External Evaluation of the BSOD Programme in Latin America Commissioned by the Netherlands Enterprise Agency

External Evaluation of the BSOD Programme in Latin America (2006 – 2011) FINAL REPORT May 20th, 2013.

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Table of contents

Contents Table of contents ...... 2 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...... 5 Management Summary ...... 6 I. Introduction ...... 11 II. A brief overview of the BSOD Programme ...... 12 III. Context Description ...... 14 A. Latin America export boom ...... 14 B. Bolivia ...... 14 1. Macroeconomic and political settings ...... 14 2. Export policies ...... 15 3. Export performance ...... 16 4. Role of BSOs in Bolivia ...... 16 5. BSOD Programme in context ...... 17 C. Peru ...... 18 1. Macroeconomic and political settings ...... 18 2. Export policies ...... 19 3. Export performance ...... 19 4. Role of BSOs in Peru ...... 20 5. BSOD Programme in context ...... 20 IV. Evaluation Dimensions ...... 21 V. Methodology ...... 23 A. Accountability ...... 24 1. Consistency ...... 24 2. Minimum Quality Norms (MQNs) ...... 24 B. Learning...... 26 1. 5C Model ...... 26

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2. Learning questions ...... 32 VI. Accountability Assessment ...... 34 A. CANEB ...... 34 1. Strategic Planning ...... 35 2. Market Development ...... 39 3. CANEB overall assessment ...... 42 B. IBCE ...... 43 1. Strategic Planning ...... 44 2. Market Information ...... 48 3. IBCE overall assessment ...... 52 C. ADEX ...... 52 1. Strategic Planning ...... 53 2. Export Marketing and Management (EMM)...... 57 3. ADEX overall assessment ...... 59 D. PROMPERU ...... 60 1. Strategic planning ...... 61 2. PROMPERU overall assessment ...... 65 VII. Learning...... 66 A. 5C Model Assessment ...... 66 1. Change in Capacity in CANEB and IBCE ...... 66 2. The BSOD Programme´s influence on the change in capacity ...... 66 3. Main Findings of the 5C model ...... 70 B. Learning Questions on the 5 DAC/OECD criteria ...... 71 1. CANEB ...... 71 2. IBCE ...... 79 VIII. Financial Analysis ...... 84 IX. Recommendations and conclusion ...... 85 A. Ten action-oriented recommendations (in order or urgency) ...... 85 B. Five lessons learnt ...... 87 C. Five approach recommendations ...... 90 D. CBI´s contribution to institutional development and SMEs` capacity to export ...... 92 ANNEXES ...... 97

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Annex I: Terms of Reference for BSOD Programme Evaluation 2012 ...... 98 Annex 2: Profile of the evaluation team ...... 114 Annex 3: Evaluation schedule ...... 119 Annex 4: Documents consulted during the evaluation ...... 120 Annex 5: Persons participating in the evaluation/ list of meetings ...... 121 Annex 6: Accountability Evaluation Matrices ...... 124 Annex 7: 5C Model Pointer Spreadsheets ...... 126 A. CADEX ...... 126 B. CADEXCO ...... 131 C. CAMEX ...... 136 D. IBCE ...... 141 Annex 8: Online Survey to the Timber Task Force (TTF) in CADEX ...... 146 Annex 9: IBCE Survey results ...... 148 Annex 10: Survey to ECEX / ISTECEX in ADEX ...... 157

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADEX The BSO Asociación de Exportadores del Perú BSO Business Support Organization BSOD Business Support Organization Development CBI Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries CADEX The BSO Cámara de Exportadores de Santa Cruz, in Bolivia CADEXCO The BSO Cámara de Exportadores de Cochabamba, in Bolivia CAMEX The BSO Cámara de Exportadores de La Paz, in Bolivia CANEB The BSO Cámara Nacional de Exportadores, in Bolivia CEE Coordination External Expert CRM Customer Relationship Management CSR Corporate Social Responsibility DAC Development Assistance Committee ECEX Escuela de Comercio Exterior, an educational institution of ADEX ECLAC The United Nation´s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECP Export Coaching Programme EMM Export Marketing and Management EMP Export Marketing Plan ETFP Effective Trade Fair Participation EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product IBCE The BSO Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, in Bolivia IMF International Monetary Fund INE Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, the official statistics source in Bolivia IOB Policy and Operations Evaluation Department MINBUZA ISTECEX Instituto Superior Tecnológico de Comercio Exterior, an educational arm of ADEX LF Logical Framework LFA Logical Framework Analysis MAC Market Access Conditions MAR Market Access Requirements MD Market Development MI Market Information MINBUZA Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands MQN Minimum Quality Norm MR Market Research OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OVI Objective Verifiable Indicator Planex Plan de Negocios de Exportación, a planning system in PROMPERU PROMPERU The BSO Comisión de Promoción del Perú para la Exportación y el Turismo SEMP Sector Export Marketing Plan SME Small and Medium Enterprises SP Strategic Planning SUNAT Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y Administración Tributaria, Peru ToR Terms of Reference TTF Timber Task-Force in Bolivia WTO World Trade Organization

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Management Summary

The Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI), an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (MINBUZA), contributes to sustainable economic development in developing countries through the promotion of exports from these countries. To fulfil its mission, CBI has offered a Business Support Organization Development Programme (BSOD Programme) to strengthen the capacity for the delivery of export development and promotion services in business support organizations in Latin America and Asia.

According to MINBUZA´s IOB (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department) guidelines, CBI is required to conduct an external evaluation by independent experts after a year of the completion of these programmes. This evaluation report offers an independent assessment on those programmes carried out, between 2006 and 2011, in Latin America with four BSOs: ADEX and PROMPERU from Peru, and IBCE and CANEB from Bolivia. It provides a short-term perspective by observing what has worked and what has not.

Context considerations

This evaluation has taken into consideration the context in which each BSO is immersed, and also, the different organizational development stage of each participating BSO.

During the programme period, 2006-2011, Latin America has experienced renewed growth driven mostly by an increase in national income due mainly to an unprecedented expansion in the demand for exports and improved terms of trade. Bolivia and Peru enjoyed the best part of these same conditions in their external sectors. Unfortunately, these booming circumstances also coincided with a prolonged downturn in aggregate demand in most parts of the European Union (EU), influencing developments that had an impact on the implementation of the BSOD Programme in these two countries. At the same time, both countries offered a quite dissimilar economic policy orientation. On the one hand, Peru was implementing a market-oriented trade policy, emphasizing the role of the private sector and the subscription of free trade agreements with different countries and regions of the world, among them the EU, while Bolivia was following policies that put the State at the centre of the development process, prioritizing the domestic market, thus relegating the non-traditional export sector. Certain restrictions were imposed to the export and domestic trade activities in staple foods and manufactured products.

BSOs in both countries have a long tradition and are well regarded institutions. The common denominator of their activities has been the representation and advocacy of their constituencies’ interests and the promotion of private sector activities in the form of foreign direct investments, small and medium enterprise development, exports at large, and sector specific developments. The participating BSOs, one of them (PROMPERU) a public sector entity, were mindful of the need to

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broaden their actions in the context of a globalized economy. This helped the design and implementation of the programme.

Evaluation criterion and methodology

The BSOD Programme consisted of four modules: Strategic Planning (SP), Market Development (MD), Market Information (MI) and Export Marketing & Management (EMM). An individual programme was tailored for each BSO to be implemented in the specific context in which it operates. In all four BSOs, an SP module was implemented; an EMM module was implemented in ADEX, an MD module in CANEB, and an MI module in IBCE.

This evaluation had two scopes: accountability and learning. For the accountability dimension, the evaluation provides an objective estimation on whether the programme complied with CBI standards and delivered its intended results. For the learning part, it presents an analysis of the critical factors of success and failure, studying their design, implementation and impact.

As per the Terms of Reference (ToR) for this evaluation, all four BSOs‘ SP modules were evaluated under the accountability criterion. All modules implemented in Bolivia were also evaluated under the learning criterion.

The purpose of the accountability scope is to present a thorough assessment of the extent to which the programme has been carried out successfully and has delivered on its expected results. To measure it, CBI has selected an indicator-based approach. Each programme module is to be measured against three indicators representing three Minimum Quality Norms (MQNs) for the transfer of competences, the use of these competences one year after the programme is finished, and the impact of the services delivered by the BSOs.

The purpose of the learning scope is to gain knowledge from the experiences gained while implementing the BSOD programme. It focuses on providing insight on the key elements that promoted achievement, but also on those that caused malfunction. The goal is to gain insights to consider the whole approach of the BSOD programme. To measure this dimension a set of learning questions related to the efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance, and sustainability were used as a guide for the evaluation process. These questions were set in the ToR and were later discussed and validated between CBI and the evaluators. In addition to this approach, for the first time in CBI external evaluations, the Five Core Capabilities Model (the 5C model) was used to assess capacity building and organizational change in the two Bolivian BSOs which took part of the programme. For this part of the evaluation, a set of pointer matrices was used, each referred to one of the five capabilities to be assessed: to act and commit, to deliver on development objectives, to related to external stakeholders, to adapt and self-renew, and to achieve coherence.

A combination of methods was used to realize the dual learning and accountability purpose of the evaluation. It was implemented in two phases. First, a desk study was conducted for a thorough review of the programme´s documentation made available by CBI. During the desk study, the bulk of the information for the accountability assessment was gathered. The information review allowed for the

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conceptualization and preparation of the learning evaluation. Fieldwork was carried out afterwards. This second stage focused primarily on the learning scope of the evaluation. Missing records for the accountability part were also collected at this stage by means of meetings or telephone conferences. Throughout the whole evaluation period, phone interviews and meetings were conducted with CBI staff and external experts involved in the programme, and also with BSO executives for clarification, validation and verification. All data gathered was then assimilated, organized, analysed and finally, presented in this report.

The methodology incorporated both quantitative and qualitative methods, using primary and secondary data, applying them, when appropriate, in order to triangulate the information received. Online surveys were suitable to conduct quantitative research on accountability indicators; in depth interviews were more apt to obtain qualitative information for the learning part of the evaluation.

Highlights of BSOD programmes

The overall objective of the BSOD programme was “to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the BSO[s] in its export development and promotion activities towards Europe and increase, in this respect, the number and quality of the services offered by the BSO[s]”. Its purpose was to “equip the BSO[s] with the competencies (knowledge, skills and attitudes) and tools that enable the BSO[s] to continually improve its [their] services to exporters to the EU market.” To achieve these goals, the programme assisted the BSOs by “…improving or developing export development and strategies and service portfolios; re-engineering BSO work processes and service delivery models; enhancing staff competencies; and increasing its cooperation with other relevant BSOs and export service providers.”

The report starts by presenting the evaluation of the programme implemented in CANEB. CANEB constituted a unique case since it is not a single BSO but rather a network of 8 regional Chambers, each autonomous with respect to CANEB and to the other members of the network. The BSOD programme was originally designed to develop CANEB capacities as a pivot agent of the network, and to develop the capacities of the regional chambers to provide improved services, but at the same time, to network as part of CANEB. When supporting CANEB as an effective pivot for the network proved difficult, it was decided to focus the programme mainly on the regional chambers that were in a better position to benefit from the programme (CAMEX, CADEXCO and CADEX, and to lesser extent CADEX-CH).While enhancing the capabilities of the regional chambers to deliver services to their affiliates and clients, the programme ended with little or no impact on CANEB as an organization due to an overestimation of the possibility to overcome the complexity and dynamics of CANEB´s network by all the parties involved in the design of the programme.

In the case of IBCE, the assistance provided by CBI coincided with a time of crisis endured by this organization. Contributions by its affiliates, the main source of funding to sustain its activities, were starting to decrease; some activities demanded expenditures with no benefit for the organization; and IBCE´s export advocacy was confrontational with the government, debilitating the technical character of its mission. The organization was not service-driven, and although there was recognition of and demand for its services, little was known about its beneficiaries.

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With the assistance of CBI, IBCE devised a new strategic plan that embraced not only activities to increase exports to the EU, but covered the full organization. A new vision and mission for the organization was established and services and activities aligned to this new vision and mission. IBCE has experienced a profound organizational change that increased its recognition as a reliable technical source of services, information and opinion, on matters related to international trade.

The programme in ADEX did improve existing services and equipped part of the staff with new skills to deliver EU-related services. It was not successful in generating new services. It is worth noting, that the programme went through an overhaul due to difficulties encountered mainly in high personnel rotation in the BSO as well as changes in coordinating experts on the part of CBI. ADEX and CBI agreed that the overhauled programme would focus more on technical assistance and, considering the difficulties in advancing the SP module, less ambitious goals were set in terms of institutional development. All of the results achieved are related to the bettering of EU-related services via technical assistance. Little impact was achieved in terms of capacity development.

The Programme in PROMPERU has gone through changes in the organizations´ management and changes in the programme coordinators. It has also experienced some changes and adaptations in the content of the programme and some delays in its implementation due to elections in Peru, and changes in administration. In spite of these events, PROMPERU has benefited from the BSOD Programme. The goals of the programme were attained at the results, purpose and objective levels. PROMPERU has benefited from CBI´s technical assistance and has become stronger in its capacity to deliver EU-related services. In terms of institutional development, the activities in the market information component were effectively used to create a transversal change for further capacity change in the organization. Although it was not possible to conduct any client satisfaction measurement during the evaluation process due to PROMPERU´s desire to leave this to a larger survey planned for some time later this year, PROMPERU is receiving a strong support from the government, and it has been given more responsibilities in areas related to international trade. Hence, we can assume that PROMPERU will continue to use the capacities transferred in the Programme even if delays or implementation missteps have occurred.

Final remarks

At the end of this report, three different levels of recommendations are presented: first, 10 immediate action-oriented recommendations are offered, and by their nature, they address mainly operational issues; second, 5 lessons are drawn from those reasons, factors and circumstances that help to explain the results of the programme; and, third, 5 approach recommendations are presented that have to do with the intervention logic and the design of the programme. Finally, the report offers an answer to the central research question on how CBI involvement contributed to the institutional development of the BSOs, and how this, in turn, contributed to the SMEs´ capacity to export. This final question is addressed taking into consideration the different contexts and diverse nature of the participating BSOs in the programme. The BSOD Programme turns out to be very beneficial in terms of transferring new capacities that allow these BSOs to guide their respective export communities on the ways and requirements to enter European markets. The programme has also strengthened, to different

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degrees, the ability of the BSOs to relate more effectively with their constituencies and to provide new services that fortify their ability to export to the EU. Certain internal processes that have the potential to improve the effectiveness with which these organizations are managed have been addressed during the programme. The use of the 5C model as an experimental evaluation tool for capacity development has highlighted the importance of considering this model from the very beginning of a programme not only in order to have a specific baseline to assist the evaluation once the programme is finished, but also to consider giving more emphasis in the programme to activities that are institutional development and process-centred and relatively less emphasis on function-specific and result-oriented activities. As for the impact of the programme on the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) aptitude to export, it is too early to make an assessment more time than a year will be needed for the new services to render a result in terms of export volumes.

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I. Introduction This evaluation report offers an independent assessment on the Business Support Organization Development Programme (BSOD Programme) carried out by the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI) in Latin America between 2006 and 2011. It has been conducted one year after the completion of the Programme, providing a short term perspective by observing what has worked and what has not.

The object of the evaluation is the BSOD Programme. The BSOD programme is one of CBI´s interventions to fulfil its mission of contributing to sustainable economic development in developing countries through the expansion of exports from such countries. It is part of the institutional development cluster. As designed for the herein evaluated implementations, the BSOD programme provides support to BSOs in acquiring the necessary competencies for sustainable and improved delivery of services in the field of export development and promotion. Through technical assistance activities, it transfers knowledge and information on the EU market so that the BSO can provide new and better services. By promoting institutional development, it aims to advance the BSO´s capabilities to make the provision of these services sustainable and well delivered. This in turn, should affect the SME´s capacity to export and allow for more exports to the EU.

This evaluation analyses the programme as it was designed and implemented in two BSOs in Bolivia (IBCE, CANEB) and two in Peru (ADEX, PROMPERU). The programme consisted of four modules: Strategic Planning (SP), Market Development (MD), Market Information (MI) and Export Marketing & Management (EMM). Each individual programme was tailored to be implemented in the specific context of each BSO, and consisted of one or two of these modules. After careful analysis of the critical activities implemented in each module, the evaluation addresses the BSOD Programme as a whole.

It is important to take into account the context in which the programme was implemented. Internal and external factors affected it positively and negatively. The programme was conducted by an organization, CBI, and with an organization, the BSO. The internal nature of these organizations and their capacities affected the results. Externally, the circumstances – economic, political, and sociological – did of course play a role, mainly at the result level. The analysis presented in this evaluation attempts to never lose this perspective.

This document has the purpose of assessing the BSOD Programme in terms of accountability and learning. For the accountability scope, the evaluation provides an objective estimation on whether the programme complied with CBI´s standards and delivered on its intended results. For the learning part, it presents an analysis of the critical factors of success and failure, studying every stage of the programme: design, implementation and impact.

As it combines the findings and analyses, this piece of work has three main objectives. First, it lists 5 lessons to be learned from the experience of the past 6 years workings of the BSOD Programme in Latin America. Second, it offers 10 action-oriented recommendations and 5 approach recommendations. Finally, it offers an answer to the central research question: how does CBI involvement contribute to the

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institutional development of the BSOs, and how does this, in turn, contribute to the SMEs´ capacity to export?

In addition, this external evaluation has used, for the first time in a BSOD Programme in CBI, the 5C Model approach to assess organizational capacity change in the BSOs that were part of the evaluation. Since this was not the main orientation in the design of the programmes five or six years ago, the evaluation under these new criteria has an experimental character.

II. A brief overview of the BSOD Programme

The BSOD programme is one of CBI´s programmes to support developing countries in increasing their exports to Europe. It focuses specifically in building up the capacities of BSOs to provide better, sustainable, and new services to the exporting SMEs they work with.

The BSOD programme, as well as the whole CBI approach, has experienced significant changes during the period covered by this evaluation. For the purposes of this report, we will refer to the modules of the programme as they were conceived in their design stage. In spite of these changes, the main objectives of the programme remain as valid now as they were back in 2006.

As stated in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the overall objective of the BSOD programme was “to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the BSO in its export development and promotion activities towards Europe and increase, in this respect, the number and quality of the services offered by the BSO”. Its purpose was to “equip the BSO with the competencies (knowledge, skills and attitudes) and tools that enable the BSO to continually improve its services to exporters to the EU market.” According to the same document, to achieve these goals the programme assisted the BSOs by:

 Improving or developing new Europe-related export development and export promotion strategies and export service portfolios;  Re engineering BSO work processes and service delivery models;  Enhancing staff competencies; and  Increasing its cooperation with other relevant BSOs and export service providers.

The programme was designed and implemented as a tailor-made intervention in the framework of four BSOD modules. Based on the BSO´s specific needs, during the design process, one or more of the following modules, also presented in the Terms of Reference, was selected for implementation:

1. Strategic Planning (SP) Module a) Activities:  Vision and mission building.  Strategy Development and Implementation.  European market research. a) Results:

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 An improved organizational strategy and operational business plan to effectively and efficiently deliver export services for the European market.

2. Export Marketing & Management (EMM) Module a) Activities:  Training needs analysis of BSO staff and external export advisors / service providers, and sector associations;  BSO staff and external advisor capacity building;  Export Marketing Plan Development;  Training Programme/Curriculum Development. b) Results:  Redesigned and newly initiated EU export courses for exporters, including training curricula;  Availability of Export audit services;  Coaching and consultancy services on Export Marketing Plans.

3. Market Information (MI) Module: a) Activities:  Creating export networks and information communities.  Service delivery Adaptation: i) Development / adaptation of dissemination instruments (e.g. portal, subscriptions, trainings, etc.) ii) Installation of an affiliate of CBI´s market information database. b) Results:  An enhanced (external) network in relation to MI service delivery.  Redesigned market intelligence policies, processes, manuals, procedures, etc.  New / improved MI products / service delivery, e.g. portal.

4. Market Development (MD) Module: a) Activities:  Value Chain Analysis and Development, and creation of strategic alliances;  Scanning of the European market for opportunities;  (Sector) Export Marketing Planning;  Initiate, facilitate and support Export Cluster Development and Export Coaching Programmes. b) Results:  Firm understanding of the value chain, its dynamics and the way to utilize the value chain to pursue the goals of increasing exports to Europe;  (Input for) Sector export marketing strategies for the European market;  Ability to maintain good relations with all players in the value chain;  Ability to coordinate efforts in the value chain;  Relevant service delivery in export coaching (e.g. in co-production with CBI).

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The BSOD programme aims to support the BSOs in developing the adequate competencies and capabilities for improved service delivery that are relevant and sustainable. The idea is that by the time an EU-related competency is created or improved, the BSO has also been supported in acquiring the necessary capabilities to replicate that experience with services oriented to other markets or even to create new services starting from that same model.

The programme seeks to transfer knowledge in the form of technical assistance and aims at modifying and improving the relevant processes by building the necessary capacities for institutional development. That way, the combination should allow for sustainable results over time.

III. Context Description

A. Latin America export boom The BSOD Programme was implemented during a time of renewed growth in Latin America. According to ECLAC, between 2006 and 2011, the evaluation period of the BSOD Programme, economic growth in Latin America averaged 4% per year (well above the growth rate in the previous two decades), driven mostly by an increase of national income due mainly to an unprecedented growth in exports. Exports grew at an annualized rate of 11% during this period, due to a strong demand for basic products originated in this region and favourable price conditions in commodity markets. Latin American terms of trade experienced an increase of 22% during the programme period. In addition to the increased amount of exports, Latin America also received substantial amounts of foreign direct investment.

The influx of foreign exchange to Latin America, notwithstanding an impressive accumulation of international reserves, put pressure on the demand for domestic non-tradable goods and on exchange rate markets. Although few cases of major currency misalignments were reported, a general tendency to appreciate local currencies prevailed in the region that did not work in favour of non-traditional exports, which are mainly produced by small and medium-sized enterprises.

Bolivia and Peru enjoyed the best part of these same conditions in their external sectors. Unfortunately, these booming conditions also coincided with a prolonged downturn in aggregate demand in most parts of the European Union (EU), influencing developments that had an impact on the implementation of the BSOD Programme in these two countries.

B. Bolivia

1. Macroeconomic and political settings Bolivia’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged 4.7% during the programme period, thanks to favourable conditions for its natural gas exports to Brazil and Argentina and for mineral exports to different parts of the world. The fiscal stance improved considerably due to higher tax revenues coming from the hydrocarbon sector and a controlled increase in public expenditures. This period also coincided with the final stages of the debt relief granted to Bolivia under the HIPIC initiative. In 2008, by the completion date of the last tranche of the debt relief, the country´s external debt represented less than 14.5% of GDP. Fiscal balances showed substantial but decreasing surpluses since

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2005. The current account balances also showed considerable surpluses contributing to a large increase in international reserves. The buffer of foreign exchange accumulated by Bolivia is equivalent to almost 50% of GDP. Inflation has been kept under control at single digit levels during the last five years. Bolivia adopted moderate counter-cyclical policies in response to the global economic crisis in 2008-2009, and currently has ample manoeuvring room to pursue economic policies to stimulate the economy in case adverse conditions occur.

Growth has been fuelled by domestic demand. Net exports contributed very little since imports grew at a rapid pace as well. Foreign and domestic investments remained at historic low levels but started to pick up in the last 2-3 years, fuelled by public sector investments in infrastructure and hydrocarbons.

In December 2005, after five years of a permanent state of social and political conflict, Bolivia elected Evo Morales as its President with an absolute majority of the vote. This granted the President´s party, Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism), an absolute majority in the Congress.

The new government reversed the market-oriented reforms undertaken in 1985-1989 and 1993- 1997, and adopted a new economic policy centred on the intervention of the State in the economy. It nationalized a number of companies that were privatized in the 1990s and some other companies in the services sectors. It has also created new public enterprises for the production of a diverse set of goods and services. The fiscal bonanza that accompanied the new government allowed for the expansion of transfers to the private sector in the form of a larger number of bonuses and certain subsidies, the latter especially for the consumption of gasoline and natural gas. The prices of a reduced number of products and services were kept under State control, and export quotas and bans were applied to some of these products. The promise to end the market-oriented reforms led to a constitutional reform that enacted State control of the economy and also led to a second landslide victory by Evo Morales in 2009.

2. Export policies One of the principles established in the Constitution approved in 2009 stipulates that international treaties signed or adhered to by Bolivia should protect and give preference to Bolivian production and promote exports with value added (Article 255). It also determines the goal of reducing the dependence on commodity exports by industrializing its natural resources under exploitation (Article 312), and stipulates that the State should promote and support exports with domestic value added (Article 318). Although not in the Constitution, but as a State policy since 2006, exports of agricultural raw and manufactured products are permitted as long as the domestic consumption is guaranteed. Hence, some quotas, bans and special permits are required to export sugar, soybeans, sunflower seeds, vegetable oils, maize and rice.

The Bolivian tax regime allows for the return of the Value Added Tax and Transactions Tax back to the exporters. This is done through the issuance of fiscal certificates that can be used to pay taxes and are traded in the financial market at a discount. Exports can also be done under a temporary admission regime that grants duty and tax free entrance of raw materials and intermediate goods. There are also 13 free trade zones in Bolivia, but with little export production activity.

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Custom duties range between 0 and 40%. Most intermediate goods are taxed at the lower end of this range, and some manufacturing goods, mainly garments, are granted protection with duties that are in the upper end of this range. Notwithstanding, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the trade weighted average tariff in Bolivia was 8.7% in 2010. This is because about 20% of imports are levied with a tariff between 0 and 10%, and 63% of imports pay a tariff between 5%-10%.

During the programme period, up until June 2009, certain Bolivian exports received preferential access to the U.S. market under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). Bolivia ceased to comply with the eligibility criteria for this preferential access, negatively affecting its garment exports. However, Bolivian exports to the U.S. kept a preferential treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences Program (GSP). Bolivia has also been granted preferential access under the GSP by the EU, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Bolivia is a member of the Andean Community and has recently requested full admission into MERCOSUR, raising concerns in the private sector because it could leave non-traditional exports to the Andean Community without preferential access to these markets.

3. Export performance Bolivian exports tripled during the program period, starting from USD 2.948 million in 2005 to USD 9.183 million in 2011. Natural gas and mineral exports accounted for 67% of total exports in 2005, whereas they represented 83% in 2011. Non-traditional exports grew at a much slower pace and almost doubled during the programme period, from USD 879 million in 2005 to USD 1.542 million in 2011. Their participation in total exports was reduced from 30% in 2005 to 17% in 2011.

Bolivian exports to the EU increased steadily from USD $162 million in 2005 to USD $804 million in 2011, representing on average 3.7% of the total amount exported by Bolivia between 2006 and 2011. Little more than half of the total value of exports to the EU is comprised of mineral products. Non- traditional exports accounted for the remaining portion. 62% of the non-traditional products exported to the EU are manufactured goods. The Netherlands are the main destination of Bolivian manufactured goods to the EU (29% of the total during the programme period), followed by the United Kingdom (28%), Italy (14%) and Spain (13%). The United Kingdom is the main buyer of Bolivian agricultural products exported from Bolivia to the EU accounting for 37% of the total amount sold during the programme period, followed by The Netherlands (17%), Germany (16%), France and Spain (each with 8%).

4. Role of BSOs in Bolivia BSOs have a long tradition in Bolivia. The Bolivian Chamber of Commerce is 123 years old, and the association of manufacturing firms is about to turn 90. The confederation of all private BSOs is 53 years old. These organizations have played an important role in the Bolivian economic policymaking process. Due to political circumstances related with military regimes in the second half of the twentieth century, and a crisis of representation in traditional political parties at the turn of this century, business and labour organizations were important actors in voicing their constituencies’ demands. However the shift that occurred in the political landscape in Bolivia after 2006 has markedly decreased the influence of private BSOs. The current government, elected twice by a majority of the vote in the recent past, has

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chosen to implement policies that put the State in command of the economy and has little belief in markets operating freely. Other social organizations have gained more influence and power in the policymaking process and private BSOs must adapt to these circumstances to have their interests taken into account.

However, it is interesting to note that in spite of the political orientation of the government and some policies and reforms that are not business-friendly, the private sector in Bolivia has weathered these circumstances well, in part due to a strong aggregate demand stimulated from abroad by booming commodity prices, and by a robust domestic consumption domestically. These developments have helped the business community to mitigate any adverse effects of the limitations imposed by the government. More importantly, the increasing capital and current expenditures by the public sector, including the nationalized and the newly created public enterprises, have opened a new market for the private sector that will continue to give ample breathing room to the private sector as long as the external conditions remain as buoyant.

5. BSOD Programme in context The BSOD Programme in Bolivia was designed to deal with two private BSOs: CANEB and IBCE. CANEB is the confederation of regional business associations known as Cámaras de Exportadores (Export chambers). These Cámaras congregate Bolivian companies of all sizes that are in the export business.

IBCE is also an organization formed by business associations, but the difference is that all of them are located in Santa Cruz, a region situated in the east of Bolivia. Its affiliates represent companies in all sectors of the regional economic activity that have an interest in international trade.

