CTC Sentinel 2(3)

march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Somalia’s New Government

FEATURE ARTICLE and the Challenge of Al-Shabab 1 Somalia’s New Government and the By David H. Shinn Challenge of Al-Shabab By David H. Shinn

Reports 5 Inside Look at the Fighting Between Al-Shabab and Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama By Abdulahi Hassan 7 Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy By Ahmed Rashid 10 Al-Qaìda’s Involvement in Britain’s “Homegrown” Terrorist Plots By James Brandon 13 Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Remains Committed to Jihad By Farhana Ali and Mohammad Shehzad 16 Deconstructing Ibn Taymiyya’s Views on Suicidal Missions By Rebecca Molloy 19 Muslim Brotherhood Faces Growing Challenges in Egypt By Steven Brooke 22 The Current State of the Moroccan Al-Shabab fighters participate in a military drill on the outskirts of Mogadishu. - Photo by Mustafa Abdi/AFP/Getty Images Islamic Combatant Group By Carlos Echeverría Jesús fter the september 11 attacks, national unity in Somalia, which offers the Bush administration’s the best hope of minimizing Somali 24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity foreign policy toward Somalia links to international terrorism. Long- 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts focused primarily on term U.S. interests in the Horn of Acounterterrorism.1 This focus was a Africa will not be served by a policy result of Somalia’s proximity to the that is consumed with military action to Middle East, U.S. concern that al-Qaìda the detriment of supporting economic might relocate to the country, a history development and a broad based Somali of terrorist bombings targeting Western government. About the CTC Sentinel interests in nearby Kenya and Tanzania The Combating Terrorism Center is an and early contact between al-Qaìda This article outlines al-Qaìda’s independent educational and research and individuals in Somalia. Although early activity in Somalia, provides institution based in the Department of Social ties exist between al-Qaìda and background and current information on Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Somalia’s al-Shabab militant group, the al-Shabab including its recruitment of West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses overwhelming objective of U.S. policy Americans and Europeans, and finally the Center’s global network of scholars and in Somalia should not be confronting offers some policy suggestions on how practitioners to understand and confront international terrorist activity. Instead, best to stabilize Somalia. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the United States should contribute other forms of political violence. to creating a moderate government of Early Al-Qaìda Activity in Somalia Al-Qaìda links to Somalia date back to 1992. At that time, the United States The views expressed in this report are those of 1 The United States provided modest amounts of hu- prepared to send troops to the country the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, manitarian assistance to Somalia each year since U.S. to open humanitarian corridors to feed the Department of the Army, or any other agency troops left the country in 1994. Moreover, in 2008 the starving Somalis in an operation known of the U.S. Government. United States began to actively support the political rec- as the Unified Task Force. Declassified onciliation process. 1 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 documents made available through primarily on capturing the three central Somalia. The primary al-Shabab the Harmony Project at West Point’s persons linked to the embassy bombings spokesperson since Ayro’s death has Combating Terrorism Center show that and Somali support for international been Muktar Robow, his former deputy. the Africa regional al-Qaìda leader, terrorism.6 In 2007, an Ethiopian air Although factions continue to hamper Abu Hafs, made multiple trips to Somalia attack against fleeing Islamists near the the organization, al-Shabab became from the al-Qaìda base in Khartoum in Somali-Kenyan border resulted in the even stronger after Ayro’s death.11 His 1992.2 The first al-Qaìda operatives death of one of the three, Abu Taha al- killing underscored outside involvement arrived in Somalia in February 1993 Sudani. in Somalia and bolstered the resolve of and, working closely with an extremist al-Shabab’s supporters to oppose all Somali group known as al-Ittihad al- The Rise of Shabab foreign elements.12 After his death, al- Islami (AIAI), established three training Aden Hashi “Ayro,” a former military Shabab stepped up its attacks on the camps. The evidence concerning al- chief of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) TFG and Ethiopians and demonstrated Qaìda’s role in attacks against U.S. who had previously received training increasing military success. and subsequent UN forces in Somalia with al-Qaìda and the Taliban in during 1993 is conflicting. It appears, Afghanistan, established al-Shabab Shabab’s Leadership and Ties to Al-Qaìda however, that al-Qaìda claimed more as early as 2004.7 Ayro attracted Al-Shabab’s leadership is decentralized, involvement than it deserved. Al- disaffected young Somalis by combining and some sub-clan militia units may Qaìda underestimated the cost of its Somali nationalism, reverence for Islam just be calling themselves al-Shabab Somalia operation and overestimated and after 2006 a clarion call to expel as a matter of convenience.13 Ibrahim the degree to which Somalis would Ethiopian military forces that had Haji Jama “al-Afghani” operates in become jihadists. It especially failed to moved deep into Somalia at the request the area where Somaliland, Puntland appreciate the strength of traditional of the Somali Transitional Federal and Ethiopia converge.14 His group Sufi doctrine in Somali Islam.3 Government (TFG). Al-Shabab became consists mainly of Isaaq and Harti clan Nevertheless, al-Qaìda did manage to a highly disciplined force.8 Many of its members and reportedly carried out recruit a number of young Somalis who followers were probably driven more attacks against foreigners in Somaliland probably formed the core structure of by Somali nationalism than religious during 2003 and 2004.15 Shaykh Fuad subsequent radical Islamist groups that fanaticism. A subset of the organization, Mohamed “Shongole” heads a group of adopted terrorist tactics.4 however, committed itself to creating fighters in the ports of Marka and Brava an Islamic caliphate in Somalia. This south of Mogadishu.16 Muktar Robow of The United States believed that three select group reportedly received the Rahanwayn clan runs the al-Shabab al-Qaìda operatives—Fazul Abdullah training in Eritrea for making roadside unit in Bay and Bakool regions of Muhammad of the Comoro Islands, bombs, car bombs and suicide vests.9 central Somalia and is affiliated with the Abu Taha al-Sudani of Sudan and From the beginning, al-Shabab has mainly Hawiye/Habir Gidir/Ayr sub- Salah Ali Salah Nabhan of Kenya—who been a decentralized organization and sub-clan unit in southern Mogadishu. took part in the 1998 U.S. Embassy increasingly subject to clan and regional He received support in late 2008 from bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar fissures. There are persistent reports Shaykh Hassan “Turki,” who has long es Salaam, Tanzania benefited from that Sudanese, Saudis, Egyptians, been in charge of a militant training AIAI protection in Somalia.5 Although Pakistanis and Yemenis have joined camp in Ras Kamboni along the coast AIAI eventually disappeared as an al-Shabab and that most of its funding at the southern tip of Somalia. Ayro identifiable organization in Somalia, a comes from the Somali diaspora and controlled an al-Shabab unit around number of Somali groups professed to foreign Islamist supporters.10 Together Dusa Mareb, but this group may now be carry on its radical agenda, the most with other organized groups in Somalia, under the direction of Muktar Robow if important of which is now known as al- al-Shabab likely obtains a residual cut it still exists at all.17 Shabab (The Youth). In the meantime, from some of the piracy ransom funds. al-Qaìda continued to call on Somalis The strength of al-Shabab’s ties to al- to wage a jihad against Ethiopian forces In May 2008, a U.S. cruise missile attack Qaìda are open to debate. Muktar in Somalia and their U.S. allies. The killed al-Shabab’s founder in the town of Robow stated in August 2008, “We will United States pursued a policy focused Dusa Mareb in the Galguduud region of 11 Anonymous; Hansen. 2 Al-Qaìda’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (West 6 Shinn, pp. 59-64. 12 Ibid. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). 7 For an excellent analysis of al-Shabab as of early 2008, 13 Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy 3 Salafist movements arose in Africa and other regions see Anonymous, “Somalia’s al-Shabab Reconstitutes Nightmare,” Enough Strategy Paper, September 2008, p. to counter the “innovative” customs and traditions of Fighting Force,” CTC Sentinel 1:3 (2008). In addition, 6; Personal interview, expatriate NGO representative Muslims who adhered to Sufi Islam. Al-Qaìda largely see Stig Jarle Hansen, “Misspent Youth – Somalia’s Sha- who has spent considerable time in Somalia, November pursues a Salafist ideology. bab Insurgents,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 9, 2008. 4 David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the 2008. 14 “Two Brutal Stalemates,” Africa Confidential 49:22 Horn,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 27:1 (2007): pp. 56- 8 Al-Shabab does not take instruction from one hierar- (2008): pp. 6-7. 58. chical structure. Each splinter group or fighting unit, 15 Ibid. 5 “Target of U.S. Strike Wanted for Multiple Attacks,” however, is disciplined and effective militarily. 16 Ibid. Associated Press, January 9, 2007; “Senior U.S. Official 9 Ibid. 17 Ibid. This unit may no longer exist, as al-Shabab’s Calls on Islamic Militia in Somalia to Turn Over al-Qaeda 10 This information is based on the author’s own confi- forces were largely defeated around Dusa Mareb by rival Suspects,” Associated Press, June 21, 2006. dential interviews. forces from Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama.

2 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 take our orders from Shaykh Usama bin forthcoming.24 While there are clearly and becoming a suicide bomber.30 Ladin because we are his students.”18 He ties between the two organizations, British security officials reported that added, “Most of our leaders were trained it is important not to overstate their dozens of extremists have returned in al-Qaìda camps. We get our tactics significance. Indeed, if the merger to the United Kingdom from terrorist and guidelines from them. Many have does occur, it will only further alienate training camps in Somalia.31 There are spent time with Usama bin Ladin.”19 al-Shabab from the vast majority of also numerous reports that Somalis Radical Somali groups, including al- moderate Somalis. from the large diasporas in Canada and Shabab, have a history of exaggerating the Scandinavian countries have joined their terrorist credentials. Muktar Shabab Recruiting Americans and Europeans al-Shabab in Somalia.32 Robow’s statement that al-Shabab A particularly disturbing turn of events takes orders from Bin Ladin may well occurred when the FBI reported that Most of these cases occurred in 2008. demonstrate more anger at the United during the past 18 months as many as It remains to be seen if al-Shabab can States for killing Ayro than a command 20 young Somali-Americans may have continue to attract young Somalis in and control association with al-Qaìda.20 left their homes in Minneapolis and St. the West now that Ethiopian forces For al-Qaìda’s part, leaders Ayman al- Paul in Minnesota, the largest Somali have left and the political situation has Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi make diaspora in the United States, under changed in the country. Although it frequent references to Somalia in their suspicious circumstances.25 A few is not clear why these young Somalis internet pronouncements. In September young Somalis were also recruited in joined al-Shabab, it may have been out of 2008, al-Qaìda operative Salah Ali Boston; San Diego; Seattle; Columbus, a sense of pursuing Somali nationalism Salah Nabhan appeared in a propaganda Ohio; and Portland, Maine.26 It has been or simply seeking adventure. At this video with Muktar Robow.21 Nabhan confirmed that several of them found point, there is no evidence to suggest reportedly knows Bin Ladin personally their way to al-Shabab in Somalia. that they went to express anti- and declared an oath of loyalty on Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. American or anti-Western feelings. behalf of al-Shabab to Bin Ladin and al- citizen, blew himself up in Somalia in The deputy director for intelligence at Qaìda. He has encouraged training in October 2008, killing dozens of al- the National Counterterrorism Center, al-Shabab camps and urged fighters to Shabab’s opponents.27 Hassan Burhan Andrew Liepman, told the Senate that oppose the TFG, Ethiopian forces and and two Somali-American colleagues these recruits “are going to Somalia to African Union peacekeepers.22 In a mid- left Minneapolis in November and made fight for their homeland, not to join al- February 2009 video, Abu Yahya called their way to Kismayo, a fundamentalist Qaeda’s jihad against the United States, on Somalis to oppose the new Somali stronghold.28 FBI Associate Director so far.”33 government and attack African Union Philip Mudd recently stated that the peacekeepers.23 At a March 10 hearing internet encouraged these recruits to go Shabab Confronts Challenging Situation held by the Senate Armed Services to Somalia, but individuals inside the Al-Shabab received much of its support Committee, military intelligence chief United States had to help them purchase inside Somalia because it vigorously Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples suggested the airline tickets.29 opposed the Ethiopian military presence. that a “formal merger announcement” Somalis rallied to this nationalist cause. between al-Qaìda and al-Shabab is There is also at least one reported case At the same time, al-Shabab’s tactics of a Somali who was studying in the of political assassinations, roadside United Kingdom returning to Somalia bombings and suicide bombings have 18 Edmund Sanders, “Conditions May Be Ripe for Al alienated many Somalis. For example, Qaeda in Somalia,” Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2008. al-Shabab took responsibility for the 19 Ibid. 24 Maples did not provide the source for this conclusion. suicide bomb attack on February 22, 20 Somali expert Ken Menkhaus argues that al-Shabab’s See “Haunted by Somalia,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2009 that killed 11 African Union 34 attacks against aid workers are a direct response to the 2009. peacekeepers from Burundi. Now that U.S. designation of al-Shabab as a terrorist organization 25 Dan Ephron and Mark Hosenball, “Recruited for Ji- Ethiopian forces have left Mogadishu in March 2008 and the missile attack that killed Ayro. had?” Newsweek, February 2, 2009; Kevin Diaz, “FBI and are confining their military activity For more, see Menkhaus, pp. 5, 12, 15-16. Peter Cole of Tracks Somali Terror Links in Minneapolis, Elsewhere,” to the part of Somalia immediately Exclusive Analysis believes that U.S. military interven- Minneapolis Star Tribune, March 12, 2009; Spencer S. Hsu tion in Somalia has actually strengthened al-Shabab. For and Carrie Johnson, “Somali Americans Recruited by 30 Jonathan Rugman, “Somali Radicals ‘Importing Ter- more, see Royal United Services Institute, “Crisis in the Extremists,” Washington Post, March 11, 2009. ror to UK’ say Intelligence Analysts,” The Times, Febru- Horn of Africa,” conference proceedings, October 23, 26 Ibid. ary 16, 2009. 2008, p. 17. 27 “One of Five Suspected Somali Suicide Bomber Laid 31 Ibid. 21 Nick Grace, “Shabaab Reaches Out to al Qaeda Senior to Rest,” Fox News Minneapolis, December 3, 2008. 32 Brandon. Leaders, Announces Death of al Sudani,” The Long War 28 Ephron et al.; James Brandon, “Islamist Movements 33 Randall Mikkelsen, “Somali-Americans Recruited as Journal, September 2, 2008. Recruiting in the West for the Somali Jihad,” Terrorism ‘Cannon Fodder,’” Reuters, March 11, 2009. 22 Nick Grace, “Shabaab Leader Sanctioned as Zawahiri Monitor 17:1 (2009); Abdi Hassan, “US-Somali Youth Join 34 “Somali Insurgents Kill 11 African Peacekeepers,” Responds to Group’s Oath of Loyalty,” The Long War Jihad in Somalia,” Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2009. Sudan Tribune, February 22, 2009; “Bombs Kill Somalia Journal, November 21, 2008. 29 Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Believes Missing Men Peacekeepers,” BBC, February 22, 2009. A Somali-lan- 23 “Al-Qa’ida’s Al-Libi Urges Mujahidin in Somalia to Joined Somali Terrorists,” National Public Radio, March guage web site, www.kataaib.info, subsequently posted Remain Steadfast, Defend Muslim Land,” compiled from 12, 2009. Also see Laura Yuen and Sasha Aslanian, “On- photos of two young men it said were the suicide bomb- jihadist websites by NTIS, U.S. Department of Com- line Tools May Have Been Used to Recruit Young Soma- ers responsible for the attack. Many Somalis see the Afri- merce, February 13, 2009. lis,” Minnesota Public Radio, March 6, 2009. can Union troops as a neutral force.

