Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 A publication of MAF Biosecurity Authority
Foot and mouth disease update
On-farm surveillance – a key strand in the biosecurity net: p5 Also in this issue: Foot and mouth disease response Bovine Tb strategy Risk analysis policy
Biosecurity cooperation with Australia security New Zealand’s contribution in world animal health body Welfare of animals on inter-island transport Devil’s tail tearthumb threatens ecosystems Australian guava moth Pest plant accord
Biosecurity
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 1 How to contact us: Contents Everyone listed at the end of an article as a contact point, unless otherwise indicated, is part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Biosecurity Authority. 3 Foot and mouth defences strengthened further All MAF staff can be contacted by e-mail, 4 Bovine tuberculosis strategy: government position outlined and the standard format for all addresses is New adviser welcomed [email protected] For example Ralph Hopcroft would be UK foot and mouth disease outbreak [email protected] (There are slight 5 Vet practices and farms could have key surveillance role exceptions for people with similar names, but 6 Risk analysis on importing Newcastle disease in hens’ hatching eggs these addresses are given where necessary.) Varroa update PO Box 2526, Wellington 7 New risk analysis policy statement New Zealand Biosecurity Authority policy statement on conducting import risk analyses (+64) 4 474 4100 (switchboard) and applying them in the development of import health standards most staff have direct dial lines which are listed where available 11 Experts discuss Otorohanga termite response (+64) 4 474 4133 Biosecurity Council representation • Animal Biosecurity Group 12 New Zealand’s contribution to key world organisation (+64) 4 470 2730 13 Biosecurity cooperation with Australia • Biosecurity Policy 14 Circus-bred chimp relocated to African sanctuary Coordination Group • Border Management Group Care for animals learned at school • International Agreements Group 15 “Operation go between” checks animal welfare on strait ships • Contracts Management Group 16 Biosecurity strategy development: process and project plan (+64) 4 498 9888 17 Exotic organism incursion policy statement • Group Director and Business Services Manager, Biosecurity 18 Devil’s tail tearthumb a threat to ecosystems Authority Marine biosecurity: spreading the word • Director, Animal Biosecurity • Director, Plants Biosecurity 19 Australian Guava Moth will not require official control • Forest Biosecurity Group Australian citrus whitefly may have blown in • Animal Welfare Group 20 Accord developed to weed out pest plants (+64) 4 474 4257 • Plants Biosecurity Group ASB Bank House, 101 The Terrace, Wellington
Biosecurity is published 6-weekly by MAF 21 New import health standards issued Biosecurity Authority. It covers biosecurity and animal health, animal welfare, plant Import health standard revoked health and forest health issues. It is of special Export veterinary accreditation interest to all those with a stake in New 22 New ornamental fish and marine invertebrate Zealand’s agriculture, horticulture, forestry, facilities standard animal welfare and environment. Minor amendments to codes of ethical conduct Enquiries about specific articles: Refer to Codes of ethical conduct – approvals, notifications & contact listed at the end of the relevant article revocations since the last issue of Biosecurity Icon Key
General enquiries (eg, circulation requests or Revised used vehicles import standard issued Animal Biosecurity information about MAF's biosecurity work): Biosecurity Magazine MAF Biosecurity Authority Plants Biosecurity PO Box 2526, Wellington 23 New organism records: 6/1/01 – 16/2/01 Phone: 04 474 4100 24 Biosecurity records notified internationally Forest Biosecurity Fax: 04 498 9888 Email: [email protected] Animal Welfare Editorial enquiries: Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 Editor: Phil Stewart Phone: 04 384 4688 Email: editor_biosecurity@ maf.govt.nz
2 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 ISSN 1174 – 4618 www.maf.govt.nz/Biosecurity/index.htm Foot and mouth defences strengthened further It’s the ultimate biosecurity threat. opportunity for us to put forward the Foot and mouth disease: Generations of farmers, veterinarians tighter border controls we have been the facts and quarantine officials have been seeking for some time. FMD is a highly contagious viral disease schooled in the behaviour of foot and As soon as the British outbreak was of domesticated and wild cloven-hoofed mouth disease (FMD) and its potential to notified, all imports of meat, wool, dairy animals (cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, deer, devastate our economy. products and other unprocessed animal camelids, and various zoo ungulates). It The current outbreak in Britain is products from Britain were suspended does not affect humans. It spreads so enough to send shivers down the spines (see page 4). At the border, all passengers easily because: of New Zealanders involved with are screened and assessed arriving from • it has a short incubation period (1-7 livestock farming. And that means all Britain are having their bags x-rayed, days); high-risk passengers are being New Zealanders – not just those who • only a small dose is required to interviewed, and where necessary earn a direct living from livestock. infect an animal; belongings disinfected. Entry rules for While all New Zealanders are at risk from equipment used on farms such as • animals can be infected through this threat to our national economic shearing tools, have been tightened. multiple routes (respiratory, oral, security, all citizens can play a useful role direct contact with membranes or in keeping the country free from FMD. On Monday 12 March, Cabinet approved damaged skin); the following package of measures to • animals shed the virus prior to onset Farmers and veterinarians have an further beef up security: important surveillance role in staying of clinical signs; • Extra X-ray machines at Auckland, alert for symptoms of the disease (see • each infected animal can release Hamilton and Wellington airports article on page 5), and MAF officials and massive quantities of virus; • New X ray machines at Whenuapai, contractors have a well-tested exotic • the virus can spread over long Ohakea, Dunedin, Queenstown and disease reponse system in place to distances by airborne dispersal; contain and eradicate FMD should it Palmerston North • it persists in the environment and in occur. (There are annual training • Another 11 teams of detector dogs animal products. simulations; the next is later this month.) • 34 additional Quarantine Officers Symptoms vary between species, but If there was an outbreak, we would all be • 43 full time and 8 part time vesicles (blisters) on the nose, mouth Quarantine Assistants involved in controlling it. This has been and feet are common to all. Animals go • A specific foot and mouth disease graphically illustrated in Britain where off their feed, are depressed and lame, publicity campaign everything from sporting events to walks and may salivate profusely. They take in the country have been put on hold. • Acceleration of the introduction of the several weeks to recover from the infringement notices campaign Travellers and importers are in the front disease. The death rate from the line of defence against foot and mouth • New Zealand expert support to the UK disease is generally low, although it may disease. Their contribution can be made under the International Veterinary be up to 20 percent in young animals. It by filling in declarations diligently and Reserves Agreement is a production disease: the most honestly, not bringing in risky goods (eg, • Additional technical and significant effects are weight loss, a reduction in milk and meat quality, and animal products) and ensuring others administrative support to receive the abortion in pregnant animals. travelling to New Zealand do likewise. expected increase in exotic disease reports resulting from the foot and FMD is endemic in Africa, the Middle The risk from FMD has a permanent mouth disease publicity campaign East, Asia and South America, although place in New Zealand’s biosecurity some countries on those continents have planning, and as such, no radical changes In the meantime, publicity efforts are successfully controlled and eradicated are necessary to accommodate the risk of being intensified. One campaign is targeting the rural sector, with a view to it. There are seven strains of the virus spread from the current outbreak in and numerous subtypes. Different increasing on-farm vigilance to detect Britain. In a world context, the greatest strains are active in different regions of symptoms of FMD. Other components of threat comes from Asia. Last year there the world. In endemic countries, FMD the campaign will address urban-based were 490 outbreaks in Southeast Asia is typically managed by vaccination. New Zealanders and travellers. alone. (At 12 March there had been 157 Although vaccination is reasonably confirmed cases in Britain.) This work dovetails into the $2.8 million effective in controlling disease, FMD The current UK outbreak represents a biosecurity campaign announced in virus will continue to circulate in relatively small increase in the ongoing December last year (Biosecurity 24:6). vaccinated populations; this means that countries that vaccinate suffer level of risk to this country. However the Derek Belton, Director Animal international trade embargoes on current graphic illustrations of the Biosecurity, phone 04 474 4155, animals and animal products imposed consequences of foot and mouth disease fax 04 474 4133, by countries free of the disease. in the United Kingdom provide the ideal email: [email protected]
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 3 Bovine tuberculosis strategy: government position outlined Good progress is being made in expenditure and an expanded vector analysis and it is a useful guideline, the finalising a proposal to amend the control programme; allocation of costs is not required to national pest management strategy for • will increase its contribution in dollar mirror exactly the outcome of the bovine tuberculosis (Tb). Provided the terms, but does not agree with the analysis. (An “exacerbator” is a person proposal is publicly notified by 30 June annual cost of the 10-year proposal or whose actions, or failure to take action, 2001, the current Tb strategy and legal to increasing its percentage share make a situation worse.) arrangements can be rolled over until (about 50 percent) of vector control Other considerations in allocating costs the amended strategy is in place. costs; include: During 2000, the Animal Health Board • will consider allowing ongoing • relative levels of private and public consulted on its proposal to achieve reinvestment of the Crown share of benefits; ‘official freedom’ from Tb over 10 years. any savings made through economic • the ability of beneficiaries to capture In responding to the Animal Health efficiencies to accelerate the vector benefits, and weightings that may Board’s proposals, and to advice on control programme; apply in light of this; possible alternatives, the government has • would, subject to further discussion, • the ability of exacerbators to avoid confirmed its position on some key prefer that the Board continue to being exacerbators; move vector control towards being issues. • other significant contributions to fully contestable; Government position achieving the strategy objectives. • has directed MAF and Treasury to Important aspects of the government The government must also consider the consult with the Animal Health Board position are that it: and other stakeholders in preparing a effect of increased Tb costs on other funding initiatives. The government • supports the objective of official Tb report for the Minister of Agriculture, freedom for New Zealand; taking into account the government’s contribution to the strategy therefore will be considered as part of the 2001 budget • agrees that official Tb freedom needs views on sharing the costs of the to be achieved in a credible time strategy. priorities. frame, particularly with respect to Allocation of costs Henry Dowler, Pest Management managing risks to trade; Strategy Coordinator, Biosecurity Policy The original 10-year strategy proposal • does not agree that a 10-year strategy Coordination Group, indicated a 60 percent share of vector phone 04 470 2745, fax 04 470 2730, is the only credible option; control costs allocated to the government. [email protected] • considers that a 12-15 year strategy is This share was based on a beneficiary- Nick Hancox, Communications also credible and would be adequate exacerbator analysis completed by the Manager, Animal Health Board, to manage Tb-related risks; Animal Health Board. Although the phone 04 474 7803, fax 04 473 8786, • accepts there is a need for greater Biosecurity Act 1993 requires such an [email protected]
New adviser welcomed UK foot and mouth disease outbreak MAF Biosecurity Authority welcomes Bill Dyck into The United Kingdom Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and the fold. Bill is to serve as Forest Industry Liaison Adviser for the Food (UK MAFF) confirmed on 21 February that they have Forest Biosecurity Group for 12-months. an outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in that country. Bill’s part-time role will encompass working with the Forest The last outbreak in the United Kingdom was in 1981. Biosecurity Group to identify and address concerns that exist The British authorities have banned all exports of livestock with MAF Biosecurity’s proposals or actions; working with the and animal products until the extent of the outbreak is known. New Zealand forestry sectors to identify any concerns they have At the time of writing, MAF Biosecurity: in the forest biosecurity area; and a communication role, • has instructed the MAF Quarantine Service to hold all animal including relaying information to industry and the wider public. products of concern arriving at the border until further notice; Bill has a long history of forestry involvement. Originally from • has suspended importation conditions for susceptible viable Canada, he came to New Zealand in 1977 and has since worked genetic material and animal products from the United in all things forestry, from labouring to forest research and Kingdom; and development. He worked for Carter Holt Harvey as General • has sent assistance to UK MAFF. Manager Forestry, and is currently a ‘science and technology Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management), broker’. Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, @ [email protected]. [email protected]
