often result in a competition in doctrinal innovation between states.43 She defines this response as reactive innovation, which may or may not mirror the opponent’s innovation.44

Regarding why and when states emulate other states’ military innovation, Goldman’s study of Meiji Japan suggests that achieving great power status was the key motivation behind Japan’s emulation of Western military models.45 Resende- Santos draws on realism to argue that states are concerned with their competitive effectiveness and emulate the states proven to be successful in their institutional and technological practices. Arguing against the neorealist argument that shifts in the global distribution of capabilities determine the balancing behaviour of states, Resende-Santos proposes the concept of states’ levels of vulnerability, akin to an index comprised of various indicators (including geographic proximity, liabilities and assets, aggregate and offensive military capabilities, and the availability of external alliance options), and argues that it is the changes in the main components of levels of vulnerability that determine states balancing behaviour.46

41Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine : France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 59. 42 Taylor Fravel, "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy," International Security 42, no. 3 (2018): 42. 43 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Engaging the Enemy : Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 9. 44Ibid., 3. 45Emily O. Goldman, "The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan," in The Sources of Military Change : Culture, Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 46 J. Resende-Santos, Military Emulation in the International System (Harvard University, 1997), 3.

13 The most frequent answers to as why the PLA embraced the RMA emphasise the role of external determinants, such as lessons of the Gulf War and Kosovo War. For example, Pollpeter points out that ‘the PLA’s drive to develop an informationised force began in the early 1990s and was a response to the revolution in military affairs and the performance of the U.S. military in Operation Desert Storm’.47 Chase et al. argues that the US victory in Operation Desert Storm, 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Kosovo War and accidental 1999 US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade demonstrated to the Chinese leadership that China lacked a military that could win wars against modern opponents and motivated Chinese leaders to invest more resources into modernising and professionalising its military.48 Wortzel supports this argument and shows that the PLA began its own RMA after observing US information operations in the Gulf War and Kosovo War.49 He concludes that China did not only learn from the US, but adopted concepts from both the US and the USSR. This explains why China accelerated its defence spending in the mid-1990s.50 Scholars such as Yung have presented a systemic explanation of the origins of the Chinese RMA. According to this interpretation, the Gulf War and Falklands War reminded the Chinese of the potential for US intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Yung argues that China’s current A2/AD strategy has been inspired by this conflict.51

47 David Lai, "Introduction," in The Pla at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 25. 48 Michael S Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (Pla) (Rand Corporation, 2015), iii. 49 Larry M Wortzel, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), xi. 50 Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (Pla). 51 Christopher D. Yung, "Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/ Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/ Malvinas Conflict," in Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011).

14 Studies have also identified various war scenarios or contingencies52 as major external threats driving China’s military developments. Easton argues that because the Chinese Communist Party ‘bases its legitimacy on upholding disputed territorial sovereignty claims, the most important goal driving PLA strategy in the Asia-Pacific is to defend against the possibility that China may lose these ‘core interests’. 53 However, other analysts argue that although Taiwan, Japan and South China Sea contingencies are considered as direct threats to China’s national interests, the US is the ultimate adversary driving China’s military modernisation. For example, Godwin argues that among all security threats in the extensive security environment, the US is the major source of the PLA’s strategic concern: ‘The apprehension about U.S. strategic intent, therefore, is the driver for much of the PLA’s modernisation programs and doctrinal evolution encompassing all realms of military operations from space to submarine warfare’.54 In a study of the PLA’s operational capabilities, Lai concludes that the initiation of China’s RMA was largely due to various crises caused by the US. He argues that, in the practical sense, various events, such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the The Hainan Island incident in 2001 spurred Chinese modernisation. At the strategic level, the US RMA demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991, Kosovo War, 2001 Afghanistan War and 2003 Iraq War respectively forced the Chinese to assess the potentials of the RMA and its implications for China.55

The balance of threat approach, though persuasive, has some empirical problems. First, realists overestimate the role played by conflicts in other countries in generating the Chinese RMA. The approach does not explain why other states that were facing significant military threats did not embrace the RMA. In other words, security threats appears to be necessary but not sufficient for explaining why states

52 For example, Taiwan contingency and South and East China Sea contingencies 53 Ian Easton, "China’s Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability," The Pro-ject 2049 (2013): 4. 54 Paul H. B. Godwin, "The People’s Liberation Army and the Changing Global Security Landscape," in The Pla at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 87. 55 Lai, "Introduction," 12-13.

15 make military innovation. You Ji argues that China’s strategy of winning a local war under high-tech conditions was a capability-based rather than threat-based strategy, as China changed its military doctrine despite the benign international security environment in the early 1990s, and this strategy did not target any specific adversaries.56

Second, this approach has problems explaining when and under what circumstances particular threats will be taken into considerations for military reform or innovation, because they fail to address domestic political issues and economic conditions that are an unavoidable part of policymaking.

Third, studies employing this approach did not explain why China, when facing external threats, choose to reduce the size of its military while increasing the quality of its weapons and personnel, instead of increasing the quantity or otherwise strengthening its nuclear deterrence. In other words, realism can explain how structural conditions (e.g., the collapse of the USSR and the Gulf War) created a demand for new ideas in defence planning, but the it fails to show why some ideas were selected over others.

While structural conditions can create pressure for military innovation, they alone cannot force innovation or reform. To influence the outcome, structural conditions need to be perceived and acted upon by policymakers who recognise the threats to their national security and launch policy proposals accordingly. What lies between external threats and policymakers are policy experts who interpret external events and provide policy advice.

1.2.1.2 Technology

A second external driver of military innovation is new technologies. Those who posit technology as a determinant of military innovation argue that as information technology revolutionises the civilian economy, it also revolutionises the conduct of warfare. Some studies argue that the diffusion of technologies has historically

56 Ji You, China's Military Transformation (Cambridge. UK: Polity Press, 2016), 126.

16 provided a stimulus for states to modernise their military forces.57 For example, Soviet military writings in the 1980s consider developments in technology as a key motivator for military innovation. The Soviets particularly emphasised the importance of technological advantage and its implications for the nature of future warfare. Thus, they coined the term Military-Technical Revolution. Additionally, some participants of the US RMA debates in the 1990s attributed innovative warfighting to advances in technology. They generally consider the Gulf War as a successful demonstration of superior US military technologies. For example, Owen suggests that it was the developments in electronic and computational technologies which significantly improved US precision strike and C4IRS capabilities.58 In other words, the PLA’s leadership was impressed by the technologies demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm rather than feeling threatened by the US military capabilities.

However, opponents to this suggest that technology alone does not determine the success of military innovation. Military organisations must make innovative changes in their training and doctrine to fully exploit new technologies. In other words, it is ‘how people respond to technology that produces seismic shifts in warfare.’ 59 They argue that the Soviets placed too much emphasis on technology, which neglected changes in other areas such as organisational structures and operational concepts.60 Root argues that ‘Technology only sets the parameters of the possible and creates the potential for military revolution. What indeed produces an actual innovation is the extent to which militaries recognise and exploit the opportunities inherent in new tools of war, through organisational structures and deployment of force’.61 This explains

57 Geoffrey Lucas Herrera, "The Mobility of Power : Technology, Diffusion, and International System Change" (1995). 58 William A Owens, "The Emerging Us System-of-Systems," (WASHINGTON DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University. US, 1996). 59 For example, Thomas A Keaney and Eliot A Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (US Government Printing Office Washington, DC, 1993); Michael E. O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 60 For example, Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report; O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. 61 Max Boot, War Made New : Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York: New York : Gotham Books, 2006), 10.

17 why Andrew Marshall, former director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment and a major RMA advocate, changed the concept of Military-Technical Revolution to the RMA. Over the years, scholars have reached a consensus that technological inventions or innovations do not necessarily cause military innovation. Technology is one factor contributing to military innovation but is far from being the only or deciding factor. How militaries make organisational, doctrinal and conceptual adaptations to best exploit technologies is the key to the successful occurrence of an RMA.

Although many studies recognise external factors as a cause for military innovation, there are other potential causes. It is the domestic factors that drive the process of the innovation. That is, once external factors help trigger military innovation, their role will diminish. Eventually, domestic factors, such as civil– military relations, economic constraints and organisational culture, will determine the process and the outcome. As Farrell argues, ‘These international drivers—new operational challenges and military emulation—give militaries reason to innovate; but the process and nature of the innovation that follows are shaped by a number of factors that are internal to the state in question’.62

There are, of course, studies focus on defence and technological industries and their role in promoting China’s military reforms. For example, Feigenbaum’s study examines how China's efforts to develop science and technology have transformed some of its most important policy-making institutions. He conducted his study on four levels of analysis: “the Chinese political and military leadership; the network of strategic weapons scientists, engineers, and administrators; the organisational systems that that have comprised the bureaucratic context that frames their work; and the external environment confronting Chinese decision-makers in the changing international system of the 1950s-1960s.”63 His approach basically is in accordance with Waltz’s four levels of analysis. By linking technology development to national

62 Theo Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008): 782. 63 Evan Feigenbaum, "The Military Transforms China: The Politics of Strategic Technology from the Nuclear to the Information Age, Unpublished Ph. D" (dissertation, Political Science, Stanford University, 1997), 11.

18 politics, his study emphasises the unique role that the strategic weapons elite has played across four decades of Chinese technology development.64 He also argues that “institutional continuity has been among the most essential features of China's adaptation to technological change since the mid-1970s.”65

1.2.2 Domestic Level

States are the unit of analysis at this level, which looks to a country’s economic and social structure, bureaucracy, political system, coalitions of interest groups, national culture and ideology and other factors for the causes of military innovation. Farrell identifies three domestic causes and drivers of military innovation: resources constraints, civil–military relations and military culture. He argues that those factors determine a nation’s reactions to the external environment.66 This approach challenges the idea that China’s reform decisions are determined solely by external threats, and instead posits that explanations of China’s military reforms should focus primarily on domestic politics, bureaucracy and economic changes. For example, Mulvenon et al. argues that China’s response to the US RMA will be constrained by its own national security goals,67 major political and social challenges, and financial and technological constraints.68 That is, the future of China’s military reforms is contingent on factors such as domestic politics and economic development.

1.2.2.1 Culture

Another influential explanation for the Chinese RMA seeks to explain how cultural factors determine China’s defence policies and military reforms. This argument puts forward the notion that, to fully understand how and why these military reforms occur, analysts must understand the role of the normative and causal beliefs

64 Ibid., 15. 65 Ibid. 66 Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," 783. 67 For example, political stability, national reunification, comprehensive national power, and rapid economic development. 68 James C. Mulvenon, "Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense," Rand, http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=784090.

19 held by key decision-makers. Yoshihara, building his study on earlier literature on strategic culture, examines Chinese strategic culture and ancient strategic texts, and explains how Chinese strategic culture impacts the pattern of its military innovations. He considers strategic culture as a central driving force behind the patterns of China’s strategic and technological choices. 69 Similarly, Gill and Henley argue that Confucianism, which values the maintenance of status quo and stability, tends to avoid revolutionary change.70 Newmyer argues that ‘a traditional Chinese strategic outlook emphasising superior information, intelligence, and the manipulation of perceptions to prepare the battlefield in peacetime shapes the People’s Republic Of China’s (PRC’s) approach to the RMA’. 71 However, history indicates that emulating or learning from the military reforms of other countries is not a natural reaction in China. The Chinese culture is far from being innovative or open minded. Many Chinese analysts argue that China missed two RMAs in the past few centuries, the last one being prior to the First Sino–Japanese War (with China’s reluctance to embrace the RMA being one reason for China’s defeat).72

1.2.2.2 Economy

Many Chinese analysts suggest that military innovation or RMA often happen during peace, or in an era of prosperity, instead of during a war or chaos. They generally believe that military revolutions are linked with and, to some extent, are a subclass of broader societal revolutions.73 This view in China was probably influenced

69Yoshihara Toshi and Toshi Yoshihara, "Chinese Strategic Culture and Military Innovation : From the Nuclear to the Information Age" (Thesis (Ph.D.)--Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2004., 2004). 70 Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, "China and the Revolution in Military Affairs," (Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 21. 71 Newmyer, "The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," 483. 72 Jian Cheng, Chunxiang Lu, and Fanjun Kong, "Exploreing New Model for Our Army’s Quality

Development (探索我军质量建设新模式)," PLA Daily, 18 February 1997.; Huaqing Liu, "Defence Modernisation in Historical Perspective," in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (DIANE Publishing, 1997), 116. 73For example, Wei Yang, "Tactical Studies," ibid.; Zhiqing (刘志清) Liu, "The Basic Foctors That

Initiated the New Revolution in Military Affairs (新军事变革开启的基本因素)," SOCIAL

SCIENCES REVIEW 21, no. 12 (2006): 140; Xiaoli (朱小莉) Zhu, American and Russian New

20 by the concept of ‘social waves’ introduced by Toffler and Toffler in their book, War and Anti-war. In this book, they examined three waves of civilisation (Agrarian, Industrial and Information), arguing that revolution in productivity will naturally cause a revolution in war. For them, military change is the product of broad social and economic changes. 74 In their words, ‘smart tools in the economy produce smart weapons for war’.75 This is in line with Joffe’s argument that ‘those reforms have been determined by China’s economic capabilities and the leadership’s threat perception’.76 This approach, however, cannot explain why China missed the last two major RMAs when its share of global GDP was, at these times, comparatively far larger than in the 1990s.

1.2.2.3 Domestic Politics

In addition to economic and technological changes, some studies posit that military reforms are a response to domestic political considerations that have only marginal relations to international factors. Although those studies do discuss the threats and challenges China faces from other countries, in general they conclude that the top priority of China’s military modernisation is to preserve the legitimacy of the CCP as the sole government. 77 For example, Tanner, when defining the PLAs ‘Historic Missions’ in 2005, listed domestic security missions above the mission of

Revolution in Military Affairs (美俄新军事革命) (Military Science Press, 1996). ; Qinsheng Zhang, "

信息化战争的基本特征与发展趋势 (Informationised Warfare: Essential Features and Its Trend of

Development)," in 军事变革与军事斗争准备 (Revlution in Military Affairs and Preparations for Military Struggle), ed. Zongren Wen (温宗仁) (国防大学杂志社 (National Defence University Press),

2003), 101.; Cheng, Lu, and Kong, "Exploreing New Model for Our Army’s Quality Development

(探索我军质量建设新模式)."; Li, "Notes on Military Theory and Military Strategy."; Jingmin Xiao and Bin Bao, "21st Century Land Operations," ibid., 311.; Zhang, "Military Conflicts in the New Era (时代特征与新时期军事斗争)." 74 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Making Sense of Today's Global Chaos (Warner, 1995). 75 Ibid., 83. 76 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), vii-viii. 77 Andrew S Erickson et al., Strategic Asia 2012-13: China's Military Challenge, vol. 12 (NBR, 2012), 31.; Easton, "China’s Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability," 4.

21 fighting against Taiwanese independence. 78 Kamphausen argues that the PLA’s reluctance to become involved in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident is a factor in Chinese decision-makers considering more dramatic reforms. Erickson et al. point to ‘the dramatic increase in defence spending since 1990 as evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement between the PLA and the Politburo’.79 Fravel’s recent study finds a high degree of correspondence between the unity of the CCP leadership and the PLA’s changes in military strategy. He argues that the Chinese leadership tend to delegate more responsibility for military affairs to the PLA when the CCP leadership manages to reach basic consensus on policies and authority structure, and this, in turn, allows the PLA to make rapid responses to military innovation.80 Cavezza attributes the PLA’s continuous doctrinal changes to domestic stability issues such as the Tiananmen Square incident,81 Xinjiang Muslim separatists, collaboration between domestic separatists and international hostile forces in an attempt to split the motherland, the Taiwan issue and pro-democracy movement within China.82 In this context, an argument can be made that military reforms are an instrument of the CCP to preserve power and maintain internal stability.

1.2.3 Individual Level

There are studies that do acknowledge individual contributions to policymaking, but mostly ascribe key roles to the top decision-makers under whom a policy was promulgated. Studies using this approach often attribute the success of military innovation to individuals who have strategic and long-term visions. Rosen and analysts at the Centre of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments refer to them as

78 Murray Scot Tanner, "How China Manages Internal Security Challenges and Its Impact on Pla Missions,”" Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (2009). 79 Erickson et al., Strategic Asia 2012-13: China's Military Challenge, 12, 31. 80 Fravel, "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy." 81 Carmen James Cavezza, "The Changing Roles and Missions of the Pla: The Challenge of Modernization" (George Washington University, 1993), 1. 82 Ibid., 25-32.

22 visionary leaders who mobilise change within their organisations. 83 Per Zisk, ‘Sometimes military officers alone formulate and interpret doctrine; other times, civilian leaders have significant direct or indirect influence over doctrinal decisions’.84 In Western military innovation studies, the debate centred on whether civilian or military leaders are the most important driver for military change—both of these are discussed below.

Some scholars argue that civilian leaders’ support is essential for military innovation. Civilian leaders are more pro-innovation, as they do not have a stake in existing organisational structures. They often force uninformed changes. For example, Posen, in his comparative study of the inter-war military doctrine of the British Royal Air Force, French army and German army, concludes that there was little internally generated innovation, with the only innovation, in the British Royal Air Force, being largely attributed to civilian intervention.85 He argues that civilian leaders initiate an innovation, but mavericks may compensate their lack of military knowledge. Similarly, Lang argues that because militaries are usually tradition-oriented, they are opposed to significant changes and innovation. Without civilian intervention, military organisations are likely to resist to innovation.86

Conversely, Zisk asserts that military institutions do not usually resist doctrinal innovation. Military officers are very sensitive and reactive to strategic threats posed by foreign countries, and military leaders’ perception and analysis of potential future

83"Fostering Revolutionary Innovation," (The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2006), 15.; Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation : The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010), 135. 84 Marten, Engaging the Enemy : Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991, 3. 85Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine : France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 224,26. 86Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 857.

23 adversaries is a driving force for military innovation.87 Rosen, another influential voice in this debate, argues that military leaders are the driving force for innovation in training and doctrine: ‘Peacetime innovation has been possible when senior military officers with traditional credentials, reacting not to intelligence about the enemy but to a structural change in the security environment, have acted to create a new promotion pathway for junior officers practicing a new way of war’.88 Therefore, military innovations are sustainable when supported by military leaders who implement relevant personnel policies. Nielsen’s study on peacetime military reforms focuses on the US Army in the 1970s and early 1980s and examines three additional failed or incomplete reforms and one successful reform. She argues that leaders within military organisations are essential to the process of military reforms, but suggests that the impact of external developments is uncertain:

Political leaders’ interpretations of the international environment, and their decisions on issues such as the military budget and conscription, shape the parameters within which military leaders act. However, military leaders play an important role in determining how to manage these challenges and constraints, and develop the specific programs and policies that shape military institutions in important ways’.89

Similar problems exist in studies on Chinese military changes, including the RMA. There are many Chinese studies that recognise that various doctrinal changes from the late 1970s to the early 2000s led to the RMA. But whenever commenting on how and why the PLA make the enabling assessments of the security environment and changes to its doctrine, these studies almost inevitably attribute these changes to Deng, Jiang or Hu’s personal visions.90

87K.M. Zisk and Stanford University. Dept. of Political Science, Soviet Reactions to Shifts in U.S. And Nato Military Doctrine in Europe: The Defense Policy Community and Innovation (Stanford University, 1990). 88S.P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Cornell University Press, 1994), 251. 89Suzanne Christine Nielsen, "Preparing for War : The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform" (2003), 2. 90 For example, Junwei Wang, "Understanding Our Country’s Guiding Principles of Military Strategy:

From a National Security Interest Perspective (从国家安全利益的发展看我国军事战略方针的抉择

24 Some scholars believe that leadership transition often creates changes in policies. Joffe argues that ‘military policy is shaped by a variety of considerations but it is the leadership’s perception of threat that is paramount. The nature of the threat and the response to it are decisive in determining the doctrine of the armed forces and their development’.91 He highlights that the leadership transition from Mao to Deng initiated reforms in every area, including military. He argues that it is the post-Mao leadership’s diminished threat perception that allowed China to devote its attention and resources towards the gradual modernisation of its military.92 Certainly, CMC leadership is crucial in this area. The Deng legacy is insufficient, however, to explain why the RMA was accepted so rapidly by the Jiang administration, or why Xi enthusiastically implemented policies that originated during the Deng and Jiang administrations.

Little literature looks at the impact of decision-makers’ educational backgrounds and organisational affiliations on their policy decisions. In a collaborative study, Lai discusses the relationship between senior leaders’ educational background and their efforts on the RMA. He states,

It is interesting to note that the Chinese leaders at this critical time are mostly well-educated engineers (Jiang has a degree in electrical engineering and had further training at the automobile works in Moscow; he was also China’s Minister of Electronic Industries in the early 1980s; Hu graduated from Tsinghua University [China’s MIT equivalent] with a degree in hydraulic engineering).

Jiang and Hu’s engineering background explain to some degree why they were so enthusiastic about the RMA.93 But Deng played an essential role in creating an

与启示)," Literature of Chinese Communist Party (党的文献) (2003): 3. Lingxun Zeng, "60 年来新

中国军事战略方针的创新发展 (Innovative Development of Military Strategic Principles in New

China over the Sixty Years)," 当代中国史研究 (Contemporary China History Studies) 16, no. 5 (2009): 3; Wang, "Understanding Our Country’s Guiding Principles of Military Strategy: From a National

Security Interest Perspective (从国家安全利益的发展看我国军事战略方针的抉择与启示)."; 91 Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, 36. 92 The Chinese Army Aftert Mao (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987). 93 Lai, "Introduction," 17.

25 intellectual climate favourable to reforms, while Xi has been enthusiastically implementing the policies promoted by the RMA. Neither had a science or engineering background.

1.2.3.1 Role of Ideas

Some studies realise the importance of ideas or ‘epistemic agents’, but do not credit them with provoking a bottom-up reform process. For example, Adamsky attributes the causes of the RMA in the USSR, US and Israel to influential bureaucratic positions:

The professional discourse that interpreted the emerging technologies as a revolutionary development was framed in each of the three countries to a large extent by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who occupied influential bureaucratic positions in the military or defence establishments: in the Soviet case the General Staff, the Office of Net Assessment in the American case, and OTRI in the case of the Israeli RMA transformation.94

In his study, those ‘norm entrepreneurs’ or ‘epistemic agents’ who ‘interpret events, frame the discourse [and] construct new consensus’ 95 are from certain governmental organisations.

Similarly, in Chinese military studies, some scholars identify a Chinese RMA school of thought in the PLA but did not trace their long-term activists and ideas and, thus, did not fully recognise the influence of those communities. For example, You Ji points out that studying PLA publications is useful as many of the authors are policy advisors to top military leaders, and many ideas carried in those articles later became actual policies.96 Lee recognises one particular discussion of this community: over 30 articles published on the single theme of ‘Designing the Future Battlefield’ (DFB) under the PLA Daily Study Military column. He considers this exercise ‘as a success in seeking truth through objective reality, and integrating train and the work of military

94 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and Israel (Stanford University Press, 2010), 135. 95 Ibid. 96 Ji You, The Armed Forces of China (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), xxi.

26 academics with “the battlefield design” ’.97 While Pillsbury highlights that the RMA advocates were mostly affiliated with the Academy of Military Science and the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND),98 You Ji more accurately describes the group of RMA enthusiasts as

strategy planners in the headquarters of the PLA specialised services, and academic staff in PLA education and research institutions. It is they who have the study of advanced Western military ideas and have spearheaded convinced the PLA top brass that times have changed. They are young, well read, visionary, and anxious to create a new PLA that is more professional than revolutionary.99

Unfortunately, he did not go further to identify who those RMA advocates are and how they convinced the PLA leaders to promote a cultural change in the PLA.

1.2.3.2 A Bottom-up Approach

While most studies focus on top leaders and military changes as a top-down process, there is a small amount of literature that has addressed this issue.100 As Cohen points out,

One characteristic of much of the writing about military transformation has been its implicit assumption that change would come from above, that is, from enlightened senior leadership imposing different ways of war on recalcitrant bureaucracies…There is no doubt that some changes do indeed have to come from the top. But the RMA theorists may have overestimated the degree to which enlightened senior leadership could, by itself, remake the armed forces, as opposed to creating conditions that would by themselves foster change. Throughout most of military history, to include the current period, change tends to come more from below, from the spontaneous interactions between military people, technology and particular tactical

97 Ngok Lee, China's Defence Modernisation and Military Leadership (Macmillan Pub Co, 1989), xx. 98 China Debates the Future Security Environment.268 99 You Ji, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking," Sage Public Administration Abstracts 28, no. 1 (2001): 347-48. 100 Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs."; Keith B Bickel, "Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940" (KB Bickel, 1998).; Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies."

27 circumstances. The critical question is whether an organisation is capable of taking those changes and adopting them widely.101

While You Ji brought up the hypothesis that ‘elements of the Chinese military are deliberately cultivating younger officers to lead China’s RMA efforts in the future’, Brown and May found the Military Forum of PLA Daily as a platform by which the PLA leadership intended to introduce the literate enlisted and junior officers to the concept of the RMA and information warfare.102 Although Brown and May show the value of the Military Forum as a platform for diffusing ideas, their findings are limited. As will be argued in the following chapters, while Military Forum was a platform that played a major role in fostering discussions on the RMA, it was not created by the PLA leadership. Rather, it was an innovative way of communication created by relatively low-level PLA Daily editors and supported by a number of young officers from the headquarters of the services and military academic institutions. The underlying assumption of You Ji and Brown and May was that the RMA was a top- down endeavour. The present study shows that foreign military ideas need agents or networks of experts to introduce them to China, adapt them to existing policies and the domestic context, transmit them to PLA decision-makers and disseminate them to the whole PLA. This community of experts not only served as advisors but also actively diffused their ideas to both decision-makers and junior officers. The resultant long-term effect is, under Farrell’s definition, a cultural change, but it is not top-down. Contrary to Farrell’s argument that ‘since innovation involves changing those things that militaries take for granted, you need a leader with authority to champion what is, in effect, cultural change’, 103 the present study argues that the Chinese military innovation was, at least partially, a bottom-up process that has been discussed (but not sufficiently explored) in Grissom’s article.104

The present study argues that Deng pursued a crossing-the-river-by-touching- the-stones approach. He did not have a grand vision of China’s reform, but knew that

101 Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," 400. 102 Michael Brown and Andrew May, "Themes in Chinese Writings on Information Warfare, 1995- 1999," (McLean: Science Applications International Cooperation, 2000), 9. 103 Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," 783. 104 Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," 919-22.

28 emancipation of minds would enable intellectuals generate ideas for reforms. He Fang also argues that, as far as China’s economy is concerned, China’s reform and opening- up policy was a bottom-up rather than top-down process. He argues that Deng did not have a grand plan for opening up. Instead, societal and intellectual pressure persuaded Deng to adopt the opening-up policy.105 Contrary to popular belief that China’s reform started in the rural areas, Liu Hong argues that the reform was started by emancipating the minds of the intellectuals and promoting science and education.106

The present study fills this gap by identifying the group of RMA enthusiasts cum epistemic community, tracing their patterns of activities, identifying their communication platforms and channels of influence, and examining their long-term impact on the RMA and ideas associated with it.

1.3 Outline of Arguments

This study advances three major arguments. First, it demonstrates that there exists an epistemic community in the PLA (hereafter RMA EC) that emerged in the early 1980s. What distinguishes them from other PLA experts was that they were the pioneers advocating a holistic, forward-looking approach to military studies and defence planning. The early members of the RMA EC were primarily young military officers, mostly working at policy research positions. For example, researchers at the AMS and the Nanjing Army War College, military research offices of MRs and the general departments, staffers at the Military Training Department (MTD) of the General Staff Department (GSD) and editors of the PLA Daily Study Military column. Many of the early members of the RMA EC in the 1980s were either relatives of or

105 Fang (何方) He, From Yanan: He Fang in His Own Words (从延安一路走来(何方自述) (People’ s Daily Press (人民日报出版社), 2015), 284. 106 Hong Liu, "A Note on China’s 1984 National-Wide Debate on the New Technological Revolution and China’s Responses (记 1984 年关于迎接新技术革命与我国对策研究的全国性讨论)," The

Economic Observer (经济观察报), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20141024/231020636680.shtml.

29 working for senior PLA and CCP leaders, and many of them were associated with the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS).107

Second, this study argues that from the early 1980s to the 2000s, the policy ideas created and advanced by the RMA EC were crucial in defining PLA conceptions of the RMA. In the early 1980s, they contributed to the reassessing of the international security environment and shaped the Chinese leadership’s threat perception which eventually led to the shift of PLA strategic thought from preparing for imminent all- out war to peacetime army building. They also promoted a forward-looking approach to defence studies.

In the mid-1980s, they proposed major PLA-wide future war studies initiatives, which resulted in introducing the concepts of local war and high-tech wars into the PLA. This eventually led to the strategy of ‘local war under high-tech conditions’, announced in 1993. In the 1990s, they kept expanding the RMA EC and engaged with MRs and group armies, disseminated their future high-tech war ideas to combat units and helping them create operational concepts. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they played a leading role in identifying the information aspect of warfare as the key of future high-tech wars. This made a significant contribution to updating the PLA’s strategic outlook from ‘local war under high-tech conditions’ to ‘local war under conditions of informationisation’. Moreover, they were among the first to introduce foreign advanced training methods such as computer simulation (with artificial intelligence), realistic combat training and base-ised training. Thus, the RMA EC played a leading role in introducing foreign military ideas and adapting them to Chinese contexts, which eventually defined the RMA with Chinese characteristics (including its concepts of local war, winning informationised local war and building an informationised military).

Third, this study argues that the RMA EC’s success is not only attributable to their ideas, but also their skills in expanding the community to increase their influence, and their ability to identify and capitalise on opportunities (created by international crises and policy changes) to influence policymaking; using all available platforms for

107 Later became China Institute for International Strategic Studies

30 exchanging and disseminate ideas, taking advantage of all channels to gain access to decision-makers.

1.4 Analytic Framework

The previous sections have discussed the research topic, the motivations and significance of this study and reviewed existing approaches to the problem. This section outlines the argument that China’s response to the world RMA and the causes of the Chinese RMA are not readily identified or explained through a focus on international variables, domestic variables or a combination of the two. Instead, we require an approach that explains why China responded to the RMA the way it did. The approach presented here is the epistemic communities framework which focuses on the role of a community of experts in shaping China’s perceptions of and responses to the world RMA. While the focus is on the RMA EC, it also takes international and domestic factors into consideration.

This section introduces the epistemic communities framework and its explanatory role in understanding the impact of communities of experts whose ideas influenced various decisions towards the RMA. This section is organised into three major parts. The first part introduces the epistemic communities framework and examines its key features and strengths. The second discusses why its usefulness in explaining the Chinese RMA. The final part explains how the case of the Chinese RMA fits into this framework.

1.4.1 The Epistemic Communities Framework

As discussed in the literature review (Section 1.2), the problem under study requires a more appropriate model—that is, one that takes into account both the expert community and time of uncertainty, as well as domestic political factors. The epistemic communities framework was introduced by Peter Haas and elaborated on by a group of scholars in a 1992 special issue of International Organization. They applied this framework to studies of various areas including political science, economics and international relations. While most studies used the epistemic communities for explaining international policy coordination, it was proven that the framework can also be used for exploring the impact of epistemic communities on a

31 state’s domestic policy and foreign and security policy. The epistemic communities framework is particularly useful for conceptualising the network structure of the group of experts that influenced the evolution of RMA-related ideas and the PLA leadership’s reform decisions.

Haas defines the epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.108 According to Haas, the role of epistemic communities is to ‘recommend policies, identify potential points for possible negotiation, diffuse new ideas and strategies, and help in the implementation of selected alternatives’. 109 The epistemic community approach suggests that ideas need agents to transmit them from civil society to decision-makers. There are ‘channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country…who function more or less as cognitive baggage handlers as well as gatekeepers governing the entry of new ideas into institutions’.110

According to Haas, an epistemic community is a group of professionals, often from a number of different disciplines, who share the following characteristics:

1) ‘Shared principled beliefs. Such beliefs provide a value-based rationale for social action by the members of the community. Shared causal beliefs or professional judgment. Such beliefs provide analytic reasons and explanations of behaviour, offering causal explanations for the multiple linkages among possible policy actions and desired outcomes.Common notions of validity. That is, intersubjective, internally-defined criteria for validating knowledge. These allow community members to differentiate confidently between warranted and unwarranted claims about states of the world, and policies to change those states. A common policy enterprise. That is, a set of practices associated with a central

108 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction : Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International organization International Organization 46, no. 1 (1991): 3. 109 Shanthi Karuppusamy, "Epistemic Communities and Regional Governance Policy Development in Municipal Finance Reform," (2012), 6. 110 Haas, "Introduction : Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 27.

32 set of problems that have to be tackled, presumably out of a conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.’ 111

As mentioned above, what bond them together is shared normative and causal beliefs rather than material interests. They are not affiliated with particular organisations or military services. Moreover, they are distinguished from interest groups as they have no shared interests. It is the combination of a shared set of knowledge base, core beliefs, and shared policy agenda that distinguishes an epistemic community from other groups. Simply put, an epistemic community is a network of experts who share a common knowledge base, causal beliefs and policy agenda.

1.4.1.1 Conditions Under Which an Epistemic Community is Likely to Emerge

An epistemic community usually emerges in response to policymakers’ demand for information. The logic behind the epistemic communities approach is that decision-makers find it increasingly difficult to understand the some certain issues. They call upon experts or specialists to interpret events and issues and help them understand the changing environment. This demand will open a window of opportunity for the epistemic communities to emerge. There are two factors that favour the emergence of epistemic communities. First, issue uncertainty. For example, new technologies that created uncertainties that require interpretation and expert advice. Second, cries, either political or economic, caused by internal or external factors.

The epistemic communities framework suggests that under conditions of uncertainty, decision-makers are more inclined to seek advice from epistemic communities. The increasing complexity and uncertainties associated with many new technologies and types of security threats have led policymakers to seek new channels of advice, often resulting in enhancement of that new policy expert community. The growing complexity and technical nature of international relations and defence issues, the global economy, the increasing number of global actors and the diversity of national security issues are challenging the traditional decision-making system. The

111 Peter M Haas, Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and International Environmental Politics (Routledge, 2015), 5.

33 decision-making capacities of decision-makers are increasingly limited. This forces decision-makers to seek advice from experts.

Moreover, after a shock or crisis, demand for expertise often arises. Innovation is easier in times of crisis. Decision-makers ‘do not always recognise that their understanding of complex issues is limited—it often takes a crisis to for decision- makers to overcome habit and seek help from an epistemic community.’ 112 Crises and shocks are policy windows through which epistemic community knowledge enters the policy process.

112 Impact OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES ON US- RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION.19

Figure 1. Factors enabling the RMA epistemic community’s long-term effect on PLA culture

35 1.4.1.2 How Epistemic Communities Impact Policymaking

According to Adler and Haas, an epistemic community influences decision- making through four stages: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection and policy persistence.113

Policy Innovation. During the policy innovation stage, epistemic community members communicating with each other via publications and during conferences and seminars, sharing ideas and making policy innovations. Members of an epistemic community frame the range of controversy surrounding an issue by relating it to state interests. They also set standards for those issues.114

Policy Diffusion. In the absence of socialisation and policy diffusion processes, new ideas cannot reach decision-makers. and would, therefore, have no effect on policy outcomes. During policy diffusion, members of epistemic communities actively spreading their ideas across organisations.115

Policy Selection. The epistemic community does not become a relevant actor until those ideas receive official recognition from people in a position to change policy based on that information. After issues are framed and ideas diffused within the community, the epistemic community will try to make policy recommendations. At this stage, they will present policy alternatives to the decision-makers and make certain policy suggestions.

According to Adler and Haas, two factors (uncertainty and timing) determine decision-makers’ use of advice from an epistemic community.116 First, the concept of uncertainty is very important—the degree to which decision-makers are unfamiliar with the issues at hand is pivotal in their willingness to seek out and use advice from epistemic communities.117 An epistemic community has more freedom to frame the

113 Emanuel Adler and Peter M Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," International organization 46, no. 01 (1992): 375-87. 114 Ibid., 375. 115 Ibid., 378-79. 116 Ibid., 381-83. 117 Ibid., 381.

36 issues and define national interests, if decision-makers are unfamiliar with the issue. But if decision-makers are quite familiar with the issue, they are more likely to seek advice from an epistemic community whose ideas are in line with their own agenda.118 In that case, the epistemic community will play the role of promoting certain ideas or policies that have already been chosen by the decision-makers. The other factor that determines the epistemic community’s role in policy selection is timing. Case studies show that policymakers are more likely to accept an epistemic community’s ideas after significant changes in military, political or economic conditions,119 including shocks and crises.

Policy persistence. ‘New ideas and policies, once institutionalised, can gain the status of orthodoxy’,120 but it requires an epistemic community’s persistent efforts and the process of socialisation their ideas gradually to gain orthodox status.

1.4.2 Use in Examining the Chinese RMA

The epistemic communities framework is particularly useful for explaining Chinese military reform for two reasons. First, within existing explanations relating to the Chinese RMA or military modernisation, little attention has been given to the role of ideas. The role of epistemic communities in influencing military innovation is under-explored in military studies in general and in PLA studies in particular. This framework helps explain the network structure of the RMA EC and its role in advocating ideas and research methods related to the RMA with Chinese characteristics. The epistemic communities framework explains how ideas become policies, and is a comparatively superior framework to those discussed in the literature

118 Ibid. 119 Ibid., 383. Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation : National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control."; Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program."; Peter M Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," ibid.43, no. 03 (1989); "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International organization 46, no. 01 (1992). 120 Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," 384.

37 review when it comes to explaining the origins and evolution of the Chinese RMA. Previous approaches in the existing literature have been unable to provide credible explanations for how ideas influence military innovation and do not consider the conditions under which ideas are likely to be influential.

Second, it addresses the issue of how decision-makers respond to crises and uncertainties. The sheer size of the PLA precludes the CMC from having either the time or the information to make all the important decisions. Thus, under the circumstances of complexity and uncertainty, the CMC or the GSD will, in searching for new ideas to make sense of a problem, consult with expert communities. For example, when China faced challenges posed by the world RMA, the RMA EC played a role in interpreting the RMA and the challenges it posed to China’s national security. Adler and Haas state ‘Between international structures and human volition lies interpretation’.121 The epistemic communities framework is useful for understanding decisions made in response to systemic stimuli. The epistemic communities framework not only complements system level analysis but increases our sensitivity to domestic political and decision-making factors.

1.4.3 The RMA Advocates as an Epistemic Community

The group of experts under investigation in this study certainly satisfy the epistemic community criterion of being a network of experts with a common knowledge base, causal beliefs and policy agenda. In this study, a common set of causal beliefs (a holistic, forward-looking approach to defence planning, shared beliefs of the nature of future wars etc) that make them a distinct community.

Alder argues that ‘agents coordinate their behaviour according to common practices that structure and give meaning to changing international reality’. 122 Applying his argument to this study, this thesis argues that the RMA EC gave meaning to the changing security environment and threat perceptions. In this study, experts

121 Ibid., 367. 122 Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation : National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," International organization International organization 46, no. 1 (1991): 104.

38 from the PLA Daily, military educational institutions, general departments and MRs who have actively engaged in discussions and debates through various platforms123 are characterised as an epistemic community. Defence intellectuals from this community were among the first ones to participate in discussions with policymakers on the changing security environment and possible doctrinal changes in the early 1980s.

They are important not only because they introduced foreign ideas to China and translated new ideas to policies, but because they are channels for exchanging these ideas. Instead of providing brief snapshots of how policies are promulgated, this study conducts a longitudinal study on the process in which policies are created or created, and, more importantly, how they are then disseminated to the whole PLA.

1.4.3.1 Identifying RMA EC Members

The EC members constitute a community with shared views on the future of warfare. The EC members could be identified through examining major newspapers discussions; seminars and conference participation; informal meetings etc.

First, the EC members could be identified by examining major themes of discussion in Study Military column. Most frequent contributors of major discussions could be considered as members. For example, Nanjing Army Command College scholars who initiated the debate on future wars, resulted in the creation of the three- year-long discussion theme DBF in the early 1980s, are considered as EC members.

Second, those who presented in those events and are also Study Military contributors could be confirmed as important members. For example, those who participated in the first and second National Defence Economic Studies conferences and also frequent Study Military contributors are considered as EC members. In the 1990s, those who participated in conferences cohosted by the EC and combat units,

123 including ad hoc seminars and conferences organised by the AMS, NDU, the PLA General Staff Department; publishing articles in military journals, such as China Military Science, the PLA Daily, Military Art; Journal of National Defence University.

39 and remained active Study Military contributors later would also be considered as newly joined members.

Third, they published book volumes during some critical points in time to influence policy-making and PLA direction of debates. Those books include selected articles that have been published in the previous years. Thus, authors of those selected articles are considered as EC members. For example, in the mid 1980s, the National Defence and Future series was the most important publication arranged by this community of experts. Most authors and participants of this book series and related projects were either Military Salon members or frequent Study Military contributors, or both.

In short, the members are: 1. Military Salon members who either participated National Defence Economics Conference, or National Defence and Future book series; 2. Frequent Study Military contributors, whose articles had been selected by book volume by Study Military in the 1980s. 3.Study Military contributors, who have participated in conference, seminars, or private discussions organised by Study Military.

1.4.3.2 Measuring the Influence of the RMA Epistemic Community

According to this framework, “epistemic communities play an evolutionary role as a source of policy innovations and a channel by which these innovations diffuse”124 to the whole PLA. It places a strong emphasis on the ideas and shared causal beliefs of its members as the means of tracing network connections and impact. The evolution of the RMA ideas, according to the epistemic communities framework, can be divided into three influence phases: policy innovation from 1985 to 1993, policy diffusion from 1993 to 1996 and policy selection from 1996 to 2002.

1.4.3.2.1 Policy Innovation (1985–1993)

124 Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," 374.

40 In the early 1980s, when the RMA EC first emerged, they framed political controversy surrounding the conventional all-out war doctrine. Soon after the strategic shift was made in 1985, they initiated a debate on national interests. By relating conventional deterrence and peacetime army building to national interests, they successfully set standards for peacetime defence planning.