3 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 across the Ethiopian border, al-Shabab’s to fissures along sub-clan and regional government to prove that it can rally strongest argument has dissolved and group lines. Furthermore, by the end most Somalis to its more moderate it is left with a tactical record that of 2008, rival Islamist militia groups agenda. The first priority is the should worry many Somalis. The recent began to confront al-Shabab. Ahlu- difficult task of reestablishing security. resignation of TFG President Abdullahi Sunna wal-Jama, a Sufi brotherhood Contrary to popular belief in the West, Yusuf and his replacement with Shaykh of moderate Islamists, called in late an enlarged African Union force is not Sharif Shaykh Ahmad further undercut December for a government of national the answer, although it can continue al-Shabab. unity and attacked al-Shabab militias in to play a useful role by keeping the Mogadishu.37 The desecration of grave port and airport in Mogadishu out of Shaykh Sharif is a Hawiye/Abgal sub- markers by al-Shabab followers may al-Shabab’s hands. The African Union clan member and was one of the two have contributed to this conflict.38 Ahlu- does not have the capacity, funding, principal leaders of the ICU that the TFG Sunna wal-Jama also took control of two experience or willingness to implement and Ethiopians deposed late in 2006. towns in central Somalia controlled by a task of this complexity. A UN Shaykh Sharif recently announced that al-Shabab, including Ayro’s stronghold peacekeeping force would be somewhat he will impose Shari`a, neutralizing one of Dusa Mareb.39 more effective, but only if there is a of al-Shabab’s key demands.35 Shaykh peace to keep that all Somali sides Sharif has ties to some of the al-Shabab In mid-February 2009, the Somali endorse.43 The international community members who once served as part of the parliament selected a new prime minister, should continue to help Somalia train a ICU militia. Consequently, he is in a Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. From professional, community-based police position to peal away some of the more the large Darod/Majerteen sub-clan and force that draws its recruits from all moderate or opportunistic members the son of an early Somali president, regions of Somalia.44 The UN special from al-Shabab and convince them to his selection bodes well for building envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould- join the new government of national international support for Shaykh Abdallah, recently commented that unity. For example, Shaykh Abdirahman Sharif’s new government.40 To its efforts to create a police force have Janaqow, a deputy to Shaykh Sharif, credit, the new government has begun progressed slowly because donors have publicly attacked al-Shabab during a to return to Mogadishu. Shaykh Sharif, attached too many conditions to paying sermon in Mogadishu in January. He Prime Minister Sharmarke and most of them.45 Financing the building of this blamed al-Shabab for the collapse of his cabinet and nearly 200 members of force would be a good project for the the Islamic Courts and accused it of the enlarged parliament are now back Arab countries, which have a stake in a killing anyone who disagreed with its in the capital. Sharmarke has also set stable Somalia. Initially, security would methods.36 Nevertheless, Shaykh Sharif as his major priority reconciliation be messy as the new government uses its is driven by a desire to achieve power with opposition groups.41 All of these own militia to deal with al-Shabab and and must overcome earlier policies that developments could work to limit al- freelancing militias. If it is possible to favored shutting down a free press and Shabab’s appeal, at least in some areas neutralize al-Shabab and independent calling for jihad against Ethiopia. of Somalia. First Steps to End the Conflict and Combat Extremism,” The other principal ICU leader, Shaykh The Way Forward Enough Strategy Paper, February 9, 2009. Hassan Dahir Aweys, remains in exile The situation on the ground in Somalia 43 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is clearly in no in Asmara, Eritrea. He opposes Shaykh is extremely fluid. Al-Shabab remains a hurry to launch a UN peacekeeping operation in Soma- Sharif and his recent alliance with the significant force but has been undercut lia. He said on February 27, 2009 that the United Nations TFG. Shaykh Hassan also appears to by the departure of the Ethiopians may start planning in June to set up a peacekeeping oper- have close connections with the radical and al-Shabab’s unpopular tactics and ation in Somalia if the security and political conditions are 42 elements of al-Shabab. It is doubtful, ideology. It is up to the Shaykh Sharif conducive. It would take months to actually send such a however, that Shaykh Hassan has any mission to Somalia. For more, see Sarah McGregor, “Ban command and control over al-Shabab. 37 For more on the organization, see Alisha Ryu, “Ten- Says UN May Establish Peacekeeping Operation in So- The organization is too decentralized, sions Mounting between Somali Islamist Groups,” Voice malia,” Bloomberg, February 27, 2009. and the fact that he resides in Eritrea of America, March 6, 2009; Abdulahi Hassan, “Inside 44 This is an idea supported by Abdi Ismail Samatar, would make any effective control over Look at the Fighting Between Al-Shabab and Ahlu-Sun- professor of geography and global studies at the Uni- units in Somalia exceedingly difficult. na wal-Jama,” CTC Sentinel 2:3 (2009). versity of Minnesota. At a Voice of America seminar on 38 Sufi custom reveres head stones while the absolutist Somalia on February 18, 2009 in Washington, D.C., he Although it remains well financed and is views of al-Shabab oppose the practice. See “Sufi Group called on the international community to help establish a seemingly led by committed jihadists, al- Accuses al-Shabaab of Using Foreigners to Destroy Somali police force of 15,000. Samatar has been involved Shabab has become increasingly subject Graves,” Garowe Online, December 26, 2008. in the last three Somali peace processes. The Somali- 39 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Islamist Militants in Somalia Be- language website, AllPuntland.com, reported on Febru- 35 Shaykh Sharif said he would not institute a strict in- gin to Fight One Another,” New York Times, December 29, ary 23, 2009 that the French minister of foreign affairs, terpretation of Shari`a. For more, see “Somali Cabinet 2008; Radio Shabelle, January 29-30, 2009. during a meeting with Shaykh Sharif, is prepared to train Votes to Implement Sharia Law,” Reuters, March 10, 40 On the other hand, he has no base of political support 10,000 Somali soldiers. Although the French minister 2009; Mohamed Amiin Adow, “Somali President Bends and may find it difficult to stand up to Shaykh Sharif. did have a meeting with Shaykh Sharif, there is no con- to Rebel Demand for Sharia Law,” CNN, February 28, 41 “Somali PM Sets Reconciliation, Security Top Priori- firmation he offered to train 10,000 soldiers. 2009. ties,” Xinhua, February 26, 2009. 45 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, comments made at a con- 36 “Senior ARS Official Blasts Al-Shabab,” Mareeg Eng- 42 For a good analysis of al-Shabab’s position, see Ken ference on Somalia at the Center for Strategic and Inter- lish News, undated. Menkhaus, “Somalia after the Ethiopian Occupation: national Studies, Washington, D.C., March 10, 2009.

4 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 militias, a Somali police force, which Inside Look at the Fighting are considered well-trained militarily, has a long tradition of professionalism as many of them were taught by jihadist in the country, should be able to ensure Between Al-Shabab and leaders who had trained in Afghanistan. security until Somalia creates a national Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama Al-Shabab received support from the army. local population in Somalia when By Abdulahi Hassan Ethiopian forces occupied the country, The United States should continue to as many Somalis saw al-Shabab as a support the new government of national since the first week of November 2008, genuine resistance force regardless of unity in spite of its imperfections, while Somalia’s hard line Islamist militant its strict jihadist leanings. According to remaining in the political background. group, al-Shabab, has engaged in fierce one respected journalist, “The Shabab It is important to give the Somali fighting with a rival armed group, known are not wildly popular, but they are government an opportunity to build a as Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama (ASWJ). The formidable; for the time being they functioning coalition, neutralize support recent fighting occurred when the have motivated, disciplined militia with for al-Shabab and co-opt organizations ASWJ, a Sufi group, reacted violently hundreds of hard-core fighters.”4 such as the newly-formed Islamic party after al-Shabab challenged their form of Hisbul Islamiyya.46 Prime Minister worship and assassinated approximately Recently, however, the Sufi organization Sharmarke has already announced 40 prominent personalities who had ASWJ picked up arms and began to that he is prepared to sit down with al- questioned the way they were ruling combat al-Shabab.5 Sufism has been Shabab, although its leaders continue to the region.1 While forces loyal to al- in Somalia’s religious landscape since oppose the Shaykh Sharif government.47 Shabab have received support from the Islam first came to sub-Saharan Africa As much as the United States opposes population due to their prior resistance centuries ago. Organized Sufi groups al-Shabab, it is necessary to let Somalis to the Ethiopian occupation, there in Somalia have rarely been involved work through their differences in their are signs that Somalis—at least in in politics, except for the anti-colonial own way. This is also the time for Galgaduud region and in Mogadishu— wars of the 19th century where they the United States to eschew military have grown weary of their presence. played a major role. In modern Somalia, activity in Somalia. It should continue This was manifest in the decision of Sufi religious organizations—such to provide humanitarian assistance, Galgaduud’s clans and traditional Sufi as the ASWJ—have been most active help to establish a police force and shaykhs to throw their support behind carrying out religious affairs within be prepared to step in quickly with the ASWJ. their communities. Only in mid-2008 development aid as soon as the security did the ASWJ begin to constitute as a situation permits. The fighting between these two groups fighting force. In terms of numbers, is significant because ASWJ defeated ASWJ can call on more armed fighters Dr. David H. Shinn is an adjunct professor in al-Shabaab in two strategically than al-Shabab, but they are not as the Elliott School of International Affairs at important towns, causing the radical disciplined or well-trained. The ASWJ’s George Washington University. He served 37 group to lose its foothold in one of the poor training is a result of its fighters years in the U.S. Foreign Service, including main arteries connecting southern and being drawn from clan militias, whose State Department Coordinator for Somalia northern Somalia. This article provides members usually do not have formal during the 1993 international intervention background on the rivalry between al- military training.6 ASWJ has come out and ambassador to Ethiopia from 1996- Shabab and the ASWJ, chronicles the in support of Shaykh Sharif Shaykh 1999. recent fighting between the two groups, Ahmad’s new unity government.7 and explains why al-Shabab is in danger Shaykh Mohamed Moalin Shaykh Amiir, of losing some of its power and control chairman of the ASWJ in Nairobi, told in Somalia. reporters that

The Rivalry Between Shabab and ASWJ we are congratulating president Al-Shabab is a hard line Islamist Sheik Sharif and we are welcoming militant group that was established as him to be the head of the unity 2 46 Hisbul Islamiyya is a new Islamic party composed early as 2004. It has some ties to al- of four factions opposed to Shaykh Sharif’s new govern- Qa`ida operatives and is considered lia’s New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabab,” ment: the hard-line Asmara wing of the Alliance for the the most jihadist-oriented out of CTC Sentinel 2:3 (2009) and Anonymous, “Somalia’s Al- 3 Re-Liberation of Somalia led by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Somalia’s armed groups. Its fighters Shabab Reconstitutes Fighting Force,” CTC Sentinel 1:3 Aweys; Harakat Ras Kamboni, a southern Somali Isla- (2008). mist group affiliated with Shaykh Hassan “Turki,” who 1 Insurgents affiliated with al-Shabab allegedly destroyed 4 Jeffrey Gettleman, “The Most Dangerous Place in the has had ties with al-Shabab; the Islamic Front of Jabhatul the graves of individuals revered by Sufis. This played a World,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2009. Islamiyya, an insurgent group formed in 2007 to oppose role in Ahlu Sunna’s violent reaction to al-Shabab. For 5 Galgaduud’s clans and traditional Sufi shaykhs have Ethiopian troops in Somalia; and a little-known, Harti more, see “Sufi Group Accuses al-Shabaab of Using For- put their support behind the ASWJ. It is thought that one clan group called Anole and based in Kismayo. Increas- eigners to Destroy Graves,” Garowe Online, December contributing factor for this action was al-Shabab’s disre- ingly, it seems to be allying itself with al-Shabab. 26, 2008. gard of Sufi customs. 47 “Somalia’s PM Calls for Talks with al Shabaab as 2 David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the 6 This also explains, however, why the ASWJ was able Ethiopia Troops Re-enter,” Garowe Online, February Horn,” Journal of Conflict Studies 27:1 (2007): pp. 56-58. to pick up arms so quickly. 18, 2009; Abdiaziz Hassan, “Somali Opposition Leader 3 For detailed background information on al-Shabab, 7 “Islamist Group Supports President Sharif,” Shabelle Vows to Fight On,” Reuters, March 6, 2009. see the following two articles: David H. Shinn, “Soma- Media Network, February 13, 2009.

