Ukraine: the Religious Dimension of the Conflict

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 259, March 2020

Ukraine: The Religious Dimension of the Conflict

While religious issues are not the primary drivers of the conflict in and around Ukraine, religion has played a significant role in it. Not only have religious rhetoric and traditions become part of an increasing polarization in Ukrainian society, centuries-old orthodox institutions have also been deeply changed through the conflict.

By Cora Alder, Palwasha Kakar, Leslie Minney

Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, together known as the Donbas, have been an active war zone since 2014 with over 13,000 killed and 1.6 million Ukrainians displaced. The conflict sparked when former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted after rejecting an Association Agreement with the EU that triggered fierce protests. The power vacuum in Kyiv was followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and unrest in eastern Ukraine, ultimately leading Russian- backed separatist forces to take control of much of the Donbas. Since 2014, Ukraine has not had full control over its border. Different types of ceasefires have been put in place, none have held. Political settle- ments have largely failed to materialize. Recently, Kyiv and Moscow took some Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, signs the declaration (tomos) of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on January 5, 2019. Murad Sezer / Reuters steps to withdraw troops from various lo- cations across the Line of Contact.

Amidst this complex political conflict, a historically-rooted religious claim to inde- cephaly was interpreted through the lens of intensified religious dynamics in the wider pendence on the part of an Ukrainian or- the wider political conflict in and around political conflict: Russia sees Ukraine in thodox church from the Russian Orthodox Ukraine and heightened tensions. The cre- need of protection from Western meddling Church (ROC) resurfaced. In January ation and recognition of a national ortho- and emphasizes a shared culture, faith tra- 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Con- dox church threw global Orthodoxy into dition, and history in support of this narra- stantinople – primus inter pares (First turmoil and generated heated responses tive. In contrast, Ukrainian policymakers among Equals) among Orthodox leaders – from political stakeholders in Ukraine, call for territorial sovereignty with a dis- granted the Orthodox Church of Ukraine Russia, and around the globe. tinct Ukrainian identity, detached from (OCU) independence (autocephaly). Calls Russia. They frame an autocephalous na- for autocephaly predate the conflict in the The tensions between Orthodoxy in tional church as an indicator of such inde- Donbas. However, the declaration of auto- Ukraine and beyond have accelerated and pendence. Religious organizations have