At the time the BSOD Programme started, the primary role of these BSOs was to voice and support broad interests of the business community with little attention to the provision of services. In the case of CANEB, its strength and sustainability rested on its ability to deal with the government on issues affecting exports and its main source of revenue was the issuance of certificates of origin, for which it collected a small fee. IBCE also voiced the interests of exporters and importers in Santa Cruz but from a more technical perspective. It was nationally recognized for its flagship publication Comercio Exterior, and its main source of revenue was the contributions of its affiliates. In sum, these were BSOs with a representation role and a limited orientation towards the provision of services.

Soon after the inauguration of the new government in 2006, tensions with the private sector started to rise, especially with the business community in the Santa Cruz region. The government wanted to regain control over activities that had been transferred to the private sector in the past and decided to take back the issuance of certificates of origin, depriving CANEB of its main source of income. At the same time, tensions with the private sector in Santa Cruz led some organizations and companies to adopt a less corporate stance, and therefore, reduced their willingness to continue supporting their representative organizations. These developments presented quite a challenging situation for the BSOD programme. On the one hand, it left a potentially debilitating environment for the BSOs in Bolivia, but on the other hand, it offered an opportunity to cooperate in reshaping these organizations in a way that

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could help the development of exports in a significant way without being engaged in political considerations.

C. Peru

1. Macroeconomic and political settings The economic performance of Peru is one of the most remarkable in Latin America. But it is important to note that not only favourable international conditions explain the good Peruvian economic results. Peru started profound structural reforms in the late 1990s, giving more predictability to its fiscal and monetary policies and opening up the economy to international trade.

Over the programme period between 2006 and 2011, the Peruvian economy grew at a rate of 7.1%, on average. This was driven by relatively high levels of both public and private investment, and especially due to foreign direct investment in the latter case (total investment averaged 23% of GDP during this period). In the last 6 years, Peru has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in South America. Private consumption also grew at a very fast rate. The contribution of net exports was also a driver of rapid economic growth, but not as important as domestic demand since the impressive export growth in this period (16% per year, on average) was also accompanied with a strong increase in imports. The current account of the balance of payments had deficits all through this period, reflecting the investment effort and relatively lower savings in the economy. This has changed recently. In spite of this trend, Peruvian international reserves increased continually over the programme period at a level that was equivalent to more than one year of imports.

Peru weathered the global economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 fairly well, thanks to a rapid fiscal and monetary response that prevented a credit crunch and a moderate fiscal expansion to stimulate the economy. Apart from a surge in inflation in 2008 and 2011, inflation has remained within a 1-3 per cent band established by its monetary authorities.

Despite high economic growth in the first decade of this century, governments in Peru obtained very low approval ratings. Part of the discontent was reflected in social unrest and rising demands for a more equitable income distribution. Policies in this direction partially succeeded and were implemented without interrupting market oriented reforms. In the first decade of this century, two successive democratically-elected governments pursued policies to attract foreign direct investment, promote private sector development, and increase the contribution of medium and small-sized enterprises, recognizing their critical contribution in generating jobs.

The 2011 election that brought Mr. Ollanta Humala to the Presidency of the nation was looked upon with suspicion by many observers from the private sector. There was the belief that his administration was going to be part of the socialist currents that were against market-oriented and pro- business policies in the region. However, these fears proved to be wrong. So far, priority has been given to attend the demands of those most in need in society, but at the same time new rules for relations with the private sector and foreign investors are maintaining a favourable environment for economic development. The current and former administrations are vividly showing an interest to fully integrate

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the country into the global economy, and are taking serious care of the policies that may contribute to this end in a competitive and efficient manner.

2. Export policies Peru has approved in the past pieces of legislation aiming at the promotion and diversification of exports. The last related legislation enacted had a general character granting the private sector freedom to export goods and services not prohibited by law (goods under international restriction). Other pieces of legislation relate to the streamlining of administrative procedures to facilitate exports. More recently, but after the programme completion, Peru is considering the approval of a comprehensive law that will take into account the recent free trade agreements signed with the U.S. and the EU.

Customs tariffs in Peru are classified in three categories: 0; 6; and 11 per cent. The average and the effective tariff rates in Peru have decreased continuously over the last decade. Since 2008, the effective rate was 2%. According to the WTO, 74% of Peruvian imports in 2010 came into the country duty free; 22% paid tariffs in a range between 5 and 10 per cent, and no product was levied a tariff higher than 25%.

Exporters are entitled to a tax credit for the general sales tax (IGV) and the selective consumption tax levied on the purchase of goods and services incorporated in an exported product. A recent law to promote services has extended those benefits to the export of services. Tourism-related services are also regarded as exports. In addition, some exports within certain limits are entitled to a draw-back regime for the restitution of tariffs paid on inputs used in exported goods in an amount equivalent to 5% of the exported value.

The government of Peru has also made great effort to promote exports by the signing of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that opened markets and gained better access conditions for Peruvian products. Aside from being part of the Andean Community, and a member of the Latin American Integration Association, Peru has signed a free trade agreement with the U.S. enforced in February 2009. Peru has signed and notified the WTO of trade agreements signed with Canada, Japan, Panama, Chile, China, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Singapore, and has announced an upcoming agreement with Costa Rica. It was also granted preferential access under the GSP by Canada, the EU, Norway, Turkey, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It should also be noted that Peru and the EU signed a free trade agreement in March 2013, which will open a larger opportunity for trade for both signing parties.

3. Export performance Export growth during the programme period was 8.9% per year, in spite of the decline caused by the Great Recession in 2009. Traditional exports grew at 10% annually in the same period, whereas non- traditional exports increased at a 5% rate. By far, minerals are the main export product of Peru. In value terms, they accounted for 60% of the total amount exported. Peru also is an oil exporting country. Oil exports represented 7% of total exports during the programme period. Other traditional products

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include fishery and cotton. In sum, all traditional exports accounted for 77% of the total over the programme period.

Exports from Peru to the EU were 17% of the total amount exported between 2006 and 2010. 65% of these exports were traditional products, while the remaining 35% were non-traditional products coming mostly from the agricultural sector. It should be noted that the value of non-traditional exports to the EU has declined over time from USD $2.3 billion in 2006 to USD $1.4 billion in 2010. The largest decline was in manufactured goods. Hence, the share of non-traditional exports has declined from 59% in 2006 to only 24% in 2010. Germany has been the largest recipient of Peruvian exports, followed by Spain (18%), Italy (16%), the Netherlands (13%), and Belgium (9%).

4. Role of BSOs in Peru Peru has an extended array of public and private BSOs. The common denominator of these entities is the promotion of private sector activities in the form of foreign direct investments, small and medium enterprise development, exports at large, and sector specific developments in the agricultural sector, fishery and handicrafts. These institutions have transcended the pure representation and advocacy functions towards development activities and service-oriented operations, and are mindful of the need to view their actions in the context of a global economy. More recently, the notion of establishing and promoting the Peru brand is not only an effort to position Peru in the tourism industry landscape, but also a competitive enhancement mechanism that is taking root in many of these organizations.

The evolving role of BSOs in Peru dates back to the 19th century. As in the case of Bolivia, its Chamber of Commerce is an institution with 125 years of history. It was created with the objective of contributing to the Peruvian reconstruction after the Pacific war with Chile, and since then, has influenced the formulation of policies to assist its members’ activities but at the same time the development of the country. The point here is that to some extent, there is a relatively long tradition of BSOs and government interaction in Latin America. This of course does not mean that those interactions have always been effective, nor were they always in the best interest of a particular country. It points to the fact that these intermediate organizations had and have the potential to influence the policymaking process in these countries if they can remain in tune with the evolving forces in society.

5. BSOD Programme in context The Programme in Peru was implemented in one public BSO, PROMPERU, and another private BSO, ADEX. PROMPERU was created in 2007 as a result of the merger of two entities, namely, PROMPEX, an organization created in 1996 to promote exports, and a former PROMPERU created in 1993 to promote Peru as a tourist destination. The new BSO institution kept the shortened name PROMPERU but was organized around PROMPEX.

ADEX is a highly regarded private BSO. It was founded in 1973 to represent private export companies in an effort to influence public policies to develop their activities. It soon affiliated companies that were in the import sector of trade and started to develop services for their affiliates. Its focus is the promotion of exports through an assorted portfolio of services.

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Against this background, the programme was implemented in an environment amicable for the private sector, institutions and policies concerned and devoted to the promotion of exports, a country with a non-traditional sector with some prior experience in entering new markets, and a changing counterpart in the government as the result of the merger of PROMPEX and PROMPERU.

IV. Evaluation Dimensions This evaluation has two scopes: accountability and learning. Each of them has a different perspective to look at each BSOD programme. When combined, they add to one another. The mainly analytical learning scope is a good complement to the fact-driven accountability scope.

MQN 1 – Transfer of Capacity (Result): The BSO and CBI certify that a minimum of 80% of the competences have been transferred. Transfer of capacity had to be verified during the implementation phase of the programme.

MQN 2 - Use of Capacity (Effect/Outcome): The BSO certifies that a minimum of 60% of the gained capacity is used in practice. Use of capacity is to be measured one year after the end of the programme.

MQN 3 – Effect of Use of Capacity (Impact): 60% of the users/clients of BSO services indicate that the service delivery of the BSO has improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance. Effect of the use of capacity is measured one year after the programme´s completion.

Assessment of accountability relies exclusively on data. The evaluation approach has looked for rigor, objectivity and independence.

The purpose of the learning scope is to gain knowledge from the experiences implementing the BSOD programme. It focuses on providing insight on the key elements that promoted achievement, but also on those that caused malfunction. By acknowledging them, the goal is to gain a viewpoint from which to consider the whole approach of the BSOD programme. The lessons learned, recommendations, and conclusions are presented to inform future decision making.

CBI has established two directives to approach the learning scope. First, it is testing for the first time the use of the 5 Capabilities (5C) Model. This model looks at organizations as open systems. It identifies 5 core capabilities needed by organizations to thrive in a context in which they are simultaneously influenced by internal and external factors. They are the capabilities to:

1) Act and commit: This capability is about the ability to work properly: to plan, make decisions and act on these decisions collectively.

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2) Deliver on development objectives: This capability concerns the organization’s skills to ensure that it is performing and producing what it is set up to do. 3) Relate to external shareholders: This capability has to do with how to relate and survive within the context and in connection with other actors. 4) Adapt and self-renew: This capability is about the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. 5) Achieve coherence: This capability is about strengthening an organization’s identity, self- awareness and discipline, balancing diversity and coherence.

The evolution of these capabilities during the programme is assessed to estimate capacity development within the organization. This internal change is an outcome of the organization. This evaluation aims to find out to what extent the BSOD programme contributed to this outcome.

Then, all three stages of the programme – design, implementation and impact – are analysed looking for insights. The approach in this case is to evaluate the programme against the 5 DAC/OECD criteria:

1) Efficiency is about the relationship between inputs and outputs, i.e. meaning that results were obtained with a reasonable use of resources. 2) Effectiveness is about the relationship between programme activities, outputs and outcomes, taking into account the intervention logic of the programme. 3) Impact is about the changes in BSO beneficiaries and society that have occurred as a consequence of the achieved outcomes. This criterion also includes unforeseen and undesired impacts that may have resulted from the programme. 4) Relevance is about the extent to which the objectives of the CBI programme are consistent with the needs of the BSO that receives support, i.e. the country´s and stakeholders´ needs. 5) Sustainability is about the continuation of benefits of the BSOD programme after the intervention has been completed, the probability of continued long-term benefits, and the resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

The way to search for relevant information about the learning scope is by using learning questions. They are formulated to inquire on the degree to which all phases of the programme have met these criteria.

After both guidelines - the 5C Model and the 5 DAC/OECD criteria - have been used to study the programme, the organizations involved and the context in which they were immersed, all the information is assimilated and interpreted. The result of this analytical exercise is presented in an open and transparent manner in this report, in the form of lessons and recommendations.

The evaluation will assess the implementation of the Programme´s modules in four BSOs in two countries: ADEX and PROMPERU in Peru, and IBCE and CANEB in Bolivia. As established in the Terms of Reference1 for this project, for the Peruvian BSOs, the evaluation covers only the accountability dimension; for the Bolivian ones, both dimensions of the evaluation are to be addressed. Table 1 presents the modules implemented in each BSO and the scope of the evaluation for each of them.

1 Terms of Reference for the BSOD Programme Evaluation 2012. Centre of Promotion of Imports from developing countries (CBI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The Hague | The Netherlands. October 2012. (see Annex 1).

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Table 1: BSO modules and their evaluation scope

SP Module EMM Module MI Module MD Module BSOD / Scope Accountability Learning Accountability Learning Accountability Learning Accountability Learning ADEX   PROMPERU  IBCE     CANEB    

V. Methodology The selected methodology is a combination of methods designed to accomplish the dual learning and accountability objectives of the evaluation. It was implemented in two phases. First, a desk study was conducted for a thorough review of the programme´s documentation made available by CBI (see Annex 4, presented as a Supplement to this report, for a complete list of this documentation). During the desk study, the bulk of the information for the accountability assessment was gathered. The information reviewed allowed for the conceptualization and preparation of the learning evaluation. Then a field work study was carried out. This second stage focused primarily on the learning scope. The two BSOs evaluated for learning were visited and a work plan was scheduled for several days in which information was obtained through interviews and direct observations of their activities and services. Missing records for the accountability part were also collected through meetings or telephone conferences. Throughout the whole evaluation period, phone interviews and meetings were conducted with CBI staff and external experts involved in the programme, and also with BSO executives for clarification, validation and verification. All data gathered was then assimilated, organized, analysed, and finally, presented in this report.

The methodology incorporates both quantitative and qualitative methods, applying them when appropriate. While online surveys were suitable to conduct quantitative research on accountability indicators, in-depth interviews were more suitable for obtaining qualitative information for the learning recommendations.

The accountability scope combined primary and secondary data. Information was obtained from primary research through in-depth interviews, online surveys and direct observation. For some parts, secondary data was the correct approach. This was the case of evaluation reports or satisfaction surveys conducted by the BSOs that served as valuable sources of information. The evaluation of the learning part was conducted mainly by primary research, conducting non-structured interviews and questionnaires for the 5C and 5 DAC/OECD assessments. Secondary information was also used to answer the learning questions.

The chosen methodology is a result of an analysis of the evaluation objectives and the conceptualization of its dimensions. The selected mix of evaluation methods was constructed as the more suitable way to deliver precise, objective and insightful results.

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This methodology was designed as the best fit for the evaluation framework selected by CBI. However, there are still some considerations about the relationship between the methodology and the evaluation framework that will be useful to the reader of this report. In the accountability evaluation, the level of compliance of the MQNs is to be assessed by assigning a percentage level to every activity. It is evident that criteria like the transfer or use of capacity cannot be measured with mathematical precision. Hence, the percentage levels we have assigned for each MQN are our best estimation of the way our observations can translate into a number (See Annex 6 for a detailed explanation).For the 5C model assessment in the learning scope, there is an important limitation in this evaluation. A baseline of the organization´s capabilities, which is ideally the first step to start an intervention that will be evaluated with this approach, was not established before the programmes were implemented. This should not be understood as a fault in the programme, it occurs just because this is the first time CBI will evaluate a BSOD programme under the lens of the 5C model (none of these programmes was designed taking this approach into consideration).

A. Accountability

1. Consistency

At the start of each programme, both CBI and the BSOs agreed that at its conclusion, compliance would be measured using Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs). So upon completion, they reported jointly the level of compliance to the OVIs. One year later, we evaluated whether consistency existed between what was stated then and the findings of our research.

The OVIs were identified in the individual logical frameworks. They are the programme SMART indicators used to organize its activities and to assess compliance of the objectives. Mostly they are directly related to implementation actions, although some indicators are aimed at measuring at the outcome and impact levels.

All OVIs have been reassessed based on the study of the programme documentation and in- depth interviews with BSO staff and CBI external experts. In some cases, when considered appropriate, information was also gathered from direct observations during the fieldwork, online surveys of participants and beneficiaries and new information shared by the BSOs.

2. Minimum Quality Norms (MQNs)

The Minimum Quality Norms are the three indicators that CBI has selected to measure accountability in this programme. To comply with them, each module has to rank above a minimum percentage that has been set in advance. In this case, the information in the completion reports, signed by CBI and the BSO, has been taken only as a reference. The evaluation process has contemplated a revision of all supporting documents to confirm what was indicated. All information has been properly cross checked.

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For MQN 1, the BSO had to certify, by the end of the programme, that there had been at least an 80%2 transfer of the competences provided by the BSOD programme. Stated another way, this means that the programme was carried out as programmed, and that the knowledge and capacities were properly transferred from the CBI expert to the BSO.

In most cases, a review of the programme documentation was sufficient for verification. Exceptionally, when there was no information on this indicator, interviews were conducted to inquire with the parties involved. If a guide, manual or evaluation report was produced as a result of the activity, we have tried to confirm its existence. Again, if it was not to be found in the available documentation, we asked the BSO or external expert to share it with us.

MQN 2 states that the BSO certifies that a minimum of 60% of the gained capacity is used in practice. This can be interpreted as the extent to which the activities conducted during the programme have been transformed into stable services or activities that are still functioning one year after the programme was finished.

This has been tested during this evaluation. The source of the information has been the BSO through interviews with its staff. When suitable, verification was conducted by direct observation of the capabilities in full implementation. In many cases, as per the evaluator’s request, the BSOs have shared documents, brochures, internal evaluations or surveys and other materials that support the use of the capabilities. When considered appropriate, online surveys were designed and conducted inquiring about this indicator. All surveys designed by the evaluation team were cleared with CBI and were conducted with the consent of the BSOs.

To comply with MQN 3, at least 60% of the clients/affiliates of the BSO have to indicate that BSO service delivery has improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance. The process to find this out is very straightforward: the methodology looks for the clients´ perceptions. In some cases, the BSOs periodically conduct evaluations of their activities and satisfaction surveys. When that occurred, this evaluation used their reports as inputs. If that was not the case, online surveys were coordinated with the BSOs and their content also cleared with CBI. A limited number of evaluations were already made after certain training activities, and in one BSO, after the full programme was implemented.

It is necessary to point out that the nature of the OVIs in this case is not suited for an evaluation with mathematical precision. Not all activities have the same impact at the results level and there are no specific criteria for weighing their relative importance in the programme other than the evaluators’ judgment. Consequently, there is some subjectivity in the evaluation that was exercised with care considering the overall objective of each particular BSOD programme. Furthermore, the evaluation was made one year after programme completion; hence, some differences may become evident with respect to the assessment made at the end of each of them by the responsible BSO persons.

2 The minimum percentages to comply with the MQNs were indicated in the Terms of Reference of this evaluation.

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B. Learning

1. 5C Model This is the first time that the 5C Model is used in an external evaluation of a CBI BSOD Programme. Since it is a new concept in the field of capacity development and is still an experimental methodology for CBI, we will discuss the 5C model in detail in this section.

This analytical framework was first devised by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) based on a field research that covered capacity building assistance between 2002 and 2008. Afterwards, IOB used the 5 capabilities framework to undertake seven evaluations comprising 26 case studies whose results were presented in a Synthesis Report in 2011.3 Other literature on the subject was also revised and is presented in the Bibliography section of this report. For this evaluation some guidance for the use of this methodology was provided in the document prepared by MDF, a consultancy, entitled 5C Model in CBI.

The 5C Model sees the BSOs as open and adaptive systems, i.e., as living organisms that evolve and perform according to their inherent and acquired capabilities. These capabilities are mouldable in processes that are influenced by the context in which the BSOs are immersed, by external stimuli, and, more importantly, by the interplay of the existing capabilities within the organization. In a sense, the 5C Model is an endogenous view of capacity building and organizational change. With this notion in mind, five capabilities are considered as critical for the ability of an organization to perform and deliver results, as depicted in the following chart:

3 Facilitating resourcefulness. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. IOB Evaluation | no. 336. The Netherlands | April 2011. Synthesis report of the evaluation of Dutch support to capacity development. 11buz010394 | E. Disposal at www.minbuza.nl/iob.

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The organization/system External factors

Capability to Capability to act adapt and self and commit renew

Capability to Inputs deliver on Outputs Outcomes development objectives

Capability to Capability to relate to external achieve stakeholders coherence

External factors

MDF has proposed the following definitions for these capabilities:

a. The partner organisation is capable of committing and acting. This [is] about the capability of the organisation to be conscious and aware of its position in the world, to configure itself, to develop its own motivation and commitment and then to act. It has a lot to do with attitude and self-perception. It is connected to deeper patterns of behaviours that are partly structural, psychological and usually deeply embedded.

b. The Partner Organisation is capable of delivering on development objectives This core capability is focused on what many see as larger development results: organisations are regarded as performance actors designed to act in accordance with technical and policy rationality. The emphasis is on functional, instrumental ways of meeting a set of objectives and fulfilling a mandate.

c. The partner organisation is capable of relating. This capability has to do with how to relate and survive within the context and in connection with other actors: consolidating and defending the system’s autonomy, functioning and existence as much through the informal and the intangible as through the formal and the tangible.

d. The partner organisation is capable of adapting and self-renewing. The fourth core capability is about the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. The pace of change shapes the future of the tasks facing the organisation or erodes

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the existing capabilities of those organisations that failed to keep up. Learning and combining short term responsiveness with the ability to focus over the long term are important aspects of this capability.

e. The partner organisation is capable of achieving coherence. The final capability addresses the notion of balancing diversity and coherence, and to encourage both stability and innovation, but also, balancing the five capabilities.

…the 5 Core Capabilities have to be strengthened in a consistent and coherent manner in order to strengthen the organisation in a sustainable way. An important principle is that the 5 C’s do not stand on their own: they are strongly interrelated and each capability is influenced by the other capabilities

To assess a programme using this model equates to appraising the contribution of its activities to one or more of these capabilities, and the other way around, to determining the extent to which the success or failure of an intervention was determined by the existence, or lack of it, of one or more of these capabilities. It can be a different perspective from focusing on results. We can judge the failure or success of a programme by the results it has achieved or by the capacities that have been strengthened and come to very different conclusions. It is something very different to focus on a task and its achievements rather than on processes and facilitation, just to mention two aspects of organizational change.

The notion of capability, aside from not having an across-the-board accepted definition, is a concept that has different implications depending on the perspective of its use. From an organization´s point of view, in relation to its context “…an organization’s capacity is not an end in itself, but rather, a means by which an organization may achieve its objectives in bringing about social change.” 4 From a capacity-building perspective, “Capacity is a legitimate end in itself. This recognition is fundamental to any serious effort to improve the understanding and practice of capacity development.”5 Both views deserve careful consideration because they have quite different implication for capacity building, and naturally to the design of development programmes. The evaluator could find himself caught in the middle when confronted with activities that could perfectly look for an output that requires certain capacity to be attained or activities that look at a process as a means of developing a capacity that could contribute to the attainment of an output. The result or even the outcome, in each case, could be different and so would be the assessment of the evaluator.

Therefore, a word of caution should be introduced as we attempt to see capacity building as an output of the BSOD Programme. The Programme was conceived, designed, and implemented under a different approach. The capacity transfer was focused on certain activities without having an assessment

4 Synthesis report of the evaluation of Dutch support to capacity development, pg. 14, and Bringing the invisible into perspective, pg. 28 5 Bringing the invisible into perspective Pg. 9

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of the state of development of these five capabilities in the organization. The evaluation criteria adopted indicators that consisted of trainings being carried out, manuals developed, documents and guidelines prepared, new services offered, and so on, but less attention was given to have indicators that could have assessed the effect of the programme on the change in these core capabilities. Also, the attention to produce results within a limited time frame, even as large as three years in the programme, although for some activities time was even shorter due to changes in contents and even people involved, was not favourable to focus in the process that underlined the capabilities that were at play.

As already mentioned before, there was no previous evaluation of the extent to which these capabilities have been developed within the organization that could have guided the programme evaluation. The knowledge that a baseline could have provided could also have helped in adapting or adding pointers that could have been more descriptive for each particular BSO, without losing sight that the idea is to test an instrument that could be used in different countries and make possible comparisons across them.

The 5C Model assesses capacity building within an organization. It looks at the BSOs as a whole, and measures changes in capacity using a set of indicators (pointers). Since these changes can be a result of multiple factors, including the impact of CBI assistance, it identifies the extent to which the programme contributed to these changes.

A pointer matrix was designed for each of the five core capabilities (See Annex 7 to find the specific indicators used in this evaluation). Pointers are specific indicators of these capabilities and are listed in the second column of the matrix. They are grouped in broad categories, listed in the first column. The status of each pointer at the beginning and at the end of the BSOD programme has been established using a scale to evaluate change in capacity.

The scale refers to a level of awareness and development in relation to the process, activity, issue or capability addressed by the pointer. Each pointer can be described to be at 5 different stages within that scale, as suggested in the MDF paper:

1) Not Aware: The organization is not aware of the importance of the pointer or it simply does not consider it as a part of their plans and structure. 2) Awareness: The organization is aware, at this moment in time, of the situation, activity or problem addressed by the pointer and is ready to act on it. 3) Exploration: The organization begins to commit to act upon the issue at hand. A variety of ideas are considered, but there is still not a definition in terms of the route the organization will take. 4) Transition: The organization is fully committed to the improvement of the specific situation, area or activity addressed by the pointer. Efforts are committed and resources allocated, but the process is still focused on changing a past reality for a better one. 5) Full Implementation: The specific issue addressed by the pointer is in its ideal course from the organization’s perspective and is consolidated. Efforts are targeted at enforcing full and adequate implementation of the designed plans.

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For the situation at the beginning of the programme, a “0” is marked in the matrix. The status at the end of the programme is marked with a “1”.

The scoring was carried out using a mixed approach. During the fieldwork, these matrices were filled out in a meeting of the evaluators with managers of the BSOs that were involved in the programme implementation. The meetings functioned as a guided self-assessment. The evaluators acted to make some clarifications and to ask questions that might have helped to identify the exact situation of each pointer at that given point in time. These scores were later reviewed and, when appropriate, complemented by the evaluators based on the information obtained from the programme documentation, interviews with CBI staff and external experts, interviews with other BSO staff and direct observations during the fieldwork. This mixed approach should provide two benefits: to know the organisation’s capabilities first hand from the people who were there on a daily basis; and to confront it and adjust it in relation to what has been observed by the evaluators one year after the programme was ended. Capacity change is measured as the difference between the status of the organization´s overall capacity at the beginning and at the end of the programme.

Using the same mixed approach, the pointers that were part of the programme are identified to signal whether the programme was influential in allowing for the change in capacity. Since this approach to make an external evaluation was not used in the design of the programme, nor was agreed upon as a means to measure the results, outcome or impact of the programme, the results should be read with the appropriate consideration. The filled pointers are presented in Annex 7 of this report.

a) Using the 5C Model

The 5C Model was used to appraise the two BSOs in Bolivia: IBCE and CANEB. The evaluation was conducted using five matrices (one for each capability) containing a set of pointers 6 that represented the existence of a specific capability.

We have used the evaluation matrices four times (with IBCE, CADEX, CADEXCO, and CAMEX). In each case, the evaluation was preceded by a brief presentation of the 5C Model, its purpose and how the session was going to be run. The presentation was followed by some questions and answers, but also during the evaluation, clarifications were offered as what was meant by some pointers, and, in some cases, also to discuss the state of certain pointers in the organization.

The focus on the organization, rather the programme itself, and on the changes it has experienced over time was an opener for the interviewed individuals, because it acted as a reminiscence of actions and projects undertaken7 that helped the organization to be in the place it was at the moment of the evaluation, as they felt that that place was an improved one. During the 5C Model assessment a

6 Pointer is a preferred term in comparison to indicator. In the revised literature, the notion of indicator is more associated with a quantitative measurement, whereas a pointer is a qualitative guide that intends to describe the existence of certain processes. 7 Programmes by other donor organizations (e.g. USAID, All Invest, and SNV) as well as internal projects (ISO certifications) also shaped the way capacity change was occurring during the BSOD´s programme implementation.

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detailed account of the actions that led to capacity development took place, so that each progress could be adequately attributed. (For more insight on this, see the filled pointer spreadsheets in Annex 7).

The scoring methodology adopted in this evaluation, following the MDF´s 5C document, had status indicators that proved to be too broad in the case of these BSOs. Most of the respondents were aware of the notions involved in the pointers, and to some extent they felt that each particular process or fact signalled by the pointers, were somehow already in place (three out the four8 BSOs analysed had already ISO 9001 certification or were in the process of getting it). Hence, many of the assessments situated a pointer implementation at the beginning of the Programme in the transition stage or even fully implemented. A better understanding of the quality or depth of that situation was not possible in an objective manner. A previous diagnosis as part of the construction of a baseline would have filled this gap.

A three hour session was held with IBCE in a guided self-assessment interview with its General Manager and champion of the BSOD Programme in its organization. With CADEX, a similar exercise was carried out but with a group of staff that participated in the programme. It worked as a focus group discussion. In this case, scoring was made among equals in the organization, but it cannot rule out the possibility of some uneasiness due to a different informal hierarchy in the organization. With CADEXCO and CAMEX, we opted for a reduced version of the pointers because of time constraints of the people interviewed, but at the same time, because they were not at the top of their organizations at the time the programme was implemented, but were rather, participants in different capacities. For our conclusions we made some adjustments to the values assigned to the state of some pointers based on our observation of how things appeared to be at the time of our fieldwork.