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government of Somalia. We estimated 500 men from three different Galgaduud is that the militant group is also bless him to be the Somali fronts with groups numbering 30 men putting most of its energy in fighting president and solve the problems each.12 According to sources in Guraceel, Somali government and African Union between the Somali people to former Somali army officers helped troops in Mogadishu. reach peace and stability.8 advise and lead the ASWJ forces, which contributed to their victory.13 Shabab’s Growing Weaknesses There are reports that ASWJ forces in Despite having better trained forces, central Somalia have received financial Signs of the fighting are still visible in al-Shabab was defeated by the ASWJ in support from Shaykh Sharif’s new both towns. One elder in Guraceel, who Galgaduud. These battles have revealed government. witnessed the fighting, said that “if al- two weaknesses affecting al-Shabab. Shabab had not intervened in people’s The first weakness resulted from the Inside Look at the Fighting freedom, their way of worshipping and Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia. From November 1 until December not exterminated elders who disagree Once the unwelcome Ethiopian force 16, 2008, fighting broke out in the with them…then they would have been largely withdrew from Somalia, al- Galgaduud region of central Somalia. In here for quite a long time. I hope they Shabab has had difficulty securing the town of Guraceel, 263 miles north of never come back.”14 In Dusa Mareb, a support across clan lines. When the Mogadishu, al-Shabab engaged in fierce resident echoed the comments made Ethiopians occupied the country, many fighting with the ASWJ. After two civilians threw their support behind battles, al-Shabab lost control of the “This time, however, it may the hard line al-Shabab because it was town. On January 25, 2009, the same a major part of the resistance. Ethiopia, two groups fought again, this time in the be difficult for al-Shabab which is considered a rival country by strategic regional capital of Dusa Mareb, to return to Galgaduud most Somalis, was welcomed by very about 310 miles north of Mogadishu. few. In fact, al-Shabab has tried to tie Al-Shabab was again defeated in short since the major clans and ASWJ to the Ethiopians, alleging that fighting that lasted a couple of hours. It sub-clans in the province the Sufi group has been armed and also lost control of the town. supported by Ethiopia to fight a proxy have thrown their support war on its behalf; there is some evidence During the fighting, both groups behind the ASWJ.” of this support.18 used small-arms such as AK-47s, PKM machine-guns, RPGs, anti-tank The second weakness is that it appears weapons, and 60mm mortars.9 In the general population in Somalia addition to the use of “technicals,”10 the by the elder in Guraceel: “Al-Shabab has grown tired of al-Shabab’s ASWJ also utilized armored personnel brought law and order to our town, but indiscriminate violence that has caused carriers (APC) during the fight in Dusa took all our freedoms and basic rights many civilian deaths. As stated by one Mareb, which it acquired from the away…if they left people alone without man in Mogadishu’s airport, “Al-Shabab Somali national army after it collapsed.11 imposing so many restrictions, they brought peace to Kismayo…They banned Al-Shabab had more PKMs and 60mm would still be ruling this town.”15 In all sorts of music, and no radio can play mortars at its disposal, but the group both towns, however, residents are music. At night they carry foot patrol in lacked mobility and resiliency, which concerned that al-Shabab will return. the neighborhoods, and if they hear any contributed to its losses. Furthermore, Many towns in Somalia frequently music coming out of your house you will relying on the use of mortars in change hands from one armed group disappear.” The man continued, “I like populated areas in both Dusa Mareb to another. This time, however, it may the fact that they have brought peace and in Guraceel had a negative effect on be difficult for al-Shabab to return to back to Kismayo, but I do not like them popular support. Galgaduud since the major clans and when they destroy our national flag,”19 sub-clans in the province—Habir Gedir, demonstrating why many in Somalia In addition to the use of APCs, ASWJ Dir, and Marehan16—have thrown disagree with al-Shabab’s attempts was able to defeat the better trained and their support behind the ASWJ.17 An to eradicate Somali nationalism. Al- numbered al-Shabab forces through additional factor that may prevent more effective military tactics. During al-Shabab from gaining power in 18 Abdurrahman Warsameh, “Counting the Cost After the battle of Guraceel, a force of 140 Ethiopia Withdraws,” AllAfrica.com, January 31, 2009. from ASWJ attacked al-Shabab’s 12 This information is based on the author’s first-hand Based on the author’s own research in Galgaduud, in reporting in Guraceel in February 2009. addition to other reporting sources, some of these al- 8 Ibid. 13 Ibid. legations can be substantiated. There is evidence that 9 This information is based on the author’s first-hand 14 Personal interview, elder in Guraceel, Somalia, Feb- Ethiopia provided some support to the ASWJ forces dur- reporting and research in Guraceel and Dusa Mareb in ruary 26, 2009. ing the battle in Guraceel. When the ASWJ was running February 2009. 15 Personal interview, resident in Dusa Mareb, Somalia, low on ammunition, Ethiopian troops allegedly resup- 10 “Technicals” is a term that refers to battlewagons, and February 23, 2009. plied them. Also during the battle of Guraceel, Ethiopian they are used by all sides in Somalia’s ongoing conflicts. 16 Marehan’s support for al-Shabab is not universal. In troops apparently mobilized near the town but the ASWJ These battlewagons are basically pick-up trucks with Lower Jubba, for example, some Marehan support al- requested that they withdraw due to concern that they mounted anti-aircraft guns. Shabab. would be labeled as an Ethiopian proxy. 11 “Ahlu Sunna Takes Control of Provincial Town,” Sha- 17 Al-Shabab draws fighters from various clans, includ- 19 Personal interview, civilian in Mogadishu airport, belle Media Network, January 29, 2009. ing some from Habir Gedir and Dir. February 18, 2009.

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Shabab’s ban on stimulants such as Conclusion Pakistan’s Continued Qat, smoking cigarettes and public Al-Shabab’s losses to the ASWJ in Failure to Adopt a entertainment will likely continue to Galgaduud demonstrate how clan further erode their support in some loyalties can shift, and why al-Shabab Counterinsurgency parts of Somalia. is in danger of losing some of its power Strategy and control in Somalia. Furthermore, Support for al-Shabab is, however, still since January 31, the former chairman By Ahmed Rashid strong in certain parts of the country, of the Islamic Courts Union, Shaykh partially due to the fact that they have Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, was chosen as in recent months, the Pakistani Taliban set up Islamic courts and brought law the new president of Somalia. With have made unprecedented inroads into and order to areas under their control. Shaykh Sharif as the head of the Somali the world’s second largest Muslim Despite al-Shabab’s recent losses, the state, it has become possible to weaken country and the only one armed with group, along with an Islamist coalition of the appeal of extreme jihadist ideology nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s February four factions known as Hisbul Islamiyya in the country. The Shaykh Sharif concessions to the Taliban in the Swat that has ties to al-Shabab,20 still controls government’s decision to apply Sharià Valley of the North-West Frontier and his past ties to Somali militias may Province (NWFP) are a watershed weaken the appeal of hard liners such as in the country’s steady slide toward “Al-Shabab’s losses to al-Shabab. To consolidate these gains, anarchy and the growing acceptance the ASWJ in Galgaduud it will require well thought strategic of the Taliban’s control in northern and material support for the Shaykh Pakistan.1 Subsequently, the Taliban demonstrate how clan Sharif regime. This support must be called for a cease-fire in Bajaur, a tribal loyalties can shift, and why sensitive of Somali social and cultural agency adjacent to Afghanistan where mores.22 Whatever help is extended to the Pakistani government has been al-Shabab is in danger of the new government has to take into battling Taliban militants since August losing some of its power account previous shortcomings, such as 2008. While neither the government giving the green light to Somalia’s rival, nor the military seem capable of halting and control in Somalia.” Ethiopia, to invade without considering the Taliban’s spread, the militants the possible backlash. Indeed, two themselves are offering cease-fires years ago, thousands of Ethiopian to Pakistan so that they can unite troops were sent to the Somali capital and combine their resources to better significant land in southern Somalia. to both empower the then TFG and combat Western forces in Afghanistan Clan loyalties help to secure al-Shabab’s eradicate extremist jihadists. That in early spring. control of Bay and Bakool regions strategy, however, did not cultivate any in the southwest because the group fruits and produced the opposite effect The current crisis adds to the already draws significant numbers of fighters by creating more jihadists than before. prevalent international concern about from the Rahanwayn clans, which are Any future strategy must avoid these Pakistan’s will to resist extremist forces predominate in those two regions. Al- previous failures. and comes just as the United States and Shabab also has significant control NATO decide upon a new joint strategy of Lower Jubba region. Furthermore, Abdulahi Hassan is a veteran Somali for Afghanistan and Pakistan before the when combined with Hisbul Islamiyya’s journalist with more than 20 years of NATO summit on April 2. The political Harakat Ras Kamboni of Shaykh Hassan experience in Somali affairs. He has been and military failure caps a long running Turki—which has a strong Ogadeni reporting on the Somali civil war since 1993. inability of the Pakistan Army and the clan connection and influence in Lower During 2006, from Mogadishu, he covered civilian government to learn, adapt or Shabelle21—al-Shabab’s influence extends the rise and fall of the Islamist movement and apply the basic principles of modern from Kismayo all the way to the Somali- the aftermath of the war in Mogadishu for counterinsurgency strategy. The army Kenyan border. various international media outlets. Much refuses to accept that the biggest threat of the information for this article was drawn faced by Pakistan is the Taliban and from Mr. Hassan’s ongoing research inside al-Qaìda, not the state of India. This Somalia. article examines the Pakistan Army’s failure to prepare for counterinsurgency warfare, the army’s unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations in the 20 Hisbul Islamiyya is composed of four factions: the Bajaur tribal agency and the Swat hard-line Asmara wing of the Alliance for the Re-Lib- Valley, and the flaws inherent in arming eration of Somalia led by Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys; pro-government tribal militias. Harakat Ras Kamboni, a southern Somali Islamist group 22 For example, when the U.S. Central Intelligence affiliated with Shaykh Hassan “Turki,” who has had ties Agency decided to support warlords in Somalia—with with al-Shabab; the Islamic Front of Jabhatul Islamiyya, the aim of capturing individuals suspected of interna- an insurgent group formed in 2007 to oppose Ethiopian tional terrorism—it had a negative impact because the troops in Somalia; and a little-known, Harti clan group warlords had a low standing in society. Many in the So- called Anole and based in Kismayo. mali public interpreted this support as a war on Islam 1 Zahid Hussain, “Taliban Extend Truce, Gain Sway in 21 The Ogadeni are a sub-clan of the Darod. rather than an operation to catch al-Qaìda operatives. Swat,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2009.

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Failure to Prepare for Counterinsurgency and the NWFP, while its officers are Army’s Failed Counterinsurgency Practices Warfare drawn from the regular army. After the Meanwhile, the army’s reluctance to The U.S. military, and in particular the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the FC train in counterinsurgency has been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the main operational force used even more detrimental. The subject Admiral Michael Mullen, spent much by Pakistan and the United States for is not taught seriously at Pakistan’s of 2008 trying to persuade Pakistan’s their joint covert support to the Afghan military colleges except in historical military to allow the United States to mujahidin. Later, it was also on the reference, such as to the Vietnam War. train anywhere from two brigades to two front line of Pakistan’s military aid and Most teaching and training still relates divisions of Pakistan’s regular forces to the conflict with India. to conduct counterinsurgency in the “Pakistan’s military must Federally Administered Tribal Areas The army’s performance alongside the (FATA) adjoining Afghanistan. The achieve the capability FC in FATA has demonstrated its lack Pakistan Army rejected the suggestion, and courage to engage of counterinsurgency training. After insisting that a conventional war with months of delay, in August 2008 the India was the major threat faced by the in counterinsurgency army moved into FATA’s Bajaur Agency army and any such defensive war would operations, in addition to promising a two week campaign to rid still be fought on the plains of Punjab the area of Pakistani Taliban, after and Sind rather than in the mountains the necessary willpower to which it would do the same in the other of Waziristan. The army also balked at alter its present course.” six tribal agencies. Eight months later, an overwhelming U.S. military presence the army is still fighting in Bajaur, in the country at a time when there unable to clear it of Taliban elements was growing anti-Americanism among and in addition it has also lost the Swat 5 the population and in the army. When support to the Taliban regime in its fight Valley in the NWFP. In Bajaur, the terrorists struck Mumbai in November against the Northern Alliance. During tactics used were the direct opposite of 2008, India threatened to launch hot this conflict, large numbers of the FC the new counterinsurgency doctrine of pursuit into Pakistani Kashmir; the were deployed inside Afghanistan in “clear, hold and build.” That doctrine incident caused the partial mobilization plainclothes to support the Taliban. In is people-centric in that military force of the Indian and Pakistani armies, the past, the FC has also been deeply is used to root out the extremists to and was used by Pakistan’s military to involved in training Kashmiri militants protect population centers. Once that vindicate its position regarding India to to fight in Indian Kashmir. is complete, the doctrine calls for the United States. rebuilding the lives of the population Today, the FC soldier not only has so that locals turn against extremists. In the fall of 2008, the army finally family members on the Taliban side in The army did the complete opposite. agreed to allow approximately 70 U.S. the present war in FATA and Swat, but It moved out the population, flattened officers train members of the Frontier has become thoroughly imbued with villages and entire towns with artillery, Corps (FC)—the main paramilitary jihadist ideas and motivations.4 For a bombings and bulldozers. This created force in FATA—in counterinsurgency force that was told for three decades vast free fire zones, which the Taliban warfare.2 Pakistan’s army chief, General that supporting jihad in Afghanistan themselves creatively used to retaliate Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, also ordered and India was part of state policy, it is against the army by ambushing soldiers the FC to be re-equipped with better naturally proving contradictory for them from concealed positions in the rubble. equipment, salaries and facilities— now to be told that the same jihadists The Taliban also forced locals who initiatives that the Bush administration are enemies of the state. Therefore, it remained to spy on government forces and the army should have carried out is not surprising that since 2004, when and enlisted more support from fleeing, using part of the largely unaccountable the army and FC launched operations in angry refugees. Moreover, the army did $11.8 billion the United States handed FATA, the FC has suffered from large- not conduct effective counterinsurgency over to the previous military regime of scale desertions, surrenders and loss tactics such as constant patrolling, President Pervez Musharraf between of morale. Before the FC can become securing and controlling distinct areas. 2001 and 2007.3 Nevertheless, despite a legitimate counterinsurgency force, Instead, it set up large camps where the training, the FC is still only a a number of steps need to be taken: it hunkered down while it relied on paramilitary force, and it remains deeply it must be reconstituted unit by unit its heavy and destructive firepower to controversial. The FC’s manpower is and thoroughly screened for Taliban inflict Taliban casualties. The army largely Pashtun, drawn from FATA sympathizers; large-scale retirements became sitting ducks in Bajaur without a should be implemented; and a younger, population to provide them information 2 Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Unit Secretly in fresher crop of recruits brought into the as to who was a Taliban member and 6 Pakistan Lends Ally Support,” New York Times, February ranks. who was not. 22, 2009. 3 Ruben Navarrette, “Who Needs Friends like Mushar- 5 In March, however, the government signed a new raf?” CNN, November 6, 2007. For the source of $11.8 peace deal with the largest tribe in Bajaur, a deal that billion, see Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United 4 For more on the Taliban’s influence on the Frontier some speculate will allow the Taliban to concentrate States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Af- Corps, see Arthur Keller, “Propaganda and Peace Deals: their operations on neighboring Afghanistan. ghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Press, The Taliban’s Information War in Pakistan,” CTC Senti- 6 These conclusions are based on the author’s personal 2008). nel 1:8 (2008). interviews and ongoing research on army operations in