taken sides and called for support of either edged. For example, a representative of the with the separatist forces and Russia on the the Ukrainian army or Russian-backed UOC-MP denied a father the burial of his other. Regardless of Poroshenko’s electoral separatist fighting units in Donbas. Church one-year old because the child had been defeat in 2019, this framing has had lasting affiliation has become more polarized and baptized in the UOC-KP. For a large num- implications on narratives around Ukrai- divided the society along orthodox juris- ber of Ukrainians, belonging to either of nian national identity, which continue to dictions, shrinking space for peacebuilding the two non-canonical churches, salvation divide conflict parties in Donbas. efforts by religious actors. The topic of reli- recognized by global Orthodoxy was thus gion has become intertwined with the con- officially only possible through the UOC- In the past, Ukrainian heads of state have flict in and around Ukraine, making it nec- MP – a church associated with Russia, had a favorable relationship with either the essary to take it into consideration when with which Ukraine is currently at conflict. Kyiv or the Moscow branch of the Ortho- contributing to further conflict resolution. dox Church and have been involved in reli- After continued persuasion by Patriarch gious affairs. Under the new Ukrainian The Desire for Autocephaly Filaret and other stakeholders, the Ecu- President Volodymyr Zelensky, the church- Since the 1990s, three orthodox churches menical Patriarchate of Constantinople state relation has taken a new turn. As the have claimed the status of the national granted Ukraine an autocephalous ortho- son of Jewish parents, Zelensky is not af- dox church, the OCU, in Janu- filiated with a confession and considers re- Salvation recognized by ary 2019. The creation of a new ligion a private matter. He reaffirmed this global Orthodoxy was officially church effectively merged the message when he met with representatives UOC-KP and the UAOC. To- of Ukrainian churches and religious orga- only possible through a church day, the OCU’s total number of nizations in December 2019. associated with Russia. parishes amounts to roughly 7,000. Several parishes are still Russian Shift of Narratives in the process of transition. So The Kremlin promotes the narrative of church of Ukraine, and there have been far, the new church has received little rec- Russkiy Mir (Russian World or Russian continuous appeals for an autocephalous ognition internationally and within global Peace), centering around a geopolitical and orthodox church in Ukraine which would Orthodoxy. ideological unity of Eastern Slavs in Be- be self-governing and not subject to outside larus, Russia, and Ukraine. While also em- authority. The “Ukrainian Orthodox Politics and Religion: Entangled phasizing the multi-ethnic and multi-reli- Church – Moscow Patriarchate” (UOC- The establishment of an autocephalous na- gious nature of Russia, the Kremlin MP), which is a constituent part of the tional church would not have been realized highlights its protection mandate towards ROC, is numerically the largest church in without political support. Former president all Russians and Russian-speakers against Ukraine with over 12,000 parishes. In 1992, Petro Poroshenko was the leading political Western interference and moral corrup- Patriarch Filaret broke away from the es- advocate for the OCU’s efforts to become tion. In this regard, the Kremlin has boost- tablishment to form the “Ukrainian Ortho- independent from the Russian Orthodox ed its ties with the ROC and Russian Or- dox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate” (UOC- Church. In April 2018, Poroshenko began thodox religion has become an integral part KP) as Ukraine’s “true” national church. appealing for the church’s autocephaly to of the national aspirations to re-establish Under his leadership, the UOC-KP soon Bartholomew I., primus inter pares in global Russia’s influence. The 2015 Russian Na- encompassed around 4,700 communities Orthodoxy. A majority of lawmakers in tional Security Strategy lists the revival of and enjoyed broad support in Ukraine. Fil- parliament supported his appeal. In the traditional Russian spiritual and moral val- aret was particularly popular among Ukrai- 2019 elections, Poroshenko campaigned ues as a strategic interest. nian nationalists, who considered him a na- under the slogan “Language! Army! Faith!”, tional hero. The “Ukrainian Autocephalous combining Ukraine’s linguistic identity, Ukraine’s pursuit of religious independence Orthodox Church” (UAOC) was founded ending the war in the Donbas, and ensur- from the ROC meant the loss of potential in the 1920s and reestablished in the 1990s, ing an independent Orthodox church. The Russian influence in Ukraine. Anticipating likewise as an attempt to become a Ukrai- struggle for an autocephalous church was this, Russian political and religious stake- nian autocephalous church. With about accentuated as a dimension of Ukraine’s holders thus tried to avert a declaration of 1,200 parishes, it was the smallest of the wider struggle for assertion of its indepen- autocephaly. When visiting Ukraine in three. dence from Russian influence. 2009, the ROC’s head, Patriarch Kirill, used the narrative of Holy Rus (Holy Russia) to Compared to other states in Europe, In this regard, the Ukrainian state consid- imply that the ROC is the church of all Ukrainians rank above average in terms of ered the UOC-MP a source of Russian in- “historical Russia”, including Ukraine. religious worship and daily prayer. Religion fluence and refused to cooperate with it. A Therewith, he offered an alternative to -au is an integral part of personal and social bill was introduced in parliament that tried tocephaly: “Holy Russia” as a decentered life. A typical Ukrainian churchgoer would to denounce the UOC-MP as an ally of entity, with Kyiv as Russia’s cradle, as a sa- have been unlikely to notice great differ- Moscow. Another aimed at simplifying the cred city and as a fortress of Orthodox faith. ences between the liturgy of the three or- transfer of parishes to the anticipated new However, Russia’s actions in 2014 under- thodox churches, the service was almost national church. Poroshenko’s political ef- mined his notions of “civilizational unity in identical. However, the conflict has sharp- forts resulted in ecclesial affiliations be- faith, values and traditions”. The annexation ened distinctions. As other Orthodox coming a marker of identity and political of Crimea strengthened sentiments of Churches considered the UOC-KP and support for actors in the conflict in Don- Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian-ness. the UAOC schismatic and non-canonical bas: support of the OCU meant allegiance (not viewed as legitimate), their sacraments with Ukrainian interests on the one hand, In the aftermath of the events in 2014, the and other rites de passage were not acknowl- UOC-MP affiliation implied alignment ROC’s leadership’s focus shifted from a

Church Constellations in Ukraine itary chaplains, and humanitarian service providers at the front lines. During the protests on Kyiv’s Maidan in 2013 and 2014, protesters used religious spaces as a point of refuge and shelter. Orthodox priests have mediated between authorities and the opposition, encouraging dialogue. Religious leaders and priests have served their communities living in the midst of war on both sides of the Line of Contact in Donbas, continuing to hold prayers and providing basic humanitarian services.

