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Local dynamics in the Syrian conflict: homegrown links in rebel areas blunt Jihadist ascendency Oweis, Khaled Yacoub

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Oweis, K. Y. (2016). Local dynamics in the Syrian conflict: homegrown links in rebel areas blunt Jihadist ascendency. (SWP Comment, 34/2016). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48009-5

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Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Local Dynamics in the Syrian Conflict Homegrown Links in Rebel Areas Blunt Jihadist Ascendency

Khaled Yacoub Oweis SWP Comments

The Assad family reign has been marked by the ubiquitous intrusion of the Alawite- dominated security apparatus on the micro-level. The demise of the regime’s vast network of repression in many regions has resulted in local patterns of governance, restoring or generating old and new elites. With the jihadist ascendency, many of the emerging structures have been smothered by religious ideology. Yet, under the surface, local power has been shaped by area-specific relationships and embedded cultures. Support from Western actors has increasingly focused on local actors who are seen as being opposed to the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. Without a fundamental change in the nature of the regime, however, prospects for harnessing such local dynamics for the larger objective of stabilization will remain limited.

Until the 2011 uprising, the security ists set up local councils and coordinated apparatus had prevented the emergence with the nascent Free Syrian Army (FSA). of local actors, except for those linked to Starting in 2012, the jihadist ascendency the regime. The security agents, over- and the influx of foreign fighters under- whelmingly belonging to the minority mined the civic roots of the revolt and Alawite sect, lived off – and enriched them- challenged the local structures of self- selves through – extortion and protection governance. But the jihadists could not rackets while providing a certain order. In monopolize control over the rebel areas. areas under regime control, this system Despite their firepower and use of violence, still holds. But where regime troops pulled jihadists’ influence differs from one area out, it unraveled, and many local popula- to the other and depends on the clout of tions reclaimed ownership of their com- new or resurgent local elites, local religious munities. These rebel areas are largely and societal traditions, and the balance of populated by Sunni Muslims and comprise power between the different rebel groups. parts of northern, central, and southern Social imbalances relating to class and Syria outside the control of the regime as wealth and the legacy of social engineering well as the so-called Islamic State. employed by the Baath regime over decades To deal with the vacuum of governance likewise play a role. Ideologically, the local created by the retreat of the regime, activ- populations responded differently to the

Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “Local, regional and international dynamics in the Syria conflict” SWP Comments 34 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office July 2016

1 jihadist creed, and often remained com- Social Decline Amplifies mitted to the moderate core values that Jihadist Appeal have been the hallmark of Islam as prac- With the demise of formal governance, the ticed in Syria for centuries. clan as a social entity underwent a resur- gence after the revolt. Clan structures and coherence, however, have been affected Al-Qaeda vs. the Southern Clans by the deteriorating living standards and An example of local structures curbing ex- the alienation of a new generation of poor tremism played out in the southern Hauran youth wrought by the civil war – factors Plain, the original birthplace of the revolt that have played into the hands of the and the biggest remaining stronghold of Islamic State with its abundant cash the Arab and Western-backed FSA. Across reserves. Similar to the rest of rebel Syria, Syria, the quiet spread of Salafist beliefs many youngsters were 12 to 14 years old brought back by Syrian expatriates re- when the revolt started and have been turning from Saudi Arabia as well as veter- without education for more than five years. ans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had In private, local FSA commanders backed prepared the ground for jihadism. Salafism by the United States complain that their in the south, however, remained tempered proposals to subsidize vulnerable youth by Damascus-based clerics adhering to a with as little as $50 per month – so that rational tradition of Islam, who wielded they would stay home rather than join the influence over the area through trade links Islamic State for the money – were turned extending all the way to the Arab peninsu- down by Washington. la. A small branch of the Masalmeh clan, More than the Nusra Front, the Islamic some of whom had fought in Iraq and State appears to have a micro understand- Afghanistan, formed a group that eventual- ing of the workings of local powers. For ly linked up with the Nusra Front, and then instance, the group won allies by helping to with the self-declared Islamic State, and restore local elites who had been sidelined fought FSA units in Deraa. Yet, their influ- by the coercive realignments of society and ence remained limited, not least because the economy deployed by Hafez al-Assad their attempts to impose strict social codes to broaden the social base of his regime. (for instance, beating men who were caught In 2012, a rebel group called the Yarmouk smoking) did not go down well with a Martyrs Brigade was formed in the Yar- population that has traditionally combined mouk River Valley near the border with devoutness with a degree of personal Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan freedom. Heights. The group’s leader – a descendant Hauran’s social organization into large of a local notable family by the name of clans also stood in the way of the jihadists. Abu Ali al-Baridi – had links with senior For instance, in 2014 a Nusra Front cell in jihadists, veterans of the Afghanistan war Deraa, comprised mainly of members of with access to cash through apparent links the Hariri clan, pressured local clerics to with al-Qaeda. The founders also included declare an FSA unit as being comprised the Jaounis, a large family of Palestinian of kuffar (unbelievers) for receiving Western origin. Freed from the control of the Assad backing. The Nusra Front members encoun- regime, the Baridis and Jaounis reestab- tered resistance from their own relatives lished themselves as the de facto rulers of in the Hariri clan, as the unit in question the Yarmouk Valley. When initial Jordanian was led by an officer from the Nusairat funding dried up in 2015, Baridi apparently clan, raising the specter of a blood feud allied himself with the Islamic State. As a between two major Haurani clans. result, fighting started between the Yar- mouk Martyrs and the Nusra Front, as well as Jordanian-backed FSA brigades. In No-