There were certain shortcomings in the evaluation. On the one hand, there was a tendency to overestimate the state of each capacity at the start of the programme and at the end. The understanding of concepts was not the same (a monitoring system, or an innovation plan, and so on, mean different things to different people in the BSOs), and on the other hand, we were not exempt from a certain degree of subjectivity in our assessment. Again, a baseline would have helped not only to have a point of reference for future comparison that would have helped to focus on the status of the capabilities at the time of the evaluation. More importantly, it would have helped to build a common ground from the start, both for the BSO and for the implementation team, for the concepts that were involved and of the nature of the capability approach for the evaluation.

The number of pointers was too large for the time devoted to this part of the evaluation. We had to simplify that number, but at the cost of probably not addressing all aspects of the capabilities

8 The evaluation was designed to assess the BSOD Programme in two institutions, IBCE and CANEB. However, CANEB is a confederation of eight other independent institutions, namely regional associations (chambers) of exporters, with the same goal, but with different organizational development, and with their capabilities at quite different stages of development. After an initial interview with CANEB´s general manager and the revision of the documentation, it was clear that the programme didn´t have an impact in terms of capacity change, according to the 5C Model criteria. Hence, the evaluation was conducted assessing the three regional chambers (La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz) where the programme was implemented, ending up with four organizational assessments.

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under analysis and not contributing in case that pointer framework would have been used for an international comparison.

2. Learning questions The learning questions are the framework of the whole evaluation. They constitute the guidelines to judge how well the programme did in building capacities within the BSOs, and whether or not the programme enabled them to better support the export sector. Furthermore, they are the framework for analysing all the information gathered.

The following learning questions have been selected for the intended goals of the evaluation:

I. Efficiency

1) What is the quality of the inputs? 2) How well were these activities organized / managed? 3) Have activities been carried out and outputs been achieved within the planned period and budget? 4) To what extent has an appropriate mix of instruments been used (training, advising, and coaching)?

II. Effectiveness

1) To what extent have outputs and outcomes been achieved, as defined in the intervention logic, looking at: a) Activities: quality and quantity of service delivery within the programme itself; b) Outputs: reduction of capacity constraints at BSO level; and c) Outcome: improvements in service delivery of the BSO. 2) Are there any unforeseen (not previously identified) outcomes as a consequence of developed BSO capacity (outputs)? 3) Can outcomes be attributed to the CBI BSOD programme? 4) Has the right intervention strategy been chosen (right nature and mix of training and consultancy services)? 5) To what extent did the programme adapt to changing external conditions to ensure maximum outcomes? 6) Are there any external factors that have negatively influenced programme implementation? 7) Are there any external factors that have positively influenced programme implementation? 8) To what extent have capacity development interventions contributed to changes in the five core capabilities? 9) Have capacity development assessment criteria been formulated?

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III. Impact

1) What has happened as a result of the programme? 2) What real difference have the activities made to the beneficiaries? 3) To what extent can increased exports be observed, as a consequence of having achieved the defined programme outcomes? 4) To what extent have relevant contacts been established between exporters and importers in the EU, as a consequence of having achieved the defined programme outcomes? 5) To what extent can the impact be attributed to the CBI BSOD programme? What would have happened if the CBI programme would not have been implemented? 6) Has the BSOD programme led to any unforeseen impacts (desired/not desired)? 7) Has the BSOD Programme led to perceptible change in the 5 core capabilities of the BSO?

IV. Relevance

1) To what extent did the programme meet the needs of the BSO? 2) To what extent did the BSOD programme meet the needs of the exporters? 3) To what extent were constraints concerning the BSO and the sector properly identified and addressed? 4) To what extent was the programme aligned to CBI policies? 5) To what extent was the programme aligned with Minbuza policy? 6) To what extent was the programme in accordance with the country’s trade policy/sector priorities? 7) To what extent is support to capacity development of the organisation based on an appropriate capacity assessment, identification of capacity challenges and priorities? 8) To what extent is the policy with regard to capacity development based on a theory of change that is shared by both the BSO and CBI?

V. Sustainability

1) Has the BSO been capable of continuing to provide products and services, or institutionalize desired organizational change as a result of CBI support in capacity development? 2) Are exporters who have received BSO support capable of continuing their relationships with importers and/or developing new relationships with others? 3) To what extent was and is the programme embedded in local structures/owned by local stakeholders? 4) What in-kind and financial support has been provided by importers, exporters, policy makers and BSOs to the implementation of the programme? 5) To what extent are the actors (BSOs and exporters) financially and institutionally able to maintain their investment in technology and in other areas critical for the continuation of the programme results?

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6) What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme? 7) To what extent have change processes been embedded within the organisation?

These questions have defined a viewpoint from where to assess the programme critically and analytically. They intend to allow for understanding when questioning why the programme turned out as it did.

VI. Accountability Assessment

A. CANEB

A series of missions sent to Bolivia during the period 2005-2008 concluded that CANEB could benefit from the implementation of CBI´s BSOD Programme. Understandably, the process was undertaken with certain cautiousness, and lasted longer than expected in a context dominated by serious political uncertainty in Bolivia. Finally, in June 2008, CANEB and CBI signed a Letter of Commitment to implement the Strategic Planning (SP) and Market Development (MD) modules.

Implementation of the programme took place between 2008 and 2011. This process proved to be complex and met with some difficulties. The programme was not implemented in one individual BSO, as in other cases, but in a network of BSOs. The members of the network were not accustomed to cooperating with one another, which made for an even bigger challenge. In spite of that, it is fair to say that most planned activities were successfully concluded. The idea to group the 8 Chambers into 3 clusters and to centralize the programme in a leading chamber in each cluster helped to achieve a more organized implementation. The chambers of La Paz (CAMEX), Oruro (CADEXOR) and Potosí (CADEXPO) were grouped into the “Altiplano” Cluster, under the leadership of CAMEX. The chambers of Cochabamba (CADEXCO), Sucre (CADEX-CH) and Tarija (CADEXTAR) were grouped into the “Valles” Cluster, with CADEXCO as the leader. And the chambers from Santa Cruz (CADEX) and Riberalta (CADEXNOR) were grouped into the “Trópico” Cluster, with CADEX assuming the leading role.

The general objective was “to contribute to the international competitiveness of the export sectors and to promote and export culture in Bolivia”. The programme objectives were to “contribute to i) a greater satisfaction of clients and exporters with Chamber services and ii) a greater satisfaction of Chambers with CANEB services”. The programme also outlined a specific purpose: “To strengthen CANEB and its members (Export Chambers) and their mutual cooperation in providing support services to (potential) exporters, members and non-members, with a stronger focus on high potential non- traditional sectors.”

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1. Strategic Planning

The objective of this module was set to deliver two results:

1. A consolidated and flexible service portfolio, with value added services, based on standardized service methodologies among the chambers. 2. A CANEB network that optimizes individual chamber strengths and specializations, with institutionalized information and knowledge-sharing mechanisms in coordination and cooperation with other service providers.

Various activities were conducted in the three Chamber Clusters:

1. CANEB Workshop (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 2. Training “Towards Recovery” (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 3. Donor Round Table (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 4. Participation in TOPIX Forum (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 5. Participation in Expro Timber (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 6. Participation in Expro Natural Ingredients (CADEXCO) 7. Agreements with RNE, European Commission, SNV, Banco Bisa (CANEB) 8. Agreement with Germina for HACCP Certification (CADEXCO) 9. Support to Help Desk – Programa “Escuchando” (CAMEX) 10. Guide for Consortium in Export Projects (CAMEX) 11. Fashion Cycle Trainings (CAMEX) 12. Training and Service Development in Corporate Social Responsibility – CSR (CADEXCO) 13. Creation of CEFEX – Training Centre for Exporters (CADEX) 14. Technical Assistance Agreement with ADEX, Peru (CEFEX - CADEX) 15. Development of new service: MIPYME Exportadora for SMEs (CADEX) 16. Cooperation Agreement with Rotterdam Business School in Education (CADEX) 17. CRM Diagnosis and Implementation Plans (CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 18. Workshop (Train the Trainers + Curriculum Development) and Trainings on Trade Fair Participation (CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 19. SEMP Workshops (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO, CADEX) 20. Trainings in Rotterdam in Effective Trade Fair Participation and CSR (CADEX)

All these activities have been grouped and organized as shown in Table 2 for evaluation purposes. In this unique case, the programme´s activities were implemented in 4 BSOs, but not in a uniform manner. Tables 2 and 3 have been designed so that a clear distinction can be made on the extent to which each BSO acted as counterpart for the programme´s activities. Our methodological approach evaluates each BSO individually, and then adds the results to evaluate the programme as a whole. Tables 2 and 3 present them separately where appropriate. When that is not case, it means that CANEB was the

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counterpart. Where applicable, OVIs have been selected to establish compliance with MQN1. In all other cases, the selected sources of verification and methodology are detailed in each section of Table 2:

Table 2: CANEB SP means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATION MEANS FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION CÁMARA NACIONAL DE EXPORTADORES (CANEB) STRATEGIC PLANNING (ORIGINALLY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT) MODULE

Expected Module Results: 1. A consolidated andn flexible service portfolio, with value added services, based on standarized service methodologies among the chambers

2. A CANEB Network that optimizes individual strengths and specializations, with institutionalized information and knowledge sharing mechanisms in coordiantion and cooperation with other service providers. Minimum Quality Norms Transfer of the capacity (result) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the 60% of the users/clients of the BSO expected module result 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has transferred practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance Activities grouped in Result 1 category OVI 5: At least 10 joint P1: Increase in joint a) Workshop with Chambers and Chamber actions activities and between 1. Interview with CANEB GM. 2. Interview with CANEB to exchange experiences and and/or exchange of CANEB and Chambers BSOs´staff 3. Direct Observation during b) activities to stimulate networking know-how and (Target: 6 per year by Fieldwork CANEB,process CAMEX, CADEXCO, experiences the end of programme) 1.1 CADEX 1,2,3,4 1. Interview with CANEB GM 2. Interview Service development with pilots, OVI 1: At least 6 with Chamber´s staff 3. Direct Observation evaluation, capacity building, process improved and new during Fieldwork description, working procedures and services used by OVI 6: 4-6 strategic roll-out chamber clients ; OVI 1. Client satisfaction surveys CAMEX, alliances forged with CANEB 5, 7 2: Increased income CADEXCO, CADEX other service providers CAMEX 5,9,10,11,18 from services with CADEXCO 5,6,8,12,18 more than 10% by the 1.2 CADEX 5,13,14,15,16,18,20 end of the Programme Develop CRM systems for all 3 clusters 1. Interview with Chamber´s staff 2. Direct 1. Not applicable for CAMEX, CADEXCO 2. CAMEX 17 OVI 3: 3 CRM Implementation plans developed Observation during Fielwork Client satisfaction survey CADEX CADEXCO 17 1.3 CADEX 17

Result 2

Workshop with CANEB and members to (re)define role, tasks and funding of 2.1 CABEN secretariat 1 1. Programme Docummentation 2. Interview Preparation of CANEB secretariat with CANEB´s then General Manager 3. service development plan based on Interview with CBI´s experts, coordinator and 2.2 outcomes 1 Programme Manager 1. Interview with CANEB GM 3. Interview 1. Interview with CANEB GM. 2. Interview with with Chamber´s staff 3. Direct Observation BSOs´staff 3. Direct Observation during during Fieldwork Fieldwork

2.3 Implementation of Development Plan 1 Implement SEMP training as network development excercise and OVI 4: Functioning intranet /communication knowledge transfer to all Chamber between chambers CANEB,experts CAMEX, CADEXCO, 2.4 CADEX 18

After conducting a thorough evaluation process (refer to Annex 6 for a detailed explanation of the conceptualization and assessment of the MQNs) our assessment of accountability is presented in Table 3:

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Table 3: CANEB SP accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION CANEB STRATEGIC PLANNING MODULE Minimum Quality Norms

Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) Critical Activities to acheive (effect/outcome) (impact) the expected module result

60% of the users/clients of the BSO indicate 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in that service delivery has improved in those transferred practice areas where CBI has provided assistance

Result 1

Workshop with Chambers and 1.1 CANEB to exchange 100 50 50 experiences and stimulate networking process

Service development with pilots, evaluation, capacity building, 83 46 N/I ** process description, working procedures and roll-out 1.2 CANEB 33 0 N/A * CAMEX 100 72 N/I CADEXCO 100 50 N/I CADEX 100 60 82

100 30 N/I Develop CRM systems for all 3 1.3 clusters CAMEX 100 0 N/A CADEXCO 100 0 N/A CADEX 100 90 82 Result 2

Workshop with CANEB and 2.1 members to (re)define role, 50 0 N/A tasks and funding of CANEB secretariat

2.2 Preparation of CANEB 80 0 N/A secretariat service development plan based on outcomes

2.3 0 N/A N/A Implementation of Development Plan Implement SEMP training as network development excercise 2.4 62.5 30 82 and knowledge transfer to all Chamber experts * N/A: Not applicable ** N/I: No information available. CAMEX and CADEXCO didn´t share their client satisfaction indicators.

a) Transfer of capacity (result) A clear distinction can be made after observing the results of the programme: Transfer of capacity to the leading Chambers of the Clusters (CAMEX, CADEXO, and CADEX) was optimal and in compliance with MQN1. On the other hand, transfer of capacity to CANEB did not reach the desired

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levels; e.g. a service platform for a full-fledged CANEB was drafted during the programme and put to consideration of the Board, and it never got to be implemented.

MQN1 compliance in critical activity 2.4 summarizes the fact that knowledge was effectively transferred to 5 of the 8 participating chambers. Other than the heads of each cluster (CAMEX, CADEXCO and CADEX), only CADEXPO in the Altiplano Cluster and CADEX-CH in the Valley Cluster got involved in writing the SEMPs for their clusters. Therefore, the goal of “transferring knowledge to all chamber experts” was not attained. .

b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) The use of capacity delivered mixed results. For example, trade fair participation services and the CRM project in the case of CADEX were implemented successfully and are still benefiting the Chamber and its clients. Other services didn´t work because of lack of demand from the BSO´s clients (i.e. CSR in CADEXCO), although the capacity is there and available for when opportunity arises. And other activities weren´t followed up on, such as the CRM project in CAMEX because they considered that the implementation plan did not fit their size and structure.

After careful analysis of these results, we can conclude that services with high demand potential and activities that fitted well in the BSO´s structure did pass the test of time. Clearly these activities represent a minority.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) The impact has been measured using client satisfaction surveys as a proxy for general client satisfaction, including the services improved or created with CBI´s assistance. 82% of CADEX´s clients have declared to be satisfied with the services they receive from the chamber. CADEX is a well-staffed and well financed BSO offering a better environment to implement CBI´s assistance and to translate its results in good customer satisfaction indicators. At the same time, most of the activities that became stable services are in CADEX.

For activities in which capacity is in use one year after the end of the programme (blue grades for MQN2), in general client satisfaction is above the minimum landmark for MQN3.

In spite of several requests from the evaluation team, CAMEX and CADEXCO did not share information on client satisfaction. Even though they claim to have positive feedbacks, we haven´t had the chance to verify that, so we have not included any assessment for them in MQN3.

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2. Market Development

This module was aimed at attaining the result of “more and better services for more exporters and export clusters of value added products in more diversified high potential sectors, based on the EU export opportunities and bottlenecks of those sectors”.

The following activities were carried out in the Chamber Clusters:

1. Elaboration of SEMP Garments (CAMEX) 2. Elaboration of SEMP Foods and Food Ingredients (CADEXCO) 3. Elaboration of SEMP Timber (CADEX) 4. 6 pilot projects in the Foods Sector (CADEXCO): a) HACCP Training and Business Plan for Certification Service b) Organic c) Business Plan for Novel Foods Service d) Creation of the “Comité de Alimentos” (Foods Committee) e) Participation in sector-related fairs f) Organic Label 5. 6 pilot projects in the Timber Sector (CADEX): a) Training in European MAR b) Capacity Building for Educational Projects in National Standards and Labour Skills c) Market Information System (website) d) Support to local companies in fair participation e) Creation of a Timber Task Force f) Bolivian Timber Round Table

For purposes of evaluation, they have been arranged as shown in Table 4. This Table also indicates the sources of verification for our evaluation. In the same manner as for the SP module, we have tried to preserve the detail and richness of the information obtained, by assessing each chamber individually. In this module, all the activities were conducted with the regional chambers and CANEB did not participate.

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Table 4: CANEB MD means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATION MEANS FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION CÁMARA NACIONAL DE EXPORTADORES (CANEB) MARKET DEVELOPMENT MODULE Expected Module Results: 3. More and better services for more exporters and export clusters of value added products in more diversified high potential sectors, based on the EU export opportunities and bottlenecks of those sectors Minimum Quality Norms Transfer of the capacity (result) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result Activities 60% of the users/clients of the BSO indicate 80% of the competences have been grouped in 60% of the gained capacity is used in practice that service delivery has improved in those transferred category areas where CBI has provided assistance

Result 1

Develop 3 SEMPs for each Cluster CAMEX 1 OVI 1 : At least 3 SEMPS developed CADEXCO 2 3.1 CADEX 3 "Regionalise" SEMPS 1. Interview with CANEB General Manager 2. CAMEX (Cluster Altiplano) 1 1. Interview with CANEB General Manager 2. Interview with BSOs´ staff 3. Review of programme 1. Chambers´ client satisfaction surveys 2. Online CADEXCO (Cluster Valles) 2 Interview with BSOs´ staff 3. Review of programme docummentation 4. Interview with external experts surveys 3. Chamber´s internal evaluations 3.2 CADEX (Cluster Trópico9 3 docummentation 4. Interview with external experts OVI 3: At least 6 Service development based on SEMPs, in the form completed pilot projects OVI 2: 3-5 EU related of pilots with exporters with Bolivian exporters export services in CAMEX * according to the relevant sectors CADEXCO 4 objectives and result of 3.3 CADEX 5 each pilor project. * The pilot projects in the garments sector (CAMEX) were cancelled

Based on this conceptualization (see Annex 6 for further details) and the evaluation during the desk study and field study we arrived at the estimations presented in Table 5:

Table 5: CANEB MD accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION CANEB MARKET DEVELOPMENT MODULE Minimum Quality Norms

Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) Critical Activities to acheive (effect/outcome) (impact) the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has improved 80% of the competences have been transferred practice in those areas where CBI has provided assistance Result 1 Develop 3 SEMPs for each 100 60 N/I ** Cluster CAMEX 100 60 N/I CADEXCO 100 50 N/I 3.1 CADEX 100 70 22 "Regionalise" SEMPS 43 50 N/I CAMEX (Cluster Altiplano) 50 50 N/I CADEXCO (Cluster Valles) 50 50 N/I 3.2 CADEX (Cluster Trópico) 30 50 22 Service development based on SEMPs, in the form of pilots with 71 43 N/I exporters CAMEX 30 N/A N/A CADEXCO 92 35 N/I 3.3 CADEX 92 50 52 * N/A: Not applicable ** N/I: No informartin available. CAMEX and CADEXCO didn´t share their client satisfaction indicators.

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a) Transfer of capacity (result) Competences in terms of SEMP methodology were properly transferred to CAMEX, CADEXCO and CADEX as the elaboration of a SEMP document for each cluster reveals. Nevertheless, the premise to “regionalize” these documents (meaning that the other members of the cluster should also be involved and that upon completion all chambers should have been invited to become involved) was not accomplished. Efforts to collaborate in this direction were clearly not sufficient. As for the pilot projects, they were conducted successfully in CADEX and CADEXCO. In the case of CAMEX, the pilot project activity was cancelled at an early stage. The reason for this is not clear for all parties. While CBI considered CAMEX didn´t have the resources to implement it, CAMEX thought it was not a CBI priority anymore.

b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) The Timber Task Force and the “Comité de Alimentos” are, most likely, the best examples of the current use of the capacities transferred in the MD module. Even though they have not made any relevant contributions to their respective sectors to date, they have been accepted as sector platforms to defend their interests and expand their business. Even though the SEMP in garments was not continued in the form of pilot project, it has helped CAMEX to organize several activities to promote the sector.

The SEMP documents are large and very detailed. They are a great source of information, but have been carefully reviewed by only a few people. To date, they have not been updated.

From the 12 pilot projects conducted during the programme, only half of them have survived in some way or another. Some of them have resulted in new services (i.e. Facilitation of the Bolivian Timber Round Table in CADEX) and others have improved existing ones (for example, fair participation services in CADEXCO). By observing the current state of these 6 projects, for which capacity is still currently in use, it has been observed that they are not operating even at half of capacity for various reasons. In some cases it is because of lack of demand at the client´s end, in others situations because the BSO has not prioritized their implementation.

As a result, use of capacity in this module is below the expected levels.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) From the original set of services designed to be implemented as a result of this module, only few have proven to be sustainable, one year after the completion of the programme in CANEB.

As Table 5 shows, the use of capacity is below 50% for this group of services. It is not surprising that the client satisfaction (MQN3) is also way below target. Even promising platforms such as the TTF and the “Comité de Alimentos” have not impacted their sectors in a relevant way. A survey directed to the participants in the TTF showed very little satisfaction with its results (nobody expressed full satisfaction, only 22% say they are satisfied, 39% are somewhat satisfied and 27% are dissatisfied). In the case of CADEXCO, its acting general manager thought it was not appropriate to conduct a satisfaction survey since the activities in the “Comité de Alimentos” were not mature yet.

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Additionally, CANEB´s programme design includes a list of 5 OVIs at the purpose and objective levels that were to be measured in this evaluation, 1 year after the programme ended. The following table summarizes our findings:

Table 6: OVIs to be assessed one year after the programme

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION CANEB OVIS AT THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE LEVEL

Compliance Level

Programe Objective (Client Satisfaction levels) 70% of Chamber clients indicate their satisfaction with the 1 * N/I / 71 % in CADEX services developed in the programme 5 of the 8 Chambers indicate they have increased their: 80 sense of ownership 80 2 empowerment 80 communication with CANEB network 80 relation with international community through CANEB 80 Programe Purpose (Use of competencies by BSO staff) Increase in joint activities and interaction between Chambers and between CANEB and Chambers (target: 6 50 1 per year by the en of the programme) 50% of Chamber service users (members and non members) are SMEs (from non-traditional sectors) 1 year 83 2 after the end of the programme Nr. Of Companies trained by the Chambers (target: 400 25 3 per year 1 year after the programme) * N/I: No information made available by CAMEX and CADEXCO.

3. CANEB overall assessment The BSOD programme in CANEB was fundamentally different from the other three being assessed in this evaluation. It is fair to say that it was implemented in different levels in four BSOs (CANEB, CAMEX, CADEXCO and CADEX), which belong to an extended network of chambers. While acting as an umbrella organization for all 8 Chambers, CANEB is also a BSO with its own set of skills, goals and problems. When the implementation of the idea of expanding CANEB functions beyond its traditional lobbying functions proved challenging due to other priorities of the member chambers, the programme privileged supporting the regional chambers. The decision made sense for two main reasons: i) the chambers, and not CANEB, are the ones that provide services to exporters, and ii) the internal politics within the network were so complex that bringing change to CANEB was becoming very difficult.

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The programme had its positive effects for the regional chambers – mainly CADEX – and, in spite of its attempts, didn´t impact CANEB as an organization in a relevant way. Almost by the end of the programme, a service brochure for CANEB and its members was written and put to the consideration of the board. The document´s approach has not been implemented as of today. It is worth mentioning that CADEX- CH (Chuquisaca) from the Valley Cluster also benefitted from the programme, mostly because of a well-driven management that seized the opportunities that were presented to it. Benefits came in the form of organizational improvements, mostly in the case of CADEX and CADEXCO, and new and improved services, for all three. Nevertheless, the use of capacity and the impact of the outcomes of the programme are, in general, below expectations.

At the results level, for Result 1, the SP module was able to improve the quality of some services offered in the network thanks to the technical assistance provided. For Result 2, however, it did not accomplish the goal of a more efficient, cooperative and communicative CANEB network, but its attempts were geared in the right direction.

The results of the MD module should be read carefully. Even though they may seem disappointing at this point, there is a valuable set of skills and competences available for use when necessary. The future presents interesting opportunities for the timber, garments and food sectors since CBI is conducting ECP and BDM programmes in some of these sectors. The BSOs have installed capacity to take advantage of them if they work out well.

The internal dynamics of the network remain complicated and the policies for the export sector in the country are not cooperating. It will still be very challenging to achieve the ambitious objectives that were set for this BSOD programme.

An important achievement of the programme is that it exposed the Bolivian network of export chambers to the benefits of collaboration, in a context where effective networking and cooperation proved difficult. It has triggered a process that could last many years, with a high potential for the export and business sectors. Having said that, it is hard to defend, that today CANEB is a stronger organization because of the BSOD programme. In some aspects, the programme may have even weakened it. After the BSOD programme, CANEB has lost command of the continuing projects of the network with CBI (the BDM and ECP-Wine programmes are being led by CADEX). CANEB has expressed its disappointment because of this.

B. IBCE The programme with IBCE was designed during the third quarter of 2007, and comprised two modules: Market Information and Institutional Development. IBCE´s commitment letters were signed officially in December 2007, for the MI module, and in May 2008, for the ID module. Both modules were treated as two market intelligence modules. Later on, the ID module was designated as a Strategic Planning module. No consequences in the originally planned activities were identified as a result of this change in denomination. Below, we will make references to the MI and SP modules, as required in the

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terms of reference for this evaluation, although the document that certifies the implementation of these two modules, signed on March 9, 2012, maintains the original denominations.

Activities for the programme were intended to start in the second quarter of 2008, and the programme itself was envisaged to be finished by the end of 2010. The overall objective of the programme was “…to develop the international competitiveness of the export sector of Bolivia and to increase awareness of opportunities on the EU-markets” The purpose of the IBCE programme was “Strengthening IBCE as a leading, customer driven and value-added provider of export market information services to the export community (incl. potential exporters) and business support network of Bolivia.” Each module aimed to attain one specific result. The programme devised certain activities as the means to attain these results. Some Objective Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) were devised to validate its implementation.

This section of the report will be devoted to the assessment of the compliance with the accountability criteria for both modules, i.e. SP and MI.

1. Strategic Planning The expected result for this module was set as: “The organization will be more effective and efficient, financially self-sustainable and a driving force and beneficiary of a closer network of relations with other intermediary organizations, optimizing synergies”.

Ten activities were planned for this Module:

1. Strategy sessions on review and realignment of work processes 2. Market research-related training 3. In-company internships in Bolivia and visits to importers and other relevant institutions in Europe 4. Guidance with development and implementation of CRM strategy and systems 5. Guidance with enhanced knowledge management and information-sharing practices 6. Strategy sessions on business models and new commercial services 7. Strategy sessions with other information providers to strengthen the information network 8. Intensification of strategic alliances 9. Syndication of the library services 10. Implementation of RSS and affiliation technology including CBI affiliate database

To perform this assessment, these activities were grouped as shown in Table 7 below, and for each group of activities, the relevant OVIs were identified, and additional verification means were selected.

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Table 7: IBCE SP means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATION MEANS FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION INSTITUTO BOLIVIANO DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR (IBCE) STRATEGIC PLANNING (ORIGINALLY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT) MODULE Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has transferred practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance

OVI 1: Strategic sessions held; OVI 1. Programme documents/reports. 2: Realigned work processes in Strategy sessions and realignment of work 2. Interview with IBCE General place; OVI 7: Focus group sessions 1 processes + revision of bussiness model and Manager 3. Intervie with Lola held; OVI 8: Benchmarking activity new services Producciones. 4. Conference with held; OVI 9: Business model programme corrdinators. revisited

1. Programme documents/reports. 2. Interview with IBCE staff that Training on: i) EU market access requirements, attended the trainiig sessions or staff that are in charge of related incl. CSR; ii) (Web based) market research; iii) OVI 3: Training conducted OVI 4: activities: José Luis Alvarez, Angela 2 Processing of information; iv) - Preparation of Trainings arranged and completed Caquegua, Monica Jaúregui, Steven market briefs, profiles etc.; v) Website Magariños, Juan Pablo Saucedo. promotion; vi) - Web writing skills 3. Conference with external experts. 4. Conference with programme 1. November 2011 Customer corrdinators. satisfaction survey 1. Programme documents/reports. 2. March 2013 new evaluation survey Development of i) Supply-side expertise by 2. Interview with Diana Sabilón RSE results. short in- company trainings in Bolivia; ii) a) OVI 5: Visits to importers arranged offcial. 3. Interview with Steven 3. Direct trial of some of these 3 Demand-side expertise by visits to importers and completed Magariños. 4. Interview with Juan services and relevant institutions in Europe following Pablo Saucedo 4. Conference with 4. Interviews with external CBI trainings in The Netherlands external experts. 5. Conference with coordinators and experts (see list programme corrdinators. and dates in Annex5)

1. Programme documents/reports. OVI 6: Information sharing practices 2. Interview with IBCE Steven documented and implemented; OVI Knowledge management & Implement RSS and Magariños and Juan Pablo Saucedo 4 14: CBI affiliate database and RSS affiliation technology incl.CBI affiliate database 3. Conference with external experts functionalities integrated in IBCE xxx 4. Conference with programme website corrdinators.