Epistemic communities play the roles of raising awareness of an issue among decision-makers and helping it remain on the policy agenda. Members of epistemic communities often frame the issues and present them to decision-makers. Allison, Zelikov and Tversky, and Kahneman all suggest that ‘how decision-makers respond to a problem often depends on the way the problem is framed’.125 The question translated to this study is how the RMA EC was able to shape policymakers’ threat perceptions and their responses to the changing security environment. The RMA EC in the 1980s attempted to reframe the problem and offering alternative solutions to problems faced by the PLA. They played a role in redefining China’s national interests and the relations between national economic development and national defence. In recent years, the RMA was framed by the RMA EC to coincide with the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and, thus, it remained on the policy agenda by being related to national interests.

1.4.3.2.2 Policy Diffusion (1993–1996)

One major contribution of the RMA EC is their efforts to educate senior leaders and mid- and junior-level officers, and they persisted in promoting the ideas and policies through military publications and by organising seminars and conferences with MRs and combat units. This, according to Farrell, is a contribution to promoting a cultural change. 126 Or, under the definition of Murray and Watts, bureaucratic

125 T. Allison Graham and Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, ed. Philip Zelikow (New York: New York : Longman, 1999), 280; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and uncertainty 5, no. 4 (1992); "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," Science 211, no. 4481 (1981); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979). 126 Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," 783.

41 recognition and acceptance was gained by the RMA EC through these various platforms, forums and channels.127 This explains why the RMA has been continued to be carried out in China despite changes in leaderships and the international security environment.

Major diffusion mechanisms include publications on newspapers and journals, seminars, symposia, conferences, internal discussions, private conversations, collaborative research or monograph. In the early 1980s, the RMA EC initially communicated through personal ties. They discussed defence issues in private group discussions and closed-door seminars.

From mid-1980s, the EC began engaging the wider defence policy research community in discussions through the PLA Daily and conferences and symposiums, and working on the same projects, members of the RMA EC maintain contact with each other, resulting in new channels for dissemination of ideas. These formal and informal forums can be used to discuss alternative perspectives on certain issues. When the network comprises prominent individuals, they will have direct influence on policymakers or encourage them to engage with an issue.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as many EC members assumed key research positions and became editors of influential military journals, those journals and newspapers became their major channels through which they diffused their ideas.

From 1993, the conference and seminars co-hosted with combat troops became one major diffusion mechanism. By expanding the community to combat troops, the RMA EC not only managed to disseminate their ideas to a wide audience but also created a two-way channel that collected training and exercise experiences from combat troops.

1.4.3.2.3 Policy Selection (1996–2002)

127 Williamson Murray and Barry Watts, "Military Innovation in Peacetime," Un published paper 11 (1995): 59.

42 In the mid-1990s, the RMA EC changed their tactics in advocating the concept of RMA and associated ideas. For example, after the adoption of the ‘Two Transformations’, they realised that to make the RMA an official policy they had to connect it to the PLA’s official doctrines and policies. Thus, they published articles and organised seminars and conferences to interpret the Two Transformations. By arguing that the RMA would be a shortcut to achieving the PLA’s quality development ambition, the RMA EC successfully led to the institutionalisation of the RMA.

According to the analytical framework, a four-step approach will be adopted. First, the existence of the RMA EC will be identified (in Chapter 2). Second, the composition of the EC, their patterns of interaction, shared beliefs, mechanisms of communication and influence will be examined (in Chapter 3). Third, the RMA EC’s views and perceptions of the security environment and future warfare will be delineated (in Chapter 4). Finally, the influence of their perceptions on the policymaking processes will be traced (in Chapters 4 to 6).

1.5 Methodology

This thesis conducts a longitudinal study on the RMA EC, their activities and the evolution of their ideas. According to Haas,

The research techniques for demonstrating the impact of epistemic communities on the policymaking process are straightforward but painstaking. With respect to a specific community, they involve identifying community membership, determining the community members' principled and causal beliefs, tracing their activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers at various points in time, identifying alternative credible outcomes that were foreclosed as a result of their influence, and exploring alternative explanations for the actions of decision makers. The use of counterfactuals may be helpful in this regard.128

Thus, the initial task, as indicated above, is to identify the makeup of the community and the content of its beliefs. The second step is to review key debates and discussions and their activities to extract their beliefs and trace the evolution of their

128 Haas, "Introduction : Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 34.

43 ideas. Next, the community’s influence on policy must be assessed. Here, process tracing techniques will be used.

This study is based on a combination of primary and secondary sources. Public lectures, speeches at conferences and seminars, and newspaper and journal articles were employed as a source to infer their views and beliefs. It makes primary use of writings in the PLA Daily Military Forum column and other primary sources, such as important official statements and memoirs written by civilian and military leaders. It examines discussions and debates in Military Forum and activities organised by Military Forum or co-hosted by Military Forum with other institutions. This means that although the Military Forum column publishes many conference and seminar summaries or abstracts, those not organised by the editorial of Military Forum will not be examined in this study. We also lack sufficient primary data on the socialisation, training and policy dispositions of individual members of the RMA EC to comment on or draw conclusions from these matters.

1.6 Scope and Limitation

This study focuses on the period from 1980 to 2002. More specifically, from the emergence of the RMA EC in the early 1980s, to the institutionalisation of the concept of the RMA in 2002. The RMA as a process not an end goal. This process, according to Mahnken, is consisted with “three distinct but often overlapping phases: speculation, experimentation, and implementation.”129 This study focuses mainly on the speculation phase, and early stages of experimentation.

In addition to the speculation phase, the EC was influential during the early experimentation phase. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, some EC members were among the first ones introducing foreign experimentation methods to the PLA. For example, they introduced computer simulation and base-ised realistic combat training to the PLA. Zhang Qinsheng played an important role creating PLA’s first realistic combat training base, Feng Yujun and Yang Nanzheng etc. were early computer

129 Mahnken, "China's Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective," 304.

44 simulation advocates. In short, this study covers the speculation phase and early stages of experimentation and does not cover the implementation phase.

1.7 Summary of Chapters

Chapter 1 has provided an outline of this study, its objects and research methodology, an overview of the literature review and the detailed analytical framework that permeates the subsequent chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 2 examines China’s domestic political circumstances under which the RMA EC emerged, arguing that the death of Mao challenged the old one-man- dominated decision-making system. This opened a window of opportunity for the emergence of the RMA EC and the adoption of the new strategic thought in 1985.

Chapter 3 discusses the composition, ideas and principle causal beliefs of the RMA EC—that is, what makes it a coherent epistemic community and distinguishes its members from other Chinese experts. It is argued that their holistic, forward- looking approach to military studies and defence planning set them apart from the mainstream PLA views in the 1980s.

Chapters 4 through 6 examine the RMA EC’s influence on the Chinese RMA, tracing the evolution of ideas and concepts associated with the RMA. Each chapter ends with a discussion of the changing composition, patterns of interaction and channels of influence of the RMA EC for the period discussed in the chapter.

Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the RMA EC’s ideas for the period 1985 to 1993, leading up to the new strategic guideline announced in 1993. In this period, the community was actively adapting a forward-looking, comprehensive approach to defence studies and defence planning, with their efforts exploring future wars, new technologies and the implications for the future of warfare leading them to conclude that the major threats China would facing in the twenty-first century would be local wars fought under high-tech conditions. The community also readily seized the opportunity created by the Gulf War to advance their ideas about future wars.

Chapter 5 examines the RMA EC’s efforts in creating specific concepts of operation for high-tech local wars between 1993 and 1995, until the conclusion of

45 their operational methods study campaign and the announcement of the Two Transformations policy. The chapter focuses on how the community disseminated their ideas to combat units and the role they played as a bridge between the policy community, commanders and scientists.

Chapter 6 examines how the community seized the opportunity created by the Two Transformations to further advocate the RMA. By connecting the RMA and the Two Transformations policy, they argued that the RMA would provide a framework to guide China’s army building and quality development. They also determined that information superiority was the key to winning future local wars, and informatisation of the military was the way to achieve PLA quality development.

Chapter 7 provides a summary of this study and discusses its implications for future PLA reforms and international security. For example, how this study may help us predict the PLA’s response to the emerging automation revolution and US third offset strategy.

46 Chapter 2: Emergence of the RMA Epistemic Community

This chapter discusses the domestic political conditions under which the RMA EC emerged and traces the origins of this community. It advances two arguments. First, China’s leadership transition and the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s created an intellectual climate that favoured the emergence of various epistemic communities. More specifically, the new decision-making system created by the rise of Deng required a new advisory system and specialist advice, which facilitated the emergence of both the international studies expert community and the RMA EC. Second, the international studies experts changed their views on the international security environment and power balance between the US and USSR in the early 1980s due to their overseas visits and discussions with US scholars and officials. This reassessment of US–China–USSR trilateral relations facilitated policymakers’ selection of peacetime army building ideas.

This chapter comprises two parts. In part one (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), it examines the domestic political conditions that created the intellectual climate for the emergence of the epistemic communities and discusses leadership factors that facilitated the change of the decision-making and advisory system. It then discusses the rise of a group of international studies experts and how they shaped the Chinese leadership threat perception in the early 1980s. In part two (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), it briefly reviews PLA mainstream debate on future wars in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and traces the origins of the RMA EC.

It is important to note that despite of its role in shaping decision-makers’ threat perceptions and the views of the international strategic situation, the international studies community did not play any role in influencing China’s defence policies. Therefore, this study only discusses its influence from 1978 to 1985.

2.1 Circumstances Under Which the Epistemic Community Emerged

This section provides a discussion of the domestic political conditions under which the RMA EC emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It sets the context for the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 3 through 6. Additionally, it examines the

47 emergence of an international studies epistemic community and its role in shaping the Chinese leadership’s threat perception in the early 1980s. There are two reasons for the discussion of the international studies community. First, it adds to the background of the Chinese intellectual environment in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Second, and more importantly, this community played an important role in shaping Deng’s threat perception and his views on the international balance of power, eventually causing China’s change of strategic outlook in 1985. As discussed in later chapters, China’s planning shift from ‘imminent all-out war’ to peacetime army building is essential to understanding the origins of consequent policies that led to the Chinese RMA.

2.2 In Uncertain Times: The End of Cultural Revolution and Leadership Transition

During Mao’s era, intellectuals and expert communities served to justify rather than guide policy. Mao micromanaged every decision, controlling even the mechanics of policy writing, and advice was solicited in a largely token fashion. Experts tended to offer advice they knew Mao preferred.130 Even Mao’s senior advisors, Chen Boda and Hu Qiaomu, simply played the role of promoting Mao’s ideas and legitimising his decisions.131 Mao made crucial decisions alone,132 including the decision to export

130 Mingjing Huopai, "He Pin’s Conversation with Professor Zhu Jiaming 3 (何頻與朱嘉明教授聊天實錄（3）)," ed. Pin He (Youtube, 2017).; Nina Phyllis Halpern, "Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955-1983" (University Microfilms International, 1990), 342. 131 Mingjing Huopai, "He Pin’s Conversation with Professor Zhu Jiaming 3 (何頻與朱嘉明教授聊天實錄（3）)." 132 Halpern, "Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955-1983," 342.;Mingjing Huopai, "He Pin’s Conversation with Professor Zhu Jiaming 3 (何頻與朱嘉明教授聊

天實錄（3）)."; Yun Sun, Institution Brookings, and Studies Center for Northeast Asian Policy, "Chinese National Security Decision-Making : Processes and Challenges," (2013): 3.

48 revolution to third world countries133 and to enter the Korean War.134 The Cultural Revolution made specialist advice even more useless. During those 10 years, research institutes were shut down: ‘No formal mechanism existed for channelling academic specialists’ advice to either bureaucratic or Party leaders…The channels and forums for professional communication—the economics journals and professional association—had all disappeared.135

After Mao’s death in 1976 and the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng returned to power (in 1977) and shifted China’s priority from political mobilisation to economic development. In the international arena, China needed a peaceful international environment for its economic reforms. Aware of the problems with the one-man-dominated decision-making system, Deng created a totally different decision-making system which required a new advisory system and specialist advice on every aspect of its decision-making. However, most intellectuals at government think tanks and universities were too used to the Mao-style decision-making system and faced tremendous difficulties coping with the reforms.136 According to Deng Liqun, among the more than 400 economic researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), very few were capable of conducting scientific research. The majority conduct economic research by combining a few numbers with Marxist- Leninist terms to do some propagandised explanatory work after decisions had already

133 Lixin Wang, "Mao Zedong’s Views of the Times and the Establishment of the International and Foreign Policy Principles of the New China (毛泽东的时代观与新中国国际和外交方针的确立)," Shandong Provincial School of the Chinese Communist Party, http://60.216.0.86/001/001013/001013001/903561435594.htm. 134 Liang (司马亮) Sima, “, "The Decision-Making on China Entering the Korean War (中国出兵援朝决策始末)," Wanqing (晚晴), no. 10 (2015). 135 Halpern, "Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955-1983," 346. 136 Mingjing Huopai, "He Pin’s Conversation with Professor Zhu Jiaming 3 (何頻與朱嘉明教授聊

天實錄（3）)."

49 been made. Most of them were unable to produce original ideas.137 This intellectual crisis provided those relatively innovative young scholars an opportunity to thrive.138

In contrast to Mao, the Deng leadership was far more receptive to innovative ideas and solicitous of experts.139 Some even argue that it was the transformation of China’s decision-making system that emancipated the Chinese intellectuals’ minds140 and led to China’s reform and opening-up policy. For example, Liu Hong went so far as to argue that contrary to popular belief that China’s economic reform started in the rural areas, it was actually started by emancipating the minds of the intellectuals and promoting science and education.141 Similarly, He Fang argues that China’s reform and opening-up policy was actually a bottom-up rather than top-down process. He Fang further argues that Deng did not actually have a grand plan for opening up, but was instead pressured to take this policy by society and intellectuals.142

In addition to creating a freer atmosphere for expression of opinions, the Chinese leadership encouraged the development of the social sciences discipline in a more scientific and policy-relevant direction. Halpern argues that in a Leninist state such as China it is not easy for expert communities to emerge from below, thus, leadership actions are necessary.143 Deng’s efforts to restore research institutes and reform the education system were such efforts that created a climate favouring the emergence of epistemic communities. Deng’s efforts to restore research and education

137 Halpern, "Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955-1983," 356-57. 138 Mingjing Huopai, "He Pin’s Conversation with Professor Zhu Jiaming 3 (何頻與朱嘉明教授聊

天實錄（3）)." 139 Nina P Halpern, "Policy Communities in a Leninist State: The Case of the Chinese Economic Policy Community1," Governance 2, no. 1 (1989): 24. 140 Mingjing Huopai, "He Pin’s Conversation with Professor Zhu Jiaming 3 (何頻與朱嘉明教授聊

天實錄（3）)." 141 Liu, "A Note on China’s 1984 National-Wide Debate on the New Technological Revolution and

China’s Responses (记 1984 年关于迎接新技术革命与我国对策研究的全国性讨论)".

142 He, From Yanan: He Fang in His Own Words (从延安一路走来(何方自述), 284. 143 Halpern, "Policy Communities in a Leninist State: The Case of the Chinese Economic Policy Community1," 24.

50 institutes helped emancipate the minds of those experts examined in this study, and they have subsequently been a major force behind China’s reforms, including military.

From October 1976, economics as a discipline had broadened its scope of inquiry and policy-oriented research had been strongly encouraged. Channels for professional communication, such as newspapers and journals, were being recreated. The number of conferences and seminars had multiplied rapidly. New institutional channels had been established to bring academic economists into contact with bureaucratic ones, and to give them a voice in policymaking.144 This trend gradually spread to international studies and defence areas.

2.2.1 Restoration of China’s International Studies Sectors and Shaping the Chinese Leadership’s Threat Perception

Since his return to power, Deng had devoted substantial efforts to securing a long-term peaceful international environment to allow China to concentrate on economic development. This created an urgent demand for experts in international studies and the discipline of international relations. Research networks inside and outside the bureaucracy were gradually been re-established in the late 1970s. Both the number and scale of research institutions rapidly increased.145 In May 1977, CASS was established, with Huan Xiang, an experienced diplomat (having served two years as ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Community), returning to China in 1978 to be appointed as its vice president, responsible for international studies and foreign academic exchange. Huan began to build the international studies sector of the academy in 1978.146 In four years, he created eight research centres consisting of more than 1,000 researchers.147

144 Halpern, "Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955-1983," 347. 145 Ibid., 348. 146 Fang He, He Fang on History and Friends: In Memory of Zhang Wentian and Other Mentors and Friends (何方谈史忆人: 纪念张闻天及其他师友) (World Affairs Press (世界知识出版社), 2010), 212-13. 147 Ibid., 245.

51 In addition to the creation of international studies institutes, Huan also promoted CASS international exchanges with the rest of the world. Since the founding of the PRC, China had not had substantial academic exchanges with the rest of the world, save for the USSR in the 1950s.148 China began its international academic communication only after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP. The first substantial meeting with foreign scholars was the CASS–Columbia University conference in October 1979, which lasted for a week. This delegation of 11 scholars led by Huan included prominent international studies experts, such as Qian Zhongshu, Li Shenzhi and He Fang, mostly from CASS. Among their 39 US counterparts, most were academics from Columbia University, with some government officials from the State Department and White House, including the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Their discussions focused on the USSR, with the conference proceedings published in 1980 as Discussions on the Soviet Issues. After the one-week conference, the Chinese delegation travelled around the US for a month.149 In January 1981, CASS made another visit to Brookings Institute. This trip also lasted about a month.150 It was mainly those meetings with foreign scholars that shaped the Chinese scholars’ perceptions of the international security environment and the strategic situation, which resulted in them challenging China’s official foreign policy and orthodoxy views at the time.

2.2.1.1 China’s Official Foreign Policy: Anti-Soviet United Front Strategy

From the foundation of the PRC, China’s foreign policy changed from ‘leaning to one side’ (一边倒) with the USSR in the 1950s to the ‘one lined policy’ (一条线) in the 1970s. After the Sino–Soviet border clashes in 1969, the USSR continued to expand its forces along the Sino–Soviet border and its diplomatic initiatives to isolate China and curb its influence in Asia. Throughout the 1970s, China’s foreign and security policies assumed that the USSR was the most significant threat to China’s national security and Moscow was unrelentingly expanding its influence worldwide,

148 Ibid., 328. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid.

52 while the US was defending its own spheres of influence with difficulty. China continued to seek closer political and economic ties with the US and other Western countries, calling for a united front against Soviet expansionism. By the end of the 1970s, ‘one lined policy’ was still China’s official foreign policy, which amounted to cooperating with the US to contain the expansion of the USSR.151 Chinese leaders still believed that a new world war was inevitable and imminent, and that the USSR was still the most significant threat to China’s national security and the biggest potential factor for causing a world war. China maintained its hardline approach in relations with Moscow and accelerated cooperation with the US against the Soviet threat.

He Fang gives two examples to demonstrate that Deng, by the end of the 1970s, was still very anti-Soviet and working under the assumption that major war was inevitable. First, in 1977, Deng tasked Hu Qiaomu to write a report titled Chairman Mao’s Theory on the Division of the Three World has Made Great Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, published by People’s Daily on 1 November 1977. This article aimed to denounce the USSR and demonstrate it as the most dangerous threat to world peace. Second, the establishment of the Central Task Force for International Issues, with Hu Qiaomu as chair and Huan Xiang as vice chair (He Fang and Li Shenzhi were both members). The major task was again to denounce the USSR and to ‘answer’ the question of how the USSR became a revisionist state.152 Both of these were personally arranged by Deng, which indicates that by at least 1978 he was firmly against the USSR and had no intention to change China’s official policy towards it.

Second, a statement from Deng to counter a remark of Hu Yaobang in 1979 indicates that Deng by that time was still against Sino–Soviet rapprochement. On 17 July 1979, during his meeting with foreign diplomats, Hu Yaobang remarked ‘the idea that the USSR is the major origin of world wars, and it would never abandon its intention to destroy China, is an issue of debate, and whether the USSR is a revisionist

151 Evan S Medeiros, China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification, vol. 850 (Rand Corporation, 2009), 47. 152 Dong (丁东) Ding and Liling (鲁利玲) Lu, "Personal Experiences on China’s Historical Foreign

Policy Change (Ii) (亲历中国外交政策的历史转折(下))," 人物 (People), no. 8 (2011): 71.

53 state is also a question worth more considerations’.153 The next day, Deng countered this by stating that ‘the danger of war is imminent, if there is an invasion [of China], it could only be waged by the USSR. So, we have to stick to our Sino–US rapprochement strategy. The US, after all, is an implicit ally of ours. We must keep preparing for an imminent early, all-out, nuclear war’.154

2.2.1.2 Change of Threat Perception

Various sources suggest that a group of CASS experts led by Huang Xiang played a major role in shaping Deng’s threat perceptions and his views on the security environment in the early 1980s. Thus, shifting China’s foreign policy from ‘one lined policy’ to ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ （独立自主和平外交政策）.155

Huan, who served as Assistant Foreign Minister between April 1964 and August 1978 and Vice President of CASS between September 1978 and July 1980,156 belonged to the inner circle of Deng’s foreign policy advisors during the 1980s.157 As a former diplomat, he had extensive contacts with foreign experts and officials. As previously mentioned, in November 1979 a CASS delegation led by Huan Xiang visited the US for week-long conference focused on the USSR. 158 During this conference, Huan Xiang and other CASS scholars met Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a senior

153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment; Xiaoqun (邢小群) Xing, "Li Yimang and Huan Xiang’s Foreign Policy Recommendations (李一氓和宦乡建言外交政策)," China

Newsweek 283 (2006); Fan (王凡) Wang, A Biography of Wu Jianming (吴建民传) (World Affiars Press (世界知识出版社), 2008); Fang (何方) He, "Mourn the Loss of Comrade Li Shenzhi (沉痛悼

念慎之同志)," Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), no. 6 (2003). 156 "Huan Xiang, Former Vice Ministers and Assistant Ministers," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/wjrw_665549/lrfbzjbzzl_665553/t222812.shtml. 157 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, 9. 158 Delegation (CASS), "Preface," in Discussion on Soviet Issues: The Proceedings of Conference on International and Soviet Issues (苏联问题讨论: 中美学者关于国际关系和苏联问题讨论会资料), ed. Delegation (CASS) (China Social Science Press (中国社会科学出版社), 1980), 2.

54 advisor to Henry Kissinger. Sonnenfeldt repeatedly explained to them that he was not an advocate of the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, ‘which was widely described as justifying Russian control over the satellites and announcing in essence that the United States was not going to try to promote anti-Russian behaviour in Eastern Europe’.159 US policy towards the USSR had been harshly criticised by the Chinese as US appeasement of the Soviet expansionism. Sonnenfeldt explained to the Chinese delegates that what he proposed was easing the tension between the US and the USSR, but that he had never made the proposition that the US should tolerate USSR expansion in Eastern Europe.160

The perceived threat of Soviet aggression diminished rapidly after various exchanges to the US. CASS delegation visits to the US and their discussions about the USSR with US scholars and officials led to a change of attitudes towards the nature of the Soviet threat. As feelings of assurance increased, the perception of the USSR as a threat decreased among Chinese scholars. 161 This eventually led them to the realisation that the Sino–US rapprochement strategy allying China with the US against the USSR was no longer conducive to China’s national interests. Thus, immediately following their trip to the US, they wrote a report proposing a more balanced strategy which distanced China from the US while improving relations with the USSR. They wrote that the confrontation between the US and the USSR would continue, and that as both powers were trying to improve their relations with China, China should take the opportunity to improve Sino–Soviet relations while distancing itself from the US.162 In other words, they urged China to abandon its Anti-Soviet United Front strategy and gradually become an independent global player. According to He Fang,

159 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Helmut Sonnenfeldt: The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine Revisited," The Washington Quarterly The Washington Quarterly 1, no. 2 (1978): 41. 160 He, From Yanan: He Fang in His Own Words (从延安一路走来(何方自述), 331. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid., 332.

55 this report was intended particularly to convince Deng who was still insisting on the Sino–US rapprochement strategy.163

Moreover, in the summer of 1980, Huan Xiang, arranged another report. The report was written by Zhang Jingyi of the Second Department of the PLA’s General Staff and revised by He Fang, director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at CASS. Titled Proposals On Distancing from the United States and Adjusting the Relations with the Soviet Union (关于建议同美国拉开距离和调整对苏关系的报告), this report argued that the idea that the USSR ‘will never abandon its intention to destroy us’ (亡我之心不死) was not necessarily correct. 164 It argued that the constant confrontation between the US and the USSR encouraged both to improve their relations with China, and under these circumstances, China should distance itself from the US and soften its stance towards the USSR—thus, prompting both countries to further compete for a better relationship with China. Huan’s views in that report were taken very seriously by the Politburo.165 His idea of the ‘strategic triangle’ composed of the US, USSR and China was highly valued by the senior leaders.166

Additionally, Li Shenzhi’s (one of Huan’s team members) role as a drafter of the international relations and diplomacy part of the Report to the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China further shaped China’s threat perceptions and views on the international security environment. 167 This report is generally considered as China’s official abandonment of its united front strategy.168

163 Ding and Lu, "Personal Experiences on China’s Historical Foreign Policy Change (Ii) (亲历中国

外交政策的历史转折(下))," 71. 164 An expression made by Mao Zedong years ago. 165 Xing, "Li Yimang and Huan Xiang’s Foreign Policy Recommendations (李一氓和宦乡建言外交

政策)," 87. 166 Ding and Lu, "Personal Experiences on China’s Historical Foreign Policy Change (Ii) (亲历中国

外交政策的历史转折(下))," 71-72; Wang, A Biography of Wu Jianming (吴建民传).

167 He, "Mourn the Loss of Comrade Li Shenzhi (沉痛悼念慎之同志)," 53. 168 Ibid.

56 Due to the re-establishment of Chinese research and advisory system in the late 1970s, international studies experts emerged and were among the first to have contact and communication with foreign scholars and experts. It was their interaction with US experts that led them to the realisation that the strategic balance between the US and the USSR would remain stable. The, the US would perceive a greater need for China if they saw a closer Sino–Soviet relationship, thus, improving relations with the USSR would provide China with a greater leverage in the geostrategic game. The international studies experts changed their views on the international security environment and the power balance between the US and the USSR in the early 1980s due to their overseas visits and discussions with US scholars and officials. Their beliefs about the changing security environment and its effects on future wars led them to push a policy prescription of Sino–Soviet rapprochement and pursuit of an independent foreign policy and strategy for peacetime army building.

2.3 Emergence of the RMA Epistemic Community

In addition to the international studies community, a number of young, future- oriented PLA officers began promoting a forward-looking approach to defence studies. While they played a smaller role shaping the PLA leadership’s threat perception, their forward-looking research approaches and efforts in exploring future wars paved the way for the PLA’s acceptance of the RMA. This section first discusses the mainstream debate on future war in the late 1970s and early 1980s, then identifies the community of experts which originated in the PLA Daily Study Military column and a private study group, Military Salon. The ideas and composition of this community is discussed in Chapter 3.

In the early 1980s, three PLA communities and three sets of collective understandings of the nature of future warfare had posed influence on China’s defence policymaking. Embedded in these different views were different expectations about the nature of future war, the adversary and technology. The first and orthodox community was attached to the Mao era’s total war doctrine. The second community was challenging one element of the orthodox school and arguing that the idea of ‘luring enemy into the deep’ was no longer relevant. Both shared the same expectations about future wars: that a Soviet invasion of China was imminent and it

57 would be an all-out nuclear war. The third community of experts, the focus of this study, was taking a much different approach. While the first two groups were debating how to react to a Soviet invasion and all-out war, the third group was arguing that a Soviet invasion could be avoided. They were anticipating a relatively peaceful international environment and that future wars would be limited and fought with high technologies. Moreover, they were advocating a future-oriented, forward-looking approach to military studies and strategic planning. Prior to the emergence of the EC, the PLA defence planning was based on historical scenarios. One major contribution of the EC is that they shifted the focus of the PLA’s defence planning from previous wars to future wars.

2.3.1 Mainstream PLA: Fighting the Last War

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Mao era’s strategic thinking was still dominant in China and the general total war doctrine was adhered to by the PLA’s leadership. The PLA was still preparing to fight protracted wars of attrition to wear down enemies.169 The official strategy before 1982 was ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’. The concept was essentially a guerrilla warfare principle, stressing the importance of luring enemies deep into Chinese territory then launching guerrilla attacks.

From the late 1970s, some senior military officers began publishing articles in military professional journals, such as Military Art, to challenge this concept.170 One

169 Zhen Zhang, Memoirs of Zhang Zhen 2 (张震回忆录 2） (Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2003), 201. 170 Dezhi Yang, "Various Issues About the Initial Phase of Future Anti-Aggression War (未来反侵略战争初期作战的几个问题)," in Selected Essays of Military Art. Ii Studies on Modern Operational

Issues (军事学术论文选（下）现代作战问题研究), ed. Military Art Editorial (Military Science

Publishing House (军事科学出版社), 1984).; Shanhe Tan, "Some Thoughts on How to Apply Strategic Guidelines During the Initial Phase of Anti-Aggression War (对未来反侵略战争初期贯彻战略方针

的一些认识)," ibid.; Shilun Song, "Preliminary Discussions on Future Anti-Aggression War (关于未

来反侵略作战的几个问题的初步探讨)," ibid.; Desheng Li, "Combination of Positional Warfare,

58 of the major points made by those articles was that during the early years of the PRC, the major task of the PLA was to preserve its military power. But after decades of economic development, this was no longer the case. The PLA now had to protect economic infrastructures and preserve its potentials for war. Thus, it could no longer afford a tactical retreat to lure the enemy into its territory.171

Others challenge the notion that active defence was naturally related to the concept of luring enemy into the deep, arguing that neither Mao nor China’s revolutionary war experience had suggested that active defence has to adopt such a strategy. Due to technological developments, Soviet attacks with armoured forces formations could rapidly penetrate into Chinese territory. The strategy of luring enemy into the deep in the initial phase of war could put the PLA in a disadvantageous situation, in which it may find it difficult to retreat. 172 In other words, Soviet manoeuvre capabilities had rendered the PLA’s strategy obsolete.

Song Shilun was an influential voice against luring enemy into the deep from the outset.173 In a 1977 CMC meeting, he opposed the adoption of the concept as the strategic guideline.174 Afterwards, he repeatedly proposed a change of the strategic guideline. In his speech to AMS researchers in January 1980, Song again displayed concerns over the strategic guideline.175 He separated the concepts of active defence and luring enemy into the deep, arguing that although active defence was the strategic guideline that directs all aspects of a war, the concept of luring enemy into the deep was context specific and should not be confused with strategic guidelines. Politically and economically important areas were close to the frontiers and the Soviet’s armoured forces and airborne operations had already made China’s trading ‘space for

Mobile Warfare, and Guerrilla Warfare During the Initial Phase of Future War (试论未来战争初期

阵地战运动战游击战的结合)," ibid.

171 Military Art. 1980.4.p25; Zhang, Memoirs of Zhang Zhen 2 (张震回忆录 2）, 197-99. 172 Military Art. 1980-4. P24-25 173 Zhang, Memoirs of Zhang Zhen 2 (张震回忆录 2）, 196-97.

174 Shilun Song, Selected Military Writings of Song Shilun: 1958-1989 (宋时轮军事文选:1958-1989 )

(Military Science Publishing House (军事科学出版社), 2007), 242. 175 Ibid., 194.

59 time’ tactics obsolete.176 A few months later, he sent a letter to Ye Jianying urging him to change the strategic guideline. Although he had repeated his ideas several times, Song hoped that the CMC would consider his proposals again given the vital importance of the strategic guideline to China’s politic, economic and military decisions, and its potential decisiveness in weathering and repelling an invasion.177

After a few years of debate, research relating to the initial phase of war eventually reached the consensus that active defence was still at the core of the PLA’s strategic guidelines, and was still a principle that guided all phases and aspects of warfare. However, luring enemy into the deep was only applicable to a certain period and under certain circumstances. The consensus was that at least during the initial phase of a war, luring enemy into the deep should not be adopted.178 Instead they argued that in the future, the major task of the PLA would be directly opposing enemy attacks and preventing enemy penetration into Chinese territory.179 Luring enemy into the deep was replaced by ‘standing up to the enemy’ in 1982.180

Although the debates led to the abandonment of luring enemy into the deep, mainstream PLA strategists continued to adhere to the traditional all-out war school of thought, believing that the danger of war was imminent and preparing for the wars that would threaten the very survival of the state. The two relatively conservative schools of thoughts discussed in the beginning of this section shared essentially the same assumptions about the security environment and future wars: that the international situation was not stable and a major war was imminent. Future wars would mirror previous ones, such as the Sino–Vietnamese War and World War II. For example, a review of Military Art Journal articles between December 1978181 and the

176 Song, "Preliminary Discussions on Future Anti-Aggression War (关于未来反侵略作战的几个问

题的初步探讨)," 55. 177 Selected Military Writings of Song Shilun: 1958-1989 (宋时轮军事文选:1958-1989 ), 244-45. 178 Tan, "Some Thoughts on How to Apply Strategic Guidelines During the Initial Phase of Anti- Aggression War (对未来反侵略战争初期贯彻战略方针的一些认识)," 114. 179 Military Art. 1980-4. P24-25 180 Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness (Routledge, 2005), 71. 181 The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party

60 end of 1983 suggests that the PLA mainstream was focusing on ‘the initial phase of war’. More specifically, they were still debating whether the PLA should abandon the concept of luring enemy into the deep.182 The assumptions underlying this debate were that major war was imminent, Soviet invasion would be followed by nuclear attacks leading to an all-out nuclear war and China would fight protracted wars.183 Thus, the debate was not on the nature of the war to be fought but, rather, whether tactics should aim to lure enemy into the deep or stand up to the enemy and prevent penetration into the Chinese territory.184 The questions raised were mainly concerned with how the PLA should respond to attacks during the initial phase of foreign invasion, and what strategy should be employed—active defence, or luring enemy into the deep.

In retrospect, this ‘all-out imminent war’ or ‘fighting the last war’ mentality constrained thinking.185 Only after their focus was shifted from ‘the last war’ to ‘the next war’ was the PLA able begin serious study of the ongoing technological revolution and reassessment of the changing international security environment— subsequently, they realised the nature of future warfare would be fundamentally different from the wars they were focusing on.186 The future war studies epistemic community that emerged from the PLA Daily Study Military column and the so-called Military Salon was a pioneer group advocating such a paradigm shift and a forward- looking approach to defence studies.

2.3.2 The Future War Studies Experts as an Epistemic Community

While the all-out imminent war school was debating luring enemy into the deep, a small group of young officers were contemplating other problems. In contrast to the mainstream PLA thinking, this community was focusing on a fundamentally

182 Zhang, Memoirs of Zhang Zhen 2 (张震回忆录 2）, 202. 183 Ibid., 201-02. 184 Military Art Editorial, Selected Essays of Military Art. Ii Studies on Modern Operational Issues ( 军事学术论文选（下）现代作战问题研究) (Military Science Publishing House (军事科学出版社), 1984). 185 Li, A New Analysis of Sun Zi (孙子谋略新论), 416. 186 ibid.

61 different future security environment. The major difference between these groups was the latter’s emphasis on the importance of focusing on the future,187 that is, on winning the next war rather than fighting the last war. They had exerted some influence on the 1985 strategic decision. More importantly, they were major players in crafting various defence strategies and concepts in the following decades. Some of them became senior PLA leaders.188 Some are still key military reform or RMA advocates.189 This section discusses the emergence and origins of this community of PLA experts.

As discussed in the previous section, the leadership transition and end of the Cultural Revolution created uncertainties and demands for specialised advice. While economics and international studies areas slowly re-established their research capabilities in the late 1970s, the re-establishment of PLA policy-oriented research lagged. A community of military experts was quietly emerging though. Its roots can be traced back to the late 1970s in the PLA Daily Study Military column and the Military Salon created by a number of young PLA officers.

In the early 1980s, there were two groups of experts, one engaged in public discussions in the PLA Daily Study Military column and the other comprising a small group of young officers from various PLA institutions, many associated with the BIISS190 or engaged in internal private seminars, referred to as the Military Salon. The editors of the PLA Daily Study Military column and a few young officers at the GSD’s

187 Study Military Editorial PLA Daily, "Hope Military Studies Like a Hundred of Flowers in Bloom ( 愿军事学术之花争芳斗艳)," PLA Daily, 2 January 1981, 3; Study Military Editorial PLA Daily,

"Hope Military Studies Like a Hundred of Flowers in Bloom (愿军事学术之花争芳斗艳)," in There

Are Indeed Some Unbreakable Lines of Defence (确有图不破的防线), ed. PLA DAILY Editorial (Long March Publishing House (长征出版社), 1983).

188 Sheng Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中

走来：两代军人的对话） (Beijing: China Youth Publishing Group, 2008). For example, Zhang Qinsheng, Song Puxuan, Li Yuanqian, Qi Changming etc. 189Cheng Li, "Promoting ‘Young Guards’: The Recent High Turnover in the Pla Leadership," China Leadership Monitor, no. 48 (2015).;Bingyan Li, "Light up the Military Innovation Culture (点亮军事

创新文化的光芒)," PLA Daily, 12 January 2016. 190 Later became China Institute for International Strategic Studies

62 MTD were the main players bridging the two groups, and they facilitated its convergence in the mid-1980s, culminating in the national defence development strategy (NDDS) debate in 1986 and publishing the National Defence and Future book series from 1986 to 1990. While the Military Salon eventually disappeared, the Military Forum (Study Military) column has been an important platform for discussing forward-looking strategic issues. This is the RMA EC.

2.3.2.1 PLA Daily Study Military Column

The PLA Daily Study Military column was created after the Cultural Revolution with the purpose was to disseminate basic military knowledge. From the early 1980s, it gradually evolved from a source providing military officers fundamental military knowledge to a platform for PLA officers and soldiers to exchange ideas on strategic and comprehensive army building issues. The editorial changed its name from Study Military to Military Forum in 1990.191 This column focuses on long-term and fundamental defence issues, and deliberately avoids short- term problems. It endeavours to foster innovative thinking and theoretical innovation and promote scientific studies and objectivity.192 Unlike some PLA academic journals, such as Military Arts and China Military Science, Study Military articles are shorter and its scope is shallower but broad, and focuses on relatively junior officers and soldiers.193 Military Forum still exists and publishes every Tuesday.

In the late 1970s, the PLA Daily Study Military column and its editors, Zeng Guangjun and Li Bingyan, were among the pioneers in the PLA trying to remove the influence of ‘two whatevers’.194 They made the first major revision of the column in 1979, aimed ‘to promote the emancipation of minds in the field of military studies’,

191 Editorial, "Our Column Has Changed Its Name to Military Forum (本刊更名《军事论坛》)," PLA Daily, 29 December 1989. 192 Ibid. 193 Bingyan Li, On Methods for Writing a Military Essay (军事论文写作方法谈) (Beijing: Great Wall

Publishing House (长城出版社), 1996), 110. 194 Refers to the statement that "We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave"

63 remove the influence of ‘two whatevers’ in the PLA and foster an intellectual climate for academic debates rather than propaganda.195

Study Military has major differences to other Chinese publications. First, it advocates a future-oriented, forward-looking approach to military studies and defence planning. Since its first revision in 1979, the editors made it very clear that the new Study Military must place more emphasis on current issues and be future-oriented.196

Second, the editors believe that one of their major responsibilities is to foster innovation—innovative ideas and innovative minds. 197 With regard to fostering innovative ideas, the editorial has its own philosophy on how to select articles and foster discussions and debate.198 Study Military publishes not only senior military officers’ views, but also articles by civilian experts, junior military officers and soldiers. The quality of articles submitted over the last three years demonstrates a healthy fostering of innovative thinking among young officers. For example, in November 1980, Major General Huang Shuying, deputy commander of the 65th Army, wrote an article for Study Military titled There are unbreakable Defence Lines.199 The column soon received a responding article from a soldier, Qi Changming, arguing that there is no such thing as unbreakable defence lines, only unbreakable defence space.200 In addition to Qi’s ideas and arguments, the editor, Li, also admired his courage to challenge a superior’s ideas. 201 Both articles were published in a later edited

195 Bingyan Li, "Explore and Try (探索与尝试)," in On the Methods of Writing Military Essays (军事

论坛写作方法谈), ed. Bingyan Li (Great Wall Publishing House (长城出版社), 1996), 115. 196 Ibid., 113. 197 Bingyan Li, Foster Innovation (扶新集) (Long March Publishing House (长征出版社), 2013), 2.

198 On Methods for Writing a Military Essay (军事论文写作方法谈), 109.

199 Shuying Huang, "There Are Indeed Some Unbreakable Lines of Defence (确有图不破的防线)," PLA Daily, 2 January 1981. 200 Changming Qi, "It Is Better to Define It as ‘Unbreakable Defence Space’ (还是提突不破的防

御空间好)," ibid., 6 Feburary.

201 Kunming Ma, "A Great Pla Scholar: Li Bingyan (军中大儒李炳彦)," Today's Massmedia (今传媒 ), no. 4 (1996): 31.

64 volume.202 In less than two years, Study Military published six articles written by Qi. In one journalist trip to then Wuhan MR, Li took the opportunity to meet Qi but learned that Qi was about to retire from his service. Li contacted the Department of Military Operations of Wuhan MR and referred Qi to work as an intern there. This internship provided Qi an opportunity to present himself and he was eventually promoted to officer.203 Years later, Qi became secretary of CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou and now serves as a major general and deputy chief of staff of Nanzhou MR. Another example is Feng Yujun, a junior staff at the Department of Military Operations of Jinan MR who published an article in Study Military in 1985, arguing that weapons acquisition and technological development should be guided by operational concepts and military theories, not the other way around. This article triggered a year-long debate on the concept of ‘transcendent research’(超越型研究 TR). His article and the debate attracted attention from one of China’s most prominent scientists, Qian Xuesen, who wrote a letter encouraging them to conduct further research on this subject.204

2.3.2.2 Military Salon

In addition to Study Military, several young military officers who were regular participants in PLA-wide campaign training, exercises and seminars began gathering together to study defence economic and strategic issues.205 Initially, it was a very casual group gathering with few participants. They had no designated meeting place or formal meeting schedules.206 Over a few years, links had been strengthened among those policy experts and commanders due to some exchanges during academic

202 PLA Daily, "Hope Military Studies Like a Hundred of Flowers in Bloom (愿军事学术之花争芳斗

艳)."