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2 vember 2015, Baridi, his deputy Abu Abdal- well organized – the local FSA brigade lah al-Jaouni, and others in the top leader- maintained a presence by simultaneously ship tier of the group were killed in a sui- cooperating with the Nusra Front and cide attack in the village of Jamleh, possibly playing on the rivalry between the Nusra with the help of a local clan at odds with Front and Ahrar al-Sham. Interestingly, the Baridis. That did not spell the end of the many supporters of the Nusra Front in the Yarmouk Martyrs, though: the combination town are former Baath functionaries who of the difficult terrain and the standing of were excluded from the civic organizations the Jaouni and the Baridi clans has proved established after the revolt, and joined the hard to defeat. Islamists to preserve their positions and Although the FSA has held its ground protect themselves. To avoid confrontation, in the south, power centers built around it locals have tended to observe Nusra Front have in some cases compounded imbalanc- edicts to close down shops during prayer es resulting from deteriorating economic time, but many support Ahrar al-Sham. conditions, providing inroads for the Is- Unlike in other towns, where Nusra was lamic State. The FSA brigades in Hauran, able to monopolize the supply of bread, most of whom are linked to the US-led Ahrar al-Sham and the FSA brigades also Military Operations Centre in Jordan, are run their own bakeries in Kfar Nubul, underpinned by membership from promi- denying the Front the power that comes nent local clans. In contrast, one group, with control over this crucial staple. But called Jaish al-Jihad, originated in a camp the balance in Kfar Nubul – and the capaci- in Deraa for refugees from the Golan ty of the local council to maneuver between Heights and their descendants. Lacking the jihadi groups – has been tenuous. Coun- both clan pedigree and resources, Jaish cil members have been kidnapped for al-Jihad received little local or outside sup- allegedly supporting rival groups, prompt- port, making it receptive to the Islamic ing civic activists to call for all armed State, with which it eventually struck an groups to leave the town. The Nusra Front alliance. Conversely, Jaish al-Jihad’s lack responded by closing down an independent of clan backing also made it easier for the radio station in Kfar Nubul in June 2016. FSA to take on this group, as opposed to Shortly after, the founder of the station the Yarmouk Martyrs. was injured in an assassination attempt in Aleppo, while a prominent citizen jour- nalist in his company was killed in the Local Pragmatism attack. Still, all-out warfare has been avoid- In other areas of Syria, local communities ed in Kfar Nubul, as most members of the lacking any external support often tended armed factions hail from Kfar Nubul itself to deal with the jihadists pragmatically. In and have showed a degree of local sensibili- southern parts of Idlib province, local elites ty, aided by a historical lack of class and needed the Nusra Front’s firepower to ward clan differences in the town. off regime attacks. But they hedged their In turf battles with other rebels in Idlib, bets by striking alliances with other the Nusra Front also appears to have been Islamist – though less radical – groups. aware of the local element. When the group Idlib province, which borders Turkey, attacked installations belonging to the local fell completely under rebel control in 2015 FSA unit in the town of Maarat al-Numaan after an offensive mostly carried out by an in 2015 and encountered local protests, on-and-off alliance between the Nusra Front only Nusra Front troops recruited from and its Salafist rival, Ahrar al-Sham. In the outside the town were used. Apparently, town of Kfar Nubul – a community on the the Nusra Front preferred to not test the fringes of Idlib, where civic activists with loyalty of members recruited from Maarat an egalitarian orientation were particular al-Numaan by having them shoot at their