OVI 11: Formal alliance with UAGRM 1. Programme documents/reports. and Customs and National Customs 2. Interview with Gary Rodriguez Strategic alliances & sindication of library 5 Chamber OVI 12: Expanded market 3. Sample agreemenst revised services research capacity; OVI 13: Library 4. Conference with programme services transferred to University corrdinators.

Cancelled activities

6 CRM Strategy 1. Programme documents/reports. 2. Interview with Gary Rodriguez Strenghthen Information networkInformation OVI 10: Martket Intelligence IBCE General Manager 7 network conference 3. Conference with programme corrdinators.

After careful revision of the reports for the programme, interviews with IBCE staff, conferences with external experts (see Annex 5 for the list and details on interviews and conferences) and programme coordinators, and on-site observation, we came up with an estimation of the compliance with the MQNs as presented in Table 8.

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Table 8: IBCE SP accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION INSTITUTO BOLIVIANO DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR (IBCE) STRATEGIC PLANNING (ORIGINALLY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT) MODULE Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has transferred practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance

Strategy sessions and realignment of work 1 processes + revision of bussiness model and 100 60 new services

Training on: i) EU market access requirements, incl. CSR; ii) (Web based) market research; iii) 2 Processing of information; iv) - Preparation of 100 80 market briefs, profiles etc.; v) Website promotion; vi) - Web writing skills

Development of i) Supply-side expertise by short in- company trainings in Bolivia; ii) a) 3 Demand-side expertise by visits to importers 80 60 93 and relevant institutions in Europe following CBI trainings in The Netherlands

Knowledge management & Implement RSS and 4 100 80 affiliation technology incl.CBI affiliate database

Strategic alliances & sindication of library 5 100 100 services

Cancelled activities

6 CRM Strategy

7 Strenghthen Information networkInformation network

a) Transfer of capacity (result) For the validation of the OVIs, and the transfer of competences, all the programme documents were revised prior to telephonic conferences with the external experts involved in the programme, and with the coordinators of the programme, plus our conversation with IBCE´s staff (see Annex 5 for a complete list and details of these interviews and conferences).

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Based on the above mentioned validation, we have established that with the exception of the cancelled activities to accommodate other BSOD priority requirements, capacities were transferred in compliance with the MQN 1 requirement.

b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) With the assistance of CBI experts, IBCE prepared a 2010-2012 Strategic Plan. It also acquired the knowledge to conduct a strategic planning process. At the time of the external evaluation, broad definitions and activities of the 2010-2012 Plan were still valid, although some targets of the original plan had already been attained. However, no new strategic planning exercise was undertaken for the upcoming years. We received an explanation that the intention was to conduct this exercise after the new Board of Directors for the 2013-2014 term was elected (which happened on March 14th, 2013; they will take office on April 12th, 2013). Lola Producciones, a consultancy firm that assisted IBCE on this matter as part of the BSOD programme, is still giving advisory services to IBCE. Therefore, we can assume that the capability is in place, not in use, but ready to be used at the right time.

In the case of training activities, the use of the capacities acquired is demand-driven. CSR consultancies are hard to sell in the Bolivian market, even though a shorter and less expensive service was designed with the assistance of CBI. Full market researches, and market access conditions-related services, are marketed but not demanded to the extent that IBCE is capable of delivering. However, some consultations are answered with the acquired capacities.

As for the training activities in The Netherlands, those were performed in the field of CSR, and in the marketing of novel foods plus an intensive internship in the area of market research for two IBCE staff at a Dutch market research agency. As already mentioned, CSR is hard to sell; and not much has been done in relation to novel foods. Activities related to novel foods, in the context of the BSOD programmes in Bolivia, are also executed by CADEXCO. There is also a specific project on amaranth that is being carried out by the export chamber of Chuquisaca, a region to the south of Bolivia; however, IBCE has not lost the capability to provide this kind of service.

RSS capabilities are fully in use by the IBCE Data Tr@de service. The other activity in this group has to do with access to the CBI site for market information. At the time of the evaluation this was available, apparently because of changes at the CBI end that were supposed to be finished any time soon, as was explained to us in meetings with IBCE and CADEXCO.

Two activities were cancelled: the design of a CRM strategy and the organization of a network of information providers. According to the General Manager of IBCE, these two activities had to be cancelled due to excessive workload on the assigned personnel, and due to other budget allocation priorities within the BSO. IBCE rather wanted to receive more assistance in strengthening their newly- created marketing unit and in training of the staff in this area. CBI hired a local consultant to deliver this assistance.

Based on the above mentioned consideration, the interviews performed with IBCE staff, telephone conferences with external experts and coordinators, and the onsite verification of the

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workings of IBCE´s services, we conclude that the use of capacities is in compliance with the MQN 2 requirement.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) The activities carried out in the programme gave birth to a new BSOD strategy that led to new services, a new website, a redesigned flag publication, and staff trained accordingly. At the end of the programme, an online survey was conducted to verify the satisfaction of IBCE´s beneficiaries with the enhanced or newly-designed services that were the result of the programme activities. At that time, results of the survey showed that the MQN3 criterion was met. From March 4 to 13, 2013, a new on-line survey was conducted with the same questions contained in the previous survey, except for two items related to new services and the deletion of services that were no longer offered. The survey was directed to IBCE´s beneficiaries. 390 responses were submitted. The results (see Annex 9 for the full report of the survey) show that the levels of satisfaction with IBCE services are above the 60% level established by the MQN. 96% of respondents think that IBCE serves efficiently in the expansion of Bolivia´s foreign trade, and 95% of respondents rate IBCE as a good or excellent service provider to support Bolivia’s international trade

Based on the above mentioned survey, the effect of the use of capacity is in compliance with the MQN 3 requirement.

2. Market Information The expected result set for this module was as follows: “The organization will provide upgraded and new customized information services, products and tools, optimizing technology, including rapid customer response and consultancy”.

Seven activities were planned for this Module:

1. Review and customize the IBCEm@il and Data Tr@de alerting systems 2. Review and upgrade usability of the website (incl. user profiles and site management information) 3. Review and reorient Comercio Exterior and Exportemos and yearbooks (hard and soft copy formats) 4. Review and reorient statistical services 5. Development of new value-added products, like market and product briefs, market access alerts for high potential sectors/product groups for the EU market 6. Development of training and consultancy services integrated with upgraded information services 7. Development of a series of thematic reports

To perform this assessment, these activities were grouped as shown in Table 9 below, and the relevant OVIs were identified for each group of activities, and additional means of verification were selected.

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Table 9: IBCE MI means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATION MEANS FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY EVALAUTION INSTITUTO BOLIVIANO DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR (IBCE) MARKET INFORMATION MODULE Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has transferred practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance

1. Programme documents/reports. 2. Interview with Gary Rodriguez. 3. OVI 2: Report incl. customer OVI 5: Revised publications Monica Jaúregui and Juan Pablo Review of publications & Customization of satisfaction Number of suscribers 1 esp.Comercio Exterior& OVI 1: Saucedo. 4. 2012 Google analitcs online publications and downloads. November 2011 Updated alerting services running reports. 5. Conference with external Customer satisfaction survey. experts. 6. Conference with programme corrdinators. 1. Programme documents/reports. 2. Interview with Angela Caquegua OVI 3: Upgraded website. Google and José Luis Alvarez. 3. 2012 2 Upgrade of website visibility. Google analitcs reports. 4. Conference with external experts. 5. Conference with programme corrdinators. November 2011 Customer 1. Programme documents/reports. satisfaction survey. And reports on 2. Interview with Juan Pablo web visitors history, suscribers and Saucedo and Steven Magariños 3. press citations (OVIs 4,6,8,10) 3 Review and reorient statistical service OVI 7: Revised statistical service 2012 Google analitcs reports. 4. Direct trial of some of these services Conference with external experts. 5. Interviews with external coordinators Conference with programme and experts (see list and dates in corrdinators. Annex 5) 1. Programme documents/reports. 2. Interview with Diana Sabilón. 3. OVI 9: New services offered & OVI Interview with Juan Pablo Saucedo Develop new value added products & 4 11: New consultancy services and Steven Magariños 4. Development of consultancy services offered (CSR) Conference with external experts. 5. Conference with programme corrdinators. Cancelled activities

1. Programme documents/reports. 2. Interview with Gary Rodriguez 5 Development of series of thematic reports IBCE General Manager 3. Conference with programme corrdinators.

After the revision of the reports of the programme, interviews with IBCE staff, conferences with external experts and programme coordinators (see Annex 5 for the list and details on interviews and conferences), and on-site observation, we came up with an estimation of the compliance with the MQNs as presented in Table 10.

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Table 10: IBCE MI accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALAUTION INSTITUTO BOLIVIANO DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR (IBCE) MARKET INFORMATION MODULE Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has transferred practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance

Review of publications & Customization of 1 100 90 online publications

2 Upgrade of website 100 100

3 Review and reorient statistical service 100 100

Develop new value added products & 4 100 80 Development of consultancy services

Cancelled activities

5 Development of series of thematic reports

a) Transfer of capacity (result) With the assistance of CBI, IBCE carried out an evaluation of its three main publications. IBCE decided to continue just one publication, Comercio Exterior, and suspend the publication of Exportemos and a yearbook. Comercio Exterior has been the long-time IBCE flagship publication, but presented an old fashioned format and long articles, and a limited number of subjects. CBI experts helped to redesign and redefine its content.

IBCE learned how to develop a personalized database of confirmed users of its alerting systems, IBCE Data Tr@de and IBCE M@il.

IBCE´s website was upgraded with the assistance of CBI experts. IBCE currently has two staff members in charge of site maintenance and development. They learned how to improve the site appearance, visibility, and functionality, as well as how to monitor the traffic to the site and to specific services provided by IBCE on-line.

In our opinion capacities were transferred in compliance with the MQN 1 requirement.

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b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome)

At present, the publication “Comercio Exterior” has a broader distribution (120 points of distribution across Bolivia and a circulation of 7.000 printed copies, which is above most of the Sunday circulation of most of Bolivian newspapers). In the last year, the number of downloads of its electronic version went up to 170.000. The advertising revenue has increased and fully covers the publication and distribution costs.

IBCE´s website remains Bolivia´s most visited page in its category. Traffic to the site has evolved from 180.483 visitors in 2011 to 208.127 in 2012. About two thirds of the users are returning visitors, which speaks of the stable demand for the services/products/information provided online.

The number of subscriptions for IBCE´s electronic services has increased substantially. IBCE M@il had 204.744 subscriptions in 2012, up from 184.727 in 2011. Subscriptions to IBCE Data Tr@de have grown from 18.198 in 2011 to 20.917 in 2012. Subscriptions to IBCE CIFRAS have grown from 25.034 in 2011 to 27.821 in 2012. These are free subscriptions, which are sponsored by a host of Bolivian companies that have a banner in a specific site window.

Statistical services are some of the most demanded services. At least every two weeks the site publishes a bulletin with Bolivian trade statistics accompanied by an analysis of trade evolution. This is the most cited publication by the press. This service is sponsored by a local bank on a yearly basis, and has been renewed since the service was launched. Statistical services and free subscription costs are fully funded by the publication´s sponsors.

It was originally envisaged to supply thematic reports as another service offered by IBCE. As with the other cancelled activities of the SP module, IBCE decided to concentrate efforts and use of the CBI assistance in strengthening and developing the newly-created marketing unit.

In our opinion the use of capacities is in compliance with the MQN 2 requirement.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact)

IBCE is a renovated organization. It has become self-sustainable from the financial point of view. It is a service-driven organization; it has achieved a better focus for its activities; and it is supplying relevant services to its beneficiaries.

In the survey conducted as part of this evaluation, when asked for the quality of the 18 services offered by IBCE, none of them got less than 76% of responses qualifying them as excellent or good.

The effect of the use of capacities is in compliance with the MQN 3 requirement.

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3. IBCE overall assessment The assistance provided by CBI coincided with a time of crisis endured by IBCE. Contributions by its affiliates, the main source of funding to sustain its activities, were starting to decrease; some activities demanded expenditures with no benefit for the organization; IBCE´s export advocacy was confrontational with the government, debilitating the technical character of its mission; even its landlords were asking IBCE to start thinking about another place to set up their offices. The organization was not service-driven, and although there was recognition and demand for its services, little was known about its beneficiaries.

IBCE has experienced a dramatic change with the assistance of CBI. A strategic-planning process embraced not only activities to increase exports to the EU, but covered the full organization. A new vision and mission for the organization was established and the services and activities aligned to this new vision and mission. A strategic plan with specific targets for 2010-2012 was adopted and followed to a great extent. All this evidence supports our assessment outlined for the SP module.

Also, IBCE has increased its recognition as a reliable technical source of information and opinion, on matters related to international trade as attested by many newspaper citations. Press citations of IBCE´s activities and publications have gone up from 4.500 in 2010 to 22.000 in 2011. The market information module´s goals at the results and purposes level were also achieved.

C. ADEX

The ADEX programme was conceived and designed between September 2006 and March 2008. Parallel to this process, a local consultancy firm – Gerens - was hired by ADEX to revise and redefine its organizational mission, vision and strategies. As a result of this project, 8 strategic objectives were adopted by ADEX and explicitly presented in a 5-year strategic plan in 2008. CBI and ADEX agreed to build the BSOD Programme on that foundation. The original BSOD Programme included two modules: Strategic Planning (SP) and Export Marketing and Management (EMM). It was intended to be implemented during the following 2 years with an LFA that would serve as main reference.

The implementation process in ADEX confronted many difficulties and setbacks for various reasons. High levels of rotation in ADEX didn´t allow for a fruitful transfer of capacities and caused a lack of ownership of the programme. Organizational transition in CBI and changes of the experts in charge of coordination also hurt the programme. In that context, the EMM module managed to advance but the SP Module was stuck. In July 2009, CBI´s Programme Manager (PM), in agreement with ADEX, decided to overhaul the programme. As a result, a new LF was formulated that better reflected the expectations of both parties. This LF is the framework that this evaluation will use in order to measure accountability.

The objective of the revised BSO`s programme was: “Increase in client satisfaction and number of EU-Exporting members”. It was also backed by a programme purpose: “Improved EU-related service delivery by ADEX.” To achieve these objectives, the programme set forth the following results to be attained by means of the implementation of their activities:

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1. Improved existing EU-related services 2. New EU-related services developed 3. ADEX-staff qualified to deliver EU-related services 4. Decentralized EU-related services developed

1. Strategic Planning

A list of 15 activities was formulated to achieve the SP module results (to improve existing EU- related services, to develop new ones and to transfer capacities to the organization in order to be able to do so):

1. Review of existing services and validate focus on Market Access Requirements (MAR), Market Research (MR), and (tentatively) lobbying services 2. Conducting specialized MAR training 3. Development of Technical Sheets 4. Development of MAR methodology 5. Development of Market Surveys 6. Conducting specialized MR capacity building 7. Development of MR methodology 8. Development of a Promotion strategy 9. Development of curricula for new ISTECEX courses 10. Development of curricula for new ECEX courses 11. Training the ISTECEX and ECEX trainer of the new/revised courses 12. Validating the focus on CSR services 13. Development of a Code of Conduct 14. Conducting training in CSR auditing and Sustainable Trade Opportunities (STO) 15. Development of a CSR strategy and activity planning

To perform this evaluation, these activities were grouped and organized by the nature of the activities of the module as shown in Table 12. Twelve OVIs were selected to assess transfer of capacity and six indicators set for achievement of the purpose level were used to assess use of capacity. When necessary, Table 12 signals all sources of verification that result from the evaluation´s methodology.

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Table 11: ADEX SP means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATION MEANS FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION ASOCIACIÓN DE EXPORTADORES DEL PERÚ (ADEX) STRATEGIC PLANNING (ORIGINALLY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT) MODULE Expected Module Results: 1. Improved existing EU-realated services ; 2. New EU-related services developed ; 3. ADEX staff qualified to deliver EU-related services.

Minimum Quality Norms Transfer of the capacity (result) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO indicate that service delivery has 80% of the competences have been transferred 60% of the gained capacity is used in practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance Result 1 OVI1: 9 Technical Sheets OVI10: ADEX stafff involved published by October OVI2: Improved in preparation of technical 2010 Methodology and work sheets and Market surveys P5: By 2012, Specialized process to continually received coaching from P1: 9 EU Technical Sheets being P4: Personalized Eu export Training received in MAR and Develop Technical Sheets &MAR methodology ; Conduct update EU Technical sector experts and the MI updated or published annually by marketing advise provided to 50 MR is repeated at least 4 times 1.1 specialized MAR training Sheets briefs by mid 2010 experta and are qualified to 2012 deliverr MAR and MR clientes annually by 2012 each per year by ADEX staff to OVI4: Improved January 2013 Client Satisfacion Survey service to ADEX members ADEX staff OVI3: 9 EU Market Methodology and work Develop Market Surveys and Market Resarch methodology Surveys completed by process to conduct EU P2: 9 EU Market Surveys being 1.2 ; Conduct specialized MR capacity building August 2011 MR by October 2011 published annually by 2012

OVI5: New Promotion Strategy for EU Services by mid-2010 Conference Luz Barreto (ADEX); Material shared on implementation 1.3 Develop Promotion Strategy Result 2 OVI 11: ISTECEX and ECETEX teachers received coaching on their Conference with Hugo Nava, Enrique Román (ADEX); Online OVI 6: 7 new EU realated OVI 7: 7 new EU realated subjects and are qualified Survey to teachers; ISTECEX ans ECEX website´s revision for Online Survey ISTECEX courses. ECEX courses developed to deliver EU-realated P3: 7 new ISTECEX and 7 new course contents Develop curricula for new ISTECEX and ECEX courses ; curricula to students ad ECEX courses being taught by 2.1 Train ISTECEX/ECEX trainers companies 2012

OVI 8: Code of conduct approved by ADEX management and distributed to ADEX Interview Luz Barreto Interview Luz Barreto 2.2 Develop a code of conduct; staff by December 2011 OVI 9: CSR strategy and P6.1: Before the end of 2012, activity planning developed ADEX has developed templates OVI 12: ADEX staff and external consultants trained and arppoved by ADEX be and published promotion material con CSR (completed Lima 2008, Rotterdam 2010, December 2011 Interview Luz Barreto; Review of documments shared by ADEX. Not applicable / Service not developed material for the new CSR Rotterdam 2010) P6: ADEX has approached portfolio inluding 1) company 10 potential clients for its Develop a CSR strategy and activity palanning; Conduct diagnosis, 2) CSR new CSR portfolio 2.3 CSR training implementation and 3) CSR audit

After the revision of the reports of the programme, interviews with ADEX´s staff and conferences with external experts and programme coordinators, we came up with an estimation of the compliance with the MQNs as presented in Table 13.

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Table 12: ADEX SP accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION ADEX STRATEGIC PLANNING (ORIGINALLY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT) MODULE Minimum Quality Norms

Transfer of the Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity (result) (effect/outcome) capacity (impact) Critical Activities to acheive the

expected module result 60% of the users/clients of 60% of the gained the BSO indicate that service 80% of the competences capacity is used in delivery has improved in have been transferred practice those areas where CBI has provided assistance

Result 1

Develop Technical Sheets &MAR 1.1 methodology ; Conduct specialized MAR 93 64 43 training

Develop Market Surveys and Market 1.2 Resarch methodology ; Conduct 100 64 43 specialized MR capacity building

1.3 Develop Promotion Strategy 100 83 43

Result 2

Develop curricula for new ISTECEX 2.1 and ECEX courses ; Train 76 64 66.5 ISTECEX/ECEX trainers

2.2 Develop a code of conduct; 100 60 43

Develop a CSR strategy and activity 2.3 100 0 N/A * palanning; Conduct CSR training

* N/A: Not applicable

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a) Transfer of capacity (result) Transfer of capacity was fully attained for most activities. There are two exceptions: i) a MAR methodology was not fully left for ADEX´s future use, as in the case of a MR methodology, in which case very well-detailed guidelines were left and are available both as a methodological guide and a teaching material to train staff on the subject. Also in the case of the curricula to be developed, only 4 courses were enriched for ISTECEX and 5 for ECEX, which falls below the target set. (7 new courses for ECEX and 7 new courses for ISTECEX)

All in all, there was full compliance with MQN1.

b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) Market research studies are being conducted with CBI´s methodology, a reasonable part of the promotion strategy for EU services has been implemented, the teachers in ADEX´s educational centres are benefiting from the materials left by the programme and the code of conduct is also being implemented.

MAR technical sheets have not been updated or produced in the way the programme expected. They are available for anyone who wants to consult them via the ADEX Data Trade service, but the methodology has not found its way to become more stable and useful.

CSR has yet to be consolidated as a service. ADEX has determined through a market research that demand for the service as it was designed (with prices been perceived as high for the intended target group, SMEs) is insufficient. At the moment, the organization is exploring ideas to find an approach to present CSR to its clients.

So, with the sole exception of the CSR service, capacity left by the programme is being used and we consider there is a general and acceptable compliance with MQN2.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) A proxy has been used to estimate client satisfaction for ADEX´s clients. Based on a last survey from January 2013, in which 991 ADEX´s clients participated, it was established that 43% of ADEX´s clients are happy with their services.

This is a good proxy since we can establish that no new service has been created in ADEX as a result of CBI´s cooperation. Mainly, services in the Market Intelligence Department and courses in ADEX´s educational centres have been improved with CBI´s methodology and one can think that they have had a positive impact in the increase in client satisfaction in relation to the 2009 baseline (39%).

For activity 2.1 a survey was conducted asking teachers of the educational branches of ADEX about the current use of the acquired knowledge and how they perceived their students satisfaction. Based on the survey, there is a 66% satisfaction rate among the beneficiaries of the transferred capacities. (See Annex 10)

Nevertheless, in spite of the improvement, client satisfaction is way below target to comply with MQN3.

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2. Export Marketing and Management (EMM)

Four activities were proposed to achieve the EMM module results. They should have allowed for the attainment of Results 2 and 3, namely to create capacities in ADEX staff for EU-related services and to generate new services:

1. Validate focus on EMP services 2. Conduct training-needs analysis and select EMM participants 3. Develop EMPs for selected pilot companies 4. Conduct 3 EMM training weeks

These four activities were grouped into two critical activities as shown in Table 14. OVIs were used to determine the extent to which capacities were transferred. Interviews with ADEX´s staff, CBI´s, PM and the Coordination External Expert (CEE), and with external experts were used to estimate the current use of capacity. Client satisfactions surveys, online surveys and interviews with ADEX´s staff were the tool selected to measure compliance with MQN3.

Table 13: ADEX EMM means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATIONS MEANS FOR THE ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION ASOCIACIÓN DE EXPORTADORES DEL PERÚ (ADEX) EXPORT MARKETING AND MANAGEMENT MODULE Expected Module Results: 2. New EU-related services ; 3. ADEX staff qualified to deliver EU-related services.

Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) (effect/outcome) Critical Activities to acheive the expected module result 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences have 60% of the gained capacity indicate that service delivery has been transferred is used in practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance Result 2 Interview Luz Barreto; OVI 1: 6 Export Marketing Plans Interview with External Client Satisfaction Surveys; Online Develop Export Marketing Plans (EMPs) for selected pilot (EMP) completed for ADEX members Experts; Interviews with surveys 2.1 companies Programme Coordinators Result 3 EMP methodology ; ECEX OVI 2: 3 EMM training weeks Client satisfaction surveys; sourses ; Interview with Luz completed by 30 ADEX and CEADEX ECEX/ISTECEX surveys; Interviews Conduct training needs analysis, select EMM particpants, Barreto; Interview with staff with ADEX staff 3.1 and conduct 3 EMM training weeks External Experts

The evaluation assessments delivered the results presented in Table 15:

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Table 14: ADEX EMM accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION ADEX EXPORT MARKETING AND MANAGEMTN MODULE Minimum Quality Norms Critical Activities to Transfer of the Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity acheive the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact) expected module 60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences 60% of the gained capacity result indicate that service delivery has have been transferred is used in practice improved in those areas where CBI Result 2 Develop Export Marketing Plans 2.1 100 11 43 (EMPs) for selected pilot companies Result 3 Conduct training needs analysis, select 3.1 EMM particpants, and 100 53 67 conduct 3 EMM training weeks

a) Transfer of capacity (result) EMM trainings achieved the expected transfer of capacities, fully complying with MQN1. For the ISTECEX and ECEX teachers that attended the training sessions, it imparted knowledge and contributed to the development of programmes to strengthen their curricula. For the companies and ADEX staff, the acquired knowledge has helped them to prepare the EMPs and to acquire a methodology to elaborate them.

b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) The EMP methodology is being used currently in ADEX, not for the preparation of new EMPs but as a methodological resource for the Market Intelligence department. The knowledge imparted in the EMP trainings has also served as material for ISTECEX and ECEX. As evidenced in other cases, the lack of demand explains why EMPs have not passed the test of time within the organization. But some of the elements of the methodology to elaborate them are still in use. As for the companies, there was little follow up on the activity. Interviewed experts have agreed on the fact that there was a lack of resources both on the side of the companies, as well as from the BSO to provide a fruitful follow up to the activity.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) In this case, we have also used ADEX´s last client satisfaction survey as proxy, plus the online surveys conducted with ECEX and ISTECEX for the use of the EMP methodology. The methodology has generated positive reaction and client satisfaction is in compliance with MQN3.

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Since EMPs are not being elaborated and companies that benefited from them are not exporting as a result of having them, MQN 3 is not met for these companies.

ADEX formulated some indicators to be measured in this evaluation to assess if objectives are being met at the higher level of the programme. Some of them are included in the accountability matrix. For reporting purposes we present them again in the Table 11 below:

Table 15: OVIs to be assessed one year after the programme

ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION ADEX OVIS AT THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE LEVEL

Compliance Level

Programe Objective (Client Satisfaction levels) 10% increase in % of clients that rate selected EU services as 1 D+ 13% (43% ) good or very good (baseline: 38% December 2009) Number of members exporting to Europe increased 10% by the 2 end of 2012 (baseline: 2009 = 211 member companies exporting D+ 50% (317 ) to EU) Programe Purpose (Use of competencies by BSO staff) 1 9 EU Technical Sheets being updated or published by 2012 6 ( 66 % ) 2 9 EU Market Surveys being published annually by 2012 6 ( 66 % ) 3 7 new ISTECES and / new ECEX courses being taught by 2012 64% Personalized EU export marketing advised provided to 50 clients 100% (128 in 2012) 4 annually by 2012 By 2012, sepecialized training received in MAR and MR is 25% 5 Beforerepeated the at end least of 42012, times ADEX each hasper yeardeveloped by ADEX temporates to ADEX and staff published promotion material for the new CSR portfolio inclding 1) Company Diagnosis, 2) CSR implementatino, and 3) CSR 0% 6.1 audit

ADEX has approached 10 potencial clinets for its new CSR 100% (90 in 2012) 6.2 portfolio

3. ADEX overall assessment

In spite of the problems that the programme had, the majority of activities planned to transfer competences to ADEX were conducted successfully. Some of them have prevailed in time, albeit timidly. While the goal was ambitious in developing new courses in ADEX´s educational branches, the end result was modest in improving some of them. The goals set by the programme for the MAR (Market Access Requirements) and MR (Market research) activities were also ambitious. (See OVIs 1 and 2 at the purpose level in Table 12. The results have fallen short of what was expected, nevertheless having contributed to a refinement of research methodologies in the Commercial Promotion Department. CSR

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capacities targeted to develop a new major service are currently not being used because demand for the service as it was originally designed for SMEs is insufficient due to high prices (Although installed capacity is still there when opportunity arises).

At the results level, the programme did indeed improve existing services and equipped part of the staff with new skills to deliver EU-related services. However, it failed to generate new services. It is worth noticing, that maybe because of the logic of the programme´s overhaul, all of the results achieved are related to the improvement of EU-related services via technical assistance. None of them really made an impact in terms of capacity change. In this regard, it is important to clarify that the second LF was not actively pursuing the kind of assistance that can promote organizational development, after both parties – ADEX and CBI – agreed that the overhauled programme would focus on technical assistance and, considering the difficulties in advancing the SP module, was less ambitious in terms of institutional development.

The achievement of some level of capacity development depended on the extent to which the programme could impact the organization´s structure. This, in turn, could have served as leverage for the knowledge shared at the EU-market level (EMM). The institutional development component of the programme had very little impact on the organization. The activities of the EMM module were conducted successfully, but follow up was practically non-existent.

As a result, ADEX benefitted from more and better knowledge of the EU market. They have incorporated it to their activities and their clients are benefitting from it. CBI has shared its knowledge with ADEX for the better. The original objective of the BSOD programme, on the other hand, was definitely not met at the impact level. It allowed for an organization with more and better information and methodologies targeted to the EU market, but it contributed very little to build up the organization. The SP module, which was designed to achieve that, had many setbacks during the programme. After the overhaul, in spite of CBI´s intention not to abandon the institutional development component of the programme, the activities of the module were mainly targeted to sharing knowledge on the EU market through technical assistance (as ADEX had requested). The institutional development component of the intervention was affected by many incidents and never lifted off as initially expected.

