COMMENTARY

higher than the highest fl ood level (HFL) The Force Multipliers of ever reached at that location, which was in June 2013. Disasters in The fi rst information of the unfolding disaster came from the almost instantane- ous videos on social media. In fact, even Himanshu Thakkar Uttarakhand Chief Minister Trivendra Singh Rawat told the media that he got While Uttarakhand is vulnerable ttarakhand is no stranger to fi rst information about the disaster from to disasters, climate change is disasters. But the fl ood disaster social media. In a way, that says a lot increasing these vulnerabilities. Uthat experienced about the disaster management in Utta- on the morning of 7 February 2021 was rakhand. Besides the as yet unquantifi ed Major human interventions unusual in many respects besides it being economic damage running into over like hydropower projects and winter when the disaster happened. A `2,000 crore (the damage to just the highways implemented without massive brown fl ood with a huge plume Tapovan Vishnugad HEP is estimated at an informed or democratic of dust was seen fi rst upstream of Reni over `1,500 crore), at least 72 people are village, following a loud bang that people confi rmed dead, and over 135 still miss- decision-making process act as heard. Reni, ironically, is the birthplace ing. The Uttarakhand government has force multipliers during such of the famous of the started the process to declare them as disasters. The violations of legal 1970s. The fl ood was seen suddenly travel- presumed dead. and other prudent norms in ling down the Rishiganga river at a men- The disaster is still not fully over as the acing speed of up to 30 metre (m) per Rishiganga river remains blocked by a their implementation further second, destroying everything in its way. 60 m high earthen dam at the Rishiganga– increase the damages. The It was carrying a lot of debris, including Ronthi Gad confl uence. It is created by absence of necessary monitoring, stones and boulders. It destroyed a bar- the debris brought down by the Rishigan- MW early warning systems and the rage and the existing 13.2 Rishiganga ga tributary Ronthi Gad, from the rock- hydropower project, several houses along fall-avalanche location, about 12 kilo- overall disaster management the banks of the river, blew away several metres (km) upstream from the Rishi- system add another layer of people and gra zing animals on the river- ganga–Ronthi Gad confl uence. A small damages during the disasters. bed, before its confl uence with the stream started fl owing downstream The lack of the ability to learn Dhauliganga river. from the landslide dam on 12 February, Along the Dhauliganga, the fl ood and its width was increased by the disas- lessons from disasters and lack destroyed a bridge and then the barrage ter management team. It is noteworthy of any accountability ensure the of the 520 MW Tapovan Vishnugad hydro- that the fi rst information about the exist- perpetuation of the situation. electric project (HEP) funded by the Asian ence of this landslide dam came from a Development Bank that was under con- non-government source, when Naresh struction since 2005, while also entering Rana, a geologist from Uttarakhand, into the tunnels of the project. It was shared a video of his visit to the area on in this area that the maximum human 11 February 2021. The offi cial agencies, lives were lost. Further downstream, it we learn, already knew about its exist- des troyed another bridge (a total of fi ve ence since 8 or 9 February, but did not bridges were destroyed). make the information public. Along the Alaknanda, the fl ood waves also entered the existing 400 MW Vishnu- How the Disaster Began prayag HEP through its tail race tunnel, The fi rst somewhat detailed account in and damaged the 444 MW Vishnugad the public domain of what may have Pipalkoti HEP of THDC India that was un- possibly happened leading to this disaster der construction, before the river en- came from Dave Petley (2021), a landslide tered a relatively broader, fl atter terrain expert geologist from the University downstream of Helang, thus slowly losing of Sheffi eld in the United Kingdom on steam. However, the extent of fl ooding 8 February 2021. Himanshu Thakkar ([email protected]) can be gauged from the fact that even at Petley said the detailed account was a is coordinator, South Asia Network on Dams, , along the Alaknanda river, result of inputs from a combination of Rivers and People, Delhi. the water level reached a massive 3.11 m world experts and citizen scientists and