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3 fellow townsfolk. Pragmatism has also been initial phase of the revolt’s militarization. a dominant feature in the al-Rouj region, In November 2011, rebels from the Khali- which is a collection of agricultural villages diya neighborhood killed six pilots and in the southwest of Idlib province. Here, other military personnel in an ambush set the Nusra Front has been seen as a bulwark up to take hostages, who would then be against regime forces concentrated in the exchanged for men from Khalidiya who neighboring governorate of Latakia. But its had been arrested by the regime during the welcome has been tempered by weariness initially peaceful protests in Homs. The of foreign and non-local Syrian fighters, operation went awry when the soldiers on such as Beduin who were driven out of the bus detected the ambush, and all were their home area around Deir al-Zor by the killed in the firefight that ensued. The rebel Islamic State. Seen as overzealous and con- squad operated under an FSA banner, but temptuous toward the locals, these Beduin the men who attacked the bus were fi- units have caused significant resentment. nanced by a Syrian expatriate from Khali- diya who lived in Saudi Arabia. When this funding dried up, the group, which was led Jihadists Compensate for Scarce by the former imam of a Khalidiya mosque Resources known as Abu Yazan, shifted allegiance Yet, the fate of homegrown groups that to the Nusra Front; when the latter’s posi- took on the Nusra Front on their own have tion in the Homs region deteriorated, they served as cautionary tales for others in the switched allegiance to the Islamic State. region. One was the Idlib Martyrs Brigade, All along, their objectives remained local, formed in 2012 by members of the Sayyed first and foremost. While focused on taking Issa family, which had been persecuted by revenge against the regime for the violence the regime in the 1980s for supporting the it had dealt the neighborhood, Abu Yazan Muslim Brotherhood. In 2013, the Idlib remained highly pragmatic. Any ally who Martyrs were defeated by the Nusra Front would help fight the Assad regime was in battles in the western Idlib countryside. welcome. The Nusra Front hounded the remaining members of the group for months after the confrontation, killing them or forcing some Resilience of a Civic Model to join their fighting units, where they In other cases, local religious traditions were used as cannon fodder on the front constitute another element in understand- lines. Other local rebel groups such as the ing the dynamics of the conflict. On the so-called Free Men of the Middle Mountain grassroots level, political and religious Brigade attempted to ward off encroach- awareness sometimes have provided the ment by the Nusra Front by joining its means to address local tensions, deal with main rival, Ahrar al-Sham. Such alliances jihadists, and cope with the regime’s siege were, however, often merely tactical and warfare. Most of the hinterland of Damas- did not reflect commitment to the group’s cus – a patchwork of recently built-up areas Salafist creed, but rather the lack of – and and farmland known as the Ghouta – is urgent need for – external support to hold overwhelmingly Sunni. Salafi thought has their ground against the jihadis. Ultimate- been spreading in such areas since the ly, the need for resources – initially to fight American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet, the regime, and later competing groups – the town of Daraya in the southwestern remains the key factor that determines how Ghouta stood out for its particular tradition rebel groups deal with the jihadis. This is of civic awareness underpinned by religious obvious in the trajectory of the Homs-based commitment. Founded by the Islamic rebel group, which staged one of the land- scholar Jawdat Saeed, the Daraya school mark attacks on Assad’s forces during the had developed an Islamic theory of civic