203 Ma, "A Great Pla Scholar: Li Bingyan (军中大儒李炳彦)," 31-33. 204 Yuqing Zhang and Junlong Zhang, "Feng Yujun: From Thinking Big to Doing Big Things (冯玉军

: 从琢磨大事到做大事)," People.cn, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51757/51719/51722/5898354.html. 205 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：两代军人的对话）.

206 Guoming Xie and Xiaoning Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北

京出了一个新的战略学派)," South Reviews (南风窗), no. 12 (1987): 13.

65 conferences and seminars.207 It gradually developed into a loosely connected group, and some began to refer to it as the Military Salon.208 The BIISS became a location for frequent seminars.209 Zeng Guangjun and Li Bingyan of the PLA Daily, and Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Sheng of the GSD’s MTD were among the founding members of this community.210 This community of experts in the early 1980s was advocating a holistic, forward-looking approach to military studies, and were pioneers in defence economics studies. They challenged underlying assumptions about future wars.

In the early years, Military Salon was an exclusive and somewhat secret club. According to a journalist who once attended a Military Salon seminar that, they never revealed its member list. Did not even allow the journalist to mention their names in his article. What he could mention is that Military Salon members were mostly young military officers, in their thirties, from many different PLA institutions.211However, they somehow decided to go public in the mid-1980s.

In January 1985, this group of experts organised the First National Defence Economic Studies conference and created an informal organisation—the preparatory group for establishing a Society for National Defence Economic Studies. Qian Xuesen, one of China’s most prominent scientists, supported this seminar and gave a keynote speech. As both the seminar and this group were the first of its kind in the PLA, the seminar proceeding was sent to the CMC and was soon acknowledged by

207 Zhiqiang Chen, "Beijing Institute for Defence Eeconomic Studies Founded ( 北京国防经济研究会

成立)," People's Daily, 6 March 1987.

208 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战略学派)," 13. 209 Ibid., 12. 210 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：

两代军人的对话）.; Ming Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )," China Military Online, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-11/01/content_6748659_3.htm.

211 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 12.

66 the commission. 212 It took them two years to finish registration and eventually establish the Beijing Society for Defence Economic Studies in March 1987.213

In addition to private seminars, Military Salon began organising large-scale conferences in the mid-1980s. And created its first official organisation, the Beijing Institute for National Defence Economic Studies (BINDES) in 1987.214 The first such event was the First National Defence Economic Studies conference, held in January 1985. As an effort towards creating an official research organisation, the preparatory group for founding the BINDES was established during this conference. The conference proceedings were soon sent to the CMC.215 The Second National Defence Economic Studies conference was held from 26 November to 2 December 1986, with the theme national defence economic development strategy. Senior PLA leaders, such as the Deputy Secretaries of the CMC, Zhang Aiping and Hong Xuezhi, gave speeches at the conference. Jin Zhude was a key conference organiser and the chief editor of the conference proceedings. Some Study Military contributors also presented in this conference,216 including Chen Weimin and Jin Zhude. Qin Chaoying and Wang Dong gave the presentation Civil-Military Coordination as a Profitable Defence Development Model.217 Although it took them two years to finish registration and

212 Guoming Xie and Xiaoning Zhang, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北

京出了一个新的战略学派)," South Reviews (南风窗), no. 12 (1987): 14.

213 Zhiqiang Chen, "Beijing Society for Defence Eeconomic Studies Founded ( 北京国防经济研究会

成立)," People's Daily, 6 March 1987. 214 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14. 215 Ibid. 216 Military Training Department of PLA General Staff Department and PLA Daily Study Military editorial, "To Write a Good History of Our Army’s Glorious and Magnificent Future (写好我军光辉

灿烂的未来史)," in Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略思考), ed.

Dezhi (杨得志) YANG and Xiang (宦乡) Huan (PLA Publishing House, 1987). 217 Chaoying Qin and Dong Wang, "On Civil-Military Compatiable ‘ Profitable Defence ’

Development Model (试论军民兼容的增殖型国防发展模式 )," in The Proceedings of National

Defence Economic Development Strategy (国防经济发展战略论文集) (PLA Publishing House, 1987).

67 establish the BINDES in March 1987, 218 they did not stop working on research projects.219

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter examined the Chinese domestic political environment in the late 1970s, arguing that it was against this backdrop that an epistemic community emerged and significantly impacted the Chinese leadership’s threat perception. The death of Mao ended China’s one-man-dominated decision-making system, creating a demand for specialised advice on almost every policy area. Consequently, Deng began to re- establish an advisory system to aid decision-making in China, creating an intellectual climate favourable to the emergence of the RMA EC which began advocating foreign defence research methods, a forward-looking defence planning approach and various foreign military ideas. These eventually led to the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

If China had taken the extreme contingencies (i.e., imminent, inevitable, all- out war) as the primary basis for planning, it would have embraced strategies and capabilities counter to those envisioned by the RMA. The logic behind the shift from nuclear-dominated strategy to a conventional deterrence strategy, per US strategists, is that ‘It will always be possible to slip mindlessly toward such an apocalypse, so we will always need to deter the extreme contingencies. But it does not take much nuclear force to destroy a civil society. We need to devote our predominant effort to a wide range of more plausible, important contingencies’.220

218 Chen, "Beijing Institute for Defence Eeconomic Studies Founded ( 北京国防经济研究会成立)." 219 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14. 220 Albert Wohlstetter, "Rpm, or Revolutions by the Minute Nuclear," in Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, ed. Robert Zarate and Henry Sokolski (The Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 617.

68 Chapter 3: The RMA Epistemic Community and Its Core Beliefs

The previous chapter discussed the circumstances of the emergence and origins of the RMA EC. This chapter discusses the common beliefs and knowledge base that held those experts together as an epistemic community. It examines the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, during which the RMA EC emerged and managed to consolidate its core beliefs. Due to the forward-looking nature of their views and approach to defence studies, they challenged three orthodoxies of the time and advanced two subjects of studies. They challenged the notion of ‘fighting the wars with whatever weapons you have’, the imminent all-out war mentality and idea that defence spending necessarily poses a burden on national economic development. Moreover, due to their holistic, forward-looking approach, they promoted strategic studies in the PLA and advocated studies on the new technological revolution and its military implications.

Section 3.1 details the composition of the RMA EC, its members and their major characteristics. Section 3.2 examines major activities of the RMA EC from 1980 to 1985, including major themes of Study Military discussions and debates, conferences and seminars, books and projects. From these is extracted the ideas and views of the community—primarily to identify their common belief and what distinguished them from the mainstream PLA views.

3.1 The RMA Epistemic Community

The RMA EC rose to prominence in the mid-1980s after three major efforts— advocating future war studies initiatives, organising NDDS debates in Study Military and publishing the National Defence and Future book series—which culminated in the establishment of the BINDES.

3.1.1 Composition

As discussed in the previous chapter, the RMA EC was formed from two subgroups: Military Salon members, who already comprised an epistemic community

69 (as they were already a cohesive group of experts meeting and exchanging ideas regularly, and, more importantly, they had already began promoting certain ideas and policies),221 and regular Study Military contributors, active throughout the early and mid-1980s. PLA Daily editors Zeng Guangjun and Li Bingyan were at the forefront of the expert network, working as coordinators bridging those two groups. Many Military Salon members were also regular Study Military contributors. But Military Salon was more exclusive. Those two groups fully converged during the NDDS debate in 1986 (discussed in detail in the next chapter).

Most Study Military contributors were professional military researchers from military research and educational institutions such as the AMS, Nanjing Army Command College and PLA Logistics College. Some were from MRs, military services and General Department’s internal military research offices. For example, An Tian and Cui Yucheng were from the Chengdu MR’s military research office, Kong Lingtong from the Beijing MR’s military research office, and Hua from the General Logistics Department’s internal research office. Few were from executive branches and combat units. For example, Zhang Qinsheng222 and Zhang Sheng of the GSD’s MTD, and Song Puxuan and Feng Yujun of the Jinan MR’s Operations Department. Nanjing Army Command College researchers were among the most active Study Military contributors. They were who provoked debates that initiated a three year– long, influential discussion theme in Study Military, called DFB.223 Qi Zhengjun, deputy commandant of Nanjing Army Command College, and Zhang Taiheng,

221 For example, the report Suggestions on Peace Time Defence Force Development Policy; Xiaohong Cai et al., "Indepth 1 (深沉的思考)," PLA Daily, 27 Feburary 1987.;"Indepth 2 (深沉的思考 2)," PLA Daily, 13 March 1987. 222 In fact, Zhang Qinsheng had switched between research and executive branches for many times during his military career. From the GSD to Beijing MR’s Military Research Office, then back to GSD, then National Defence University, and GSD, then became commander of the Guangzhou MR, eventually became deputy chief of the GSD. 223 Youfu Huang, Haiying Li, and Binggyan Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿真中实现科技大练官)," PLA Daily, 29 December 1998.

70 commander of the 28th Group Army, were among the few senior officers who participated in and supported the debate in the early 1980s.224

Military Salon has never revealed its member list or allowed journalists to refer to those scholars by their names.225 However, we know they created the documentary In-depth, which explored the potential military revolution in the early 1980s,226 and published the National Defence and Future book series.227 Known Military Salon members are: Cai Xiaohong, Wang Dong, Qin Chaoying, Wang Bo, Wang Subo,228 Zhang Sheng, Zhang Qinsheng, Zeng Guangjun, Li Bingyan,229 Guo Weiping, Yin Bing, Liao Shining, Qiu Xiaoguang,230 Chai Yuqiu, Jin Zhude, Chen Xiaolu, Xie Gang and Zhu Songchun.231 Their official affiliations are illustrated in Figure 2.

Military Salon members of the RMA EC have two major characteristics. First, many of them were associated with the BIISS. Second, many were either related to or worked for senior CCP or PLA leaders. For example, Zhang Sheng was son of Defence Minister Zhang Aiping; Cai Xiaohong was son of Minister of Justice Cai Cheng; Qin Chaoying was son of Qin Chuan, president of People’s Daily; Zhang Qinsheng was

224 By senior, I mean senior colonel or above. 解放军报 1983-7-22 做未来战场的设计师; 面向实际

预测未来-简评学军事副刊的未来战场设计

225 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战略学派)," 12.

226 Ibid., 13. Cai et al., "Indepth 1 (深沉的思考).";"Indepth 2 (深沉的思考 2)."; "Indepth 3 (深沉的思

考 3)," PLA Daily, 20 March 1987.;"Indepth 4 (深沉的思考 4)," PLA Daily, 27 March 1987. 227 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14.

228 Qin and Wang, "On Civil-Military Compatiable ‘Profitable Defence’ Development Model (试论军民兼容的增殖型国防发展模式 )."

229 Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )".

230 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：两代军人的对话）, 459.

231 Dezhi Yang and Xiang Huan, Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略

思考), National Defence and Future (PLA Publishing House, 1987).

71 son of former Mayor of Lüliang, Shanxi;232 Chen Xiaolu was son of Marshal Chen Yi, China’s former foreign minister; Jin Zhude worked as assistant to Director of the General Department of Logistics Hong Xuezhi, and prominent scientist Qian Xuesen; and Zhu Songchun worked as assistant to both Premier Zhou Enlai and General Su Yu.233

232 The Global Intelligence Files, "China/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Vietnam/Uk - Large-Scale Changes Due in Top China Military Body - Hong Kong Paper," WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/69/695172_china-taiwan-hong-kong-vietnam-uk-large-scale- changes-due-in.html 233 "General Zhu Songchun Has Become an Advisor to the Chinese Traditional Culture Institute (朱松

春将军受邀，担任首届中国传统文化国际学术研讨会顾问)," the Chinese Traditional Culture Institute, http://www.cyifs.com/xnxw-8.htm.

Figure 2. Official affiliations of core RMA Epistemic Community members in the mid-1980s

The Study Military group had more influence on public debates and opinions, while Military Salon had direct access to senior policymakers. The community members have two major characteristics. First, as previously mentioned, most were professional military researchers from across a variety of research institutes. One reason for this was the general dearth of information, especially military knowledge, prior to the information age. Military researchers, with access to military studies and books, especially foreign books, were in a position to acquire knowledge on foreign wars, military theories and technologies. For example, according to Zhang Yunyi, he

73 was able to immerse himself in military theoretical studies when he was a visiting researcher at the AMS Encyclopaedia Editing Office.234

Based on their expertise, those members can be put into two sub-categories: strategic and future studies experts, including Study Military editors, MTD officers and those from Nanjing Command College (specialised in strategic and operational matters, and forecasting future wars); and defence economics experts, including members of the BINDES and those from Logistics College. Qin Chaoying and Wang Dong of the AMS was also an active participant of the ‘profitable defence’ debate and is considered a defence economics expert.

Second, many early RMA EC members, especially those most active ones, were relative of, or used to work for senior PLA leaders as staff or advisors. In addition to the aforementioned relationships of Military Salon members, Shen Weiguang worked as secretary for Fu Quanyou, commander of the Chengdu MR (and later chief of the GSD of the PLA). There are probably two reasons why many members are of princeling backgrounds: first, during the Cultural Revolution, only relatives of high- level officials had access to higher education; second, without such princelings as members, this group would not have been approved by the relevant authorities, let alone allowed access to decision-makers. Therefore, it may have been a strategy adopted by the founding members to have better access to decision-makers. For example, Chen Xiaolu, deputy secretary general of the BIISS and son of Marshall Chenyi, was involved in some major RMA EC activities,235 but did not contribute much in terms of writing of articles and reports. The RMA EC probably engaged some princelings simply for their connections and influence. Another benefit of princelings (and researchers in general departments and MRs’ military research offices) was their access to foreign materials and even classified information. For example, Yang Nanzheng was the son of Qian Xuesen’s chief of staff. As Qian Xuesen introduced operational research to China, Yang was among the first to read Chinese-translated books and articles on operational research. This reading prompted Yang to conclude

234 Yunyi Zhang, New Forms of War (Shijie Zhanzheng Xin Xingtai), ed. Ying Lv, National Defence & the Future (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1990), 188. 235 For example, he was an editor of National Defence & Future series.

74 that to achieve military modernisation, the PLA had to learn quantitative research and command and control tools and methods. 236 As many RMA EC members were researchers at general departments and MRs’ internal policy research offices, or associated with BIISS (a think tank associated with the intelligence departments of the GSD), they had better access to foreign books, materials and even classified materials.

3.1.2 Major Activities and Debates

From the late 1970s to 1985, the RMA EC had various major activities and discussions and published many books. The most influential one was the Study Military discussion theme DFB, debated from 1983 to 1986. Their discussions, research projects and publications mostly fall in one or more of the following categories: foreign military development, exploring future wars, and defence economics.

3.1.2.1 Foreign Military Development

Foreign military development entails new military theories, concepts of operations, technologies or war experiences. In the Foreign Military Studies Review, a collaborative effort by Study Military and GSD’s MTD, prominent military researchers were invited to analyse groundbreaking and influential foreign military books. 237 According to the editors, the new technological revolution and its implications on military affairs resulted in new military theories and concepts. As foreign military studies were being translated into Chinese, many PLA personnel were enthusiastic to learn from foreign militaries. This project was intended to introduce those foreign military studies to PLA officers.238

236 Sina Game, "An Interview with a Chinese Game Designer, Yang Nanzheng: Military, Wargame, and Commercial Games. (访“中国游戏第一人”杨南征：军人、兵棋与商业游戏)," Sina.com, http://games.sina.com.cn/y/n/2015-09-02/fxhkafa9607481.shtml. 237 Editors, "Publisher Notes," in Reviews of Foreign Military Books (国外军事论著评介), ed. Military Training Department of PLA General Staff Department and Study Military Column of the PLA Daily (1986), 1. 238 Ibid., 1-2.

75 3.1.2.2 Exploring Future Wars or the New Technological Revolution

According to the founding members of the RMA EC, the original purpose of creating Military Salon was to address issues related to, “how to conduct army building in peacetime, in the face of the new technological revolution.”239Their early focus was on exploring future wars, and addressing defence economic issues.240

There Are Unbreakable Defence Lines published selected Study Military articles publish from 1979 to 1982, covering various research fields, including characteristics of modern wars and Mao Zedong’s military thoughts, theoretical issues regarding the initial phase of war, operational methods for winning a war against superior adversaries, and research reports on tactical issues. 241 Instead of solely focusing on defence lines, some articles argued that future defensive wars should pay more attention to other factors such as time and space.242

The DFB and TR debate was a three-year debate (from 1983 to 1986). In 1983, two young scholars from Nanjing Army Command College wrote a several articles to explore the future of warfare, which prompted editor Study Military editor Li Bingyan to create a new discussion section named DFB. 243 This theoretical exploration challenged the traditional ways of thinking and stimulated the desire to explore the

239 Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )". 240 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)."

241 PLA Daily, "Hope Military Studies Like a Hundred of Flowers in Bloom (愿军事学术之花争芳斗艳)." 242 Yangping Chen, "Wish to Grow up and Grow into a Towering Tree - a Review of Tthere Are Indeed Some Unbreakable Lines of Defence.(愿茁壮幼苗长成参天大树-写在《确有突不破的防线》出版

之际)," PLA Daily, 6 January 1984. 243 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."; Guangjun Zeng, Hua Hua, and Bingyan Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕

正在拉开), National Defence & Future (国防与未来丛书) (PLA Publishing House, 1987), 5.

76 future. It soon attracted a number of innovative minds.244 Those debates resulted in the PLA’s first textbook on Coordinated Tactic Studies. 245 The DFB and ideas associated with future studies and research on future wars gradually infiltrated the whole PLA.246 In 1985, the DFB was further promoted, with a more advanced version of the debate named ‘transcendent research’. This debate further strengthened the PLA’s focus on future wars.247

The Smoke of Gunpowder that is Flying into the Future collected articles on foreign local wars, with a focus on high-tech weapons, new operational modes and concepts. 248 This could be considered the first attempt (by the PLA and Study Military) to explore local wars. Drawing from those local wars, they learned many lessons on technologies, tactics, the nature of future wars and operational methods. By analysing foreign local wars, this publication tried to understand the new technological revolution and its implications for the nature of future wars.

The Suggestions on Peace Time Defence Force Development Policy report urged the PLA to take advantage of the current peaceful international environment and make a decisive change of its defence development’s guiding thought, from preparing to ‘fight an early, all-out, and nuclear war’ to peacetime defence development. It further argued that the PLA should ‘embrace the forthcoming military revolution, in order to better prepare itself for the next war’.249

244 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."; Zeng, Hua, and Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕正在拉开). 245 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."

246 Zeng, Hua, and Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕正在拉开), 5. 247 Ibid. 248 PLA DAILY Editorial, "Publisher Notes," in The Smoke of Gunpowder That Is Flying into the Future (飘向未来的硝烟), ed. PLA DAILY Editorial (PLA Publishing House, 1984).

249 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：

两代军人的对话）, 457.

77 3.1.2.3 Defence Economics

Meanwhile, Military Salon had conducted many projects and organised many seminars. For example, they created three mathematic models to address defence planning and defence economic issues: the mathematical model for calculating the total national military forces, the mathematical model for calculating the personnel of the PLA, and the mathematical model for forecasting national defence budget development trends.250 The third model was highly praised by Vice Premier Yao Yilin, and the Ministry of Finance found it very useful and asked to work with Military Salon to further develop the models.251

In January 1985, they organised the First National Defence Economic Studies conference, and created an informal organisation—the preparatory group for establishing the BINDES.252

3.2 Advocating a Holistic, Forward-looking Approach to Defence Studies

This section investigates what distinguished the RMA EC from other PLA scholars. The members shared a set of normative and causal beliefs and possessed their own approaches to understanding the nature of future wars, and the relations between military spending and national economic development, that were different from the mainstream PLA school of thought. This section argues that the RMA EC have two enduring core beliefs that have guided their studies from their establishment through to the present.

The RMA EC members believe that military studies as a discipline should be future-oriented and forward-looking, and comprehensive and holistic. Since the late 1970s, the RMA EC has advocated this approach to defence studies and planning.

250 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid.

78 3.2.1 Future-oriented, Forward-looking Approach to Defence Studies

While future-oriented defence planning is now standard practice in the PLA, in the early 1980s it was considered bizarre. As some scholars in the 1980s applied a future studies approach to China’s economics and international studies, this community of experts were among the first to introduce this approach to the PLA.253 Since the creation of Study Military, its editors have tried to shift the PLA’s focus from the past to the future. For example, in the introduction of There Are Indeed Some Unbreakable Lines of Defence, while acknowledging the importance of studying military history, the editors placed great emphasis on future studies. They argue that military studies as a discipline should be considered future studies rather than ‘archaeology’. Military studies scholars should be innovative, explorative and willing to challenge authority. They urge PLA analysts to focus on future operational requirements and avoid being indoctrinated by textbook theories.254

In 1983, Study Military created a new discussion theme, DFB, to explore the future.255 One characteristic of DFB is that almost every article concerned the twenty- first century. They forecasted the future of economic development, international politics, security environment and potential adversaries. Alvin Toffler was probably the most-quoted author.256 While a focus on forecasting future security environment, future war scenarios and technological developments now seems commonplace, in the

253 Li, On Methods for Writing a Military Essay (军事论文写作方法谈), 76.

254 PLA Daily, "Hope Military Studies Like a Hundred of Flowers in Bloom (愿军事学术之花争芳斗

艳)." ibid., 3. 255 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."; Zeng, Hua, and Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕正在拉开), 5. ; Jianghe

Li and Binyan Li, "Let You Pent to Touch the Future: On ‘Designing Future Battlefield’ and How to Write a Millitary Forecating Article (让你手中的笔触向未来:从“未来战场设计”谈军事预测

文章的写作," in On the Methods of Writing Military Essays (军事论坛写作方法谈), ed. Bingyan Li

(Great Wall Publishing House (长城出版社), 1996), 77. 256 Hua Hua, The Art of Planning the Future (规划未来的艺术), National Defence & Future (国防与

未来丛书) (PLA Publishing House, 1988), 1.; Li, On Methods for Writing a Military Essay (军事论文

写作方法谈), 76.

79 early 1980s, articles anticipating future wars were often criticised for being ‘left’ and those exploring the technological revolution and its military implications were accused of worshiping foreign ideas or xenocentrism. 257 Conservative defence analysts argued that DFB articles were divorced from reality, suggesting that ‘many of those articles are scientific fictions and delusions…Star wars and robotic wars [described in those articles] are illusory imaginations’.258 Thus, they coined the term transcendent research to denounce them. But, interestingly, DFB participants were very proud of their ‘illusory imaginations’ and adapted this term for their future- oriented research by creating another discussion section titled ‘transcendent research’ to further promote their futurist approach and ideas. 259 This debate challenged traditional ways of thinking and stimulated the desire to explore the future. It soon attracted a number of innovative minds.260

The RMA EC argue that future wars will differ from previous wars. Military theories should play a role in guiding weapon acquisition and research and development (R&D)—that is, a theory-driven approach by which operational concepts guide weapon design. Underlying this position were beliefs that instead of responding to future threats and security environment, the PLA should be able to shape the evolution of the security environment. The military could and should make investment in technologies and weapons according to the most likely future war scenarios.

Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Guoyu argue that military theories must anticipate future technological development instead of focusing on the current technologies.261

257 On Methods for Writing a Military Essay (军事论文写作方法谈), 86-87.

258 Editorial, "Welcome to Participate in the ‘Trascendent Research’ Debate (欢迎参加关于“超越

型”研究的讨论)," PLA Daily, 4 January 1985. 259 Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )".

260 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."; Zeng, Hua, and Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕正在拉开). 261 Qinsheng Zhang; Guoyu Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪

之交的军事理论革命)," in New Modesl of Army Qualitative Building: Selected Papers on ’Two

Basic Transformations) (军队质量建设新模式—实现“两个根本性转变”系列优秀论文集), ed.

80 Shen Weiguang argues that ‘In the current era, humans are following the track designed by the futurists and the strategists. The military is no exception. The popular concept of information warfare is, in fact, a product made by the futurists’. 262 Thus, RMA EC believed they could shape the development of future technologies and wars, rather than just respond to the changing environment. Future studies and scenario- based planning methods were appreciated by most RMA EC members.

Li argues that Alvin Toffler’s books not only anticipated future technological development but played the role of persuading informatisation of society and military affairs.263 Hua suggests that military reforms are not initiated by theoretical thinking itself but by practical demands.264 Those studies, published in the 1980s, all focused on exploring the future security environment and future warfare, 20 to 30 years into the future (i.e., the twenty-first century), with an eye for the strategic level of modern military and defence theoretical studies.265

3.2.2 Comprehensive and Holistic Approach to Military Studies and Reform

For defence planning, a systematic matter, to focus on the long-term future, it requires input from various areas, necessitating a holistic approach—for example, holistic defence reforms that require the PLA to examine the whole spectrum of weaknesses that affect the PLA’s operational capabilities. The RMA EC’s holistic perspective enabled them to establish comprehensive frameworks such as the NDDS (discussed in Chapter 4).

Guoyu Zhang; Bingyan Li, New Era Military Studies Paper Series (Beijing: Long March Press, 1998), 171. 262 Zhang, Brain Power of China (中国高层新智囊), 394. 263 Bingyan Li, "Using New Philosophic Concept to Guide the Trend of Military Revolution (以新的

哲学观引领变革潮流)," in Foster Innovation (扶新集), ed. Bingyan Li (Beijing: Long March

Publishing House (长征出版社), 2013), 284. 264 Hua Hua, "On the Reform Approach of “Comprehensive Design and Stage-by-Stage Implementing”

(试论 “总体设计，分阶段推进”的改革策略)," PLA Daily, 22 April 1988. 265 Guangzheng Hu and Xianshe Xiao, "Preface " in The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争鸣) (PLA Publishing House, 1989).

81 RMA EC members agreed that to study war and defence issues, military researchers could not focus solely on military matters. Rather, they had to adopt a systematic approach and understand a wide range of issues and related areas—for example, politics, economics, technologies, demography, culture and history. As Zhang Yunyi realised when working as a visiting fellow at AMS, studying war was no longer a military issue but had become a complex social systematic project. An exclusive understanding of only military theories was detrimental to studying warfare. 266 Per Zhang Qingsheng, ‘studying and crafting national defence development strategy requires grand systematic thinking, and forward-looking perspectives’.267 While issues about strategy, grand strategy, national security and national interests were considered the prerogative of national leaders,268 the debate initiated by the RMA EC shifted the PLA’s thinking from a solely military perspective to a systemic way of thinking, able to study military issues from a comprehensive national power perspective.269

Because the RMA will cause changes in basically every aspect of the military, not only military thought, military organisations, operational concepts etc., but also other aspects of the country. Thus, the PLA will need a macro system for comprehensive planning. The system not only specifies the goals, but also provide planning content, methodologies, and steps. They used the PLA’s development of its C3I system in the past decade as an example, arguing that due to the lack of macro guidance, and theory-driven planning, there was no communication and collaboration between different levels and institutions of the PLA, millions were spent on computers and systems that are incompatible with each other. Thus, they suggest that China must

266 Zhang, New Forms of War (Shijie Zhanzheng Xin Xingtai), 188. 267 Qinsheng Zhang, Collected Works of General Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃) (Research

Institute of Maritime Security and Cooperation (海洋安全与合作研究院), 2015), 280.

268 Mingming Sun; Xiaohong Cai, "Preface," in National Security Amist Global Turbulence (动荡中的国家安全) (PLA Publishing House, 1988).

269 Zhengqi; Fei Chen; Bingyan Li; Shengjun Liu Nan, "Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上

的奋力拼搏)," in Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的拼搏), ed. Shouzeng Zheng; Fayou Zhong (National Defence University Press, 1993), 13.

82 have systemic thought and comprehensive plans for the reform.270 This is the concept of system engineering had been advocated by Qian Xuesen and his associates. It was the early version of the popular concept ‘top level design’.

It was the combination of these beliefs—a forward-looking, future-oriented approach supported by a comprehensive and holistic view—that distinguished the RMA EC from the all-out war school. These beliefs led them to challenge three orthodoxies (explored in the next section) and provided them with the cognitive skills to craft long-term strategies.

3.2.3 Challenging the Orthodoxies

The RMA EC’s core beliefs, explored in the previous section, led them to challenge three central tenets of the military orthodoxy.

3.2.3.1 Challenging ‘Fighting the Wars with Whatever Weapons You Have’

The RMA EC countered the dominant concept of ‘fighting the wars with whatever weapons you have’ by advocating the idea of ‘developing weapons for whatever wars we will fight’.271 The former had been created by Marshall Zhu De during the Second Sino–Japanese War, during which China had no industrial bases and the PLA was forced to fight enemies with whatever weapons it possessed.272 The RMA EC had proposed that military theories should play a role in guiding weapon acquisition and R&D. Underlying this position were beliefs that instead of responding to future threats and security environment, the PLA should be able to shape the

270 Feng Zhang and Binggyan Li, "Servicemen’s Historical Mission at the Turn of the Century: A

Report on “Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史

使命— ”迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)," PLA Daily, 2 January 1996, 280. 271 Ma, "A Great Pla Scholar: Li Bingyan (军中大儒李炳彦)," 30.

272 Guangzheng Hu and Xianshe Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响

到二十一世纪的争鸣), National Defence & Future (国防与未来丛书) (PLA Publishing House, 1989), 202.

83 evolution of the security environment. 273 They believe that winning future wars requires fundamentally different approaches from studying past wars. 274 This is particularly important for the PLA, as the mainstream was still focusing on ‘fighting the last war’. More important, instead of responding to future threats and security environment, they believe that the PLA should be able to shape the evolution of the security environment.275 In their words, the PLA should be able to design the future battlefield.

This argument can be traced to a 1979 article by Li Bingyan, in which he challenged ‘fighting the wars with whatever weapons you have’, stating that there are two reasons why creating innovative military theories is very important: first, innovations on operational theories could always maximise the power of the weapons one may have, and second, by creating new operational concepts and theories, the military could make future investments in technologies and weapons according to the most likely future war scenarios. Those theories and concepts could also provide a better direction for future technological R&D.276 Although this idea did not have much impact on PLA thinking or policymaking, the debates on this subject in DFB in 1985 were very influential.

In 1985, Feng Yujun, in his article Let Operational Theories to Guide Weapon Development, again raised the idea that weapon acquisition should be guided by wars

273 Ibid., 204.; Bingyan, "Creating Military Future Studies in Our Military: A Discussion on Transcendental Research (努力创造和发展我军的军事未来学:关于超越性研究的讨论)," PLA

Daily, 28 June 1985.; Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争鸣), 203.

274 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)." 275 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争

鸣), 204. Pla daily 1985.6.26; ibid., 203.

276 Bingyan, "Must Have Serious Discussions on New Operational Methods (要认真探讨新的作战方式)," in There Are Indeed Some Unbreakable Lines of Defence (确有图不破的防线), ed. PLA DAILY

Editorial (Long March Publishing House (长征出版社), 1983), 14. "Must Have Serious Discussions on New Operational Methods (要认真探讨新的作战方式)," PLA Daily, 4 September 1979.

84 the military expected to fight. This provoked debate on the relations between weapon and technological R&D and operational theories.277 However, Feng’s views were contested by those who supported the old school of thought.

Liu Zhongxin argues that military thought is often created by new weapons and technologies, but new academic thoughts also stimulate weapon development. Professional military officers often make requests to scientists and engineers for new technologies and weapons that meet their requirements. Chen Wenhua went further to argue that weapon development should not only be guided by military theories but be based on forecasting the future security environment—more specifically, the PLA should develop new weapons and technologies in response to foreign country’s developments or potential future developments.278 Yin Qingchuan and Feng Yujun point out that the US AirLand Battle and Strategic Defence Initiative are both examples of imagining future wars. 279 Blitzkrieg was another example of an innovative operational concept being more important than weapon technologies.280

Especially after the 1985 strategic decision was announced in June 1985, the TR advocates argued that as the PLA had already shifted from preparing for imminent wars to peacetime defence planning, it had to make long-term plans on weapon acquisition and technological development for winning the next war instead of the last war. During peacetime, to understand what weapons to develop, the PLA had to understand who China may fight and what the war may look like.281 Editors of DFB

277 Zhang and Zhang, "Feng Yujun: From Thinking Big to Doing Big Things (冯玉军:从琢磨大事到做大事)".

278 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争

鸣), 203. 1985.4.5 279 Ibid., 204.; Bingyan, "Creating Military Future Studies in Our Military: A Discussion on Transcendental Research (努力创造和发展我军的军事未来学:关于超越性研究的讨论)."

280 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争

鸣), 203. 281 Ibid., 202.

85 argued that any war they study will take place in the future, thus, without analysing future trends theoretical studies will have no practicable applicability.282

This debate soon attracted a great amount of attention from both military officers and military scientists such as Qian Xuesen. 283 He also had realised the problem of weapon development was not only a technological issue, but a question of what technologies should be developed.284 In his letter responding to Feng’s article, Qian Xuesen said,

We are very interested in your and other comrades’ articles in PLA Daily. We have been thinking about that, scientists and technological experts in our country have been very eager to develop new weapons, and we actually do have the ability to do so. But we have no idea about what to make. Because we do not know what kind of war we will be fighting…The issue you brought up is actually one of our headaches…As you are working at the operations department, please tell us what kind of war our military will be facing in the 21st century and what weapons and technologies will be required…Also, please promote the ‘transcendent research’ idea, and encourage others to participate [in this debate].285

The TR debate lasted from 1985 to 1986.286 Despite criticism, this concept (or rather, way of thinking) had, by the end of 1986, penetrated almost every aspect of the PLA.287 The number of authors and readers of DFB increased dramatically, as did the attention paid to it by the PLA.288

282 Li, On Methods for Writing a Military Essay (军事论文写作方法谈), 77. 283 Zhang and Zhang, "Feng Yujun: From Thinking Big to Doing Big Things (冯玉军:从琢磨大事到

做大事)".

284 Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )". 285 Zhenyu Mi, Qian Xuesen Modern Military Science Thoughts (钱学森现代军事科学思想) (Beijing: China Science Publishing House, 2011), 159-60. 286 Zhang and Zhang, "Feng Yujun: From Thinking Big to Doing Big Things (冯玉军:从琢磨大事到

做大事)". 287 Zeng, Hua, and Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕正在拉开), 5.

288 Liangmin Shao, "The New Technological Revolution and Its Impact on Military Affairs (新技术革

命对军事领域的冲击)," The People's Liberation Army Daily, 27 April 1984, 3.

86 3.2.3.2 Challenging the Imminent, Inevitable, All-out War Mentality

By emphasising the importance of foreseeing the nature of future wars and studying foreign local war cases, the RMA EC challenged the orthodoxy all-out school of thought. They asserted that thinking about how to win future wars is not the same as assessing how past wars were won, and both require different methods.289 This was particularly important for the PLA, which was still focusing on ‘fighting the last war’. More important, the RMA EC argued that the PLA could shape the evolution of the security battlefield instead of merely responding to future threats.290 In their words, the PLA should be able to design the future battlefield.

This directly opposed the ongoing assumptions within the PLA that war was imminent, inevitable and would, from the outset, involve nuclear weapons. In 1983, the PLA, working under the all-out war strategic guideline, was debating operational methods focused on defending against attacks by enemy tank formations and preventing breakthroughs. Li Bingyan raised some critical questions, asking if future wars are difference from the current ones, should we still fight in the same way, and if the nature of war is constantly changing, why focus on current operational methods? To challenge the all-out war mentality, Li and Zeng Guangjun, discussed those issues with experts at Nanjing Army Command College and in DFB,291 which explored the technological developments and trends in the security environment, and forecasted modes and trends of future wars. Additionally, Study Military initiated debates and published books analysing foreign militaries and local wars. By advocating research on local and high-tech wars, they challenged the assumption that future wars would be all-out nuclear wars. Later, RMA EC members Zeng Guangjun, Li Bingyan, Zhang

289 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿真中实现科技大练官)."

290 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争

鸣), 204.; Bingyan, "Creating Military Future Studies in Our Military: A Discussion on Transcendental Research (努力创造和发展我军的军事未来学:关于超越性研究的讨论)."; Hu and Xiao, The

Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争鸣), 203.

291 Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )".

87 Qinsheng and Zhang Sheng wrote a report urging that the PLA to make a decisive change of its defence development guiding thought, from preparing to ‘fight an early, all-out, and nuclear war’ to peacetime defence development.292

In March 1985, a book was published as a collaborative effort by MTD and Study Military. Its introduction clearly states, ‘In our military, as a huge amount of foreign military books are being imported [to China], there has been a rising trend in learning, exploring, and innovating, all for the purpose of winning tomorrow’s wars’. 293 The first chapter, For Winning Future Wars, 294 was written by Zhang Taiheng, commander of 28th Group Army295 and one of the few generals frequently participating in Study Military discussions. He argued that ‘new technological revolution will definitely revolutionise our ways of army building and war fighting. In order to win future wars, we must study harder [too understand it]’.296 He pointed out that in the face the new technological revolution, the PLA had to answer three questions: what changes the technological revolution will bring to future wars, what the trends in future wars are, and what types of new operational methods may emerge. He further argued that to make scientific predictions on future wars, the PLA must try to understand the new technologies and their implications for the military while also placing emphasis on the study of basic military theories. Without understanding military theories, the PLA would have problems addressing those questions. 297 Overall, the book argued that a major factor of US defeat in the Vietnam War was US forces being postured to win the last war. The success of the Gulf War was due to more than a decade of study and training on winning the next war.298

292 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：

两代军人的对话）, 457. 293 Editors, "Publisher Notes," 1. 294 Ibid., 1-4. 295 He later became Commander of Chengdu Military Region, and then Commander of Jinan MR. 296 Editors, "Publisher Notes," 1. 297 Ibid. 298 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."

88 3.2.3.3 Challenging the Notion that Defence Spending Necessarily Burdens Economic Development

The RMA EC’s studies in defence economics in the early 1980s greatly impacted the PLA’s defence strategy debate in the late 1980s. Members of the RMA EC were among the few defence economists in the 1980s who believed that national defence does not necessarily burden a nation’s economic growth. Using a comprehensive approach, they argued that defence spending could add value to the economy. Their ideas also influenced the current concept of civil–military integration.

Defence economics was one major focus of Military Salon seminars and Study Military discussions. In January 1985, this group of experts organised the First National Defence Economic Studies conference. 299 In this conference, they championed the idea that China should consider military goods as one type of commercial goods. As the exchange of military products and arms trading are commonplace in international markets, instead of creating financial burdens, military products and weapons could create profit. This was developed into the concept of ‘profitable defence’.300 Qin Chaoying, Chen Weimin and Wang Qi of the AMS argued in an article that defence investment need not be ‘consuming’, and can be transformed from ‘consumption type of defence’ to a profitable defence. 301 To achieve this transformation, China had to stick on its civil–military coordination program.302 The conference proceedings were later sent to the CMC.303 On the basis of this conference and their previous research, in 1986, some RMA EC members were invited by the

299 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14. 300 Haixi Luo and Weimin Chen, "How to Conduct National Defence Development (国防发展的道路

如何走)," Military Economic Research (军事经济研究), no. 6 (1988): 53.

301 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争鸣), 236. 302 Ibid. 303 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14.

89 GSD to give a lecture to senior PLA officers.304 In his lecture, Jin Zhude advocated profitable defence.305

3.2.4 Advocating Novel Research Areas

The RMA EC’s core beliefs led to their advocating two research areas which would heavily affect the PLA and, in the long term, lead it to embrace the Chinese RMA. These two research areas are introduced in this section and elaborated on in Chapter 4.

3.2.4.1 Advocating Long-term Strategic Planning and Strategic Studies in the PLA

Their belief in holistic and comprehensive approach to defence studies led them to emphasis on the importance of strategic studies. Prior to 1980, strategy or strategic studies was the prerogative of top PLA leaders and discussion of such matters among other military officers was rare.306 During the DFB discussions, many experts in the RMA EC realised that new technologies had blurred the boundaries between tactical, operational and strategic issues. To address tactical or operational issues, military officers would have to study strategic issues, necessitating a top-down approach. They focused 20 years into the future, on the twenty-first century rather than the current debate.307 This community of experts began promoting strategic studies in the early 1980s, turning strategic studies into a popular field of research—‘even some foreign scholars acknowledged that the new generation of young Chinese are inheriting their ancestors’ strategic visions’.308 They fostered a new generation of

304 Ibid. 305 Luo and Chen, "How to Conduct National Defence Development (国防发展的道路如何走)," 53. 306 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：

两代军人的对话）. 307 For example, Military Training Department of PLA General Staff Department and Study Military editorial, "To Write a Good History of Our Army’s Glorious and Magnificent Future (写好我军光辉

灿烂的未来史)," 36.

308 Hua, The Art of Planning the Future (规划未来的艺术).

90 strategic thinkers and strategists who later became influential PLA strategic planners and advisors.

In 1986, Wang Dong, an RMA EC member, argued that strategy has three major characteristics. First, it is a comprehensive system. He saw strategy from a systems engineering perspective, encompassing multiple dimensions, levels and variables. Military is one sub-system of the overall national system. Thus, army building should always be subordinate to the overall national system. Second, strategy focuses on the long-term future. To anticipate the future and even shape future events, strategy must predict future trends based on historical and current trends. He went further to argue that since the new technological revolution will have great impact on the military, the PLA must prepare itself for the forthcoming new era. Third, strategy has a hierarchical structure. There are big systems and sub-systems. The state has a national strategy, the military has its own military strategy and other government organisations have their respective development strategies. All sub-strategies should work in accordance with the national strategy.309

3.2.4.2 Advocating Studies on the New Technological Revolution and its Implications for Future Wars

In 1983, China had nation-wide enthusiasm for the new technological revolution.310An intensive debate about the implications of the new technological revolution was had among military analysts in China. This debate eventually created a new trend in military theoretical studies in the PLA.311 The RMA EC was among the pioneers in the PLA exploring the new technological revolution and its implications for future wars. Many of the community’s experts explicitly or implicitly expressed concerns over the PLA’s approach to military studies, which at the time was still focusing on historical case studies without envisioning future warfare and scenarios.