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The operation caused 400,000 people Flaws in Arming Pro-Government Tribal military must achieve the capability and to flee Bajaur, and they are now Militias courage to engage in counterinsurgency living in poor conditions as internal The army’s latest strategy to create pro- operations, in addition to the necessary refugees barely being looked after by a government tribal militias to attack willpower to alter its present course. financially strapped government.7 These the Taliban has proved unsuccessful refugees include important tribal elders because there is no plan to protect such Until the Pakistan Army is able to re- and chiefs and educated youth—all militias once they disband and go home determine its strategic priorities and vehemently anti-Taliban—who would for rest or to care for their families. its interpretation of the country’s have provided the necessary support The Taliban have massacred and then security, it will not be able to practice for military operations if they had mutilated the bodies of several groups counterinsurgency successfully. The been protected in the first place. The of such militiamen after they had gone army’s current national security most common accusation among these home for rest. That has worked as a doctrine is entirely focused on India. refugees is that the army was always powerful deterrent against joining the In sharp contrast, the civilian national killing the wrong people—civilians militias. security doctrine is focused on building rather than the Taliban.8 the state in terms of improving relations Most recently, the NWFP provincial with neighbors, increasing trade, The army used similar tactics in last government also said that it will advancing the economy, and providing year’s military offensive against distribute 30,000 rifles to local militias mass education and development. the Pakistani Taliban in the Swat to defend their territories against The contrast between the two in how Valley. Swat is a long twisting valley the Taliban.10 Such experiments, civilians and the military see the future surrounded by high mountains; it is however, are likely to fail in Pakistan’s of Pakistan has remained the principle far more heavily populated than areas tribal areas because the Taliban have contradiction that has bedeviled the in FATA. While what should have successfully decimated the tribal elite country since its inception and has occurred was securing villages and who would be the traditional leaders constantly pitted the army against towns one by one, combined with deep of such militias. More than 300 tribal civilian political forces. patrols in the mountains to keep the chiefs and elders have been killed since Taliban on the run, the army instead 2004.11 The individuals whom the Practicing successful counterinsurgency set up camps where it hunkered down, government is now trying to promote relies upon outlining proper strategic used excessive firepower that killed as tribal elders are not the traditional priorities and on making national hundreds of civilians, failed to protect leaders and consequently do not have security doctrine relevant to the needs the local anti-Taliban tribal elders who the full support of their tribes or clans. of the population, rather than on the were trying to protect their villages Similar attempts now being carried out needs or desires of the army. Pakistan’s and homes with their own followers in selective provinces in Afghanistan by biggest threat today comes from the and allowed the Taliban to dismantle the U.S. military are also fraught with Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qaìda or kill the local police force and civil the same kind of dangers, as the Taliban and Afghan Taliban allies. It does not administration. The Taliban burned have also decimated the tribal elite in come from India. down approximately 200 schools, and that country. In both war zones, the teachers were forced to flee. No element Taliban have deliberately replaced the Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist of the state machinery or the population tribal elite with their own mullahs who and writer. He is the author of four books, was adequately protected or defended.9 act as military commanders, judges of including Taliban (2000) and Jihad (2002). local Sharià courts and administrative His latest book is Descent into Chaos: U.S. The army is now negotiating a truce heads. Policy and the Failure of Nation Building with the Pakistani Taliban in both in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia Swat and in the tribal agencies. In the Conclusion (2008). He writes for the Daily Telegraph, past, such cease-fires have left the Even without receiving training from the BBC, the Washington Post, El Mundo, Pakistani Taliban free to consolidate the U.S. military, the Pakistan Army the International Herald Tribune, the New their territorial gains, while at the same can learn modern counterinsurgency York Review of Books as well as for Pakistani time allowing them to concentrate their practices. Professional army officers can media. He has been covering the wars in firepower on U.S. and NATO forces in study counterinsurgency from books in Afghanistan since 1979. He is a member of the Afghanistan. Once again, this seems addition to the vast body of experience Advisory Board of Eurasia Net of the Soros to be the aim of the Pakistani Taliban, that has emerged from recent wars Foundation, a scholar of the Davos World who are under the influence of Afghan in Iraq and Afghanistan. By applying Economic Forum and a consultant for Human Taliban leaders and al-Qaìda. that theory to basic military training Rights Watch. In 2004, he was appointed to and doctrine and gaining knowledge of the Board of Advisers to the International Bajaur. local conditions and the enemy, soldiers Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. At the 7 “14 Militants, 3 Women Killed in Bajaur,” Daily Times, and officers can be quickly retrained. invitation of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, August 21, 2008. For this to occur, however, Pakistan’s he became the first journalist to address the UN 8 This information was drawn from the author’s per- General Assembly in New York in September sonal interviews with refugees. 10 “Pakistan’s NW Govt to Arm People Against Mili- 2002 and the first journalist to address NATO 9 Amanda Ruggeri, “Taliban Extends Cease-Fire With tants,” Agence France-Presse, February 22, 2009. ambassadors in Brussels in September 2003. Pakistan in Troubled Tribal Region,” U.S. News & World 11 Aamir Latif, “Masquerading as Taliban,” IslamOnline. Report, February 24, 2009. net, June 28, 2008.

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Al-Qaìda’s Involvement The 7/7 Bombings In December 2004, Siddique Khan, The terrorists who carried out the along with Shehzad Tanweer who would in Britain’s “Homegrown” July 7, 2005 London bombings were become one of the 7/7 suicide bombers, Terrorist Plots initially depicted as “ordinary” British traveled to Pakistan for the final time. Muslims who had been “brainwashed” The two men stayed in the country for By James Brandon by extremist Islamist preachers and six weeks, leaving in February 2005. radicalized by the war in Iraq.1 Since On this trip, their precise whereabouts in the united kingdom, the discovery of then, it has become clear that the 7/7 are unknown—although it is likely new terrorist plots generally follows a bombers, and particularly their leader that they received further bomb- clear trend. In a blaze of publicity, the Mohammed Siddique Khan, had been making training that was specific to would-be terrorists are arrested or, involved in jihadist movements prior to their proposed mission. At some point more rarely, succeed in carrying out an 9/11 and that he and the other bombers during the trip, each man also recorded attack. Soon afterward, their friends had deliberately cultivated relationships a martyrdom video. Their decision to and family are quoted as saying that with a wide range of pro-jihadist groups make the videos indicates that they the suspects are innocent and that they and individuals in the United Kingdom had not only decided to carry out the would never be involved in terrorism. and abroad. Meanwhile, journalists speculate that these men (of whom little is yet known) Siddique Khan’s serious involvement in “Each of the major apparently acted alone and had few if any jihadist groups began in July 2001 when terrorist plots affecting links to known terrorists or extremist he attended training camps at Mansehra groups. This is often accompanied by in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier the United Kingdom since learned speculation that this is a sign Province (NWFP) run by Harkat-ul- the 9/11 attacks in the that more terrorists are becoming “self- Mujahidin, a Kashmiri terrorist group starters,” operating alone and forming with close ties to the Taliban.2 Khan then United States have had fully independent cells as outlined in traveled to Afghanistan where he hoped ties back to al-Qaìda’s Abu Musàb al-Suri’s The Global Islamic to fight against the Northern Alliance. Resistance Call. This in turn often triggers He was taken ill, however, and unable to central organization in further speculation that al-Qaìda no take part in any fighting. In July 2003, Afghanistan and Pakistan.” longer exists as an organization or even Khan returned to the region to attend as a network, an impression that is training camps run by unspecified often only strengthened by the internet jihadist groups at Malakand in northern ranting of apparently isolated figures Pakistan.3 At these camps, Khan and London bombing attacks, but also that such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. other volunteers were trained to use they had now all received the training light weapons and rocket-propelled and skills necessary to do so. After the In the light of 24-hour news, this process grenades (RPG).4 Zeeshan Siddique, bombings, this recording was released is understandable. It ignores, however, another British Muslim who attended exclusively by al-Qaìda’s media wing, the steady stream of information from the camps with Siddique Khan, was later al-Sahab. Significantly, the video had terrorism trials in the United Kingdom— arrested by Pakistani police and found been edited to include clips of Ayman some of which last for months—that are to have phone numbers for known al- al-Zawahiri praising the two Britons. increasingly bringing the whole concept Qaìda members in his possession.5 It is This again probably indicates that there of “self-starters” and “leaderless jihad” possible, therefore, that Siddique Khan was a clear channel of communication— into question. Recent British trials first made contact with al-Qaìda at this albeit probably through a number of in fact indicate that the majority of time while at the camp. According to intermediaries—between these British men major terrorist plots formulated in the some media reports, Siddique Khan and and al-Qaìda’s most senior leaders. United Kingdom in the post-9/11 era others in the Malakand camp actually were at least partly directed by major received training from Abd al-Hadi 7/21 Bombings al-Qaìda figures in the Afghanistan al-Iraqi, a senior Iraqi member of al- Initially, the abortive 7/21 bombings and Pakistan border region. Indeed, Qaìda.6 carried out on July 21, 2005, two weeks without the training supplied by al- after the 7/7 bombings, were described Qaìda members, it is likely that few 1 “Suicide Bombers’ ‘Ordinary’ Lives,” BBC, July 18, as a “copycat” attack that had been of these plots would ever have become 2005. hastily put together—hence the reason viable. This article shows that each of 2 Rachel Williams, “July 7 Plot Accused Tell of Times suggested for its failure. In the months the major terrorist plots affecting the with Taliban,” Guardian, May 21, 2008. following the bombings, however, it United Kingdom since the 9/11 attacks 3 “7/7 Accused ‘Joined Weapons Camp,’” BBC, April 18, became clear that the 7/21 bombers in the United States have had ties back 2008. had significant contact with a range of to al-Qaìda’s central organization in 4 Ibid. other extremist groups and individuals Afghanistan and Pakistan. 5 Mohammed Khan and Carlotta Gall, “Accounts After in Pakistan and the United Kingdom— 2005 London Bombings Point to Al Qaeda Role From including with people who were close to Pakistan,” New York Times, August 13, 2006; Dominic Casciani, “Jihadi Diary: Inside the Mind,” BBC, June 14, on the Backstreets of Lahore,” The Times, May 1, 2007; 2007. Sean O’Neill et al., “7/7 ‘Mastermind’ is Seized in Iraq,” 6 Daniel McGrory et al., “Meeting of Murderous Minds The Times, April 28, 2007.

10 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 the 7/7 bombers. It is also now known called for al-Ghabra to be prosecuted; nitrate and aluminum powder—most that the bombings were planned well in however, the police apparently lack the probably from Abd al-Hadi or someone advance and that Muktar Said Ibrahim, necessary evidence to do so.14 Despite similar.18 At some point in Pakistan, the leader of the 7/21 plot, traveled to this, the Bank of England has ordered Khyam came into contact with Siddique Pakistan at approximately the same for al-Ghabra’s assets to be frozen under Khan.19 Together with other British time as Siddique Khan.7 British measures initiated in 2001 extremists, Khyam and Siddique Khan against the Taliban and al-Qaìda—a conducted test explosions at their rented Ibrahim first traveled to Pakistan in late highly unusual measure that indicates house in Lahore—eventually attracting 20048 where the Crown Prosecution the suspicion surrounding him.15 the attention of the Pakistani police Service believe he was trained in bomb- (who briefly investigated but took no making. As in the case of Siddique “Crevice” Plotters action).20 Khyam may have already been Khan, how and where this took place Planned and developed in parallel to introduced to Siddique Khan through is presently unknown. Unlike Khan, the 7/7 and 7/21 plots was the so-called Quayyam Kham, their mutual contact Ibrahim, a Somali, had few contacts in “Crevice Plot” to attack unspecified from Luton. Nine months after their Pakistan and no experience in training targets in the United Kingdom— meeting in Lahore, in February 2004 camps there. Therefore, it is likely potentially including nightclubs and Khyam was recorded by MI5 talking that Ibrahim received some assistance shopping centers. It was led by Omar to Siddique Khan a few months before and advice before he left the United Khyam, a British Muslim from south Khan headed to the Malakand training Kingdom. It has been reported by UK London, who had extensive experience camp. During the call, Khyam gave newspapers that MI5 believes that of training camps in Pakistan and who Khan advice about training camps: Ibrahim was assisted by Mohammed was part of the British al-Muhajiroun al-Ghabra, a U.S. Treasury-designated network led by Omar Bakri. Khyam you’ll be with Arab brothers, terrorist who lives freely in the United first attended militant training camps Chechen brothers. The only thing Kingdom.9 The U.S. Treasury has in Pakistan in 1999, at age 18, where I will advise you, yeah, is total accused al-Ghabra of organizing “travel he received training in light weaponry obedience to whoever your Emir to Pakistan for individuals seeking to and RPGs.16 In 2001, he traveled to is…whether he is Sunni, Arab, meet with senior al Qaida individuals Afghanistan where he was reportedly Chechen, Saudi, British—total and to undertake jihad training. Several impressed by the Taliban. obedience. I’ll tell you up there of these individuals have returned to you can get your head cut off.21 the UK to engage in covert activity on These experiences, however, were behalf of al Qaida.”10 It also said that apparently not enough to secure him The ethnic diversity that Khyam al-Ghabra traveled to Pakistan in 2005 access to the terrorist training that he emphasized is likely to be only found in to meet Faraj al-Libi who was then “al- wanted. Therefore, Khyam possibly an al-Qaìda camp—perhaps the one that Qaeda’s director of operations” and that turned—like Ibrahim—to British Siddique Khan visited in Malakand. he had contact with Harkat-ul-Jihad al- extremists in order to contact al-Qaìda Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, two in Pakistan. Among them may have been Once back in the United Kingdom, Pakistani terrorist groups.11 If true, this Mohammed Quayyum Khan, a British Khyam maintained his contacts with may mean that al-Ghabra could have man living in Luton (known as “Q” al-Qaìda members in Pakistan. On one arranged for Ibrahim to be trained in under British reporting restrictions) occasion, also in February 2004, Khyam bomb-making in Pakistan and for him who is reported to have been in contact even reportedly contacted Abu Munthir, to meet individuals from al-Qaìda and with Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, the Iraqi al- Abd al-Hadi’s deputy, to double-check a related organizations—a possibility Qaìda man who may also have trained bomb-making recipe.22 Soon afterward, that some British newspapers have Siddique Khan. MI5 reportedly said Khyam and his gang were arrested by suggested.12 One fact in support of that Abd al-Hadi had “secret meetings” police who feared that they were close this thesis is that in December 2004 with Khyam on several occasions.17 In to completing their own bomb project Ibrahim was driven to Heathrow airport summer 2003, Khyam, perhaps now based on ammonium nitrate fertilizer. to catch his flight to Pakistan by Rauf armed with information about how to Mohammed, an Iraqi taxi driver who contact al-Qaìda, returned to Pakistan. Related Cells is believed to have helped al-Ghabra In Pakistan, he learned to build In addition to these major bomb send British Muslims to fight abroad.13 homemade bombs using ammonium attempts, there is further evidence that Prominent British politicians have suggests a range of connections between 14 Ibid. other UK-based extremists and al-Qaìda 7 “Profile: Muktar Ibrahim,” BBC, July 11, 2007. 15 “Financial Sanctions: Terrorist Financing and al- members abroad. 8 Ibid. Qaeda and the Taliban,” Bank of England, December 21, 9 David Leppard, “Fixer for 21/7 Plot Free in London,” 2006. 18 McGrory et al. The Times, July 15, 2007. 16 “MI5 Transcript of Bomber’s Conversation,” Channel 19 Casciani. 10 “Treasury Designates Individual Supporting Al Qai- 4 News [London], May 1, 2007. 20 McGrory et al. da, Other Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of 17 Shiv Malek, “The Jihadi House Parties of Hate,” Sun- 21 “MI5 Transcript of Bomber’s Conversation.” the Treasury, December 19, 2006. day Times, May 6, 2007; Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, 22 “Terrorists Planned to Rival 9/11 with UK Bomb 11 Ibid. “Free - The Man Accused of Being an al-Qaida Leader, Plot,” Daily Mail, April 30, 2007; Peter Bergen and Paul 12 Leppard. aka ‘Q,’” Guardian, May 1, 2007; “Questions Over ‘Plot Cruickshank, “Al Qaeda-on-Thames: UK Plotters Con- 13 Ibid. Mastermind,’” BBC, May 1, 2007. nected,” Washington Post, April 30, 2007.

