Evan Mawdsley. : Twelve Days That Began a World War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. 360 pp. $30.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-300-15445-0.

Reviewed by J. Garry Cliford

Published on H-Diplo (June, 2012)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

In this deeply researched and well-written war against the United States, and Adolf Hitler book, Evan Mawdsley reconstructs the climactic outlined to his inner circle his secret plans for ex‐ twelve days in December 1941 that became the terminating Europe’s Jews. As the twelve-day peri‐ key turning point of World War II. In day-to-day od ended, the British prime minister, Winston S. detail, he shows how the disparate fghting in the Churchill, invited himself to spend Christmas in Far East, the Atlantic, North Africa, and the Soviet Washington, while Foreign Secretary Anthony Union suddenly fused together into a truly global Eden traveled to Moscow to discuss wartime coop‐ war. eration and postwar plans with Premier Joseph On December 1, Emperor Hirohito approved Stalin. In Mawdsley’s artful retelling, these twelve fnal Japanese war plans to attack Britain and the days began a “new war,” in Churchill’s phrase, United States. Within the next few days, British that would spell defeat for the Axis powers, end forces in Libya pushed General Erwin Rommel’s European empires in Asia, and give rise to the Afrika Korps back toward Tobr`uk, while London bipolar Soviet-American Cold War over the next also reinforced Singapore with the arrival of two half century. capital ships, the Repulse and Prince of Wales. The Moving deftly from London to Berlin to Tokyo Red Army’s frst successful counterattack against to Rome to Moscow to Singapore to Manila to exhausted German forces west of Moscow came Washington and to other distant locales, Mawds‐ on December 6, followed a day later by Japan’s ley reviews the unfolding events largely through successful surprise assault on Pearl Harbor and the eyes and decisions of the principal leaders-- its invasion of Malaya. By December 12, President Roosevelt, Churchill, Hitler, Stalin, and Japan’s Franklin D. Roosevelt had rallied stunned Ameri‐ embattled warlords--none of whom could antici‐ cans with his “Day of Infamy” speech, Germany pate the eventual outcome. The Japanese may and Italy had foolishly and obligingly declared have come the closest to sensing the future, even H-Net Reviews as they launched their high-risk operations As for Churchill, who famously “slept the against and Malaya, convinced that Wash‐ sleep of the saved and thankful” the night he was ington’s trade embargo “threatened the very exis‐ told about Pearl Harbor, the prime minister had tence of our empire,” as Premier Tojo Hideki put to face “the full horror” of losing the Repulse and it, and thus justifed a gamble that might result in Prince of Wales to Japanese torpedo planes of the national suicide (p. 11). Noting that the Germans Malayan coast two days later (pp. 177, 238). In had “never pressed Tokyo for a direct attack on what Mawdsley calls an example of “mirror imag‐ America,” Mawdsley points to the irony of Hitler’s ing,” Churchill dispatched the two doomed war‐ jubilation when news of Pearl Harbor reached ships to Singapore in the mistaken expectation him in his East Prussia headquarters on the that they would mimic the German battleships evening of December 7 (p. 22). Having just re‐ Bismarck and Tirpitz by tying down enemy units turned from overseeing Wehrmacht operations in and forcing “the already overstretched Japanese Russia and erroneously thinking that a Pacifc to think twice about further mischief” (pp. 81, 83). war would prevent Americans from concentrat‐ When the deterrent became the target for de‐ ing on a strategy, the German dicta‐ struction, as did the U.S. Pacifcfeet in Oahu, it tor denounced the “Anglo-Saxon Jewish-capitalist opened the way for Japan’s conquests from Singa‐ world,” called President Roosevelt a liar and ag‐ pore to the Solomon Islands over the next six gressor, and gratuitously declared war on the months. Notwithstanding subsequent counterof‐ United States before a cheering Reichstag on De‐ fensives in the Pacifc and Burma in 1942-43, cember 11 (p. 252). Japan’s thrust southward “had a permanent ef‐ Back in Washington, Roosevelt had promised fect. European colonial power was never efec‐ the British as early as December 1 that if Japan tively restored” (p. 284). moved against Malaya or the Dutch East Indies Mawdsley also elucidates key parts of the sto‐ “we should obviously all be together,” even ry through the observations of lesser players, es‐ though he would need a few days “to get things pecially those who kept diaries, such as Nazi pro‐ into political shape here” (p. 73). Despite the deba‐ paganda chief Joseph Goebbels who dutifully cle at Pearl Harbor, which Mawdsley attributes as recorded the sinister link between Hitler’s deci‐ much to misperceptions and mishandling in sion for war against America and “the destruction Washington as to unpreparedness in Honolulu, of the Jews [that] must be its necessary conse‐ Roosevelt followed up his “Day of Infamy” speech quence” (p. 263). The Wannsee Conference in Jan‐ with a stirring “Fireside Chat” where he pro‐ uary 1942 would fesh out the details of the loom‐ claimed that “there is no such thing as security for ing Holocaust. Another perceptive diarist was any nation--or any individual--in a world ruled by Britain’s ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax the principles of gangsterism” (p. 226). After infer‐ (E. F. L. Wood), who lost a bet to his wife when the ring from “Magic” intercepts that Hitler intended “Japanese balloon” went up earlier than he had to declare war, the president waited two more predicted (p. 120). The one scenario that might days for Hitler to act before announcing that “the give the Japanese “cause for pause,” Halifax noted long known and the long expected has taken on December 3, was “if things are really going place,” whereupon Congress voted for war against [bad] against the Germans in Russia” (p. 92). Un‐ Germany and Italy with only one abstention (p. fortunately, U.S. diplomats had rejected any 253). In Mawdsley’s words, Roosevelt had begun eleventh hour modus vivendi that might have what Henry Luce called “the American Century” continued negotiations for another month, and with all its global commitments (p. 215).