D. PROMPERU The BSOD programme in PROMPERU was officially launched in 2008, however, its prior track record dates back to 2006, when a letter of commitment for a BSOD programme was signed with PROMPEX. After the merger of PROMPEX with an organization in charge of tourism promotion named PROMPERU, two CBI missions visited Peru in 2008 to assess the viability to engage PROMPERU in a BSOD programme in accordance to the new conditions presented after the merger of the aforesaid institutions. These two missions identified some bottlenecks for the expansion of EU-related exports, of which two were selected as the focus for a BSOD programme: i) to bring PROMPERU staff up to standard, and ii) to have PROMPERU prepared to render high-quality export-related services to tend to

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the Peruvian export community, especially to export to the EU markets. A letter of commitment was signed in October 2008.

The programme contemplated one module: Strategic Planning for the EU. The Completion report refers to an Export Development and Promotion Module. This change of denomination had no perceivable impact on the intended results of the programme. The first mission of the programme visited Peru in December 2008. The programme was implemented through mid-2010. The activities of the programme were adjusted in time and content as the implementation of the programme progressed.

The overall objective of the programme was “To contribute to the availability and performance of sufficient quality services (for the EU market)”. The programme purpose was “To contribute to the generation and strengthening of export-promotion services based on the competencies developed by PromPeru.” The programme was designed to attain the following results:

1. Improved and demand-driven organizational planning process 2. Improved market information service to external and internal clients 3. Improved export promotion services 4. Improved export marketing planning training service 5. Customer relations management strategy developed and approved, and under implementation.

1. Strategic planning Eight activities were originally planned for this module. During the course of the programme, some adjustments were made to the planned activities:

1. Training on market research 2. Training on EU trends and access requirements 3. Training on export marketing plans 4. Training on effective fair participation 5. Consulting for the establishment of a CRM system 6. Consulting on EU-related information management 7. Roll-out of PROMPERU´s strategic plan (EU sections) through sector work plans 8. Development of a commercial antennae network

For evaluation purposes, these activities were grouped as shown in Table 16 below, and for these groups of activities, the corresponding OVIs were identified, and additional verification means were selected.

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Table 16: PROMPERU SP means of verification for accountability

VERIFICATION MEANS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION PROMPERU STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE EU MODULE (LATELY REPORTED AS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT & PROMOTION MODULE)

Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact)

60% of the users/clients of the BSO 80% of the competences have been 60% of the gained capacity is used in indicate that service delivery has transferred practice improved in those areas where CBI has provided assistance

OVI 1: SEMP methodology adopted as instrument for annual Improved & demand-driven organisational 1 organizational (POI) planning and planning process piloted for Garments (sub) sector (baby wear)

OVI 2: 3 MI documents developed and standarised by Promperu staff using CBI Methodology. Garments (baby wear), home decorations and Increased client satisfaction Improved Market Information service to external Fresh Fruit and vegetables. OVI perception from 70% to 80% by the 2 & internal clients 3:Improved MI processes Telephonic conferences with end of October 2012 (baseline: established and Internal MI collection PROMPERU´s staff currently in March 2009) & dissemination processes re- charge of these activities, Increased client satisfaction among defined. OVI 4: CBI affiliate website conferences with external experts clients from the garments sector; installed and the programme coordinators baseline November 2011 and the programme manager (see These surveys were estableshided OVI 5: Improved export promotion complete list in Annex 5). in the commitments done by material developed; OVI 6: Improved Programme documentation and PROMPERU but not carried out. export promotion methodologies & 3 Improved Export Promotion service additional materials received by mail. internal processes manual OVI 7: Effective trade fair participation training and coaching Improved Export Marketing Planning (training) OVI 8: Planex methodology revised 4 service and PROMPERU trainers trained

OVI 9:CRM strategy developed and aproved by management OVI 10: Customer Relations Management Strategy 5 CRM processes/workflows developed & implemented established, OVI one unique reference point for client contact

Cancelled activities No CRM strategy implementation New ideas are driving a different CRM due to Promperu´s internal decision approach Promperu trainers trained (not done Difficult to assess in a context of Training because deemed unnecessary) high personnel rotation Spanish funding for this activity was Development of commercila antennae network OVI 11: B2B startegy developed secured in December 2009. No need to continue with this.

According to the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, this assessment was conducted in a desk study. After the revision of the programme reports, the conferences held with PROMPERU staff, conferences with external experts and programme coordinators (see a complete list and details of these conferences), we came up with an estimation of the compliance with the MQNs as presented in Table 17.

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Table 17: PROMPERU SP accountability assessment

ACCOUNTABILITY MATRIX PROMPERU STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE EU MODULE (LATELY REPORTED AS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT & PROMOTION MODULE) Minimum Quality Norms Use of the capacity Effect of the use of capacity Transfer of the capacity (result) (effect/outcome) (impact)

Improved & demand-driven organisational 1 100 80 planning process

Improved Market Information service to external 2 100 70 & internal clients No survey was conducted at the request of PROMPERU because they are plannig to do it later this year.

3 Improved Export Promotion service 100 100

Improved Export Marketing Planning (training) 4 50 50 service

Customer Relations Management Strategy 5 80 60 developed & implemented

Cancelled activities CRM Training Development of commercila antennae network

a) Transfer of capacity (result) According to the revision of the programme documents and reports, and to conferences held with PROMPERU´s staff, CBI´s external experts that participated in the training, coaching, and consulting activities, and with the programme coordinator at the end of the programme, we can conclude that the contribution of CBI, was fully implemented in improving the planning process and to improve the information services and also to better export promotion activities, especially in the area of trade fair participation. CBI´s contribution was limited in the case of the Planex system in PROMPERU, as will be discussed in the next section, and was effective, but only in a very early stage, in the case of the CRM strategy implementation. Notwithstanding, given the nature of other transferred capacities in other critical activities as presented in Table 15, the required 80% for the MQN1 compliance has been met.

b) Use of the capacity (effect/outcome) The SEMP methodology was adopted in PROMPERU to prepare Operational Sector Plans (OPS) which are part of the documented planning process in the organization. In that sense, the capacity is in

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place, and it is expected to be used during the course of the implementation of the yearly planning process. No new sector plans were prepared under this exact methodology, but the planning process in PROMPERU is a formal process that is followed aimed at its full implementation. Hence we can expect that this will be the case with all its parts, including the OPS.

The market information service is fully implemented and the procedures designed with CBI assistance are institutionalized. Some updates and modifications have been introduced using the capacities acquired.

Participation in fairs and the preparation of export promotion materials are very well documented, and a conference with the person in charge of the participation in the ESE fair supported our views. Improvements in this experience have been translated to the rest of the Peruvian fair participations organized/supported by PROMPERU. PROMPERU has a long experience in fair participation and it can easily be assumed that the reported trainings have fallen on fertile land.

PROMPERU is using Planex, custom-made software developed prior to the BSOD Programme, to help Peruvian exporters in developing an export plan. The reports by CBI experts, and our recollection from a conference with PROMPERU staff, give us the impression that Planex was ahead of the SEMP and EMP tools used by CBI. Useful comments were provided by CBI experts, more than new capacities. Planex´s new developments and attention to issues raised by CBI experts were addressed without CBI assistance.

As for the CRM system, PROMPERU plans to contemplate its implementation in 2013 and 2014. CBI assistance was very helpful in tracing a roadmap for its implementation. However, PROMPERU has decided to roll out the system to the tourism sector and to the new functions assigned to PROMPERU, namely, the country-brand administration and the direct relation with the Peruvian commercial attachés abroad. These new assignments have an implicit expanded workflow; additional types of customers, and probably, different hierarchies within the organization. For all these reasons, it is understandable that not all activities contemplated originally were undertaken, but it should be recognized that the process that led to preparation of the strategy presented by CBI experts was useful in its content as the basis for the system that will be implemented in the coming future.

Under the abovementioned considerations, and taking into account all factors that have played around both the programme, PROMPERU , and even changes within CBI, we can conclude that all applicable capacities are in use in PROMPERU, at a level than fulfils the MQN2 criterion.

c) Effect of the use of capacity (impact) According to the programme, at the end of December 2012, PROMPERU would have to have conducted a survey to test, whether or not, the agreed targets of the programme were met, i.e. Increased client satisfaction perception from 70% to 80% by the end of October 2012 (baseline: March 2009), and increased client satisfaction among clients from the garments sector (baseline November 2011). This survey was not conducted. PROMPERU plans to carry it out during 2013, but it has no

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specific date for this purpose. For the purpose of this evaluation, we asked PROMPERU´s consent to undertake a small survey to a random sample of the population that participated in the 2009 survey. PROMPERU had the impression that a survey at this time, before the large survey they plan to conduct, could create confusion among their beneficiaries and hence was not in agreement with this idea. Therefore, it is not possible to make an evaluation of the impact of this programme.

2. PROMPERU overall assessment The Programme in PROMPERU has gone through changes in the organizations´ management and changes in the coordinators of the programme. It has also experienced some changes and adaptations in the content of the programme and some delays in its implementation due to elections in Peru, and changes in administration. Notwithstanding these events, PROMPERU has benefited from the BSOD Programme. It has a stronger capacity in fair participation with results in the fishery sector, it has a well-established market information system that has evolved based on an extensive overhaul with the assistance of CBI, and it finished a pilot in the baby wear sector that served as the basis for the preparation of Peruvian companies to participate in fairs in the UK, Germany and Denmark.

With the exception of the cancelled activities - most notably a CRM system was missed - the goals of the programme were attained at the results, purpose and objective levels. PROMPERU has benefited from CBI´s technical assistance and has become stronger in its capacity to deliver EU-related services. In terms of capacity change for institutional development, the activities in the market information component were effectively used to create a transversal change in the way the organization deals with the elaboration of research, documents, and publications. This change in one single process of the organization, served as the axis for further capacity change in the organization. We have observed this case with interest and have included the manner in which it worked in the lessons learned in this report.

At the end of the Programme, some activities remained with targeted results for the end of 2012. One of them, a critical one, was to conduct a survey of client satisfaction of the services rendered by this organization. As already mentioned this was not done. PROMPERU is a large public sector institution that is receiving a strong support from the government. It has been given more responsibilities in areas related to international trade, and the lead in the marketing of Peru´s brand abroad. These are priority areas for the Peruvian government, hence we can assume that PROMPERU will continue to use the capacities transferred by the Programme even if delays or implementation missteps have occurred.

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VII. Learning

A. 5C Model Assessment

1. Change in Capacity in CANEB and IBCE IBCE and CANEB (and the organizations it embraces) were affected by an adverse policy setting during the programme period. Export restrictions were imposed on some goods, and regional tensions put the Government against the Santa Cruz region where IBCE and CADEX operate. Export promotion became a second-order concern. The advocacy of a free trade regime had been paramount at least during the early years of the programme feasibility analysis.

IBCE experienced a reduction in the contributions it received from its member organizations, one of which is CADEX, a member of CANEB; and CANEB was deprived from the collection of revenue coming from the certification of origin taken back by the government. This threatened their continuity and, at the same time, demanded actions as advocacy institutions for the export community. This situation put these organizations´ strengths to the test.

It should also be noted that personnel rotate more intensely in this type of institution than in private companies. These institutions usually pay lower salaries than most of their beneficiaries’ entities. Some personnel use their tenure at a BSO as a stepping stone to a career in a private company.

It was fortunate in these circumstances that booming commodity prices and a strong demand for goods exported by most of the Bolivian export community eased any pain from an adverse policy climate and allowed for increased profits even with diminishing amounts of production. This helped both BSOs to look for other sources of revenue, especially by providing services to their clientele.

Both institutions were forced to plan for a different kind of environment. Prior to 2006, the working relations between BSOs and the government were not exempt of tensions, but were more cooperative in nature. Afterwards, the change from a market-oriented economy to a State-commanded one, were compelling for a change in the mission and vision of these organizations. The degree to which this was attained is varied, but in all cases some response in this direction was given. For further explanations of the assessment using the pointer matrices that support the content of this section, please refer to Annex 7.

2. The BSOD Programme´s influence on the change in capacity

a) IBCE The BSOD Programme in IBCE is a success story measured in terms of capacity development. The intervention logic was able to nurture the organization´s capacities. But also, the organization really owned the programme and was open to revise and, when needed, change its fundamental structures. The combinations of this favourable condition for the programme´s objectives can be attributed to a very unfavourable context for IBCE at the time when the programme was starting. It has been described as a moment of profound crisis, in which the organization was literally fighting for its survival.

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In that context, the strategy sessions conducted in the SP module unleashed IBCE´s capability to act and commit by setting a well thought and clear strategy for the future. These sessions, open to the participation of IBCE´s senior staff, addressed delicate problems that the organization had at the time. To mention a few: they set a clear mission and clear cut objectives aligned with the organizational values that motivated the staff to act upon them; they stressed the vision of a self-sustainable organization that generated income from taking care of their client´s needs; and, they encouraged a major transformation from a centralized organization to a more open one. In times of distress, the programme helped to improve the organization´s self-perception and, with the invaluable help provided by the top of the organization, created the atmosphere to motivate and commit its staff towards a promising vision.

The decentralization of the organization´s structure required knowledge to be available for everyone at all times for it to deliver on its objectives. The assistance in knowledge management helped to improve collaboration and give confidence to the staff that was being empowered. It also helped to promote a customer-driven organization, sharing information about their client´s needs across its functional areas.

The ability to relate to external stakeholders was a more complicated challenge. IBCE was sometimes perceived as an exclusive regional organization promoting private interests and carrying a political agenda. This was a concern inside the organization and was identified soon during the implementation of CBI´s assistance. One of the most difficult decisions they made in the strategy sessions was to make the commitment to focus exclusively on delivering services for the international trade sector and setting aside all regional, political and personal ambitions. This proved fruitful in creating new relationships with clients and sectors, which would have been unthinkable back then. But surely, this came at the cost of losing others. So far, the results of the process are not bad. Maybe this example illustrates IBCE´s current credibility and relation with the community: it recently bought and inaugurated its own building in Santa Cruz, which was financed entirely by its own resources and voluntary collaborations from businessmen and organizations from the private sector.

One of the reasons IBCE entered into a critical moment in 2008-2009 was the fact that it was not finding the necessary flexibility to adapt. The programme, as part of the strategic planning activities, helped the organization decentralize and become more flexible. It allowed for a self-renewal during the programme and it certainly has created an organization that is more prepared to deal with unpreventable changes.

Finally, it can be said that the redefinition of the mission, vision and the consequent realignment of processes has shaped a more coherent organization, one that listens to its clients and beneficiaries, and aims to deliver solutions to their needs through its services.

b) The CANEB network

(1) CANEB The BSOD programme in CANEB was originally designed to develop its capacities and the capacities of the regional chambers that are affiliated to CANEB. Already during implementation, it was

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decided that a large part of the programme should focus on the individual regional Chambers instead of the CANEB secretariat, as they (the regional Chambers) were the ones directly attending the SMEs. In the programme design, 1 of the 3 components dealt with the CANEB secretariat, and was meant to strengthen its networking function. The strengthening of CANEB as network facilitator proved very difficult during the programme, not least because the members of CANEB (the regional Chambers) did not prioritize materializing this vision for CANEB sufficiently. Therefore, ambitions for this component were downgraded during the programme, and focus shifted towards the individual chambers.

As a result of this, CANEB was not impacted by effective support in capacity development from this programme. We will go straight through to see how the regional chambers benefited from it.

(2) CAMEX CAMEX has traditionally focused on lobbying for the export sector from La Paz, and has also applied its skills in favour of the exporters throughout the whole country. When the BSOD programme was initiated, CAMEX still perceived itself as an effective lobbying organization but was not focused on providing other services for the export sector. Because of this, there was a mismatch from the very beginning between what CBI wanted to provide and what CAMEX was interested in receiving.

A suitable example for that situation was CBI´s recommendation that the chamber focus more on services. At the time, CAMEX´s strategic plan was focused exclusively on its core strength: lobbying. The recommendation was not wrong, but it was untimely and irrelevant at the time, since it was not applicable due to CAMEX´s internal functioning. Although the programme did not influence CAMEX in building a service-oriented organization at the time, it did motivate its staff by teaching them new skills and presenting new challenges, like the SEMP for the garments sector, or a project to communicate better with their affiliates. Because of the aforementioned mismatch in expectations explained earlier, it is unlikely that the programme was able to develop the capacities to act and commit and to deliver on development objectives. Just to present one example, strategic planning in CAMEX was targeted at offering better lobbying services and the programme wanted to strengthen the organization by promoting other services, they were not in tune as to how to better act and in what area the commitment should have been made.

One very interesting aspect of the SEMP development for the garments sector was that CAMEX was able, to some extent, to engage CADEXPO of Potosí in preparing the document. CAMEX also perceives that communication in CANEB´s network has improved and that it is starting to communicate better with the other chambers. Both aspects are positive impacts that the Programme had in its capacity to relate. CAMEX perceives it relates better with external stakeholders when performing its lobbying activities. In that area, the BSOD programme didn´t provide any form of assistance.

CBI´s approach of a self-sustainable service driven organization has been reconsidered almost one year after the programme has concluded. Also, technical assistance provided to create better communication channels is being used to promote new services based on client´s needs. CAMEX does not intend to abandon its core strength, lobbying, which is internally perceived as the activity that gives

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coherence and its raison d’être. But it may be starting to consider offering services to adapt to new times and new challenges.

(3) CADEXCO Most of the technical assistance provided to CADEXCO was directed at developing new services, but their activities did not really have an impact in terms of capacity development. CADEXCO has a positive self-image and may have considered that this kind of support was not needed. This notion can be supported by external views from some experts: for example, CBI´s CRM external expert considered that, among all the chambers, CADEXCO was the more advanced in managing relationships with its clients.

CADEXCO´s capacity to act, commit and deliver on a more service-oriented approach was encouraged by CBI´s programme. Technical assistance provided for fair participation and trade promotion was incorporated to their activities. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that no substantial change at the organizational level was originated by the BSOD programme; most likely because core processes from which to unleash capacity change weren’t identified.

CADEXCO acknowledges the fact that the programme promoted the collaboration and cooperation within CANEB´s network and that some results are already evident. In the most remarkable case of collaboration within a cluster, CADEX-CH worked in the SEMP of the Natural Ingredients sector and also was selected to conduct one of the pilot projects of the MD module. The credit for this goes to CBI, CADEXCO, but most notably to CADEX-CH´s management. CADEXCO´s capacity to relate was positively influenced by the programme.

CADEXCO is trying to adapt to new times. The CSR project is one example of this. CBI contributed to this project, which was initiated before, supported by other donor organizations, like USAID. CSR is not only trending in global trade, but it is also a necessary approach for conducting business these days. The organization has also been certified with an ISO standard for quality in managerial processes.

The challenge for the organization is to achieve coherence when applying for an ISO norm, developing new CSR services and focusing on the foods sector. The programme did not play a major role in this area. It is something they will have to figure out.

(4) CADEX The BSOD programme was more intense in the case of CADEX and more relevant in terms of capacity development. Experts and executives in charge of implementing the problem considered that it offered better conditions for a successful execution. This could also make sense because the Santa Cruz region is the more prosperous in Bolivia, friendlier to the private sector and one that has historically had strong institutions that support private sector activities. In any case, collaboration was more intense between CBI and CADEX than any other chamber. This more stable and continuous relationship created the conditions for greater capacity development than in the other members of the network.

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Another member of Santa Cruz´s private sector institutional framework, CADEX was suffering from similar difficulties as IBCE when the programme started. In times of decaying contributions from its members, CBI´s strategy to generate income from services came just in time. And CADEX had to acquire the capacity to adapt to new challenges. It goes to its credit that it found a way to self-renew internally, notwithstanding that CBI helped in mobilizing the resources to do so with its many technical assistance interventions. It is fair to say that both organizations were able to collaborate to allow for capacity change within CADEX.

This approach required CADEX to relate to new stakeholders. Formerly it served mostly large companies in very few sectors. Bolivia changed profoundly as a consequence of the 2006 new- government inauguration, and CADEX is adapting to that focusing more on SMEs and diversifying the export sectors they promote. The CRM project has been a key programme in this on-going process. They still need to relate better, communicate better and provide better services to their new clients. This will shape an organization that delivers superior results to companies that need them.

CADEX is in the hard process of adapting and innovating to achieve coherence as a new organization, different from the one they were in the past, but pursuing the same goal to promote exports. The BSOD programme has indeed contributed to a, hopefully, successful outcome.

3. Main Findings of the 5C model

a) IBCE Capacity development was notably attained by IBCE. The combination of many factors created the ideal context for the implementation of a programme that could deliver capacity development as a result. One should be careful not to forget that capacity development was not explicitly a goal of the programme. By having access to the core structure of the organization and having the support of top management to advance fundamental institutional change and development, the programme was able to attain impressive results. While it is good news that such a programme had this type of positive impact, it is evident that the probability of finding a mix of similar favourable conditions for future implementations is very low.

b) CANEB The BSOD programme in CANEB presents mixed results when measured for capacity change. Maybe the only organization where support in terms of capacity development was relevant was CADEX. Two reasons explain this: i) CADEX and CBI collaborated better with one another than CBI and any other chamber during the programme and ii) the programme was more intense in CADEX than in the other chambers, making it the most important beneficiary of the intervention. It wouldn´t be correct to compare this programme with IBCE´s and expect the same results. The programme implementation in these two cases was extremely different. Nevertheless, CADEX benefitted from some change in capacity that has yet to show results that can be considered stable. For the other chambers, CANEB, CAMEX and CADEXCO, we don´t consider that they benefited from relevant changes in capacity caused directly by the BSOD from the 5C model perspective (Of course, they experienced capacity development, but from factors not directly linked to the BSOD intervention). In the case of these three other organizations, the

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programme displayed some interesting possibilities for capacities building that were sometimes explored with the Technical Assistance programmes, but it will be up to them to develop the necessary capabilities.

c) General Assessment The BSOD Programme for IBCE and CANEB design dates back to 2005-2006 when the 5C Model had not even been conceived. The organizations and their characteristics were analysed using a different approach. Hence, capacity development, in the sense the 5C Model understands it, was not at the core of the programme in IBCE and CANEB. There was no capacity assessment in the terms of the 5C Model prior to the programme design, and for that reason, the identification of capacity shortcomings and better venues to address them was absent in that context.

If the 5C model were to be used in a programme design, there must be a commitment to undertake institutional development (ID) activities as part of the programme. The impact scope of ID- related activities, to a certain degree used in IBCE, is wide within the organization. It showed not to be effective to constrain them to the scope of an intervention designed to develop a specific capacity or expertise as seen in CANEB. ID could be more beneficial by addressing a perceived weakness and a perceived need by the organization at large. The indirect approach to address ID issues by skill improvements in specific areas could result in little impact in the organization, as seen in CANEB, CAMEX and CADEXCO and to a lesser extent in CADEX. This is more likely when the programme is based on short-term trainings.

The main difference between IBCE and CANEB was the approach taken by the Programme. In IBCE, it focused on the organization´s strategy, vision and mission, whereas in CANEB, it focused on strengthening technical and operational capabilities. The results, in the latter case, were not as solid as in IBCE in terms of capacity change.

B. Learning Questions on the 5 DAC/OECD criteria

1. CANEB

a) Efficiency

(1) Findings  The majority of the programme´s inputs were of good quality and delivered as scheduled.

 Exceptions:

 CADEX was not pleased with the quality of the CRM project, although it claims to have collaborated with the expert to achieve a satisfactory result at the end.  Timber sector training was not well organized: short notice, too many days, low rate of attendance.  Garments project in CADEX had many problems, which were not properly managed and the activity was cancelled due to these problems.

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 For the CRM diagnostics and implementation plans, a local consultant was hired to perform a consultancy that lasted, a combined time of approximately 6 months. For that period of time, it is very likely that hiring a foreign consultant could have been more expensive.

 Programme spent EUR 86,500 more than budgeted (approximately 10% more); it was scheduled to last until early 2011, it was concluded by late 2011.

/ The mix of activities allowed for an improvement at the service level through technical assistance; it was not suitable for capacity development because it did not address the chambers´ key processes in this area properly.

(2) Assessment CANEB´s programme efficiency was challenged by the fact that it was implemented in three different cities across the Bolivian territory, and also by the past history of lack of communication and cooperation within the network. In spite of this CANEB, CBI and the Chambers managed to implement the programme with a low level of incidents. The quality of the inputs in trainings and consultancy was appreciated by the BSOs. The programme went 10% over budget and lasted a little bit longer than expected, both within a reasonable frame given the context.

The activities conducted during the programme were appropriate to promote improvements in the chamber´s services with technical assistance, but they were insufficient to achieve capacity development as the 5C Model conceives it because only a few of them (notably, in the case of support of fair trade participation) were engrained in core processes of the organizations.

A major incident for the programme, also in terms of efficiency, was the cancellation of the Garments pilot projects in CAMEX. The potential benefits of such a programme were missed, fundamentally because of poor communication and coordination between CBI, the External Expert, CANEB and CAMEX; and not because the programme wasn´t necessary. 6 pilot projects were designed to be implemented in CAMEX as part of the activities of the MD module. There isn´t an agreement of the parties involved on the reasons that led to the cancellation of these pilots. According to CBI it was because CAMEX lacked the resources to carry out this activity. According to CAMEX it was because the activity was not a CBI priority anymore. A clear story on what happened could not be reconstructed.

It is evident that the there was a clash between the External Expert in charge of the Garments projects in CAMEX and the chamber and the companies in this sector. CAMEX and the companies have reported that the consultant arrived late and left early from a workshop in La Paz and that the content of the outlined pilot projects was not in tune with their expectations. Added to those incidents in the BSOD programme, other difficulties experienced in the same sector with CBI and the same consultant in another CBI programme (ECP) only added further tension to the situation. All these incidents accumulated creating a difficult ambiance for cooperation, especially since the companies involved couldn´t make a distinction between the BSOD and the ECP programmes; all incidents were attributed indistinctly to the cooperation with CBI via CAMEX. It is important to state that the External Expert

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respectfully declined to have an interview for this evaluation, so we have not had the opportunity to listen to her version and, thus are not presenting any judgement on these facts, hence, a balanced opinion is not possible without having heard all parties involved in the matter.

What is clear and can be stated for evaluation purposes, is that the level of confusion is still high and the collateral damage for the programme, CBI, CAMEX and the expert exists. To this day, CAMEX hears complaints from the companies that still can´t differentiate between the BSOD and the ECP programmes, and feel they have been misled in this case. The fact that the whole situation involves a single supporting organization – CBI -, two programmes being simultaneously conducted by CBI – the BSOD and the ECP -, a single external expert carrying out both programmes, and a single supporting organization coordinating locally with the companies involved – CAMEX -, we conclude that an effort of more effective communication and coordination could have controlled the situation, if not prevented it from happening as it did. This detailed account could provide help to the learning focus of this part of the evaluation by preventing similar cases in the future.

b) Effectiveness

(1) Findings  As a result of the programme, CANEB´s network has been exposed to the benefits of cooperation.

 Cooperation attitudes were increased to some extent within CANEB´s network.

 The programme was able to thrive until completion in the midst of challenging conditions in Bolivia.

 Chamber´s capacity to deliver services has improved.

 To some extent, capacity development was achieved in CADEX that helped the organization to adapt to challenging times during the programme.

 Because of how it was designed, the programme was not able to properly address the complex diversity of the chambers that explains the network dynamics:

 CANEB, CAMEX and CADEXCO were not properly supported in terms of capacity development, mainly because of a mismatch between what the programme wanted and what they really wanted or needed.

 CANEB: While the programme was trying to strengthen CANEB and expand its influence beyond its lobbying function, this was not a priority for the network members.  CAMEX: The chamber portrayed itself as a lobbying platform for its affiliate companies, and the programme was providing assistance for a service driven organization.  CADEXCO: The organization made its most significant advances in capacity development in the process of getting its ISO certification. The chamber effectively benefited from the BSOD support only as long as it matched and complemented its ISO process.

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(2) Assessment The programme was most effective in exposing the network to the benefits of cooperation and collaboration. By doing so, it also alleviated the level of constraints that historically prevented a more collaborative ambiance. It is worth noting that this was achieved in the midst of a complex situation for the Bolivian exports sector.

The programme explicitly advocated for a stronger CANEB to be a true leader as an umbrella organization for the network. This objective was not met. The programme had to adapt to changing conditions. One of the key decisions made halfway, was to focus on the regional chambers, and then the programme moved almost exclusively to CADEX and CADEXCO. To strengthen CANEB was without question a major challenge. For various reasons the programme was not capable of dealing with this.

In all fairness to the programme, it must be said that it was not designed to consciously foster capacity development. In this evaluation, we are using the 5C model – assessing the BSO´s capabilities - to estimate the level of organizational or institutional development, one of the two components of the BSOD programme. In this respect, only CADEX benefited from an effective type of assistance.

c) Impact (Foreseen and unforeseen impacts of the programme)

(1) Findings  Some Chambers are better equipped to render better services. Examples of areas of improvement:

 Fair Participation Service in CAMEX, CADEX, CADEXCO.  CRM in CADEX.  CADEX´s ability to deliver on international cooperation programmes.  Timber Task Force and Comité de Alimentos are established as local platforms for their sectors. They still have to show results.  General information on EU market. Attention brought to opportunities in the EU market.