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4 and peaceful resistance against oppressive which fell under regime siege later in the rulers. Unlike Sunni clerics backed by the same year. The rebels, many of whom were regime, who bestowed religious legitimacy local protesters who took up arms after the on Hafez al-Assad while steering the popu- crackdown, remained in close coordination lace away from politics, Saeed called for with the local council and refrained from political engagement. His body of work is interfering in it. Daraya also relied on the also positioned against the approach of support of expatriates from the town as the late Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist well as educated youth who had fled the ideologue whose theories had a formative crackdown but resumed their activism in influence on the founders of al-Qaeda. Turkey and the West. Under international Already a decade before the revolt, youth pressure, in June 2016 the regime allowed from Daraya had embarked on campaigns the first food delivery into Daraya since to clean the streets and improve conditions 2012, where several thousand civilians – in their neglected suburb. To the regime, of an original population of 80,000 – still such civic activities were a challenge to its live under siege. Today, Daraya is highly monopoly over all forms of social organiza- vulnerable to fall to a renewed regime of- tion. Dozens were arrested, tortured, or fensive after extensive aerial bombardment forced to flee the country. When the revolt weakened the rebels’ defense parameters. broke out, these pre-existing local struc- tures and experiences generated large demonstrations and a council staffed by Tales of Two Cities educated members who worked along By contrast, in the eastern part of the specialized lines. Daraya became a civic Ghouta, a harsher and power-hungry model for many Syrians opposed to Assad, school of Islam produced an undemocratic and accordingly was dealt a particularly model of rebel governance that exacerbated brutal crackdown early on. Three Daraya local differences and became prone to youth injured by regime gunfire at a pro- corruption. The region was also an early democracy demonstration were shot dead casualty of the regime’s strategy to under- in their beds at a government hospital. mine the civic and peaceful orientation of Ghiyath Matar, a 25-year-old follower of the revolt by injecting radical elements. In Saeed, distributed flowers and water to June 2011, the authorities released Zahran Assad’s soldiers, but was arrested, tortured, Alloush from prison – a Salafist cleric and and killed by Airforce Intelligence in Sep- a native of Douma, one of the largest sub- tember 2011. Western ambassadors, who urbs in Eastern Ghouta – along with other were still in Damascus at the time, went jihadists who had fought in Iraq. With collectively to Daraya to pay their condo- Saudi financial backing, Alloush set up lences, but the gesture did nothing to what by 2013 became the “Army of Islam” mitigate the crackdown. Attracted by the (Jaish al-Islam), which evolved into one of Daraya model, Issam Zaghloul, a Dama- the largest rebel groups – numbering an scene lawyer, went to the suburb and em- estimated 15,000 fighters – as well as being barked on setting up an independent court. one of the most well-equipped and funded. Secret police abducted Zaghloul from his A key figure in securing support from office in Damascus, and he is presumed to Riyadh has been Alloush’s father, Abdullah, have died in Assad’s security dungeons. In a preacher in exile with close links to the one of several regime offensives, the mostly Wahhabi clerical establishment, which Alawite Republican Guards overran Daraya underpins the Saudi monarchy. Initially, in 2012 and summarily executed hundreds Jaish al-Islam captured large arms depots of young men. The killings spurred large- from the regime and had supply routes scale armed resistance in Daraya that drove opened to Jordan and Turkey, before out Assad’s forces from most of the suburb, Assad’s troops and Iranian-backed Shi’ite