44 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 Vet practices and farms could have key surveillance role MAF is looking for ways to use the practices representing different Naturally the survey produced much animal health information held in geographical regions, types of farming information on disease conditions and veterinary practices and on farms to and farmed species from throughout the diagnoses, and this helps to identify the improve surveillance. country. Although the main interest was main problems that prompt farmers to in cattle and sheep, three equine practices call on veterinary help. Although useful A recent pilot study by AgriQuality New were included, and information about information, the AgriQuality analysts Zealand surveyed the animal health other species involved in veterinary visits found the process of manually extracting information held by a selection of rural was also recorded. it from the records was laborious. To be veterinary practices and farmers. of use for surveillance purposes, an Information was extracted from the The participating practices all had electronic means of data collection would practices and farmers’ records and computerised records from which the have to be devised. evaluated for its potential to contribute relevant information was transferred to a towards MAF’s ability to rapidly detect database. Each practice provided records Farms new infectious for up to100 The second part of the survey, the diseases and randomly sentinel farm survey, tested the suitability emerging trends in selected clients of hand-held computers for collecting disease patterns. As (with full information directly on farms. Five a result, MAF will confidentiality). veterinarians volunteered to trial one of further explore ways The survey two devices, which used a data capture to capture and use collected details program created for the purpose by this information. such as the type AgriQuality. The veterinarians of visit, the questioned farmers on all animal health MAF Biosecurity species, the problems on the farm over the previous monitors the disease clinical signs if 12 months. This usually required a status of the Only 14 percent of vet visits concerned sick animals. the visit involved telephone call to the farmer in the country’s animals to sick animals, and the diagnosis. evening or a special visit to collect the accurately define New Zealand’s animal relevant information as veterinarians health status. It is imperative that the This yielded a huge quantity of found that they did not have time during surveillance programme has the means of information, not only about the disease a normal farm visit. Hand held PCs had rapidly detecting new infectious diseases situation. It also showed there is high some problems from contamination with and emerging trends in disease patterns. level of contact between rural water and organic material. We are constantly striving to find ways to practitioners and their clients. Overall, enhance disease surveillance. each rural client averaged 20 visits with Despite the drawbacks, the results the veterinarian a year. provided a valuable comparison with the Rural veterinarians, by the nature of their sentinel practice survey. They presented work, have close contact with their Interestingly, this study showed that only animal health information from the farmer clients and the health of their 14 percent of visits concerned sick farmer’s point of view. This showed that livestock. Interested in whether this animals. Routine visits, retail sales and farmers involve their veterinarian in a information could be of use in animal clinic visits with working dogs or pets relatively small proportion (about 30 health surveillance, MAF Biosecurity accounted for the other 86 percent. percent) of the animal health problems commissioned a pilot survey using a However, both kinds of encounters were that the farmer considered significant. selection of veterinary practices as included as they offer the opportunity for Survey conclusions ‘sentinels’. discussion of animal health matters. Not Rural veterinarians and farmers could unexpectedly, dairy cattle generated more The first part of the survey, the sentinel play an even greater role in animal health farm visits and retail sales than any of the practice survey, set out to evaluate the surveillance than they currently do, other farmed species. information held in the veterinarians’ particularly with the development of records of everyday visits to farms and Some farms seldom receive veterinary technologies to capture, verify and contacts with farmers. The second part, visits. Nineteen of the 39 practices interpret the data they hold. MAF the sentinel farm survey, looked at the surveyed estimated the number of farms Biosecurity Authority has initiated feasibility of using hand-held computers in their area that were not serviced by further studies and will explore how this to collect animal health information veterinarians. The estimates ranged from information can best be used. directly from farmers. 0 to 30 percent, and veterinarians Roger Poland, Programme Coordinator reported that these tended to be ‘lifestyle’ Veterinary practices (Surveillance), MAF Biosecurity, or small farms, and farms that were phone 04 498 9820, fax 04 474 4133, This survey involved 39 veterinary predominantly sheep and beef cattle. [email protected]
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 5 Risk analysis on importing Newcastle disease in hens’ hatching eggs An analysis of the risk of importing While the introduction of field strains of spread have been greatly exaggerated over Newcastle disease in hens’ hatching low virulence might not cause severe the past 30 years, but a number of other eggs is available for public comment. disease in New Zealand bird populations, pathways exist by which introduced they could still have significant effects on strains of the virus could spread. The analysis of the risk posed by exotic avian health and production. Further, strains of avian paramyxovirus type 1 Copies of the risk analysis can be since the stability of low virulence field (APMV-1, the causative agent of obtained from the MAF website or by strains appears not to be as great as was Newcastle disease) in imported hatching contacting Martin van Ginkel. thought in the past, there is a risk that eggs of hens (Gallus gallus) recommends such strains could mutate and become Martin van Ginkel, Technical Adviser, the following key safeguards: virulent after introduction into chicken Risk Analysis, phone 474 4100 x8502, [email protected] • pre-export testing of layer flocks to flocks. ensure that APMV-1 viruses are not Howard Pharo, National Adviser The analysis concluded that there is a low circulating; (Risk Analysis), Animal Biosecurity, risk that exotic strains of APMV-1 could phone 04 4744 137, fax 04 4744 133, • post-arrival quarantine to ensure that be introduced in hens’ hatching eggs if [email protected] any undetected APMV-1 viruses are appropriate safeguards were www.maf.govt.nz/ animal IHS/riskanal/ contained. implemented. The risks of airborne hatch-egg.pdf Although non-pathogenic strains of Newcastle disease simulation to test New Zealand response systems APMV-1 are present in New Zealand, there has never been an outbreak of MAF, AgriQuality New Zealand Limited and the poultry industry will be testing Newcastle disease in this country. The response systems for exotic animal disease in late March. The simulation will be based around an incursion of highly virulent Newcastle disease, which is one of the introduction of highly virulent strains major exotic diseases of concern for New Zealand. would almost certainly result in serious mortality in commercial and hobby Response exercises are an ongoing part of MAF’s quality systems for biosecurity. poultry flocks. In addition, exposure of They complement monitoring activities such as surveillance and auditing of wild birds to the virus could have contracted suppliers to ensure that our standards and systems are effective. Each potentially devastating effects on exercise is followed by a debriefing to identify where improvements can be made. endangered native bird populations. Matthew Stone, Programme Coordinator, Exotic Disease Response, phone 04 498 9884, fax 04 474 4133, [email protected]
Movement controls early enough and some horticultural areas. Seven Movement controls designed to slow the to make hundred apiaries will be inspected in the spread of varroa are still in place. eradication high-risk grid cells, with a further 1200 Beehives and live bees are the main focus feasible. apiaries selected at random from the of the controls but some other items such No varroa has remainder of the South Island. as used equipment and bee products also been found in MAF has contracted management of the require a permit before being moved. the South programme to AgriQuality New Zealand. New Zealand is now divided into Infected, Island. Inspections will be carried out by Buffer and Disease Free zones. In general, Surveillance specially trained beekeepers working on the controlled items cannot be moved since varroa was detected in contract. All the hives in each selected from the upper North Island to the lower New Zealand has consisted of the survey apiary will be tested using sticky boards North Island, or from the North Island to that was part of the varroa emergency and miticide strips. Recent research the South Island. These restrictions will response and inspections of over 1000 demonstrated that this test is most be reviewed later in the autumn, when hives around Christchurch in September sensitive when there is little brood (bee more surveillance testing has taken place. 2000. larvae) in a hive. This means testing South Island surveillance The whole South Island has been divided through the summer is less likely to find A major testing programme has just into 20 km grid squares, defined as either low level mite infections. begun on South Island beehives to high or low risk. High-risk areas are those Paul Bolger, Varroa Programme Coordinator, confirm that varroa is not present in the associated with urban areas, ports, phone 04 474 4144, fax 04 474 4133, South Island and to detect any incursion airports, major honey processing plants [email protected]
66 BiosecurityBiosecurity Issue Issue 26 26 • • 15 15 March March 2001 2001 New risk analysis policy statement The MAF Biosecurity Authority has developed by a team representing all The policy statement stresses that all SPS finalised a policy statement on how it relevant groups within the Authority, (biosecurity) measures must be based on will carry out import risk analyses, and through a series of meetings and a risk analysis. ‘Based on’ means that the apply them in the development of import revisions of successive drafts. Other results of the risk assessment must health standards. That policy statement biosecurity departments and relevant sufficiently warrant – that is to say, is presented below. industry and interest groups were reasonably support – the SPS measure consulted on a draft of this statement at stake. The policy statement was developed to before a final draft was made available for The policy statement also details the enhance consistency within the Authority public consultation in Biosecurity 21: 7 – 10. obligations in section 22(5) of the in risk analysis, and to ensure that MAF Although only few, and minor, comments Biosecurity Act and in the SPS agreement Biosecurity operates according to its legal were received during the public relating to development of an import obligations (especially the Biosecurity Act consultation phase, the policy statement health standard. These are to be 1993 and the WTO ‘Agreement on the development team has spent time considered by the risk analyst, given that application of sanitary and phytosanitary ensuring that all biosecurity groups all biosecurity measures must be based measures’ or SPS agreement). It aims to within MAF Biosecurity could work in on a risk analysis. be a clear statement to stakeholders accordance with the policy statement. (domestic and international) of how Barry O’Neil, Group Director, The section on dealing with uncertainty MAF Biosecurity conducts and applies phone 04 474 4128, fax 04 498 9888, or lack of knowledge (2.9) has been import risk analysis. [email protected] added, and a few other minor changes The risk analysis policy statement was made. Biosecurity Authority policy statement on conducting import risk analyses and applying them in the development of import health standards
1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE it is reasonable to suspect constitutes, and the nature and possible effect on harbours, or contains an organism that people, the environment and the 1.1 Purpose may – economy is assessed; This policy statement sets out the (a) Cause unwanted harm to natural and principles to which the Biosecurity physical resources or human health • appropriate biosecurity measures to Authority (MAF Biosecurity) will adhere in New Zealand; or effectively manage the risks posed by when conducting risk analyses and (b) Interfere with the diagnosis, manage- these organisms are developed; and applying them to effectively manage risks ment, or treatment, in New Zealand, • the results, conclusions and of pests or unwanted organisms. associated with the importation of ‘risk recommendations arising from the goods’. 1.3 Risk analysis analysis are effectively communicated This policy principally covers the science- Risk analysis provides the best means of amongst interested parties. based assessment of risks (‘risk analysis’) ensuring that chief technical officers Risk analysis also allows regulators to and the development and issuing of (CTOs), or those acting under their make the best use of available resources. import health standards under the delegated authority, fulfil their legal MAF Biosecurity is committed to Biosecurity Act 1993. obligations under section 22 of the developing a high level of expertise in Biosecurity Act when developing import 1.2 Background POLICYrisk analysis, and consistently using risk health standards. One of MAF Biosecurity’s principal analysis in the development of import functions is protecting New Zealand’s Risk analysis is a management tool that health standards. biosecurity and biodiversity by incorporates scientific methods to enable 1.4 MAF Biosecurity’s accountabilities administering part III of the Biosecurity regulators to gather and assess Act 1993, which deals with the “effective information and data in a thorough, [This section will be completed when the management of risks associated with the consistent, logical and transparent way. It memorandums of understanding with importation of risk goods” (s 16). ensures that: other departments are finalised] ‘Risk goods’ are defined in s 2 of the act as: • organisms that may cause unwanted 1.5 Related documents harm are identified; any organism, organic material, or other MAF Biosecurity Authority will develop thing, or substance, that (by reason of its • the likelihood of these organisms import health standards under the nature, origin, or other relevant factors) being introduced into New Zealand Biosecurity Act:
BiosecurityBiosecurity Issue Issue 26 26 • •15 15 March March 2001 2001 77 • taking into account the risk analysis 2.2 Terminology used in risk analysis • Identify for those organisms the techniques developed by the world MAF Biosecurity risk analyses will use associated potential biological, organisation for animal health or relevant international terminology: that economic and environmental Office International des Epizooties of the OIE when dealing with animal consequences of entry, establishment (OIE), and those developed under the health or zoonoses1 , and that of the IPPC or spread. auspices of the Interim Commission when dealing with phytosanitary • Evaluate the likelihood of the entry, on Phytosanitary Measures (ICPM) matters2 . Each risk analysis will contain a establishment and spread of those operating within the framework of glossary of the terms used which have a organisms, and the associated the International Plant Protection different meaning in different risk potential biological, economic and Convention (IPPC) (see appendix A); analysis lexicons. environmental consequences3 . • in accordance with the Biosecurity 2.3 Key elements in risk analyses • Evaluate how the sanitary or Council policy statement on Section 22(5) of the Biosecurity Act sets phytosanitary measures that might be interdepartmental consultation on risk out the elements that must be considered applied would affect the likelihood of analyses and import health standards when an import health standard (IHS) is the entry, establishment or spread of under section 22 of the Biosecurity Act developed. Because all MAF IHSs are to those organisms4 . 1993 (17 December 1998); be based on a risk analysis, the obligation The requirements of both the Biosecurity • in accordance with the MAF to have regard to certain matters is set out Act and the SPS agreement are reflected Biosecurity Authority policy statement here. Under this policy statement, MAF in sections 2.4 – 2.8 of this policy on consultation (29 February 2000); risk analysts must ensure these matters statement. are properly considered when risks are • in accordance with the Protocol on assessed and any sanitary or 2.4 How things are to be considered harmonisation of quarantine phytosanitary measures recommended. The act requires a decision-maker to administrative procedures (1988) to “have regard to” the matters listed in s the Australia New Zealand Closer Section 22(5) of the act states: 22(5). This means that they must take the Economic Relations Trade (5) When making a recommendation to the Director-General in accordance with this criteria into account and consider them Agreement. section, the chief technical officer must when making a decision. It is up to the Within MAF Biosecurity the Animal have regard to the following matters: decision-maker to decide how much Biosecurity, Forest Biosecurity and Plants (a) The likelihood that goods of the kind weight to give each consideration, so long Biosecurity groups will develop and or description to be specified in the as the ultimate decision is not import health standard may bring document their procedures for unreasonable or irrational. POLICYorganisms into New Zealand; conducting risk analyses in accordance (b) The nature and possible effect on For instance, there is a procedural with this policy. people, the New Zealand environ- obligation in the Biosecurity Act to 2 IMPORT RISK ANALYSIS ment, and the New Zealand economy consider possible effects on social, of any organisms that goods of the 2.1 Use of risk analysis kind or description specified in the cultural and aesthetic conditions that affect or are affected by components of All import health standards prepared by import health standard may bring into New Zealand; the broad definition of ‘environment’. MAF Biosecurity under part III of the (c) New Zealand’s international obliga- The act allows, but does not require, Biosecurity Act will be based on a risk tions; importation decisions to be made on the analysis, which may assess a commodity (d) Such other matters as the chief basis of such considerations. or a pest/pathway combination. technical officer considers relevant MAF risk analysts will document how the MAF Biosecurity may use the risk to the purpose of this Part. statutory criteria were taken into account analyses of other parties, including other The SPS agreement and related WTO for each risk analysis. countries or relevant international jurisprudence also set out what is organisations. However, before doing this required in a risk analysis. A risk analysis 2.5 Organisms and the likelihood of MAF Biosecurity will carefully evaluate will: introduction the risk analysis and modify it, if • Identify the organisms whose entry, The analysis may be of the risks posed by necessary, for New Zealand establishment or spread New Zealand an organism or a number of organisms circumstances. wishes to prevent. associated with the importation of risk
1 The Office International des Epizooties International animal health code, mammals, birds and bees (2000) defines ‘Risk analysis’ as “The process composed of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication” (terms which are themselves defined). 2 The International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures number 5 (Glossary of phytosanitary terms, 1999) defines ‘Pest risk analysis’ as “The process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether a pest should be regulated and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it”. 3 It is not sufficient for a risk analysis to conclude that there is a ‘possibility’ of entry, establishment or spread of an organism (with associated potential consequences); a valid risk analysis must evaluate the likelihood (i.e. probability). The evaluation of likelihood can be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively, and the risk evaluated must be an ascertainable risk rather than a theoretical uncertainty. 4 To facilitate the possible development of import health standards, any sanitary or phytosanitary measures recommended shall be justified in the risk analysis and not be more trade restrictive than required, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.
88 BiosecurityBiosecurity Issue Issue 26 26 • •15 15 March March 2001 2001 goods. All organisms that are being Zealand “environment” is defined as: Biosecurity Act: if they relate to the considered must be listed in the risk Environment includes: “effective management of risks associated analysis. with the importation of risk goods” (s 16). (a) Ecosystems and their constituent parts, 2.6 Effects on people, the economy and including people and their communities; This could include the possible disease environment and impacts or effects on the environment of Risk analysts must consider the potential (b) All natural and physical resources; and the risk goods themselves, if they were an effects on people, the economy or (c) Amenity values; and organism (eg, a pathogen imported for diagnostic work); as these cannot be environment of organisms that may be (d) The aesthetic, cultural, economic, and introduced as a consequence of social conditions that affect or are considered under paragraphs (a) and (b) importing risk goods. The potential affected by any matter referred to in of s 22(5). paragraphs (a) to (c) of this definition. effects of importing the risk goods The nature and possible effect on the themselves (such as economic effects on 2.7 International obligations New Zealand environment of new domestic producers) cannot be In common with other jurisdictions, New organisms for which approval to import considered in a biosecurity risk analysis. Zealand is a party to a multitude of for release is given under the Hazardous 2.6.1 People international agreements. As a party to a Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 will not be considered by MAF. That A risk analysis for a commodity that may treaty, New Zealand is obliged to comply assessment is the responsibility of the harbour zoonotic organisms cannot be with the relevant treaty provisions and, Environmental Risk Management completed until the risks associated with where necessary, give full effect to them Authority (ERMA New Zealand). such organisms are addressed. In such in its domestic law. Risk analysts should cases risk analysts will develop and apply have regard to these obligations when 2.9 Dealing with uncertainty or lack of risk analyses in cooperation with other conducting a risk analysis and knowledge recommending sanitary or phytosanitary agencies, particularly the Ministry of Uncertainty results from both variation measures. Health. inherent in biological systems and from 2.6.2 Economy International agreements of treaty status lack of information. MAF Biosecurity to which New Zealand is a party and will incorporate a level of precaution in Risk analysts must consider economic which are relevant to part III of the its import risk analyses to account for effects that could arise from the Biosecurity Act include: uncertainty, for instance when making a introduction, establishment or spread POLICYof professional judgement on whether organisms, including: • the General Agreement on Tariffs and available information is sufficient, when Trade 1994; • the potential damage in terms of loss making assumptions or selecting of production or sales in the event of • the Agreement on the Application of parameters for quantitative risk analyses, the entry, establishment or spread of a Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and when recommending risk pest or disease; and (1994); management decisions based on a risk • the costs of control or eradication in • the Convention on Biological analysis. What constitutes sufficient New Zealand; Diversity (1992); scientific evidence will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the and should consider the relative cost- • the Australia New Zealand Closer degree of uncertainty and the severity of effectiveness of alternative approaches to Economic Relations Trade Agreement potential harm. limiting risks. (1983); Where biosecurity risk management The economic analysis of possible effects • the International Plant Protection measures are adopted in situations where on the New Zealand economy need Convention (1952). there is not sufficient scientific evidence extend only as far as is necessary for the There are other relevant international necessary for a comprehensive analysis of risk analyst to reasonably establish agreements to which New Zealand is a risks, MAF Biosecurity Authority will appropriate conditions for the party, but which are not of treaty status take appropriate steps to seek the importation of risk goods. It does not and thus do not create any legal additional information necessary for a necessarily need to extend to a precise obligations unless they are incorporated more objective assessment of risk and quantification of every potential effect on in other, treaty-status international review the measure accordingly within a the economy. If similar risks have instruments. These include: reasonable period of time. previously been assessed in a risk analysis or in the development of an import • The Rio Declaration on Environment 2.10 Process for conducting risk analyses health standard, such an analysis need be and Development (1992). When carrying out import risk analyses repeated only if new information has 2.8 Consideration of other matters MAF Biosecurity will: come to light or if relevant circumstances In recommending sanitary or • Invite the participation of other have changed. phytosanitary measures, a risk analyst can departments whose biosecurity 2.6.3 Environment also consider any other matters that are responsibilities might be affected, as Under the Biosecurity Act the New relevant to the purpose of part III of the outlined in the Biosecurity Council
BiosecurityBiosecurity IssueIssue 2626 •• 1515 MarchMarch 20012001 9 policy statement on interdepartmental 3 CONSIDERATIONS WHEN measures contained in an IHS are based consultation on risk analyses and DEVELOPING IMPORT HEALTH on a risk analysis no further consultation import health standards under section STANDARDS UNDER s 22 OF is required before the IHS is issued. 22 of the Biosecurity Act 1993. THE BIOSECURITY ACT (However, every government department with biosecurity responsibilities must still • Ensure risk analyses are reviewed 3.1 Background be notified as required under section within MAF, prior to being peer- Under s 22 of the Biosecurity Act 1993, 22(8) of the Biosecurity Act.) If different reviewed by appropriately-qualified the Director-General of MAF may issue measures are used then a round of experts outside MAF. Peer reviewers an import health standard (IHS) stakeholder consultation must be will be given specific terms of specifying the requirements for the undertaken followed by a review of reference for their critique. Each importation of risk goods. This authority submissions as set out in MAF critique will be, in turn, reviewed and, is delegated to MAF Biosecurity Biosecurity’s consultation policy. where appropriate, incorporated into Authority chief technical officers (CTOs). the analysis. If suggestions arising Import health standards are issued from the critique are not adopted the following the recommendation of a CTO. rationale for doing this must be Within MAF the authority to make such documented. recommendations is delegated to those Barry O’Neil • Undertake consultation in accordance national managers and national advisers Group Director, Biosecurity Authority within the Animal Biosecurity, Forest with the MAF Biosecurity Authority 9 February 2001 policy statement on consultation. Biosecurity and Plants Biosecurity groups whose duties include the development of • Prepare an analysis of all submissions IHSs. (The Biosecurity Policy and make this available to all those Coordination group maintains current who made submissions. schedules of delegations.) • Publish the subsequent decision of a APPENDIX A: Risk analysis 3.2 Standards to be based on a risk chief technical officer to issue, or not techniques developed by relevant analysis issue as the case may be, standard(s) international organisations based on the risk analysis. Under this policy the domestic and Under the SPS agreement, international international legal obligations relating to standards, guidelines and 2.11 Consultation POLICY developing an IHS are set out in sections recommendations developed by “relevant Consultation is an integral part of the 2.4 – 2.8, as they must be considered by international organisations” are defined risk management process. MAF risk analysts. in annex A, paragraph 3 as: Biosecurity recognises that consultation The development of an IHS is a separate • for animal health and zoonoses, the is an iterative and collaborative process process from a risk analysis, but the standards, guidelines and involving a two-way dialogue from the sanitary or phytosanitary measures recommendations developed under the very start of the risk management auspices of the International Office of applied in an IHS must be based on those process. Every reasonable opportunity Epizootics; recommended in a risk analysis approved will be extended to stakeholders to • for plant health, the international by the CTO. ‘Based on’ means that there involve them directly in the process standards, guidelines and must be a rational relationship between through an appropriate forum or recommendations developed under the the risk analysis and the IHS developed; auspices of the Secretariat of the medium. any IHS must be reasonably supported by International Plant Protection MAF Biosecurity undertakes to consider a risk analysis. Convention in cooperation with regional organisations operating within the with an open mind all concerns raised If there is a difference between the framework of the International Plant and to provide timely feedback. To ensure recommended measures in the risk Protection Convention. that a meaningful dialogue is established analysis and those finally adopted in an The relevant guidelines for risk analysis are: all parties should acknowledge that, while IHS, the reasons justifying the differences they have a right to propose an must be detailed in a bridging document. • Contained in the current edition of alternative view, they also have an The person recommending that an IHS the OIE International animal health obligation to provide reasoned argument. be issued under section 22(5) of the code, mammals, birds and bees. In the 2.12 Work programmes Biosecurity Act is responsible for ninth edition (2000), this is chapters 1.3.1 and 1.3.2; pp 21—28. Each group in MAF Biosecurity carrying checking that the IHS meets the out risk analyses will develop in advance obligations in that section of the act (as • IPPC (1996) Guidelines for pest risk an annual work programme of risk discussed in sections 2.4 – 2.8 of this analysis. International Standards for analyses which will be discussed with policy statement). Phytosanitary Measures; ISPM consultation committees, and published. Provided the sanitary or phytosanitary Publication No. 2.