However, it has become increasingly difficult for religious actors to engage in peacebuilding efforts and promote social cohesion. Stringent registration procedures and discriminatory practices by governing bod- ies and the de-facto authorities on either side of the conflict line inhibit work across jurisdictions. Some religious actors have thus started to shuttle between communities under the radar on an individual basis. Furthermore, services provided by religious unity between Russia and Ukraine to a Rus- battalions and pro-Russian fighting units groups and organizations are often framed sian World battling increasing de-Chris- such as the self-proclaimed “Russian Or- as “secular services”, allowing an easy ex- tianization in the West. The OCU is seen as thodox Army” have assaulted members of change of services across divides. The neu- undermining the ROC’s attempts to build other confessions. More recently, priests be- tral categorization of these services is under an Orthodox civilization and to hinder uni- longing to the UOC-MP have ty across global Orthodoxy. Ukraine is reported threats of physical vio- It has become increasingly framed as having come under Western – lence and coercion aimed at difficult for religious actors to particularly US American – influence. Ac- forcing people to change their cording to remarks by Russian Foreign faith in government-controlled engage in peacebuilding efforts Minister Sergei Lavrov in 2018, awarding areas. Moreover, new registra- and promote social cohesion. the OCU with autocephaly is a provocation tion procedures in the Donbas orchestrated by Patriarch Bartholomew I. region enable the de-facto au- with direct support from Washington. thorities to legally ban, fine, and confiscate threat, as polarization limits collaboration anything related to the practice of an un- for these on-the-ground efforts that con- Religious Actors in the Conflict registered religious community, such as the tribute to peace and stability. It remains vi- Religious actors have responded to the OCU, Evangelicals, and Jehovah’s Witness- tal to keep communication open across the conflict in Donbas in ways that have driven es. The Organization for Security and Co- line, as these religious organizations have both conflict and peace. Mobilization operation in Europe’s Special Monitoring the capacity to build human capital and along ecclesial (church affiliation) lines has Mission (SMM) and the human rights of- support peacebuilding efforts. previously existed, but has intensified with fice of the United Nations have expressed the OCU’s declaration of autocephaly in their concern at these developments. Tensions in Global Orthodoxy 2019. Ukraine witnessed waves of patriotic These inter-Orthodox tensions along po- mobilization from 2014 onward, which Disputes over local-level transfers of par- litical lines have also had an impact on churches and religious organizations in ishes have increased as parishes are faced global Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Kyiv and across both sides of the Line of with the decision to vote upon with which Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate Contact reinforced. For example, the All- “mother church” to affiliate. Religious lead- of Constantinople have had a strained rela- Ukrainian Council of Churches and Reli- ers are understanding that a parish transfer tionship for centuries. The ROC claims to gious Organizations, encompassing many could put themselves and their church at have the most parishes and demands cor- religious groups in Ukraine, urged Ukraini- odds with Moscow- or Kyiv-aligned clergy. responding recognition. It argues that all ans of different religions and denomina- For ordinary church-goers, rumors circu- persons of Orthodox confession living in tions to aid civilians in the Donbas and to lating of church grabbing, as well as real post-Soviet states (except for Georgia and defend their homeland against Russian- take-overs add an additional element of Armenia which have their own autocepha- backed separatists, fueling the increasingly pain and confusion to their daily lives. lous churches) should be ruled under the divisive discourse around religious identity. jurisdiction of the ROC. It connects Rus- Religion, however, has not only been a di- sian national aspirations with ecclesial af- These mobilization trends have gone hand viding force. On the contrary, many reli- filiation and authority. in hand with hostile attacks and discrimi- gious actors continue to push for peace. natory practices along religious lines. Start- They have continuously taken on roles of Both the head of the UOC-MP and the ing in 2014, nationalist Ukrainian volunteer activists, insider mediators, prison and mil- head of the ROC have thus condemned the