309 Dong Wang, "On Strategic Awareness (战略意识浅析)," PLA Daily, 7 February 1986. 310 Zhang and Li, "Servicemen’s Historical Mission at the Turn of the Century: A Report on

“Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ”

迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)." 311 Ibid.

91 Although the concept of a RMA had not yet been conceived, articles on the new technological revolution and its implications for national defence had frequently appeared in DFB. For example, Shao Liangmin wrote an article in April 1984, titled The New Technological Revolution and its Impact on Military Affairs, arguing that the new technological revolution brought a block of new technologies, including electronic technology, biotechnology, optical technology and new material technology, that would result in future weapons with better strike capabilities, mobility and precision, and perhaps more artificial intelligence elements.312

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the mainstream and dominant views within the PLA on future wars in the early 1980s, and identified an epistemic community comprised of young officers advocating a future-oriented, forward-looking and holistic approach to defence studies. This community championed this approach to challenge orthodoxy ideas, promote strategic studies in the PLA and advance discussion on the new technological revolution and its military implications. The next chapter will discuss the uncertainties created by the 1985 strategic decisions and examines how the RMA EC seized the opportunity and used their expertise to influence policy selection.

312 Shao, "The New Technological Revolution and Its Impact on Military Affairs (新技术革命对军事

领域的冲击)," 3.

92 Chapter 4: In Search of a Framework for Peacetime Defence Planning (1985–1993)

This chapter examines the RMA EC’s activities and contributions between 1985 and 1993. More specifically, it studies how they helped decision-makers to address uncertainties which arose after China’s shifting of its defence paradigm from imminent war to peacetime army building. The community’s expertise in strategic studies, future studies and defence economic was applied collaboratively to create a framework for peacetime defence planning. The RMA EC also took the Gulf War as an opportunity to further advance their ideas, eventually leading to the new Military Strategic Guidelines announced in January 1993. In addition to the common beliefs and knowledge base that held the RMA EC together, this chapter will examine their activities after the strategic shift, arguing that in the mid-1980s, a very clear common policy agenda emerged from this community—searching for a framework for peacetime defence planning and promoting ideas and policies towards the RMA.

It argues that, the 1985 strategic decision was a shift from preparing for imminent war to focusing on long-term defence development. Without this shift from short-term to long-term perspective, China could have wasted 30 years preparing to fight the last war. The period between the announcement of the strategic shift in 1985 and the strategic guidelines in 1993 was a period of uncertainties, in which the PLA was desperately trying to define the goals of its army building, missions for military struggles and what types of future wars it should prepare to fight.313 The strategic guidelines defined China’s strategic goal and clarified the PLA’s tasks of military struggle.

In addition to the 1985 strategic shift, the RMA EC made three major contributions in this period that paved the way to the RMA. First, they played an important role in exploring future wars and the new technological revolution, creating the intellectual atmosphere which shaped PLA leaders’ thinking about the future wars.

313 Enze Su and Bingyan Li, "Studying War in the Laboratory (在实验室研究和学习战争)," PLA Daily, 17 June 1997.

93 Second, they articulated the 1985 strategic shift, raised controversies and addressed uncertainties surrounding this paradigm shift, and played a major role in crafting the NDDS. Third, they redefined China’s national interests and explained the relation between national interests and defence reforms, thus, keeping the latter on the policy agenda.

In the period between 1985 and 1993, the EC made four contributions that paved the way to the RMA. First, they played an important role exploring future wars and the new technological revolution, and creating the intellectual atmosphere which shaped the PLA leaders’ thinking about the future wars. And envisioned that the most likely future wars China may face in the 21st century would be local wars fought with high-tech weapons. Second, they articulated the 1985 strategic shift, raised controversies and addressed uncertainties surrounding this paradigm shift. And played a major role crafting the national defence development strategy. Third, they redefined China’s national interests and explained the relations between national interests and defence reforms. By relating those ideas and policy objectives to national interests, they managed to keep those ideas on policy agenda. Fourth, they actively advocated their ideas and concepts about future wars and defence strategy, and readily seized the Gulf War as an opportunity to influence policy-making, which eventually led to the adoption of the Military Strategic Guidelines in 1993.

4.1 In Uncertain Times: The 1985 Strategic Shift

As discussed in Chapter 3, the PLA engaged in a significant paradigm shift in the early 1980s. They reassessed the future international security environment and potential security threats. This assessment provided the direction for shifting the PLA’s focus away from a strategy designed to meet a Soviet threat to one oriented towards the new dangers of peacetime. The RMA EC was one of few groups with similar ideas to the PLA, with the international studies community led by Huan Xiang and Li Yimang. In the early 1980s, they had debate on the future security environment and nature of future wars. They challenged the all-out war school, studied foreign local wars and explored the new technological revolution and its implications for future wars. Based on their discussions, the RMA EC members developed their ideas into a report, Suggestions on Peace Time Defence Force Development Policy, to the CMC.

94 The report urged the PLA to take advantage of the current peaceful international environment and make a decisive change from preparing to ‘fight an early, all-out, and nuclear war’ to peacetime defence development. It further argued that the PLA should ‘embrace the forthcoming military revolution, in order to better prepare itself for the next war’.314

At an enlarged CMC meeting in June 1985, Deng made radical changes, the ‘strategic shift’, to the strategic guiding thought. He defined ‘peace and development’ as the ‘theme of the era’ and directed the PLA to enter a period of ‘peacetime army building’.315 Deng stated that

In accordance with our independent foreign policy of peace, we have improved our relations with the United States and with the Soviet Union. China will not play the card of another country and will not allow another country to play the China card, and we mean what we say. This will enhance China’s international status and enable us to have more influence in international affairs.316

Moreover, he suggests that ‘In order to concentrate on rapid economic development and to further raise the quality of the armed forces, China will make a strategic shift of its guiding principle of army building from always being prepared against a massive war of invasion to peacetime army building’.317 This strategic shift was a watershed in Chinese defence planning. It marked the formal shift of its defence planning from preparing for imminent all-out war to peacetime army building. It reflected China’s assessment of the major shifts of the balance of power, the changing security environment, the nature of war and new military technologies.

314 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：两代军人的对话）, 457. 315 Roy Kamphausen; Andrew Scobell, Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army Exploring the Contours of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 84. 316 Xiaoping Deng, "Speech at an Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party," People’s Daily, http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1410.html. 317 Guihua Yang, The Pla’s 30 Years of Reform and Development (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun, Gaige Fazhan 30 Nian) (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2008), 85.

95 However, the strategic decision greatly increased the complexity of PLA defence planning. Many uncertainties arose surrounding peacetime army building. The main uncertainties centred on the nature of future wars, defence planning in peacetime, the scope and speed of the reform and how should it cope with the comprehensive national economic development, and the new technological revolution and its implications for the military. Many were unsure about the decision, asking ‘what if world war happens in the future?’318 Li Bingyan refers to the few years in the mid to late 1980s as ‘a period of strategic vacuum’,319 in which enthusiasm for the new technological revolution was high, but no one knew how to bring about China’s peacetime army building.320 Fravel points out that ‘Before 1985, the PLA planned to fight only one type of war with a specific adversary, namely a total war fought to counter a Soviet invasion. In 1985, the CMC shifted from total war to a range of local wars with limited objectives greatly increased the scope and complexity of the planning problem that strategy aims to address’.321

While the new guiding thought (i.e., strategy) stated that China should engage in peacetime army building, at the operational level there was nothing to direct how the PLA should go about this, much less how to plan for the next 10 to 20 years. Senior PLA officials had to determine which threats the PLA must be prepared to address; what capabilities would be required to do so; and how the PLA should be organised, trained, equipped and employed to counter these threats successfully if and when they materialised. Questions were big picture and expressed overall uncertainty within the PLA. What should be the PLA’s share in the allocation of resources? To what extent should China cut its defence budget? What kind of war should China’s army building

318 Zhang, New Forms of War (Shijie Zhanzheng Xin Xingtai), 186. 319 Ming Wu, "A Review on Mjoar General Li Bingyan's New Book 'a New Interpretation of Suzi' Strategies' and His Research on Military Strategy (李炳彦将军新作《孙子谋略新论》及其军事谋略研究评述)," China Military Online, http://www.81.cn/byyd/2015-11/02/content_6751654_3.htm.

320 "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )".; Li, Foster Innovation

(扶新集), 299. 321 Fravel, "The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy: Comparing the 1987 and 1999 Editions of Zhanlüexue," 79.

96 be based on? What are the goals of China’s army building?322 Thus, immediately after the 1985 CMC meeting, the PLA leadership began seeking expert advice on the goals of national defence for the twenty-first century, and to create a framework guiding its national defence development. Chief of the General Staff Yang Dezhi pointed out that to understand and craft strategies the PLA had to get strategic studies experts involved in the process, citing the important role of think tanks and policy experts in Western countries’ decision-making processes.323

RMA EC founding members, Zeng Guangjun and Li Bingyan of the PLA Daily and Zhang Sheng and Zhang Qinsheng of GSD’s MTD, had realised the problems facing the PLA and were searching for solutions.324 As an attempt to address all those defence planning issues associated with this paradigm shift, they reached out to a wider range of PLA scholars to discuss the issues.325 In the years following the 1985 strategic shift, the RMA EC addressed the uncertainties surrounding the kind of war China would likely face in the twenty-first century, the strategy the PLA should adapt to make defence planning in peacetime and the kind of defence China wanted for the twenty-first century. In short, although the strategic decision changed China’s threat perception and shifted its focus from all-out war to long-term economic development and peacetime army building, it was this small group of military officers who voluntarily initiated the search for a new defence planning paradigm.

322 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争

鸣), 173.

323 DEZHI YANG, "Raise Strategic Studies to an Appropriate Level of Importance (把战略研究提到应有的高度)," in Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略思考), ed.

Dezhi (杨得志) YANG and Xiang (宦乡) Huan (PLA Publishing House, 1987), 4-5. 324 Wu, "A Review on Mjoar General Li Bingyan's New Book 'a New Interpretation of Suzi' Strategies' and His Research on Military Strategy (李炳彦将军新作《孙子谋略新论》及其军事谋略研究评

述)".

325 Bingyan Li, Grand Strategem and the New Revolution in Military Affairs (大谋略与新军事变革) (PLA Publishing House, 2004), Preface.

97 4.2 Exploring Future Local Wars and High-tech Wars

Built on their previous studies, this community of experts was a major force in the PLA exploring future wars in the 1980s and played a major role in determining the likely nature of future wars as local wars with neighbouring countries fought with high-tech weapons. Their contributions in exploring future war were fourfold. First, they raised the issue to the MTD leadership, which initiated a PLA-wide conference on campaign studies. Second, they continued the DFB section until 1986. Third, the Study Military column initiated a discussion section to study foreign local wars. Fourth, Study Military carried on exploring future wars and new technologies.

Soon after the 1985 strategic shift, the RMA EC realised the issues associated with the decision. Although it shifted the PLA’s focus to the peacetime security environment and army building, it lacked a new military strategy or framework to guide China’s peacetime army building. More importantly, the kind of wars China may face in the future remained unknown. Li Bingyan and Zeng Guangjun of the PLA Daily discussed this with Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Sheng of the MTD. Then they reached out to other RMA EC members.326 Together they raised this issue to both Zhang Sheng’s father, Defence Minister Zhang Aiping,327 the Chief of MTD, Hu Changfa, and the Director of Campaign Training Bureau, Tong Weiming. All three turned out to be very enthusiastic about the proposal, agreeing that campaign training should focus on future wars and believing that, instead of limiting this discussion to the Campaign Training Bureau, they should involve the whole PLA.328

As a result, three major initiatives were created by the MTD to encourage future war studies: first, organising the first PLA-wide Campaign Studies Conference; second, arranging seminars and lectures for senior PLA officers to get all military

326 Wu, "A Review on Mjoar General Li Bingyan's New Book 'a New Interpretation of Suzi' Strategies' and His Research on Military Strategy (李炳彦将军新作《孙子谋略新论》及其军事谋略研究评述)".

327 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：

两代军人的对话）, 460. 328 Ibid., 461.

98 research and academic institutions, intelligence organisations, military services and war zones involved in studying future wars, and assign them relevant future war research projects; and third, encourage military services and war zones to explore their own aspects of future wars by conducting exercises and simulations.329 As discussed in this chapter and Chapter 5, the RMA EC was to varying degrees involved in all three initiatives from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. In addition to three PLA-wide Campaign Series Studies conferences, they were also invited to give lectures to senior PLA officers on future wars and defence planning issue. Moreover, in the early 1990s, they were involved with MRs and combat units to promote studies on operational concepts and theories. The first contribution they made during this period was to explore future wars, concluding that the most likely type of wars China would face in the twenty-first century was local wars fought under high-tech conditions.

Chief of General Staff Yang Dezhi, in his speech at the 1986 Campaign Theory Studies conference, stated that only studying future wars would provide the PLA with the right direction and basis for defence technological development, R&D, organisational changes and training and education: ‘first, we have to study the changing international environment and the strategic situation. Identify our major adversaries and potential adversaries, and where the threats from. Second, we have to study science and technological development to understand the nature and characteristics of future warfare’.330 He was emphasising the importance of studying future warfare by first identifying specific potential adversaries and the trends of future technological development. Zhang Zhen, president of the National Defence University (NDU), spoke at this conference, placing the same emphasis on studying future wars. In his discussion of traditional campaigning theories, he stated that ‘we must preserve those ones [principles] that are applicable to future wars, and change those ones that

329 Ibid. 330 DEZHI YANG, "Chief of the Gsd Yang Dezhi’s Keynote Speech at the Pla's First Conference on the Campaign Theory," in Exploring the Ways to Victory: Selected Papers of the Pla's First Conference on the Campaign Theory (通向胜利的探索: 全军首届战役理论学术讨论会优秀论文汇集) (PLA Publishing House, 1987), 5.

99 are not in line with the characteristics of future wars’.331 He presented the NDU’s preliminary plan for campaigning studies, suggesting that five sub-fields of campaigning would be studied at the NDU: combined campaign studies, naval campaign studies, Air Force campaign studies, and campaign logistics studies. The basic guiding thoughts of a combined campaign would be a major part of combined campaign studies, focusing on the future of campaigning, its operational characteristics and future trends. He also urged the PLA to pay more attention on the future of warfare and think about future scenarios into the twenty-first century.332

As a joint effort by the MTD and the newly established NDU, the first PLA- wide conference on campaigning was held in 1986. This conference demonstrated that traditional campaign theories were facing challenges and new ideas about campaigning were starting to appear in military journals and newspapers.333 Several issues were under debate, grouped under two umbrellas. First, the understanding of basic campaign thoughts (战役基本思想). Participants reached a consensus on this issue, agreeing that as a means to achieve strategic goals, campaigning needs a principle theory which would represent strategic intent (战略意图). In the past, China had theories such as ‘lure enemy into the deep’ and ‘war of annihilation’. It needed basic campaign thoughts (or theories) for future wars, especially wars under high-tech conditions.

Second, did China needed brand new theories (basic campaign thoughts) for future local war campaigning? Participants reached a consensus that the old theory of campaign, war of annihilation, had to be changed to suit the changing environment, but failed to reach a consensus on what the new theory or concept should be. Many new concepts were created during the seminar. This seminar showed widespread agreement on the following issues: that campaign basic thoughts are very important,

331 Zhen Zhang, "Several Issues About Campaign Theory Development in Our Military (关于我军战役理论发展的几个问题)," ibid., 14. 332 Ibid., 24. 333 Bin Huang, Opening the Gate to Military Studies— Teaching at the National Defence University

(叩开军事殿堂之门—我在国防大学执教) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 2004), 71.

100 the traditional concept of war of annihilation needed to be revised, the new concept will have some key elements such as ‘comprehensive’ (整体), ‘focal point’ (重点) and ‘offensive’ (进攻).334

4.2.1 The Local War Debate

In the mid- to late 1980s, the PLA had an extensive debate on future wars, concerning whether the PLA should focus on preparing for total wars or local wars.335 In 1986, two subgroups of the RMA EC almost simultaneously triggered interest in studying local wars. The first was indirectly initiated by the RMA EC through the first PLA-wide Campaign Series Studies conference. The second was the ongoing debate in Study Military. This led the PLA to shift its focal point of struggle to local wars. The RMA EC and its members played a major role in the study of local wars in the mid-1980s, conducting their own research and provoking research by others.

4.2.1.1 The AMS Branch

The first local war studies branch was led by Mi Zhenyu and Liu Jixian of the AMS, who realised the importance of local wars during the first PLA-wide Campaign Series Studies conference (held in 1986 as part of MTD’s initiatives encouraging future war studies). There were 264 papers submitted to the conference from throughout the PLA.336 Mi Zhenyu, one of the essay examiners, found there were no articles on local wars. Therefore, he and Liu Jixian wrote an conference article on local wars to provoke interest in the topic, A Tentative Opinion on the Establishment of a

334 Ibid., 71-73. 335 Zhenyu Mi, "Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars, and Its Implications to Army Building (局部战争的特点，发展趋势及对军队建设诸方面的影响)," in A Study on War and

Strategic Theories (战争与战略理论探研), ed. Zhenyu Mi (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2004), 252. 336 Huaizhi Han, "Deputy Chief of the Gsd Han Huaizhi’s Speech at the Pla's First Conference on the Campaign Theory," in Exploring the Ways to Victory: Selected Papers of the Pla's First Conference on the Campaign Theory (通向胜利的探索: 全军首届战役理论学术讨论会优秀论文汇集) (PLA Publishing House, 1987), 8.

101 Theoretical System for Operations in Local War.337 By the start of the conference, they added a local war section to the end of the volume. In addition to Mi and Liu’s essay, three more essays on local wars were added. 338 Those conference papers initiated a debate on whether the PLA should focus on preparing for local wars or all- out wars. This debate attracted the attention of the senior PLA leadership, encouraging the AMS to conduct a project on the development and trends of local wars.339 Project participants were Mi Zhenyu, Qin Chaoying, Shou Xiaosong, Liu Jixian and Wang Baocun. 340 All were frequent Study Military contributors and participants in the National Defence and Future book series. Thus, this can be considered a project led by the RMA EC.

In May 1987, the GSD organised a seminar specifically for studying local wars and their implications for army building. Mi Zhenyu presented his collaborative project on local wars.341 From those PLA-wide Campaign Series Studies conferences held between 1986 and 1987, dozens of operational concepts emerged. During the 1987 conference, the PLA choose the concept of ‘integrated operations, focused strikes’ as the basic campaign thoughts (guiding operational-level activities). Consequently, it was reported to the CMC and became the PLA’s new official basic campaign thoughts. Based on this, the PLA created 10 basic campaign principles (战役基本原则).342 The ideas and concepts created in those seminars were added to the

337 Mi, "Creating Local War Campaign Theories (建立局部战争战役理论体系刍议)," 231. 338 They are Understand Local Wars from the Sino-Vietnamese War, presented by Liu Cunzhi, then Vice Commander of Guangzhou Military Region (written by Lv Dingwen); Pay Attention to Local War Studies, Inherit and Develop Our Campaigning Theories, by Guo Shufang, research fellow at the AMS; and On the Development Trends of Combined Campaign in Future Local War, presented by another Study Military EC member, Li Qianyuan, then Commander of the 1st Group Army. 339 Mi, "Characteristics and Development Trends of Local Wars, and Its Implications to Army Building (局部战争的特点，发展趋势及对军队建设诸方面的影响)," 252. 340 Ibid., 232. 341 Ibid. 342 Huang, Opening the Gate to Military Studies— Teaching at the National Defence University (叩开

军事殿堂之门—我在国防大学执教), 73.

102 textbook The Science of Campaigns (战役学),343 the only authoritative campaign studies textbook for the whole PLA for 10 years.344

According to both policymakers and defence scholars, such as former CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Zhen, Vice Commandant of the AMS Mi Zhenyu, and NDU Professor Huang Bin, the first PLA-wide Campaign Studies Conference played a significant role in challenging traditional views on future warfare and military operations. When recalling this conference two decades later, Huang Bin states ‘This conference made a bunch of young intellectuals coming to the fore. Many new theories and ideas emerged. They broke through the constraint of many traditional thought and knowledge in military affairs. This conference played a very important role driving the development of campaign theories’.345 When commenting on the significance of this conference, one participant said ‘the significance of this conference is more of its process and influence rather than its outcome’.346 These conferences were important events, gathering defence intellectuals together to challenge traditional thoughts and create new ideas.

4.2.1.2 Local War Debate in Study Military

Another branch of local war studies was based in Study Military debates of foreign local wars in the early 1980s. In September 1986, Study Military realised the importance of studying local war and published an article written by Zhang Qinsheng, Liang Hunan and Yan Xiaoyin as an attempt to initiate a systemic study on local war.347 The article argued that the emerging new technological revolution had made the movement of goods and people easier than before, which made the boundaries and

343 Houqing WANG and Xingye ZHANG, "Science of Campaigns (战役学)," (Beijing: National Defence Press, 2000). 344 Huang, Opening the Gate to Military Studies— Teaching at the National Defence University (叩开军事殿堂之门—我在国防大学执教), 74-75. 345 Ibid., 155. 346 Ibid. 347 Qinsheng Zhang; Hunan Liang; Xiaoyin Lu, "Local War: A Major Current and Future Threat (局部

战争—现实和未来的主要威胁)," PLA Daily, 26 September 1986.

103 borders between countries less important and the world more integrated. As countries become increasingly economically interdependent on each other, their incentives for war will gradually diminish. Thus, local war and limited war will become a major type of war for countries to achieve their political and economic goals without devastating consequences.348 In the following weeks, the PLA Daily published several articles on local war and limited war.

Li Qianyuan argues that future local wars will have five major characteristics. First, strategic objectives are limited and the war will be concluded quickly. Due to the balance of power between US and USSR, no one wants to get involved in a protracted war that may potentially shape the balance of power. Second, a prevalence of high-tech and low intensity warfare, with airstrikes, missile attacks and electronic warfare becoming major forms of operation. Third, the battlefield will become multifaceted, with dimensions that span land, sea, air, space and the electromagnetic spectrum, forcing a change to the traditional views of the battlespace. Fourth, local wars erupt very suddenly, and surprise attacks will be more common. Fifth, forces will become elite, as local wars need surprise attacks to seize the initiative.349 He urged the PLA to push towards a more multifunctional military optimised to switch between different missions.350

In October 1986, Study Military published an article by Li Gang, a graduate student of the Military College. The main argument put forward by Li was that although all-out war was not impossible, the most likely form of future war will be local war. Future local wars will be a mix of battles in the air and sea with high-tech weapons. Land war, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare and positional warfare will be less relevant. Instead, the PLA will have to create new operational methods, such as manoeuvre warfare and electronic warfare.351

348 Ibid. 349 Qianyuan Li, "Characteristics of Future Local Wars (未来局部战争特点浅析)," ibid., 19 December. 350 Ibid. 351 Gang Li, "Imagining Future Forms of Operations (设想我军未来作战形式)," ibid., 24 October.

104 The local war and limited war theories were based on the assumptions that globalisation and the volume of international trade gave countries less incentives for war, especially large-scale, all-out wars. Victory was not necessarily achieved through occupation but through destruction by firepower and information capability. This debate addressed issues such as the nature of future local wars and what kind of forces will be required to fight them. This sought to uncover what the implications for PLA army building were, and what organisational changes the PLA would have to make to win future local wars. Their studies made several general points. First, future local wars will be high-tech in nature. Second, they require small but multifunctional forces—thus, the concepts of rapid response forces and special forces came to prominence. Third, deterring war from erupting is as important as winning a local war. These would transform the PLA from an all-out nuclear war–oriented organisation to a theatre-focused force capable of conventional deterrence.

4.2.2 Exploring the New Technological Revolution and its Implication for Future Wars

In addition to the local war debate, the RMA EC’s zeal for the new technological revolution did not stop in 1985. Building on their studies in the early 1980s, they kept exploring the new technological revolution and its implications for future wars during the NDDS debate. In the influential article Thoughts On NDDS, the authors repeatedly emphasised the importance of exploiting the ongoing technological revolution.352 Future wars, as fleshed out in this study, would be far different from the previous ones. This article was highly regarded by the CMC leaders and received some encouragement from the CMC.353 In a subsequent related study, An Tian urged the PLA to appreciate the importance of developing limited war theories. 354 Zhang Yunyi’s study, New Forms of Wars, reviewed major defence research approaches,

352 Qinsheng Zhang et al., "Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略思

考)," in Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略思考), ed. Dezhi (杨得志) YANG and Xiang (宦乡) Huan (PLA Publishing House, 1987), 44.

353 Ma, "A Great Pla Scholar: Li Bingyan (军中大儒李炳彦)," 31.

354 Tian An, Theories and Strategy of Modern Limited War (现代有限战争的理论与战略), National Defence and Future (PLA Publishing House, 1987).

105 explored the new technologic revolutions and the international political and economic environment, and argued that the nature of war had fundamentally changed.355

Jin Zhude and Wang Dong’s article on the new technological revolution and its implications for future wars was one of the articles pointing out that due to the unavoidable mass destruction were nuclear weapons used and the emergence of high technologies, some conventional weapons such as precision-guided munitions and directed-energy weapons could now be used to achieve strategic goals.356 A group of the RMA EC experts even made a documentary to emphasise the importance of the technological revolution and its implications for national defence, arguing that many countries changed their defence development strategy because of the new technological revolution.357

Although the EC was among the most forward-looking experts in the PLA, there were different views among its members. Some of them were thinking even ahead of the rest of the community. For example, while the majority of the EC was focusing on a range of newly available technologies such as stealthy technology, long- range precision strike, night vision capabilities etc. Some of them were arguing that the information warfare will become dominant area of warfare. And a few others were studying artificial intelligence and robotic wars.

Shen Weiguan, often considered the father of information warfare, specifically argued that future wars will be information wars. He wrote a book, Information Warfare in 1985, but could not get it published.358 Two years later, his mentor, Zeng Guangjun suggested that he write an abstract to publish in Study Military. However,

355 Zhang, New Forms of War (Shijie Zhanzheng Xin Xingtai), 39-49. 356 Zhude Jin; Dong Wang, "Forcasting New Weapon Revolution and Its Implications (对新武器革命

及其影响的预测)," in Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略思考), ed.

Dezhi (杨得志) YANG and Xiang (宦乡) Huan, National Defence and Future (PLA Publishing House, 1987), 209-10. 357 Cai et al., "Indepth 1 (深沉的思考)."; "Indepth 2 (深沉的思考 2)."; "Indepth 3 (深沉的思考 3).";

"Indepth 4 (深沉的思考 4)."

358 Jiang, "Shen Weiguang—the Father of Information Warfare (信息战之父沈伟光)," 3.

106 it failed again, due to some senior leader’s comment that, ‘it seems alright at the first sight, but the more I read the more uncertain [I] feel’. Shen did not give up, and tried again to persuade the PLA Daily, saying that this subject was very important which could potentially make a theoretical innovation. Eventually, Zeng and Li decided to make it a special case and published a brief in the PLA Daily on 17 June 1987, titled The Rise of Information Warfare.359 According to Shen, this was the first article on information warfare in China. Wang Weixing, Director of the Department of World Military Research at AMS, even argues that Shen created the concept before anyone in the US.360

In comparison with information warfare, artificial intelligence and robotics warfare looked even more futuristic. Yang Nanzheng began speculating on robotics and artificial intelligence, and autonomous revolution in the early 1980s. His project on the application of artificial intelligence in the military and future robotics wars was published by National Defence and Future series in 1987. In this study, Yang Nanzheng urged the PLA to appreciate the importance of developing artificial intelligence and robotics for future wars.361 He argued that a computer could be considered as an extension of a human brain—artificial intelligence had already reached a certain level of maturation, which made computer simulation and wargaming very similar to reality, and command automation would be important for future wars. 362 He was also one of the early PLA scholars promoting artificial intelligence and computer simulations in military training in the late 1980s.363

However, it is important to note that studying new technologies and its implications to future wars does not mean they were advocating a tech-driven military

359 Ibid. 360 Ru Yang, "‘Light War’: A New Form of Warfare in the Future (“光战争”:30 年后的战争新

形态)," Defence Review http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/06/c_128599316.htm.

361 Nanzheng Yang, Automation Forces (智能军队), National Defence & the Future (国防与未来丛书) (PLA Publishing House, 1987). 362 "Future Wars and the Competition in Artificial Intelligence: On Automated Command and Control (未来战争的智能较量已经开始—谈谈指挥自动化)," PLA Daily, 7 March 1986. 363 Ibid.

107 revolution. Since by the EC members understand very well that technology alone will not be able to revolutionise the conduct of war, military institutions need to exploit a combination of technological, organisational changes, and new operational concepts.

4.3 In Search of a Framework for Peacetime Defence Planning

Another major impact the RMA EC made was organising studies and debates aimed at creating a framework for peacetime defence planning. Their efforts to fill this gap had two phases. The first was the NDDS debate from 1986 to1987, and the second was initiated by re-emphasising the importance of the reforms in 1987 followed by a national defence analysis discussion conducted in 1988. The underlying idea was, that after the strategic shift made in 1985, China required a more systematic approach to the problem of peacetime defence planning. This section shows how those experts, working collaboratively, used their expertise in strategic studies, future studies and defence economics to create a framework for peacetime defence planning. This framework eventually became the NDDS, with massive ramifications in the mid- to late 1980s including making possible long-term peacetime defence planning while reducing defence costs.

4.3.1 Phase One: National Defence Development Strategy Debate

To search for a peacetime defence planning framework, the RMA EC soon realised that US experiences offered the best material. As a result, they began drawing on national economic development strategy, a US concept developed in the 1970s, for defence planning. According to Military Encyclopaedia, the term NDDS was adopted in China in the late 1970s from the book Strategy of Economic Development, and began to be used by the defence community in 1986. The origin of this term could be traced back to the post-war technological revolution. The debate argued that to improve the PLA’s ability to predict future technological developments would have great implications for war and defence.364

364 Chinese Military Encyclopedia Editorial, Chinese Military Encyclopedia: Military Arts (中国军事

百科全书: 军事学术) (Military Science Publishing, 1997), 145.

108 The NDDS debate was comprised of seminars, Study Military discussions and book publications. The RMA EC’s efforts culminated in publishing a National Defence and Future book series in cooperation with the MTD from 1986 to 1990 to reinforce their efforts towards creating a framework for defence planning.

The series was designed particularly to meet the requirements discussed in the previous section. The series was edited by Zeng Guangjun, Li Bingyan and Zhang Qinsheng. The authors and editors were members of the Beijing Society of Defence Economic Studies and the Military Salon, and can be considered the most active members of the RMA EC in the 1980s. After a few years of promoting future studies and studying future wars, the 1985 strategic shift opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for the RMA EC. The PLA Daily worked closely with the MTD to organise seminars and studies to fill the gap. Research into the future security environment and future warfare saw the PLA Daily publish an edited book of select previously published articles and various book-length monographs assessing future wars. The latter became the National Defence and Future book series, comprising 10 books. The books of the series fall into three categories: studies introducing strategic studies and future studies methods to the PLA, studies aimed at creating an NDDS, and studies articulating the relation between defence spending and economic development. These three categories are explored in the following sections.

4.3.1.1 Introducing Strategic Studies and Future Studies Methods and Theories to the PLA

As the RMA EC realised the importance of a comprehensive and systematic approach to study defence issues and conduct defence planning, they needed analytical and planning tools. In the 1980s, they made efforts to create these and adopt foreign tools and methods. First, strategic studies and defence planning methods for middle- and low-level officers were a recent import to China. As China was focused on imminent, all-out war, the PLA lacked tools and methodologies for long-term defence planning in peacetime, which involves greater uncertainty. As previously mentioned, prior to 1980, strategic studies were restricted to top PLA leaders. Members of the RMA EC were among the early strategists to emerge in the early 1980s. Built on their previous studies, they devoted a few National Defence and Future books and articles

109 to introduce defence planning methods. One example is Invisible Lever, which introduces the US defence planning system, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.365 Another example is Hua Hua’s book, The Art of Planning for the Future, which reviews existing studies on strategic planning. This book is one of the first to conduct a systematic study on strategic planning, a method that aids decision-making and long-term planning for an uncertain future—precisely what the PLA leadership desperately needed. Hua Hua’s book heavily draws on US strategic studies and strategic planning literature and case studies. According to Hua, in the 1980s, the experience of catastrophes caused by poor planning and rushed decisions spurred the study of strategy and strategic decision-making. 366 He implies that various catastrophic mistakes made in previous decades, such as the Cultural Revolution, were a major factor for interest in strategy and discreet strategic decision-making. Thus, scientific methods and systematic study on decision-making seemed very important in the 1980s. Hua also argues that strategic planning should not be confused with making plans, and that the process of planning is also very important.367

Second, to define the strategic goals for national defence development requires systemic and scientific methods to predict the future security environment and future economic and social development. The fast pace of technological development also needed to be considered.368 As Zhang Qinsheng points out, ‘crafting national defence development strategy needs grand systemic thinking and focus on the future’.369 Military theories have to anticipate future technological development instead of focusing on the current technologies. 370 As the RMA EC already had years of experience applying future studies methodologies to defence studies, their private

365 Kaizhao Zheng, Invisible Lever (无形的杠杆), National Defence & the Future (国防与未来丛书) (PLA Publishing House, 1988). 366 Hua, The Art of Planning the Future (规划未来的艺术), 2. 367 Ibid. 368 Zeng, Hua, and Li, The Prelude Is Begining (序幕正在拉开), 1-2. 369 Zhang, Collected Works of General Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃), 280.

370 Qinsheng Zhang and Guoyu Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世

纪之交的军事理论革命)," PLA Daily, 2 September 1997, 171.

110 discussions in Military Salon, formal seminars and debates in Study Military provided them an advantage in giving advice to decision-makers.

One year after the TR debate concluded, He Zhong and Zhang Shujiang raised the idea again, arguing that TR is in essence military future studies and forecasting: in ‘predicting future wars, it has to transcend the weaponries we currently have’.371 They emphasised that anticipating the future is a prerequisite for decision-making, but this itself is not a decision-making process. It only tries to determine what the future may be, but never tries to insist that the future must be the same as anticipated.372

Han Ping quoted Qian Xuesen’s reply to Feng Yujun, arguing that because no clear idea existed about what kind of war China may fight in the future, scientists had no idea what technologies and weapons to develop. According to Han Ping, thanks to the TR debate, the notion that ‘military theorists design future war scenarios, then scientists develop new weaponries to meet the needs of those scenarios’ had, by 1986, already become a critical step in China’s army building.373

This approach suggests that military theorists must assess the security environment, potential threats and what will be required for winning future wars. Scientists will develop technologies and weapons according to those needs, and the military will make organisational changes based on those future war theories. In other words, military theorists design future wars. The policy prescription is that military theorists and strategists should think ahead of weapon developers and scientists and envision future wars to guide weapon development. This means that field officers and theoreticians will play a dominant role in defining future wars and what technologies and operational concepts will be created, while scientist will serve in a supporting role.

371 Chong He; Shujiang Zhang, "Predicting the Future Does Not Equal the Great Leap Forward: Renewed Discussion on Transcendent Research （预测未来不等于大跃进:关于超越型研究的旧话重提）," The People's Liberation Army Daily, 18 July 1986. 372 Ibid. 373 Ping Han, "We Need to Understand What Kind of Wars We Will Face in the Future (要把未来打

什么仗搞清楚)," ibid., 21 February.

111 4.3.1.2 Comprehensive Studies Towards a National Defence Development Strategy

During this debate, many were devoted to creating a comprehensive NDDS, which was reflected in the book series. For example, the first book is a book-length monograph which includes previous studies of RMA EC members covering all areas of future wars and defence planning.374 Another comprehensive study was an AMS project led by Mi Zhenyu, published in 1988, titled China’s National Defence Development Concept. This is a systematic study on China’s national defence strategy, assessing the security environment, identifying China’s defence strategic goals and ways to achieve these goals.375 The first chapter analyses the international strategic environment in 2000. 376 Other chapters cover most aspects of China’s national defence strategy (e.g., defence economic development strategy, defence technological development strategy, and defence education development strategy) and draw a blueprint for the PLA’s organisational reforms for the twenty-first century.377

4.3.1.3 Articulating the Relations Between Defence Spending and Economic Development

Several issues concerning the defence economy emerged soon after the strategic shift. For example, under the new strategy, how to balance the relations between defence development and economic development; how to conduct defence economic development to meet the requirements of the strategic shift; and how to choose the goals and paths for defence development to make it work in accordance with national economic development. Scientific theories were urgently needed to answer these questions. It was under these circumstances that defence economic scholars of the RMA EC invented the concept of profitable defence.378 During the NDDS debate, the RMA EC further developed its profitable defence concept, arguing

374 Yang and Huan, Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy (国防发展战略思考). 375 Wu; Jinsheng Xiao; Miao Li, Concepts for China’s National Defence (中国的国防构想), 3. 376 Ibid., 5-20. 377 Ibid. 378 Hu and Xiao, The Debates That Have Implications for the 21st Century (影响到二十一世纪的争

鸣), 236.

112 that national defence could be beneficial to national economic growth. In the National Defence and the Future series, Zeng et al. proposed that the real potential of national defence is in the civilian sectors. To maximise the potentials of China’s national defence, defence planning must take civil industries and the mobilisation of civilian personnel into account.379 They concluded that despite China’s backward military and industrial base and underdeveloped economy, the PLA could still be transformed into a high-tech and lean military able to fight a high-tech local war. Defence spending and technological developments do not necessarily have to burden national economic development and, with scientific planning, defence developments could be utilised by civil industries and potentially generate profit.

After the 1985 strategic shift, how to craft a NDDS became an urgent matter that the PLA had to address. For those studying defence economics, their job was to help decision-makers address the economic aspect of the NDDS.380 Because of their previous studies in this area (see Section 3.1.2.3), such as the three mathematical models created to study defence economic issues,381 one of the RMA EC members, Jin Zhude, was invited by the GSD to give a lecture to senior PLA officers in 1986.382 His lecture, National Defence Development Strategy: From a National Defence Economics Perspective, promoted the RMA EC’s idea of creating a ‘profitable defence’. 383

Before this concept, the conventional wisdom in China was that defence spending is always at the cost of national economic development and did not make any contribution to social economic growth. The RMA EC contested this, stating that if defence spending was well planned under the NDDS, such spending could work as

379 Military Training Department of PLA General Staff Department and Study Military editorial, "To Write a Good History of Our Army’s Glorious and Magnificent Future (写好我军光辉灿烂的未来

史)," 37.

380 Luo and Chen, "How to Conduct National Defence Development (国防发展的道路如何走)," 53. 381 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)." 382 Ibid., 14. 383 Luo and Chen, "How to Conduct National Defence Development (国防发展的道路如何走)," 53.

113 a stimulus to national economic development and contribute to national economic growth.384 The RMA EC defence economists soon played a much larger role in PLA’s defence economics studies and national defence planning.

4.3.2 Phase Two: Re-emphasising the Importance of Reforms

In addition to the discussion of what kind of wars China may fight in the future and search for a new defence planning framework, in the second half of the 1980s the RMA EC made attempts to justify China’s military reforms. Per Adler and Haas’s, the community were ‘engaged more in justifying, fleshing out, and promoting policies’.385 The first attempt they made to justify and re-emphasise the importance of the military reform was a discussion in 1987, titled Modernisation must be the Central Task of the Military. The second was a debate in 1988, titled National Defence Analysis.

4.3.2.1 The Goal of Military Reform: Modernisation Must be the Central Task of the Military

The strategic shift eventually changed China’s threat perception and shifted its focus to long-term economic development and peacetime army building. But another extreme soon emerged. Some people understood the strategic shift as a shift from total war to total peace, arguing that because war is the military’s raison d'être and China no longer faced any external threats, the military did not have to prepare for a war.386 They misinterpreted Deng’s emphasis on the relatively peaceful environment and economic development as saying that military modernisation was no longer.387 The issues of debate were: during peacetime, when China is focusing on its economic

384 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战略学派)." 385 Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," 381. 386 Qinsheng Zhang; Bingyan Li, "Complete the New Historic Transformation: Iunderstanding the Cmc’ s ’Two Basic Transformations’.(完成新的历史性转变—学习军委关于‘两个根本性转变’战

略思想的体会)," PLA Daily, 14 January 1997.

387 Weiqing Song, "Focusing on Military Modernisation (把军心凝聚在现代化的旗帜下)," ibid., 21 August 1987.

114 development, is military modernisation is still important; is improving the military’s combat capabilities still that urgent;388 does the military still need to fight wars; did the PLA still have to prepare for military struggles; and what kind of wars China may face in the future.389

Many military intellectuals, including the RMA EC, soon became uneasy about this misperception and decided to arrange another discussion section to argue against this view and demonstrate the importance of national defence in peacetime.390 In July 1987, Study Military initiated a discussion to re-emphasise the importance of military reforms.391 According to the editors, as the CMC had made it very clear that modernisation will be the central task of the military, the Study Military column would spend the rest of the year articulating this policy and addressing issues surrounding questions of why army building must focus on modernisation; the relations between modernisation, revolutionisation and professionalisation; what must be modernised; and military modernisation with Chinese characteristics. 392 This was obviously a different effort than earlier discussions and debates. Its purpose was not to create ideas or raise issues but, rather, to help justify and explain the CMC’s policy.

This debate was a major attempt by the RMA EC to frame the range of political controversies surrounding the issue of military reform. The first article under this debate was written by Zou Yuqi, Chief of the General Staff of the Beijing MR. He

388 Guangjun Zeng, "National Defence and the Pla’s Historic Responsibilities in the New Era (国防

观与新时期军队的历史责任)," ibid., 17 July. 389 Li, "Complete the New Historic Transformation: Iunderstanding the Cmc’s ’Two Basic

Transformations’.(完成新的历史性转变—学习军委关于‘两个根本性转变’战略思想的体会)."

390 Qinsheng Zhang; Guangjun Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)," ibid., 15 July 1988.;

Chaoying Qin: Yanyan Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)," ibid., 29 July.1988.12.2.; Yuchen Cui; Jianghe Li, "National Defence and National Coherence (大国防与民族

凝聚力)," ibid., 2 December.