1010 BiosecurityBiosecurity Issue Issue 26 26 • 15• 15 March March 2001 2001 Experts discuss Otorohanga termite response
Experts agree that termites have been Otorohanga area should continue for area; the traps would likely require eliminated from the infested area in a further five years; at the end of servicing every two or three days; Otorohanga, but surveillance of the which, assuming no new termite • any other reported sites of potential wider area is likely to continue. activity is detected, MAF could termite activity in the Otorohanga consider termites to have been On 16-18 January 2001, MAF hosted a area be followed up and surveyed as eliminated from the Otorohanga area; meeting of world experts to discuss necessary; and infestations of exotic subterranean • the current array of bait stations is • all old, untreated wooden utility poles termites in New Zealand. MAF sought maintained on the seven residential within the immediate Otorohanga advice on effective monitoring strategies properties, with inspections reduced area be inspected for evidence of to achieve confirmation of elimination to a quarterly, rather than the current termite activity. and discussed an appropriate response monthly (or two-monthly during the MAF is satisfied that the best advice plan for any future finds of the Australian winter months) frequency; available has been received through the subterranean termite (Coptotermes • wooden stakes be placed on the 21 termite forum, and will follow up each of acinaciformis). residential properties not currently the recommendations. The invited experts, from the United monitored by the bait stations, to be Subterranean termites were accidentally States, Malaysia and Australia, agreed that inspected quarterly; where possible, introduced to New Zealand through the elimination of the termite colony from the stakes should be placed at each importation of Australian hardwood the known infested area of Otorohanga corner of the residents’ houses in sleepers, timber and poles before timber has been successful. The objective of conjunction with a large piece of quarantine inspections were properly future response actions is to determine wooden material; established in the 1970s. Incursions of whether a residual population of termites • annual visual surveillance of wooden subterranean termites in New Zealand remains in the wider Otorohanga area. debris, trees and residential homes have been limited to the North Island and In considering future response actions in should continue; colonies have been detected and Otorohanga, the participants of the responded to as required. • sticky traps be placed on utility poles termite forum recommended that: Mark Ross, National Adviser (Forest with a fluorescent light during the Pest Surveillance and Response), • monitoring to determine whether a predicted alate flight season MAF Forest Biosecurity, residual population of termites (1 December to 31 January) within a phone 04 498 9611, fax 04 498 9888, remains within the infested two-kilometre radius of the infested [email protected].
nominations were received for the primary production industry representative and four for the representative of environmental organisations. Biosecurity Council representation The Biosecurity Council is an advisory body to the Minister for Two new members have been appointed to the Biosecurity Biosecurity. It advises on strategic policy matters and Council. Wren Green will represent environmental coordinates the activities of the government departments with organisations, and Craig Lawson will represent primary biosecurity responsibilities. It also provides a forum for production industry organisations. Mick Clout and Bob establishing priorities for biosecurity programmes and Diprose have also been appointed as alternate representatives discussing broad biosecurity policy issues. of the two sectors respectively. Their role is to support the The appointments have been approved by Cabinet. council member and act as a ‘back-up’ should the member be unable to attend a meeting. Suzanne Main, Biosecurity Secretariat, phone 04 498 9930, fax 04 470 2730, [email protected] The Labour Party pre-election manifesto indicated that the www.maf.govt.nz/Biocouncil Biosecurity Council’s membership should be expanded to include a representative of primary production industries and of environmental organisations. A request for nominations was sent in November 2000 to members of various biosecurity consultative forums, environmental organisations and primary production industry organisations not represented on those forums, universities and Crown Research Institutes. The request was also placed on the Biosecurity Council website. Twenty-seven Wren Green Craig Lawson. Mick Clout. Bob Diprose.
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 11 New Zealand’s contribution to key world organisation Three MAF specialists are making Key issues for the Administrative risk analysis – something more significant contributions to an important Commission now are implementing the comprehensive and more suitable as a international organisation that exists to 2000 – 2005 strategic plan, under a new practical guide than the chapter in the cooperate on animal health issues and Director-General appointed last year. Code. The first meeting of a group set international standards. This involves issues such as the writing the handbook (chaired by Stuart involvement of developing countries in MacDiarmid) decided to closely base the The OIE, or Office International des international standard-setting, the OIE publication on one currently being Epizooties, is known under the English structure of the OIE’s constituent completed by Noel Murray of MAF’s name world organisation for animal working groups and ad hoc groups of Animal Biosecurity group. health. The 77-year-old experts, and the OIE’s possible role in intergovernmental organisation exists to: In the absence of any significant peer- setting standards for animal welfare. • promote and coordinate research on reviewed literature on animal health important contagious diseases of Expert groups import risk analysis, the OIE realised that livestock; The expertise of Stuart MacDiarmid, an authoritative handbook on the subject could be written only by people who • collect and disseminate information MAF’s National Manager (Risk Analysis) actually carried out risk analyses on a on the spread of important animal in the Animal Biosecurity group, has day-to-day basis and had experience in diseases; been recognised during many years of dealing with real-life situations. The • set standards under which animals involvement in various OIE expert selection of two New Zealanders for this and their products may be traded groups dealing with risk analysis and the project is recognition of MAF’s without spreading diseases. diseases known as transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). reputation for expertise in risk analysis This standard-setting function has taken and fairness in applying risk analysis in on a new importance because, since 1995, From 1992 until last year Stuart was a agricultural trade decisions. the OIE has been recognised under the member of the OIE working group on Over the past two years Noel has been World Trade Organization SPS informatics and epidemiology. This writing MAF’s handbook on how to agreement as the international group examined the information needs conduct animal health risk analyses. The organisation for setting standards, of the OIE, especially to advise on the use of the MAF text as a basis means that guidelines and recommendations relating best ways of collecting and disseminating the OIE Import risk analysis handbook to diseases of animals and animal the information necessary for countries will be completed much earlier than diseases that affect humans. to carry out risk analyses and establish technically justifiable import conditions. otherwise could have been expected. It The OIE is the most influential global also means that the OIE Handbook will animal health organisation, and is vitally The working group’s functions have been be firmly rooted in practical experience. important to New Zealand because of its reallocated to a group on informatics and Throughout the text, real-life examples role in setting standards affecting various ad hoc groups under the Foot and are provided to illustrate points, as international trade. For these reasons Mouth Disease and Other Epizootics hypothetical examples are of little value. New Zealand works to ‘punch above its Commission. weight’ in the OIE. The first section of the Handbook, already Because of his expertise with TSEs, Stuart The OIE’s board of directors nearly complete, introduces the basic has been invited on the OIE ad hoc concepts of risk analysis such as hazard Barry O’Neil, MAF Biosecurity’s Group groups on BSE and scrapie. These groups identification, release assessment, Director (and formerly its Director meet as required to write or revise the exposure assessment, consequence Animal Biosecurity) has been elected to relevant chapters in the OIE International assessment and risk management. The the Administrative Commission as animal health code. This contains many of second section, which deals with representative of the Asia, the Far East the OIE’s international standards for quantitative risk analysis, requires more and Oceania region. Previously he was protecting animal health when trading in work but is already well underway. President of the Regional Commission animals and animal products. for that area. The group members have committed Stuart has also been a member of the themselves to completing the Handbook Despite its rather ordinary title, the ad hoc group on import risk analysis, Administrative Commission is actually within two years. The next meeting of which wrote the revised chapter on risk this group for the preparation of an the OIE’s board of directors. It oversees analysis that was published in the 2000 the work of the OIE’s head office (the import risk analysis handbook is edition of the International animal scheduled for June 2001, in Teramo, Italy. Central Bureau) and its chief executive health code. (the Director-General), making Derek Belton, Director Animal management and budget International handbook on Biosecurity, phone 04 474 4155, recommendations to the International risk analysis fax 04 498 9888, Committee (the annual meeting of The OIE central bureau has responded to [email protected] delegates from all member countries). calls for an international handbook on 12 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 Biosecurity cooperation with Australia A senior officials’ group established to Biosecurity awareness approach, is exercising the minds of strengthen transtasman dialogue on Both countries are working to increase biosecurity officials in a number of biosecurity issues met recently, and has awareness among the public and other countries. set five key priorities for cooperation stakeholders of the importance of The concept of during 2001 – 2002. Its four working biosecurity for protection of primary ‘appropriate level of protection groups continue to make progress on industries and biodiversity, and the against biosecurity risks’ operational issues. context within which biosecurity fits for This rather difficult concept attempts to nations (such as Australia and New Senior officials from New Zealand’s unify consideration of the costs and Zealand) that are highly dependent on Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and benefits of a country’s decision to accept international trade. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade a particular level of risk. For instance, a met with their Australian counterparts New Zealand (MAF Biosecurity) is high level of protection might mean recently, to continue a transtasman beginning a Biosecurity Awareness consumers and the economy are denied dialogue on biosecurity cooperation. Programme, and Australia (AFFA) is access to certain goods (eg, foods and putting new resources into In 1999 New Zealand and Australian animal or plant breeding material), and communication about biosecurity. implies higher spending on biosecurity ministers agreed to strengthen Australia and New Zealand will be transtasman dialogue on biosecurity systems. But at the same time, the communicating similar messages, to likelihood of biologically and issues, and a new senior officials’ group similar (or the same) audiences. called the Consultative Group on economically damaging incursions is lower. Biosecurity Cooperation (CGBC) was Broadening the established with representation from scope of biosecurity Working groups MAF and its counterpart agency AFFA Both New Zealand and Australia are The four working groups overseen by the (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries addressing the risks to indigenous flora Consultative Group on Biosecurity and Forestry – Australia), and both the and fauna as part of their biosecurity Cooperation are: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsibilities. In New Zealand, for and Trade and Australian Department of instance, two new positions are being • One each for animal health and plant Foreign Affairs and Trade. created in MAF Biosecurity with this health, reviewing existing biosecurity responsibility. measures that affect transtasman The group is co-chaired by Barry O’Neil, trade and identifying those that do Group Director of MAF Biosecurity, and Trends in transtasman travel not appear to be based on a his counterpart Simon Hearn, Executive Transtasman travel is set for a radical contemporary risk analysis or sound Manager of Biosecurity Australia in change because of a continuing high level science, or do not reflect genuine AFFA. of growth in passenger numbers, the air differences in pest or disease status Consultative Group on services agreement recently concluded between the two countries (or the Biosecurity Cooperation between New Zealand and Australia, and differences in the level of sanitary or The CGBC: rapid technological advances that may phytosanitary protection deemed lead to electronic handling of customs appropriate by Australia or New • strengthens dialogue at a policy level and immigration requirements. Zealand). These groups also look at on transtasman biosecurity issues; These changes have significant verification procedures associated • provides overall impetus and implications for biosecurity, as with trade such as pre-export direction on policies for harmonising biosecurity clearance could become the clearance, certification, post-arrival animal health and plant health only obvious regulatory intervention at inspection and permit systems. measures affecting trade between the the border and there is industry and • An operations working group that two countries; public pressure for more seamless travel concentrates on border operations, • oversees four working groups; between the two countries. aiming to harmonise quarantine activities at the border. • reports to ministers at least annually. Applying precaution in biosecurity risk management • Another group cooperating on the Key issues for the CGBC Both domestically and internationally in 2001–2002 development of risk analysis there is considerable talk of the methodology and its harmonisation At its most recent annual meeting on 13 ‘precautionary approach’ or where possible between Australia and February 2001 in Wellington, the CGBC ‘precautionary principle’ in New Zealand. identified a number of key issues and environmental protection, biosecurity planned mechanisms for cooperation in and other areas. How to apply precaution Barry O’Neil, Group Director, phone 04 474 4128, fax 04 498 9888, the immediate future. in biosecurity risk management, without [email protected] abandoning a science- and rules-based