OCU’s autocephaly. They are of the opin- with little outside support. Out of the 14 polarizing church belonging. In the eyes of ion that Bartholomew I. should have played recognized autocephalous churches within the public, Zelensky’s distance towards re- the role of a peacebuilder or mediator be- the Orthodox tradition, only the Greek ligious matters is seen as apathetic towards tween the different orthodox churches in Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of the OCU against the background of a his- Ukraine rather than causing a “schism”. Alexandria publicly recognize the OCU. torically close church-state relationship. As Their stand is inter alia of political and eco- Historically, however, newly autocephalous such, the loss of political support within nomic nature. The ROC is anxious about churches take time to integrate fully into Ukraine and the lack of support across oth- losing up to a third of its parishes, alongside the pan-Orthodox community. er global autocephalous churches has treasured religious sites in Ukraine such as weakened the new church. The OCU’s the monastery complex Kiev Pechersk Unclear Future leadership has done little to communicate Lavra, if all UOC-MP parishes and prop- Autocephaly in 2019 added a complex reli- these limitations or to manage believers’ erties were to be transferred to the OCU. gious dimension to the simmering war in expectations. Hence, the public’s excite- Further, the ROC fears a loss of parishes Donbas, and it remains to be seen how it ment for the OCU has dampened and the would affect its standing within global Or- will fully unfold. Once again, two Ortho- church is increasingly seen as a primarily thodoxy. Constantinople’s decision caused dox churches exist within the same terri- political project. the ROC to cut ties with the Ecumenical tory with ambitions to be the national Patriarchate in Constantinople and effec- church of Ukraine. The Kremlin and the Recognizing that the conflict in and around tively put any pan-Orthodox meetings in- ROC hold on to the UOC-MP. The Ukrai- Ukraine is not solely manifested through volving Constantinople on ice, thereby de- nian government, meanwhile, is preoccu- territorial disputes but is also reflected in creasing chances of reconciliation. pied with security, political, and economic issues of religious institutions, power, and matters related to the conflict in Donbas. It shared identity represents an important Constantinople on the other hand, has an is thus unlikely to intervene politically on step in gaining a more holistic understand- interest in defending its position as primus behalf of any one church. Overall, control ing of the conflict and possibilities of its inter pares within global Orthodoxy. Con- over religious power will remain an issue of resolution. While disputes about ecclesial stantinople historically granted affiliation and power have not lead to an independence to churches that Having been granted autocephaly escalation of the conflict in and around had previously submitted to has placed the OCU at the center Ukraine yet, international policy makers Constantinople’s ecclesiastical are well advised to keep an eye on these dy- rule. By granting autocephaly to of competition between Moscow namics with a view to preventing potential the OCU, Constantinople took and Constantinople for prestige further politicization of the issue. away ROC’s authority over Ukrainian parishes. Constanti- and spiritual authority. nople is thus accused of acting Cora Alder is a program officer in the Mediation outside its scope of duties and having set a contention between Moscow and Kyiv as Support Team at the Center for Security Studies dangerous precedent. The ROC and others quarrels over ownership of significant reli- (CSS) at ETH Zurich, working on mediation fear it might not be long until other gious property and parish transfers unfold processes that deal with religious dimensions. Churches claim their right to indepen- and as the recognition of the OCU’s inde- dence, such as the Latvian and Moldovan pendence on the part of the Orthodox Palwasha L. Kakar is a senior program officer for from the ROC, or the Montenegrin and community is likely to solidify. religion and inclusive societies at the U.S. Institute North Macedonian from the Serbian Or- of Peace (USIP) who developed the Religious thodox Church. While the call for autocephaly has been Landscape Mapping methodology on which this around at least since the 1990s, its declara- analysis is based. Having been granted autocephaly has tion must be read within the modern-day placed the OCU at the center of competi- conflict dynamics in Donbas. Poroshenko Leslie Minney is a program specialist with the tion between Moscow and Constantinople rhetorically intensified the nervousness Russia Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace for prestige and spiritual authority. How- around the UOC-MP’s and the ROC’s (USIP), researching and analyzing Ukraine’s peace ever, Ukraine’s church currently finds itself linkage to the Russian government, further process and Russia’s role around the world.

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