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5 militia imposed a tight siege on the Eastern local councils and refused to submit to the Ghouta. In 2014, Jaish al-Islam expelled the authority of the Unified Judiciary Council – Islamic State from Eastern Ghouta, where it a tribunal including representatives of the had made inroads in 2013 by relying on various brigades in Eastern Ghouta that recruits drawn largely from Golan Heights was supposed to arbitrate in disputes be- refugees in the nearby district of Hajar al- tween rebel groups and as an independent Aswad. court drawing on a mix of religious and Realizing the strength of Jaish al-Islam, civic law. But Jaish al-Islam refused to hand the Nusra Front and other groups operating over hundreds of prisoners in its custody in Eastern Ghouta kept their heads low as to the tribunal, many of whom had been Alloush consolidated power. But resent- captured in turf warfare and have not been ment rose against Alloush as he imprisoned heard from since. Families of the prisoners members of other armed factions. Jaish al- joined a growing civic protest movement Islam also stands accused of abducting four in Ghouta against Jaish al-Islam, but to no prominent secular activists who had taken avail. Male relatives of the prisoners often refuge in Douma and disappeared in ended up joining the Nusra Front, moti- August 2014. The “Douma Four” include vated more by resentment against Jaish al- human rights lawyer Razan Zaitouneh, Islam than by jihadist leanings. Tension who, after the revolt, helped found grass- burst into open warfare in May 2016, with roots organizations known as local coor- hundreds of fighters from Jaish al-Islam dination committees, and Samira Khalil, a and rival rebel factions – including the former political prisoner and wife of Yassin Nusra Front – reportedly killed. The Assad al-Khalil Haj-Saleh, a veteran leftist who is regime and Hezbollah took advantage of now in Istanbul. the infighting and captured several towns Localized war economies that formed and large tracts of agricultural land in the during the civil war also helped foster new Eastern Ghouta virtually unopposed, re- networks and rivalries. Resentment grew ducing rebel territory in Eastern Ghouta over favoritism within Jaish al-Islam, but approximately by a quarter. in particular about the group having ex- At the same time, the limited ceasefire ploited the siege imposed by the regime as deal agreed upon by Russia and the United a business opportunity. Situated at the edge States in February 2016 reduced the threat of Eastern Ghouta, Douma became a hub of aerial bombings by the regime, encour- for tunnels dug under a main highway that aging civilians in Eastern Ghouta to take would supply the rebel districts of Qaboun to the streets again and protest against the and Barzeh, closer to Damascus. The tunnel rebels across the board for endangering trade disproportionally benefited Alloush’s Eastern Ghouta. Jaish al-Islam’s conduct has protégés and merchants from Douma. also undermined its cohesiveness: members Unlike their peers in Damascus, most of a brigade stationed in the nearby Damas- merchants in Douma had not hesitated to cus district of Qaboun stayed away from the back the revolt. Many viewed themselves as fighting in Eastern Ghouta, considering it discriminated against and marginalized a selfish and unnecessary turf war between by the regime’s alliance with the business Douma and the other towns. class of the capital. Still, the Douma elite became seen as growing rich at the expense of the rest of Eastern Ghouta. Other rebels benefited from the tunnel trade, too. But Alloush, who was killed in an air strike in December 2015, became an embodiment of a revolt gone wrong. Jaish al-Islam under- mined local governance by interfering in