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General Georgii Zhukov’s successful counterattack mate decision about whether to fght for the Sovi‐ came too late for Tokyo’s leaders to take notice. et capital” (p. 97). He also highlights Stalin’s diplo‐ A similarly well-placed witness was the com‐ matic skills, namely, for signing a Declaration of mander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the Polish H. Hart, who fulminated into his diary after meet‐ Government-in-Exile on December 5 and then for ing with his British counterpart in Singapore on his famous statement to a visiting Eden that he December 6: “my Government has assured the preferred “practical arithmetic” to “algebra” by British of armed support in any one of four con‐ arguing for a treaty of alliance that would recog‐ tingencies.... And not a word to me about it” (p. nize the Soviet Union’s 1940 boundaries in any 156). Unwilling to approach Congress until shots postwar settlement (p. 275). Like Churchill and were fred, President Roosevelt had made com‐ Roosevelt, however, Stalin underestimated their mitments to London via Lord Halifax without new enemy, telling his visitors that the Japanese alerting his military chain of command to the must have been operating German aircraft in de‐ specifcs. Thus did Hart, his army counterpart livering “such telling blows against the British General Douglas MacArthur, and the commanders Navy in the Far East” and predicting that Japan at Pearl Harbor do their best to improvise in the “must fail within a few months” because its absence of complete information. Mawdsley even troops were “worn out” (p. 275). Because the Sovi‐ suggests that, however “arrogant, blinkered and et leader did avoid any commitment to entering ignorant of aviation” MacArthur may have been, the Pacifc war, the new Allies would henceforth he was “not to blame” for U.S. bombers in the fght “two separate wars” within the larger global Philippines being destroyed on the ground several confict and “we shall sufer as the result,” as hours after Pearl Harbor. Instead, Mawdsley Britain’s ambassador to Moscow predicted (p. faults “the men in Washington,” including “to 278). some extent the President himself,” for pursuing In Mawdsley’s superlative book, this reviewer “a half-baked strategy which provided the Philip‐ did note a few minor errors in his treatment of pines with aircraft but inadequate bases” (p. 194). American policies. He confuses, for example, the Nonetheless, despite all the blunders accompany‐ military backgrounds of Roosevelt’s Republican ing the outbreak of war in the Pacifc, Halifax cabinet ofcers, Henry L. Stimson and Frank mused in his diary: “I can’t imagine any way in Knox, saying that the seventy-four-year-old Stim‐ which they [the Japanese] could have acted so as son had served in the Spanish-American War to more completely rally ... and infuriate Ameri‐ when it was the Rough Rider Knox who had can opinion” (p. 176). fought alongside Teddy Roosevelt in 1898; Roo‐ As the author of a previous book, Thunder in sevelt’s secretary of war earned his title of the East: The Nazi-Soviet Struggle, 1941-1945 “Colonel” Stimson as an artillery ofcer in World (2005), Mawdsley is sure-footed in analyzing de‐ War I. Mawdsley also misidentifes the “powerful velopments on the eastern front. He recounts Democrat” from Texas as John, not Tom Connally Hitler’s frenetic eforts at micromanaging German (p. 178). These slips do not distort an otherwise ac‐ forces in front of Moscow, especially his counter‐ curate picture of the political crosscurrents that productive orders to “stand fast” with “fanatical the president had to navigate as he inched toward resistance” (p. 271). In contrast, Mawdsley credits war. In this regard, however, Mawdsley oversim‐ Stalin with keeping his nerve, for overseeing the plifes what he calls Roosevelt’s “most remarkable battle without obtrusively interfering with his wobble,” namely, the notorious 203-202 vote in commanders, and especially for making “the ulti‐ the House of Representatives in August 1941 that barely passed “the renewal of the one-year ‘selec‐

3 H-Net Reviews tive service’ conscription system” (p. 66). In fact, that legislation did not “renew” the draft itself, which was mandated by law to continue through 1945, but instead extended the one-year period of service to all trainees by an additional eighteen months. With Roosevelt failing to explain the ur‐ gent need for longer service and then slipping out of Washington during the House vote to confer ceremoniously with Churchill aboard the ill-fated Prince of Wales of Newfoundland, many repre‐ sentatives balked at breaking the implied promise of one year of training when Congress had enact‐ ed the Selective Service Act in September 1940. In‐ deed, the one-vote margin bore the maneuver mark of all such close votes, whereby everybody kept tally as the vote proceeded and individuals in delicately balanced districts were able to vote nay and yet see a measure that they fundamentally supported obtain enough votes to pass. If the vote for an eighteen-month extension had failed, a compromise on twelve months would have passed within a few days. Not even the most in‐ veterate isolationists wanted to disband the U.S. Army just months before Pearl Harbor. In short, this is international history at its fnest, a panoramic rendering of a watershed mo‐ ment in world history. It will be required reading for anyone interested in World War II.

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Citation: J. Garry Cliford. Review of Mawdsley, Evan. December 1941: Twelve Days That Began a World War. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. June, 2012.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35634

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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