Economic & Political Weekly EPW march 6, 2021 vol lVi no 10 13 COMMENTARY some fascinating satellite imagery from under construction), and central agencies training programme on “Resilient Infra- Planet Labs. His conclusion was that it suggesting that a glacier lake outburst structure in Hilly Areas: Avalanche, GLOF was a landslide disaster and explained fl ood (GLOF) or glacier breach or ava- & Debris Flow” on 18 February 2021, how it may have started a few months lanche or cloudburst, among others, Director of WIHG Kalachand Sain said that ago, culminating in falling of rocks and caused the disaster. Similarly, while sat- there was suffi cient time for the NTPC to snow from a height of 5,600 m to about ellite imageries from Planet Labs were evacuate all the people at risk at the 3,800 m, a fall of 1,800 m. available in media and on the internet, Tapovan Vishnugad HEP (FICCI 2021). India’s Home Minister Amit Shah told there was nothing in the public domain The Uttarakhand State Disaster Man- the Rajya Sabha at around 1 pm on from the Indian Space Research Organi- agement Authority seems completely 9 February 2021 that it was a snow sation or Uttarakhand Space Applica- absent from the scene either in terms of avalanche disaster (PIB 2021). He said: tion Centre till 10 February 2021. pre-disaster monitoring or in taking steps On 7 February 2021 at about 1,000 hours to save lives during the disaster. In fact, an avalanche has occurred in the upper Disaster Management there should have been an early warning catchment of Rishiganga River, a tributary Key aspects of disaster management in system in place that could have saved of Alaknanda River in Chamoli District of Uttarakhand, which led to sudden rise in the this context include monitoring, early many more lives. But, it does not exist water level of Rishiganga River. Due to fl ash warning, and actions during and post the either in the Rishiganga or Dhauliganga fl ood on account of rising of water levels disaster. The actions during the disaster basin, or anywhere else in Uttarakhand. in the river Rishiganga, a functional Rishi- include getting the information about the The NTPC’s Tapovan Vishnugad project MW ganga small hydro project of 13.2 was unfolding disaster as soon as possible has faced so many disasters already since washed away. The fl ash fl ood also affected the under construction 520 MW NTPC Hydro and alerting those at risk soon in terms 2008, but is only now talking about put- Power Project downstream at Tapovan on of time and location, downstream. This ting in place an early warning system the river Dhauli Ganga … requires not only accurate information (SANDRP 2021). Should not the NTPC It is observed from the satellite data (Planet in time, but also a mechanism that en- and power ministry top brass as well as Lab) of 7 February 2021 in catchment of Rishi sures that the information reaches those the Uttarakhand disaster management Ganga river at the terminus of the glacier at NTPC an altitude of 5600 m a landslide triggered at risk. In this regard, a senior offi - department be held acco untable for this? a snow avalanche covering approximately cial claimed, There is no doubt that our disaster 14 sq km area and causing a fl ash fl ood in the We had a complete system of emergency rescue efforts are one of the best, thanks downstream of Rishi Ganga River. measures. But water came with such vol- to National and State Disaster Response Note that India’s home minister is also ume and speed that reaction time was nil. Forces and other paramilitary groups. referring to Planet Labs imagery. (Nandi 2021) But there is clearly a lot more we can do However, there is still some controversy Maybe the NTPC offi cials should be in terms of planning, decision-making, as to whether a glacier was involved in told that Mangshri Devi had enough monitoring, and pre-disaster and during the disaster. The Wadia Institute of time to call her son repeatedly that not disaster efforts. The rescue efforts at the Himalayan Geology (WIHG) scien tists say only saved her son’s life, but lives of two Tapovan project suffered crucial delays a breach in a temporary waterbody dozen more people. In one of the most due to non-availability of accurate tun- formed due to a hanging glacier crash- remarkable stories from the Chamoli nel maps from the project authorities as ing down after a huge rockslide resulted avalanche disaster it was reported that per several reports (Upadhyay 2021). in the fl ash fl ood in Chamoli district Vipul Kairuni of Dhaak village in Tapovan, One expected that the authorities (Santoshi 2021). However, Petley says working at the now destroyed Tapovan would have used drones and helicopters there is no involvement of a glacier. Vishnugad HEP, was saved thanks to and also satellite images to immediately There is no mention of a glacier in the frantic calls by his mother Mangshri assess the ground situation in the Rishi- home minister’s statement in the Rajya Devi as she and Vipul’s wife saw from ganga catchment from where the fl ood Sabha too. Similarly, there is no evidence their village home, situated at a height originated and also better understand to