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6 Conclusions and Recommendations stance, in the south many activists already The attitudes and interests of old and new refer to the southern brigades of the FSA local elites have played a main role in con- as Sahawat, an allusion to the Iraqi militias taining or expanding the jihadist reach. of that name which helped the American They have also provided governance where occupation forces to defeat al-Qaeda in the Syrian state, which had been captured Sunni-majority areas after 2006, but by the extended Assad clan, had been achieved few political gains for the Sunnis. forced to withdraw. Any attempts to solve In northern Syria, the United States has the Syrian conflict with diplomatic means backed the Kurdish PYD (Democratic Union and reconstruct Syria as a coherent politi- Party) – the Syrian branch of the PKK cal unit will have to rely on their coopera- (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) – even as the tion. This may require difficult choices: by group advanced beyond the areas tradi- far not all of the groups and brigades that tionally settled by Kurds and into Arab wield power on the ground and/or enjoy territory. The PYD advance raises concern legitimacy among local populations may across local rebel communities that the appear palatable to Western actors. At the Sunni rebel areas – with Western collusion same time, the high variety in local pat- – are being squeezed between the regime terns of interaction indicate that behind on the coast, the Islamic State to the east, the smoke screen of Islamist ideology, the Kurdish militia in the north, and a many groups may be receptive to incentives Jordanian and Western-backed mercenary that lead to different approaches. For in- force in the south, with the objective of stance, a formation such as Ahrar al-Sham imposing a solution that amounts to little could be key. The group has often acted as more than a facelift for the Assad regime. a balancing force in rebel areas, and has been torn between hardliners and more pragmatic figures. Including the latter International Diplomacy elements in a pacification process could On the diplomatic side, more and more be part of a larger process that separates members of the mainstream Syrian opposi- those Islamists who are ready to respect a tion see the negotiations in Geneva as an (admittedly low) minimum of democratic attempt to impose just such a formula, and humanitarian ground rules from the with changes being restricted to the formal jihadi hard core that will have to be con- makeup of the political institutions and a tained and rolled back by military force. token increase of Sunnis and other com- At the same time, such pragmatism finds munities in positions of nominal power. its limits when it comes to a continuation Yet, the key for substantial change and of Assad’s rule and Alawite domination. for harnessing the civic and democratic Local alliances have shifted in sometimes potentials in Syrian society – including the unpredictable ways and several times over, local elites in the rebel areas – lies in a but few, if any, rebels have ever sought or radical overhaul of the security sector, accepted support from regime troops and where the real power resides. Reform of the militias against their rivals. Thus, the cur- security sector is slotted as a topic in the rent strategy pursued by Western nations Geneva peace talks and appears to be a and some Arab countries, such as Jordan priority for Germany, which is a member and the United Arab Emirates, to restrict of the International Syria Support Group support to actors who make fighting the (ISSG). Russia, on the other hand, appears Islamic State and al-Qaeda a priority, while more than happy to endorse the security “leaving Assad for later,” is likely to back- sector as is. But the enormous size, reach, fire. Where FSA units appear to comply and sectarian composition of the numerous with these pressures, their local legitimacy security branches should be slashed. Only suffers and jihadis gain support. For in- by turning them into fully accountable

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7 bodies operating under civilian law and politically neutral (or bi-partisan) oversight would a fundamental shift in the structure of the Syrian system be possible. It could also take the sting out of an increasingly sectarian discourse that blames Alawites as a sect – rather than the small circle of Ala- wites who hold the reins of power – for the crackdown on the revolt and the subse- quent destruction that befell rebel areas. The time for such an approach may be running out, however. Local elites are less and less able to integrate and control the youth in rebel areas, more and more of

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und whom have become impoverished and Politik, 2016 uprooted and who are deprived of educa- All rights reserved tion. They form a ready recruiting ground These Comments reflect for the Islamic State and other radical the author’s views. groups, which will undermine efforts to SWP bring local communities into any frame- Stiftung Wissenschaft und work that may be established through the Politik German Institute for Geneva process. On the other end of the International and spectrum, thousands of peaceful and Security Affairs educated Syrians have been languishing Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 in Assad’s jails and underground dungeons 10719 Berlin since the crackdown on the revolt and the Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 subsequent waves of arrests and abduc- www.swp-berlin.org tions. Many have already died or disap- [email protected] peared, but their fates have been largely ISSN 1861-1761 treated by the ISSG as a footnote. Aside from the humanitarian imperative, their presence could be crucial for the stabiliza- tion of the local level, especially if a settle- ment is reached that opens the way for them to reestablish themselves in their hometowns. The same holds true for the thousands of civic activists who fled the country and would need effective security guarantees to be able to return and con- tribute toward the restoration of state structures that would serve the Syrian people, rather than the survival in power of a small, corrupt, and excessively violent and sectarian elite.

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