 Network members are aware of the potential benefits of cooperation, and the Chamber Network has started to work, albeit still timidly.

 Capacity gains in CADEX have helped the organization adapt and better fit the new local reality.

 No real positive impact for CANEB as an umbrella organization for the network of chambers.

 No real impact for the chambers in smaller regions, except for CADEX-CH Chuquisaca.

 No significant impact in capacity development in CAMEX, CADEXCO, CANEB.

 Unforeseen and undesired impacts:

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 CBI´s image has been questioned in La Paz: Some companies that were involved in the garments project are disappointed, due to the problems detailed above in the efficiency assessment of this programme, because they think they have been misled by CBI.  CANEB losing command of the continuing projects with CBI like the BDM and ECP – Wine, today being led by CADEX, has, according to CANEB, disappointed and confused the umbrella chamber and increased susceptibilities between some members of the chamber network. CANEB has informed us that it has expressed its disappointment to CADEX and CBI. This unintended consequence arises because some parties understand that taking CANEB out of the cooperation framework with CBI is counterproductive to the BSOD´s objective of strengthening it as the leader of the network.

(2) Assessment As a result of the programme services having been improved, some chambers are better equipped to deliver them and Bolivian exporters are more aware and better informed about opportunities in the EU market. Results are uneven between chambers, but they are all appreciative of the technical assistance provided.

CANEB, which as an individual organization was also a focus of the programme, was not significantly impacted. In all truthfulness, after some adjustments in the programme, it clearly didn´t prioritize CANEB under the premise that basic conditions for assistance in institutional development were non- existent.

The programme also had unforeseen, undesired impacts. The mismanagement of the Garment pilot projects in La Paz has raised questions about CBI´s credibility among some companies. It has also affected the ECP project in the garments sector negatively. While everyone recognizes the positive effect the programme had on increasing awareness about cooperation, some of its actions, especially continuing with the ECP and BDM programmes have generated more susceptibilities and have increased tensions in some relations. CANEB losing command of the continuing projects with CBI (BDM and ECP – Wine) has generated discomfort in some chamber members that consider this way of proceeding counterproductive to the BSOD objective of empowering CANEB as the leader of the network.

While no significant organizational changes in terms of the 5C Model were fostered by the programme in CANEB, CAMEX and CADEXCO, the type of change that was promoted in CADEX helped it adapt to a new more challenging context. As it turns out, support in capacity development in CADEX has shown good results. To understand this, it is important to mention that the BSOD programme was a better match for CADEX´s specific needs, expectations and plans at the time. Because of this match, added to CADEX´s ability to mobilize resources (money and staff), the programme could take advantage of the commitment made by the organization in making changes at the institutional level.

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d) Relevance

(1) Findings  The idea of a strong and cooperative network is desirable, although not initially perceived so by the network´s chambers.

 The programme specially addressed the needs of exporters in the Timber and Food sectors.

 In times of great uncertainty for the export sector, the programme offered an alternative vision to CANEB´s network which focuses on services. It offered a broader perspective to weather a complex period for the export sector and it effectively addressed the needs of exporting SMEs, coherent with CBI and Minbuza policies.

 /  The communications problem in the chamber network was properly identified, but poorly understood and addressed.

 CBI´s assistance to CANEB and CAMEX in strategic planning, which could have achieved capacity change, was not relevant because it didn´t interpret their self-portrayal.

The development of a service-oriented network led by CANEB was not among CANEB´s priorities. It has continued to focus on lobbying and has not made a clear effort to derive income from other services.

 Country policies which are not favourable to free trade did not cooperate with the programme´s objectives.

(2) Assessment The programme´s results, purpose and objectives as stated initially were all desirable for the benefit of Bolivia´s export sector, and CANEB and its network of chambers. Nevertheless, possibly during the design process, it failed to properly understand and interpret the local reality.

When it comes to the specific actions of the programme, some of them became irrelevant because they didn´t address the real needs and expectations of the BSOs. We think that the major problem for this was that the dynamics of the network, and its internal politics, were not properly understood, interpreted and addressed beginning with the initial phase of the programme design. We conclude that when designing the programme and setting its objectives, all parties involved overestimated their possibilities to overcome constraints and obstacles due to the internal competition and regional ruptures that were reflected in the internal politics. It is also evident that some important aspects were not properly recognized and made some interventions irrelevant (e.g. CAMEX self- portrayal during the programme as a lobbying platform, made the CRM implementation plan and any cooperation in terms of strategic planning irrelevant for the organization). Some activities were considered as not having practical use for the chambers, or were implemented with unfortunate timing. This had a negative impact in the chances of the programme of providing support for positive capacity change.

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But the programme´s role in offering an alternative on how to deal with a complex context for the export sector in Bolivia was very important and very relevant in times of great pressure. The chamber network must appreciate the fact that the BSOD programme presented a service-driven model, which is an attractive, if not necessary, alternative for the BSOs to thrive.

e) Sustainability

(1) Findings  CADEX, CADEXCO and CADEX-CH have been able, at different levels, to sustain the benefits of the programme.

 CADEX seems to be able to mobilize resources and secure investments (i.e. CRM project). This is the key to sustaining the programme´s results in the form of services and capacity gains.

 CANEB is in a worse financial position. This situation hinders its chances of sustaining any benefits derived from the programme.

 The network is still using CANEB as a lobbying platform, but to this day, doesn´t use or empower the chamber as an effective network coordinator, as the programme hoped it would.

 New services didn´t stabilize because of lack of demand:

 CSR in CADEXCO  HACCP certification in CADEXCO  SMEs service (Mipyme Exportadora) in CADEX

 Organization and structural conditions were not properly addressed by the programme: communication and cooperation continue to be challenging.

 Country policies continue to be difficult and uncertain for the sector.

(2) Assessment Bolivia is still in the process of implementing a recently approved constitution (2009) by constructing the necessary legal framework. This new social contract benefits explicitly the role of the state in the economy and presents new challenges for the private and export sectors. For this reason, many of their current efforts are directed to the promotion of favourable export policies. The sustainability of the programme´s benefits are surely linked to the level of success the sector will show in these efforts.

Simultaneously, BSOs are looking to adapt to the new reality. Only recently have they been deprived of their traditional income sources, export affiliates have become more reluctant to pay their contributions and the country´s policies have not helped. But this has forced them to look for alternatives. The BSOD programme´s service-driven approach seems the best one. They still have to face the reality of lack of demand for new services or reluctance towards innovation, but all of them have shown the intention to go in that direction.

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Difficult times have also proven fruitful to foster cooperation within CANEB´s network. In spite of their differences, chambers are more aware of the benefits of a collaborative attitude and they have verified (by applying to some cooperation programmes in consortium) that it brings them more opportunities.

To some extent, CADEX has the ability to maintain its gains in capacity, mainly because it has proven it can mobilize resources in order to do that. For the few gains, if any, for the other chambers sustainability is unlikely simply because they are too fragile.

It is still too soon to tell if the positive impacts of the programme will be sustainable in time. It is clear, however, that the CANEB network has every incentive to achieve that.

Table 18: CANEB overview of evaluation criteria assessment

Design Implementation Follow-up Criteria/ Phase (satisfactory / less (satisfactory / less (satisfactory / less than satisfactory) than satisfactory) than satisfactory)

Efficiency Less than satisfactory Satisfactory

Effectiveness - Output level Satisfactory

- Outcome level Less than satisfactory

Impact Less than satisfactory

Relevance Less than satisfactory

Sustainability Satisfactory

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2. IBCE

a) Efficiency

(1) Findings

 IBCE´s commitment and ownership of the programme contributed to a good organization of activities.

 Experts’ qualifications were in line with the requirements of the activities carried out.

 Total amount spent in the programme was 7.5% below the budgeted figure.

 A remarkable achievement in capacity development was attained through an efficient use of resources:  Both sides, IBCE and CBI, were capable of saying no to some activities and prioritizing the ones that could have greater impact.  When necessary, they chose to hire a local consultant that worked inside IBCE at a much lower cost than the one that would have been paid for a European consultant doing the same job.

 There was a solid balance between strategic activities for capacity development and technical assistance for the Market Information module.

 Implementation took one additional year than originally programmed. An additional time was necessary mostly to complete the programme and at the same time for the implementation of some refinements for the results of the completed activities.

(2) Assessment The activities of the programme were well organized in terms of logistics and the availability of IBCE´s staff to attend the training and coaching sessions of the programme. The external experts with whom we had the chance to talk over the phone praised IBCE´s staff motivation and their commitment to comply with the assignments they received. In the interviews with IBCE´s personnel, the qualifications of the team of experts were praised, both in terms of their knowledge and their ability to motivate people to do their work.

The total amount of money spent in the programme was 7.5% below budget. Being this a good sign of efficiency, it must be considered in light of the alleged reasons that led to the cancellation of three activities. According to IBCE´s general manager, one of the reasons was to have more resources devoted to the newly-created marketing unit that eventually was provided along with additional trainings on novel foods and two internships in the Netherlands.

The implementation of the programme took more time than initially intended. This could be the result of some adjustments made to the programme, but at the same time, due to the fact that some activities required multiple revisions until properly finished.

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Trainings, technical assistance and consultancy services were soundly arranged so that IBCE could acquire new capabilities at the same time and in the same areas where new services were developed. The way activities were organized also allowed for more technical aspects of the cooperation to leverage from the gains in capacity.

b) Effectiveness

(1) Findings  The content of the executed activities were in accordance with quantified estimates in the logical frameworks.

 Good balance between training and consultancies, and flexible implementation.

 Capacity constraints addressed by the programme, with observable reductions:  Planning process improved and up to standards.  New services developed, and older ones redesigned in accordance with demand requirements.  New sources of financing were found.  Improved internal work organization.

 Improved channels of communication with beneficiaries  A web site that is functioning as an effective way of communication and service delivery.  Effective use of social media.  Targeted information services according to demand specifications. No untargeted mass delivery.

 An array of conditions have contributed to the outcomes, nevertheless, CBI´s role has been very strong and influential in shaping the renewed IBCE organization.

 Three cancelled activities.  CRM design and implementation.  Information provider network.  Development of thematic reports. According to IBCE´S General Manager, the reason for these cancellations had to do with the need to concentrate efforts in the development of the newly created marketing unit. It probably had to do more with the availability of human and financial resources on the side of IBCE to allocate staff to these activities and to devote the necessary funds for investments related to the implementation of a CRM system at that time.

 New risks need control, especially those related with the focus on IBCE´s mission. Too much emphasis on financial sustainability could turn IBCE into emphasizing profitability transforming the BSO into a consultancy firm.

 New service in the out-rebound of the BSO focus. IBCE initiated a translation service that is provided at a competitive price and good quality. This is not a service that the programme intended to support or develop. It is just an unforeseen result that once again puts the question on the extent to which a BSO could maintain its role in society without acting as a pure consultancy-services provider.

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(2) Assessment During the programme, and as part of the planned activities of the programme, IBCE was coached to fully develop a strategic plan for the period 2010-2012 (not only strategic planning for the EU). This plan has laid the ground for IBCE´s adaptation to changing circumstances in the political and policy stances of the Bolivian government. IBCE was facing hard options that could have threatened its very own existence. The strategic plan finally drafted, allowed for the adoption of a new direction, and a new definition of mission and vision. It also led to the reprioritization of functions and the creation of a new one to strengthen the marketing side of the BSO. IBCE is currently funding 95% of its budget with the delivery of services, giving the organization full independence from affiliate or voluntary contributions. IBCE acquired a relatively high political profile, or at least it was perceived so. This was hurting and constraining the organization. The new strategic plan helped change that.

This process unleashed IBCE´s capabilities to act and commit; to deliver on its new set goals; to self-renew by adapting to a new vision and mission; to relate according to its new created self-image; and, to do all this in a coherent way. The external experts in charge of the programme were capable of accompanying this process through wise guidance. The outcome has been very satisfactory.

The profound change that IBCE has experienced is not exempt from risks. The new focus, in terms of demand-driven services that could cover costs and leave a margin, could push IBCE too much towards a consultancy-type operation risking its objective as a think-tank. Both are not the same type of organization, although a grey area may be possible. Functioning as a consultancy could isolate IBCE from a broader audience in the export sector, especially from small and medium-sized enterprises. It could also lead IBCE to lose its focus on export-related services. A case in point is its translation service. They are a big income source for IBCE. Although, until now, supplied mostly to CBI for export-related materials, it needs a clear definition of limits to remain so.

Of course, not all these results could be attributed to the programme. An array of circumstances coincided and contributed to the success of the programme. The external adverse political environment for the private sector actually helped its implementation since people in the organization felt more committed to the organization and to the work needed to have it strive in this context. Booming prices in international markets allowed the private export sector to grow and weather the effects of some restrictions to exports and domestic prices. These, in turn, alleviated IBCE from the pressure of performing with a harder stance in its advocacy role, and gave IBCE freedom to adopt a more technical profile.

c) Impact (foreseen and unforeseen impacts of the programme)

(1) Findings  IBCE is today a much stronger and less fragile organization.

 IBCE was able to capitalize on a deep crisis and outline a path for the near future.

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 Better understanding of its technical role in international trade matters.

 Services meet their beneficiaries’ expectations, as tested via focus groups.

 Better internal organization means a better response to beneficiaries´ needs.

 Higher competition among BSOs.

(2) Assessment It is very likely that IBCE would have languished had its strategic planning implementation not occurred. At least one can say it is very unlikely that IBCE would have come off as strong from the crisis it went through. One of its early responses was to downsize the organization, and that could have continued to the point of making the entity itself irrelevant had it not refocused its activities.

IBCE performed a service-portfolio analysis, and kept all those services for which there was a true demand. It also addressed and corrected internal procedures that were not contributing to a good performance. Among them, a working environment where very little was shared, work was not decentralized, and where the allocation of time and tasks was far from optimal.

These developments have triggered a competitive response from other two stronger BSOs in Santa Cruz, CAINCO and CADEX, which started to copy some of IBCE’s innovative products, one of which had to be abandoned by IBCE: a membership card with discounts for its beneficiaries.

d) Relevance

(1) Findings  The programme addressed the main concerns of the BSO: how to find a new direction, a sense of purpose and ways to be self-sustainable.

 IBCE is a think-tank that changed its focus from being an advocacy organization for an interest group to a technical and credible institution on international trade matters, something that was necessary for its survival.

 The support of exports from developing countries, and the attention to SMEs are part of the services provided by IBCE. In that regard, the programme was aligned with CBI and Minbuza policies.

 Advances in capacity are in line with both IBCE´s and CBI´s bases on organizational development.

(2) Assessment With the assistance of CBI, IBCE strengthened and developed capacities that gave the organization a technical profile. The decision to shy away from a political profile and role was fortunate. Good communication, coordination and commitment from both sides were key factors in understanding and properly addressing IBCE´s needs. This also helped to address the organization´s dependence on its general manager, and to promote other people to leadership roles.

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IBCE is a more credible reference in international trade matters. It has the possibility of influencing and balancing the debate on policy issues in an environment not favourable to free trade and not favourable to the private sector. In such a context, it becomes difficult to find coherence with the country’s trade policy and sector priorities, except for the prioritization of the SME. Notwithstanding, it is still possible to be a contributing part in the policy-making process when technical discussions are held.

To do all this, both organizations were able to cooperate effectively maintaining coherence with their approach to organizational development and making it happen within IBCE.

e) Sustainability

(1) Findings  IBCE feels it has full ownership of the programme.

 IBCE is capable of continuing to provide better products and services and has better ways to reach its beneficiaries.

 IBCE has achieved self-financing for more than 90% of its budget.

 It has its own building. It has the potential to maintain investments as required.

 There is a committed leadership to the programme´s results.

 A relative good safekeeping of programme documentation and manuals (video manuals) was able to ensure sustainability of transferred capacities.

 Staff rotation in key executives of the organization may have hindered the results of the programme.

(2) Assessment The programme has achieved results that are sustainable over time. The strategic planning process is one of them. It is not only the new direction that IBCE has adopted, but it has the knowledge and retains the advisory function to undertake a new planning exercise over the next three years. A new course has been set, and what is needed is an updated plan for its implementation. IBCE has learned by experience that this is the kind of planning that is conducive to good results, and at the same time, it has great pride for having been part of the design of this and other parts of the programme. It is by maintaining this practice that the organization has the better chances to keep its capacity gains, and the potential to build on them.

IBCE´s ability to build on the programme´s results is shown in its ability to suspend those services that are not producing the expected results, but at the same time to design new ones, like the newly created logistic information service for the export community.

Although there were no direct contributions from the business community to the programme, the fact that in a matter of weeks IBCE raised the needed money to supplement its savings to acquire its

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own building, shows that there is a recognition of IBCE´s contribution to international trade in Bolivia, and that there is also expectation that this could continue to be the case.

The programme engaged IBCE at the top of the organization and at its middle management level also. Hence, there has been a good understanding of the needed conditions for the continuation of its success, among them, a proper follow-up. Areas where this is not seen have to do with activities or consultancy for services that don’t have a demand, as is the case with CSR services.

Table 19: IBCE overview of evaluation criteria assessment

Design Implementation Follow-up Criteria/ Phase (satisfactory / less (satisfactory / less (satisfactory / less than satisfactory) than satisfactory) than satisfactory)

Efficiency Satisfactory Satisfactory

Effectiveness - Output level Satisfactory

- Outcome level Satisfactory

Impact Satisfactory

Relevance Satisfactory

Sustainability Satisfactory

VIII. Financial Analysis Table 20 shows the total amount spent in each of the BSOD Programmes in Latin America.

Table 20: Budgeted and executed expenditures in the BSOD programmes

Amount spent BSO Number of modules Amount budgeted Relative to Absolute budget PROMPERU 1 €440.000 €478.252,84 8.7% IBCE 2 €880.000 €813.972,77 -7.5% ADEX 2 €880.000 €842.354,44 -4.3% CANEB 2 €880.000 €966.489,77 9.8%

Total expenditures in PROMPERU and CANEB were above budget, while amounts spent in IBCE and ADEX were below budget.

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Due to accounting changes in CBI, we did not have access to the information that would have made possible a detailed comparison of the amounts budgeted and spent by module and by activity in each BSO. However, in general terms, and based on the results we described in the previous sections, it appears that the amounts spent in CANEB and ADEX were the largest, but at the same time, these BSOs were the ones with more mixed results.

It is also important to note that the depth of the same activities implemented in each BSO was not the same. For instance, ETFP was more comprehensive in PROMPERU than in CADEXCO because of the different past experience both had in this regard. It could have been interesting to see whether or not the amount spent in this activity reflects this fact.

For the reasons explained earlier, we can´t do more than present the figures and present these possible lines of analysis. For future implementations, we suggest keeping an organized and detailed state of the finances of the programme that will result in beneficial insights.

IX. Recommendations and conclusion

The report has arrived to three different levels of recommendations: first, 10 immediate action-oriented recommendations are offered, and by their nature they address mainly operational issues; second, 5 lessons are drawn from those reasons, factors and circumstances that help to explain the results of the programme; and, third, 5 approach recommendations are presented that have to do with the intervention logic and the design of the programme. Finally, the report offers an answer to the central research question on how CBI involvement contributed to the institutional development of the BSOs, and how this, in turn, contributed to the SMEs´ capacity to export.

A. Ten action-oriented recommendations (in order or urgency)

1. Make a checklist to evade the most common barriers for a successful execution Write down the usual avoidable obstacles for a successful implementation of an activity, and check that these will not be present at any time. This could sound obvious or needless for activities that are routinely performed by CBI staff and experts and the involved BSOs as well, but is not. We have noticed some activities with little attendance because of short-notice invitations (timber training in the case of CANEB), the lack of translators when the audience needs them (two activities in PROMPERU), another more important activity in conflicting schedule with the workshop (people coming in and out of an MAR Training in ADEX), or the lack of photocopied materials for one training activity (Trade Fair Participation trainings in CANEB), to name a few incidents that happened during the programmes being evaluated. Checklists are very useful so the busiest organizer doesn’t miss a detail. 2. Create or strengthen an internal monitoring capability in the BSOs.

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The existence of comprehensive monitoring systems is not a high ranking feature in the BSOs we have evaluated. Capacity building can be supported by designing a programme component that transfers the capability to develop a proprietary monitoring system to the BSOs, at least, for the activities developed during the programme and one year after it has ended. It could benefit any further evaluation, but more importantly, it will help the sustainability of the programme by counteracting the natural tendency to lose the enthusiasm after the external experts have left. It could also serve as a starting point to develop the internal capability to broaden the scope of the monitoring system, and at some point in the future, evolve into a monitoring system of its 5 core capabilities. 3. Secure full participation in the programme activities. Some of the training activities confronted situations of constant ins and outs of the participants. The reason for that had to do with the day-to-day functions of the BSO´s staff. Hence, it must plan for workshops and trainings that do not add a heavy workload for the trainee, by either asking the BSOs to give them a leave of absence, or by performing the training activities during part, and not all, of the day, or by planning training sessions in two or more shifts over a longer period of time. Some of these, or other solutions to this problem, could be coupled with a signed commitment by the person participating in that activity. 4. Look for a broader commitment by the BSOs after the programme has been completed. As we have seen in the BSOD Programmes, it is possible that some activities will need to be finished after the programme is finished (a report revision, the circulation of some conclusions or papers, and the like). There are also responsibilities after the programme for evaluation purposes, as is the case with PROMPERU and the client satisfaction survey. The programme should include some sort of signed commitment to secure that this happens. For some activities during the programme implementation, it is perfectly conceivable to establish some responsibilities and sanctions in case of non-compliance. 5. Provide skills and device incentives so the sector platforms can deliver results The sector platforms like the Timber Task Force (TTF) and the Natural Ingredients Committee are a good idea. They have gathered stakeholders from each sector but aren’t cohesive or capable of producing benefitting results for the sector. The BSOs could play a bigger role if they were better trained as facilitators. And the platform could be more effective if it had been designed with incentive mechanisms to encourage active participation. 6. Include follow up activities and responsibilities in the Terms of Reference of External Experts Sometimes the role played and pressure applied by the programme´s coordinator aren´t enough and follow up is missed by CBI´s external experts and the BSOs. Without the proper follow-up, activities and services tend to languish. A list of follow-up activities (they don’t need to be complicated or too many) and checkpoints in the Terms of Reference for external experts sharing their knowledge and expertise with the BSOs can encourage a better follow up. Both the experts and the participants will join the programme´s coordinator and its counterpart in the BSO as interested parties in the quality and impact of the follow up. 7. Create an open-access documentation of the whole programme. For anyone in the BSO that might be interested in the subject, more importantly after the programme is finished (during the programme all participants have access to this information),

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there must be the possibility for anyone in the organization to access the information related to the programme. That includes an organized online library of all training materials left by the external experts, manuals of the activities that need to be repeatedly executed, methodologies for technical operations, and sources of further information. 8. Help to enlarge the BSOs´ circle Identify which activities that are part of a BSOD Programme are potentially outsourced. This is already the case of CSR services in CADEXCO and IBCE where collaboration of other institutions has been promoted by these organizations; SEMP documents in PROMPERU are being outsourced to other companies that have the time and resources to write these type of plans that are by nature quite extensive; or, HACCP certification services, where CADEXCO plans to benefit from the expertise of a local certification company. In similar cases where expanding the BSO circle seems more effective for the impact of the activity, the program can be more proactive in building the promotion capability in the BSO to reach a larger number of potential suppliers of those services to participate in the training sessions, but also to assist the BSO in creating a certification or qualification procedure that may encourage its suppliers to attend these training sessions. 9. Identify the core processes, which at the moment of the design are being supported and/or prioritized by the top management. Frequently, activities that try to develop capacities end up bringing only technical improvements. Parallel to the BSO´s needs assessment, the formulator must conduct an assessment of the processes of the organization to find out which ones are perceived as priorities by the top executives. Then, it must choose a core process from which to spread the BSOD capacities throughout the organization. This will be the axis from which to unleash capacity development. 10. Find two champions from the BSO for each activity High rotation is the enemy of sustainable results. The power of the programme´s coordinators can be limited and they too can rotate, as it happened in the programmes in ADEX and PROMPERU. Each activity should have at least two champions within the organization. Then, it must find the way to motivate and compensate them for their efforts. Look for the commitment of the partner organization to retain them for the duration of the programme. This will promote ownership of the activities and generate incentives so the champions can nurture capacity development. Manuals and background documents are not a substitute for individuals in charge.

B. Five lessons learnt

1. Understand internal and external dynamics and politics of the BSOs. Outsiders can help!

In some cases, the programme did not understand, interpret and properly address the ambiance in which the BSOs were operating. The costs of not having a precise understanding of the BSO´s context and internal tensions grew as the Programme progressed and continued until the evaluation process. The programme in CANEB turned out to be very challenging because the complex composition and

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dynamics of the network were not properly understood and addressed during the formulation and feasibility studies. This doesn´t mean they weren´t identified. Reports that date back to the formulation process already mention problems of cultural differences within the network, and fear of losing autonomy when favouring a more empowered CANEB. We can add the very well researched and documented problem of regional cleavages in Bolivia. The fundamental question then becomes: How can the programme have a better understanding of these potential constraints to better inform how to address them? To assist competing BSOs at the same time can be quite frustrating during the implementation process. This is not exclusive of CANEB, it was also the case in ADEX and the Lima Chamber of Commerce in Peru; the members of the network were competing for the same clientele with very similar kinds of services. It can certainly be hard to obtain information on important, but complicated to address, intricacies by talking directly to the supported organizations, which have every incentive to underplay these kinds of obstacles in a feasibility study for a cooperation programme. Outside parties and direct contact with other stakeholders can help by providing a broader perspective.

2. Communicate what you do, both internally and externally, in a coherent and open way. Beware of confusing your partner or creating false expectations!

The BSOD programme in CAMEX had a major setback with a cost for CBI, the partner organization, the external expert involved and the programme itself. The six pilot projects designed to be implemented in the garments sector were cancelled in a way that only created more confusion and had collateral damage on all parties involved, mostly damaging their image and their credibility. This cost could have been avoided. Our task and intention is far from assigning blame on anyone. But, based on the confusing nature of the various narratives on the same issue, we can point for sure to a lack of communication and coordination from all sides. From the standpoint of the designers of the programme, there is certainly something than can be done. CBI implemented two programmes almost in parallel, BSOD and ECP. From the time of the feasibility analysis until the moment of programme completion, the modules of the BSOD programmes also changed their denominations. These changes were meant to be for internal purposes only. But when both programmes were implemented simultaneously in CAMEX and a group of companies that were part of CAMEX, the beneficiaries believed it was the same programme. And neither CBI, nor the external experts were capable of correcting this misunderstanding. Both could have also been confused, although this does not seem to be the case here. A simpler formulation of what CBI´s responsibilities and limitations were, and a consistent way to communicate them, both internally and externally, could have avoided this unfortunate incident.

3. Provide assistance only in those areas where demand for the outcome has been thoroughly tested.

Many services developed with CBI´s technical assistance were not sustainable because of lack of demand. A similar set of knowledge was shared in all 4 programmes evaluated based on CBI´s core strength: the EU market. Part of that knowledge is not being used today because of lack of demand for some of the services it intended to create. Just to name one example, this was the case of CADEXCO´s HACCP certification services. A newly developed service that doesn´t appeal to the BSOs´ clients, or is priced with no connection to the market reality is condemned to disappear. The Business Plan written in

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one of the pilot projects in the natural ingredients sector estimated that, on average, 48 companies would demand HACCP certification each year after CADEXCO and Germina, a local consultancy with experience in this sector, started offering the service. To date, no company has been certified and only one has expressed real interest. In cases like this one, all the efforts from CBI, the external experts and the BSO have then no tangible impact. There is one, very conventional way to solve this. In the same manner any private company determines whether the effort to try to sell a new product is justifiable, this type of analysis should guide the areas of intervention based on a thorough study of demand conditions for that service.

4. The institutional development component of the BSOD programme will not work if it is not effectively engaged in at least one core process of the organization.

The major goal of the strategic planning module of the BSOD programme was to allow for capacity development. This is something that apparently was also sought when that module was named institutional development. This is a major challenge. Support in the form of international trade knowledge and information sharing on the EU market can foster technical and informational improvements. But they could barely cause a positive change in capacity in the organization. Their reach is not as large as in the thriving process of IBCE´s capacity development, where the assistance went beyond technical improvements. Capacity development is a complex process that demands many conditions. It requires trust, commitment, leadership and, fundamentally, the willingness of the organization to open its doors to intervene on its most fundamental structures. There is the need for hard and diligent work in order to attain these conditions. On top of this, it is unrealistic to ask for full access to the organization´s core activities in every implementation. Our proposition is to target one core process in the organization, and to open it to the possibility for capacity development. By core process, we mean a process that cuts across the organization and is perceived as important by the heads of the organization. An obvious example is strategic planning. Another example can be seen in PROMPERU. The MI training sessions and consulting ended in institutionalized formal guidelines. Those guidelines are used by many of the organization´s divisions and changed their approach and methodologies in favour of one coherent view. That window in MI, has promoted transversal change in the organization, which could promote organizational change in the longer run.