support the contention that there was from the river, that a massive fl ood was the causes. Reliable sources tell us that a temporary waterbody formed at the approaching the dam site. It was thanks some of this was used, but strangely a lot site of the avalanche as suggested by the to frantic, repeated calls by Mangshri of the information so gathered has not WIHG scientists. Devi that not only Vipul, but at least two been shared in the public domain. It is What is worrying is that till Petley’s dozen more people could run to safety worrying that the offi cial agencies seem report came out on the evening of via a ladder and save their lives (Azad to be treating even disaster-related inf- 8 February, there was nothing from 2021). She did exactly what the disaster ormation as a state secret. Indian agencies in the public domain management department of Uttarakhand Here, one should also mention that about how the disaster began. The only and NTPC should have been doing. the fl ood forecasting department of the thing we had were contradictory state- In fact, speaking in the inaugural Central Water Commission (CWC) was ments from different agencies from session of the National Institute of Disas- completely absent during the disaster. It Uttarakhand, from the NTPC (developer ter Management–Federation of Indian was only at 6 pm on 7 February 2021 that of the Tapovan Vishnugad HEP that was Chambers of Commerce and Industry the fi rst information about the fl ood was

14 march 6, 2021 vol lVi no 10 EPW Economic & Political Weekly COMMENTARY posted by the department, by which developed to allow remote monitoring cumulative impact assessments, carry- time the disaster had already passed. of lake bodies from space. The preface to ing capacity studies, disaster potential as- The Chamoli disaster also brings the NDMA guidelines on GLOF (the docu- sessment studies, or genuine public con- attention to dam safety issues, which are ment also covers LLOF—landslide lake sultation processes in vulnerable areas important not only for completed dams, outburst fl ood) says: of Uttarakhand act as force multipliers but also dams under construction, for not The disa ppearance of mountain glaciers, during disasters, as we have seen in only structural safety but also operational expan sion of large glacial lakes and the for- 2013 and again now. Climate change is safety. A United Nations University report mation of new glacial lakes are amongst the worsening the vulnerabilities of Uttara- most recognisable impacts of global war- made public in January 2021 on this issue ming in this environment. The IHR lies in khand. The adverse impacts of the ill- also highlights the safety of dams in India Seismic Zones IV and V making the reg ion informed project decisions further in- and need for decommi ssioning unsafe, highly prone to earthquakes. This combined crease when projects violate norms dur- old dams (Perera et al 2021). Unfortu- with other disturbances such as avalanches ing the implementation in the absence and falling boulders is making the glacial nately, in India, dam safety is not even lakes vulnerable to brea ches, unleashing of credible monitoring and compliance backed by any law and the dam safety sudden, potentially dis astrous fl oods in the achieving mechanisms. bill remains pending before Parliament nearby communities. This is particularly true of projects for almost two decades (SANDRP 2019). “In contrast to other countries, there like Rishiganga HEP and the Tapovan The bill also suffers from a lot of legal are no uniform codes for excavation, Vishnugad HEP. The expert committee lacunae. For example, it does not have construction and grading codes in India. headed by Ravi Chopra—appointed fol- much to say about the safety of under Restricting constructions and develop- lowing the Supreme Court’s 13 August construction dams, a relevant question ment in GLOF/LLOF prone areas is a very 2013 order by a bench headed by Justice in the context of the Chamoli disaster. effi cient means to reduce risks at no K S Radhakrishnan (Alaknanda Hydro cost,” the NDMA (2020: 30) guidelines Power Co Ltd v Anuj Joshi & Ors 2013)— NDMA’s Guidelines for GLOFs say. The guidelines emphasise the imp- had warned in its report of 2014 that the The National Disaster Management ortance of land use planning: “There are glacier valleys and paraglacial zones Authority (NDMA) guidelines for manage- no widely accepted procedures or regu- occ upy areas between 2,000 m and 5,000 ment of GLOFs from October 2020 say lation in India for land use planning in m elevations (MoEF 2014). Below 2,000 that risk reduction has to begin with the GLOF/LLOF prone areas. Such regula- m elevation are the infl uence zone of the identifying and mapping such lakes, tions need to be developed” (NDMA 2020: paraglacial area, where the fl oods from taking structural measures to