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In December 2008, Rangzieb Ahmed, other airline plotters, were reportedly cylinders and petrol.30 The May 2008 a Pakistani man living in Manchester, first “radicalized” partly during visits attempted restaurant bombing in Exeter was convicted of being a member of al- in 2002 to a Pakistani camp for Afghan was even more amateurish, being built Qaìda. Much of the evidence for the refugees.26 Such camps are frequently largely according to videos on the conviction came from analysis of his used by the Taliban and other groups to YouTube.com website.31 phone records and from incriminating recruit supporters—initial contacts with evidence written in invisible ink in one al-Qaìda sympathizers may have been Several important questions about the of his notebooks. Ahmed’s contacts made there. Another leading suspect al-Qaìda-linked plots, however, remain include: Abu Hamza Rabia, a leading in the airline plot was Rashid Rauf, unanswered. For example, it is not yet Egyptian member of al-Qaìda who a British Muslim who was arrested clear to what extent the leaders of the was killed in Pakistan in December by Pakistani police in 2006, and who 7/7 and 7/21 bomb plots proactively 2005; Mamoun Darkazanli, a key al- reportedly also had contacts with sought out al-Qaìda members and to Qaìda financier of the 2004 Madrid Muktar Ibrahim, the leader of the 7/21 what extent al-Qaìda found them and bombings who also knew several of bombers.27 In December 2007, however, pushed them toward violence. Likewise, the 9/11 hijackers; and Khalid Habib, Rauf escaped from police custody shortly it is not yet clear at what stage Siddique a prominent al-Qaìda fighter who had before he was due to be extradited to Khan, Khyam and others decided to fought in Chechnya and Afghanistan.23 the United Kingdom.28 Rauf was later target the United Kingdom. Did they Ahmed also had connections to Yassin reported to have been killed by a U.S. make this decision before they left the Omar, one of the 7/21 bombers, who missile strike in November 2008 in United Kingdom and traveled to meet had called his cellular phone in March Waziristan in northern Pakistan while militants in Pakistan? Or did they travel 2005. He additionally worked with in the company of Abu Zubair al-Masri, abroad planning to fight in Kashmir or Abdul Rahman, a local “recruiting an Egyptian who was an al-Qaìda Afghanistan, only to be convinced that they sergeant” in Manchester to locate explosives expert.29 Although Rauf’s should instead attack targets in Britain? potential recruits to al-Qaìda who death has not been officially confirmed, might be willing to travel to Pakistan his death in the presence of a senior al- These cases also make clear that many of or Afghanistan. Additionally, Habib Qaìda member would suggest a further the links between British extremists and Ahmed, Rangzieb’s co-defendant who link between the airline plotters and al-Qaìda were forged after 9/11 at a time was also convicted, had numerous close al-Qaìda’s senior members—as well as when al-Qaìda’s network in the United contacts with al-Muhajiroun, the British underscore the links between the 7/21 Kingdom and Pakistan was supposedly radical organization. Rangzieb Ahmed’s bombers and al-Qaìda. under heavy pressure. The fact that connections both to al-Qaìda’s senior al-Qaìda could not only survive this leadership and to British extremists Conclusion pressure but also expand aggressively are a clear indication that al-Qaìda As more evidence emerges from police into the United Kingdom demonstrates potentially plays a direct role in the and judicial investigations, it is becoming both the group’s remarkable resilience recruitment of British Muslims at the clear that many of the United Kingdom’s and also the resourcefulness of its street-level in the UK itself—as well as largest terrorist plots developed as members. Above all, however, these in their training in Pakistan. a direct result of the plotters’ close cases indicate that al-Qaìda remains involvement with senior members of al- a potent network of like-minded Additional recent evidence of close Qaìda in Pakistan. Indeed, it seems fair individuals—if not a formal, centralized links between British extremists and al- to say that without al-Qaìda’s direct organization as it was pre-9/11—whose Qaìda members in Pakistan comes from involvement, many of these plots would continuing power and reach should not the trial of the 2006 “airline bombers.” never have become remotely viable. be underestimated. Ahmed Abdulla Ali, the leading airline Other bomb plots carried out without plotter, was in Pakistan frequently al-Qaìda’s guidance have been far more James Brandon is a senior research fellow during 2002-2005—including in amateurish and ineffective. The July at the Quilliam Foundation, a counter- December 2004 when the 7/7 and 7/21 2007 attempted car bombings in London extremism think tank based in the United bomb plot leaders were also in the and Glasgow, for example, involved far Kingdom. He previously worked for the country.24 Ali was in phone contact cruder “bombs” made of propane gas British think tank Civitas and has written on with Muktar Ibrahim, the leader of the Islamism and terrorism for numerous think 7/21 plot, and British officials believe tanks and journals. He has also worked as a that all these plotters were trained be Sought in Alleged Al Qaeda Plot,” Los Angeles Times, journalist, reporting on Islamic issues from simultaneously or by the same al-Qaìda September 11, 2008; Gordon Corera, “Bomb Plot – The Europe, the Middle East and Africa for print operatives—all three plots involved al-Qaeda Connection,” BBC, September 9, 2008. and broadcast media in 2002-2007. Mr. the use of Hydrogen Peroxide-based 26 Milmo. Brandon has a master’s degree in Middle 25 explosives. Ali and Assad Sarwar, two 27 Duncan Gardham, “Airliner Bomber Plot: The al-Qae- Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental da Connections,” Daily Telegraph, September 8, 2008. and African Studies in London. 23 “Links to Global Terror Network,” Manchester Evening 28 Massoud Ansari and Miles Erwin, “London Airline News, December 18, 2008. Bomb Plot Suspect Escapes,” Daily Telegraph, December 30 Duncan Gardham, “Glasgow Bomb Plot: The Bombs 24 Cahal Milmo, “‘You will be Destroyed’: Bombers 17, 2007. Constructed by Airport Terrorists,” Daily Telegraph, De- Convicted of Heathrow Plot,” Independent, September 9, 29 Kevin Dowling, “Missile Strike Kills Suspected UK cember 16, 2008. 2008. Mastermind of Airline Bomb Plot,” The Times, November 31 “Muslim Convert Admits Failed Suicide Bomb At- 25 Janet Stobart and Sebastian Rotella, “Retrials Will 22, 2008. tack,” The Scotsman, October 15, 2008.

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Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (special prayers) to celebrate their Takbeer,10 Saeed wrote, “Islam propounds victory.4 Publicly, however, operational both da`wa (proselytize) and jihad. Both Remains Committed to planners have denied a role in the are equally important and inseparable. Jihad attacks, and in recent weeks the LeT’s Since our life revolves around Islam, political wing attempted to distance therefore both da`wa and jihad are By Farhana Ali and Mohammad Shehzad itself from extremism by allegedly essential; we cannot prefer one over renaming its organization Tehrik-i- the other.” The symbiosis of education lashkar-i-tayyiba (let) is in the spotlight Hurmat-i-Rasool.5 (da`wa) with jihad forms the basis of LeT/ for allegedly masterminding attacks JuD’s political and religious power.11 in India’s financial capital of Mumbai This article argues that initial claims on November 26, 2008. The event has by LeT/JuD that it will transform its In addition to involvement in Kashmir, caused authorities to question the image into that of a peaceful group LeT/JuD allegedly participated in Islamist group’s growing strength, are noteworthy if the organization previous terrorism plots involving the as well as its command and control withdraws from pitched warfare. Yet a United Kingdom12 and orchestrated structure. Since the deadly attacks in stream of reports indicates that LeT/JuD numerous attacks in India, including Mumbai, the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and in Pakistan remains devoted to violent New Delhi’s Laal Qila (Red Fort) on Jama`at-ud-Da`wa (JuD) network, the jihad and will continue to galvanize December 22, 2000, Srinagar Airport latter of which is allegedly a front for support to transform South Asia into an in Indian-held Kashmir on January LeT, has been quick to deny involvement. Islamic-style regime. 5, 2001, and the Indian Parliament in With mounting evidence against them December 2001. A statement released by by Indian intelligence officials, Lashkar Inside the Network LeT after the attack in Srinagar reflects leaders have made public statements Formerly known as Lashkar-i- their aspirations today: claiming a change in their terrorist Tayyiba (Army of the Pure), the newly policies that have previously justified a camouflaged extremist organization and Prior to September 11, we were in number of attacks in India. In January armed wing of the JuD has been active a position to liberate Kashmir any 2009, the Islamist organization since the early 1990s.6 LeT was the time, but our target is the whole of appeared to take a new tack in Kashmir military offshoot of Markaz Dawat-ul- India and Israel’s turn after that. by toning down its “violent Kashmir- Irshad (Center for Religious Learning We only want the destruction of centric agenda,” opting for a peaceful and Propagation),7 the latter of which India…we are the ones fighting for settlement to the decades-old crisis.1 If morphed into Jama`at-ud-Da`wa after the liberation of Kashmir and the LeT is serious about ridding itself of the 2002.8 While the LeT and JuD are viewed future of Pakistan. terrorist label, this could prompt the as separate entities, the two groups are Pakistani security services to engage likely the same, enabling the JuD to The LeT/JuD allegedly subscribes to a local jihadist outfits to seek a solution increase its da`wa (missionary) and jihad hadith that recognizes the importance to the conflict in Kashmir, the main axis activities under the LeT framework.9 and relevance of “Ghazwa Hind,” a of discord between two nuclear-armed The JuD’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, has made tradition that calls for Muslims to neighbors.2 this point clear in his written work replace Hindu-dominated India with and public statements. In the magazine an Islamic style-government through Whether the LeT has the capacity for the use of jihad. While the hadith 13 change is questionable, however, and 4 Ibid. is possibly unauthentic, it serves worth further examination. Sensitive 5 Various reports indicate that the JuD may attempt to sources from within LeT indicate change its name, albeit temporarily. See Roul and “JuD 10 This document was in Urdu in the JuD’s magazine that the group is not ready to alter its Planning Name Change,” Deccan Herald, January 2, in 1999. position vis-à-vis India. These sources 2009. The name change is also cited in Pakistan’s lead- 11 For background on the organization, see Muham- state that Lashkar rejoiced over the ing English daily, Dawn, on January 3, 2009. The name mad Amir Rana (translated by Saba Ansari), A to Z of 3 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai. change has not yet been confirmed. Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal, 2006), They apparently offered nawafil shukrana 6 For background, see Jayshree Bajoria, “Profile: Lash- pp. 317-342; Mariam Abou Zahab, “I Shall be Waiting kar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyi- for You at the Door of Paradise: the Pakistani Martyrs 1 Animesh Roul, “Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba Chooses ba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba),” Council on For- of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure),” in Aparna Between Kashmir and the Global Jihad,” Terrorism Focus eign Relations, December 2, 2008. Rao, Michael Bollig and Monika Bock, The Practice of War 6:3 (2009). 7 The LeT was allegedly created by Pakistani intelligence (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 133. 2 Yaroslav Trofimov, “A New Tack in Kashmir,” Wall services to balance India’s control over Kashmir. For 12 Benjamin Sand, “Pakistan Denies Islamic Charity Street Journal, December 15, 2008. It should be noted background, see Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan: National- Link to UK Bomb Plot,” Voice of America, August 15, that Pakistan has a historical record for engaging local ism Without a Nation? (London: Zed Books, 2002). 2006. militant groups for national security interests; the most 8 Qandeel Siddique, “What is Lashkar-e-Taiba?” Nor- 13 Hadith literature varies widely depending on the recent example of engagement is the government’s truce wegian Defense Research Establishment, 2009, p. 4. source of the tradition. Islamic scholars agree that not all with the Taliban in the Swat Valley (February 2009), a 9 The statement that the two groups are likely the same hadith is considered a hadith from the Prophet Muham- move that has prompted wide debate within the U.S. and is based on the authors’ assessment. Additionally, the mad, unless a scientific methodology of transmission can Pakistan on the potential consequences of talking to a U.S. National Counterterrorism Center identifies the link be attributed to Muhammad. As long as hadith does not once hard-battled enemy. between the two groups as follows: “LT Coordinates its contradict the main schools of Islamic thought and the 3 Personal interview, JuD insiders, Pakistan, December Charitable Activities through its Front Organization, books of Islam—the Qur’an and sunna—then it is accept- 2008. Jamaat-ud-Dawa.” able. Only when a reliable chain of transmission is estab-