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 13 Circus-bred chimp relocated to African sanctuary The recent successful relocation of a code, Animals in entertainment, New Zealand circus chimpanzee to a which also covers the use of animals in sanctuary in Zambia was the films and rodeos. It is anticipated that a culmination of a collaborative effort by draft code will be available for public the MAF Biosecurity Authority Animal consultation in May. Welfare Group, SAFE (Save Animals In what is believed to be a world first, the from Exploitation) and a New Zealand Animal Welfare Act places restrictions on circus, Circus Magic. the use of non-human primates (gorillas, The Animal Welfare Group facilitated chimpanzees, bonobos, and orang-utans) negotiations between the owners of the in research, testing and teaching. Only circus and SAFE. SAFE was previously the Director-General of MAF can involved in the relocation of another approve their use, and any circus chimpanzee to the same sanctuary The former circus chimpanzee joins a group of experimentation must be in the best earlier in 1999. Sonny, the 12-year-old 75 chimps at the African sanctuary. interest of the individual ape or its male chimpanzee, was born and bred in New Zealand legislation only allows species. The benefits must not be New Zealand, and had performed all his chimpanzees to be kept in either circuses outweighed by the likely harm to the life in the circus. or zoos. All zoos and circuses containing individual. exotic animals are registered by MAF His new home is the Chimfunshi Wildlife There is a growing public awareness that annually. Currently there is one Orphanage in central Zambia, a non- the great apes share a number of traits remaining performing circus chimpanzee profit refuge that cares for a wide variety with human primates – a capacity for while three zoos have chimpanzees. of sick, wounded or unwanted animals. sign language, complex cognitive and The primary residents are 75 The Code of Recommendations for the social systems and an awareness of self. chimpanzees who have been rescued Welfare of Circus Animals and The relocation and these legislative from zoos and circuses or confiscated Information for Circus Operators, which changes undoubtedly reflect the change in from poachers. They have been was developed under the old Animals society’s views on the keeping of primates. repatriated from as far away as Russia and Protection Act 1960, was deemed to be a Wayne Ricketts, National Adviser, Haiti (and now New Zealand). Cary code of welfare under the Animal Welfare Animal Welfare, phone 04 474 4726, Ridgway, owner of Circus Magic, reports Act 1999. It is currently being reviewed fax 04 474 4133, that Sonny is settling in well. and has been incorporated into a new [email protected] Care for animals learned at school The Animals in Schools Education Trust (AISET) was • Poultry biology (a course book for teachers of senior established in 1993 to teach young people the need for secondary school students) animal welfare and obtain a balanced view of people’s • The chook book (a resource for primary school students) relationships with animals. AISET is based upon the • Our pet dog, and its welfare belief that attitudes towards animals are formed early • Rebecca’s pet cats and how she cares for them in life. This is reflected in the Trust’s mission that “learning to care for animals leads to caring for each other”. • Animal welfare: what are the issues? (Royal Society Beta Series) • Pets or pests? AISET comprises board members from a variety of organisations including the New Zealand Veterinary Association, MAF, the • Brandy the budgerigar (a resource for teachers, early RNZSPCA, Federated Farmers, The New Zealand Kennel Club, the childhood educators and students) New Zealand Cat Fancy, the New Zealand Zoological Gardens, the • NZVA puppy pre-school pack National Museum, the Wellington College of Education, Landcare • Starters and strategies (various articles on animal health Research New Zealand Ltd and the Royal Society of New Zealand. and welfare for primary schools) Mark Leishmann is Trust Patron and Kathryn McKinnon • Talking about dogs in the community represents MAF on the Trust. • Control officers and teachers, friends of the family The Trust provides teacher resources covering animal topics for all • Caring for animals (a guide for teachers, early childhood levels of early childhood, primary and secondary education. AISET educators, and students). endorses educational animal welfare resource material that it The Convenor, AISET, New Zealand Veterinary Association, considers is balanced and informative. The following educational PO Box 11-212, Wellington, phone 04 471 0484, material has been endorsed by AISET: fax 04 471 0494, [email protected] (attn: AISET) • Safe fun with animals (video & parent and teacher notes) www.vets.org.nz. • NZVA kit for veterinarians visiting schools
14 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 “Operation go between” checks animal welfare on strait ships
An investigation into inter-island • check compliance with the relevant crates do not appear to provide livestock transport carried out in late Act and Code of practice; adequate ventilation when in motion. January revealed no animal welfare • provide educational and reference • Parking in the marshalling area offences. However some room for material to drivers; should be in lanes so that trucks are improvement in transporters’ procedures able to move out if necessary, and to • check loading and the positioning of and training was identified, which enable trucks to get the maximum trucks on each vessel; would improve animal welfare on long- amount of natural air movement haul journeys. • check the competency of drivers in when stationary. relation to the Act and Code during Over the Christmas period and early • The shipping company should notify transit between islands; January, the MAF drivers when there is a significant Enforcement Unit had delay – drivers to be proactive in received information phoning ahead to ascertain departure concerning the length of times. time that stock are in • Driver training must include basic transit from the farm to information on the Animal Welfare destination. This related Act. particularly to the inter- island movement of • Transfer of information between stock on the Cook Strait drivers when there is a change of ferries. Delays in ferry driver, eg, a hand-over form, which departure times meant indicates pick up times, time on the trucks were left on the road and ETA. wharves for several Moooving south: double deck truck transporting dairy cows to the • Random wharf inspections as an hours, raising animal South Island. ongoing educational tool. welfare issues. With the summer heat and • collect information for future ongoing shipping delays, it was an planning and reference. Feedback and consultation with stakeholders commenced on 5 March, opportune time to investigate further. Key stakeholders were informed of the with the aim of gaining agreement on Southern dairy conversions operation just prior to its improvements to practices. stimulate cross-strait traffic commencement. Earl Culham, Senior Animal Welfare In addition to the normal cross-strait Drivers of all stock trucks waiting to Adviser, MAF Enforcement Unit, phone traffic in livestock, the large number of board the ferries were interviewed using a 09 357 1061, fax 09 357 6480, farm conversions in the South Island has standard questionnaire. It included a [email protected] created demand for milking cows. These question about how long the stock spent cows are being supplied from the North in transit. The average time without food Island. Estimates of the numbers to be and water was 14.5 hours, with the transported in the next three months longest being 18.5 hours. These times do vary from 9,000 to 30,000. not meet the recommended maximum of The Enforcement Unit’s Animal Welfare 12 hours. team inspected all livestock trucks on the Recommendations Correction to wharves at Picton and Wellington during for improved practices three days in late January. Code named While no animal welfare offences were website address Operation go between, the investigation identified, there are some ways the was designed to check all stock trucks In Biosecurity 24:7 we gave an transport industry could improve animal waiting to board the ferries at the incorrect URL for the Plant welfare on long haul transport. For Wellington and Picton terminals over a Biosecurity Index on the MAF example: 72 hour period. The RNZSPCA was website. This outstanding resource invited to assist with the truck inspection. • Trucks must be in the maximum of plants and their biosecurity The objectives of this operation were to: ventilation area on board the ship. status is directly searchable at • check on the welfare of stock on all • Truck crate design does not appear to http://www1.maf.govt.nz/cgi-bin/ trucks waiting to be loaded on to ferries take into account adequate ventilation bioindex/bioindex.pl departing Wellington and Picton; when the vehicle is stopped. Some
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 15 Biosecurity strategy development: process and project plan
The biosecurity strategy development workshop-based rounds of nation-wide communications plan will serve as the team has refined the strategy public consultation. The first round of basis for consultation with government development process and prepared a public consultation (September- agencies and other major stakeholders to detailed project plan. December 2001) will be based on an ensure that it meets the needs of all issues paper and the second (May-July parties in terms of providing for the The development process and the project 2002) on a draft biosecurity strategy. mutual exchange of information and plan were submitted to the Biosecurity encouraging and facilitating stakeholder Council for approval in March 2001. The Timeline for strategy participation in strategy development. development process makes maximum development provision for stakeholder involvement, The indicative timeline, key events and The biosecurity strategy development thereby meeting the government’s target dates for the strategy development team hopes to use the existing requirement that the strategy “be are shown in the table below. communication networks of government developed in an open and participatory Project plan agencies and other stakeholders as much manner with input from the range of as possible to disseminate information The project plan identifies 10 main stakeholders and the general public”. It and invite input and feedback. The phases in the strategy development also ensures that the strategy will be communications plan will include both process. Each phase has specified tasks completed and ready for implementation general publicity and stakeholder identifying such things as deadlines, by December 2002. The project plan communication aspects. Likely required inputs, intended outputs and identifies 10 main phases and breaks each components of publicity are to use key identified participants. The project plan down into specific tasks with deadlines, papers (eg, the draft strategy) to advertise can be modified to respond to changing inputs, outputs and participants. major forthcoming events (eg, sector circumstances without prejudicing the Strategy development process workshops and public consultation) and final outcome. to invite the Minister for Biosecurity to The biosecurity strategy development The 10 phases of the project plan are: launch major initiatives (eg, publication process will run from March 2001 until • Preparation of the Biosecurity Strategy ). December 2002. The Biosecurity Council • Identification of issues will appoint a strategy reference Consultation with Maori will be a crucial (advisory) group to provide it and the • Public consultation on issues part of the strategy development. Advice strategy development team with advice • Development of draft strategy is being sought initially from the MAF from a wider stakeholder perspective. Key • Public consultation on draft strategy Maori Strategy Unit on how to develop stakeholders will be invited to involve • Development of final strategy an acceptable and effective consultation process to ensure that biosecurity issues themselves early in the process by joining • Biosecurity Council and Cabinet of interest and concern to Maori are stakeholder working groups to identify approval of final strategy incorporated into the strategy. The next biosecurity issues (April-June 2001). •Preparation of Biosecurity Strategy for step will probably be to seek advice from publication The working group members will be Maori networks and from central and • Publication of Biosecurity Strategy provided with a Strategy vision framework local government agencies with paper to familiarise them with the • Launch and distribution of experience in Maori consultation. strategy development process and their Biosecurity Strategy task, and give basic information about Malcolm Crawley, Biosecurity Strategy Communication and consultation Development Team, phone 04 460 current structures and programmes. Two important elements of the project 8710, fax 04 460 8779, A wider range of stakeholders and the plan are currently in preparation: the [email protected] public will have the opportunity to be communications plan and the process for involved by participating in two consultation with Maori. The draft
Key events 2001 2002 JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND Strategy advisory group established Strategy vision framework ready Joint stakeholder working groups operating Issues paper ready for public consultation Public consultation (workshops etc) Draft strategy ready for public consultation Public consultation (workshops etc) Final strategy to Biosecurity Council Strategy approved by council and Cabinet Published strategy ready for implementation