5. For the use of the 5 capabilities model, establish evaluation criteria from the beginning so that all parties are assured that activities to this end are contemplated and understand how they will be evaluated.

Interventions to develop some of the 5 core capabilities of an organization include activities targeted to supporting the one or more processes that reflect the strength of these capabilities. Assessing capacity change in this framework (the 5C Model) is done better by verifying the quality and performance of these processes within the organization. In this sense, an effective intervention is not constrained to setting a goal for a determined indicator. It is more important that it has a full understanding of the relevant process involved in advancing the desired capabilities and thus has a clear roadmap designed and the resources committed to promote said advancement. This is the reason why it will be so important for future programmes (and evaluations), based on the 5C Model as a capacity

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development tool, to establish a capacity baseline. This will serve as a tool for optimal programme design, monitoring, and evaluation.

C. Five approach recommendations

1. The BSOD Programme should be more explicitly targeted to exporting SMEs and their needs. The central research question of this evaluation refers clearly to the improvement of SMEs´ capacity to export. But from what we have been able to learn about the programme, it has not been specifically targeted to this target group, maybe with the exception of a service developed with CADEX (“Mi Pyme Exportadora”) that was not continued. If the goal is to benefit SMEs through the BSOs, their needs should be better served and the constraints that prevent them from exporting (more), should be addressed. In the way the programmes were conceived and implemented, there is no means to ensure that SMEs are benefiting from them. In the case of BSOD CANEB, the programme set out to achieve that one year after its implementation, at least 50% of the BSOs beneficiaries are SMEs. This is a general criterion that allows having SMEs as clients for an information service, but this does not imply that that specific service is tackling a real problem that prevents the SME sector from exporting. A tailored approach for this sector was not to be found.

2. In the design process, involve all interested parties. In the early stages of an intervention, when the BSOD programme´s feasibility is being assessed, participation of all relevant interested parties and stakeholders should be encouraged. Strategic partners, external stakeholders, clients, beneficiaries and other donors could bring greater insights on the BSO´s role in society and its relevant capacities. This can benefit the subsequent formulation and design stages with an external view of the organization and a final approach that reflects a thorough understanding of the BSO´s needs, capabilities and its role within the export sector. Beware not to include its competitors or adversaries. This may be a bit difficult, but could certainly be worth trying. Since SMEs exporting from developing countries don´t come in large numbers, it would be better to make an effort to concentrate energies and resources.

3. For effective interventions make an explicit differentiation between programme or activities designed for capacity development, and the ones designed for consulting and technical assistance. Short term missions coming on and going off in a period of several years, focusing on trainings on operational and technical issues could be a good approach for technical assistance. If this is the case, consider reducing the BSOD Programme in terms of activities, and the programme period focusing in capabilities that are needed and could provide a service in demand. This should help gain and maintain momentum; have a clear centre of attention and address any organizational weakness directly.

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If the goal is to develop some capabilities, consider a programme whose planning might be incremental and focused in one or more processes rather than on short-term outputs. Base it on a capacity assessment (the 5C model is an option) to set a baseline for comparison at the end.

If both approaches are going to be combined, specific verifiable indicators need to be designed and a well-differentiated evaluation performed. We base this on the observation that knowledge can be effectively shared through trainings and workshops and the resulting service can be sustained by a real and well-addressed demand for it. On the other hand, institutional development in terms of the 5C Model is a more complex endeavour that requires a real impact on a core process of the organization. Both should impact the organization in improved services for exporters through different pathways and areas of impact. In our experience in this evaluation, we have noticed that it is conceivable that the 5 DAC/OECD criteria on technical assistance activities could be met in any module without really making a lasting impact in any capability.

4. Reach further with technical assistance Unlike the more complex institutional development component of the BSOD programme, the modules that are mostly targeted at providing skills, via training and technical assistance, could serve a broader audience. Explore opportunities to reach other organizations like universities, journalists, institutes and companies to share that specific knowledge. It could find its way as a service outside a traditional BSO. Make sure that the knowledge imparted by the programme is spread to all interested companies and stakeholders, so that it doesn´t benefit only a small interest group. To provide technical assistance in the areas where CBI is strong, an exclusive and closed relationship is not as necessary as it is for promoting capacity development. The BSOs can play the role of integrating the parties that can improve the quality and reach of the benefits created by the new acquired knowledge in favour of the export sector.

5. Have a clear understanding of the synergies that occur by combining the BSOD modules with other CBI programmes As CBI has opted for a more integrative approach, it will be important to find the right place for the BSOD programme in this new context. The idea of supporting BSOs can be of great value for the exports sector of any country, but its goal to promote capacity change is possibly a very complex one to attain. It will then be useful to understand when and how other programmes can leverage from what the BSOD is capable of doing and vice versa. For instance, BSOs can play a very important role in accompanying and providing a follow-up system to SMEs participating in the BDM (Business Development Module) programme. By doing so, it could develop its capacities to relate to, and deliver services for the SME sector. This recommendation goes in line with other external experts’ recommendations in relation to the ECP and BSOD programmes.

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D. CBI´s contribution to institutional development and SMEs` capacity to export

The BSOD programme has offered the participating BSOs trainings, technical assistance, internships in Europe, consulting services, and the opportunity to learn or participate in events in Europe and Latin America. A selection of this array of interventions, adapted to the specific needs of each BSO, has contributed to broaden their areas of expertise by acquiring or furthering knowledge on how to export to the EU. It has also contributed to widen their service portfolios and to expose their affiliates to techniques critical for an export-oriented planning, marketing and production. The BSOs themselves have been exposed to practices and tools that not only were reflected, to different degrees, in new services, but also in administrative arrangements that brought them closer to their target beneficiaries and improved their internal functioning to this end. The design and workings of the programme has relied heavily on the direct involvement of the staff of the BSOs and on activities that congregated their affiliates, thereby improving the chances of achieving sustainable results. As a consequence, a stronger BSO has emerged in most cases, notably in the case of IBCE.

As expected, institutional development is a complex endeavour that requires a great deal of cooperation and adaptation from all the involved parties. Especially in the more complex organizations, cultural and idiosyncratic factors could represent an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of the very same parties. In these cases, institutional development is elusive, but there is still room for some gains in terms of the advancement of certain organizational functions, as was the case of CANEB.

Institutional development, as envisaged in the 5C model, is even more challenging. The approach this model suggests is more process- and objective-oriented and not as much task- and result- aligned. It attempts to make profound changes in the organization that could take a longer time than the one established for the BSOD Programme, but also, it could aim to a broader objective that not necessarily may easily translate into export gains in the short run. The BSOD Programme was not conceived under the 5C model criterion, and therefore, it is hard to make an evaluation guided by this model. However, there are signs of the kind of achievements expected using the 5C model in the case of IBCE, where the whole organization underwent a total overhaul with the assistance of CBI, or in the case of PROMPERU where the whole organization processes were influence by activities related to market information and, to some extent, also through effective fair participation.

Factors beyond the control of CBI and the participating BSO could also influence the degree of implementation of a programme and, therefore, leave little time for its fulfilment. This was the case of ADEX where not much was attained in terms of institutional development due to the rotation of personnel and also changes in the coordinating experts on the side of CBI that led to changes in the programme that relied mostly in technical assistance for specific services of the organization.

As to the impact on the export sector, and especially on SMEs, one year after the programme was finished has proven to be a very short time to assess tangible results of the programme. In some cases, pilot projects have to mature into actual programmes, new techniques have to be translated into

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applied knowledge at the company level, and the BSOs themselves have to learn to adapt their organizations as required by the improved service portfolios and to gain confidence in the tools they are using to promote exports to Europe.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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DABELSTEIN, Niels. The Paris Declaration Secretariat. Phase Nº2. Project Completion Report. March 2012. 20 p.

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ANNEXES

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Annex I: Terms of Reference for BSOD Programme Evaluation 2012

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Annex 2: Profile of the evaluation team

CV Team Leader, Mr. Fernando Candia Castillo

Juan FERNANDO CANDIA Castillo

Calle “B” No. 2. Entre calles 16 y 17. Calacoto [email protected] La Paz, Bolivia Phone (591) 77790506 ______

Birth date and Place of Birth: April 19, 1956 – La Paz, Bolivia Citizenship: Bolivia

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

EFECE & ASOCIADOS La Paz, Bolivia Managing Director September 1997 - at present

 Senior Partner and major shareholder of EFECE & Asociados, a consulting services company.  Member of the Board of Directors of commercial and manufacturing enterprises.  Independent Advisor to various foreign and domestic private companies operating in Bolivia.  Senior researcher at Fundación Milenio.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA La Paz, Bolivia August 1995 – August 1997  Minister

CENTRAL BANK OF BOLIVIA La Paz, Bolivia August 1993 – August 1995  President (Governor)

SOCIEDAD ACEITERA DEL ORIENTE (SAO) Santa Cruz, Bolivia a seed oil manufacturer and leading exporter in Bolivia 1992 – August 1993

 General Manager (CEO).

BANCO DE SANTA CRUZ DE LA SIERRA S.A La Paz, Bolivia a commercial bank 1989 – 1991

 Financial Engineering Manager in charge of international financing affairs

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA La Paz, Bolivia May 1986 – August 1989  Undersecretary of Planning and Economic Policy

CONFEDERACIÓN DE EMPRESARIOS PRIVADOS DE BOLIVIA La Paz, Bolivia the Bolivian private sector companies association March 1983 – 1984

 Executive Secretary July 1982 – February 1983  Economic Advisor at the Bolivian private sector companies association.

MORGAN-FINANSA BANK Santiago, Chile

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a commercial Bank 1981 – June 1982  Chief of the Studies and Statistics Department

CHILEAN TOBACCO COMPANY Valparaiso, Chile 1980  Senior year at the Federico Santa Maria Technical University, Adolfo Ibañez Foundation worked as a member of the Management Services

TEACHING EXPERIENCE La Paz, Bolivia 1986 – 1993  Associate Professor at the Bolivian Management Studies Institute. 1997 – 2002  Microeconomics Professor at Nuestra Señora de La Paz University. 2002 – 2004  Project Appraisal Professor. Master’s Degree Program, Catholic University of Bolivia.

EDUCATION

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Cambridge, MA, USA Master in Public Administration 1986 . UNIVERSIDAD TÉCNICA FEDERICO SANTA MARÍA, ADOLFO IBÁÑEZ FOUNDATION Viña del Mar, Chile Commercial Engineer 1980

GERMAN SCHOOL MARISCAL BRAUN La Paz, Bolivia Class of 1975

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS Regularly posts his comments on the Bolivian economy and international finances on his company´s webpage www.efece.biz.

“Commentary on Hydrocarbons Policy, Shocks and Collective Imagination: What Went Wrong in Bolivia?" published in The Natural Resources Trap. MIT Press 2010. “El Péndulo del Gas”. Editor with Napoleón Pacheco. Fundación Milenio. 2009. “Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Bolivia” with José Luis Evia and Luis Carlos Jemio. IDB Working papers No. 103. Washington DC. November 2009. “Políticas Sectoriales para Promover la Competitividad en Bolivia”. With Eduardo Antelo. In Políticas Sectoriales en la Región Andina: Lecciones y Propuestas. Corporación Andina de Fomento. Caracas, Venezuela. October 2005. “Análisis y Revisión de la Confiabilidad y Responsabilidad de la Administración del Sistema de Finanzas Públicas (de Bolivia)”. Canadian Agency for International Development (ACDI). Published in el Program Based Approach Intranet de ACDI. May 2005. “Cultura y Economía”. In Las Culturas de Bolivia. Temas en la Crisis. La Paz, Bolivia No. 65. 2004. “Políticas Macroeconómicas, Marco Institucional y Escenarios Posibles para el Desarrollo Económico del Occidente de Bolivia” Instituto PRISMA, March 2002. “Bolivia: Nuevo Rumbo de una Economía Emergente” editor with W. Kenning. May 2001 “Armonización de las normas prudenciales de regulación del sector financiero en la Comunidad Andina de Naciones”. Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina. March 2000. “Bolivia’s Pension Reform”. Mimeo for Seminario Resolving the Social Security Crisis, Harvard University, 1997. “Algunos Obstáculos para encarar el Desarrollo de la Economía Boliviana” in Ajuste Estructural con Equidad y Crecimiento. Ediciones BAREMO, 1991. “Rasgos sobresalientes de la Historia Contemporánea de la Economía Boliviana” in Inversiones Mineras en Bolivia, 1991.

LANGUAGES

 Proficiency: Spanish and English  Fluent in German.

La Paz, Bolivia, November 2012 CV Senior Consultant, Mr. Fernando Candia Peñaranda

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JUAN FERNANDO CANDIA PEÑARANDA

Jacarandá No. 9, Aranjuez [email protected] La Paz, Bolivia Phone Number: (591) 76765887

Birth date and Place of Birth: September 10, 1985 – Boston, MA, USA Citizenship: US, Bolivia

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

EFECE & ASOCIADOS La Paz, Bolivia Director, Business Development January 2010 – at present  Directs the division in charge of Business Development and Project Evaluation.  Areas of expertise: Project evaluation, strategic planning, valuation, macro-economic analysis, negotiations, technology.

EFECE & ASOCIADOS La Paz, Bolivia Analyst February – December 2009  Research Analyst in consulting projects in Project Evaluation, Corporate Governance, Macroeconomic Analysis and Public Finance.

BOLIVIAN STOCK EXCHANGE La Paz, Bolivia Intern - Analyst January - March 2008  Validated the proper operation of the electronic stock Exchange.  Worked on the development of derivatives and regulation of currencies and overnight transactions.  Wrote the 2007 macroeconomic review for the company´s annual report

MOVIE THEATER “6 DE AGOSTO” La Paz, Bolivia Intern – Independent Researcher June – August 2007  Worked on an independent research study to assess the viability of a project by the City of La Paz, which intended to create a movie theatre for independent films.

BABSON COLLEGE Babson Park, MA Student Office Assistant January - May 2007  Assisted the Human Resources VP, in the research for the design of new policy regarding paid leave.  Collaborated with administrative tasks, text translation and events.

ARCO IRIS FOUNDATION La Paz, Bolivia Intern January - February 2006  Fundación Arco Iris is non-for-profit organization that gives shelter, food and education to children living on the streets of La Paz.  Worked on research and business planning for the productive departments of the organization, where beneficiaries work after completing school.

UNIVERSIDAD ADOLFO IBAÑEZ Viña de Mar, Chile Teacher’s Assistant – Economics March - July 2005  Scored tests.  Conducted support lectures.

EDUCATION

UNIVERSIDAD ADOLFO IBAÑEZ Viña del Mar, Chile Master of Science, Finance 2009 Commercial Engineer, Major: Business Administration; Minor: Film 2008  Was granted scholarship for academic excellence in all college years.  Top 10% of the class, Academic Average: 5.64/7.0

BABSON COLLEGE Boston, MA, USA Exchange Student January - May 2007  Selected by Universidad Adolfo Ibañez to attend Babson College, exchange program that was for only one student of each institution.

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GERMAN SCHOOL MARISCAL BRAUN La Paz, Bolivia Class of 2003 1990-2003

SKILLS AND INTERESTS

Software: Microsoft Office: Word, Excel, Power Point, Project; E-Views, Crystal Ball; Basic knowledge of programming.

Languages: Spanish, English (advanced), German (fluent).

Film: Independent Producer since 2003. Recently, raised approximately USD 200,000 in film festivals for film projects.

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CV Mr. Werner Saal, Research Assistant

WERNER SAAL Gutiérrez

Calle “B” No. 2. Entre calles 16 y 17. Calacoto [email protected] La Paz, Bolivia Tel. (591) 2-2794646 ______

Birthplace and Date of Birth: La Paz, Bolivia. 1976 Citizenship: Bolivian

EXPERIENCE

EFECE & ASCOCIADOS La Paz, Bolivia Research Assistant February 2012 - Present

 Elaborated Economic and Financial Indexes for EFECE´s publications.  Conducted research and analysis for consulting projects in Bolivia, Paraguay and Guyana.  Conducted market analysis for various industries.  Assisted the elaboration of Project Evaluations for Educational institutions and companies in the private sector.

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS AVANZADOS EN DESARROLLO – INESAD La Paz, Bolivia March 2011– January 2012  Researcher

GTZ – GERMAN TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGENCY La Paz, Bolivia November 2005– February 2011  Conducted several technical assistance programmes in the period that GTZ operated in Bolivia.

EDUCATION

UNIVERSIDAD MAYOR DE SAN ANDRÉS La Paz, Bolivia Master in Public Administration 2003-2005

UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA BOLIVIANA “SAN PABLO” La Paz, Bolivia B.A. in Economics 1996 - 2001

INSTITUTO COMERCIAL SUPERIOR DE LA NACIÓN, (INCOS) La Paz, Bolivia Accountant 1992 - 1995

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

“Nueva política financiera para el desarrollo productivo de Bolivia”. Thesis Project for the MPA programme. (in progress) - “La inflación óptima en la economía boliviana: 1987 – 1999”. Departamento de Economía de la Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2001. - “Las Micro finanzas en apronte” in “ABC Economía & Finanzas” N° 52 –Año 8, July, 2005. - “Modelo Econométrico sobre la Hiperinflación Boliviana” published in “El periodo de la hiperinflación y el Banco Central (1980 – 1985)” from the book “Historia monetaria contemporánea de Bolivia: 7 momentos capitales en los 77 años de historia del Banco Central”, Banco central de Bolivia, 2005.

La Paz – Bolivia, March 2013

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Annex 3: Evaluation schedule

TIMEFRAME FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN BSOD PROGRAMME EVALUATION 2012 - 2013 WEEKS ACTIVITIES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Preparation Desk Study Study of programme documentation Definition of Learning questions Interviews with CBI staff Methodological proposal/Evaluation matrix Definition of interview topics Interviews with CBI external experts Interviews with BSOs executives Design of questionnaires for fieldwork Financial analysis of the programme Field Work Fieldwork and Interviews with BSOs CADEX, Santa Cruz, Bolivia IBCE, Santa Cruz, Bolivia CADEXCO, Cochabamba Bolivia CANEB, La Paz, Bolivia CAMEX, La Paz, Bolivia CADEX-CH, Sucre, Bolivia Tabulation and interpretation of results Report writing Drafting of report Draft presentation and discussion Final report Submission/Presentation

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Annex 4: Documents consulted during the evaluation

These are presented as a supplement to this report.

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Annex 5: Persons participating in the evaluation/ list of meetings

List of interviews with External Experts

Nº Expert Role BSO Date of Interview 1 Rupa Ganguli Baby wear Sector Expert PROMPERU January 8th , 2013 2 Fernando López Consultant on Marketing and Sales IBCE January 9th , 2013 3 Andrés Saldías Local CRM Expert CANEB January 10th , 2013 4 Frank Lekanne Knowledge Management Expert IBCE January 11th , 2013 Fred Janssen and 5 SEMP Trainers PROMPERU January 11th , 2013 Monique Harmsen 6 Frans van Gerwen Feasibility and Formulation ADEX January 11th , 2013 7 Reg Leenes Coordinator ADEX January 18th , 2013 Coordinator IBCE 8 Joost van der Kooij January 22nd , 2013 MI Coach and Trainer ADEX Coordinator IBCE 9 Alfons van Duijvenbode January 22nd , 2013 Feasibility and Formulation CANEB 10 Marco Bijl Timber Sector Expert CANEB January 24th , 2013 Trade & Fair Intl. Business Meeting 11 Cristina Jervis CANEB January 24th , 2013 Expert 12 Freek-Jan Koekoek NI Sector Expert CANEB January 25th , 2013 Trainer on MAR and CSR Auditing IBCE 13 Klaas de Boer SEMP Trainer CANEB January 29th , 2013 CSR Services Trainer ADEX Feasibility and Formulation CANEB 14 Sam Boering January 31st , 2013 Project Cycle Management Trainer ADEX Feasibility and Formulation CANEB 15 Gunter Schranz February 7th , 2013 MI Service Development Expert PROMPERU FFV Sector Expert PROMPERU 16 Piet Schotel February 14th , 2013 FFV Sector Expert ADEX Coordinator CANEB Coordinator MD 17 Jan Willen Richelmann Coordinator , from mid-2010 to February 15th , 2013 PROMPERU end 2011 Coordinator ADEX 18 Raiza Castrillo HACCP Expert CADEXCO March 8th , 2013 ADEX 19 Andrew Jones Programme Coordinator March 28th, 2013 PROMPERU

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List of interviews with BSO executives

Nº Executive Position BSO Date of Interview th International Cooperation Coordinator ADEX February 5 , 2013 1 Luz Barreto in Projects Management ADEX March 20th , 2013

2 Cesar Freund International Cooperation Manager PROMPERU February 5th , 2013

CANEB February 5th , 2013 3 Claudia Viscarra Manager CANEB March 18th , 2013 Programme Manager at Centre for CBI February 6th , 2013 4 Erik Plaisier Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries CBI March 25th , 2013 February 8th , 2013 5 Martín Salces Project Manager CADEX February 18th, 2013 February 22nd , 2013 Beatriz Manager, Client Services and Commerce CADEX February 19th, 2013 Fernández 6 Mariana Zamora Former General Manager CANEB February 19th, 2013 February 19th, 2013 7 Gary Rodríguez General Manager IBCE February 22nd , 2013 8 Mónica Jáuregui Manager, Promotion IBCE February 20th, 2013

9 Angela Caquegua Department Head, IT IBCE February 20th, 2013

10 José Luis Alvarez In charge of Data Tr@de, website IBCE February 20th, 2013 Steven 11 Market Researcher IBCE February 20th, 2013 Magariños 12 Alejandro Ayala Manager, Business and Promotion CADEX February 21st, 2013

13 Fabiola Asbún Manager, Finance and Operations CADEX February 22nd, 2013 María Esther 14 Manager, Technical Operations IBCE February 22nd, 2013 Peña Chief Executive at the Commerce 15 Hugo Nava ADEX March 5th , 2013 Institute Academic Director at the Commerce 16 Enrique Román ADEX March 5th , 2013 Institute 17 Lourdes Guerra Business Intelligence Analyst ADEX March 6th , 2013 18 Maurizio Rojas Interim General Manager CADEXCO March 7th, 2013 19 Valeria Vargas Trainings and Public Relations CADEXCO March, 7th 2013 20 Monica Balderas Export Promotion CADEXCO March 8th, 2013

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Beatriz Espinoza Manager CAMEX March 11th , 2013 21 22 Ana Palacios Department Manager CAMEX March 11th , 2013 23 Mario Ocharan Business Intelligence Deputy Director PROMPERU March 20th , 2013 Horacio 24 Advisor SNV March 20th , 2013 Barrancos 25 Claudia Solano Coordinator, Quality Department PROMPERU March 21st , 2013 Coordinator, Programmes and Multi 26 Juan Luis Kuyeng PROMPERU March 22nd , 2013 Sector Projects 27 Carlos Díaz Electronics Business Manager PROMPERU March 22nd , 2013 28 Mónica Chávez Specialist, Business Promotions PROMPERU March 22nd , 2013 29 Francisco Vía Coordinator, Fishery Products PROMPERU March 25th , 2013 30 Gisela Morales Manager CADEX-CH March 28th, 2013

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Annex 6: Accountability Evaluation Matrices

The framework for the evaluation of the accountability scope establishes that compliance is addressed measuring the level of conformity with 3 Minimum Quality Norms (MQNs). The threshold for each of these MQNs was set in the ToR. It is important to note that these MQNs and the thresholds were set in agreement with the BSOs at the beginning of each programme, and were reported accordingly in each completion report.

This Annex aims to explain the reader the rationale behind the numbers presented in the various accountability matrices in the main report.

Each accountability assessment in this report is preceded by a matrix containing the means of verification used during the evaluation. These matrices also present the conceptualization of the assessment, specifically, how the activities were grouped and which means of verification were considered appropriate to evaluate them. The matrices list a series of critical activities, as presented in the LFA of each programme that group the activities of the intervention and have also served as framework in the progress and completion reports of the programme.

For MQN1, OVIs set to monitor the attainment of the implementation objectives have been used as a parameter for the transfer of capacity. For example, if an OVI indicated that 3 SEMPs had to be developed, it was a good indicator that capacities in the SEMP workshops were effectively transferred. Sometimes OVIs could be measured using a binary approach (done or not done, 100% or 0%) as in the case of OVI5 in ADEX´s SP Module (“New Promotion Strategy for EU services by mid-2010”). In other cases, a percentage level of compliance could be assessed in relation to a pre-determined target as in the case of OVI2 in Promperu´s SP Module (“3 MI documents developed ...”). In this case it was also possible to assign a 1/3 or 2/3 level of compliance based on observation.

For MQN2, a variety of methods were used to verify through different sources the level of use of the gained capacity at the moment of the evaluation (one year after the programme was completed). Telephone conferences, meetings, direct observations, revision of documentation provided by the BSOs and online surveys were the means to assess the level of use of capacity. Interviews were conducted with the BSO´s staff and external experts involved in the programme. The observed level of use of capacity cannot be measured with mathematical precision. For that reason, the following criteria were used to assign a number to the observations we made: i) capacities that were not being used at all, were given a 0 percentage level; ii) capacities that were available in the form of a new or improved service, but were not being applied on a consistent basis, were assigned a number in the range of a 1% - 60% depending on the demand frequency; iii) capacities being used in the form of a new or improved service and used/demanded on a consistent basis, were assigned a number in the range from 61% - 100% depending on the demand frequency and the relative importance of the used capacity of the service.

For MQN3, since it refers specifically to client satisfaction, we only used client satisfaction surveys. When available, we asked the BSOs to share them. If indicators for client satisfaction did not exist, we asked the BSOs if we could conduct surveys for this evaluation. Unfortunately, PROMPERU has not conducted a survey on client satisfaction recently and thought it was better for us not to conduct one, since they were planning to survey their clients later this year, and feared to confuse their beneficiaries conducting various surveys in a short period of time. CAMEX and CADEXCO mentioned they

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had their own indicators for client satisfaction and made a commitment to share them with the evaluation team. In spite of repeated requests, this information was not provided. For these cases, in preserving rigorousness, we have preferred to refrain from giving any imprecise assessment, since the mentioned BSOs did not provide any documentation to support claims of acceptable levels of client satisfaction.