13 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 as the guiding principle for several By responding to social and economic control of Lebanon’s municipalities, jihadist groups in Pakistan, including ills under the platform of Islamic social and likely use its social services the LeT/JuD. The idea that militants justice,16 groups such as the JuD have infrastructure to “win the hearts and will “Islamicize” India by force after done exceptionally well to meet the minds” of the people.17 assumed victory in Afghanistan is not population’s expectations in times of a new concept; it has been previously crises or natural disasters, and win their As one of the largest Islamic charity’s highlighted in the literature of Maulana loyalty. Through the provision of social in Pakistan, no political campaign Fazul Rahman Khalil14 and Masood services, the JuD is able to connect with or military activity promises the Azhar, the latter the founder of Jaish- the people in a way that surpasses the same rate of success as the LeT/JuD i-Muhammad (JeM). Ghazwa Hind state’s ability. Not only does this put network. Granting people their “basic and the narrative of restoring Islam pressure on the state, but it disallows necessities of life,” including the right in the world is allegedly taught to external actors, such as neighboring to (religious) education, employment, members at the JuD’s center in Muridke countries and the international water, food, housing, and security, outside of Lahore; these spectacular these organizations are viewed as congregations, attended by hundreds of progressive Islamists. As organized members, reinforce religious activism “LeT/JuD in Pakistan structures with personnel working in to influence the process of an Islamic remains devoted to violent various capacities, from social workers identity formation.15 to protectorates of the population, the jihad and will continue LeT/JuD has established a national Connected by a similar religious to galvanize support to identity that builds solidarity among its ideology and strategic goal, the JuD and participants. In doing so, they maintain LeT complement one another. To its transform South Asia into a level of independence, can expand members, the two organizations exist on an Islamic-style regime.” their Islamic agenda, and could qualify paper only. The distinction is made by as legitimate authorities to a population the JuD’s vast social services network in that increasingly perceives the civilian Pakistan. The social services provision government as corrupt and conceding the organization offers arguably keeps community, from exploiting the local to Western demands. All these factors the Islamists alive and attractive to population to steer them away from the demonstrate why the Pakistani state local communities in Pakistan. In recent Islamists’ camp. In doing so, the JuD finds it difficult to eliminate the group. history, the JuD played a pivotal role in and by extension the LeT are able to aiding the victims of Pakistan’s 2005 grow their organization through social Lifelong Ambitions earthquake; the group worked alongside networking. With local support and What accounts for the LeT/JuD’s ongoing the U.S. military and international sympathy from a needy population, effectiveness? It is apparent after the aid organizations, such as the United these Islamists produce awareness of November 2008 attacks that the group Nations, to provide needed relief. their activities and promote a particular proved to the international community As a result, the JuD is tolerated and religious doctrine that guides their its capabilities against India. Given its welcomed by the Pakistani government associational work. Similar to LeT/ size and strength, one senior Pakistani for filling an important civic need. The JuD, Lebanese Hizb Allah offers a fair journalist said in an interview that “LeT JuD is considered the best organized comparison. Known for an extensive is the new Al-Qaeda.”18 His statement Islamic charity in South Asia with a and transparent social services arm, the social network unmatched by other Lebanon-based organization is viewed 17 During and after each conflict, Hizb Allah has quickly Islamic groups or militant outfits. as the champion of the local Shi`a distributed aid to those most affected by war and devel- population for rebuilding society in the oped plans for reconstruction. In its most recent war with lished can a hadith be considered authentic. The Ghazwa aftermath of war. Yet, unlike the LeT/ Israel, a Kuwaiti-based journalist told the lead author Hind tradition is attributed to the Prophet Muhammad JuD network, Hizb Allah’s ambitious that “Hizb Allah was quick to place the Iranian flag at the although there is little evidence to support this claim; the political agenda reflects the group’s sites of homes it intended to rebuild, with Iranian money tradition is propagated by the late Shaykh Muhammad desire to grow its influence, seek greater of course.” Hizb Allah’s immediate response to help the Akram Awan of the Naqshbandia Owaisiah, a major Lebanese people allowed it to gain popular support for Sufi Islamic order. Local militant outfits in Pakistan -be 16 The concept of “faith and good works” also has its ori- militant retaliation against Israel. lieve that Ghazwa Hind legitimizes “jihad in Kashmir,” gins in Christianity and Judaism. The concept of giving 18 Personal interview, Khawar Rizvi, U.S.-based Paki- thereby justifying attacks against Indian targets. For is referenced in at least 93 of the 114 verses of the Qur’an stani journalist, Washington, D.C., December 2008. more information on the Islamic order and application and is central to the faith, even though it is not one of its Former U.S. security officials have also expressed- con of Ghazwa Hind, see the Urdu-language website, www. five pillars. Unlike zakat (a mandatory alms), charity is cern over LeT’s global network. On March 8, 2009, Juan ghazwatulhind.com. voluntary but highly encouraged to attain God’s plea- Zarate, the deputy national security adviser for coun- 14 For lectures by Rahman, see www.tauheed-sunnat. sure. For Islamists, the goal extends beyond developing terterrorism in the Bush administration, stated, “We com/sunnat/content/ghazwa-uhud-ka-pas-manzar. an Islamic society. Rather, it is the groups’ desire for po- are and should be concerned about the threat LT poses, Also note that Khalil, Azhar and Hafiz Saeed publish litical power—with the use of Islamic slogans and narra- given its global network. It doesn’t just reside in South widely in their own publications. Since the crackdown tives—that lies at the heart of their strategic objectives. Asia. It is an organization that has potential reach all over on the LeT, the Pakistani government has banned these Employing language and themes drawn from the Islamic the world, including the US.” See Josh Meyer, “Militant publications, although this move will unlikely preclude faith also has helped Islamists identify with the popula- Threat from Pakistan Alarms U.S.: Officials See Indica- these organizations from circulating their message. tion in need, translating into the public’s admiration for tion of Presence within United States,” Chicago Tribune, 15 Jaffrelot, p. 133. the group’s political platform. March 8, 2009.

14 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 indicates a heightened awareness of the al-Qaìda, Lashkar is focused on attacks group members, all of whom were group’s emotional power and a need to against Indian and Western targets allegedly recruited, trained, and directed indulge in surprising moves to maintain inside the subcontinent. from Pakistan. According to the report, their elevated status. While LeT/JuD Indian authorities expect Pakistan to is local and al-Qaìda a transnational It will be difficult for the Pakistani hand over the conspirators to face trial movement, arrests of senior al-Qaìda government to counter the LeT/JuD in India, dismantle the infrastructure commanders in LeT safe houses suggest network. LeT/JuD is one of the largest of terrorism and adhere to bilateral and a link between the two groups, although jihadist outfits in the country. Not only international agreements, such as the the details of this relationship remain does the organization draw in thousands SAARC Convention on Suppression opaque.19 of members in Pakistan, but recruits of Terrorism, which requires member from Muslim communities throughout states to provide mutual legal assistance Nevertheless, there are similarities India. The Deccan Mujahidin, the group to neighboring states in terrorism cases. between al-Qaìda and the LeT/ which claimed responsibility for the Naturally, the “need-to-do-more” on an JuD. The LeT/JuD appeals to a global Mumbai attacks, is likely a pseudonym Indian timeline is unlikely to be well audience despite being a local group. for Lashkar.21 The attacks in Mumbai received in Pakistan. Like al-Qaìda, the LeT/JuD network showed a level of sophistication that has an ideological framework that reflects the group’s coming-of-age. A key obstacle for Islamabad is how to attracts members outside of Pakistan; it The LeT/JuD’s legitimate activities eliminate Islamists that once served its is not uncommon to find members from in the name of charity, education, and foreign policy agenda in Kashmir and Central Asia and the Arab world with public service (all under the guise of Afghanistan.23 According to Pakistani religious ideological doctrine) provide scholar Zahid Hussain, the state had “In the short-term, the organization a cover for its extreme no intention of clamping down on the excesses. With a veneer of secrecy, LeT/JuD’s propaganda machinery or its Pakistan appears willing Lashkar can operate under the radar militant infrastructure, even though the to act against members of and not raise suspicion from local group was added to the terrorist watch authorities. Its camouflaged activities— list in 2003.24 Whether the government’s the LeT/JuD to prove it has networks of legitimate mosques, schools, crackdown on the network is cosmetic the courage to fight its own media and publications work—help the or convincing will depend on the final organization sustain its presence inside outcome of the Mumbai investigation, creation, but it is probably Pakistan and abroad. which is still pending. incapable of shutting down Moving Forward Undoubtedly, the choices facing an organization important In response to international pressure, the United States will not be easy. to its survival.” Pakistan has taken a series of steps Pushing Pakistan too far by forcing the against the group, such as closing LeT/ shutdown of the LeT/JuD network will JuD offices, arresting hundreds of likely upset the bilateral relationship. suspected members, including senior The United States can, however, LeT, or to find Lashkar’s participation leaders, and intending to hold a public encourage Pakistan to move quickly to in activities outside of Pakistan.20 In trial of key commanders. Additional prosecute the suspects—it is the first addition, the LeT/JuD benefits from a pressure on Islamabad to delegitimize step to restore faith and confidence with support network outside of Pakistan that the JuD’s authentic activities (such as India, whose External Affairs minister includes Saudi Arabia, a country with charitable work), however, will have recently announced his country’s whom JuD leader Hafiz Saeed developed long-term consequences that could unwillingness to resume the composite relations in 1985 when he studied in the impact the country negatively. Thus, dialogue on Kashmir unless Pakistan kingdom, and subsequently received counterterrorism cooperation between dismantles its terrorist infrastructure.25 support from during and after the Pakistan, India and the United States is In truth, Pakistan is being pressed to Afghan jihad. Many of the similarities deliberately protracted. “do more” by senior U.S. officials and end there, however. The LeT/JuD the Indian government to “crush the remains a local organization with Inside India, officials appear dissatisfied ultras operating from its [Pakistan] local ties to Pakistani militant groups. with Pakistan’s overall treatment of the soil,”26 a statement that will likely Despite its shared strategic vision with dossier22 that New Delhi insists offers arouse resentment inside Islamabad a wealth of evidence against Islamist against an important ally and a regional 19 Siddique, pp. 8-9. partner for asking what it considers 20 Personal interview, various Pakistan experts, Janu- 21 Personal interview, Khawar Rizvi, Washington, D.C., impossible. ary-February 2009. A journalist in Pakistan told the au- December 2008. Rizvi said that Deccan is “an unknown thors that LeT/JuD draws on support from members in and unfamiliar name to the public, but the name is sig- 23 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with other Islamic countries. Students worldwide participate nificant. Deccan is a place in Hyderabad, a state in India Militant Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). in Islamic training at the JuD institution in Muridke and with a Muslim majority population. There, LeT has a 24 Ibid. LeT members are suspected of fighting in the Iraq war strong footprint and can manipulate Indian Muslims’ 25 “Pakistan Has To Do More to Dismantle Terror Infra- against U.S.-led forces. See Praveen Swami and Moham- anti-Hindu sentiment.” structure: Pranab,” Times of India, February 24, 2009. mad Shehzad, “Lashkar Raising Islamist Brigades for 22 A scanned copy of the report can be read at www.the- 26 “Pak Needs To Do More on Combating Terror: John Iraq,” The Hindu, June 13, 2004. hindu.com/nic/mumbaiattacksevidence-3.pdf. Kerry,” Times of India, February 26, 2009.

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In the short-term, Pakistan appears Deconstructing Ibn accepted Islam. He witnessed the military willing to act against members of the strength of veteran Muslims crumble at LeT/JuD to prove it has the courage Taymiyya’s Views on the hands of the newly converted, and he to fight its own creation, but it is Suicidal Missions despaired at the sight of soldiers fleeing probably incapable of shutting down an from the conventional battlefield.4 organization important to its survival.27 By Rebecca Molloy Despite these difficult conditions, what One senior Pakistani journalist doubts was most distressing to him was not an Pakistan’s ability or willpower to jihadist ideologues regularly advocate elusive victory in battle or the Mongols’ effectively dismantle the LeT/JuD the legitimacy of suicide attacks, and legitimacy once in power, but rather the because the state needs to “protect an some sectors of Muslim society accept latter’s mismanagement of the Muslim important constituency—the jihadi the authenticity of this tactic. It is, networks.”28 Not surprisingly, an initial therefore, critical to examine the more crackdown against LeT/JuD will have significant primary sources that have “Jihadists’ form of dissent little to no impact on the organization’s been misused by jihadists to formulate fits Islamic legal definitions long-term existence. Therefore, the and support their arguments.1 This coming weeks are critical for Pakistan. article sheds light on a lesser known of brigands (muharibun) Both India and Pakistan will need treatise attributed to the Hanbali and rebels (bugha) to reach a final agreement on the theologian and scholar Ibn Taymiyya, Mumbai investigation or risk further who is probably the most widely cited who spread terror and provocation. medieval scholar by the Salafi-jihadi destruction.” trend in Islam.2 The treatise, entitled Farhana Ali is a Senior Fellow at the Qaìda fi al-inghimas fi al-àduww wa-hal yubah Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, fiha? (A Principle Regarding Plunging into the where she studies conflicts in the Muslim Enemy, and is it Permitted?) is a short work community’s affairs. Underlying world. From 2000-2005, she was one of comprising 48 pages in the original Ibn Taymiyya’s confrontations with the few American Muslim political officers manuscript.3 Despite the brevity of the the authorities was “a structural to fight the war against terrorism in the work, it demonstrates Ibn Taymiyya’s disposition to cooperate with the U.S. government, and subsequently joined perception of inghimas (plunging into). state, and it is cooperation rather than the RAND Corporation as an international Although his understanding of inghimas confrontation that is the keynote of policy analyst to focus on South Asia greatly differs from that of today’s his political thought.”5 Moreover, even research and thematic issues, such as jihadists, they exploit his writings and when he expressed concern with the trends in female suicide terrorism. Ms. Ali the concept of inghimas to justify suicide prevailing political order, Ibn Taymiyya regularly travels to Kashmir and Pakistan attacks. unfailingly accepted the legitimacy of to examine socio-religious groups and their Sunni Muslim society. He consistently impact on regional security. She lectures, The Context of Ibn Taymiyya’s Writings argued that the best response to unjust appears regularly in the media, as well as Ibn Taymiyya lived in the wake of the rulers is forbearance.6 What is at stake, writes for U.S. and foreign publications. Mongol onslaught that culminated in according to him and other scholars, is the fall of Baghdad and the destruction lawlessness and “corruption on earth,”7 Mohammad Shehzad is a senior investigative of the Àbbasid caliphate in 1258 AD. or a complete breakdown of governance journalist in Pakistan who examines The murder of the caliph and his family and social order if certain forms of local militant groups inside Pakistan left the Muslim umma without a central dissent go unchecked. This occurs if and transnational terror networks in the authority. Baghdad and other centers dissenters reject the legitimacy of the region. His numerous contacts in jihadist of Islamic civilization were seized and outfits make him a valuable resource and destroyed. Unlike his jihadist followers, 4 Jihadists extend the conventional meaning of battle- a key insider. He publishes widely on Ibn Taymiyya coped with an enemy that field to include civilian populations, even those protected terrorism for various audiences. was initially pagan, but subsequently under Islamic law. 5 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong 1 For a detailed account on the proliferation of suicide in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University attacks and popularization of martyrdom, see Assaf Press, 2001), p. 150. Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, 6 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu` al-Fatawa (Madina: Majma` al- Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: Malik Fahd li-Tabaàt al-Mushaf al-Sharif, 1995), vol. 35, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). p. 21 and vol. 4, p. 443; Ibn Taymiyya, Minhaj al-Sunna 2 See, for example, William McCants and Jarret Brach- al-Nabawiyya (Riyadh: Ibn Saùd University, 1986), vol. man, Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combating 2, pp. 241-242; Al-Siyasa al-Sharìyya (Beirut: Dar Ibn 27 Pakistan relies on groups such as the JuD to balance Terrorism Center, 2006), pp. 7, 12. Hazm, 2003), p. 39 in Khalid Medhat Abu al-Fadl, The Indian hegemony in the region. Islamabad also prob- 3 This treatise has not been published in the West and is Islamic Law of Rebellion: The Rise and Development of the ably understands the leverage and influence that the JuD currently available only in Arabic, edited and prepared Juristic Discourses on Insurrection and Insurgency and Brig- network enjoys, thereby prohibiting the civilian govern- by Abu Muhammad Ashraf b. Àbd al-Maqsud, Qaìda andage (unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted to ment from taking too harsh an action against an organi- fi al-inghimas fi al-àduww wa-hal yubah fiha? (Riyadh: the faculty of Princeton University, 1999). zation that potentially threatens the state. Adwa’ al-Salaf, 2002). The only copy of the manuscript 7 Accusations of causing corruption were often used be- 28 Personal interview, Khawar Rizvi, Washington, D.C., (#444) is said to be located at the Egyptian National Li- tween political rivals in Islamic history. See al-Fadl, p. December 2008. brary in Cairo. 60.