16 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 Exotic organism incursion policy statement MAF Biosecurity has prepared a policy • considering the need for, and Funding arrangements statement to ensure decisions about obtaining, expert, industry and In developing the response options and responses to exotic organism incursions community advice; rationale for allocating funding are transparent and consistent. • carrying out a delimiting and responsibilities, consideration will at least be given to the following matters: The policy statement will guide decision- environmental survey; makers and stakeholders in developing • ensuring appropriate legal • the relative levels of public and response programmes for specific instruments are in place; private benefit likely to arise from organisms or groups of organisms. eradication or management of the • commencing any immediate Comments are invited. organism; eradication, containment or other Growth in international trade and travel, management actions. • the ability of industries, communities intensification of production systems or individuals to capture the private Initial response phase completed based on exotic species, and climatic and benefits of eradicating or managing environmental changes, have all increased The initial response phase is complete the organism; when one or more of the following applies: the risks of incursions of new, harmful • whether there are industries, organisms. Incursions are inevitable, and • diagnosis confirms that the organism communities or individuals whose recent, high profile instances have is not exotic; activities or inaction contribute to the increased awareness of the current risk • the organism is exotic, but unwanted creation, continuance, or management programme. These issues organism status is not warranted; exacerbation of the problems caused have added impetus to the development by the organism; of the policy statement. • no further response action is required or practicable; • costs and liabilities that may arise Key parts of the policy statement are from legal requirements (eg, outlined below. However, the • sufficient arrangements are in place to compensation under section 162A of circumstances of different incursions sustain the initial level of response the Biosecurity Act 1993 or the mean that every part of the policy until decisions about a longer-term promulgation of regulations); statement will not apply to every response are made. incursion – for example, some but not all • the ability and willingness of Decision-making and responding industries, communities or organisms may be easily, quickly and beyond the initial phase cost-effectively eradicated. individuals to pay any costs they may When determining arrangements (if any) be allocated; Initial response phase for responding beyond the initial phase, • mechanisms by which any costs it is necessary to reconsider the roles, MAF Biosecurity will work to establish allocated may be recovered and the appropriate incursion response responsibilities and interests of relative acceptability of mechanisms government, affected industries, agreements with key organisations and to those who will be required to pay; individuals in the sectors for which it is communities and other parties. It may be responsible. appropriate for government resources to • whether any unusual administrative be applied. On the other hand, a better problems or costs are expected in The initial phase of a response to an outcome may be achieved by helping recovering the costs allocated; incursion involves a number of activities others to determine and make resourcing • mechanisms that will enable a that may occur in parallel or in sequence. and implementation arrangements reasonable level of ongoing This includes urgent decisions and beyond the initial response phase. actions relating to: accountability to those who will be Organism impact, response required to pay. • positively identifying the suspect options and cost-benefit analyses Submissions on the full text of exotic organism and determining Decisions about preferred response the draft policy statement whether it is an unwanted organism; option(s) beyond the initial phase will Comments on the full text of the draft most often be informed by an organism • determining the initial level of policy statement are invited. impact assessment, response options response, including whether to Arrangements have been made to send analysis and cost-benefit analysis. establish a response team; the full text to a range of stakeholders. Preferred response options may not be • investigating the means by which the This is also available on the MAF website. able to be implemented without organism was introduced, making any Henry Dowler, Biosecurity Policy government approval or new financial necessary border control adjustments Coordination, phone 04 470 2745, appropriations. Ministers will be advised and taking enforcement action; fax 04 470 2730, [email protected] and, subject to any time constraints, • consulting and informing key substantial consultation with affected www.maf.govt.nz organisations and individuals; parties will occur. Submissions close on 30 April 2001
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 17 Devil’s tail tearthumb a threat to ecosystems MAF Biosecurity of March and used by MAF and in areas with abundant leaf litter, it can Authority and the Auckland Regional Council to determine also tolerate shade and dry sites. The Auckland Regional what further action is required. plants quickly form long, highly Council are Auckland Regional Council and branched vines that climb over shrubs investigating the Auckland City Council are briefing field and small trees. The numerous curved, potential distribution staff on the plant and checking for sharp prickles on the leaves serve as of a new adventive sightings during field operations. grappling hooks that help anchor the weed species for New Zealand, Devil’s Auckland-based Department of vine to other plants. The dense leafy tail tearthumb (Polygonum perfoliatum). Conservation staff are also watching for growth habit shades other species The investigation follows the it. No further sightings have been beneath the sprawling, bushy tangles. identification of this weed from a small reported to date. Birds are probably the primary long- site in Epsom, Auckland late last year. A fast-growing annual distance dispersal agents of Devil’s tail tearthumb. Water is also important. The A meeting was held in mid December to Devil’s tail fruits can float for 7-9 days, important brief Auckland local authorities about the tearthumb, a native for dispersing seed long distances along plant and to discuss follow-up actions. of Japan, is an streams and rivers. The long vines annual vine that The Auckland Regional Council is to be frequently hang over waterways, allowing may grow up to the point of contact for reporting fruits that detach to be carried away in 15 cm a day and potential new sites in the area. As part of the current. can reach heights a delimiting survey, MAF and the of over 7 m when Threat to sensitive ecosystems regional council are this month climbing on shrubs distributing an awareness pamphlet in Devil’s tail tearthumb Although most infestations occur on and trees. The thin, grows quickly and can the area surrounding the current site. smother the plants it disturbed lands such as roadsides, mature, light green Residents in the area are being asked to climbs over. ditches, cleared woodlands, fields and leaves have a contact the Auckland Regional Council’s gardens, there is a concern that this characteristic triangular blade, 2-7 cm Biosecurity Unit if they notice suspect species may spread into important wide. The veins on the underside of the plants on their properties. wetlands. Once established in a sensitive leaf blade and the long leaf stalks have ecosystem, its rapid spread could make Pamphlet downward-pointed, curved barbs. At the eradication difficult and costly. There are distribution is base of the leafstalk is a prominent leaf- many habitats in New Zealand, such as scheduled to like cup of tissue that surrounds the stem. wet thickets and along rivers in lowlands, occur prior to The inconspicuous flowers are borne in similar to its native habitat. flowering. Initial small clusters on side branches and form John Randall, National Adviser (Pest metallic blue, berry-like fruits, about distribution Management Strategies), Plants information from this survey will be 5 mm in diameter. The fruits are expected Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9815, combined with data obtained by council to form in mid-autumn to winter. fax 04 474 4257, staff during routine field visits by the end Although it prefers moist soils, especially [email protected]
Marine biosecurity: spreading the word awareness and knowledge of the marine environment. The Ministry of Fisheries is taking the opportunity of ‘Seaweek’ The marine environment plays a large role in the lives of many New to spread information about marine biosecurity issues. Zealanders, for recreation, commercial, sports, or customary fishing, aquaculture or for its visual beauty. ‘Seaweek – See Life’ is the theme for this year’s Seaweek. Its emphasis is on the diversity of organisms in our marine As with the terrestrial environment, there are a vast array of marine environment. Seaweek has run from 9 – 18 March 2001. Activities invaders, which have been arriving at a steady rate since ships first included: started visiting New Zealand. The 148 exotic species so far • Disseminating curriculum information to 27,000 teachers identified are expected to increase once port baseline surveys around the country for use during Seaweek. Through students commence this year. Some of these invaders could threaten our discussing their classroom activities at home, the concept of unique marine ecosystems. We have acquired a few harmful species marine biosecurity can reach a large audience. already but have yet to acquire many well known ‘global trotters’. • A static display on marine biosecurity and biodiversity at It is important that people know how to avoid introducing and Wellington’s Central Library and possibly at Te Papa. dispersing marine pests, and about the types of organisms they • Dissemination of educational information on marine should look out for. biosecurity and biodiversity to all libraries. Maria Cassidy, Policy Analyst, Ministry of Fisheries, Seaweek has been held annually since 1987. It is organised by the phone 04 470 2659, fax 04 470 2669 [email protected] Marine Education Society of New Zealand and the New Zealand [email protected] for marine biosecurity surveillance and Association for Environmental Education. Its aim is to increase biodiversity information, or public awareness through school curricula. 18 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 18 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 Australian guava moth will not require official control
Australian guava moth (Coscioptycha record was obtained from Mangonui in is a well documented record of aerially improbana) appears unlikely to threaten Doubtless Bay. MAF has confirmed all dispersed organisms entering New native or commercial species. MAF will identifications. Zealand from Australia, which includes not be initiating any research into this A home garden pest moths, butterflies, birds, other insects such as aphids and some plant pathogens, home garden pest in New Zealand, or In Australia, the guava moth is recorded particularly rusts. MAF has concluded undertake official control measures as a home garden pest of guava, citrus that guava moth most probably entered against it. and feijoa and the joint industry/MAF New Zealand the same way. Caterpillars found in mandarins grown survey has also detected guava moth on in a home garden at Ahipara, near Kaitaia home-grown stonefruit, nashi pear, Unlikely to affect natives, eucalypts in Northland, were submitted to MAF for loquat and macadamia fruit. As in The known Australian guava moth plant identification, in June and July 1999. The Australia, it has not been detected in host families are Cunoniaceae adult moths were identified in August commercial fruit production. (Schizomeria ovata), Celastraceae that year as Coscioptycha improbana Blown over Tasman (Cassine australis), Myrtaceae (eg, feijoa (subsequently known as the guava moth). Besides guava moth, there were several and guava) and Rutaceae (citrus). MAF Immediately after the identification was other ‘new to New Zealand’ insects has noted communications from forest confirmed, MAF entomologists went to recorded in Northland at about the same biologists about the possible impact of Kaitaia to determine the extent of the time. These included the tropical grass guava moth on Eucalyptus and New infestation. Guava moth was found in webworm and the scoliid wasp parasite of Zealand members of the Myrtaceae mandarins and guavas in home gardens scarab beetles. In 1995 the Auckland War (eg, pohutukawa and rata), Cunoniaceae along a 15 km transect from Ahipara to Memorial Museum published a paper of (eg, kamahi) and Rutaceae (eg, Kaitaia. extensive sightings of Australian blue poataniwha), and concerns that initial consultation may not have been wide MAF consulted with representatives of moon butterflies (142) and blue tiger enough. the fruit industry and as a result, further butterflies (67) throughout Northland, joint industry and MAF survey work was Taranaki, Manawatu, Horowhenua, There are no records of guava moth undertaken. Guava moth was also Golden Bay and Nelson. attacking Eucalyptus, and guava moth detected in Kerikeri (but not in Records of a further six species of caterpillars feed in large fleshy fruit (not Whangarei). The citrus industry Australian lepidoptera in New Zealand in the non-fleshy seed capsules of the employed a local entomologist, Dr Jenny were also obtained between April and above New Zealand natives). In addition, Dymock, to obtain samples and rear June 1995. Weather conditions at the if introduction was via wind dispersal, caterpillars to adults for identification. As time were conducive to aerial dispersal of guava moth will undoubtedly have had a result of this, an additional location Australian insects to New Zealand. There Continued on page 20 Citrus whitefly blows in The Australian citrus whitefly (Orchamoplatus citri) was The species is identified by MAF in Auckland in October last year. This distributed throughout follows the discovery of the insect on grapefruit at a private Australia, with the property in the Henderson area. MAF then instigated a exception of the survey and additional discoveries were soon made at Northern Territory. Kumeu, Takapuna, Hobsonville and several sites close to the Ladybirds and original location. lacewings are predators of O. citri in Australia. How this insect got into New Zealand is not known. Wind There is no dispersal and the smuggling of nursery stock are possible information on the pathways. The detection of the whitefly on Lord Howe levels of parasitism and Island in 1996 lends support to the wind dispersal theory. predation in New Orchamoplatus citri is a minor pest due to the production of Zealand. honey-dew, which encourages the growth of sooty mould Australian citrus whitefly infestation. MAF has briefed the on foliage and fruit. It causes no direct damage to the fruit New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation and is currently awaiting a and is not known to be a vector of viruses. Direct effects from response from its members regarding any additional concerns. feeding on the infested foliage are not known, though other sap-sucking pests such as aphids can cause foliage to become George Gill, Technical Adviser (Plants Pest Management), wilted and distorted. The insect can infest all varieties of citrus Plants Biosecurity, phone 04 470 2742, fax 04 474 4257, and populations of O. citri may build up in sheltered positions [email protected] within the canopy during warm moist weather.