391 Yuqi Zou, "Identifying the Focal Points of Army’ Building (把握住新时期军队工作的中心)," ibid., 10 July 1987. 392 Ibid.

115 warned that instead of being discouraged by temporary setbacks, the PLA should focus on the big picture and try to achieve its long-term goals. 393 Zeng Guangjun summarised the popular misperception as ‘national defence is military, and military is all about waging war. The national defence is important when facing a war. If there is no threat of war, the national defence would be no longer important’.394 He then challenged this, arguing that for a nation, security interest is the top priority. Survival and development are two most important interests of a nation. He further argued that development means the development of a country’s comprehensive power, not only economic development.395 Zeng argued that national defence should be viewed from the perspective of a nation’s survival and prosperity, rather than a pure warfighting perspective. Thus, deterring or containing wars is as important as winning a war.396 Similarly, Yao Youzhi’s article challenges the notion that national defence development is always at expense of economic development. He argues that raising public awareness of national defence will increase the military’s combat capacity and the economy’s productivity. This will eventually increase the comprehensive national power and its warfighting potential.397 In their article, Shi Wenting et al. argue that to carry out reforms, emphasis should be placed on the extent to which the reforms are conductive to China’s military modernisation (as the PLA may have to make some compromises to achieve this comprehensive goal).398 Wang Dong et al. argued that the defence budget must be allocated from the top, that is, the interest of an individual or single entity must be subordinated to the comprehensive goal or interest of the whole PLA modernisation.399

393 Ibid. 394 Zeng, "National Defence and the Pla’s Historic Responsibilities in the New Era (国防观与新时期

军队的历史责任)." 395 Ibid. 396 Ibid. 397 Youzhi Yao, "Strengthening National Defence Awareness (强化全民的国防意识)," ibid., 7 August. 398 Wenting Shi: Bingyan Li; Ruozhou Su, "Reform Is Necessary for Achieving Military Modernisation (改革是实现我军现代化的必由之路)," ibid., 18 September.

399 Dong Wang; Lumin Lan; Qianxiang Wang, "Efficiency Is the Solution (从效益上找出路)," ibid., 14 August.

116 By 1989, the argument that the absence of security threats and peaceful international environment negated any need to prepare for war remained persistent.400 Zeng Guangjun wrote an article in March 1989 criticising the tendency of extremism on either side, arguing that the sentiment towards war preparation in China had shifted from extremely alert in the 1970s to over-relaxed in the late 1980s. He argues that although the international environment had become more peaceful, China still had unsolved territorial disputes and was bordered by the USSR (which maintained a huge military force and arsenal). Moreover, China should prepare for future scenarios, to the year 2000 and beyond.401

During the mid- to late 1980s, the RMA EC had successfully persuaded a shift of China’s mentality from all-out war to peacetime army building. But they also had to ensure that the new mentality of peacetime army building was not equated with planning for peace. Defence spending had to be maintained at a certain level, with the key being how to balance defence spending and economic development.

4.3.2.2 National Defence Analysis

In July 1988, Study Military launched a new discussion section, National Defence Analysis. This was yet another effort in searching for a new defence planning strategy. This debate raised controversies around issues such as what is national interest, what are the relations between national interest and national defence, and why should China’s army building and national defence strategy be based on clearly identified national interests. In addition, it also brought up the concept of deterrence. This debate lasted for until the end of 1988.

According to Adler and Haas, ‘Epistemic communities exert influence on policy innovation by (1) framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, (2) defining state interests, and (3) setting standards’.402 To exert influence on

400 Zeng, "National Defence and the Pla’s Historic Responsibilities in the New Era (国防观与新时期

军队的历史责任)." 401 Ibid. 402 Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," 375.

117 policy innovation, in the years following the NDDS debate, the RMA EC arranged various debates and discussions to achieve two goals. First, to justify and re-emphasise the PLA modernisation program, which faced even internal resistance. Second, to help determine the nature of future wars. Through the latter, the RMA EC made significant contributions towards the new primary principles incorporated into China’s Military Strategic Guidelines (announced in 1993), with many of their suggestions being adopted word for word. For example, ‘in preparing for future military struggle, we must focus on winning local wars under modern technological conditions, especially high-tech conditions, that might potentially break out’,403 and, ‘In peacetime, the army needs to take averting an outbreak of hostilities as one of its most important functions’.404

4.3.2.3 The National Interest Debate

The PLA realised that to craft a grand strategy or military strategy, China needed to define its strategic goals. These would need to be based on a thorough understanding of China’s current national interests,405 which would help guide PLA army building and defence planning.406 Per Zhang Guoyu, ‘in order to craft a grand strategy, the first step is to define China’s national interests’.407 Through this debate on China’s national interests, the RMA EC further advocated their search of a framework for peacetime defence planning.

Experts define national interests according to types, levels and order of importance. Zhang Guoyu defines national interest as a systematic concept that includes a nation’s political, economic and security interests.408 Zhang Qinsheng and Zeng Guangjun argue that China’s national interests could be divided into two

403 Zemin Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin— Volume 1 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2010), 275. 404 Ibid., 279. 405 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

406 Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)."

407 Guoyu Zhang, "Grasp the Essence of the Military Strategy (把握军事战略的主题)," ibid., 8 July. 408 Ibid.

118 categories, static (enduring) and dynamic. The static national interests include state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the socialist political system, China’s political and economic status in the Asia-Pacific region and China’s ties and exchanges with the rest of the world. The dynamic national interests exist for a particular period of time. For example, at the time of this debate in 1988, they were economic development, anti-hegemony, maintaining peace and reunification (with Taiwan).409 Qin Chaoying and Li Yanyan divided national interests into four levels: vital interests, essential interests, important interests and marginal interests.410

This debate reached consensus on a few major points. First, national interests include the two most important aspects of the survival and development of the nation. 411 Survival is more often related to military and national defence, while development is mostly about economic development.412 This means that a top priority in defining national interest is to sort out the relations between national defence and national economic development. Any strategic choice must be based on a thorough and accurate assessment of the environment in which a nation struggles to survive.

Second, national interest is a comprehensive concept which includes the interests of all cultural, social and interest groups. The varying interests of different political parties, social classes, nationalities and social organisations must be subordinated to and serve the overall national interests.413 Zhang and Zeng criticised China as too influenced by ideology and too focused on the interests of social classes and political parties instead of national interests. They further argued that objectives

409 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)." 410 Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)."

411 Ibid.; Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

412 Guoyu Zhang, "Military Theoretical Studies in the New Millennia: Challenges and Responses (新千年军事理论发展面临的挑战与对策述要)," ibid., 11 January 2000.

413 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."; Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析

国家利益学说)."

119 and interests on the part of the military are non-existent as the military serves the national interests.414

Third, as they agreed that national interests change and expand overtime, they broadened China’s definition of national interests to include maritime interests and interests in space and other domains.415 Zhang and Zeng argue that as the competition for resources becomes harsher, a worldwide competition in naval and maritime forces will be inevitable.416 Cai Wenyi argues that since China’s future development is highly dependent on maritime resources, maritime interests will be of great importance to the future of the nation and must be protected and expanded by a powerful navy.417 The US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) suggested that space will be a domain for future competition. 418 By identifying more diversified interests, they also raised the importance of other operational domains and argued that the PLA should invest more in other armed services such as the navy and the air force.

Fourth, China’s national interests were no longer confined to the narrow notion of domestic interests. It also includes overseas interests. Zhang and Zeng argue that as China is becoming an outward-looking economy, it would have to deal increasingly with other countries and potentially protect its overseas interests militarily.419 Qin Chaoying and Li Yanyan argue that as a newly established regime, it was understandable that China payed much of its attention to domestic political stability

414 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

415 Ning Lu, "The Functions of the Military ( 论军队职能)," ibid., 9 September.; Wenyi Cai, "Understanding National Defence from a Resources Crisis Pespective (从资源危机看国防)," ibid., 18

November.; Qingshan Li, "Resources Competition and Armed Conflicts in the Future (资源争夺与未

来军事冲突)," ibid., 27 April 1990.; Fangyou Chen; Xikang Xu; Xiaoyong Huo, "Military Officers Must Have Maritime Domain Awareness (军人需要有海洋观)," ibid., 29 May 1987.; Wenyi Cai,

"Making a Decision for Space Competition (在太空竞争面前的选择)," ibid., 23 October..1987.10.23;

Guoning Jiang, "Pay Attention to Strategic High Ground (将眼光投向战略制高点)," ibid., 27 March. 416 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

417 Cai, "Understanding National Defence from a Resources Crisis Pespective (从资源危机看国防)."

418 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)." 419 Ibid.

120 and internal political struggles for the first few decades. But by the 1980s, China had already managed to stabilise its sovereignty and internal issues, while the external environment was changing rapidly. Thus, China should redefine the role that national interests play in determining China’s national defence.420

This debate also explained the relations between national interests and national defence. The basic arguments were that national defence serves national interests, thus, as national interests change the role of national defence should change accordingly. National interests determine what military capabilities to develop. Thus, a notion first conceived by Zhang and Zeng in 1988421 now became official policy.422

Zhang Guoyu explained the relations between national interest, grand strategy and military strategy: the goal of any military strategy is to serve national interests.423 Zhang Qinsheng and Zeng Guangjun made it very clear that the purpose of military reform or military modernisation is to serve national interests.424 Zhang et al. argued that the ultimate goal for military reform is to create a highly modernised, scientific military capable of deterring and winning future wars and serving national interests.425 Further, ‘security and defence are directly related to a nation’s survival and development. Because national interest is national defence’s raison d'être’.426 In his article explaining the functions of the military, Lu Ning argues that the functions of the military are constrained by China’s national interests. As China’s national interests expand from land to include the sea, air and, eventually, space, the functions of the PLA also expand from waging war on the land, war on sea, in the air and, eventually,

420 Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)." 421 Ibid.; Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)." 422 Chuanjia Zhang, Jinyu LIU, and Luming Jiang, The Security Measures for Achieving the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (实现中华民族伟大复兴的安全保障) (People’s Publishing House, 2012), 263. 423 Zhang, "Grasp the Essence of the Military Strategy (把握军事战略的主题)." 424 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

425 Zhang, Collected Works of General Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃), 37.

426 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

121 in space. 427 Similarly, China’s increased integration into the global economy and subsequent expansion of interests to include, for example, critical infrastructure and energy security, require change in the PLA’s functions.428

They all agreed that the military serves China’s national interests and, as national interests change, the PLA must evolve accordingly. For example, as China’s national interests were expanding to maritime, space and cyberspace domains, the role of PLA was changing and China’s defence planning for the twenty-first century should cover those domains. The idea that national interests determine military capabilities to be developed was adopted as China’s official doctrine.429

The debate identified four major threats to China’s national interests. First, economic and technological challenges due the gap between China and the developed countries.430 Second, potential local war and maritime conflicts with neighbouring countries, with persistent unresolved land and maritime border disputes increasingly important for deciding sovereignty over resources. 431 Third, threats to China’s maritime interests. On 26 August 1988, under National Defence Analysis, Study Military published another section of articles to assess the security environment and current and potential challenges to China’s national interests. Three articles addressed maritime challenges. 432 Fourth, China will no longer face specific adversaries in peacetime. Qin Chaoying and Li Yanyan argue that since adversaries are not specified in peacetime, its defence planning and the pace of its development should be different from wartime.433 Zhang Qinsheng and Zeng Guangjun made a similar point, and implied that as China was no longer facing specific adversaries its defence planning

427 Lu, "The Functions of the Military (论军队职能)." 428 Ibid. 429 Zhang, LIU, and Jiang, The Security Measures for Achieving the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (实现中华民族伟大复兴的安全保障), 263. 430 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)." 431 Ibid. 432 Puxuan Song; Yunhua Cai, "Be Aware of the Future Environment (清醒认识未来的生存环境)," ibid., 26 August. 433 Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)."

122 should shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning.434 However, the PLA not capable of meeting those two challenges. For example, the PLA was still not modernised to the point of being able to win a modern high-tech war and its warfighting capabilities in all domains required improved. Hence, the need for military reform.435

In identifying those threats to China’s national interests, the RMA EC proposed the need for the PLA to address two issues to protect China’s national interests. First, doctrine to address potential local war challenges had to be changed. Second, in the longer term, China had to close its economic and technological gaps with other powers. Thus, the RMA EC indirectly raised the importance of weapons technology development and local war threat. They connected military reform to national interests by arguing that addressing the two challenges required the PLA to carry out reforms.

4.3.2.4 Deterrence and War Prevention

Deterrence was extensively discussed in this debate. The idea posed a significant challenge to conventional wisdom in the 1980s, during which the sole task of the PLA was to win a war. Prior to the Sino–Vietnamese War, few PLA officers gave much thought to deterrence and instead focused on warfighting. In contrast to many PLA studies at the time, the RMA EC boldly proclaimed that a central purpose of China’s defence policy must be to prevent a major war. They began to argue that due to the change of the security environment, maintaining peace and deterring foreign aggression was as important as winning a war. Thus, they promoted the shift of Chinese defence policy away from a traditional military emphasis on maintaining a war-winning posture towards a policy of conventional deterrence, arguing that deterrence had already become a prominent component of China’s defence strategy.

This debate opened with general assertions about the objectives of China’s military policy. Deterrence was presented as the most basic and obvious of these goals.

434 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)." 435 Ibid.

123 In 8 July 1988, Zhang Guoyu wrote an article for the PLA Daily arguing that in addition to preparing for winning future local wars, the PLA should also work to contain local wars and prevent armed conflict from erupting. The PLA should shift the focus of its military strategy from winning a war to deterring a war.436 Similarly, Zhang Guoyu argued that creating and maintaining a peaceful environment was the most urgent strategic task for protecting China’s national interests. Military strategy also encompassed peacetime deterrence, and he argued that in addition to winning a self-defence war, China should also increase deterrence capabilities as a basic aim of its army building.437

Qin Chaoying and Li Yanyan argue that peacetime army building is very different from wartime—the former is constrained by many social and economic factors.438 Zeng Guangjun wrote an article arguing that deterrence is a major aspect of peacetime defence policy. In peacetime, winning without fighting is the central goal of the military. Even if the military goes to a war, its ultimate goal is still to deter the war from escalating or to prevent future wars of a larger scale.439 What could China do to ensure that deterrence prevailed and what would be required to keep the adversary deterred? Zeng argues that for the purpose of deterrence, the military has to improve both its quantity and quality. Moreover, it is necessary to create an intimidating image that deters adversaries from trying to invade China.440 Shi et al. urged the PLA to pay more attention to peacetime competition. They argued that while people are quite alert to the breakout of wars, they are not aware of the importance of peacetime competition which often turns out to be more significant. This is a matter, the authors note, of being able to see potential future challenges. Moreover, history

436 Zhang, "Grasp the Essence of the Military Strategy (把握军事战略的主题)." 437 Ibid. 438 Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)."

439 Zeng, "National Defence and the Pla’s Historic Responsibilities in the New Era (国防观与新时期

军队的历史责任)." 440 Ibid.

124 shows that the inability to recognise technological and doctrinal innovation during peacetime can have dire consequences during wartime.441

In retrospect, the rise of the concept of deterring a war from erupting made two contributions to the PLA’s defence planning. First, by framing it as an issue connected to national interest, it further justified Deng’s 1985 decision and emphasised the importance of focusing on capability-building for deterrence. Second, focusing on conventional deterrence suggests that China began working under the assumption of mutually assured destruction, as occurred in the USSR and US. Thus, improving conventional capabilities became seen as the key for future defence planning in China.

4.3.2.5 Goals Achieved by the National Interest Debate

According to the epistemic communities framework, the national interest debate served both policy innovation and policy persistence roles. Regarding policy innovation, by redefining China’s national interests and relating the national interest concept to military reforms and modernisation, the community furthered their efforts towards a national defence planning framework. By emphasising connections between national interests and national defence, and the role the military plays in assuring deterrence, they had persuasively argued for the modernisation of the military to guarantee China’s economic development.

The debate also contributed to policy persistence. It helped the PLA overcome interest groups by arguing that national interests are the comprehensive overriding interests of the nation, which are served by the military.442 Further, army reform issues were linked to national interests and, thus, remained on the policy agenda.

4.4 In Uncertain Times: The Gulf War

Despite the aforementioned efforts to influence decision-making and shape general opinions on military modernisation, by the end of the 1980s, institutional

441 Su, "Reform Is Necessary for Achieving Military Modernisation (改革是实现我军现代化的必由

之路)."

442 Li, "National Interest: A Brief Analysis (浅析国家利益学说)."

125 resistance to change remained alive and well in the PLA. For example, although the RMA EC had been thinking about future wars and predicting them as high-tech local affairs, there was no shortage of criticism from the mainstream military theorists. The majority still believed that future wars would be dominated by ordinary weapons, with high-tech weapons remaining unaffordable for most countries. Only the superpowers had the potential to wage high-tech war in the future, but the balance of terror will prevent them from becoming purely high-tech militaries.443 In 1990, Study Military had a discussion section, On Managing the Army, which tried to emphasise the importance of institutionalisation of policies and ideas. But it was the Gulf War that provided the RMA EC and the PLA the opportunity to raise these issues to the forefront of discussion, leading to the institutionalisation of local war under high-tech conditions as doctrine.

The Gulf War provided an external stimulus for change. It demonstrated US precision strike capabilities and information war. The fast tempo, huge financial costs and high intensity of these wars, combined with the lethal nature of the weapons used, alerted the PLA to just how different modern warfare was from their 1980s predictions. It helped to underscore, in a way no analysis or seminar could, the importance and urgency of reform. It created enormous uncertainties among the PLA leaders. Many considered the Gulf War as an indicator of the advent of high-tech war.444 Soon after the Gulf War broke out, General Liu Huaqing (then on the Politburo Standing Committee) tasked the intelligence department of the GSD and the AMS to monitor and analyse the conflict. 445 President and CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and CMC Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun all repeatedly stressed the importance of analysing and learning from the Gulf War. All three general departments, COSTIND, NDU, AMS, all services and all MRs conducted studies on

443 Li, "Complete the New Historic Transformation: Iunderstanding the Cmc’s ’Two Basic

Transformations’.(完成新的历史性转变—学习军委关于‘两个根本性转变’战略思想的体会)."

444 Zhang, Memoirs of Zhang Zhen 2 (张震回忆录 2）, 317.; You, The Armed Forces of China.

445 Huaqing Liu, Memoir of Liu Huaqing (刘华清回忆录) (Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2004), 607.

126 this war. General Liu organised an electronic equipment seminar to learn more from the Gulf War and Chairman Jiang voluntarily participated in the entire two-day seminar,446 very rare for a CMC chairman. From 23 February to 26 April 1991, the China Society of Military Sciences organised six Gulf War Seminar series. 447 According to Chen Bojiang, a researcher at the AMS,

Prior to the Gulf War, there had been a fierce debate among PLA thinkers, some kind of quality versus quantity argument. There was a group arguing that we were making a mistake betting on the effectiveness of new technology. And while that was not a majority voice, it was a very loud voice. And it had a profound effect on our military thinking. Desert Storm demonstrated, beyond question, that technology had a high leverage, that could work, even in the fog of war.448

The Gulf War forced the PLA leadership ‘to confront the disconcerting reality that China’s armed forces were inadequate for the demands of modern warfare’.449 It also offered the RMA EC an opportunity to re-emphasise the importance of military reform and modernisation. They abruptly seized the opportunity by organising and participating in seminars and research. For example, the Gulf War discussion section in Military Forum. More importantly, soon after the Gulf War, they published three edited volumes of collected articles written for Study Military from 1983 to 1992. Many articles for the major debates in the 1980s were also included. Those books were intended to frame the issue and define China’s national interests, as the Gulf War created uncertainties. Largely because of the Gulf War, Shen Weiguang’s book, published a year prior, soon became a popular book and a compulsory reading for CMC members and leaders of all MRs.450

446 Ibid., 608. 447 Military Arts. July 1991.7.p.39 448 Bojiang Chen, Interviews in English on Military, Diplomacy and International Relation Issues (World Affairs Press (世界知识出版社), 1999), 87. 449 Finkelstein, "China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the “Military Strategic Guidelines”," 102. 450 Jiang, "Shen Weiguang—the Father of Information Warfare (信息战之父沈伟光)," 4.

127 Kang Xiangzhen used the Gulf War to re-emphasise the importance of better coordination between military services for local wars.451 Drawing on Operation Desert Shield, Jia Weidong and Zhang Bing suggested that this operation is a typical example of campaign-level deterrence. They argued that the US developed theories on campaign-level deterrence in the 1980s, having previously only practiced strategic- level deterrence.452 Some studies emphasised the importance of the concept of system confrontation.453 Chen Feng and Chen Xiaogong in January 1991 argued that the crises in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the Gulf War indicate that the world order was facing significant changes, positing that it become multi-polar in nature.454

Similar with their efforts in organising events and publishing books after the 1985 strategic decision, the RMA EC seized on the Gulf War as an opportunity to raise issues and influence policymaking. According to the epistemic communities framework, those are policy selection efforts.

In 1992, the RMA EC published a series of books, the New Era Military Studies Paper Series, which comprised three books of collected articles published by Study Military (Military Forum) from 1983 to 1992. The first book, National Defence Analysis, collected articles focusing on issues such as the international environment, world military development and macro analysis of China’s national defence and army building. The title of the book was adapted from the discussion in Study Military in 1988. The selection of previously published articles for the book suggests the editors were trying to use the Gulf War as an opportunity to promote their ideas created in 1988. The second book, National Defence Forecasting, collected articles focusing on

451 Xiangzhen Kang, "Modern Local War Require Better Coordinations [between Services] (现代局部战争呼唤有机高效协同)," The People's Liberation Army Daily, 11 November 1991.

452 Weidong Jia; Bing Zhang, "The Impressive Campaign-Level Deterrence (引人注目的”战役级威

慑”)," ibid., 18 January. 453 Xinzhi Song; Qingyi Su, "A Revisit of Constraints on Air Power (对空中力量制约因素的再认

识）," ibid., 25 January. 454 Feng Chen; Xiaogong Chen, "The World Is in Transition from the Old Strategic Era to a New One (世界正处在新旧战略格局交替的过渡时期)," in National Defence Analysis (国防思辩录), ed. Guangjun Zeng, New Era Military Studies Paper Series (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992).

128 examining high technology and anticipating its implications on future wars. The third book, Casual Essays on National Defence, collects short essays not intended for indepth analysis but, rather, as an assortment of ideas to inspire reform and new ideas.455

The first book, National Defence Analysis, covers every aspect of reform policies and could be considered as a prescription for future reforms. It addressed uncertainties and complexities surrounding future wars and PLA reforms. It is roughly divided into six parts. Articles in the first part of the book examine the international security environment and the world military development. Also covered is the changing character of warfare, including two articles published in the Gulf War Analysis section in January 1991.456 The second part consists of articles on national interests and values. Part three addresses elements of military reforms, with articles focused on air force development, navy and maritime security and strategy, the electromagnetic spectrum, rapid response forces, logistics and coordination between military services. The fourth part focuses exclusively on justifying and articulating reforms—why they are important, how to conduct them, and the importance of comprehensive planning or reform design. The fifth part studies military theoretical issues such as military theoretical research methods, Mao Zedong’s military thoughts and applications to the current reforms. The sixth part address various issues, for example, new technologies and their implications for future wars, the issues and problems with current army building, and professionalisation of the military.

Drawing on their studies on local wars in the 1980s, Zhang and Zeng conclude that future wars will have five characteristics. First, local war under high-tech conditions is and will remain a major threat. Second, due to new weapon technologies, the nature of war and form of operations are also changing. Third, future wars will start with electronic warfare and competition in achieving ‘electromagnetic dominance’ will be fierce. Fourth, all domains (land, sea, air and space) are integrated in operations. Fifth, long-distance missile attacks can mean adversaries have no direct

455 Military Forum Editorial, "Introductory Notes," ibid. 456 Chen, "The World Is in Transition from the Old Strategic Era to a New One (世界正处在新旧战略

格局交替的过渡时期)."; Benwang Sha, "The Gulf War and Its Implications to the World (海湾危机

对世界军事形势的影响)," ibid.

129 contact with each other.457 They understood that space will become a new domain that requires attention. Moreover, information technologies will make military services more integrated and joint operations will become a major form of operation. They repeatedly referred to the Gulf War to emphasise their views on future wars.458 While they maintained that war will be short and intense,459 with decisive battles,460 this only partially suggests that pre-emptive strike capabilities or surprise attacks are of vital importance. Rather, the emphasis is actually on the importance of peacetime defence planning.

According to Zhang and Zeng that, China’s military posture, defence planning, operational theories and organisational structure had not fundamentally changed since 1949. But in the same time the security environment and operational requirements had changed dramatically. The security environment had changed from a wartime to peacetime environment, in which the PLA faced no specific adversaries and had no specific military missions. Military operations had changed from army-dominated land-based operations to multi-service coordinated actions. The PLA itself had changed from a revolutionary army that aimed to overthrow the old regime to a state military engaged in socialist economic development. Because of these changes, the PLA was under pressure to change its operational theories and organisational structure to cope with the new security environment. To do this, China would have to change from threat-based to capabilities-based defence planning, change its military posture and improve the capabilities of its navy and air force, and ensure better coordination and jointness between the services.461

In the second volume, National Defence Forecasting, the authors explored future wars. Many of those studies agreed that future wars will be small in scale and

457 Qinsheng Zhang; Guangjun Zeng, "Quality: The Life of the Military (质量:军队的生命)," ibid., 2. 458 Ibid. 459 Ibid., 6. 460 Taiheng Zhang, "Local War and Weapons Development (局部战争与武器装备的发展)," PLA Daily, 1 June 1990. 461 Zeng, "Hurray! National Interests (国家利益万岁)."

130 limited in time and space.462 There were five major reasons for this conclusion. First, because of the balance of power between the US and the USSR, world war is no longer likely. Since the end of World War II, there had been many small-scale wars indicating them as the prevailing form of violence between countries. 463 Second, new technologies such as precision-guided munitions made strikes more accurate, thus, significantly reducing the destruction and space of war.464 Third, the post-war global economic order or globalisation makes countries more interdependent. Moreover, instead of waging a war to secure other countries’ resources, international trade had become a more cost-efficient way of making profits. Per An Tian and Cui Yuchen, developed countries now could use their technological advantages to reap economic benefits through international trade, significantly reducing the incentives for war.465 Fourth, information technologies will make war become ‘softer’. Again, future wars will be limited wars, in terms of time and geography.466

Regarding the kind of military China should have for the twenty-first century, these studies agreed on a few points. First, for the army, they mostly emphasised the importance of reducing the size of the army. Second, they proposed creating more elite forces, for example, rapid response forces and special operation forces. Guo Anhua writes that future rapid response forces will be much smaller in size.467 Tong Qingyin refers to British Special Air Services’ raid on Pebble Island to argue the importance of developing special forces.468 Third, the new technological revolution has some

462 Yunzhong Cao; He Xia, "Facing Frequent Local War Threats (经常性的威胁来自局部战争)," in National Defence Forecasting (国防预言录), ed. Guangjun Zeng, New Era Military Studies Paper Series (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1992), 10. 463 Ganglin Li, "All-out War or Limited War? (大战乎？小战乎？)," ibid.

464 Zhiwei Liu, "Forcasting Future Wars in the 1990s (九十年代战争形态概测)," ibid.; Yunzhong Cao, "Do Not Underestimate Small Wars (对小战不可小视)," ibid.

465 Tian An; Yuchen Cui, "The Rise and Fall of Total War (全面战争的兴衰)," ibid.

466 Liu, "Forcasting Future Wars in the 1990s (九十年代战争形态概测)." 467 Anhua Guo, "Rapid Response Forces Will Become Smaller in the Future (快速反应部队的发展趋

势—小型化)," ibid.

468 Qingying Tong, "The Tendency of Being ‘Small’ (“小”的趋势)," ibid., 14.

131 implications for the organisational structure of the PLA: coordinated operations structures between military services and integrated joint command will multiply the combat capabilities of the military; the need for multifunctional, combined, modular forces; and more emphasis on software, such as Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems.469 As the boundaries between tactical, operational and strategic levels of operations become blurred, command and control at the highest level will give direct orders to the lowest level of operations, that is, more centralised command.470

4.5 The Strategic Guidelines for the New Period

At an enlarged meeting of the CMC in January 1993, Jiang Zemin announced the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period—the highest level of national guidance and direction to the armed forces of China. This policy addressed questions that had been hotly debated in the 1980s, including, for example, the PLA’s strategic objective for army building, the relationship between China’s defence development strategy and its NDDS, the types of wars China should be prepared to fight in future, whether containment of wars was a major duty of the PLA, and whether conventional deterrence capabilities would be strengthened. And the RMA EC was a major force in raising those issues and fostering debates on them.

Jiang summarised the Military Strategic Guidelines as:

to take Mao Zedong’s military thinking and Comrade Deng’s thinking on army building in the new period as our guide; subordinate ourselves to and serve the country’s development strategy; focus on winning local wars fought under modern technological conditions, especially high-tech conditions; quickly raise the quality of the army; strive to improve its rapid response capability; make the most of our strengths; compensate for our weaknesses; respond to changes flexibly; prevent war from breaking out; be victorious if it does; safeguard the country’s territory and sovereignty and its maritime rights and interests; preserve national unity and social stability; and

469 Hewen Wang, "Organisational Structures Will Become More Coordinated and Flexible (编制体制

朝着合成灵活机动的方向发展)," ibid., 341-42.

470 Jingming Shi; Ping Lu, "On ‘Mini Wars’ (谈“袖珍型”战争)," ibid.

132 provide powerful security guarantees for reform, opening up and modernisation.471

Among these four points, three of them are closely related to the debates and arguments of the RMA EC in the 1980s. First, defending China’s territory, sovereignty and maritime interests are national interests that the PLA is supposed to protect. That is, the Military Strategic Guidelines requires each the military to obey and serve China’s national interests. Second, he explicitly emphasised that the Military Strategic Guidelines must serve the national development strategy. The relationship between China’s NDDS and national development strategy, and the relationship between defence spending and economic development were (as explored in previous sections) thoroughly debated by the RMA EC in the 1980s. Third, he emphasised the point that in addition to winning a war, the PLA should also try to deter or contain the war from erupting. This idea was originally raised by the RMA EC in 1987 and a consensus reached by the end of 1989—that the military must focus on developing deterrence capabilities to prevent future wars. By 1993, when the Military Strategic Guidelines was announced, the PLA had already fully assimilated US ideas of deterrence.472

The PLA’s national defence strategy of ‘winning local war under high-tech conditions’, announced in 1993, ‘effectively ended the PLA’s soul search for a proper strategy in the second half of the 1980s, when it suddenly lost a reference object against which its overarching strategy was normally formulated’.473 The NDDS debate and courses in the 1980s had laid the ideological preparation for the Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period and Two Transformations in the 1990s.474 An article published on the Chinese Ministry of Defence’s official website suggests that the debate on the NDDS initiated by the MTD and PLA Daily marked the beginning of an intellectual evolution and a strategic level of military theoretical innovation, leading

471 Zemin Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 2 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2010), 281. 472 Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪之交的军事理论革命)," 168. 473 You, China's Military Transformation, 127. 474 Li, Foster Innovation (扶新集), 299.

133 to doctrine change in 1993 to winning local wars under high-tech conditions 475 (discussed in detail in the next chapter).

4.6 The RMA Epistemic Community, 1985–1993

This section examines the changing composition of the RMA EC during the period examined in this chapter. The activities undertaken by this community in influencing policy development are also explored here. From 1985 to 1988, the community rapidly rose in prominence. While they continued to influence decision- making, the composition of the community and their activities gradually changed from 1989 to 1993.

Section 4.6.1 examines their major activities and publications in this period through conferences and discussions, and identifies the expansion of the community. Section 4.6.2 examines the influence of the community and how they took the Gulf War as an opportunity to influence decisions and disseminate their ideas to the whole PLA. Section 4.6.3 discusses questions related to the epistemic communities framework, such as the RMA EC’s pattern of communication and channels of influence.

4.6.1 Composition of the RMA Epistemic Community

The composition of the RMA EC remained largely unchanged during the NDDS debate and national interest debate in 1988. However, from the late 1980s, while the community continued to expand towards the size necessary to penetrate the whole PLA, the composition of the RMA EC changed in two major respects.

First, from 1990, some members, especially some princelings, began retiring from their military services. Prominent members such as Zhang Sheng, Qin Chaoying, Cai Xiaohong and Jin Zhude gradually left military theoretical studies to pursue other interests. Second, members working at research and academic institutions were became more active. Many of them were promoted to more important and influential positions, such as headquarters’ internal research offices or research offices of MRs.

475 Wu, "Reading Sunzi During a Revolution (站在军事变革潮头读《孙子》 )".

134 Many also became editors of influential journals and newspapers. Moreover, the NDU was established in 1986, and many of its researchers and academics joined the RMA EC. Zhang Guoyu became an active Study Military editor in the late 1980s. Qi Changming was a PLA Daily journalist from 1985 to 1991 and became much more involved in the community’s activities. Sun Mingming became editor of the AMS Military Art Journal. Kong Lingtong, a researcher at the Beijing MR’s military research office, and an active Study Military contributor, became an NDU academic and editor of the Journal of National Defence University in the late 1980s. Chai Yuqiu of the 24th Group Army became a researcher at (later director of) the GSD’s military research office and editor of the internal journal Bulletin of Military Work (军事工作

通讯).476 Liu Shengjun at the Logistics College became editor of the newly created journal, Military Prospects, in 1989. Liu Senshan became editor of Nanjing Army Command College’s Journal of Military Command. In short, the EC in the late 1980s, as the princelings were retiring, and more professional researchers and academic joined the community, they EC were gradually becoming a much more open community than it was in the early 1980s. In comparison with the early 1980s, they had much members in the late 1980s, and organised much more public events.

As illustrated in Figure 3, by the early 1990s, many EC members assumed editor positions in prominent military professional journals. And this direct changed the nature of their influence that will be discussed in later sections.

476 Fengheng Lei, "Miltary Scholar General Chai: A Legendary Life of a Strategist (“谋略家”的传

奇人生——记军人学者柴宇球将军)," People's Daily Online, http://en.people.cn/other/about.shtml. ;

"General Chai Yuqiu and His Book — Strategy ( 柴宇球将军和他的《谋略》)," http://www.huaxia.com/200373/00036473.html.

135 Figure 3. RMA Epistemic Community members became editors of major PLA journals and newspapers in the late-1980s and early 1990s.

4.6.2 Diffusion Mechanism

According to the epistemic communities framework, while the RMA EC’s major contributions during the mid- to late 1980s were still policy innovation, they became more involved in policy diffusion. In addition to creating new ideas, or learning from foreign militaries, one major role of the EC is the dissemination of new ideas to the decision makers as well as officer corps. For the period under review, the mechanisms of dissemination are fivefold.

The first mechanism is publishing articles on Study Military column and other military journals. In this period, they kept publishing articles on Study Military and other journal journals.477 Moreover, as some of them became editors of influential PLA journals, their selections of journal articles will to some extent reflect their world views and causal beliefs. For example, the EC member assumed editor position of the two of the PLA’s most authoritative military journals, Military Art Journal and Journal of National Defence University. And Journal of Military Command was arguably the most influential journal on tactics studies, and mid-level commander education. Which means that they influence every level of PLA officers through those journals.

The second is through conferences and seminars. For example, through Zhang Sheng and Zhang Qinsheng, the EC directly raised the future war studies issue to MTD leaders and successfully initiated a PLA-wide trend in future war studies. Their study on future wars and military strategy was supported by many senior PLA leaders, such as Zhang Zhen, Xiong Guangkai, He Chengxuan, Liao Xilong, Liu Cunzhi, Zhang Xusan, Mi Zhenyu.478 They organised numerous seminars and conferences, which

477 Major themes of discussion are listed in Table 2. 478 Zhang, Walking from the War: Dialogues between Two Generations of Soldiers (从战争中走来：

两代军人的对话）, 461.

136 will be discussed in later sections. For example, through Zhang Sheng and Zhang Qinsheng, the EC directly raised the future war studies issue to MTD leaders and successfully initiated a PLA-wide trend in future war studies. Their study on future wars and military strategy was supported by many senior PLA leaders, such as Zhang Zhen, Xiong Guangkai, He Chengxuan, Liao Xilong, Liu Cunzhi, Zhang Xusan, Mi Zhenyu.479

The third is through EC members working at official think tanks or advisory positions. While many of the EC members assumed important think tank positions, their role as formal advisors were better established. Which means more official channels to policy makers were established in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, as discussed in the previous section, many of them became researchers or directors of the General Staff Department, General Logistics Department, military regions, and military services. As think tanks of their respective organisations, their research and advice became more official. Of course, their influence was dependent on decision-makers’ personal habit and recognition of those official advisors, and we unfortunately, have no such information on details about the decision-making and consultation process in the PLA. But the Military Research Offices, as internal think tanks of their respective organisations, have a much better reach to decision-makers. For example, Chai Yuqiu, director of GSD’s Military Research Office, is responsible for GSD’s internal journal Bulletin of Military Work, and prepares research and briefings for GSD leaders, should have much better influence than researchers outside of the GSD. Another example is core EC member Jin Zhude, who used to work as personnel assistant to Qian Xuesen. He was one of the reasons why Qian earnestly supported their studies in the 1980s. Qian frequently attended conferences and seminars organised by the EC. In 1986, he attended the AMS’s Centre for Operational Research’s seminar, and asked Mi Zhenyu if the AMS has a centre for military economics study, and invited him to give a lecture at COSTIND.480 As a key advocate of systems science, Qian’s interactions with this community of military

479 Ibid. 480 Mi, "The Economic Facotors and Contrants on Warfare: A Discussion on Our Military Strategic Goals in 2000 (研究经济因素对战争的制约作用探讨我国 2000 年的军事战略目标)," 224.

137 experts helped him influence the military thinking and promoted this methods in the PLA. This also allowed this community of experts to influence the weapon research and development, and Qian had also served as a channel through which their ideas reached the CMC decision-making.

The fourth is personal ties, and private discussion groups. This include their personal ties with senior policy makers, and private discussions with their peers. For example, Shen Weiguang’s personal ties with Fu Quanyou. The role of personal ties with senior leaders played an important role in disseminating their ideas and influencing decision-makings. But gradually diminished in the early 1990s, as many princelings were retiring. Zhang Zhen during the mid to late 1980s served as a major channel for the diffusion of EC ideas. Primarily into training and education sectors. As deputy chief of the General Staff, Zhang encouraged the EC to study new issues and fostered their innovative thinking, during the early stage of the development of the EC. After he became the president of the NDU, he firstly provided facilities to support their study. In the second half of the 1980s, he earnestly implemented Deng’s training and education reform. The reform on the one hand, further encouraged innovative studies military theories and cultivated young NDU lectures. It on the other hand, also assimilated many ideas of the EC members, and made some of them official course literature, which further reenforced the influence of those ideas. In other words, he helped diffuse EC ideas to the whole PLA through the NDU. Zhang Zhen became vice chairman of the CMC in October 1992. Soon after the new CMC was established, the CMC decided to create a new military strategic guidelines. And Zhang Zhen was the one directed the GSD, AMS and NDU to draft the new strategic guideline.481 Given his relations with the EC, especially with those from the GSD and NDU, they should had been a channel through which the EC reached the CMC.

The fifth is through professional military educational institutions. The MTD was responsible for the whole PLA’s education and training. Research and educational

481 Zhang Wannian Biography Editorial Group, Zhang Wannian: A Biography. Volume 2 (张万年传 2) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2011), 60.; Jixian Liu, "Theory and Practice of General Zhang Zhen to Lead Military Scientific Researches (张震将军领导军事科研工作的理论与实践)," China Military Science, no. 4 (2016): 114.

138 institutions such as the AMS and Army Command College are often assigned the tasks of wring text books. Many EC members working at educational institutions played an important role diffusing EC’s ideas through university courses and text books. For example, Army Command College academics, Qi Zhengjun, Wang Kefu, Guo Anhua, Li Zheng, Zeng Sunan, Huang Peiyi whole authored the PLA’s first Science of Tactics text book,482 were all EC members. They were also authors of couple of other text books: Coordinated Command Studies, and Coordinated Tactics Studies,483 and Science of Coordinated Tactics, the PLA’s first text book on coordinated tactics.484 The NDU created a course the National Defence Development Strategy Studies and the text book on NDDS.485 EC members and frequent Study Military contributors, authors Liu Hongji and Luo Haixi were also lectures of the course and participated writing the text book.

Their sensitivity to timing is a key to their success in diffusing ideas and influencing policy-making. Since 1985 the NDDS debate, they also arranged conferences and seminars, and published books on those issues in a timely manner. After 1985 strategic shift, they made the proposal to study future wars, and arranged Study Military discussions on NDDS. After the Gulf War, in addition to seminars and Study Military discussions, they also published the New Era Military Studies Paper Series, collecting their articles and studies from 1985 to 1992.

482 Peiyi (黄培义) Huang, "Self-Improvement, and Willing to Play a Supporting Role (自强不息甘当

人梯)," in Military Flag: Generals’ Accounts of the Military History (军旗飘扬—南京部分将军口述军史) (Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House (中共党史出版社)), 212. 483 Ibid., 213. 484 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿真中实现科技大练官)."

485 Li, Foster Innovation (扶新集), 299.; National Defence Development Strategy Studies Course

Editorial Group, National Defence Development Strategy Studies Course (国防发展战略学教程) (PLA National Defence University Press, 1989).

139 4.6.3 Activities from 1985 to 1993

In the early 1980s, the community’s seminars and discussions were mostly private or closed-door. After the 1985 strategic shift, as they recognised the opportunity created by uncertainties surrounding peacetime army building, the community began arranging public events and large-scale conferences. A timeline of the community’s activities is shown in Table 1.

Policy innovation entailed the aim of their activities being creating new ideas, introducing foreign ideas to the PLA and adapting these ideas to the Chinese context. Soon after the Gulf War, they arranged conferences and seminars, Military Forum discussions and a book series. These were not solely aimed at seizing on opportunity to influence policy selection. Some were brainstorming sections, aimed at creating new ideas and finding solutions to address challenges posed by the Gulf War. Others were clearly aimed at influencing policy selection, for example, the New Era Military Studies Paper Series which published collected articles and studies from 1985 to 1992 (discussed in Section 4.4).