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Annex 7: 5C Model Pointer Spreadsheets

A. CADEX

5 C MODEL - CADEX POINTER MATRIX 1: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACT AND COMMIT 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION

Te organization Strategic plans exist plans, takes and aim at providing YES 0 1 decisions and acts value added services on these decisions for its beneficiaries

The implemented model generates YES 0 1 The organization revenues to finance mobilizes financial operational costs and human Staff has sufficient resources core competences in YES 0 ; 1 accordance with job profile A monitoring system Major emphasis was given to YES 0 1 in place Commercial Promotion, CRM, Projects. The organization Able to identified conducts effective unexpected/unplanne monitoring d outcomes (good or NO 0 1 bad) and react accordingly Staff is supported in The organization developing has adequately YES 0 1 competences in line motivated staff with their job profile The organization effectively Programmes implements implemented in line YES 0 1 programmes with donor (support) supported by requirements external parties

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5 C MODEL - CADEX POINTER MATRIX 2: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO DELIVER ON DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization has sufficient financial autonomy Sound financial as to keep management NO 0 1 delivering its systems in place export related services The organization’s infrastructure is Knowledge considered infrastructure and NO 0 1 sufficient and management relevant for its systems in place core tasks (ICT and HR)

Able to acquire the The organization necessary skills to has adequate and YES 0 1 introduce and sustain sufficiently stable new/improved human resources services Staff rotation is low PARTIALLY 0 1 The organization The organization delivers services knows the target YES 0 1 to the target group group needs in line with their needs and with Organization capable external of translating assistance to knowledge into YES 0 1 improve/develop products and appropriate services services

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5 C MODEL - CADEX POINTER MATRIX 3: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO RELATE TO EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization is a recognized The partner key player in organization is active NO 0 ; 1 export promotion in lobbying on behalf in the country of the sector Beneficiaries regard The organization these services as YES 0 1 is considered useful for their needs credible / reliable in the eyes of Systems in place to relevant communicate fluidly YES 0 1 stakeholders (incl. with beneficiaries and beneficiaries) stakeholders

The organization Partnership works together agreements in place / YES 0 1 with strategic signed partners Able to coordinate different Able to convene its programmes of stakeholders as to external realize the full YES 0 1 assistance aoiding potential of external the duplication of assistance efforts

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5 C MODEL - CADEX POINTER MATRIX 4: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ADAPT AND SELF RENEW IMPORTANT TO 0 1 2 3 4 POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT PARTNER FULL COMMENTS NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTATION Able to fine-tune with Management has an society as to remain YES 0 1 understanding of a legitimate shifting contexts and intermediary trends (external Adequate external factors). sources of YES 0 1 Important support in market information information in place The organization The organization has changes products information regarding YES 0 ; 1 and services on the beneficiary basis of information satisfaction coming from the Beneficiary beneficiaries and information is used in YES 0 1 from market product development information

The organization has a decentralized NO 0 ; 1 management style The organization The organization has structure and a succession and management is NO 0 ; 1 promotion policy in flexible enough to place embrace and produce change The required leadership exists to adapt the YES 0 1 organization to future desired changes

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5 C MODEL - CADEX POINTER MATRIX 5: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACHIEVE COHERENCE 0 1 2 3 4 PART OF CBI IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER FULL COMMENTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION There is consistency Vision & Mission between ambition, translated into NO 0 ; 1 vision, strategy strategy and and operations operational plans Operations reflect Organization has the organization’s defined operating core operating principles in line with NO 0 ; 1 principles and the organization’s values mission and vision There is an The organization innovation YES 0 1 has the means to strategy/plan learn about the diverse and Able to adopt and evolving needs of translate to its its beneficiaries beneficiaries the and to ability to embrace YES 0 1 accommodate its and adjust to foreign actions based on markets access that knowledge requirements and practices

The organization The organization values, strategies seeks the transfer and programmes and adaptation of are aligned with capacities suitable to YES 0 1 the national be used effectively in policies, export the context in which it sector needs and is immersed regional aspirations

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B. CADEXCO

5 C MODEL - CADEXCO POINTER MATRIX 1: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACT AND COMMIT 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION Their strategic plan is based on a 5-year plan and their yearly operative plans Te organization Strategic plans exist (POAs). They have been written in line of plans, takes and aim at providing CADEXCO´s process for obtaining the YES 0 ; 1 decisions and acts value added services ISO:9001 certification. In this sense, on these decisions for its beneficiaries CBI´s support in this area has been used when it accomodated this process within of CADEXCO. The implemented CBI´s support resulted in new services, model generates YES 0 ; 1 which could generate new revenue in The organization revenues to finance the future. mobilizes financial operational costs and human Staff has sufficient resources core competences in PARTIALLY 0 1 accordance with job profile Their annual operations plan (POA) was A monitoring system PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 implemented before the BSOD in place programme. The organization conducts effective Able to identified monitoring unexpected/unplanne d outcomes (good or PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 bad) and react accordingly Staff is supported in The organization developing has adequately PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 competences in line motivated staff with their job profile The organization effectively Programmes implements implemented in line NO 0 ; 1 USAID, PROEX, CEPROBOL, PROCOIN programmes with donor (support) supported by requirements external parties

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5 C MODEL - CADEXCO POINTER MATRIX 2: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO DELIVER ON DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization has sufficient financial autonomy Sound financial as to keep management NO 0 ; 1 delivering its systems in place export related services The organization’s Knowledge infrastructure is infrastructure and considered management NO 0 ; 1 sufficient and systems in place relevant for its (ICT and HR) core tasks Able to acquire the The organization necessary skills to has adequate and NO 0 1 introduce and sustain sufficiently stable new/improved human resources services Staff rotation is low NO 0 1 The organization The organization delivers services knows the target YES 0 ; 1 to the target group group needs in line with their needs and with Organization capable external of translating An example of a new service from CBI´s assistance to knowledge into YES 0 ; 1 support is HACCP certification improve/develop products and appropriate services services

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5 C MODEL - CADEXCO POINTER MATRIX 3: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO RELATE TO EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization They are in the process of becoming is a recognized The partner more representative of the Natural key player in organization is active PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 Ingredients sector through the "Comité export promotion in lobbying on behalf de Alimentos" in the country of the sector Beneficiaries know and make use of The organization PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 is considered services provided by credible / reliable the organization in the eyes of They have always communicated Systems in place to relevant effectively with their affialiates and communicate fluidly stakeholders (incl. YES 0 ; 1 donors. CBI helped to improved the with beneficiaries and beneficiaries) communication with the network of stakeholders Chambers in CANEB. The organization Partnership works together agreements in place / PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 UPB, CADEPIA, Loval Government with strategic signed partners Able to coordinate different Able to convene its programmes of stakeholders as to external realize the full NO 0 ; 1 assistance aoiding potential of external the duplication of assistance efforts

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5 C MODEL - CADEXCO POINTER MATRIX 4: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ADAPT AND SELF RENEW

IMPORTANT TO 0 1 2 3 4 POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT PARTNER FULL COMMENTS NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTATION

The CSR programme is important to Able to fine-tune with relate with society and be valued. CBI Management has an society as to remain YES 0 ; 1 complemented the efforts made before understanding of a legitimate by USAIS and others with an audit shifting contexts and intermediary trends (external workshop. factors). Adequate external sources of YES 0 1 There is room for improvement. information in place CRM was not implemented, the chamber The organization had other priorities in line with the changes products The organization has ISO:9001 process. They are planning to NO 0 1 and services on the information regarding implement it in the coming year. basis of information beneficiary Advances to date have been the result coming from the satisfaction of different type of approaches. beneficiaries and from market Beneficiary information information is used in YES 0 ; 1 product development

The organization has a decentralized PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 management style The organization The organization has structure and a succession and This change was promoted by the ISO management is NO 0 1 promotion policy in process flexible enough to place embrace and produce change The required leadership exists to CBI´s trainings abroad have had an adapt the YES 0 ; 1 impact in giving staff a refreshed organization to future perspective and tools for leadership desired changes

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5 C MODEL - CADEXCO POINTER MATRIX 5: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACHIEVE COHERENCE 0 1 2 3 4 PART OF CBI IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER FULL COMMENTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION There is consistency Vision & Mission between ambition, translated into YES 0 ; 1 vision, strategy strategy and and operations operational plans Operations reflect Organization has the organization’s defined operating core operating principles in line with YES 0 ; 1 principles and the organization’s values mission and vision

There is an Their is an innovation plan defined for The organization innovation NO 0 1 each area in the POA. ISO process was has the means to strategy/plan crucial for this. learn about the diverse and Able to adopt and evolving needs of translate to its its beneficiaries beneficiaries the and to ability to embrace YES 0 ; 1 accommodate its and adjust to foreign actions based on markets access that knowledge requirements and practices

The organization The organization values, strategies The BDM and ECP projects are showing seeks the transfer and programmes the Chamber network can collaborate and adaptation of are aligned with and should collaborate more. As a capacities suitable to PARTIALLY 0 1 the national consequence of the programme they be used effectively in policies, export have also started a fruitil coopration with the context in which it sector needs and is immersed CADEX-CH. regional aspirations

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C. CAMEX

5 C MODEL - CAMEX POINTER MATRIX 1: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACT AND COMMIT 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION FULL IMPLEMENTATION

Te organization Strategic plans exist CBI supportin this area was not relevant. plans, takes and aim at providing NOT IN A RELEVANT 0 ; 1 CAMEX focused on lobbying and decisions and acts value added services WAY represenation, not services. on these decisions for its beneficiaries

The implemented CBI increased the owareness of the model generates PARTIALLY 0 1 necessity of having self sustainable The organization revenues to finance services mobilizes financial operational costs and human Staff has sufficient resources core competences in Support in Marketing and Commercial YES 0 1 accordance with job Promotion. profile A monitoring system NOT IN A RELEVANT 0 1 USAID played a key role in this area in place WAY The organization Able to identified conducts effective unexpected/unplanne monitoring d outcomes (good or NO 0 ; 1 bad) and react accordingly Staff is supported in The staff has been always prepared to The organization developing fulfill its lobbying role; CBI supported in has adequately PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 competences in line providing competences for other motivated staff with their job profile services The organization effectively Programmes implements implemented in line NOT IN A RELEVANT 0 ; 1 SIPPO, USAID, BBS programmes with donor (support) WAY supported by requirements external parties

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5 C MODEL - CAMEX POINTER MATRIX 2: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO DELIVER ON DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization has sufficient financial autonomy Sound financial as to keep management YES 0 1 delivering its systems in place export related services The organization’s infrastructure is Knowledge considered infrastructure and NO 0 ; 1 sufficient and management relevant for its systems in place core tasks (ICT and HR)

Able to acquire the The organization necessary skills to has adequate and YES 0 1 introduce and sustain sufficiently stable new/improved human resources services Staff rotation is low YES 0 1 The organization The organization Sectorial approach was important; CBI delivers services knows the target YES 0 1 supported with programa Escuchando to the target group group needs in line with their needs and with Organization capable external of translating assistance to knowledge into YES 0 1 improve/develop products and appropriate services services

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5 C MODEL - CAMEX POINTER MATRIX 3: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO RELATE TO EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization is a recognized The partner The chamber´s strength is lobbying for key player in organization is active NO 0 ; 1 the export sector export promotion in lobbying on behalf in the country of the sector Beneficiaries regard The organization these services as NO 0 1 is considered useful for their needs credible / reliable in the eyes of Systems in place to relevant communicate fluidly NO 0 1 Today in social networks, e-commerce. stakeholders (incl. with beneficiaries and beneficiaries) stakeholders

The organization Partnership works together agreements in place / YES 0 1 with strategic signed partners Able to coordinate different Able to convene its programmes of stakeholders as to external realize the full PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 assistance aoiding potential of external the duplication of assistance efforts

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5 C MODEL - CAMEX POINTER MATRIX 4: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ADAPT AND SELF RENEW IMPORTANT TO 0 1 2 3 4 POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT PARTNER FULL COMMENTS NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTATION Able to fine-tune with While they were always recognized for Management has an society as to remain PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 their lobbying role, CBI helped them to understanding of a legitimate be recognized for their services too. shifting contexts and intermediary trends (external Adequate external factors). sources of NO 0 1 information in place The organization The organization has changes products information regarding PARTIALLY 0 1 and services on the beneficiary basis of information satisfaction coming from the Beneficiary beneficiaries and information is used in NO 0 1 from market product development information

The organization has a decentralized NO 0 1 management style The organization The organization has structure and a succession and management is NO 0 1 promotion policy in flexible enough to place embrace and produce change The required leadership exists to adapt the NO 0 1 organization to future desired changes

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5 C MODEL - CAMEX POINTER MATRIX 5: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACHIEVE COHERENCE 0 1 2 3 4 PART OF CBI IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER FULL COMMENTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION

There is The organization will soon ellaborate a consistency Vision & Mission new strategic plan. (2013 - 2017) One between ambition, YES 0 ; 1 translated into option is that it becomes more services vision, strategy strategy and oriented in line with CBI´s support. and operations operational plans Operations reflect Organization has the organization’s defined operating As in the former comment, the core operating principles in line with NO 1 0 organization might enter a new cycle, it principles and the organization’s could mean a transition process. values mission and vision There is an This coul be part of the new strategic The organization innovation NO 0 1 plan. has the means to strategy/plan learn about the diverse and Able to adopt and evolving needs of translate to its its beneficiaries beneficiaries the and to ability to embrace NO 0 1 accommodate its and adjust to foreign actions based on markets access that knowledge requirements and practices

The organization The organization values, strategies seeks the transfer and programmes and adaptation of The first signs of a more collaborative are aligned with capacities suitable to PARTIALLY 0 ; 1 Chamber network are starting to be seen the national be used effectively in now. policies, export the context in which it sector needs and is immersed regional aspirations

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D. IBCE

5 C MODEL - IBCE POINTER MATRIX 1: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACT AND COMMIT 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION FULL IMPLEMENTATION

Te organization Strategic plans exist The most recent strategic plan (2010 - plans, takes and aim at providing YES 0 ; 1 2012) was ellaborated with CBI. CBI´s decisions and acts value added services support was of high value. on these decisions for its beneficiaries

The implemented model generates YES 0 1 The organization revenues to finance mobilizes financial operational costs and human Staff has sufficient resources core competences in YES 0 1 accordance with job profile A monitoring system YES 0 ; 1 in place The organization Able to identified conducts effective unexpected/unplanne monitoring d outcomes (good or YES 0 1 bad) and react accordingly Staff is supported in The organization developing has adequately YES 0 1 competences in line motivated staff with their job profile The organization effectively Programmes Currently there are no donor sponsored implements implemented in line programmes takin place in IBCE. They YES 0 ; 1 programmes with donor (support) would rather sell services to these supported by requirements organizations too. external parties

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5 C MODEL - IBCE POINTER MATRIX 2: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO DELIVER ON DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization has sufficient financial autonomy Sound financial as to keep management NO 0 ; 1 delivering its systems in place export related services The organization’s infrastructure is Knowledge considered infrastructure and YES 0 1 sufficient and management relevant for its systems in place core tasks (ICT and HR)

Able to acquire the The organization necessary skills to The programme significanly empowered has adequate and YES 0 1 introduce and sustain the staff. sufficiently stable new/improved human resources services Staff rotation is low YES 0 ; 1 The organization The organization Improvement in this took place almost delivers services knows the target YES 0 1 entirely because of the BSOD to the target group group needs programme. in line with their needs and with Organization capable external of translating assistance to knowledge into YES 0 1 improve/develop products and appropriate services services

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5 C MODEL - IBCE POINTER MATRIX 3: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO RELATE TO EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 0 1 2 3 4 IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT FULL COMMENTS ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION The organization is a recognized The partner key player in organization is active YES 0 1 export promotion in lobbying on behalf in the country of the sector Beneficiaries regard The organization these services as YES 0 1 is considered useful for their needs credible / reliable in the eyes of Systems in place to Today they have a personalized relevant communicate fluidly database, and communicate almost in a YES 0 1 stakeholders (incl. with beneficiaries and daily basis with beneficiaries beneficiaries) stakeholders (DataTr@de, IBCEM@il) The organization Partnership works together agreements in place / YES 0 ; 1 with strategic signed partners Able to coordinate different Able to convene its programmes of stakeholders as to external realize the full NO 0 ; 1 assistance aoiding potential of external the duplication of assistance efforts

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5 C MODEL - IBCE POINTER MATRIX 4: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ADAPT AND SELF RENEW IMPORTANT TO 0 1 2 3 4 POINTER PART OF CBI SUPPORT PARTNER FULL COMMENTS NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENTATION Able to fine-tune with Management has an society as to remain YES 0 1 understanding of a legitimate shifting contexts and intermediary trends (external Adequate external factors). sources of YES 0 1 information in place The organization The organization has changes products information regarding YES 0 1 and services on the beneficiary basis of information satisfaction coming from the Beneficiary beneficiaries and information is used in YES 0 1 from market product development information

The organization has a decentralized YES 0 1 management style The organization The organization has structure and a succession and management is YES 0 1 promotion policy in flexible enough to place embrace and produce change The required leadership exists to adapt the YES 0 1 organization to future desired changes

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5 C MODEL - IBCE POINTER MATRIX 5: THE ORGANIZATION IS CAPABLE TO ACHIEVE COHERENCE 0 1 2 3 4 PART OF CBI IMPORTANT TO PARTNER POINTER FULL COMMENTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATION NOT AWARE AWARNESS EXLORATION TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION There is consistency Vision & Mission between ambition, translated into YES 0 1 vision, strategy strategy and and operations operational plans Operations reflect Organization has the organization’s defined operating core operating principles in line with YES 0 ; 1 principles and the organization’s values mission and vision There is an The organization innovation NO 0 ; 1 has the means to strategy/plan learn about the diverse and Able to adopt and evolving needs of translate to its its beneficiaries beneficiaries the This progress reflects the benefits from and to ability to embrace YES 0 1 CBI´s trainigns and workshops on the accommodate its and adjust to foreign subject. actions based on markets access that knowledge requirements and practices

The organization The organization values, strategies seeks the transfer and programmes and adaptation of are aligned with capacities suitable to NO Not applicable to IBCE. the national be used effectively in policies, export the context in which it sector needs and is immersed regional aspirations

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Annex 8: Online Survey to the Timber Task Force (TTF) in CADEX

En una escala de 1 a 3, en la que 1 equivale a PLENAMENTE, 2 equivale a PARCIALMENTE y 3 equivale a POCO O NADA, ¿En qué medida cree Ud. que el TTF (Timber Task Force) ha alcanzado los siguientes objetivos?

Top number is the count of respondents selecting the option. Bottom % is percent of the total respondents selecting the option. 1. PLENAMENTE 2. PARCIALMENTE 3. POCO...O...NADA Ser una plataforma nacional para la madera 5 6 6 y el bosque en Bolivia. 29% 35% 35% Actuar como "una sola voz" frente a 4 12 1 cuestiones como el FLEGT, ESC y otros. 24% 71% 6% Ser una mesa integral para discutir 4 11 2 problemas nacionales de la madera. 24% 65% 12% Aumentar las exportaciones de 1 11 5 manufacturas y muebles. 6% 65% 29% Integrar a los diferentes actores del sector 2 9 6 forestal en Bolivia. 12% 53% 35%

¿Conoce Ud. el documento SEMP (Sector Export Marketing Plan) preparado con la asistencia del CBI para el sector de madera?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Si 9 50.0% No 8 44.4% No Responses 1 5.5% Total 18 100%

¿Cree Ud. que el SEMP es una buena base para que se convierta en una estrategia nacional para el desarrollo del sector de la madera?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Si 8 44.4% No 2 11.1% No Responses 8 44.4% Total 18 100%

¿Cree Ud. que el SEMP tiene planteamientos que pueden facilitar las exportaciones de madera o productos de la madera a la Unión Europea?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Si 8 44.4% No 2 11.1% No Responses 8 44.4% Total 18 100%

¿Cómo califica Ud. el número de reuniones que sostiene el TTF en el año?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Demasiadas 0 0.0% Suficientes 8 44.4% Pocas 8 44.4% No creo que sean necesarias estas reuniones 0 0.0% No Responses 2 11.1% Total 18 100%

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Por favor indique cuál debería ser el orden de prioridad para las siguientes 7 actividades que podría desarrollar el TTF de ahora en adelante (por favor marcar con el número 1 a la más prioritaria y continuar así hasta marcar con el número 7 a la menos prioritaria).

Top number is the count of respondents Más prioritaria selecting the option. Bottom % is percent of the total respondents selecting the option. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mantener actualizado el sitio de internet 2 2 1 1 6 1 3 www.boliviatimber.com .bo 13% 13% 6% 6% 38% 6% 19% Proponer al gobierno políticas para desarrollo 8 4 1 1 1 1 0 del sector 50% 25% 6% 6% 6% 6% 0% Organizar cursos de capacitación en costeo, 0 2 5 4 2 2 1 mercadeo y exportaciones 0% 13% 31% 25% 13% 13% 6% Proveer información sobre las condiciones de 5 4 1 3 0 2 1 mercado internacionales 31% 25% 6% 19% 0% 13% 6% Promover la difusión y adopción de normas 0 2 3 4 3 3 1 internacionales para las exportaciones del 0% 13% 19% 25% 19% 19% 6% Promover la adopción y difusión de normas 0 1 4 2 1 4 4 nacionales para el sector 0% 6% 25% 13% 6% 25% 25% Promover la reforestación y la 1 1 1 1 3 3 6 responsabilidad social empresarial 6% 6% 6% 6% 19% 19% 38%

¿Qué tan satisfecho está usted / su empresa con el desempeño del TTF en el último año?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Muy satisfecho 0 0.0% Satisfecho 4 22.2% Medianamente satisfecho 7 38.8% Insatisfecho 5 27.7% Muy insatisfecho 0 0.0% No Responses 2 11.1% Total 18 100%

¿Cómo califica usted el rol de CADEX en su tarea de facilitar de esta organización?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Excelente 1 5.5% Bueno 9 50.0% Regular 5 27.7% Malo 1 5.5% Muy Malo 0 0.0% No Responses 2 11.1% Total 18 100%

¿Cree usted que la situación del sector de madera ha mejorado como resultado de la creación y las actividades desempeñadas por el TTF?

Number of Response(s) Response Ratio Si 6 33.3% No 10 55.5% No Responses 2 11.1% Total 18 100%

¿Qué aspecto no tocado en las anteriores preguntas debería ser un tema de atención del TTF?

11 Response(s)

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Annex 9: IBCE Survey results

RESULTADO Encuesta de Satisfacción de Clientes - Servicios IBCE

Realizado por: IBCE Fecha de realización: Del 4 al 13 de marzo del 2013 Técnica de recolección de datos: Encuesta por correo electrónico Tamaño de la muestra: 390 respuestas Número de preguntas: 7

1.- En los últimos años el IBCE se ha planteado la Misión de coadyuvar al fortalecimiento y expansión del comercio exterior boliviano prestando un servicio eficiente a los agentes económicos. ¿Cómo calificaría que se ha cumplido esta Misión?

Total 357 personas respondieron la pregunta 1.

Calificación Respuestas Porcentaje Excelente 158 44% Bien 184 52% Regular 14 4% Mal 1 0% TOTAL RESPUESTAS: 357

Regular Mal 4% 0%

Excelente 44% Bien 52%

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El 52% de las personas que respondieron la encuesta califican “bien” el cumplimiento de la Misión planteada por el IBCE y 44% de excelente, mientras que solo el 4% de regular.

2.- ¿Cómo calificaría los siguientes servicios?

Total 380 personas respondieron la pregunta 2.

TOTAL Servicios Excelente Bueno Regular Malo RESPUESTAS Boletín IBCEm@iL 212 161 7 0 380 Boletín IBCE Data Tr@de 163 192 15 2 372 Boletín CIFRAS 191 164 19 1 375 Boletín Transporte & Logística 95 219 41 4 359 Periódico "Comercio Exterior" 134 184 26 4 348 Información de mercado 130 190 34 6 360 Medios sociales (Facebook, Twitter y Youtube) 62 184 70 6 322 Foro Permanente de Diálogo con la Sociedad Civil Sobre Producción, Comercio Exterior e Integración 94 180 67 5 346 Servicios de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (RSE) 89 157 57 6 309 Investigación de mercados 121 170 50 5 346 Perfiles de mercado 118 178 44 5 345 Requerimientos de acceso a mercado 89 195 50 4 338 Certificación Triple Sello 69 200 54 2 325 Quick scan RSE 63 184 66 2 315 Servicio estadístico 133 177 37 2 349 Condiciones arancelarias 85 202 44 3 334 Traducciones 67 197 59 5 328 Catálogos Online 80 191 60 7 338

Ranking de los servicios del IBCE según calificación Excelente y Bueno

Excelente/Bueno Nº Servicio % s/Total 1 Boletín IBCEm@iL 98% 2 Boletín IBCE Data Tr@de 95% 3 Boletín CIFRAS 95% 4 Periódico "Comercio Exterior" 91% 5 Información de mercado 89% 6 Servicio estadístico 89% 7 Boletín Transporte & Logística 87%

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8 Condiciones arancelarias 86% 9 Perfiles de mercado 86% 10 Investigación de mercados 84% 11 Requerimientos de acceso a mercado 84% 12 Certificación Triple Sello 83% 13 Traducciones 81% 14 Catálogos Online 80% 15 Servicios de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (RSE) 80% Foro Permanente de Diálogo con la Sociedad Civil Sobre 16 Producción, Comercio Exterior e Integración 79% 17 Quick scan RSE 78% 18 Medios sociales (Facebook, Twitter y Youtube) 76%

El servicio del Boletín IBCEm@iL fue calificado por el público con el 98% como Excelente/Bueno, le siguen en importancia Boletín IBCE Data Tr@de, Boletín CIFRAS, Periódico "Comercio Exterior", e Información de mercado.

Gráfico del Ranking de los servicios del IBCE según calificación Excelente y Bueno

Boletín IBCEm@iL 98% Boletín IBCE Data Tr@de 95% Boletín CIFRAS 95% Periódico "Comercio Exterior" 91% Información de mercado 89% Servicio estadístico 89% Boletín Transporte & Logística 87% Condiciones arancelarias 86% Perfiles de mercado 86% Investigación de mercados 84% Requerimientos de acceso a mercado 84% Certificación Triple Sello 83% Traducciones 80% Catálogos Online 80% Servicios de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial… 80% Foro Permanente de Diálogo con la Sociedad Civil 79% Quick scan RSE 78%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

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Ranking de los servicios del IBCE según calificación Regular y Malo

Regular/Malo Nº Servicio % s/Total 1 Medios sociales (Facebook, Twitter y Youtube) 24% 2 Quick scan RSE 22% Foro Permanente de Diálogo con la Sociedad Civil Sobre 3 Producción, Comercio Exterior e Integración 21% 4 Servicios de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (RSE) 20% 5 Catálogos Online 20% 6 Traducciones 20% 7 Certificación Triple Sello 17% 8 Requerimientos de acceso a mercado 16% 9 Investigación de mercados 16% 10 Perfiles de mercado 14% 11 Condiciones arancelarias 14% 12 Boletín Transporte & Logística 13% 13 Servicio estadístico 11% 14 Información de mercado 11% 15 Periódico "Comercio Exterior" 9% 16 Boletín CIFRAS 5% 17 Boletín IBCE Data Tr@de 5% 18 Boletín IBCEm@iL 2%

Sin embargo los servicios con menor aprobación fueron: Medios sociales (Facebook, Twitter y Youtube), Quick Scan RSE, Foro Permanente de Diálogo con la Sociedad Civil Sobre Producción, Comercio Exterior e Integración, Servicios de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (RSE), y Catálogos Online. Cabe mencionar que estos mismos servicios tienen un nivel de aprobación por el público por encima del 70%.

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3.- ¿Cómo considera usted la utilidad de los siguientes sitios Web?

Total 381 personas respondieron la pregunta 3.

TOTAL Sitios Web Excelente Bueno Regular Mala RESPUESTAS www.ibce.org.bo 229 143 9 0 381 www.rsebolivia.org 63 213 48 5 329 www.exclusivamenteboliviano.com 88 186 52 4 330

Excelente/Bueno Sitios Web % s/total www.ibce.org.bo 98% www.rsebolivia.org 84% www.exclusivamenteboliviano.com 83%

www.ibce.org.bo 98% www.rsebolivia.org 84% www.exclusivamenteboliviano.co… 83% 70% 80% 90% 100%

El 98% de los encuestados calificaron como Excelente/Bueno el sitio web de la institución.

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4.- El tiempo de respuesta a las solicitudes de servicio realizadas al IBCE es:

Total 361 personas respondieron la pregunta 4.

Calificación Respuestas Excelente 88 24% Bueno 240 67% Regular 33 9% Malo 0 0% TOTAL RESPUESTAS: 361

Bueno Regular 67% 9%

Malo Excelente 0% 24%

La respuesta a las solicitudes de servicio realizadas al IBCE es buena, lo dice el 67% que respondió la encuesta, mientras que el 24% califica de excelente.

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5.- ¿Cómo calificaría al IBCE como un proveedor de servicios de apoyo al comercio exterior?

Total 375 personas respondieron la pregunta 5.

Calificación Respuestas Excelente 177 47% Bueno 181 48% Regular 16 4% Malo 1 1% 375

Bueno 48% Regular 4%

Malo Excelente 1% 47%

El 48% de los encuestados califica al IBCE como “Buen” proveedor de servicios de apoyo al comercio exterior, así también el 47% lo califica como “Excelente” en esta tarea.

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6.- ¿Cómo calificaría al IBCE como un generador independiente de información y opinión?

Total 388 personas respondieron la pregunta 6.

Calificación Respuestas Excelente 174 45% Bueno 184 47% Regular 29 8% Mala 1 0% TOTAL RESPUESTAS: 388

Bueno 47% Regular 8%

Mala Excelente 0% 45%

Como un generador independiente de información y opinión el IBCE fue calificado en un 47% como Bueno y con un 45% de Excelente.

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7.- ¿Cómo calificaría la comunicación y la relación que tiene el IBCE con la empresa / institución / usted?

Total 382 personas respondieron la pregunta 7.

Calificación Respuestas Excelente 153 40% Buena 202 53% Regular 24 6% Mala 3 1% TOTAL RESPUESTAS: 382

Buena 53%

Regular 6%

Excelente 40% Mala 1%

La relación que tiene el IBCE con la empresa/institución/usted, fue calificada con un 53% como Buena y con un 40% como Excelente.

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Annex 10: Survey to ECEX / ISTECEX in ADEX

Cuestionario para Profesores de ISTECEX / ECEX Participantes en Capacitación de CBI

1. ¿En cuál de las siguientes instituciones enseña usted? a. ISTECEX 66.66% b. ECEX c. Ambas 33.33%

2. ¿Recibió Ud. alguna capacitación de parte de expertos del CBI ? a. Sí 100.00% b. No 3. ¿Recibió Ud. algún material de estudio preparado con la asistencia del CBI acerca del mercado de la Unión Europea para las exportaciones peruanas? a. Sí 100.00% b. No 4. ¿Ha aplicado usted estos conocimientos y materiales en los cursos que dicta? a. Siempre 83.33% b. La mayoría de las veces 16.66% c. A veces d. Nunca e. Anteriormente sí, pero ahora quedaron obsoletos 5. ¿Cómo califica la calidad de la asistencia recibida por parte de CBI en desarrollar una mejor currícula para ISTECEX y/o ECEX en relación a las exportaciones a la Unión Europea? a. Excelente 66.66% b. Muy Buena 33.33% c. Regular d. Mala e. Muy Mala f. Desconozco esa asistencia 6. ¿Cómo percibe la satisfacción de sus alumnos en relación a los temas y la currícula creada o mejorada a partir del apoyo de CBI? a. Muy satisfechos 66.66% b. Satisfechos 33.33% c. Medianamente satisfechos d. Insatisfechos e. Muy insatisfechos

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This is a publication of Netherlands Enterprise Agency Prinses Beatrixlaan 2 PO Box 93144 | 2509 AC The Hague T +31 (0) 88 042 42 42 E [email protected] www.rvo.nl

This publication was commissioned by the ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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