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 19 Accord developed to weed out pest plants
The National Pest Plant The focus of the NPPA They will also provide an opportunity for Accord is being developed will be a list of pest input from other interested groups who as a partnership between plants that have been are not parties to the accord. determined as regional councils and A small technical working group (TWG) unwanted organisms government departments. made up of representatives of biosecurity under the Biosecurity It aims to provide departments, regional councils and other Act 1993 (the ‘accord surveillance for certain interested groups will make applications list’). Determination of pest plants as pest plants (weeds) and enforcement of to MAF Biosecurity to have particular unwanted organisms will ensure national prohibitions against their commercial plants determined by a CTO as an coverage for all species on the accord list. sale and distribution. A draft of the unwanted organism. The TWG will also The obligations arising from the NPPA accord is available for comment. recommend to the accord parties that are also intended to ensure consistent pest plants that have been determined as Previous approach implementation of surveillance and unwanted organisms should be included enforcement programmes. For several years, the National on the surveillance list. Surveillance Pest Plant Initiative (NSPPI) Roles of the parties A larger consultative group, drawing its has coordinated regional council Under the NPPA, authorised persons members from the same sources as the surveillance of commercial outlets (such appointed under the Biosecurity Act and TWG, will provide comments to the as nurseries and garden centres) to employed by regional councils will be TWG on the advice it provides to CTOs prevent the sale or distribution of certain able to enter commercial outlets to and accord parties. Individual members pest plants. The NSPPI involved regional ascertain the presence of plants from the of the consultative group will also have a councils including a common list of 110 accord list. They will also be able to take role in forwarding proposals for plants to invasive weeds as ‘pests’ in their regional steps to enforce prohibitions against their be included in the accord list to the TWG pest management strategies (RPMSs). sale and distribution. for consideration. With the first round of reviews of RPMSs in progress, the NSPPI has been reviewed Chief technical officers (CTOs) in Implementing the accord relevant biosecurity departments will and a new approach is being developed to The NPPA will come into effect on 1 July determine the accord list of unwanted address some of the problems of the old 2001, to coincide with the organisms. Biosecurity departments may initiative (see Biosecurity 21:15). implementation of the first of the also fulfil discretionary surveillance and reviewed RPMSs. Release of a plant New approach enforcement roles where necessary. In identification publication in support of The National Pest Plant Accord (NPPA) addition to these roles, MAF Biosecurity the NPPA is likely to occur later. will be a cooperative agreement between will coordinate the appointment of regional councils and government authorised persons. MAF Biosecurity invites comments on departments with biosecurity the draft accord, and is also seeking All parties will provide advice and responsibilities. Cooperation between all nominations for members of the two information regarding the NPPA and will parties is important for the success of the working groups. take part in working groups that will be NPPA, and may be useful as a model for established for amending and updating David Harrison, Systems Coordinator, intra-governmental cooperation in the accord list. Biosecurity Policy Coordination, phone relation to future pest management 04 474 4173, fax 04 470 2730, initiatives. As with the NSPPI, the aim of Working groups [email protected]
the NPPA will be to prevent the Two working groups will be created to Submissions on the draft NPPA and commercial sale and distribution of continue to promote the principle of nominations for each of two working certain pest plants. partnership that underpins the NPPA. groups close on 30 March 2001
Guava moth: continued from page 19 provide any further information. This The basis for this decision is the guava other opportunities to establish in New insect has no international pest profile. moth’s known distribution, which covers Zealand in the past if the native flora did approximately 1,000 km2 in Northland, A proposal was submitted for funding, in fact provide appropriate host material. its low international profile and that the from an internal MAF research fund, for most likely entry into New Zealand was Scant information on biology preliminary research on the pest’s through wind-blown transtasman There is a small amount of information biology. This application has been dispersal. published on this pest in home garden declined. It was felt that this work would textbooks, but there is virtually no not contribute to MAF’s operations. Barney Stephenson, National Adviser information on its biology. MAF Preliminary investigations have now been (Plant Pest Surveillance and consulted with government counterparts completed and MAF will not initiate any Response), Plants Biosecurity, phone 04 474 4102, fax 04 474 4257, in Australia when the pest was first official control action against this pest or [email protected] detected, and they were not able to conduct research on it.
20 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 • Frozen inedible deer by-products from the UK, 16 March 2000 • Untanned cattle/sheep/goat/deer hides from the UK, 15 January 1998 New import health standards issued • Unprocessed animal fibre from the UK, 29 November 2000 The following new import health standards (IHSs) have been • Specified meat based flavourings from the UK, 14 January issued by the Director Animal Biosecurity and are available for 1998. use. Any previous IHSs covering these combinations of country of Deer velvet from Canada origin and commodity/species have been revoked. MAF has received information indicating that chronic wasting Importation of bovine meat products for human consumption disease (CWD) may be much more widespread in the Canadian from Japan farmed elk industry than was formerly thought. Japan has now regained its foot and mouth disease free status Following last year’s cases of CWD, the Canadian authorities have and this standard has been re-issued. This import health stand- embarked on an enhanced surveillance programme for the ard is based on The importation into New Zealand of meat and disease and have detected several more infected herds. meat products - A review of the risks to animal health, ISBN Until now, MAF has permitted the importation of deer velvet from 0-477-0849-9, dated March 1991. Canada on the grounds that the incidence of CWD appeared to Importation of dairy products for human consumption from be far less common in Canada than in the United States, from Japan which velvet importation is not permitted. Importation of dairy products not for human consumption from Japan On the basis of the new information, MAF has suspended, from Japan has now regained its foot and mouth disease free status 1 February 2001, the importation of deer velvet from Canada and these standards have been re-issued. These import health until issues such as distribution of infectivity and risk to humans standards are based on The importation into New Zealand of can be adequately clarified. Once such details have been dairy products – Risks to New Zealand livestock, January 1998. clarified it may be possible to formulate safeguards which would permit resumption of trade. Frozen rabbit meat and meat by-products for pet food from Australia The Canadian Food Inspection Agency will not issue export This standard was advertised for public consultation in permits for deer velvet until further notice is received from MAF. Biosecurity 24:20. The products must: Frozen inedible bovine by-products for further processing from • be of Australian origin; France and Germany • originate from a government-licensed establishment that This standard has been revoked pending an agreement with the processes animals for human consumption and operates European Commission in regard to new requirements for prod- under government supervision; and ucts originating from countries where bovine spongiform en- cephalopathy is present. • be derived from animals which were subjected to post- mortem inspection. Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management), Animal This standard is based on The importation into New Zealand of Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, meat and meat products – A review of the risks to animal health [email protected] – ISBN 0-477-0849-9, dated March 1991. www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS
Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management), Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, Export veterinary accreditation [email protected] MAF is inviting comment on the programme for accreditation of www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS veterinarians for the certification of animals and animal germplasm for export. The programme is based on all final Import health standards revoked certification being provided by government veterinarians with The following import health standards (IHSs) have been revoked, supporting preparations performed by accredited veterinarians. and the commodity or species from that country of origin is not This will provide the opportunity for non-MAF veterinarians to included on any replacement IHS. contribute to the export certification process. Animals and animal products from the UK The period for public consultation will close on 1 May 2001. It is The following import health standards have been revoked due to planned to implement this programme no later than 1 July 2001. the foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom: Copies of the programme can be obtained from the MAF website • Cattle semen from UK and Channel Islands, 10 March 2000 or by contacting Jim Edwards. • Deer semen from UK, 27 September 1999 Jim Edwards, National Manager, International Trade, • Deer embryos from UK, 27 September 1999 phone 04 4744 138, fax 04 4744 227, [email protected] • Live deer from UK, 27 September 1999 www.maf.govt.nz/AnimalIHS/iatind/httoc.htm
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 21 New ornamental fish and marine Revised used vehicles import invertebrate facilities standard standard issued The standard Transitional facilities for ornamental fish and MAF is soon to introduce a new import health standard for used marine invertebrates, dated 24 January 2001, has now been vehicles entering New Zealand from any country. approved. It replaces the standards for tropical fish quarantine At a well-attended meeting on 7 February, interested parties facilities and supervision of tropical fish quarantine, both dated were introduced to the draft of the new standard. The standard 30 January 1994. will be issued for implementation in the week beginning
The major changes in the new standard are: 19 March 2001. • The operator must now have a quality system with docu- A draft import health standard for used vehicle imports was mented procedures (ie, a quarantine manual). released for consultation in August last year. Taking into • Wastewater may now be disposed through a municipal account the issues raised in the 39 submissions received, MAF sewerage system without chlorination although the facility then revised the draft. The initial risk assessment on the used must still be able to chlorinate its wastewater in the event of vehicle import pathway came as a result of the number of gypsy a disease occurrence. moth interceptions on used vehicles from Japan. • The minimum number of inspections for fresh water fish has The new import health standard will address the need to more been reduced to three for the six-week quarantine period, explicitly manage the risks associated with used vehicle starting from when the supervisor has approved the quaran- inspection arrangements. As such, clear time limits for both tine manual. pre-shipment and on-arrival inspections will be introduced, Kerry Mulqueen, National Adviser (Import Management), strengthening the previous requirement that 100 percent of Animal Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9625, fax 04 474 4132, used vehicles entering New Zealand must be inspected, and [email protected] decontaminated if required.
Minor amendments to codes of ethical MAF recognises that the findings of the risk assessment, conduct undertaken in March 2000, did not establish a clear need to Code holders may make minor amendments to their code of strengthen the current import measures for used vehicles. ethical conduct. Code holders are reminded that if they made Recent results of gypsy moth host testing work, carried out any minor amendments during 2000, they are required by law to overseas by Forest Research scientists, reinforce those findings. notify MAF in writing of the changes as soon as practicable in The development of the new standard has been greatly 2001, and by 31 March 2001 at the latest. facilitated by the significant interest shown by industry and The Animal Welfare Act 1999 defines a minor amendment as interested parties during the consultation phases. one ‘that would not materially affect the purposes of the code’. Gypsy moth not such a threat to our natives Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare, New Zealand’s native trees do not appeal to gypsy moth, phone 04 470 2746, fax 04 498 9888, [email protected] according to the results of research commissioned by the MAF Codes of ethical conduct – approvals, to assess the risk posed by the exotic pest to New Zealand’s notifications & revocations since the forests. last issue of Biosecurity Gypsy moths are native to Eurasia and severely damaged the All organisations involved in the use of live animals for research, oak forests of North America after its establishment there in the testing or teaching are required to adhere to an approved code of mid-1800s. Nod Kay, of Forest Research, worked in a quaran- ethical conduct. tine facility in France to assess the risk of gypsy moth to key Codes of ethical conduct approved: Nil species of New Zealand’s native forest. New Zealand tree Notifications to MAF of minor amendments to codes of ethical species, used during the study, were obtained from the plant conduct: Nil collections of European institutions. Notifications to MAF of arrangements to use an existing code of The research shows that native trees such as totara and various ethical conduct species of beech are comparatively resistant to gypsy moth, and • Virionyx Corporation Ltd (to use HyClone New Zealand’s code) that the risk of the moth’s establishment in these forests is low. Codes of ethical conduct revoked or arrangements terminated However, introduced Northern Hemisphere trees (eg, oak) • New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd are at risk. • Pest Solutions • WatPa Enterprises Ltd (two revocations) Gypsy moth is a high-profile pest internationally and, as such, Approvals by the Director-General of MAF for the use of non-human MAF maintains an early warning trapping programme for it. The hominids: Nil moth has been intercepted on imported goods such as used Approvals by the Minister of Agriculture of research or testing in the vehicles entering New Zealand. national interest: Nil Ruth Frampton, Director Forest Biosecurity, MAF Forest Linda Carsons, Senior Policy Adviser, Animal Welfare, Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9639, fax 04 498 9888, phone 04 470 2746, fax 04 498 9888, [email protected] [email protected].