Table 2: Timeline of the RMA Epistemic Community’s Activities, 1985–1993 Major Themes of Discussion 1983–1986 Designing Future Battlefield 2 Feb 1986 – 4 Sep 1987 Profitable Defence 21 Mar 1986 – 5 Jun 1987 Thoughts on National Defence Development Strategy 26 Sep – 14 Nov 1986 Local War Debate 10 Jul 1987 Military Works Must Focus on Modernisation 8 Jul 1988 – 1989 National Defence Analysis Dec 1990 – Jan 1991 Gulf War Analysis Conferences and Seminars 3 May 1986 Strategic Studies is a Key Step Toward Achieving Strategic Changes 1986 2nd National Defence Economic Conference May 1986 Seminars on ‘How should the PLA adapt to the new guidelines for army building’

140 1986 National Defence Modernisation and Development Strategies Seminar Series 1989 The 3rd National Defence Economic Conference Books and Conference Proceedings 1986–1988 National Defence and Futures book series (10 books) 1988 China’s National Defence in 2000 (AMS, Liu Jixian) 1992 New Era Military Studies Paper Series (three books)

The NDDS debate and the first PLA-wide Campaign Theories Research Conference both attracted senior PLA leaders’ attention. The concept of NDDS was soon accepted by the General Staff, and they began organising lectures for senior officers on this topic. In June 1987, the GSD organised the National Defence

Modernisation and Development Strategies Seminar Series (国防现代化发展战略系

列讲座), comprising 10 lectures delivered by prominent scholars and officials. These were General Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi, Chief Secretary of the State Council’s Institute of International Studies Huan Xiang, Deputy Director of General Staff Intelligence Department Xiong Guangkai, Wu Chunqiu of AMS and Wang Shouyun of COSTIND. The purpose of this seminar series was to improve senior PLA officers’ strategic thinking and ability to promote military reforms.486 RMA EC member Jin Zhude was the youngest and most junior officer invited to give a lecture.487 This lecture series was one of the major channels through which the RMA EC’s ideas from past few years were disseminated to senior PLA policymakers.

4.6.4 Influence

The RMA EC exercised considerable and demonstrable influence over the PLA between 1985 and 1993. They had provided decision-makers with specific ideas about future wars, advocated superior approaches to defence studies and overturned

486 Military Training Department of PLA General Staff Department, National Defence Modernisatin Development Strategy (国防现代化发展战略研究) (Yiwen Military Publishing (军事谊文出版社), 1987). 487 Xie and Kong, "A New School of Strategic Thought Is Emerging in Beijing (北京出了一个新的战

略学派)," 14.

141 the PLA’s conservative strategic guidelines. Adler and Haas argue that ‘In the absence of war, policymakers’ expectations about war tend to follow directly from the theoretically informed advice they receive’.488 By offering expert advice and framing the context, RMA EC influenced policymakers’ expectations of future wars, in turn, influencing their military reform policies.

Chen Bingyan and Qiu Changwei, in a 2003 PLA Daily article, argue that, in retrospect, the ideas raised in DFB in the 1980s sounded bizarre to most contemporaries but were proven accurate and later incorporated into PLA doctrine. They further argued that the idea of ‘designing the future’ has been a major characteristic of the RMA in the twenty-first century. In the information age, instead of adapting to the future environment, the PLA must be able to shape it.489

Second, the RMA EC shifted the PLA to a future-focused approach to planning. In the 1980s, defence planning was based on assumptions drawn from previous wars. The framework the community proposed focuses on the future environment and sets a wider horizon of 15 to 20 years. Their ideas resonated with the PLA. For example, in April 1993, Jiang Zemin emphasised that innovations in military theories were still lacking. In December 1993, he again urged the PLA to pay more attention to military theoretical research. In March 2003, he was even more specific, stating ‘We must make use of the guiding role of military theories. Make innovations in military theories and operational ideas, in order to better promote the informatisation of our military and prepare for military struggles’.490

The approaches introduced by the RMA EC have continued to influence the PLA’s defence planning. For example, in a NDU report prepared for the 18th National

488 Adler and Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," 376. 489 Chen and Qiu, "Promoting the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics: Innovate the Concepts and Desigin the Future (推进有中国特色军事变革:创新观念设计未来)."

490 Xianming (牟显明) Mu and Xiaosong (赵小松) Zhao, "Scientific Guidance for Innovation in

Military Theory ( 军事理论创新的科学指南)," Guangming Online, http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2005-07/06/content_264290.htm.

142 Congress of the CCP in 2012, three influential experts491 on China’s military reform and civil–military integration program argued that military theories are drawn from military experiences but also guide military development. Military theories are the ‘soul’ that guides the scientific development of the military, and492 the PLA must make organisational changes based on the future wars it expects and is expected to fight.493

Many studies agree that policies and debates in this period paved the way to the Chinese RMA. The Two Transformations announced in December 1995 indicates the beginning of the RMA with Chinese characteristics.494 Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Guoyu argue that the DFB together with the 1986 All-army Operational Theory Studies conference, 1987 All-Army Foreign Operational Theory Studies conference and 1988 All-Army Conference on Key Operational Theory Studies were precursors to the creation of various new operational concepts, such as ‘comprehensive operations, striking key points’. 495 Zhang quotes the argument of General Fu Quanyou, PLA Chief of General Staff from 1995 to 2002 (during which RMA research began to ﬂourish in China), that ‘military theoretical innovation is the precursor and spirit of RMA and directs RMA development’.496 Some ideas and concepts debated by the RMA EC in the 1980s had, by the 1990s, been generally accepted and later gained orthodoxy status. For example, the concept that military strategy serve national

491 Zhang Chuanjia (章传家), expert panel member of the Leading Group for National Defence and

Military Reform of the Central Military Commission; Liu Jinyu (刘晋豫), director of NDU’s Centre for National Defence Economic Studies, and professor Jiang Luming (姜鲁鸣) of this centre. 492 Zhang, LIU, and Jiang, The Security Measures for Achieving the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (实现中华民族伟大复兴的安全保障), 247. 493 Ibid., 259. 494 "The Insider’s Story of the Most Significant Military Reform in the History (“史上最牛”军改

出台幕后)," Phonex Weekly (凤凰周刊), no. 35 (2015).

495 Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪之交的军事理论革命)," 166. 496 Ng, Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness, 109.

143 interests, which change over time necessitating matching changes in military strategy, was mentioned by former Chief of the General Staff Fang Fenghui in 2002.497

From Jiang’s speech, we identify three casual factors for China’s change of doctrine. First, the new technological revolution and world RMA. Second, foreign local wars, especially the Gulf War. Third, China’s expansion of interests. All were external factors. Per Fravel, ‘external motivation is the emergence of new missions for a military created by changes in a state’s political goals. New missions can arise for a variety of reasons, such as the acquisition of new interests abroad to be defended, changes in the security needs of an ally, or shifts in a state’s political goals for the use of force that require new capabilities’.498

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the RMA EC’s activities and ideas from 1985 to 1993. It traced the process by which ideas and expectations of war emerged and were diffused. In the mid-1980s, the PLA was confronted with the complex and uncertain issues of understanding future wars and searching for a new strategy for peacetime army building. As a result, the PLA leadership sought advice from the policy experts, who, in turn, framed the issue of military reform as a national interest. In this period, the RMA EC reassessed China’s security environment, redefined China’s national interests and potential security threats, developed a new vision of future war and created a framework for peacetime defence planning. Together, these all paved the way to the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

RMA EC members were not only involved in influencing the GSD’s decision to initiate future war studies across the whole PLA, they also actively organised events and studies on futures wars. Moreover, some of those members were selected by the GSD to give lectures to senior PLA officers on future wars and how to craft strategies for the twenty-first century. This community of experts was a major player advocating

497 Fenghui Fang, "Innovation in Military Theory in an Era of Dramatic Change (激变时代呼唤战略

理论创新)," PLA Daily, 15 January 2002. 498 Fravel, "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy," 42.

144 future studies and exploring future wars, as well as crafting national defence strategy in the 1980s and early 1990s. They were a major intellectual force that laid the theoretical foundation for the PLA’s local war under high-tech conditions doctrine.

By learning from foreign military studies, the RMA EC created a forward- looking, systematic approach for defence planning. This is especially important for the more complex and uncertain environment of the twenty-first century. Before the CMC announced the military strategic principles in 1993, the RMA EC had created the underlying framework for peacetime defence planning. Although the outbreak of the Gulf War created the conditions for further reforms, the RMA was not a forgone conclusion in 1993. It required more promotion of ideas in the early 1990s. In this period, they conducted research and organised conferences and seminars on future wars. These efforts raised the issue the need for the PLA’s policymakers to address developing a strategy in response to the unfolding RMA. They argued that the PLA should wake up to the essentially intellectual challenge of war in the information age.

This chapter identified the Military Salon as an epistemic community that influenced China’s 1985 strategic shift. It argues that the Military Salon emerged in the early 1980s and gradually gained prominence in the mid-1980s. The 1985 strategic shift created uncertainties which prompted decision-makers reach out to search for expert advice. The RMA EC, comprising members of the Military Salon and editors and contributors of Study Military, promptly grasped this opportunity to lecture policymakers and developed an NDDS based on their previous. Essentially, the policy-relevant knowledge of the RMA EC provided a framework for peacetime defence planning as sought by the PLA.

Another major contribution of the RMA EC was stimulating wider debate on China’s defence priorities and the need for a transformation to meet the challenge of the twenty-first century. Various thoughts and methods, derided by conservative elements at the time, later gained orthodox status now. For example, focusing on local wars, future wars of a high-tech nature, TR, future focus, technological development, the profitable defence concept and civil–military coordination—all are important to understanding the current Chinese national-level strategy of civil–military integration.

145 According to Li Bingyan, the thoughts, theories and concepts created in the 1980s exercise ongoing influence.499

The next two chapters will argue that the RMA EC played an important role in developing the theoretical basis for the RMA and other issues. By breaking the existing paradigm, this community opened the window for future PLA reforms and the RMA.

499 Bingyan Li, Military Essay Writing Methods (军事论文写作方法谈) (Beijing: Changcheng Publishing House, 1996).

146 Chapter 5: Using Operational Methods to Guide China’s Army Building (1993–1996)

This chapter examines the RMA EC’s ideas and activities from the announcement of Military Strategic Guidelines in 1993 to the announcement of the Two Transformations in December 1995. It focuses on the process by which the community’s beliefs and ideas were diffused to combat troops, arguing that the RMA EC in this period was busy engaging combat troops and creating operational methods together with commanders. By introducing a ‘requirement-driven’ reform approach, and disseminating the idea of ‘using operational methods to guide army building’ to combat troops, they not only encouraged combat troops to create concepts of operations for future wars but created a channel to transmit operational concepts and feedbacks from combat troops to the RMA EC. These efforts helped their ideas to penetrate the whole PLA and encourage all levels of commanders to think about future high-tech wars. This chapter, according to the EC framework, is mainly a period of policy diffusion. In which the EC tried very hard to disseminate those ideas and concepts they discussed in seminars and newspapers to combat units. As they well understand that future implementation mostly depend on how the combat units would understand their ideas and the extent to which they would be willingly accept those ideas.

Section 5.1 discusses the forward-looking and theory-driven approach the RMA introduced in the early 1990s. More specifically, it examines the requirement- driven approach to China’s army building ( the idea of ‘using operational methods to

guide army building’ (战法引导建法). Section 5.2 briefly reviews major discussions

the RMA EC had in Military Forum and conferences and seminars they hosted or co- hosted with other organisations, and the creation of the feedback loop with combat units. Section 5.3 explores the creation of new operational methods and identification of requirements. Section 5.4 maps the changing composition of the community between 1993 and 1996, and their activities and channels of influence.

147 5.1 A Requirement-driven Approach to China’s Army Building

After the Military Strategic Guidelines was adopted in 1993, the RMA EC began making innovations in operational methods and promoting the idea of ‘using operational methods to guide army building’. They aimed to use this as a starting point for China’s RMA.

From 1993 to 1996, the PLA in general, and the RMA EC in particular, was engaged in a three-year campaign to create new operational methods (concepts).500 Studying operational methods was a means to an end—identifying operational requirements of future wars. Consequently, the PLA would conduct military training, make organisational adaptations and weapon acquisitions based on those identified operational requirements.501 What lies between operational methods (concepts) and operational requirements is training; by testing operational methods and concepts, operational requirements will emerge and the PLA would know what weapons they needed and what organisational changes were required. This was referred to as the ‘demand-driven’ approach to China’s army building, and was based on the theory- driven approach advocated by the RMA EC since the early 1980s.

Earlier studies on future high-tech wars led the RMA EC to conclude that the first battle would be the decisive battle and the initial phase of war is critical to the entire war. Thus, pre-war preparation and army building in peacetime is important for winning a future high-tech local war. The question was, how to carry out peacetime army building? To address those challenges posed by the changing nature of warfare, they argued that the PLA should take a theory-driven approach to its army building. They proposed the concept of ‘using operational methods to guide army building’.502 This was a two-step approach of 1) studying operational methods to identify demands

500 Shiying Kan and Bingyan Li, "The Soldiers’ Ambition in the New Century (跨世纪军人的事业

追求)," PLA Daily, 26 May 1998. 501 Yujun Feng; Jinjiu Yan; Bingyan Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’ s Campaign Exercises and the Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活

全盘—从济南军区战役演习看战法研究的辐射效应)," ibid., 17 January 1995. 502 Ibid.

148 of future wars, and 2) conducting military training and making organisational adaptations and weapon acquisitions according to those identified demands.503

They attributed the success of US reform in the 1980s to their theory-driven approach and used the US AirLand Battle concept as an example to emphasise the importance of having a clear vision of future wars and creating operational concepts. They argued that it was the creation of the AirLand Battle concept which provided the guidance to the US military’s weapon development, organisational changes and training reforms.504 The logic was that studying operational methods will help the PLA understand the nature of future warfare and assess potential threats against enduring national goals and objectives. Once this was achieved, PLA officers would have a better understanding about operational requirements of future wars and how to conduct reforms. Moreover, the RMA EC believed that operational concepts would help the PLA reach consensus on how to carry out reforms and avoid stovepiping. This requirement-driven approach, or ‘using operational methods to guide army building’, is illustrated in Figure 4.

503 Ibid. 504 Shouzeng Zheng, "Cultivaing Operational Theory Studies (培育作战理论新的“生长点”）," ibid., 18 March 1997; Zhang, "Facing Challenges and Thinking About Countermeasures (面对挑战思考对策)."; Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战

役演习看战法研究的辐射效应)."

149

Figure 4. The requirement-driven approach to army building

First, combat troops create concepts of operation to address future war threats. Studying operational methods means imagining future war threats, and this will help commanders to think about future war scenarios. Second, the PLA will carry out its army building (training, acquisitions and organisational adaptations) based on the operational requirements that emerge from war scenarios. What lies between operational concepts and future war requirements are the tools for testing those concepts, for which the RMA EC proposed computer simulation and exercises.

150 5.2 Disseminating Ideas to and Collecting Feedbacks from Combat Troops

The RMA EC was aware that their intellectual effort and innovation in military thought were not going to achieve meaningful results if the concepts were not accepted by the armed services, MRs and combat units tasked with their implementation.505 Although some ideas created in the 1980s had been embedded in PLA military textbooks, without sufficient implementation in combat units those ideas did not have the effects expected by the RMA EC. Therefore, they urged the executive and research branches to better cooperate with each other to narrow the gap between theory and practice.506

To promote their theory-driven approach to reforms, in 1993, the RMA EC began engaging combat troops. They organised many conferences with MRs, group armies and provincial military districts. Their interactions with combat troops eventually created a feedback loop that allowed them to disseminate ideas to and collect operational concepts and feedbacks from combat units. This section discusses major activities towards creating this feedback loop and building a bridge between the research community and executive branches. These activities can be categories into two groups: conferences co-hosted with combat troops, and feedbacks from combat troops to RMA EC members.

5.2.1 Conferences and Seminars Co-hosted with Combat Troops

In summer 1993, Military Forum, Military Prospect, and the 21st Group Army of Nanzhou MR co-hosted a PLA-wide conference at 21st Group Army headquarters in Baoji. The theme of this conference was Local War Under High-tech Conditions.507

505 Guoyu Zhang and Wujun Guo, "Advocating 'Two Changes' through Deepening Theoretical Research (以深化理论推动转变)," ibid., 1 April 1997. 506 Nan, "Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的奋力拼搏)," 14.

507 Zhengqi Nan, Fei Chen, and Shengjun Liu, "A Report on Local War Studies Seminar (我军三次战

法研究的回顾与启迪—来自局部战争研讨会的报告)," PLA Daily, 30 July 1993.; Shouzeng Zheng;

151 This was the first large-scale conference the RMA EC organised with a group army. Participants from all general departments, military services, PLA academic institutions and MRs attended this conference. 508 Nearly 100 papers were submitted. 509 More than 20 participants were either major generals or lieutenant generals.510 In addition to the organisers, Li Bingyan and Liu Shengjun, other RMA EC members who presented at the conference included Mi Zhenyu and Wang Zengquan of the AMS, Qi Changming of PLA Daily, Liu Senshan of Nanjing Army Command College and Nan Zhengqi of Logistic Command College. 511 The conference host, Zheng Shouzeng, commander of 21st Group Army, became an active Military Forum contributor and RMA EC member soon after this conference.

In this conference, participants made some systematic assessments of the characteristics of future local high-tech wars. Some ideas that had been discussed during the Gulf War were brought to prominence during this conference. As will be discussed in detail in the next section, they reached a certain level of consensus on the nature of future high-tech local war. For example, high-tech local wars are non-linear and multidimensional in nature; they will be more sudden, faster and more intense; and the first battle will be decisive. To address the changing nature of warfare, they placed great emphasis on the following concepts: manoeuvre operations, joint operations and structure destruction.

The highlighted importance of manoeuvre operations led to another seminar with 21st Group Army in spring 1994, title Manoeuvre Operations. 512 The 61st Division of 21st Group Army was one of the PLA’s first rapid manoeuvre forces

Fayou Zhong, Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的拼搏), Military Prospect Series (National Defence University Press, 1993). 508 Donghai Du, "Speech at the Local War under High-Tech Conditions Conference," in Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的拼搏), ed. Shouzeng Zheng; Fayou Zhong (National Defence University Press, 1993), 4. 509 Ibid., 5. 510 Ibid. 511 Zhengqi Nan; Wanjun Li, "Address the Issues That Constrain the Quality of Logistics Personnel," ibid. 512 84810 Unit Headquaters, " The End of One-Dimensional Linear War Era," PLA Daily, 27 May 1994.

152 created in the early 1990s.513 It was commanded by Chang Wanquan (later China’s Minister of Defence).514 As 21st Group Army was one of the first group armies to build operational-level manoeuvre forces, this conference was particularly important for building the bridge between the policy community and combat units.

In November 1994, Military Forum and Military Prospect co-hosted another high-tech local war conference with Sichuan Military District. It was a PLA-wide conference which received 260 papers515 and was attended by more than 100 officers. The theme of the conference was, ‘The Initial Phase of High-tech Local Wars’. This was inspired by studies conducted in 1993 and papers presented at the 1993 conference.

During this conference, participants reached a consensus that for future high- tech local wars, the first battle will be decisive. To win the first battle, the PLA should pay particular attention to studying the initial phase of high-tech local wars. Other conclusions were that war planning and preparation are the key for the first battle, surprise is important for the first battle, achieving information superiority and electromagnetic spectrum dominance had become even more important than achieving air supremacy and sea control, strikes from air and sea could be decisive, the final stage of a war still needs the army, war mobilisation should pay more attention to technological mobilisation, the sequence of strikes may be turned around (enemy

513 "The First Three Emergency Manoeuvre Combat Units Created by Our Army (我军首次建立的三

支应急机动作战部队)," China.com, http://military.china.com/zh_cn/critical3/27/20070620/14170775.html. 514 Wanquan Chang, "Boarder Region Emergency Manoeuvre Operation Principles under High-Tech Conditions," in Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的拼搏), ed. Shouzeng Zheng; Fayou Zhong (National Defence University Press, 1993). 515 Wentao Zhu; Jiuru He; Bingyan Li; Shengjun Liu, "Overview of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (高技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会综述)," in Planning for Victory before

Fighting —the Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (先胜后战—高

技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑), ed. Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995), 1.

153 attacks may first strike the rear instead of the front), and attacks should focus on the enemy’s high-tech vulnerabilities.516

5.2.2 Feedbacks from Combat Troops

In addition to those conferences and seminars with group armies and military district, some RMA EC members in the 1990s began making efforts to disseminate the community’s ideas to proximate military institutions and formations. More importantly, they got feedbacks from these units’ training and exercise experiences. These are explored below.

The Jinan MR Operational Methods Research Course for Senior Officers was held in 1993. During the course, they reached three conclusions. First, to prevail in future high-tech local wars, the PLA had to study foreign military developments and studies. Second, weapons and technologies are an important but not decisive factor for winning high-tech local wars, and the PLA had to create operational methods to maximise its combat capabilities. Third, high-tech wars are essentially information warfare, thus, the PLA must focus on this aspect of warfare, for example, focusing on sabotaging an enemy’s C3I system while protecting its own.517

Feng Yujun, the 26th Group Army’s chief of staff, who was in charge of the group army’s tests of operational methods in simulation and training, wrote an article with Liu Feng, to share the group army’s experiences in Military Forum in November 1994. 518 They emphasised that operational methods studies had to be closely connected with military training. Based on their experiences, they argued that combat

516 Ibid., 3. 517 Chunxiang Gao; Jian Sun; Jinjiu Yan, "Understanding the Guiding Principles of Modern Local Wars—Course Summary of Jinan Mr’s Operational Methods Studies (努力掌握现代局部战争的指导规律)," PLA Daily, 18 June 1993. 518 Yujun Feng and Feng Liu, "Getting the New Operational Methods into Training Bases: Inspirations from a Group Army’s Operational Methods Research (让战法从书斋走向训练场-济南军区某集团

军深化战法研究的启示)," ibid., 18 November 1994.

154 capabilities can be maximised through innovative operational concepts and those concepts had to be tested in training as soon as possible.519

In addition to their exercises and the feedback sent back to Military Forum, the Jinan MR’s Military Operations Department arranged a Campaign Theory Studies Course for their officers in 1995. Feng Yujun wrote a few reports on behalf of the MR and published them in Military Forum. The first lecture emphasised integrated joint operations, arguing that. as the nature of war has changed, multidimensional battlefield and networked systems require jointness between armed services. They complained that the operational methods research campaign still lacked coordinated studies. Each MR and service or group army still focused on their own studies, significantly constraining the PLA’s potential for joint operations. They went further to argue that there are two obstacles, ideological and institutional, that caused this problem. To overcome those obstacles, they urged the PLA to, first, created an integrated joint research mechanism to get remove the traditional single service mentality; second, to create integrated joint combat training bases to improve joint operations capabilities; and third, institutionalise joint operations research by drawing up joint combat doctrine.520

The second lecture emphasised theory-driven, future-oriented approach to reform. A clear example of how the RMA EC’s ideas had been absorbed by all levels of combat units. The lectures asserted that as the PLA will fight future wars, its development should be future-oriented, creating operational methods that address future challenges and guide weapons acquisition.521 Further, scientists do not know what future threats China will face, thus, they do not know exactly what kind of weapons and technologies they need to develop, but military officers who can assess

519 Ibid. 520 Yujun Feng; Shouqing Zhu, "Meeting the Demands of Integrated Battlefield—the 1st Report from

Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies Class (要适应一体化战场的需求—来自济南军区战役集训班的学

术报告一）," ibid., 27 June 1995. 521 Yujun Feng; Jishan Lin; Shouqing Zhu, "Bringing Generals and Scientists Together — the 2ed

Report from Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies Class (让将军和科学家坐在一起—来自济南军区战役

集训班的学术报告二）," ibid., 4 July.

155 future threats do not usually possess sufficient knowledge on science and technology. 522 While they urged officers to acquire more knowledge on technology and scientists to study some military theory, scientists and military officers must meet each other and exchange ideas.523

The third lecture emphasised the importance of studying past local wars China had fought.524 As interest in studying foreign local war cases increased, this lecture argued that the PLA should still study China’s own military history and involvement in local wars via systematic studies—comparative manner with in-depth understanding of the context in which those wars were fought. Moreover, the PLA should face its own mistakes. Only by studying those mistakes could it learn from those local war experiences.525

The fourth lecture introduced scenarios-based computer simulation and realistic combat training.526 It argued that operational methods are created for fighting future wars. The military should create an environment simulating a real combat environment to test those operational methods. For example, computer simulations based on realistic scenarios, and training and exercises at combat training bases. They urged the PLA to build realistic combat training bases.527

In January 1996, Feng Yujun wrote an article summarising the Jinan MR’s Commanders Training Course and presenting what the commanders had learned from this training course, including their training experiences and feedbacks for operational

522 Ibid. 523 Ibid. 524 Yujun Feng; Shouqing Zhu, "Pay Attention to Local War That Our Army Have Fought——the 3rd

Report from Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies Class (注重研究我军打过的局部战争—来自济南军区

战役集训班的学术报告三）," ibid., 11 July. 525 Ibid. 526 Yujun Feng; Shouqing Zhu, "Writing Scripts and Getting into Character——the 4th Report from

Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies Class (设计剧情进入角色—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告

四）," PLA Daily, 25 July 1995. 527 Ibid.

156 methods research.528 Those lectures were another example the RMA EC diffusing their ideas to executive branch and combat units, and feedback from combat units and training being sent to the community. In other words, they created a feedback loop between the policy community and combat units. Feng Yujun and Song Puxuan were now serving as a two-way channel, playing the roles of disseminating the RMA EC’s ideas to Jinan MR and sending feedbacks from combat units’ training and exercise experiences to the community. This indicates that the theory-driven, future-oriented approach the RMA EC had been promoting since the 1980s had received support from both scientists and combat units.

In January 1995, Jinan MR conducted several exercises to test the operational methods created in the past two years. Early RMA EC members Feng Yujun and Song Puxuan of Jinan MR’s Military Operations Department were involved in those exercises. Feng Yujun wrote the report together with PLA Daily journalists and editors Li Bingyan and Yan Jinjiu. Per Haas, ‘the diffusion of ideas occurs by many channels that include direct persuasion, demonstration effects, and inducements and incentives’. 529 Those exercises demonstrated the importance of using operational methods to guide military training.530

The director of the Operations Department of Jinan MR complained that the region still lacked coordination between different armed services, and argued that joint operations are important for winning future high-tech local wars.531 One division, drawing on its own training experiences, complained that ‘although everyone is talking about high-tech local wars, all-out war mentality still constrains our

528 Yujun Feng, "Achieving a Second Leap Forward in Oprational Methods Research—a Report from

Jinan Military Region’s Commanders Training Course (实现战法研究的第二次飞跃—济南军区军

事主官集训传来的信息)," ibid., 30 January 1996. 529 Haas, Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, and International Environmental Politics, 12. 530 Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the

Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战役演习看

战法研究的辐射效应)." 531 Ibid.

157 thoughts’.532 For example, the traditional static force groupings can no longer cope with the changing operational forms for local war under high-tech conditions. Combat units at all levels will have to fulfil diverse combat missions.533 To address this lack of jointness, the PLA should learn from the US which had once had similar problems (e.g., US C3I networks operated by different services being incompatible with each other). This problem was solved only after the creation of the AirLand Battle concept, which worked as a standard model for reforms on the command and control systems. Similarly, certain operational methods had to be created and consensus had to be reached to solve jointness issues in the PLA.534

Drawing on US experience, the RMA EC proposed two methods to improve PLA training. First, realistic combat training. They argued that US success in the Gulf War was the outcome of its reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. The US military based its training reforms on the AirLand Battle concept and conducted realistic combat training in accordance with this operational concept. Second, computer simulations. They took notice of recent US emphasis on network-based computer simulation and war gaming, and argued that the PLA should adapt those approaches and technologies.535

The above conferences, seminars and courses served three roles: creating new ideas and reaching consensus on certain concepts, diffusing ideas to combat units, and fostering exchanges of ideas and bridging the gap between policy community and combat units.

5.3 Operational Methods and Operational Requirements for Future Wars

Those discussions and debates resulted in the creation of many operational concepts and helped the PLA to get a grasp of future wars, including identifying operational requirements for future wars to guide its army building. This section

532 Ibid. 533 Ibid. 534 Ibid. 535 Ibid.

158 reviews the concepts created during those conferences, seminars and Military Forum discussions, and discusses what operational requirements were identified.

The Military Strategic Guidelines announced in January 1993 raised questions on how to fight future local wars. A new trend in studying operational methods soon emerged. 536 Articles discussing new operational methods 537 for future local wars appeared in Military Forum. In March 1993, Military Forum launched a discussion section on creating new operational methods.538 In 1994 and 1995, the column made various attempts to encourage further studies on operational methods.539 This trend in studying operational methods lasted for about three years.

In this period, the RMA EC gradually acquired a better understanding of what constitutes a high-tech local war and how China should address the resulting challenges. Many new operational concepts were created, some becoming enduring concepts with ongoing influence within the PLA. For example, rapid manoeuvre operations, information warfare, system on system confrontation, structure destruction and joint operations. Some of those ideas were not new to the RMA EC. For example, information warfare.540 and structure destruction541 had originally been conceived and discussed by some members in the 1980s.

5.3.1 Traditional Operational Methods Rendered Obsolete

The RMA EC’s views on local wars are mostly based on their studies of foreign local war experiences. The most prominent was the Gulf War, but other wars such as the Falklands War also shaped Chinese views on high-tech local wars. The PLA was impressed by various new military capabilities, such as airstrike capabilities,

536 PLA DAILY, "Deepening Research on Operational Methods (把战法研究引向深入)," ibid., 13 June. 537 Or operational concepts 538 PLA DAILY, PLA Daily, 5 March 1993. 539 Military Forum Editorial, "New Year’s Greetings from the Editors (本刊新年致读者)," ibid., 7 January 1994.; PLA DAILY, "Deepening Research on Operational Methods (把战法研究引向深入)."

540 Jiang, "Shen Weiguang—the Father of Information Warfare (信息战之父沈伟光)."

541 Shan Hong, "On Structure Destruction Warfare (论结果破坏战)," PLA Daily, 2 May 1995.

159 long-range strike capabilities, precision strike capabilities, rapid deployment capabilities and highly efficient command and control systems.542 During this phase of intensive studies on operational methods, the RMA EC came to the following conclusions. New technologies had revolutionised the conduct of war and redefined the battlespace. New high-tech weapons posed significant challenges to traditional operational concepts. Future high-tech local wars had some major characteristics fundamentally different from traditional Chinese understanding of the nature of warfare—non-contact, non-linear, multidimensional, shorter in duration, smaller in scale and more intense. Those studies suggested that two traditional Chinese means of conducting war, traditional linear positional operations and the notion of three phases of war, had been rendered obsolete.

This period of study on operational methods had led the RMA EC to the realisation that the well-defined fronts that characterise traditional warfare had given way to non-linear combat formations. New technological developments have provided the material means for in-depth, precision strikes. Joint airstrikes and long-range strike capabilities had rendered linear operations obsolete. The traditional breakthrough tactic of first striking the forward position and then the in-depth position was no longer effective.543

Traditional close-combat fighting was no longer relevant. The new technological revolution enabled accurate, long-distance strikes. As Tian Baoxian states, ‘those [long-range] attacks had already become some countries’ “assassin’s mace” ’. 544 High-tech local wars were not land-based and linear. In the future battlefield, opposing sides will employ long-range strike capabilities, such as stealthy intercontinental bombers, deep-strike capabilities and long-range land-based missiles to attack the enemy thousands of kilometres away. The opposing sides may never meet each other but, rather, engage in a non-contact war.

542 Zhang and Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪之交的军事理论革命)." (剑指巅峰 20)

543 Nan, "Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的奋力拼搏)," 16.

544 Baoxian Tian, "On Non-Contact Operations (谈非接触性作战)," PLA Daily, 18 Feburary 1994.

160 The battlefield would become multidimensional. New technologies would transform war on land, in the air and at sea, while involving the dimensions of space and the electromagnetic spectrum, leading to multidimensional warfare. 545 They argued that the Vietnam War introduced electronic warfare to the world, but the Gulf War had demonstrated the evolution of electronic warfare to a separate dimension of operations. 546 It is worth noting that outside the RMA EC, cyberspace was not considered a separate domain in the mid-1990s.

Future high-tech local wars would be more sudden, intense, of smaller scale and shorter in duration. This contravened China’s traditional notion of three phases of war. Precision-guided munitions made operations more damaging and offered the potential for surprise attacks. The short duration and high intensity of high-tech local wars made it very important to seize operational initiative through surprise attacks, and most local wars begun with surprise attacks. Drawing on the lessons of other countries’ local wars, the RMA EC concluded that new technologies had made deception and surprise attacks more important and easier to conduct. For example, during the Gulf War, the coalition forces employed new technologies and conducted deception operations to exploit Iraqi weaknesses and achieve operational surprise.547 A potential enemy of China would probably open with a surprise attack to exploit its own technological advantages and avoid a protracted war with China. 548 Thus, achieving surprise was deemed by many RMA EC members as the key to quick and decisive victory. During the 1993 conference with 21st Group Army, they reached the

545 Baiyun Long; Caijin Yuan; Yong Han, "A Discussion on Operational Methods for Defeating the Superior in a Local War under High-Tech Conditions (高技术局部战争中以劣胜优的战法探讨)," in

Planning for Victory before Fighting —the Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War

Conference (先胜后战—高技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑), ed. Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995), 18. 546 Nan, "Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的奋力拼搏)," 16-17. 547 Songlai Nie, "Using the Gulf War to U.S. Modus Operandi for Local War under High-Tech Conditions(从海湾战争看美军在高技术局部战争中的作战特点)," ibid., 466.

548 Zhang, Collected Works of General Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃), 27-28.

161 consensus that local war will open with surprise attacks.549 Wang Chengqing referred to the Taiwan Strait scenario, arguing that China should identify the enemy’s key facilities and, in the event of war, make short but intense surprise attacks on those facilities. The purpose of this kind of attack is to make a point and deter the adversary from making risky moves.550

Local wars could be concluded very quickly.551 The Gulf War lasted for 42 days. Many local wars prior to 1991 were even shorter.552 Feng Xiangjian and Chen Zhonglong argued that high-tech weapons gave war planners both the incentive and capabilities to finish a war in a short period of time. First, the high cost of high-tech wars will force decisions makers to try finish a war as soon as possible. Second, high- tech weapons, especially precision-guided munitions, can quickly destroy a country’s key military and political command centres.553

549 Geng Zhang; Shengjun Liu, "On the Key Issue of Our Country’s Weaponry and Equipment Development That Requires an Urgent Solution (论新形势下我国兵器装备发展亟待解决的一个关

键问题)," in Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的拼搏), ed. Shouzeng Zheng; Fayou Zhong (National Defence University Press, 1993), 431. 550 E.g declare independence. Chengqing Wang, "Two Types of High-Tech Local War’s Initial Phase

(浅谈高技术局部战争序幕阶段的两种表现趋势及其现实意义)," in Planning for Victory before

Fighting —the Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (先胜后战—高

技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑), ed. Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995), 27. 551 Liu, "On the Key Issue of Our Country’s Weaponry and Equipment Development That Requires an Urgent Solution (论新形势下我国兵器装备发展亟待解决的一个关键问题)," 431. 552 Nie, "Using the Gulf War to U.S. Modus Operandi for Local War under High-Tech Conditions(从

海湾战争看美军在高技术局部战争中的作战特点)," 467.

553 Xiangjian Feng; Zhonglong Chen, "High-Tech Local War Will Begin with the Decisive Battle (高技术局部战争开始之时就是主力决战开始之时)," in Planning for Victory before Fighting —the

Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (先胜后战—高技术局部战争

序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑), ed. Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995), 30-31.

162 Traditional Chinese doctrine divided a war into three distinguishable phases: the initial phase, mid phase and end phase. The RMA EC argued that new technologies meant future local wars would be short and intense conflicts. 554 Instead of the traditional three phases, they placed great emphasis on the initial phase of war. The RMA EC organised a PLA-wide conference to study the initial stage of high-tech local wars.555 Most members of the RMA EC mostly believed that in future local wars, the initial phase will be crucial and the first battle decisive.556 Zheng Shouzeng argued that as protracted wars are unlikely in the future, the early phase of war would be important.557

Zhang Qinsheng argued that peacetime planning and army building is important as the first battle will be decisive.558 Ding Zhaoqian argued that the 1986 US bombing of Libya lasted only 18 minutes, but took five years to prepare for.559 To

554 Zhang, Collected Works of General Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃).

555 Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li, Planning for Victory before Fighting —the Proceedings of the Initial

Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (先胜后战—高技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑) (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995).

556 Zhaoqian Ding, "Pre-War Preparation for High-Tech Local Wars Requires Good Strategem (高技

术局部战争临战准备需要高水平的谋略)," in Planning for Victory before Fighting —the

Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (先胜后战—高技术局部战争

序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑), ed. Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995), 12.; Nie, "Using the Gulf War to U.S. Modus Operandi for Local War under High-Tech Conditions(从海湾战争看美军在高技术局部战争中的作战特点)," 466.; Wang, "Two Types of High-Tech Local War’s Initial Phase (浅谈高技术局部战争序幕阶段的两种表现趋势及其现实意

义)," 24-25.; Chen, "High-Tech Local War Will Begin with the Decisive Battle (高技术局部战争开

始之时就是主力决战开始之时)," 27-28.; Shouzeng Zheng, "Improving the Art of Command through Manoeuvring (在动中实现指挥艺术的升华)," PLA Daily, 1 July 1994. ; Liu, "Overview of the Initial

Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (高技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会综述)," 3.

557 Zheng, "Improving the Art of Command through Manoeuvring (在动中实现指挥艺术的升华)." 558 Zhang, "Military Conflicts in the New Era (时代特征与新时期军事斗争)."

559 Ding, "Pre-War Preparation for High-Tech Local Wars Requires Good Strategem (高技术局部战

争临战准备需要高水平的谋略)," 2.

163 win the first battle, China must carefully study everything about its enemies, including their weapons, strategies, tactics and even culture and religions. More importantly, the PLA must create battle plans and scenarios, conduct exercises to test those plans, then make changes accordingly. China must first develop its emergency manoeuvre forces, then develop forces able to operate in different environment and accomplish different types of missions, then build theatres of operations. To do this, China must identify potential theatres of local wars, study potential enemies, create scenarios and battle plans, and build logistics and supporting facilities in the theatres of operations.560 Future local wars will be conducted jointly by the army, navy and air force as an integrated system connected by the C3I networks against an enemy’s system—system on system confrontation. 561 A local war under high-tech conditions was to be a confrontation between two systems within a given battlefield.562

5.3.2 New Operational Methods and Operational Requirements for Future Wars

As traditional methods of operation had been rendered obsolete, the RMA EC created new concepts of operations to address future war challenges. For example, structure destruction; non-contact operations; multidimensional operations; joint operations; and non-linear, rapid manoeuvre operations.563

Operational methods were based on the changing combat missions and state of China’s defence technological development. Long-term planning was used to fully consider the threat faced by China and the possible warfare tasks of the future. The RMA EC expected that traditional linear positional operations would barely meet the demands of future local wars as non-linear operations, rapid manoeuvre operations,

560 Ibid., 13. 561 Han, "A Discussion on Operational Methods for Defeating the Superior in a Local War under High- Tech Conditions (高技术局部战争中以劣胜优的战法探讨)," 18.

562 Wenxian Dong, "The General Trend of Military Confronation— Confrontation between Systems

(军事对抗的大趋势—系统对抗)," PLA Daily, 24 January 1992. 563 Zheng, "Cultivaing Operational Theory Studies (培育作战理论新的“生长点”）." (军队质量建

设新模式 43); Zhang and Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪之

交的军事理论革命)." (剑指巅峰 22)

164 and joint operations of system on system confrontation were adopted by more foreign armies. The expanded battlefield requires not only traditional land forces but naval, air, special forces and emergency manoeuvre forces. New operational methods, such as manoeuvre operations and joint operations, will become major forms of operations in future conflicts. This necessitated small but lean forces with rapid manoeuvre capabilities. China would have to build its own C4IRS capabilities to connect the dispersed troops.

The RMA EC’s writings during the operational methods debate reveal great interest in mobile (manoeuvre) operations and rapid response forces,564 contained in concepts such mobile operations (机动战) and rapid deployment forces (应急机动部

队), also referred to as rapid response forces (快速反应部队). The PLA traditionally relied on an in-depth positional defence. But the abruptness and speedy rhythm of a high-tech local war had rendered positional warfare obsolete and manoeuvre warfare a necessity.565

All-depth and non-linear operations need troops that can deploy and manoeuvre rapidly in a multidimensional battlespace. They suggested that the PLA should create more small units possessing a high degree of mobility. For example, they used the title The End of the Era of One-dimensional Linear Warfare for the article summarising the conference From Mobility to Mobile Operations. One major argument was that future wars will be multidimensional and non-linear and multidimensional warfare requires mobile operational forces. Zhang Qinsheng argued that rapid response, manoeuvre and deployment capabilities are the key to seizing

564 Chunyan Zhao; Daolei Zhou, "New Trend in Special Operations (特种作战新趋势)," ibid., 16 May 1995.; Yuqian Wu, "Re-Exploring Manoeuvre Operations (机动作战再探)," ibid., 29 April 1994.;

Chunzheng Zhou; Fei Chen, "On Manoeuvre Operations and Logistics Support (论机动战与后勤保

障)," ibid., 6 May.; Qirui Sun, "Manoeuvre Capabilitie and Manoeuvre Operations (机动力与机动战)," ibid. 1995.

565 Shouzeng Zheng, "Making Cross-Century Development in Campaign Training (实现战役训练的

跨世纪发展)," ibid., 22 December 1998.