16 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 political order as well as the Sunni In Qaìda fi al-inghimas, Ibn Taymiyya Ibn Taymiyya inextricably ties his notion Muslim society governed by it. Ibn opens the discussion with a number of of inghimas with the undesirable situation Taymiyya asserted that even if such scenarios that help describe what he of confronting a numerically superior people believe that they are commanding means by the term “inghimas” and where army, and the three example scenarios good and forbidding evil, when they it would be more appropriate to carry it correctly read as cases in which a soldier rebel against authority they are in fact out. The author introduces the matter on the battlefield decides to carry out doing more harm than good, and they of “an individual or group fighting an attack that will likely result in his must be fought and stopped.8 [an enemy] that outnumbers them, on death. Such a mission is dangerous and condition there is some benefit to Islam self-destructive, and in this sense may Today’s jihadists have no such claim to in fighting, even if the (individuals) are be considered “suicidal.”13 The idea of fame; they are not faced with similar likely to be killed.” Next, he introduces a “suicidal mission” also appears in historical and geopolitical conditions. three scenarios in which inghimas Ibn Taymiyya’s Majmu` al-Fatawa where They rebel against authority and applies: he mentions the widely-cited Qur’anic delegitimize Sunni Muslim society story of the Companions of Pit (ashab al- in a manner that in certain regions First Scenario ukhdud). He writes: is contributing to a breakdown of “Like [in the case of] a man who storms government and social stability the ranks of the infidels and penetrates In the story [of the Companions of (Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan). them. Scholars call this ‘plunging into the the Pit] the young boy is ordered Jihadists’ form of dissent fits Islamic enemy,’ since [the man] is swallowed up to get himself killed in order to legal definitions of brigands (muharibun)9 in them like a thing that gets submersed manifest religion’s splendor. and rebels (bugha) who spread terror in something that engulfs it.” For this reason the four imams14 and destruction. Their terror-based have permitted a Muslim to plunge methods and pursuit of indiscriminate Second Scenario into the ranks of the unbelievers, slaughter and lawlessness are difficult “And like a man who kills an infidel even if he thinks they will kill to distinguish from those of bandits, officer among his friends, for instance, him, on condition that this [act] such as their historical counterparts, by pouncing on him publicly, if he [can] is in the interest of Muslims. We the Khawarij.10 get him by deceit, thinking he can kill have expanded on this matter him and take him unaware like that.” elsewhere. Thus, if a person does Manipulating Ibn Taymiyya’s Definition of what he believes will get him killed Inghimas Third Scenario in the interest of the battle (jihad), Jihadist ideologues have manipulated “And [like] a man whose comrades have even though his death is more Ibn Taymiyya’s use of the term inghimas fled and so he is fighting the enemy powerful than his killing of others, in an attempt to justify suicide bombing alone or with a few others, and yet this and if what he causes the death of tactics.11 Their interpretation has is inflicting harm on the enemy, despite another for the benefit of Islam, not been derived in accordance with the fact they know they are likely to be which would not occur except appropriate Sharià procedure, and it killed.” through this [act of him losing his does not override explicit Qur’anic and life], and if it [constitutes what] legal texts prohibiting suicide. The aforementioned scenarios are all staves off the enemy’s corrupting “permissible according to most scholars damage to religion and earthly of Islam who belong to the four schools possessions which cannot be of law and others.” defended except by this means, then it is more appropriate.15 8 Taymiyya, Majmu` al-Fatawa, vol. 4, pp. 440-441, 444, The legitimacy of being outnumbered 450-452; Minhaj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya (Riyadh: Ibn in battle in the third scenario is further Clearly, inghimas (plunging into) pertains Saùd University, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 233, 244. highlighted on page 45 of the document to an extreme situation, as on the 9 In a video in 2000, Abu Musàb al-Suri called jihadists by comparing the notion to the events battlefield or elsewhere in the course of a 12 to commit larceny, murder and arson against non-Mus- of the battle of Badr (624 AD). Ibn conventional war, involving combatants. lims in Muslim countries. For more, see Emrullah Uslu, Taymiyya says: The description and language in the “Al-Qaìda Robbers Target Jewelry Stores,” Eurasia passages lend themselves to a restricted Daily Monitor 6:25 (2009). And know that a group is permitted context to justify missions that in all 10 During the battle of Siffin (657 AD), some of Àli b. to fight those who outnumber them likelihood result in Muslim casualties. Abi Talib’s supporters (shià) rejected arbitration, on the despite their weakness, and there Since suicide is absolutely forbidden in argument that judgment belongs to Allah alone, using the is no difference in this between an slogan “la hukma illa lillah.” These dissenters eventually individual and the very few; thus withdrew from Àli’s supporters and were later known one person fighting three is like 13 This is different from other meanings signified by the as Khawarij. See, for example, Cook, p. 157: “The activist three people fighting ten. word “suicidal”: causing, intending, or relating to sui- moralist believes it to be his duty to take a stand against cide. political injustice, and to do so by recourse to arms; thus 12 Badr was a key battle in early Islam and a turning 14 This refers to the imams of the four Sunni legal he ends up fighting against Muslims in the manner of the point in Muhammad’s struggle with his Qurayshi oppo- schools. Kharijites.” nents in Mecca. It is considered in Islamic history a de- 15 Taymiyya, Majmu` al-Fatawa, vol. 28, p. 540. Also see 11 Jihadist lexicon does not use the term “suicide attack,” cisive victory attributable to divine intervention and the “Martyrs of Nejran” in David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam rather one finds phrases such as “carrying out jihad.” genius of Muhammad. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 20.

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Islam,16 there would have to be a clear To justify their tactics, jihadist identified in the case of inghimas.19 On benefit to the outcome of the war and ideologues have attempted to analogize page 36 of the inghimas text, Ibn Taymiyya engagement in jihad, a decisive repulsion suicide bombings with inghimas. In says: of the enemy’s damage to Islam, in order particular, they have attempted to to embark on a mission that would portray the technological superiority of And God, the Sublime, tries the surely end with the individual’s death. Western countries as justification for believers in self-devotion to the Where it is unmistakably beneficial, suicide-murder. The analogy, however, point of being killed for the sake of then, “it is more appropriate.” Note Ibn is invalid. Partial statements by Ibn God and the love of His messenger. Taymiyya’s use of the comparative in Taymiyya were isolated, stripped of And so, if they are killed, they are the last passage; it is not absolutely deliberate restrictions, and elaborated martyrs (shuhada’), and if they live, appropriate, merely “more appropriate” on devoid of syntactic, juridical and they are happy.20 historical contexts.18 Ibn Taymiyya was obviously aware of the notion of Indubitably, Ibn Taymiyya sees the “The promotion of suicide- inequality, and despite that put several possibility of coming out alive from murder as a legitimate restrictions on the applicability of such a mission even when advocating inghimas. Jihadist ideologues did not martyrdom in the cause of God. He case of inghimas is an follow proper Sharià procedure, neither asserts that the lone fighter unfortunately successful because if they did they could not have will be killed, nor argues that the manipulated the language of inghimas success of the mission depends on the name-game and an evasive to suit their case. With false premises, fighter’s death. This is crucial, since legal device.” their improper analogy might take the the possibility of surviving is absent form of the categorical syllogism: when considering the state of mind of a suicide terrorist, up to and during the a. [All] Endangering oneself to harm the act of taking his or her own life.21 than, for example, doing nothing. This enemy is permissible. places several restrictions even before b. Endangering oneself by inghimas On page 37, Ibn Taymiyya commentates reaching the statement on the relative includes taking one’s own life. on the Qur’anic verse 2:54 where he appropriateness of employing inghimas. c. Definition of enemy includes Sharià- reconstructs ellipses in the Qur’anic In addition, Ibn Taymiyya’s repeated protected groups. text to explain its meaning. He uses use of the phrase “and thus [the soldier] d. Therefore, taking one’s own life to the verse to show that it is prohibited fights until he is killed” connotes an harm Sharià-protected enemy groups is to kill sinners among one’s own people ongoing battle, rather than a single permissible inghimas. as it is tantamount to being killed “at event occurring in a concentration of one’s own hands.” It is best and entails non-combatants. This barely qualifies as weak inductive greater reward, explains Ibn Taymiyya, reasoning. For one, as seen above, “to die for the sake of God at the hands Ibn Taymiyya, like other scholars endangering oneself to inflict harm on of the enemy, not at the hands of one who deal with inghimas, is neither the enemy is permissible on condition another.” implying nor legitimizing “suicide there is a benefit to the outcome of the mass-murder” of non-combatant men, war and a decisive repulsion of the Conclusion women and children. Instead, Ibn enemy’s damage to Islam. Even the The promotion of suicide-murder Taymiyya offers a limited context worst wave of suicide bombings has as a legitimate case of inghimas is an within which an almost certainly not accomplished that. Second, inghimas unfortunately successful name-game “suicidal attack” on numerically, or applies to armies in the heat of battle, of and an evasive legal device.22 With by analogy technologically, superior which their Sharià-protected victims false legal reasoning and a manifold enemy combatants could be rendered are usually not part. Third, in the more decontextualization of a historical term, “more appropriate.” There is, without acceptable “suicidal missions,” one dies jihadist ideologues have managed to a doubt, a difference, as Ibn Taymiyya at the hands of the enemy, not by one’s apply the word inghimas to a staple tactic repeatedly states that Muslim and non- own doing. In this respect, the jihadists’ in their strategy book. They have been Muslim non-combatants must not be case for their brand of martyrdom harmed and collateral damage should attacks lacks the legal reason (Ar. ìlla) 19 On the concept of ìlla, see Nabil Shehaby, “Ìlla and 17 be avoided. Qiyas in Early Islamic Legal Theory,” Journal of the Amer- is prohibited.” See Ibn Taymiyya, Qaìda mukhtasara fi ican Oriental Society 102:1 (1982): pp. 27-46. 16 For example, Qur’an 4:29-30 states, “And do not take qital al-kuffar wa-muhadanatihim wa-tahrim qatlihim li- 20 Ibn Taymiyya, Qaìda fi al-inghimas fi al-àduww wa- your own lives for God has mercy on you. And so he who mujarrad kufrihim (Riyadh: Àbd al-Àziz b. Àbd Allah hal yubah fiha? (Riyadh: Adwa’ al-Salaf, 2002), p. 36. This does this in transgression and violation. We shall burn b. Ibrahim al-Zayr al-Hamad, 2004), pp. 91-92. Also see refers to the Qur’an. him in Hellfire. This is an easy feat for God.” al-Sarim al-maslul àla sahtim al-rasul (Beirut: Dar Ibn 21 Dr. Boaz Ganor, “The Rationality of the Islamic Radi- 17 One example of many is Ibn Taymiyya’s interpreta- Hazm, 1997), vol. 2, p. 513. cal Suicide Attack Phenomenon,” International Institute tion of Qur’an 2:190 and his stance on aggression against 18 In fact, Ibn Taymiyya himself criticized those who for Counter-Terrorism, March 31, 2007. non-combatants: “aggression means transgressing/ ex- use partial statements of Ibn Hanbal (d. 855 AD) thereby 22 On prohibition of evasive legal devices, see Dr. Ahmad ceeding a limit, and so (the Qur’anic text) indicates that ignoring the complexity of his juridical opinion. See al- al-Raysuni, Imam Al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objec- fighting those who do not fight us constitutes aggression, Sarim al-maslul (Saudi Arabia: al-Haras al-Watani al- tives and Intents of Islamic Law (Herndon, VA: Interna- and God confirms this and indicates that excessiveness Saùdi, undated), vol. 2, pp. 483-484. tional Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005), pp. 56-57.