prevent 30). In the Himalayan region, there are paraglacial zones fl ow. This could be their sudden breach, and establishing at least three reported instances (two in seen on 7 February 2021, leading to the mechanisms to save lives and property Nepal and one in China) of implementa- destruction of the Rishiganga and Tapo- in times of a breach (NDMA 2020). tion of sensor- and monitoring-based van Vishnugad HEPs, bridges, roads, and A message from the Prime Minister that technical systems for GLOF early warning. houses. The committee has clearly rec- was included in the NDMA guidelines says: “Besides classical alarming infrastructure ommended that no hydropower projects The hazards associated with glacial forma- consisting of acoustic alarms by sirens, should be taken up in such zones. If this tions in the Indian Himalayan Region (IHR) modern communication technology using recommendation of the Supreme Court– require an integrated strategy to minimise cell and smart phones can complement appointed panel had been implemented, disaster risks … to effi ciently deal with gla- cial hazards and strengthen our prepared- or even replace traditional alarming infra- the proportions of the Chamoli disaster ness and resilience. structure,” the NDMA (2020: 30) has said. would have clearly been much lower. The message from the union home The guidelines also call for dissemination Did the detailed project reports and minister talked about higher possibili- of accurate information (Tiwary 2021). environment impact assessments of the ties of GLOFs in the Indian , The most striking aspect of these rec- Tapovan Vishnugad HEP take these risks and early warning and minimisation of ommendations of the NDMA guidelines into account? Did the Expert Appraisal disaster risks. The preface from the NDMA is that the recommended steps are all Committee on River Valley Projects, the chairperson and members states that absent when we review the Chamoli MoEF, the Central Electricity Authority, despite massive losses in the Parechu ava lanche disaster. So, when will these the CWC and Geological Survey of India disaster in Himachal Pradesh in 2005 guidelines be implemented? Key recom- (all the agencies involved in sanctioning and in June 2013, “disaster mendations of the NDMA’s 2008 guide- the project) look at these risks? Will there risk management related to GLOFs has lines for reservoir operations remain be an independent inquiry into the disas- not been mainstreamed into develop- unimplemented even today. ter that this project faced, along with the ment policies and programmes.” earlier numerous disasters, including in The NDMA has recommended use of Violations and Non-compliance 2008, 2012, 2013, and 2016? To what extent synthetic-aperture radar imagery to au- The development projects, including do the NTPC and the sanctioning bodies tomatically detect changes in waterbod- hyd ropower projects, highway, need to be held accountable for the lapses? ies, including new lake formations. It has railway lines, or mining, without adequate Unfortunately, we are unlikely to see said methods and protocols could also be appraisals, credible project-specifi c or any such independent inquiry either into

Economic & Political Weekly EPW march 6, 2021 vol lVi no 10 15 COMMENTARY the Tapovan project, Rishiganga project, projects that were under construction in Nandi, Jayashree (2021): “Activists Question Govt’s Move to Push On with Uttarakhand Hydel Pro- or the disaster, or get any answers to these basins, which included Tapovan jects,” Hindustan Times, 17 February, https:// these and such other questions. Our Vishnugad and Vishnugad Pipalkoti hydro- www.hindustantimes.com/cities/dehradun- news/activists-question-govt-s-move-to-push- system does not have any such provision power projects. The Chamoli disaster has on-with-uttarakhand-hydel-projects- either to fi x accountability or even to given the signal to scrap these projects 101613503065025.html. learn lessons for the future. In June 2013, under construction. In fact, there is also a NDMA (2020): “NDMA Guidelines: Management of GLOFs,” National Disaster Management Autho- Uttarakhand faced its worst ever disaster, case for reviewing all the existing hydro- rity, Government of India, Delhi, https:// but we still do not have any report that power projects, looking at the damage to ndma.gov.in/sites/default/fi les/PDF/Guide- lines/Guidelines-on-Management-of-GLOFs. comprehensively looks at the disaster to the Rishiganga and Vishnuprayag HEPs pdf. learn lessons for future. in this disaster. As for the Char Dham Perera, D, V Smakhtin, S Williams, T North and A Curry (2021): “Ageing Water Storage Infra- highway, the Supreme Court should halt structure: An Emerging Global Risk,” UNU-IN- Role of Judiciary the work on it and ask the project to go WEH Report Series, Issue 11, United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment The Chamoli disaster also brings to focus back to get environment clearances even and Health, Hamilton, Canada, https://inweh. the role of the judiciary in a number of for the 5.5 m width road. The Court unu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Age- ing-Water-Storage-Infrastructure-An-Emerg- ways. For example, the environment should also punish those responsible ing-Global-Risk_web-version.pdf. clearance to the Tapovan Vishnugad HEP for dumping muck into rivers and such Petley, Dave (2021): “The Catastrophic Landslide and Flood in Chamoli in Uttarakhand: The Se- was challenged before the then existing other violations. quence of Events,” Landslide Blog, 8 February, National Environment Appellate Autho- There is also a need to set up an https://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2021/02 / rity (NEAA) in 2005–06 for inadequate inq uiry committee of independent per- 08/chamoli-2/. PIB (2021): “Statement in Parliament by Union appraisal, but the NEAA rejected the sons to look into the Chamoli disaster Home Minister Shri Amit Shah Regarding Ava- petition saying it had come too late! The with a view to identify lacunae, fi x lanche in the Upper Catchment of Rishiganga River in Chamoli District of Uttarakhand,” Ravi Chopra Committee report (MoEF accounta bility, learn lessons for future, Press Information Bureau, 9 February, https:// 2014) submitted to the Supreme Court and also provide a road map for the www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID =1696552. recommended no projects in the parag- changes required. Identifi cation of vul- SANDRP (2019): “Dam Safety Bill 2019: Will It Help lacial zone, including the paraglacial nerable areas and habitats and their Prevent Dam Disasters in India?” South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People, 30 Septem- infl uence zone, but the recommendation monitoring is also required, including ber, https://sandrp.in/2019/09/30/dam-safety- remains unimplemented. In fact, the installing early war ning systems. bill-2019-will-it-help-prevent-dam-disasters -in-india/. original order by Justice Radhakrishnan — (2021): “Tapovan Vishnugad HPP: Delays, Dam- dated 13 August 2013, about the role of References ages and Destructions,” South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People, 20 February, https:// hydropower projects in the Uttarakhand Alaknanda Hydro Power Co Ltd v Anuj Joshi & Ors sandrp.in/2021/02/20/tapovan-vishnugad- disaster of June 2013, got derailed after (2013): Civil Appeal No 6736 of 2013, Supreme hpp-delays-damages-and-destructions /. Court judgment dated 13 August. his retirement. Santoshi, Neeraj (2021): “Wadia Institute Scientists Azad, Shivani (2021): “Uttarakhand Glacier Burst: Visit Chamoli Disaster Site, Explain What The people of Reni village had chall- A Mom’s Frantic Calls to Son Saved About 25 Caused It,” Hindustan Times, 10 February, https:// enged the illegalities by the Rishiganga Lives,” Times of India, 14 February, https:// www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/wadia- timesofi ndia.indiatimes.com/india/Uttara- institute-scientists-visit-chamoli-disaster-site- HEP in the in khand-glacier-burst-A-moms-frantic-calls-to- explain-what-caused-it-101612923345955.html. 2019, but the high court appointed a son-saved-about-25-lives/articleshow/ Tiwary, Deeptiman (2021): “Explained: How to Tackle a Glacial Burst and How Is India Pre- committee of two government offi cials, 80903647.cms. FICCI India (2021): “Resilient Infrastructure in pared,” Indian Express, 15 February, https://in- who reported that there are no viola- Hilly Areas: Avalanche, GLOF & Debris Flow dianexpress.com/article/explained/uttara- khand-glacier-fl ash-fl ood-rishiganga-death- #Day1,” 18 February, https://www.youtube. tions. The Supreme Court has been seen toll-7180258/. com/watch?v=nHIWDIqIzl4. to be lenient in the Char Dham highway Upadhyay, Vineet (2021): “Chamoli Disaster: Rescue MoEF (2014): “Assessment of Environmental Deg- Strategy Changes after Labourers Found Trapped case, allowing all kinds of illegalities to radation and Impact of Hydroelectric Projects in Another Tunnel,” New Indian Express, 11 Feb- go unpunished. These are only a few of during the June 2013 Disaster in Uttarakhand,” ruary, https://www.newindianexpress.com/ report of the committee headed by Ravi nation/2021/feb/11/chamoli-disaster-rescue- the instances that show that the judicial Chopra, submitted to Ministry of Environment strategy-changes-after-labourers-found- bodies need to be much more careful and Forests, Government of India, New Delhi. trapped-in-another-tunnel-2262331.html. and rigorous in dealing with such cru- cial environmental matters. Licensing by EPWI

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16 march 6, 2021 vol lVi no 10 EPW Economic & Political Weekly