165 operational initiative in future wars.566 Zhang explains that as potential adversaries all are aware of China’s war potential, no one would like to be engaged in a protracted war with China. To avoid China’s advantages and exploit their own advantages in advanced technologies, an enemy was likely to start with surprise attacks and attempt to achieve strategic goals as quickly as possible. This necessitated that China ‘improve its rapid manoeuvre operational capabilities as the first priority of army building in the new period’.567 Nie Songlai argued that the Gulf War indicates that future local wars require rapid response and power projection. For the same reason, Feng Xiangjian and Chen Zhonglong also urged the PLA to create rapid manoeuvre forces.568 Wang Chengqing argued that China should create some rapid response forces equipped with advanced weapons and create appropriate operational concepts to address local wars.569

Mobile operations emphasise four points. First, stealth, as information technologies had made battlefield more transparent, operational movement will be difficult. Thus, forces will have to enter a theatre clandestinely. Second, timing, of vital importance to mobile operations. Third, manoeuvre forces must be dispersed on a battleﬁeld without deﬁned frontlines to reduce chances of detection by an enemy’s ISR systems. Fourth, mobile operations must be able to conduct both offensive and defensive operations.570 This requires the PLA create its own C3I networks, rapid transport and deployment capabilities, and better stealthy technologies. Zheng Shouzeng, building on a 27 May article of his group army, argued that mobile operations will require reforms on command and control. 571 What the RMA EC emphasised in terms of offensives was multi-directional and multidimensional assaults

566 Zhang, Collected Works of General Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃), 27. 567 Ibid., 27-28. 568 Chen, "High-Tech Local War Will Begin with the Decisive Battle (高技术局部战争开始之时就是

主力决战开始之时)," 29. 569 Wang, "Two Types of High-Tech Local War’s Initial Phase (浅谈高技术局部战争序幕阶段的

两种表现趋势及其现实意义)," 26. 570 84810 Unit Headquaters, " The End of One-Dimensional Linear War Era." 571 Zheng, "Improving the Art of Command through Manoeuvring (在动中实现指挥艺术的升华)."

166 to create gaps in enemy fronts, concentration of force, agility and mobility, synchronisation and in-depth strikes. Operational methods which certainly resembled those of the US military.

Those studies on operational methods gradually led the RMA EC to realise that victory or defeat is no longer determined by the scale of destruction or the number of casualties inflicted or sustained. Working as a comprehensive system, there are critical nodes and crucial links that can affect the whole system—centres of gravity and critical enablers. Strategic objectives could be achieved by destroying or paralysing key targets.572 They argued that non-linear precision strikes on the enemy’s critical nodes (打关节) had become a major mode of operation.573 To win a local war under high-tech conditions, it is important to identify and hit key enemy nodes and the links connecting them. 574 For example, destroy key economic infrastructures, paralysing the enemy’s warfighting capabilities or even using psychological warfare and deception.575 Once these critical parts are damaged, the functions of the whole system will be in disorder.

Zheng Shouzeng argued that the key to gain a quick victory is to identify and sabotage the critical nodes of the enemy’s system. Drawing on The Initial Phase of High-tech Local War conference, he argued that Chinese forces will have to be seemingly dispersed to survive but remain virtually connected with each other. When conducting an attack, they will have to be integrated into a comprehensive system.576 Nie Songlai argues that during the Gulf War, the US had defined their objectives at every level of command. More importantly, they also identified Iraqi centres of gravity

572 Guoyu Zhang, "A Review of Our Military Theoretical Studies since the Gulf War and an Outlook of Future Military Theoretical Studies (对海湾战争以来我军学术研究的回顾和前瞻)," ibid., 14 January.; 573 Nan, "Combat in the Silent Battlefiled (寂静战场上的奋力拼搏)," 16. 574 Han, "A Discussion on Operational Methods for Defeating the Superior in a Local War under High- Tech Conditions (高技术局部战争中以劣胜优的战法探讨)," 18. 575 Zhang, "A Review of Our Military Theoretical Studies since the Gulf War and an Outlook of Future Military Theoretical Studies (对海湾战争以来我军学术研究的回顾和前瞻)."

576 Zheng, "Improving the Art of Command through Manoeuvring (在动中实现指挥艺术的升华)."

167 (in order of importance, Iraqi command and control systems, weapons of mass destruction research facilities, and the elite Republican Guard divisions).577 Critical objects that support or connect the enemy’s combat system should be primary targets, including command centres, communication hubs, information-processing centres, high-tech weapon control systems and supply systems.

In recognition of the PLA’s inferior capabilities, Wang Naiming argued that to defeat a superior military with inferior equipment, China should target the enemy’s C3I, logistics and firepower systems. First, paralyse its nerve system (its C3I system). Second, cut off the logistics and supply systems that help maintain the enemy’s operational forces and platforms (e.g., water, petrol and food supply). Third, attack critical objects of its firepower systems (e.g., airports, missile launchers and other military facilities).578 ‘This tactic does not make elimination of the enemy’s effective forces its objective but, rather, the destruction of the enemy’s overall structure for combined arms operations and weakening of the enemy’s overall efficacy in combined arms operations’.579 Those concepts are intertwined. For example, Wu Yuqian argued that the focus of mobile operations is to destroy the ‘centre of gravity’ (重心) of the enemy’s system, which he assessed as C3I and logistic support systems.580

577 Nie, "Using the Gulf War to U.S. Modus Operandi for Local War under High-Tech Conditions(从海湾战争看美军在高技术局部战争中的作战特点)," 465.

578 Naiming Wang, "Sticking to the Strategy of Defeating the Superior with Inferior Equipments (坚持

以劣势装备战胜优势装备之敌的对策)," in Planning for Victory before Fighting —the Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local War Conference (先胜后战—高技术局部战争序幕阶段学

术研讨会论文选辑), ed. Shengjun Liu; Bingyan Li (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1995). 579 Huan Chen, "The Third Military Revolution," in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (DIANE Publishing, 1997), 394. 580 Wu, "Re-Exploring Manoeuvre Operations (机动作战再探)."

168 Chinese analysts first learned about electronic warfare from the Falklands War.581 The electromagnetic spectrum was mentioned by Kang Xiangzhen in 1991.582 Liu Senshan wrote an article emphasising the importance of preparation and stratagem in electronic warfare.583 Wang Naiming suggests that China should first improve its peacetime strategic intelligence collecting capabilities. He argues that for high-tech local wars, it is important to achieve electromagnetic spectrum dominance, air supremacy and sea control, with electromagnetic spectrum dominance being the key to seizing the initiative and winning the first battle.584 Various members of the RMA EC wrote on this topic, including Liu Shengjun;585 Li Qiang, Rong Bo and Shen Li;586 and Zhu Baoren.587

During conferences in the early 1990s, and Military Forum debates prior to 1995, various concepts were created to define the key of the future high-tech war. Some did not reach widespread acceptance or consensus, such as psychological warfare,588 cyber warfare, information war, informatisation and digitalisation. The concept of digitalised army and digitalised war, proposed by various presentations in one conference, was an early version of informationised warfare.589

581 Ding, "Pre-War Preparation for High-Tech Local Wars Requires Good Strategem (高技术局部战争临战准备需要高水平的谋略)," 16.

582 Xiangzhen Kang, "Electromagnetic Dominance and War Initiative (制电磁权与战争主动权)," PLA Daily, 26 April 1991. 583 Guofu Liu, "Psychological Warfare under High-Tech Conditions (高技术条件下的心理战)," ibid., 11 March 1994. 584 Wang, "Sticking to the Strategy of Defeating the Superior with Inferior Equipments (坚持以劣势

装备战胜优势装备之敌的对策)," 20. 585 Shengjun Liu, "Digitalised Army Is Quietly Emerging (数字化军队悄然兴起)," ibid.

586 Qiang Li; Bo Rong; Li Shen, "Digitalised War Is the Future of Warfare (未来战争将是数字战争)," ibid. 587 Baoren Zhu, "Preliminary Understanding of Information Warfare (对信息战的初步认识)," ibid. 588 Liu, "Psychological Warfare under High-Tech Conditions (高技术条件下的心理战)."

589 Li, Planning for Victory before Fighting —the Proceedings of the Initial Phase of High-Tech Local

War Conference (先胜后战—高技术局部战争序幕阶段学术研讨会论文选辑).

169 Operational requirements identified in this operational methods debate included demands for joint, special and mobile operational forces; rapid response and rapid manoeuvre; rapid deployment capabilities; building the PLA’s own C3I systems; and attacking the enemy’s C3I and information system. Electromagnetic and electronic warfare (and to a lesser extent, cyber war and psychological warfare capabilities), which had been on the periphery for the early 1990s, now became important.

Many of these concepts and ideas emerged in Jiang’s speech in December 1996. He stated that ‘We need to focus on adjusting the structure of the army and reforming its command system so that army units are more capable of conducting joint operations and manoeuvres and carrying out a variety of tasks’.590 Jiang pointed out that China’s military modernisation needed to improve three capabilities simultaneously—firepower, mobility and information capabilities. 591 In the late 1990s, developing China’s elite and rapid deployment forces became a top priority for the PLA. CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin repeatedly emphasised the importance of building rapid deployment forces in every military service.592 In 2002, Jiang again emphasised that ‘For some time to come, we need to give priority to developing rapid deployment forces, and make them the first to achieve mechanisation and informatisation so that they can act as the army’s strategic fist’.593

The ideas of a future-oriented, theory-driven approach to China’s military reform, promoted by the RMA EC since the early 1980s, was eventually endorsed by Jiang Zemin in 1996. Additionally, he emphasised the importance of learning from other countries’ experiences:

we must draw from military developments from the outside world and our past experience in army building, emancipate our minds, dare to explore new paths and advance new ideas to raise our research on military theory to a new level. We need to focus our theoretical research on trends in world military development and on understanding the futures and nature of high-tech

590 Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 2, 596. 591 Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 3, 573. 592 Ibid., 86. 593 Ibid., 573-74.

170 warfare and make our research more future-oriented, practical and comprehensive.594

5.3.3 Testing Future War Scenarios in Simulation and Exercises

The RMA EC members employed several means to ensure that the proposed theory-driven, future-oriented approach and the notion of ‘using operational methods to guide army building’ were intellectually and analytically convincing. They found that US-designed computer simulations and combat base training were ways to test their concepts and strengthen their theory-driven approach to reforms.

As early as the late 1980s, some RMA EC members began promoting computer simulations. For example, as mentioned in Section 4.2.2, in the National Defence and Future series, Yang Nanzheng had already suggested use of computer simulations and artificial intelligence to strengthen the PLA’s training.595 However, the value of computer simulation was only widely recognised in the mid-1990s. During this period, many RMA EC members raised ideas on computer simulation and combat laboratories in their conference presentations and Military Forum articles. Zhang Qinsheng argued

What are the demands of future wars? We can only gain a clear idea through theoretical thinking, and can only complete such a design through the theoretical study of science. With the emergence of the technology of ‘virtual reality’ the military theories guiding future wars will be produced in combat laboratories, and the inspection of the ‘product’ quality of the army will also be conducted in combat laboratories. This tremendous change has provided new ideas for military development.596

In the 1990s, despite technological advancements, ideological and institutional resistance to reform remained persistent. For example, although many simulation systems were very advanced, they were used to simulate warfare according to

594 Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 2, 594. 595 Yang, "Future Wars and the Competition in Artificial Intelligence: On Automated Command and Control (未来战争的智能较量已经开始—谈谈指挥自动化)." 596 Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 405.

171 historical experiences. Li argues that ‘adapting technological thinking is far more important than adopting technologies [themselves] into the military’.597

Although the PLA conducted an All-Army Operational Methods Research

Outcomes Evaluation (全军战法研究成果总结论证) in October 1995,598 the RMA

EC did not end its study on operational methods. Later that month, Military Forum called for further exploration of operational methods,599 and the community began to direct its attention towards the concept of RMA.

The RMA EC’s efforts in advocating computer simulation and baise-ised training will be further explored in the next chapter.

5.4 The RMA Epistemic Community, 1993–1996

This section discusses the composition of the RMA EC, its major activities and discussions, and its changing channels of influence in the period covered in this chapter.

5.4.1 Composition

Three major changes to the composition of the RMA EC occurred between 1993 and 1996. First, the journal Military Prospects assumed a leading role, co- hosting major conferences with group armies and Military Forum. Its editor, Liu Shengjun, became an active member of the RMA EC contributing to major discussions and events. Second, many RMA EC members were promoted to more senior positions. For example, Cui Yuchen became director of Chengdu MR’s military research office and Chai Yuqiu became director of the GSD’s military research office. Third, in the process of disseminating their ideas to combat units, the RMA EC successfully attracted some field officers to join the community. For example, after their conference

597 Li, Foster Innovation (扶新集), 116-17. 598 Guoyu Zhang, "Trying Hard to Create New Models for Operational Methods Studies—a Summary of All Army Operational Methods Research Outcomes (努力创造战法体系的新模式—全军战法研

究成果总结论证经验综述)," PLA Daily, 24 October 1995. 599 Ibid.

172 with 21st Group Army, the group army commander, Zheng Shouzeng, became a member of the RMA EC and regular contributor to Military Forum. Feng Yujun (冯

育军), the 26th Group Army’s chief of staff, joined the RMA EC and became a regular

Military Forum contributor, focusing particularly on the RMA and military training.600 Such commanders and staff from MRs and combat units were important for ideas to be integrated into PLA training. In this period, the EC successfully expanded its influence to combat troops. They not only managed to diffuse their ideas to commanders of various levels, but also assimilated some of them into this community. In other words, the EC became more open in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s.

5.4.2 Activities

Activities were conducted through three major channels: publishing essays on other journals and newspapers, organising conferences and seminars to engage MRs and group armies, and disseminating ideas to proximate units and collecting feedbacks from combat units. For example, as previously discussed, Military Forum and Military Prospect organised a conference with the 21st Group Army in 1993 and another conference with Sichuan Military District in 1994. Feng Yujun and Song Puxuan of Jinan MR’s operational department and Feng Yujun of the 26th Group Army actively introduced ideas to their institutions’ training and education.601 Jinan MR conducted

600 Yujun Feng and Yujun Feng, "Achieving Transformation in Campaign Level Training (率先实现

战役训练的转变)," in New Modesl of Army Qualitative Building: Selected Papers on ’Two Basic Transformations) (军队质量建设新模式—实现“两个根本性转变”系列优秀论文集), ed. Guoyu Zhang; Bingyan Li, New Era Military Studies Paper Series (Beijing: Long March Press, 1998). 601 Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the

Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战役演习看战法研究的辐射效应)."; Feng and Liu, "Getting the New Operational Methods into Training Bases:

Inspirations from a Group Army’s Operational Methods Research (让战法从书斋走向训练场-济南

军区某集团军深化战法研究的启示)."; Yan, "Understanding the Guiding Principles of Modern Local Wars—Course Summary of Jinan Mr’s Operational Methods Studies (努力掌握现代局部战争的指

导规律)."; Zhu, "Bringing Generals and Scientists Together — the 2ed Report from Jinan Mr’s

Campaign Studies Class (让将军和科学家坐在一起—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告二）.";

173 training and exercises to test those operational methods created by the RMA EC, and through Feng Yujun and Song Puxuan they collected training experiences from involved combat units for feedback to the RMA EC.602 The RMA EC played a role in bridging the policy community with combat units. They also successfully brought some promising commanders into this community. In the 1990s, the RMA EC increased efforts to expand their influence and disseminate ideas to a wider audience— per the epistemic communities framework, they had reached the policy diffusion stage. The RMA EC’s areas of focus for this period are shown in Table 2.

Zhu, "Pay Attention to Local War That Our Army Have Fought——the 3rd Report from Jinan Mr’s

Campaign Studies Class (注重研究我军打过的局部战争—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告

三）."; "Meeting the Demands of Integrated Battlefield—the 1st Report from Jinan Mr’s Campaign

Studies Class (要适应一体化战场的需求—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告一）."

602 Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战役演习看

战法研究的辐射效应)."; Yan, "Understanding the Guiding Principles of Modern Local Wars—Course

Summary of Jinan Mr’s Operational Methods Studies (努力掌握现代局部战争的指导规律)."; Zhu, "Bringing Generals and Scientists Together — the 2ed Report from Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies

Class (让将军和科学家坐在一起—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告二）."; Zhu, "Pay

Attention to Local War That Our Army Have Fought——the 3rd Report from Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies Class (注重研究我军打过的局部战争—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告三）.";

"Meeting the Demands of Integrated Battlefield—the 1st Report from Jinan Mr’s Campaign Studies

Class (要适应一体化战场的需求—来自济南军区战役集训班的学术报告一）."; Feng and Liu, "Getting the New Operational Methods into Training Bases: Inspirations from a Group Army’s

Operational Methods Research (让战法从书斋走向训练场-济南军区某集团军深化战法研究的启

示)."

174

Table 3: RMA Epistemic Community’s Areas of Focus, 1993–1996 PLA Daily Discussion and Debates 17 Jan 1995 Military Reform Going into Depth 24 Oct 1995 Deepening Studies on Operational Methods603 Seminars and Conferences May 1992 Applying Marxism to Guide Future Army Building604 1993 Jinan MR Operational Methods Research Course for Senior Officer

1993 PLA-wide Conference on Local War Under High-tech Conditions

May 1994 PLA-wide Conference on Manoeuvre Operations at the 21st Group Army605 Nov 1994 The Initial Phase of High-tech Local War Conference Nov 1994 PLA-wide Conference on the Initial Phase of High-tech Local Wars at Sichuan Military District606 Jan 1995 Security environment and Army Building in 1995607

603 Zhang, "Trying Hard to Create New Models for Operational Methods Studies—a Summary of All

Army Operational Methods Research Outcomes (努力创造战法体系的新模式—全军战法研究成果总结论证经验综述)." 604 1992.6.5. co-hosted by Military Prospects, Military Forum and Naval Research Institute. 605 Co-hosted by Military Forum, Military Prospect, and 21st Group Army. 606 Co-hosted by Military Forum, Military Prospect, and Sichuan Military District. 607 Guoyu Zhang and Bingyan Li, "95 Security Environment and National Defence Development Seminar (95 安全环境与国防建设座谈会)," PLA Daily, 3 January 1995.

175 1995 Jinan MR Campaign Theory Studies Course (published in Military Forum) Dec 1995 Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World RMA608 1995 Jinan MR exercises reports (published in Military Forum) 1996 Jinan MR Commanders Training Course (published in Military Forum)

5.4.3 Diffusion Mechanisms

For the period review, the diffusion mechanisms remained largely the same with previous period. For example, newspapers and journals debates are still one major channel diffusing their ideas. While personal ties were playing a diminishing role, seminars and conference with combat troops were becoming the most important diffusion mechanism.

The PLA Daily and various military professional journals remained major channels of the RMA EC’s influence. From 1994, the PLA Daily published many articles exploring the causes and drivers of the RMA, characteristics and trends of the current RMA, and the implications for the international strategic situation. According to Li Bingyan, those articles and efforts had the purpose of ‘preparing public opinion for the RMA with Chinese characteristics. In other words, [the slogan of] “actively promoting the RMA with Chinese characteristics”, already had a well-prepared ideological basis’.609

Personal ties with policymakers were still a channel of influence. As Zhang Zhen became vice chairman of the CMC in 1992, he remained a direct channel of influence on the highest decision-making body. Qu Fanghuan, then the chief of staff of a group army, wrote an article in 1993 re-emphasising the importance of research on operational methods. He quoted a military theorist, saying ‘ “war, is a possibility of the future. Thus, we should face it with historic perspectives” ’. He agreed with other members of the RMA EC on many fundamental ideas, for example, military

608 Co-hosted by Military Forum and Army Staff College. 609 Li, "Promoting the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics (奋力推进中国特

色军事变革)."

176 studies should focusing on forecasting the future, and learning from foreign militaries’ experiences.610 A few months after this article was published, he was appointed as director of the MTD of the GSD. In the following years, he played a role in implementing some ideas and incorporating them into training and exercises. Zhang Taiheng, one of the earliest RMA EC members and Study Military contributor in the early 1980s,611 had become commander of Chengdu MR in 1990. Liu Shengjun was close to former director of the PLA General Political Department, Li Dengsheng, who was enthusiastic about future studies and encouraged studies on future scenarios and strategy. 612 Thanks to Li Dengsheng’s support, the journal Military Prospect, published by the AMS, NDU and Logistic College, was established. Within a few years, it was one of 10 core PLA military journals.613

As academics, they brought their ideas to their lessons. Some, as authors and editors of PLA military course literature, had a more profound influence on future leaders. As more experts from professional military educational institutions became active members of the RMA EC, they began to serve as a mechanism to transfer ideas from the community to their institutions. Ideas and theories were embedded in textbooks, for example Campaign Studies (with writings from Wang Houqing and Huang Bin), which further helped the dissemination of ideas to the whole PLA. From the mid-1990s, PLA professional military education institutions became more important in promoting ideas and a cultural change. Personal or sub-group meetings occurred more frequently as RMA EC members came to work at the same institutions. For example, in May 1994, Shen Weiguang became the director of the Special Economic Zones Office of State Council and Ge Hongsheng’s secretary and moved to

610 Fanghuan Qu, "We Have to Conduct More in-Depth Research on Operational Methods (战法研究

要向深度发展)," PLA Daily, 25 June 1993.

611 Taiheng (张太恒) Zhang, "Tactics Reform Must Follow the Chinese Route (战术改革应当走中国式的道路)," in There Are Indeed Some Unbreakable Lines of Defence (确有图不破的防线), ed. PLA

DAILY Editorial (Long March Publishing House (长征出版社), 1983).确有突不破的防线.71. 181 612 Shengjun Liu, "In Memory of Fomer Director of the Pla General Political Deparment, Li Desheng (怀念原总政治部主任李德生同志)," Motherland (祖国), no. 12 (2016). 613 Ibid.

177 Beijing. Li Bingyan, an old friend of Shen, visited him often to discuss Chinese and foreign military theories. Li also encouraged Shen to continue his study on information warfare.614 Consequently, Shen resumed his military studies again, expanding his influence on China’s information warfare concepts in the following years.

The most significant change in activities and method of policy dissemination in this period was seminars and conferences co-hosted with group armies, MRs, provincial military districts and educational institutions (discussed in Section 5.2.1), and the establishment of the feedback loop with combat formations (discussed in Section 5.2.2). As more RMA EC ideas were increasingly adopted into PLA doctrine and operational concepts, officers and soldiers were inculcated with the methods of thinking and approaches championed by the RMA EC, helping to overcome institutional resistance to the reform. Much of the RMA EC’s impact in this period was not immediate but was profound. In addition to some direct and obvious influence on policymaking, influence was prevalent over the new generation of PLA officers.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined the RMA EC’s activities and discussion between 1993 and 1996. The RMA EC’s theory-driven, future-oriented approach was largely adopted by the PLA. The community not only participated in the PLA-wide operational methods debate and created various operational concepts to address new challenges posed by high-tech local war, but introduced the concept of using operational methods to guide army building. In addition to disseminating their ideas to the whole PLA, members of the RMA EC also managed to establish a feedback loop with combat units, establishing a bridge between their policy community and combat units.

614 Jiang, "Shen Weiguang—the Father of Information Warfare (信息战之父沈伟光)," 4.

178 Chapter 6: The Institutionalisation of the RMA (1996–2002)

This chapter examines the RMA EC’s activities and contributions from the adoption of the Two Transformations (and the conclusion of the PLA’s operational theory studies campaign at the end of 1995) to the official announcement of the RMA in December 2002. It argues that in this period, the RMA EC made three key contributions to eventuating the RMA. First, they further promoted the RMA by relating it to the PLA’s official policy of Two Transformations. Second, they used the RMA as a framework to identify the PLA’s weaknesses and made policy recommendations on how the PLA should achieve quality development (via the Two Transformations). Third, they introduced and promoted specific tools to help the PLA conduct experimentation and implement reform policies. In this period, per the epistemic communities framework, the RMA EC was at the stage of trying to influence policy selection.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 discusses the policy of the Two Transformations and the uncertainties it created, and how the RMA EC seized it as an opportunity to advocate the RMA. Section 6.2 discusses the approach the RMA EC created to achieve quality development, and their proposal that the PLA should use the RMA as a framework to guide its quality development. Section 6.3 examines the challenges posed by the world RMA and the RMA EC’s proposed responses to those challenges. Section 6.4 analyses the RMA EC’s role in promoting computer simulation and realistic combat training as tools to test concepts of operation and ensure implementation of the RMA. Section 6.5 covers the official adoption of the RMA by the PLA. Section 6.6 maps the changing composition and activities of the RMA EC between 1996 and 2002, and Section 6.7 concludes this chapter.

6.1 In Uncertain Times: The Two Transformations

In 1995, the PLA released the new Outline for Army Building, which introduced the concept of Two Transformations (两个转变), directing the PLA to ‘begin the transformation (1) from preparing to fight Local Wars Under Ordinary Conditions to preparing to fight and win Local Wars Under Modern High Technology

179 Conditions, and (2) from being a military based on quantity to one based on quality. It called as well for the PLA to transform from being personnel intensive to becoming science and technology intensive’.615 In addition to ‘winning local wars under modern high-tech conditions’, the second transformation focused on quality development. Kang Xiangzhen and Chen Yanbo of the GSD argued that the Two Transformations referred to the changes of military strategy and defence development strategy,616 for military planning and the conduct army building respectively. This ultimately led to an effort to develop a way of waging war that depended less and less on quantitative material superiority and attrition.

While the Two Transformations raised the point that the PLA had to make quality developments, how to achieve this was unclear. As Zhang Qinsheng put it,

In recent years, our troops have attained considerable results in implementing the military strategic guideline of the new period, learning high-tech technologies and knowledge, and in studying wars under high-tech conditions. However, where shall we place the nucleus of high-tech development? Where shall we put the main emphasis of local high-tech wars? A consensus on these issues has yet to be reached throughout the army. People still tend to place greater emphasis on hardware instead of software, and on the present instead of the future.617

The RMA EC actively arranged PLA Daily discussions and seminars to address how the PLA would make quality development. In years following the announcement of this policy, the RMA EC devoted itself to two major efforts. First, helping the CMC to elaborate the policy of Two Transformations and relating the policy, especially the concept of quality development, to the RMA. In other words, taking the Two Transformations as an opportunity to advocate the RMA. Second, they provided advice on army building. For example, what organisational changes to be made, how to carry out training reforms, and building up the PLA’s information warfare capabilities.

615 Scobell, Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army Exploring the Contours of China's Military, 124. 616 Xiangzhen Kang; Yanbo Chen, "Historical Choice and Revolutionary Change (历史性的抉择革命

性的转变)," PLA Daily, 28 January 1997. (军队质量建设。21)

617 Zhang, "Military Conflicts in the New Era (时代特征与新时期军事斗争)."

180 6.2 Introducing the RMA

After the official adoption of the Two Transformations in December 1995, the RMA EC quickly seized the opportunity to advocate the concept of RMA and theory- driven approach to reforms. In the same month, Military Forum and Army Staff College co-hosted a seminar, Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World RMA.618 Dozens of experts from general departments, MRs, armed services and military educational institutions, as well as civilian international studies scholars and information technology experts participated this seminar.619

This seminar posited that information is the foundation of the current RMA. The digitalisation of the battlefield and the army is the prerequisite of information war.620 Various questions were raised. Will information warfare become the core of the current RMA? Is the essence of the revolution to incorporate new technologies into the existing framework (system) or should reform start with changing the whole framework? As a developing country, should China stick to the current route, finish mechanisation first and think about information warfare later, or should China start planning for information warfare now? Regarding its guiding thought, should the reform be theory-driven or based on experience gained in previous war? In practice, how to change the whole idea of strategic planning? How to identify the focus of technological development? How to make organisational adaptations? How to create new operational methods?621

618 Zhang and Li, "Servicemen’s Historical Mission at the Turn of the Century: A Report on

“Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ” 迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)."; Li, "A Report on “Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ”迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈

会”评述)." 619 Zhang and Li, "Servicemen’s Historical Mission at the Turn of the Century: A Report on

“Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ”

迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)." 620 Ibid. 621 Ibid.

181 Using Sun Tzu’s dictum, ‘Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win’, the attendees argued that China’s traditional thought of learning by doing was outdated. To embrace the RMA, the PLA should focus on innovating its military theories and operational methods, then let those theories drive army building.622 They made several general propositions. First, challenge the conservative mindset and overcome policy inertia. Second, create a macro control system for comprehensive planning, as the RMA will cause changes in basically every aspect of the military, including thought, organisations and operational concepts, but also other aspects of the country and society.623 The system not only specifies the goals, but also provides planning content, methodologies and procedure. They used the PLA’s development of its C3I system in the past decade as an example, arguing that due to the lack of comprehensive guidance and theory-driven planning, there was no communication and collaboration between different levels and institutions of the PLA. Millions were spent on computers and systems incompatible with each other. Thus, they suggested that China must have systemic thought and comprehensive plans for the reform. 624 Third, improve PLA education as the information age requires more qualified personnel. Fourth, create laboratories for simulation and wargaming. Simulation will help the military test military theories at much less cost. Fifth, create the assassin’s mace (杀手锏). As a developing country, China cannot afford a conventional approach to compete with developed countries. Instead of incorporating new technologies into the existing framework, China should start from scratch and create its own information war capabilities. In other words, take an asymmetric approach to the RMA.625

622 Ibid. 623 For example, the economy and the politics, and technological developments. 624 Zhang and Li, "Servicemen’s Historical Mission at the Turn of the Century: A Report on

“Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ”

迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)." 625 Ibid.

182 6.2.1 Connecting the Worldwide RMA with the Two Transformations

After a few months of promoting the concept and examining elements of the RMA, they realised that the discussions on Embracing the Challenges posed by the World-wide RMA seminar626 had not achieved their goal of using the RMA to drive PLA army building and quality development. To embrace the worldwide RMA, the concept had to be connected to the PLA’s own quality development policy, and the RMA EC believed that the worldwide RMA could provide the PLA a framework for carrying out the quality development program envisioned in Two Transformations.627 Thus, connecting the RMA with the existing objectives would help them promote the RMA. In August, Military Forum announced a call for papers for the discussion section National Defence and Economics in the 21st Century, specifically devoted to ‘studying PLA’s quality development against the backdrop of the world-wide RMA’.628 A month later, Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Guoyu wrote an article, titled Finding the Conjunction of the World-wide RMA and Our Army’s Quality Development.629 This discussion lasted for a few months. Before it concluded in 28 January 1997, the community launched another campaign articulating the Two Transformations and connecting it to the RMA. This included various seminars, conferences and a year-long discussion section in Military Forum, titled Discussions on Achieving the ‘Two Transformations’.630

With quality instead of quantity articulated as the key to the modernisation of the PLA, the RMA EC connected the quality development of the PLA with the

626 From December 1995 to August 1996. 627 Military Forum Editorial, "Thinking About Quality Development against the Backdrop of the Rma (在军事革命的背景下思考质量建设)," PLA Daily, 6 August 1996. 628 Ibid. 629 Qinsheng Zhang and Guoyu Zhang, "Finding the Conjunction of the World-Wide Rma and Our Army’s Quality Development (寻找世界军事革命与我军质量建设的契合点)," ibid., 10 September. 630 From 14 January 1997 to 6 January 1998.

183 ongoing worldwide RMA.631 Zhang Qinsheng and Li Bingyan argued that although the concept of the RMA was not debated in Chinese contexts, the 1985 strategic shift was a decision based on the new technological revolution and its implications for the military.632 Other analysts at the time shared the believe that Two Transformations indicated the PLA was moving towards the RMA.633 Ma Baoan and Jin Junyi argue that Two Transformations was a major step towards embracing the RMA.634 As Zhang Qinsheng stated, ‘A military revolution is now in the ascendant in today’s world. Thoughts on reinforcing the quality building of our army should be conducted against this general background’.635

6.2.2 The RMA as a Framework to Achieve the Two Transformations

In 1997, the RMA EC began organising seminars and conferences to study the RMA and the Two Transformations together—or, as the RMA EC saw it, studying the Two Transformations against the backdrop of the worldwide RMA. In January, two seminars were devoted to this issue. The first was seminar with NDU’s postgraduate school on topics such as On Studying High-tech and how to emphasise the forward-

631For example,Yanbin Xu, "Information Warfare Is in Essence Philosophical Warfare (信息战的深

层是哲学战)," PLA Daily, 13 August 1996.; Military Forum Editorial, "Thinking About Quality Development against the Backdrop of the Rma (在军事革命的背景下思考质量建设)."

632 Li, "Complete the New Historic Transformation: Iunderstanding the Cmc’s ’Two Basic

Transformations’.(完成新的历史性转变—学习军委关于‘两个根本性转变’战略思想的体会)."

633Ibid.; Baoan Ma and Junyi Jin, " Military Strategy in the New Epoch (军事战略的划时代转变)," ibid., 25 March.; Zhang and Zhang, "Finding the Conjunction of the World-Wide Rma and Our Army’ s Quality Development (寻找世界军事革命与我军质量建设的契合点)."

634 Ma and Jin, " Military Strategy in the New Epoch (军事战略的划时代转变)."

635 Zhang, "Military Conflicts in the New Era (时代特征与新时期军事斗争)."

184 looking approach of theoretic studies. During this debate, the experts identified the PLA’s major weaknesses and provided specific solution to those problems.636

The second January seminar invited many policy experts based in Beijing to provide their views on this the Two Transformations. Experts agreed that the policy had provided the direction of reforms, but it remained the PLA’s responsibility to conceive specific ideas about how to conduct reforms. In this seminar, Zhang Qinsheng pointed out that the ongoing worldwide RMA posed a great challenge to traditional military theories. The world’s most advanced militaries were all making great efforts to innovate their military theories. He argued there were three characteristics of those new military theories. First, they are forward looking. Second, they embraced diversity of experience, integrating lessons from foreign militaries. Third, they were adaptive to new situations and innovated very fast.637 It is obvious that Zhang Qinsheng took this opportunity to advocate a forward-looking approach, or what they referred to as TR in the 1980s, and that China should not hesitate to learn from foreign militaries. If military theories lagged behind military development, they will lose their value. The PLA should improve its military theories to achieve the Two Transformations and prepare for the RMA.638 Both points seemed very basic ideas. But without those intellectual changes, it could be very difficult for China to embrace the US-led RMA.

Zhou Hongwei of the AMS argued that theoretical studies should also shift their focus from individual military services to joint operations.639 Zhu Baogang of the GSD emphasised the importance of cooperation and coordination between defence industries and civilian industries. 640 Li Li of the NDU pointed out that in the

636 Li, "Complete the New Historic Transformation: Iunderstanding the Cmc’s ’Two Basic

Transformations’.(完成新的历史性转变—学习军委关于‘两个根本性转变’战略思想的体

会)." 637 Ibid. 638 Ibid. 639 Feng Zhang, "Entering into the New Stage of Miitary Quality Development (跨入军队质量建设新

阶段)," ibid., 21 January. 640 Ibid.

185 information age, the bottleneck of China’s modernisation might ISR technologies— this was a good area to begin quality improvement. Zhang Zhaoyin of the GSD argued that many countries had made organisational adaptations the first priority for the RMA, and the lack of organisational changes explained China’s lack of success in previous attempts at reform.641

To advocate and articulate the Two Transformations, in March 1997, Military Forum hosted another seminar and invited experts from MRs and military educational institutions to discuss how to articulate and promote the policy. They argued that since the Two Transformations had been announced, the PLA had reached a good understand of this concept, its background and context, and had already reached consensus on the importance of achieving the policy’s goals. However, as was stated in the two previous seminars in January, in addition to understanding the importance, necessity, and urgency of carrying out the policy, it was the time to study practical policy issues. First, they had to figure out the problems of the PLA military modernisation, that is, make an assessment of its weaknesses. Then, they had to find solutions for those weaknesses. And, instead of keeping those issues within the RMA EC, they must engage the whole PLA and make all military officers and soldiers understand their research outcomes.642 As reforms are theory-driven, the RMA EC has to create theories able to guide reforms, and the first priority is to make comprehensive planning. For example, setting short-term, mid-term and long-term goals for the Two Transformations. 643 They proposed a three-step approach to achieve the Two Transformations: 1) using the RMA as a framework to assess PLA and find its weaknesses and problems, 2) coming up with solutions for those problems, and 3) disseminating those solutions and ideas to the whole PLA.

641 Ibid. 642 Zhang and Guo, "Advocating 'Two Changes' through Deepening Theoretical Research (以深化理

论推动转变)." 643 Ibid.

186 6.3 Key RMA Challenges and the PLA’s Response

The RMA EC’s studies in the following years touched on many specific issues and came up with many practical measures to tackle their problems. More specifically, drawing on foreign RMA studies, the community identified two major weaknesses of the PLA: achieving information superiority, and the organisational and force structure needed to achieve it. They argued that the RMA provide a framework to address those weaknesses. And innovative US simulation and base-ised training would work to increase the possibility of implementing those operational concepts and new organisations. In other words, the theoretical foundation for the RMA was further improved during this phase of research.

6.3.1 Information Superiority: The Information Dimension of Warfare

Since the early 1990s, the RMA EC had viewed information as an increasingly critical resource in local wars under high-tech conditions. By the mid-1990s, they began viewing information as a dominant resource. There was an increase in discussions on information warfare or the information aspect of warfare in late 1995. Shen Weiguang’s November 1995 article, The Focal Point of the World’s Current Military Revolution: An Introduction to Information Warfare Studies,644 initiated a year-long debate on the role of information in future wars. Shen defined information warfare as ‘using information as a weapon to attack opponent’s perception and information systems. In order to influence, constrain, and change its decision-makers’ resolve to fight’.645 He argued that if firepower is considered as ‘hard’ strike power, information warfare is ‘soft’ strike power, aiming to win a war without fighting.646 He further argued that the concepts of manoeuvre operations and structure destruction should be studied under information warfare contexts.

644 Shen, "The Nucleus of the Current World Revolution in Military Affairs—an Introducation to

Information Warfare (当今世界军事革命的重心— 信息战研究导论)." 645 Ibid. 646 Ibid.

187 Some analysts began criticising the PLA for too much emphasis on hardware (e.g., firepower and mobility) rather than intangible factors such as the information aspect of war. In a war of the information age, the force superior in acquiring, processing and using information it is likely to prevail. Thus, studying how to establish information superiority over its adversary should become a major focus of the PLA’s operational art.647 The PLA should focus on the development of forces and concepts of operations that would emphasise networking and informatisation.648 Shi Huailin argued that information and knowledge had become the core factor in warfighting. Since most major armies were establishing information warfare studies organs, the PLA should explore information warfare too. He pointed out that China lacked computers and other information technologies and a talent pool for information warfare.649

Obtaining superiority in the information realm would become central to success in future warfare. Drawing on the Kosovo War, Wang Baocun argued that NATO and Yugoslavia fought one war with their respective approaches representing two different ages. While NATO was fighting a war in the information age, Yugoslavia was fighting a mechanised war. There were three factors of warfighting capabilities: fire power, mobility and information. The major difference between NATO and Yugoslavia forces was that the information dimension played a leading role in NATO’s warfighting and a marginal role in Yugoslavia’s operations. Xu Yanbin argued that information since has always been a factor influencing the success and failure of wars, it has just become more important in the information age. He was among the first Chinese analysts to consider political and psychological warfare as kinds of information warfare, arguing that any operations targeting enemy decisions and decision-making processes are information warfare.650 Ge Chengwei argued that

647 Xu, "Information Warfare Is in Essence Philosophical Warfare (信息战的深层是哲学战)."

648 Huailin Shi, "Reinforcing Our Army’s Information Warfare Capabilities (加强我军信息战建设)," ibid., 19 November.; Xu, "Information Warfare Is in Essence Philosophical Warfare (信息战的深层是哲学战)."

649 Shi, "Reinforcing Our Army’s Information Warfare Capabilities (加强我军信息战建设)."

650 Xu, "Information Warfare Is in Essence Philosophical Warfare (信息战的深层是哲学战)."

188 during the Kosovo War, Yugoslavia lost the war mainly because of its inferior information technologies translating to a lack of battlefield awareness. Yugoslavian conventional weapons were among the most advanced, but lacked enabling information capabilities. For example, the MiG-29, but no early warning or C4IRS systems.651

Cyber war or operations in the cyber domain had become a major topic in the late 1990s, especially after the Kosovo War. As discussed in previous chapters, although PLA analysts had been discussing the information age, information revolution and related warfighting concepts since the 1980s, the only consensus reached was that future wars will be mainly local wars fought under high-tech conditions. There was much discussion on electronic warfare, command and control automation and C3I systems, but cyber security and cyber warfare was not a major topic until the late 1990s. The Kosovo War made the PLA in general, and the RMA EC in particular, interested in cyber security and desiring a better understanding of information age warfare. Shen Weili identified that during the Kosovo War, many NATO countries had faced cyberattacks from other countries (including Chinese hackers). He argued that the PLA had to strengthen its cyber defence capabilities, while creating its own cyber operation forces. 652 Chang Ming argued that as the internet was becoming import for everyday life, network-based warfare will be challenged by increasing cyberattacks.653 Through those discussions and debates, the community determined that future war will be information war, or informationised in nature. At strategic, operational and tactical levels, all concepts and doctrines have to be created against the backdrop.654

651 Chengwen Ge, "Grasp the Focal Point of Military Struggle in the New Era (把握新时期军事斗争

的着力点)," ibid., 7 September 1999.

652 Weili Shen, "Pay Attention to Operations in the Cyber Domain (重视网络作战)," ibid., 27 July. 653 Ming Chang, "Battle Networks and Cyber Dominance (网络化战场与制网络权)," ibid., 24 September 1996. 654 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)."

189 6.3.2 Organisational Changes

Regarding organisational structures, they agreed on two major points. First, changes in organisational structure are important for quality development and are a critical aspect of the RMA. The purpose of making organisational changes is to improve the PLA’s combat capabilities.655 Zhang Zhaoyin, director of the GSD’s

Military Training and Service Arms Department (军训与兵种部), pointed out that making organisational changes is the key to transforming the PLA from a ‘quantity- based’ force to a ‘quality-based’ one (从 ‘数量型’ 转向 ‘质量型’). RMAs in history suggest that a change of military strategy is often achieved through making organisational changes. It is an important criterion to measure the success or failure of a strategic change.656

Second, organisational changes must be guided by concepts of operations, that is, theory driven (as discussed in Chapter 5). Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Guoyu argued that in anticipating the future wars, the PLA should ask what it should do, not what it can do.657 Before making any organisational changes, the military must make an effort to understand the particular range of plausible contingencies and opponents over the next few decades, and the capabilities of these opponents and alternative operational concepts for these contingencies. Liu Jixian, 658 research fellow at the AMS, argued that ‘we must take a scientific approach to determine our military’s structure and organisations, based on scientific prediction of future high-tech local wars, and take into account of factors such as future adversaries’ organisational structure, their combat capabilities and patterns of behaviour, as well as our own alternative ways of operation’.659

655 Liu, "Accelerating Organisational Reforms (加速推进编制体制改革)." 656 Zhang, "Organisational Changes Increase Combat Capbilities (结构调整出战斗力)."