22 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 New organism records: 6/1/01-16/2/01 Biosecurity is about managing risks – protecting the New Zealand environment and economy from exotic pests and diseases. MAF Biosecurity Authority devotes much of its time to ensuring that new organism records come to its attention, to follow up as appropriate. The tables below list new organisms that have become established, new hosts for existing pests and extension to distribution for existing pests. The information was collated by MAF Forest Biosecurity and MAF Plants Biosecurity during 6/1/01 – 16/2/01, and held in the Plant Pest Information Network (PPIN) database. Wherever possible, common names have been included. FOREST BIOSECURITY RECORDS 6/1/01-16/2/01 Validated new to New Zealand reports: No new records for this period. Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment New host reports Acrocercops laciniella Eucalyptus nitens Waikato Forest Research Other PPIN host records include Eucalyptus bridgesiana, (black butt leaf miner) (shining gum) E. calophylla, E. ficifolia and Eucalyptus sp. Mycosphaerella suttoniae Eucalyptus viminalis South Canterbury Forest Research Other PPIN host records include Eucalyptus gunnii. This (Ascomycete) (manna gum) fungus has previously been recorded on E. saligna. Kabatina thujae Chameacyparis Mid Canterbury MAF National Plant Other PPIN host records include Thuja plicata. (tip blight of juniper) lawsoniana Pest Reference Laboratory (Lawson’s cypress) Pythium sp. Pittosporum eugenioides Mid Canterbury MAF National Plant Other PPIN host records include kiwifruit, garlic, asparagus, oats, (pythium root rot) (lemonwood) Pest Reference Laboratory capsicum, florist’s chrysanthemum,kaka beak, Cucumis pepo, Scanborough lily, carrot, Dianthus, lisianthus, feijoa, strawberry, broadleaf, Gypsophila, Lolium spp., tomato, Narcissus sp., olive, avocado, parsley, Phaseolus spp., pea, Prunus spp., Sandersonia, tulip, blueberry, Vicia faba. Thanatephorus cucumeris Pittosporum eugenioides Mid Canterbury MAF National Plant Other PPIN host records include garlic, asparagus,capsicum, (rhizoctonia damping-off) (lemonwood) Pest Reference Laboratory florist’s chrysanthemum, Cucumis sativus,tamarillo, carrot, Dianthus, Eucalyptus saligna, strawberry, Gypsophila, barley, Oriental hybrid lily, Lolium spp., tomato, yam, Paeonia sp., passionfruit, parsnip, Phaseolus vulgaris, pea, Sandersonia, Solanum spp., ryecorn, wheat, Vicia faba,and Vitis vinifera. Phytophthora gonapodyides Pittosporum eugenioides Mid Canterbury MAF National Plant Other PPIN host records include kiwifruit, tamarillo, Dianthus, (phytophthora root rot) (lemonwood) Pest Reference Laboratory loquat, Eucalyptus sp. apple, Prunus spp., pear, grape. Kabatina thujae Cupressus arizonica Mid Canterbury MAF National Plant Other PPIN host records include Thuja plicata and (tip blight of juniper) (Arizona cypress) Pest Reference Laboratory Chameacyparis lawsoniana. Extension to distribution reports Acrocercops laciniella Eucalyptus ficifolia Bay of Plenty Forest Research Other PPIN distribution records include Auckland. (black butt leaf miner) (red flowering gum) Acrocercops laciniella Eucalyptus nitens Waikato Forest Research Other PPIN distribution records include Auckland and (black butt leaf miner) (shining gum) Bay of Plenty. Kabatina thujae Chameacyparis lawsoniana Mid Canterbury MAF National Plant Other PPIN distribution records include South Canterbury. (tip blight of juniper) (Lawson’s cypress) Pest Reference Laboratory Nematus oligospilus Salix sp. (willow) Waikato MAF National Plant Other PPIN distribution records include Auckland, (willow sawfly) Pest Reference Laboratory Bay of Plenty, Gisborne and Mid Canterbury. PLANTS BIOSECURITY RECORDS 6/1/01-16/2/01 Validated new to New Zealand reports
, phone 04 470 2742, fax 04 474 4257, [email protected] Organism Host Location Submitted by Comment Paratylenchus nainianus Prunus armeniaca (apricot) Central Otago NPPRL The nematodes in this group are not reputed to be serious pests, (pin nematode) and are not associated with virus transmission. New host reports Alternaria brassicola Brassica campestris ssp. Mid Canterbury NPPRL This organism is known to occur widely in New Zealand. (alternaria leaf spot) pekinensis (chinese cabbage) Peronospora parasitica Brassica campestris ssp. Mid Canterbury NPPRL This organism is known to occur widely in New Zealand. (downy mildew) chinensis (bok choy) Botryotinia fuckeliana Dianthus sp. (pink) Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include: strawberry, perennial ryegrass, tomato, (grey mould) apple, olive, passionfruit, avocado, kiwifruit, Brassica sp., Eucalyptus spp, macadamia, plum, pear, grape, potato, onion, watermelon, cucumber, carrot, tamarillo and persimmon. Colletotrichum acutatum Allium vineale (crow garlic) Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include: apple, kiwifruit, camellia, strawberry, (anthracnose) tomato, watermelon, lemon, mandarin, quince, pumpkin, orchid, persimmon, passionfruit, avocado, peach, pear, nashi and blueberry. Gibberella acuminata Briza minor (shivery grass) Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include garlic, carnation, tomato, peach, (fusarium root rot) passionfruit, nectarine, potato, and broadbean. Eumerus tuberculatus Cyrtanthus sp. Wanganui NPPRL E. tuberculatus occurs throughout New Zealand. (lesser bulb fly) Prays nephelomima Olea europaea cv. Sauri (olive) Auckland HortResearch Other PPIN hosts include lemon and mandarin. P. nephelomima (olive kernel borer) is also recorded from Australia on citrus but no damage has been ector Forest Biosecurity, MAF Forest Biosecurity, phone 04 498 9639, fax 04 498 9888, [email protected] MAF Forest Biosecurity, ector Forest Biosecurity, recorded on olive. Nectria haematococca Iris sp. Dunedin NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include kiwifruit, kauri, garlic, asparagus, (root rot) chestnut, chrysanthemum, watermelon, cabbage tree, pumpkin, lemon, wheat, potato, pea, Prunus spp., rose, tomato, and tamarillo. Frankliniella occidentalis Fragaria x ananassa Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include chrysanthemum, lemon, cucumber, (Western Flower Thrips) (strawberry) carnation, Hardenbergia sp., sunflower, passionfruit, nectarine, Zantedeschia, and rose. Stemphylium lancipes (leaf spot) Aquilegia vulgaris (columbine) Auckland NPPRL PPIN also records this organism from the Waikato region. Oidium sp. Rhododendron sp. Auckland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include: courgette, Eucalyptus spp, and lambs ear. Pseudomonas viridiflava Cichorium intybus (chicory) Southland NPPRL Other PPIN hosts include: grape, rose, blueberry, nectarine, (leaf spot) apricot, peas, rock melon, pumpkin, passionfruit, tomato, Echinacea, carrot, kiwifruit, onion, capsicum, courgette. Peristoreus cruciger Olea europaea (olive) Northland NPPRL This is an endemic species that is known from Nestegis spp. (Maire). Extension to distribution reports
Forestry records: Ruth Frampton, Dir Plants records: George Gill, Technical Adviser (Pest Management), MAF Plants Biosecurity Gill, Technical Plants records: George Stemphylium lancipes Aquilegia vulgaris Auckland NPPRL This organism has been previously recorded in Auckland and (leaf spot) (columbine) Waikato.
Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001 23 Biosecurity regulations notified internationally These biosecurity (sanitary and phytosanitary) regulations have been either proposed or implemented by members of the World Trade Organization, and have been notified under the SPS agreement (the WTO agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures) between 6 January 2001 and 13 February 2001. (Under ‘Reference’, Add. refers to an addendum or additional information for an existing notification, Corr. to a corrigendum or correction to an existing notification, and Rev. to a revision of an existing notification. ‘Status’ refers to the type of regulation – either routine ‘R’ or emergency ‘E’.) For further information contact the New Zealand SPS Notification Authority by quoting the ‘member’ and ‘reference’ number of the regulation that you are interested in.
Keawe Woodmore, Coordinator, New Zealand SPS Notification Authority, phone 04 474 4226, fax 04 470 2730, [email protected]
WTO member Reference Status Date notified Summary of content Comments deadline Canada 94 E 31/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Chile 68 E 30/1/01 Camelidae semen 14/3/01 Chile 69 R 30/1/01 Camels 14/3/01 Colombia 40 R 8/1/01 Animal feedstuffs none Czech Republic 14 Rev1 E 8/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Czech Republic 22 Rev1 E 8/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Czech Republic 23 Rev1 E 8/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a EEC 110 R 8/2/01 Framework for food legislation 30/3/01 EEC 111 R 8/2/01 Use of specified pathogen free embyronated 30/4/01 eggs as a diagnostic aid EEC 112 E 8/2/01 TSEs n/a EEC 103 Add1 R 7/2/01 Extension of comments period for animal byproducts 28/2/01 not intended for human consumption Indonesia 14 E 12/2/01 BSE in Europe n/a Japan 62 E 17/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Korea 77 R 8/1/01 Quarantine facilities for live cattle 8/3/01 Korea 78 R 12/1/01 Straw and forage as animal disease risk 20/3/01 Korea 80 E 16/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Korea 81 E 23/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Korea 85 E 2/2/01 BSE in Europe n/a Korea 86 E 2/2/01 CWD in Canada and the USA n/a Animal biosecurity Malaysia 7 E 16/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a New Zealand 78 E 5/2/01 CWD in Canada n/a Philippines 26 R 6/2/01 Lifting of measures relating live pigs and semen 27/2/01 from the United Kingdom except East Anglia Switzerland 23 E 25/1/01 BSE in Europe n/a Uruguay 4 R 16/1/01 Poultry and poultry products 8/2/01 USA 375 E 8/1/01 FMD in Argentina n/a USA 376 R 8/1/01 Discussion paper on establishing resistance thresholds 9/4/01 for antimicrobial drugs used in food-producing animals USA 379 E 12/1/01 Measures relating to BSE in Europe n/a USA 389 R 29/1/01 Testing of residual formaldehyde and residual moisture 26/3/01 USA 395 E 13/2/01 FMD in South Africa n/a
Colombia 39 E 8/1/01 Measures against mealy bug (Maconellicoccus hirsutus)n/a EEC 110 R 8/2/01 Framework for food legislation 30/3/01 New Zealand 65 Add2 R 9/2/01 Implementation of measures for used cars, n/a vans and utility vehicles Panama 33 E 29/1/01 Measures relating to coffee berry borer n/a
Plants biosecurity Peru 22 R 5/2/01 Plantain and banana fruit or propagating material none Peru 23 R 5/2/01 Management of risks associated with citrus plants none USA 387 R 29/1/01 Mangoes from the Phililppines 23/3/01 USA 392 R 13/2/01 Alternaria destruens for control of dodder 9/3/01
EEC 110 R 8/2/01 Framework for food legislation 30/3/01 New Zealand 65 Add2 R 9/2/01 Implementation of measures for used cars, n/a vans and utility vehicles
Forest biosecurity Exotic disease and pest emergency hotline: 0800 809 966 • Animal welfare complaint hotline: 0800 327 027 www.maf.govt.nz/Biosecurity/index.htm 24 Biosecurity Issue 26 • 15 March 2001