657 Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪之交的军事理论革命)." 658 later became vice-prisident of the PLA Academy of Military Science, and now serving deputy head of the PLA’s Military Reform’s Advisory Panel, 659 Liu, "Accelerating Organisational Reforms (加速推进编制体制改革)."

190 They RMA EC identified the PLA’s organisational problems and made recommendations accordingly. First, the PLA’s command and control structure was outdated. A new organisational structure must be created that separates its combat command system from the administrative chain of command 660 and flattens the command structure. The distinctions between the two chains of command (operational and administrative) are ambiguous. Theatre commanders possessed no operational authority over other military services. This hindered their capability to conduct joint operations.661 Moreover, military organisations tend to have less levels of command in the information age, with Zhang Zhaoyin pointing out that the US military had recently changed its strategic command and control system, the relative sizes of the military services and the structures of its combat units. Many divisions had been converted into brigades to enhance mobility, with each brigade having three to four battalions working as the basic tactical combat unit. Similarly, the Russian military had reduced the number of its military services from five to four, with plans to reduce to three. The Russians had also been changing their corps–divisions military structure towards a corps–brigade structure.662

Second, the number of high-tech forces is still small. The PLA needs more elite forces that are small, multifunctional and modular units. The concept of rapid response and special forces, which had been debated and studied in the early 1990s, had been further examined and experimented with in the late 1990s. Zhang Qinsheng and Zhang Guoyu argued that as the whole world was embracing the information age, there would be a convergence in world military development and military theoretical development.663 Russia had already embraced the Western ideas of low-to-middle intensity warfare, and campaign-level operations will be the major type of operations for achieving strategic goals. Precision-guided munitions enabled air and ground forces to strike enemy ground forces throughout the depth of the theatre and paralyse

660 Zhang, "Organisational Changes Increase Combat Capbilities (结构调整出战斗力)." 661 Ibid. 662 Ibid. 663 Zhang and Zhang, "Revolution in Military Theory at the Turn of the Century (世纪之交的军事理

论革命)."

191 the enemy’s operational system.664 Kang Xiangzhen argued that local wars require more and better rapid response and special forces. He refers to the Falklands War, the US invasion of Grenada and the Gulf War to argue that how to combine special forces, rapid response forces and massive invasion forces has become important for winning a local war.665 By 1997, the US military had increased the number of rapid response forces to 50 per cent of its total forces.666

Third, the PLA is still ground force–centric. Future forces must be integrated joint forces, focusing on systems integration, jointness and connectivity. For example, Feng Yujun and Feng Yujun argued that to adapt campaign training to winning local wars under high-tech conditions, the PLA had to closely monitor world military theoretical developments, think the unthinkable (i.e., the most difficult and complicated situations), and gradually shift from land-based combined campaigns to joint operations.667 Su Enze highlighted the Kosovo War as indicating that future wars will become more comprehensive. As the distinction between strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations becomes blurred, specialisation in one level or field of operations will not be sufficient. For example, to win a local war under high-tech conditions, the commander must understand both high-tech weapons and their tactics usage, and have the strategic vision to make battle plans that support the strategic picture. He gave the example of F-117s conducting strategic bombing of Iraqi nuclear reactors and B-52 Stratofortresses conducting operational-level bombing of Republican Guard Forces. The combination of long-range missiles and special forces has gradually eroded the ideas of frontlines and rear areas. Military services had become more integrated, the organisations of the military had become more flexible. Troops would become modular and able to be combined for the conduct of different missions. Command and control systems would be more integrated, perhaps supported

664 Ibid. 665 Xiangzhen Kang, "The Rise of Special Forces (特种作战部队的崛起)," ibid., 13 August 1996. 666 Zhang, "Organisational Changes Increase Combat Capbilities (结构调整出战斗力)."

667 Feng and Feng, "Achieving Transformation in Campaign Level Training (率先实现战役训练的转

变)."

192 by increasingly automation. Traditional and non-traditional operational concepts will be more integrated.668

However, some argued that instead of following the exact path of the US, China should adopt an asymmetric approach to its informatisation. Zhang Zhaoyin argued that as the US precision-guided munitions had almost reached 100 per cent accuracy, they had the luxury of focusing on integrating weapons and systems. The accuracy of China’s precision-guided weapons remained unsatisfactory, thus, China should place priority on precision-guided munitions instead of launching a program of integrating all systems. In short, China should balance short-term and long-term planning issues.

In addition to these three major problems, logistic and military educational systems also needed reform. Each service and MR had its own logistics system which was largely incompatible with other services or regions. This causes much duplication and a huge waste of resources. Military educational institutions had capacities that far exceed their needs and many programs and disciplines overlapped with civilian universities. Instead of keeping those programs, the PLA could outsource to civilian universities.669

In sum, the RMA EC argued that to conduct organisational changes, the PLA needed a top-level design, crossing-the-river-by-touching-the-stones approach. To promote a greater degree of jointness in the efforts of each of service to develop emerging operational concepts, the RMA EC recommended a provision that would require a top-down approach to ensure that these efforts were being coordinated above the service level. In a seminar discussing the Two Transformations, the RMA EC experts argued that the PLA should prioritise its tasks, take an approach similar to Deng’s approach to economic reforms in creating special zones to test theories. They

668 Enze Su, "Kosovo War and New Military Theories (科索沃战争与新军事理论)," PLA Daily, 1 June 1999. 669 Zhang, "Organisational Changes Increase Combat Capbilities (结构调整出战斗力)."

193 suggested that the PLA choose some experimental samples to make its organisational changes and weapon acquisitions.670

Following the development of information technology, the battle network will allow direct communication between the GSD and frontline commanders, reducing the number of command levels and shortening the line of information flow. Realtime battlefield intelligence will be available to every level of commander. Thus, the command structure will become horizontally wider and vertically shorter, shifting from centralised to dispersed command, or ‘thin and flat’ (扁平) command system.671

6.4 Training as a Way to Ensure the Implementation of the RMA

Some RMA EC members had drawn from their exercises experience in Jinan MR and had been advocating computer simulation and realistic training since 1995.672 Their forward-looking and theory-driven approach to defence studies had led them to propose a revolution in military training to serve the purposes of testing concepts of operations, conducting experimentations and helping implementation of reforms. This concept of operational theory-driven approach to reforms has been previously discussed in Chapter 5. It suggests that army building must be based on specific operational theories and operational requirements. The PLA’s acquisition, training and organisational adaptations must be guided by the forward-looking operational theories they created.673

The RMA EC argued that the traditional defence planning stages were technological development, weapon development, military theory, and organisational

670 Zhang and Guo, "Advocating 'Two Changes' through Deepening Theoretical Research (以深化理论推动转变)."

671 Chuangjie Xu, "The Military Revolution Is Changing the Military’s Way of Commanding (军事

革命推进指挥形态演变)," ibid., 30 January 1996. 672 Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the

Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战役演习看

战法研究的辐射效应)." 673 Ibid.

194 changes. The new stages in the information age were military theory, technological development, weapon development, and organisational changes. In the information age, commanders and military theorists became the pioneers of military technological innovation and the drivers of reform.674 The logic behind the new RMA is that the military develops new capabilities by taking the following steps. First, bringing up ideas and concepts. Second, create hypotheses (scenarios). Third, testing those hypotheses in training. Fourth, make adjustment to those hypotheses based on experimentation results. Fifth, evaluating those concepts and hypotheses and conducting demonstrations. Sixth, developing or improving military capabilities according to those concepts.675

This approach placed great emphasis on operational requirements. It argued that training (computer simulations, online training and realistic combat training) is the key to understand how to conduct reform and improve weapon technologies. The RMA EC suggested that only combat troops know exactly what capabilities are required, what technologies need to be improved and how to make organisational changes to maximise combat capabilities. During the ‘use science and technology to train troops’ process, the training and exercises conducted allowed commanders to provide feedback and advice to scientists on how to improve technologies to cope with future wars. Their feedbacks turned out to be very useful. As one of the scientist commented to a commander, ‘your ideas identified a point of breakthrough that I have been searching for for many years’.676 This approach obviously requires cooperation between policy experts, commanders and scientists. The RMA EC’s discussions, debates and seminars with scientists and combat units in the 1980s and 1990s helped bridge those three communities.

This approach was actually an upgraded version of the TR approach created in the 1980s. The key difference being that it now focused on ‘shaping’ the future

674 Li, "Using New Philosophic Concept to Guide the Trend of Military Revolution (以新的哲学观引领变革潮流)," 284. 675 Ibid., 286. 676 Gao, Zou, and Li, "Make Contributions to the Rma with Chinese Characteristics (建功中国特色军

事变革主战场)."

195 environment and future wars instead of forecasting future development.677 In 1998, Military Forum and Nanjing Army Command College initiated a new discussion,

Scanning the High-tech Battlefield (高技术战场扫描), which was intended to create a new trend in studying high-tech wars (just as DFB had in the early 1980s).678 This was intended to create new ideas to cope with the changing nature of warfare, from mechanised war to informationised war.679 It was a policy innovation effort inspired by the success of the DFB. The major difference between the two discussions, according to Army Command College experts, was that human–machine collaboration was becoming important for future wars.680

The RMA EC realised that new technologies such as computers, the internet and artificial intelligence will revolutionise training and help the PLA shape future wars. This led to them promoting computer simulation, online training and exercises as methods testing their forward-looking operational theories and concepts. The logic was that after operational theories and concepts were created, the PLA had to test those theories and concepts in simulations and exercises to identify operational requirements. And operational requirements will guide the weapon acquisition, organisational adaptations and training. The RMA EC promoted simulation and exercises as ways to increase the possibility of implementing those operational concepts and new organisations.

This brought the PLA to the concept of ‘training in the laboratory’, or experimentation, simulation and base-ised training. Like most concepts, this was inspired by its US counterpart. The PLA saw the performance of US troops in the Gulf War and learned that most of these scenarios had been created and rehearsed in war

677 Wujun Guo, Dehong Lv, and Bingyan Li, "National Defence Developement and the Rma (新军事变革中的国防建设)," ibid., 30 October 2001.

678 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)." 679 Ibid. 680 Ibid.

196 games and simulations.681 They realised that after the Vietnam War, the US military made significant improvements in its training. Realistic combat training and simulation prepared the US to win the Gulf War.682

The RMA EC realised that the PLA had already had enough discussions and debates on theories and concepts of operation. It was time to move to experimentation. For example, Zheng Shouzeng argued that information warfare should be applied to military training as soon as possible.683 Liu Hongji argued in 1997 that ‘the PLA had created some operational concepts, such as structure destruction, non-contact warfare, all-depth operations etc. But the most urgent issue now, is how to apply those concepts into training’.684 Feng Yujun and Feng Yujun argued that although concepts and methods of operations are prerequisite, by the mid-1990s the PLA had already created or adopted many concepts of operations, including non-linear operations, integrated operations, in-depth operations, mobile operations, long-range operations and electronic operations. To select the best concepts or combination of concepts, the PLA had to experiment through methods including further theoretical research, case studies, scenarios-testing, field research and campaign-level exercises.685 Many began to argue that simulation and laboratories provide technologies for designing future wars. The PLA should learn from the US military and improve PLA war gaming,

681 Zhang, "Military Theoretical Studies in the New Millennia: Challenges and Responses (新千年军事理论发展面临的挑战与对策述要)."

682 Yujun Feng et al., Intering into Battlefield from Here: On Base-Ised Training (从这里走向战场—

浅谈基地化训练) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2002), 45. 683 Shouzeng Zheng, "Integrating Information Warfare Studies into Military Training (把信息战研究

融入训练实践)," PLA Daily, 9 July 1996.

684 Hongji Liu, "Theories for Transformations and Theoretical Transformations (转变的理论和理论的转变)," ibid., 11 March 1997.

685 Feng and Feng, "Achieving Transformation in Campaign Level Training (率先实现战役训练的转

变)."

197 simulation and exercise capabilities. 686 Li Bingyan pointed out that information technology meant that the military did not have to study war from fighting an actual war, but could study war in the laboratory, including hypothetical scenarios.687 In future, the battlefield will be network-based and digitalised, with information dominance critical for winning. Li Bingyan and Feng Yujun argued that the PLA should create massive simulation facilities to develop and test new weapons and train its troops.688

It is generally believed that the PLA began significant exercises and realistic combat training to test operational methods during ‘use science and technology to train troops’ process in 1998.689 In 1998, Jiang Zemin called for the PLA to ‘use science and technology to train troops’ (科技大练兵). That prompted a three-year period of exploration and experimentation of new training principles. During this period, the PLA began to send combat units and division-level (and above) commanders to NDU and the National Defence University of Technology to study high-tech conditions.690 According to Li, ‘use science and technology to train troops’ was actually providing technique support to new operational concepts created earlier in that decade.691

686 Baoping Tan, "Focusing on the Key Aspect of ’Using Science to Train Troop’ (在科技练兵的聚焦的上着力)," PLA Daily, 23 November 1999.; Zhang, "Military Theoretical Studies in the New

Millennia: Challenges and Responses (新千年军事理论发展面临的挑战与对策述要)."

687 Bingyan Li, "Understanding the World-Wide Rma from a Philosophic Perspective (用哲学的眼光

看世界新军事变革)," in Foster Innovation (扶新集), ed. Bingyan Li (Long March Publishing House

(长征出版社), 2013), 164.

688 Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战役演习看

战法研究的辐射效应)."

689 "‘Use Science and Technology to Train Troops’ in the 1990s (90 年代全军科技大练兵)," Xinhua, https://news.sina.com.cn/china/2000-10-13/134645.html. 690 Yuanqing Li, Junhua Hu, and Bingyan Li, "Promoting the Transformation of Military Training into Informationised Conditions (努力推进军事训练向信息化条件下转变）," PLA Daily, 27 December 2007. 691 Kan and Li, "The Soldiers’ Ambition in the New Century (跨世纪军人的事业追求)."

198 6.4.1 Computer Simulation

Computer simulation was introduced into the PLA in the late 1970s. The introduction of command automation and computer simulation had initiated some enthusiasm for learning about computers in the PLA. But due to the lack of relevant education and infrastructures, these computers became typing machines rather than tools for simulation and command automation.692 The PLA’s computer simulation from the 1980s to the late 1990s had gone through three development stages. During the first stage, the number and variety of simulations were limited by technological constraints. During the second stage, technological advancements enabled the PLA to create more simulation systems. Many units and educational institutions created their own simulation systems. But most turned out to be too obsessed with the technology itself rather than understanding rationales behind those systems. For example, while the PLA had more computer simulation systems and created different models simulating a wide range of scenarios, most models were based on past experiences and data, and did not have a clear view of what kinds of wars China may face in the future. 693 During the third stage, from 1997 to 2002, the PLA built its network, connecting simulations and training systems, and paying more attention to creating models simulating future scenarios rather than historical cases. In 1997, the PLA had begun building up the PLA-wide Military Training and Information Network. By October 2002, it had connected 18 MTDs and military training bases with 76 military professional education institutions, and created more than 80 databases.694 By the early 2000s, not only combat units were using computer simulations and wargames for training. The games were also becoming some officers’ and soldiers’ favourite

692 Su and Li, "Studying War in the Laboratory (在实验室研究和学习战争)."

693 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿真中实现科技大练官)."

694 Yongzhong Chai and Bingyan Li, "Strategic Change and Leapfrog Development (战略性转变跨

越式发展)," ibid., 4 November 2002.

199 pastime. 695 Computer simulation made a good contribution to the PLA’s informatisation.

Due to the futuristic studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially the extensive research on operational methods from 1993 to 1996, the PLA, by the late 1990s, had not only identified that future wars will be fought against the background of the informatisation or information wars, it had created many operational concepts for this context. Huang Bin et al. argue that in the past, operational theories were developed from real war experiences. But in the information age, operational theories are being developed and tested in ‘operational laboratories’,696 meaning they are future-oriented. Instead of being based on past experiences, operational theories in the information age are created to shape the future. Operational theories and concepts created in the1990s were being tested in computers. Chen Yong (commandant of Nanjing Army Command College) and Zhang Zengshun argued that the RMA was not only revolutionising operational theories, organisational structure and weapons, but military research methodologies. Information technology made training easier and cheaper because research outcomes related to the RMA, such as operational concepts, can be tested in laboratories before being formally promulgated or even before being tested in combat training and exercises.697

The RMA EC’s contribution to computer simulation was twofold. First, some members were pioneers advocating computers simulations since the 1980s. For example, Yang Nanzheng of the AMS and Su Enze of Airforce Command College were pioneers in artificial intelligence and computer simulation. As Su Enze and Li Bingyan argued that command automation and computer simulation systems are two of the major elements of the current RMA. Thus, China had no choice but to develop

695 Gao, Zou, and Li, "Make Contributions to the Rma with Chinese Characteristics (建功中国特色军

事变革主战场)."

696 Bin Huang, Mingliang Li, and Jizhong Huang, "The New Century’s Competition in Compaign Theory (拉开新世纪战役理论角逐的序幕)," ibid., 7 October 1997.

697 Yong Chen and Zengshun Zhang, "Accelerating the Rma with Chinese Characteristics（把中国特

色军事变革推进快车道）," ibid., 25 March 2003.

200 those systems to embrace the challenges posed by the ongoing RMA.698 Moreover, Nanjing Army Command College had been actively adopting artificial intelligence, automation and human–machine collaboration to improve its education and training. It also updated its computer training system to adapt to future information age wars, to the Information Battlefield Political-Military Confrontational Training System.699

However, what distinguishes the RMA EC from most other simulation advocates and users is their forward-looking, future-oriented approach to training and simulation. Besides the technology itself, they were focused on promoting a way of thinking, a forward-looking approach to conducting simulation and training. The proponents prepared a series of articles on matters relating simulations. Their principle argument was that computer simulation is just a tool to train the troops. Whether to simulate scenarios based on historical experiences, past wars, the future security environment or future wars was decided by the people who use it. Li Bingyan pointed out that since it is easier to find historical data than forecasting future events and creating future scenarios, people tend to focus on simulating past wars instead of future wars. A good simulation and training system was one based on future weapon and technological development, military thoughts, and operational theories of both the PLA and its potential adversaries, with the timeframe of 10 to 20 years into the future. The simulation system should be created for imitating future information wars, for example, creating models for electronic warfare, information warfare and precision warfare. Those models should be able to interact with each other and combine into a multidimensional war simulation system. For this reason, the war game must pay more attention to joint operations.700 Li attributes the success of Army Command College’s Information Battlefield Political-Military Confrontational Training System to their holistic approach to simulation. More specifically, they bridged the gap between science and policy (operational theories) by having uniformed personnel familiarise

698 Su and Li, "Studying War in the Laboratory (在实验室研究和学习战争)."

699 Huang, Li, and Li, "Achieve Scentific Military Training through Computer Simulation (在模拟仿

真中实现科技大练官)." 700 Ibid.

201 themselves with technology while scientists gained better knowledge of operational concepts.701

6.4.2 Realistic Combat Training: Exercises to Test Concepts of Operation

In addition to computer simulation, realistic combat training, especially combined tactics base-ised combat training (or base-ised training, 合同战术基地化

训练) is a step towards the implementation of concepts of operations and organisational changes. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the RMA EC made three major contributions to improving the PLA’s realistic combat training. First, they were pioneers in advocating, participating and organising exercises as a way to test operational theories and concepts they created in the early 1990s. For example, when drafting the ‘Regulations for Staff Departments’ (司令部条例) for the whole PLA, the GSD had a panel of eight experts. Feng Yujun was the youngest expert on the panel. The first advice he gave was that the regulations were too divorced from combat realities.702 Hua Hua and Jin Yinan argued that from 1994 to 1999, the US military had conducted many experimentations and combat training in the digitalised battlefield, and the PLA should accelerate its experimentation under informationised conditions. 703 Ye Zhisheng argued that in the early 1990s, the US military were conducting simulation and experimentations on informationised war in laboratories. When the Kosovo War began, warfare under informationised conditions had already become reality.704 They urged military policy experts to watch exercises to identify demands and make innovations in military theories and operational methods, authorities to watch exercises to make organisational reforms, and scientists to watch

701 Ibid. 702 Yuqing Zhang, Junlong Zhang, and Chao Huang, "Feng Yujun, Brigade Commander in Jinan Military Region: Aiming at the Construction of Combat Effectiveness.(济南军区某摩步旅旅长冯玉

军瞄准实战抓战斗力建设)," ibid., 15 August 2007. 703 Hua Hua and Yinan Jin, "On the Military’s Challegence in the Internet Age (谈军队迎接网络时

代的挑战)," ibid., 20 June 1999. 704 Haicheng Sun, Bo Yang, and Guoyu Zhang, "Let Information Warfare Dominate the Training Ground (让信息战训练主宰训练场)," ibid., 13 July.

202 exercises to test newly created weapons and technologies. In short, carrying out the RMA through training and exercises.705

Second, some RMA EC members were actively participating in and organising exercises. For example, Jinan MR was the pioneer testing operational methods in 1995.706 Feng Yujun and Song Puxuan, two active RMA EC members, were working in the MR’s department of military operations responsible for those exercises. Feng was the main author for all their exercise reports.707

Third, some RMA EC members were major advocates of the concept of base- ised training and involved in building the first combined tactics combat training bases. The new strategic guidelines provided the PLA with new combat missions, combat directions and regions. Manoeuvring operations combat units ( 机动作战部队) especially were required to accomplish a wide variety of missions under a variety of environments and regions. 708 Realistic combat training bases can best serve the purpose of designing a future battlefield by replicating a real (existing or predicted) battlefield, from weapons to severe weather conditions. More importantly, by building up the bases under informationised conditions, troops will be able to train under conditions that best simulate the real combat environment. For example, military training bases such as Zhurihe Combined Tactics Training Base not only have varying terrain (e.g., grasslands, hills and deserts) but allow the army to mock nuclear, chemical and biological warfare as well as urban combat. Troops can use both regular

705 Li, Hu, and Li, "Promoting the Transformation of Military Training into Informationised Conditions (努力推进军事训练向信息化条件下转变）."

706 Li, "Demand-Driven, Give Live to the Whole System—Jinan Mr’s Campaign Exercises and the

Spillover Effect of Research on Operational Methods (需求牵引走活全盘—从济南军区战役演习看战法研究的辐射效应)." 707 Ibid. 708 Feng et al., Intering into Battlefield from Here: On Base-Ised Training (从这里走向战场—浅谈基

地化训练), 34.

203 weapons (e.g., tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery) and high-tech weapons and equipment (e.g., electromagnetic weapons and air surveillance).709

The PLA’s training in the 1990s was still based on the all-out war era’s training mechanisms. For example, each military service was still trained in isolation. There was lack of joint training between services, huge wastage of resources caused by duplications of training equipment and facilities and low-quality training due to repeatedly training in environments troops were already familiar with.710 The GSD leadership brought up the concept of base-ised training in the early 1990s.711 Because the PLA lacked sufficiently sized training bases, advanced equipment, training bases in severe weather and terrain conditions, and troops that could imitate China’s potential opponents in terms of weapons and operational concepts.712

Feng Yujun et al. argue that base-ised training, as a ‘pre-war battlefield’ for future wars, serves as a laboratory for reform experimentations, testing new operational theories, combat methods, weaponry and equipment.713 There are three major advantages of base-ised training. First, base-ised training fosters better joint operations and training between services and MRs. By the early 2000s, the PLA’s training was separated. At the theatre command level, single service campaign training and joint operations training were managed by different authorities, making joint training very difficult to arrange. Second, it bridges research institutions, combat units and educational institutions. Base-ised training tests research outcomes, such as operational concepts and tactics which provide guidance for training at combat units and professional military educational institutions. Third, it provides the most realistic combat experiences. It employs high-tech equipment, such as computer simulation,

709 Viola Zhou, "8 Things to Know About China’s Biggest Army Training Base," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2103593/8-things-know-about- chinas-biggest-army-training-base. 710 Feng et al., Intering into Battlefield from Here: On Base-Ised Training (从这里走向战场—浅谈基

地化训练), 44. 711 Ibid., 31. 712 Ibid., 47. 713 Ibid., 26.

204 networks and multimedia to maximise the simulation of an actual battlefield, and it creates an enemy team based on certain opponents’ weapons, operational concepts and ways of thinking. Together, those mechanisms simulate a realistic combat environment.714 Feng Yujun et al. argue that training bases must aim at imitating a battlefield under high-tech conditions. For example, focusing on building hardware that facilitates concepts such as battlefield surveillance, electronic confrontation, airstrikes, manoeuvres and precision strikes. Special emphasis was placed on the electromagnetic spectrum.715

The US military’s Fort Irwin National Training Centre was the PLA’s major inspiration for base-ised training.716 Based on his visits to US and British combat training bases, and a three-month research trip to a Russian combat training base, Zhang Qinsheng proposed the concepts of ‘multi-service joint training’ and base-ised training (基地化训练).717 He emphasised the importance of information confrontation

(信息对抗) and creating ‘blue forces’ to imitate foreign elite troops for training purposes. He also made the proposal to build a joint command control centre that integrated all military services. In 1997, he was tasked to build the PLA’s first Combined Tactics Combat Training Base in Zhurihe,718 to help the army prepare for future high-tech wars.719 Zhurihe still the PLA’s most sophisticated battle laboratory

714 Ibid., 28-29.; Kaihui Yu and Wenmao Lin, "Strengthening the Blue Forces for Confrontation Training (强化蓝军搞活对抗)," PLA Daily, 7 May 1996. 715 Feng et al., Intering into Battlefield from Here: On Base-Ised Training (从这里走向战场—浅谈基

地化训练), 49. 716 Ibid., 45. 717 Zhongmei Yang, China Is on the Verge of Coup (中國即將發生政變: 解析政變前夜的九大關鍵

人物) (China Times Publishing Co, 2011), 244. 718 Ibid., 245. 719 Dennis Wong, "A Visual Guide to the Base Hosting China’s War Games," South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/infographics/article/2103892/visual-guide-base-hosting-chinas-wargames.

205 for experimenting with new concepts and weapons and for training unit commanders to think creatively.

6.5 Institutionalisation of the RMA

After years of studying past wars, analysing foreign studies of the RMA, and speculating on the future warfare, in Jiang Zemin’s speech at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in December 2002, the PLA leadership for the first time officially brought up the concept of the RMA with Chinese characteristics. Jiang defined that, “Information is at the core of the new revolution in military affairs. Human warfare is changing from mechanised to informationised warfare.”720 He emphasised four trends that will influence the PLA army building and its operational methods: first, informationised weapons and equipment will become the key determinant of combat capabilities. Second, noncontact and nonlinear operations will become important operational methods. Third, combat between systems will become the basic feature of combat. Fourth, space will become a new strategic high ground in international military competition.721 And they all have been extensively studied and debated by this expert community in the 1980s and 1990s.

With regard to the military strategic guidelines, he argues that, the PLA must carry out more thorough research on issues concerning strategic guiding thought. For example, on concepts such as deterrence, containing a war from erupting; joint and coordinated operations; innovation in military theory. 722 With regard to defence development strategy and military modernisation strategy, he specified the long-term objective of the PLA modernisation as, “to gradually informationise national defence and the military, […] as this is necessary for us to be able to respond to the challenges posed by the world revolution in military affairs, and protect our national security, unity and our ever-expanding national interests.”723 He went further arguing that, “in terms of defence development strategy, in addition to existing mature technologies,

720 Jiang, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin—Volume 3, 578. 721 Ibid., 579-82. 722 Ibid., 584-86. 723 Ibid., 587.

206 we must pay attention to emerging technologies, and be more forward-looking.”724 Concepts such as ever-expanding national interests, deterrence, contain war from erupting, forward-looking, are all concepts first emerged in the EC’s discussion in the 1980s and 1990s.

Forward-looking, theory-driven approach to military training had become orthodox in the late 1990s. MTD of GSD wrote in 1999 that the PLA’S ‘use science and technology to train troops’ must be theory-driven. The PLA must anticipate future and study its enemies, and train its troops according to the those future-oriented theories and future war scenarios.725

6.6 The RMA Epistemic Community, 1996–2002

6.6.1 Composition

A few RMA EC members assumed senior PLA leadership in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Zhang Zhaoying became active member in the mid-1990s. He wrote many paper for Military Forum, in addition to his participation in the EC’s seminars and conferences. Zhang Qinsheng become director of NDU’s Military Campaign Teaching and Research Laboratory in 1998. 726 As the NDU’s most important discipline, campaign studies is of important for the PLA, 727 and the director of this laboratory is a very important position. Moreover, Hu Changfa, another senior officer, former director of the MTD, who supported the EC’s studies in the 1980s later became

724 Ibid., 588. 725 Military Training Department of PLA General Staff Department, "Deepening the Policy of ‘Use

Science and Technology to Train Troops’ (把群众性科技练兵进一步引向深入)," PLA Daily, 28 December 1999. 726 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Zhang Qinsheng 章沁生 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Pla; Deputy Director, National Committee for Disaster Reduction (Ncdr)," China Vitea, http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Zhang_Qinsheng/career 727 Huang, Opening the Gate to Military Studies— Teaching at the National Defence University (叩开

军事殿堂之门—我在国防大学执教), 175.

207 deputy Commandant of the NDU in December 1993. Li Dianren, political commissar of Army Staff College was active EC member.

Figure 5. RMA Epistemic Community members were promoted to senior positions responsible for experimentation and implementation

6.6.2 Activities

Between 1996 and 2002, the RMA EC was making efforts to influence policy selection. First, they articulated the Two Transformations and tried to relate it to the RMA. The also advocated simulations and exercises to demonstrate and test operational concepts and organisational changes. In the early 2000s, they became more involved with civilian researchers from many other disciplines. For example, Military Forum organised a seminar on the RMA in late 2003. In addition to military researchers, they also invited researchers from China’s Society of Macroeconomics, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Institute of Political Science Chinese Academy of Social Science, and Renmin University.728 In a seminar on the RMA in 2003, participants included editors from Sina.com, a Chinese media website; journalist from People’s Daily and other newspapers; and professors from various civilian universities.729 The RMA EC’s activities between 1996 and 2002 are shown in Table 3.

728 Yawen Cheng and Guoyu Zhang, "Summary of the Seminar on Accelerating the Rma with Chinese Characteristics (加速推进中国特色军事变革专题座谈会纪要)," PLA Daily, 6January 2004. 729 Ibid.

208

Table 4: Timeline of the RMA Epistemic Community’s Activities, 1996–2002 Military Forum Discussions Nov 1995–1996 Debate on Information Warfare Aug 1996–Jan 1997 21st Century National Defence and Economy730 14 Jan 1997 – 6 Jan 1998 Discussions on Achieving the Two Transformations 13 Jan – 29 Dec 1998 Scanning High-tech Battlefield 22 Jun – 30 Nov 1999 Examining the Kosovo War 2000 If Warfare has become ‘soft’? Conferences and Seminars Dec 1995 Embracing the Challenge Posed by the World RMA731 Logistics Conference (Military Forum co-hosted with Sep 1996 Military Prospect and the General Staff Department)732 Seminars on ‘Two Changes’ with National Defence Jan 1997 University postgraduate students Jan 1997 Seminar on the CMC’s Policy of the ‘Two Changes’733 1 Apr 1997 Seminar on Deepening the Two Transformations 13 Apr 1999 Seminar on Kosovo War734 Books and Conference Proceedings

730 Le Zhu, "Chinese Defence Research in the Past 30 Years— National Defence Economics (中国特色国防研究 30 年-国防经济篇)," Military Historical Research (军事历史研究), no. 3 (2008): 1.

731 Zhang and Li, "Servicemen’s Historical Mission at the Turn of the Century: A Report on

“Embracing the Challenges Posed by the World Rma” Symposium (跨世纪军人的历史使命— ” 迎接世界军事革命挑战传记座谈会”评述)."

732 Xu, "The Military Revolution Is Changing the Military’s Way of Commanding (军事革命推进指挥形态演变)."

733 Zhang, "Entering into the New Stage of Miitary Quality Development (跨入军队质量建设新阶

段)."1997.1.21；军队质量建设 10-17 734 Mostly lecturers and students of NDU Graduate School, and Su Enze.

209 New Models of Army Qualitative Building: Selected Papers 1998 on ‘Two Basic Transformations’

6.7 Conclusion

From 1996 to 2002, the RMA EC made three contributions preparing the PLA for the RMA. First, they seized Two Transformations as an opportunity to advocate the RMA. By relating the RMA to Two Transformations, they made the proposition that the concept of the RMA would provide the PLA with a framework to achieve army building and quality development. They further applied the RMA framework to assess the PLA’s key weakness and made prescriptions for those weaknesses. Moreover, they upgraded their forward-looking defence planning approach in the 1990s and argued that instead of anticipating future events, with the help from new technologies the PLA was now able to shape the future wars by ‘waging wars in the laboratory’ using computer simulations and realistic combat training to test concepts of operations and ensure the successful of implementation of those policies and organisational changes. Some members of the community were involved in creating simulation systems, combat training bases and organising exercises. All of this prepared and propelled the PLA for and towards the RMA in 2002.

In the past decade, the EC’s influence has gradually been diminishing for two reasons. First, many of the EC members retired in the past few years. Second, there may has been some political struggle inside the PLA, which led to the forced retirement of some EC members, such Zhang Qinsheng.735 However, their ideas have influenced a whole generation of military officers. Many younger officers are still in favour of EC’s ideas and thoughts. For example, in a book published in 2015, many officers expressed their support of Zhang Qinsheng and the EC’s ideas, and still remember the EC’s debates and influence in the 1980s and 1990s. 736 Moreover, some

735 Lao Tang, "The Quality of Strategists (战略家的素养)," in Collected Works of General Zhang

Qinsheng (章沁生将军战略文萃) (Beijing: Research Institute of Maritime Security and Cooperation (海洋安全与合作研究院), 2015), 295-99.

736 Tezhan Xianfeng, "A Faithful Intellectual Aristocrat (信仰高地上的精神贵族)," ibid.; Tang, "The

Quality of Strategists (战略家的素养)."; ibid.

210 EC members kept fostering new generation of strategic thinkers. In 2015, Li Bingyan co-authored a book with two new generation military scholars to explore future wars.737 In short, the EC as a community has been shrinking, but their ideas are still influential.

737 Yanning Hu; Bingyan Li; Shengliang Wang, Light Warfare (光战争) (Beijing PLA Publishing House, 2015).

211 Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study has documented and examined a group of defence analysts, military newspaper and journal editors, and academics that emerged in the early 1980s. They advocated a holistic, forward-looking approach to defence studies and planning, forming an epistemic community of pioneers in the study of foreign military development and war experiences. They introduced many ideas related to the RMA, adapted them for the Chinese context and transmitted them to PLA decision-makers and disseminated them to the whole PLA.

There are three parts in this conclusion. The first part summarises major findings of this thesis. The second part discusses the significance of the argument of this thesis. The third part addresses the implications of these findings for future PLA reforms and the international security environment.

7.1 Summary of Major Findings

Some major findings of this study are summarised in the following.

There has been an epistemic community in the PLA that has been advocating a holistic, forward-looking approach to defence planning since the early 1980s. Their efforts in exploring future wars and creating a peacetime defence planning framework led the PLA to focus on future local wars, the new technological revolution and the informatisation of the military. Their studies, to a large extent, define the combination of concepts that comprise the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

Although perceptions of change in the international security environment and the new technological revolution were two factors which precipitated China’s military revolution. The RMA would have been much delayed or not happened at all, without a community of experts advocating a holistic, forward-looking approach to defence planning. Peacetime defence planning deals with the future rather than the present, involving greater uncertainty than planning for immediate war. Preoccupation with imminent all-out war prevented the PLA from making long-term planning for peacetime. Had the RMA EC not advocate removing the influence of ‘two whatevers’

212 and developing a forward-looking, long-term perspective in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the PLA may have been preoccupied with preparations for imminent all-out war for many more years, ignoring the change in the international security environment and technological revolution. Thus, the forward-looking approach for peacetime defence planning advocated by the RMA EC since the late 1970s is one of their major contributions.

A domestic political environment is important in fostering both the intellectual climate for the emergence of such epistemic communities and a decision-making system, as well as an advisory system able to transmit ideas from policy researchers to the decision-makers. The intellectual environment created by Deng in the late 1970s and early 1980s fostered the intellectual development of the Chinese scholars.

The contribution of the RMA EC is mainly intellectual. First, they always advocated a holistic approach to address defence planning issues. They always urged the PLA not focus on the military itself, but to adopt a systemic, comprehensive way of thinking and planning, or systematic thinking. Since the 1980s, they promoted systematic engineering and strategic studies to the PLA. They studied the relations between economic development and national defence. They expanded the definition of national interests to other domains such as space, cyberspace and maritime. They argued that to properly engage in defence planning, the PLA had to have a better understanding of many other aspects of the society. Moreover, the PLA had to take overseas interests into account. In the 1990s, they further expanded the definition of national security and argued that it includes all aspect of security (e.g., economic, cultural and ideological), not only defence.

Moreover, the RMA EC always emphasised the importance of focusing on the future. For example, even they were pioneers advocating computer simulation and realistic combat training as ways to train troops, the biggest contribution they made regarding computer simulation was not the technology or simulation itself but the way of using it. More specifically, they repeatedly urged to use those models to simulate future wars under high-tech and informatised conditions rather than simulating previous wars. Their contribution was not to create any high-tech technologies or weapons, but to introduce ideas to cope with the rapidly changing high-tech

213 environment and wars. A holistic, forward-looking approach to defence planning is the main characteristic that distinguishes the RMA EC from other military experts and was another of their major contributions to the PLA.

To influence policies, experts need, first, channels into the decision-making process and, second, partners in military services and MRs with the ability to form winning coalitions. Ideas promoted by epistemic communities do not matter much unless these two conditions are met. Their success in leading the PLA to the current RMA is not only attributable to the ideas they created, but also their skills in reaching decision-makers; their skills in diffusing ideas to policy research community, as well as scientists and combat troops.

Moreover, their sensitivity to timing and understanding the art of framing their ideas are crucial. This study also finds that they are good at identifying and capitalising on opportunities (created by international crises and policy changes) to influence policymaking.

Regarding the RMA EC’s contribution to the Chinese RMA, they first created an intellectual climate favourable to the RMA. More specifically, they helped shift China’s threat perception from an imminent war mentality to long-term peacetime conventional deterrence. They fostered future-oriented debates that were unorthodox and seemingly bizarre. Second, they shifted the PLA’s paradigm from short-term to long-term issues—that is, they changed China’s defence planning paradigm. Third, they found a way to balance defence spending and economic growth, explored future wars and created a framework for peacetime defence planning. Fourth, they were also instrumental in disseminating those ideas to PLA institutions and penetrated the whole PLA. They also found channels to influence the highest decision-making processes.

7.2 Significance of Results

This study contributes to both the existing literature on the Chinese RMA and military innovation. By tracing the evolution of ideas that led to the Chinese RMA, this study provides a detailed explanation of the RMA with Chinese characteristics. Previous studies mostly explain the Chinese RMA as the Gulf War and Kosovo War serving as a wake-up call to the PLA leadership as to the foreign threat enabled by the

214 RMA. But none of these previous cannot tell us why China choose the combination of concepts which together form the RMA with Chinese characteristics, or why the concept survived despite various leadership transitions.

Regarding this study’s contribution to the military innovation literature, this is a typical bottom-up case of military innovation. It was a loosely connected network of experts voluntarily gathering together through various means to exchange ideas. They were not assigned to the task. What kept them together were common beliefs and policy agenda. The findings of this study suggest that fostering innovative thinking among PLA officers had a less obvious but long-term influence on policymaking. The significance of understanding the bottom-up process of the Chinese RMA is that it provides us a better understanding of the rationale behind the Chinese RMA and military innovation in general.

Moreover, this study is a three-level analysis, touching on domestic-level factors, external factors and individual-level factors, unlike most studies which attribute the Chinese RMA solely to external threats or leadership roles. This study argues that the emergence of the RMA EC was largely attributable to China’s domestic political changes, and the Deng leadership played a critical role in creating an intellectual climate favourable to the emergence of the community. This community was a voluntary group of experts, driven by common beliefs and policy agenda. Their activities and ideas were not directed by the PLA leaders. This makes the creation and adoption of the Chinese RMA a case of bottom-up innovation. Few scholars have touched on this.

7.3 Implications of Findings for Future Chinese Reforms

This study has some implications for the study of current and future PLA reforms. The current period is very similar to the period from the late 1970s and 1980s. First, it is widely accepted in the US defence community that new artificial intelligence and robotic technologies are now revolutionising the conduct of warfare. The third offset strategy the US announced in November 2014 is arguably another attempt towards a new RMA, as was the second offset strategy in the 1970s. The third offset strategy is a focused program by which the US and its allies could use their

215 technological superiority to neutralise China’s A2/AD advantages. According to many senior Pentagon officials, it is essentially competitive strategy for peacetime deterrence, for great power competition with China and Russia. How do the Chinese perceive the third offset strategy? How might they react to it? What countermeasures may they have? Would China initiate another RMA? This study improves the ability to explore, explain and anticipate the directions of the PLA’s force build-up. The current RMA, which China officially embarked on in 2002, give us some ideas about China’s future activities. As far as a competition is concerned, China’s reaction to the third offset strategy will determine the future development of the strategy. The US offset strategy and China’s potential responses will have great implications for regional and world stability. For example, in order to understand if or how would the PLA respond to the ongoing automation revolution, we could try to find out if there is a community of experts who have been studying the artifice intelligence and its implications to future wars, and who are those people have been monitoring the U.S. third offset strategy. We may ask some questions such as: are they a coherent group of experts that share common beliefs with regard to future wars? Do they share common policy agenda? What are their channels to influence decision-making? What are the mechanisms for diffusion of their ideas? Do they have the skills to form winning coalitions? And what are their perceptions of the artificial intelligence and the U.S third offset strategy?

Second, similar with Deng’s efforts in the late 1970s, Xi Jinping has called for building world-class Chinese think tanks. Xi’s emphasis on the role of think tanks is, in fact, initiating another period of reforming the advisory system. It may open another window of opportunity for defence intellectuals to pose more influence on PLA decision-making. This study has provided a framework and example of an epistemic community’s influence on PLA policymaking.

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