18 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 spinning Islamic tradition and law to Muslim Brotherhood Despite these reports, the (re)emergence suit their cause. Ibn Taymiyya and other of an organized jihadist movement in Muslim jurists, however, have expressed Faces Growing Egypt remains a remote possibility. their condemnation of those groups Challenges in Egypt Radicalization in the Sinai feeds off the pursuing indiscriminate slaughter economic deprivation and governmental and lawlessness. Thus, not only have By Steven Brooke neglect of the Bedouin population there, jihadists removed themselves beyond conditions that do not transfer well to the pale of mainstream Muslim society for decades, the Muslim Brotherhood other parts of Egypt.2 The vicious jihadist constituting today’s Khawarij, but they has dominated Egypt’s ideological campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s have acquired—in pursuing tactics of landscape. Today, the group is not just still reverberate among the Egyptian indiscriminate murder, suicide-murder the largest organized political opposition population, and the steadily expanding and banditry—the status of brigands to the Egyptian government, but its security and intelligence services have (muharibun), people who disrupt social influence touches nearly all sectors of learned from their experiences. There order, with all the Shari`a consequences Egyptian society, including religion, remains no high-profile jihadist figure of that distinction.23 Jihadists have charity and commerce. Probably or group in Egypt to cluster around blurred the line within Islamic law not coincidentally, the profile of the or from which to receive ideological between expression of bravery and anti- Brotherhood’s mainstream Islamism guidance. Indeed, the recantations Shari`a, deviant criminal behavior. has grown as jihadist activity in Egypt and revisions of erstwhile jihadist plummeted following its bloody apex in groups such as Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the Dr. Rebecca Molloy holds a master’s degree 1997. Egyptian Islamic Group) and Egyptian and a doctorate degree in Arabic and Middle Islamic Jihad highlight the weakness of Eastern studies from New York University. The Brotherhood’s surprisingly good Egypt’s domestic Salafi-jihadi milieu. She taught Arabic as an adjunct assistant showing in Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary professor at Queens College (SUNY) and elections was a high-profile sign While welcome, organized Salafi- New York University, and continues to of the organization’s growth. Since jihadism’s difficulty in gaining a privately prepare doctoral candidates then, however, the movement’s foothold in Egypt addresses only part for their proficiency exams in Arabic. organizational cohesion has been of a complex situation. As frustration Research interests and expertise involve stressed by both endogenous and with the government increases and neo- medieval Arabic linguistic theory, Islamic exogenous developments. Egypt’s liberal economic reforms exacerbate legal reasoning, and Qur’anic exegesis. Dr. changing religious landscape, the socio-economic divides, a non-violent Molloy has been involved in projects for West jostling of different tendencies inside but especially stern, politically quietist Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) the Brotherhood itself, a government brand of Salafist Islam has elbowed its since 2005. As an FBI Fellow at the CTC, crackdown on the group, and the effects way into Egypt’s religious landscape.3 she designed the curriculum for the CTC’s of Israel’s recent actions in the Gaza The relationship between this “pietist” Arabic Familiarization course, Arabic Name Strip challenge an organization whose Salafism and the Brotherhood is a Analysis and Phraseology. She has experience unofficial slogan, some affirm, is “listen complex and not necessarily antagonistic in intermediate training of advanced FBI and obey.”1 While this poses a series one.4 It is telling, however, that perhaps agents and JTTF training. Other professional of dilemmas to the Brotherhood, the the main area of disagreement between experience includes serving as a Non- implications also stretch widely across the pietists and the Brothers is over the Commissioned Officer for security auditing Egyptian society. legitimacy of political action. Pietist of technical encryption facilities for the Salafism grants an almost unwavering Israeli Defense Force’s Central Command, A Changing Ideological Landscape allegiance to the ruler while strictly and translation. After an absence of seven years, a series avoiding politics and electoral of jihadist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula participation, a stance sharply at odds in 2004, 2005 and 2006 killed nearly 150 with the mainstream political Islam of people, including foreign tourists. The Egyptian press has recently been dotted

with periodic reports of the revival of 2 International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Sinai Question,” historical jihadist groups, such as Takfir January 30, 2007; Scott Anderson, “Under Egypt’s Vol- wal-Hijra or Egyptian Islamic Jihad, cano,” Vanity Fair, October 28, 2006. or the emergence of new groups with 3 For a more pessimistic view of the spread of Salafism names such as The Platoon of Khalid al- in Egypt, see Chris Heffelfinger, Trends in Egyptian Salafi Islambuli, Muhammad’s Army, or The Activism (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 23 Ibn Taymiyya stated his opinion on the legal conse- Abdullah Azzam Brigades. A nascent 2007). quences: “Scholars have disagreed whether or not (the “al-Qa`ida in Egypt” has even emerged, 4 In describing Salafists, this article relies on the broad murderer) should be killed by reason of (his) brigandage, stirring fears that the country will once categories (jihadist, pietist, and political) used by Samir but the stronger (argument) is that he should be killed as again become a jihadist battlefield. Amghar, “Le Salafisme in Europe: Le Mouvance Poly- a punishment for killing because killing for the sake of morphe d’une Radicalisation,” Politique Etrangere 1 general corruption is a hadd crime, similar to the one who 1 Personal interview, Muslim Brotherhood activist, sum- (2006). Additionally, the author’s personal correspon- steals money having his hand cut off and like withhold- mer 2006. For an excellent analysis of the Brotherhood dence in 2008-2009 with a Muslim Brotherhood mem- ing their rights.” Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasa al-Shar`iyya and the war in Gaza, see Joshua Stacher, “The Brothers ber was particularly helpful to understanding this rela- (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 2003), p. 63. and the Wars,” Middle East Report Spring (2009). tionship.

19 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 the Muslim Brotherhood.5 This rivalry Pietist Salafism in Egypt has also Egyptian society has been mirrored by has been exploited in Saudi Arabia, for expanded due to a number of Saudi- a strengthening of this trend inside the instance, as a way for the government trained and influenced clerics. Largely Brotherhood. It is increasingly popular to counter the growing influence of eschewing formal organizations, among younger activists.13 political Islamists. In interviews, some popular shaykhs such as Abu Ishaq Muslim Brothers have claimed that al-Heweny, Mohamed Hassan, and The influence is somewhat visible in the same strategy is being used by the Mohamed Hussain Yaqob are creating a the Brotherhood’s internal debates Egyptian government today. As they religious center of gravity that competes over political participation. While see it, allowing, or even encouraging, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s the Brotherhood has been officially the growth of pietist Salafism offers political Islamism. As apparent from committed to the political process since a way to divert the rising religiosity their biographies, many are influenced 1984 and shown little outward signs of the Egyptian population into a by Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz, Muhammed of revisiting that decision, the issue is direction without immediate political Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Muhammed still a fault line in the group. Among ramifications.6 Ibn al-Uthaymin, and others from the some conservative members, especially Saudi Salafist establishment. They, those influenced by a traditional The entry of this trend into Egyptian and others linked to this movement, Salafist wariness of politics, the group’s society has been eased by migratory, run professional websites, host austere electoral forays are a distraction from commercial, and religious links to the television programs, carve out niches the Brotherhood’s core mission of da`wa Arabian Peninsula. Despite recently in Egyptian bookstores, and operate (preaching) and tarbiyya (education, being overtaken by Asians, millions increasingly influential charities and upbringing).14 The other side of of Egyptians have worked as migrant religious associations. While this trend the divide is inhabited by “middle laborers in the Gulf, particularly in is non-violent, their rigid conception generation” Muslim Brotherhood Saudi Arabia.7 As these workers return, of belief, occasionally antagonistic leaders as well as a small but highly some bring a Saudi-style religious posture toward religious minorities, and vocal younger generation of politically conservatism with them.8 Similarly, tendency to withdrawal from society engaged activists.15 Saudi Arabian investment in Egypt led the Egyptian scholar of Islamist has increased dramatically, reaching movements, Khalil al-Anani, to warn of These divisions have been amplified $1 billion in 2005 and steadily growing a revival of “social violence” as Egyptian by the Egyptian government’s ongoing since.9 While the vast majority of this society undergoes a “Salafisation.”11 crackdown on the Brotherhood. In investment is simply routine commerce, December 2005, candidates affiliated there are occasionally religious and The Brotherhood Under Pressure with the officially banned but tolerated cultural repercussions.10 Beyond Egyptian society, these Muslim Brotherhood managed to win changing religious dynamics influence 88 out of 454 seats in the Egyptian 5 For more on this strain of Salafism, and particularly on the Muslim Brotherhood as well. The parliament. This was followed shortly its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, see Stephane Brotherhood is a large organization, after by Hamas’ majority victory in the Lacroix, “L’apport de Muhammed Nasir al-Din al-Alba- consisting of a number of competing Palestinian parliamentary elections. ni au Salafisme Contemporain,” in Bernard Rougier ed., sources of ideological inspiration. These unexpected successes spurred Qu’est-Ce Que Le Salafisme? (Paris: Presses Universitaires One of these is a Salafist-tinged the Egyptian government to increase De France/Proche Orient, 2008), pp. 54-57, 62-64. conservatism, historically stronger the pressure on the Brotherhood, 6 Personal interview, Muslim Brotherhood activists, among more rural constituencies of the partly to remind the newly-empowered summer/fall 2008. Some recent news reports have also Brotherhood but increasingly making organization that the traditional “red mentioned this tactic. See Paul Schemm, “Ultraconserva- urban inroads. In part, this influence lines” still applied. In addition to a wave tive Islam on Rise in Mideast,” Associated Press, October entered the Brotherhood through those of arrests, a number of legal measures 18, 2008; Nabil Sharaf al-Din, “After Years of Support- members who studied or spent time in designed to constrict the Brotherhood’s ing Salafism To Counter the Muslim Brothers and the Saudi Arabia during the repression participation in Egyptian political life Jehadists, Egyptian Authorities Launch a Campaign To of the 1960s and 1970. Its lineage also Counter a Salafi Tide Among Youths,” Ilaf.com, Decem- traces back to the general support Saudi 13 Khalil al-Anani, “Supressing the Muslim Brotherhood ber 12, 2008. Arabia offered conservative opposition is not a Solution,” Daily Star [Cairo], March 5, 2008. 7 Jackline Wahba, “Does International Migration Mat- movements throughout the Middle East 14 The debate is partially illustrated in Israel Elad-Alt- ter? A Study of Egyptian Return Migrants,” draft paper during the “Arab Cold War” from 1958- man, “Democracy, Elections, and the Egyptian Mus- 12 prepared for the conference “Arab Migration in a Global- 1970. The recent growth of Salafism in lim Brotherhood,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 3 ized World,” February 2003. (2006). For a contemporary account, see Rania Badawi, 8 See, for instance, Caryle Murphy, Passion for Islam, 11 International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Muslim Broth- “Al-Doktor Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Rais al Ittihad al Alami (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 31-34. ers: Confrontation or Integration?” June 18, 2008, p. 22. Ulema al Muslimeen (1/2), Qawaneen al-Irhab wal al- 9 “Saudi Investment in Egypt Reaches 1 Billion Mark,” There is also a risk that crude “preventative countermea- Thuwara’ Makhalafa Lilsharia,” al-Masry al-Youm, Sep- Saudi Arabian Market Information Resource and Direc- sures” against some of these conservative, though non- tember 8, 2008. In an interview, one Muslim Brother tory, June 5, 2005. violent, actors may actually provoke the sort of violence attributed al-Qaradawi’s hard-line stance on Shi`a to in- 10 See some examples cited in Jack Schenker, “Hyatt and the government is seeking to avoid. fluence from Gulf-based Salafists (al-Qaradawi is based Dry - Saudi Hotel Owner Takes the Fizz Out of Cairo’s 12 Saeed Shehabi, “The Role of Religious Ideology in in Qatar). Tourist Allure,” Guardian, July 21, 2008; Rod Nordland, the Expansionist Policies of Saudi Arabia,” in Mardawi 15 For a vivid portrait of this young, politically active co- “The Last Egyptian Bellydancer,” Newsweek, June 9, al-Rasheed ed., Kingdom without Borders (New York: Co- hort, see Marc Lynch, “Young Brothers in Cyberspace,” 2008. lumbia University Press, 2008), pp. 190-191. Middle East Report Winter (2007).

20 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 were also introduced.16 article], the Salafis are there.”22 Ayman moment.”25 In Egypt, Supreme Guide al-Zawahiri in particular has repeatedly Muhammed Mahdi Akef personally According to the Brotherhood’s Supreme appeared on video and audio releases led the Brotherhood’s participation Guide Muhammed Mahdi Akef, in the alternatively heckling and enjoining in a series of massive protests against last 10 years 25,000 Muslim Brothers the Brotherhood. For instance, in a Israel’s actions. According to Deputy have spent time in prison.17 In 2008 March 11, 2007 audiotape, released at General Guide Muhammed Habib, alone, according to other Brotherhood the height of the Egyptian government’s more than 1,200 Muslim Brotherhood sources, more than 7,500 activists repression of the Brotherhood, al- activists were arrested protesting the were arrested.18 Whether intended or Zawahiri offered a carefully crafted attacks on Gaza, and hundreds remain not, the Egyptian government’s arrests message to Brotherhood members in prison.26 Yet in crafting a response, of politically engaged, pragmatic and sympathizers, urging them to the Brotherhood’s leadership was individuals such as Khairat al-Shater reject the Brotherhood’s peaceful, forced to balance between pressures and Isam El-Arian have subtly shifted accomodationist approach that has led from the cadres (and society writ large) the internal dynamics of the group to nothing but repression: while preserving the organization’s in a more conservative direction. As long-term viability. As a conservative conservative influences figure more I appeal to all my Muslim brothers organization concerned with ensuring prominently in the group’s issuances, to set themselves free from the its survival and expanding its reach such as the draft party platform, some shackles of the organizations inside Egyptian society, the Brotherhood inside the movement have expressed leading them into the mazes must avoid provoking a regime their frustrations.19 The Egyptian of politics…The Egyptian increasingly worried about ongoing government’s actions also reportedly government is pouncing on those socio-economic disturbances and a caused some prominent voices within who recognized the legitimacy of looming, potentially chaotic transfer of the Brotherhood to privately question its president, constitution, and power. As driven home especially hard whether or not the benefits of political laws. It is pouncing on those who in the last few years, confrontation with participation are outweighed by the accepted the rule of the majority the government carries tremendous heavy costs of state repression.20 of voters, and renounced the rule consequences. of Shari`a. It is pouncing on those As government pressures exacerbate who accepted citizenship and Fortunately for the Brotherhood, different tendencies in the Brotherhood abandoned and renounced the however, direct and drastic and internal tensions stretch the brotherhood of Islam.23 confrontation is unnecessary. As movement’s boundaries, external actors dissatisfaction grows (and the very sober are attempting to exploit the turmoil. The Effects of the Gaza Crisis International Crisis Group wrote even The internet has become a significant Israel’s recent offensive in the Gaza before the Gaza crisis that “anti-regime field in this contest.21 As one Egyptian Strip has also affected the Brotherhood. sentiment appears to be reaching new Muslim Brother stated, “everytime there Although Israel may have weakened heights”), the Brotherhood will benefit is a forum or a comment section [of an Hamas, their military action in Gaza from its position as the most prominent also strengthened Islamist movements opposition to an increasingly unpopular 24 27 16 “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integra- across the Middle East. Islamists government. Going forward, the tion?” pp. 12-15. positioned themselves at the center of Brotherhood will likely continue to avoid 17 “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Leader Expects ‘Noth- popular anger and frustration, leading hot button issues, such as presidential ing Good’ From Obama,” al-Arab [Doha], January 24, Hossam Tammam, a savvy observer succession, while staking out positions 2009. of Islamist politics, to write that supported by Egyptian popular opinion, 18 “Egypt Arrests 7588 From the Brotherhood in 2008,” “Islamism is now the master of the such as stopping natural gas shipments al-Jazira, January 30, 2008. to Israel or reopening the Rafah border 28 19 In the fall of 2007, a number of young activists created 22 Personal interview, Muslim Brotherhood activist, fall crossing with Gaza. www.ikhwanoffline.com, which paralleled the Brother- 2008. hood’s official www.ikhwanonline.com website to regis- 23 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Concern and 25 Hossam Tammam, “Shifting Sands,” al-Ahram Week- ter their disappointment with the conservative editorial the Concern of Every Muslim,” al-Sahab, March 11, 2007. ly, February 19-25, 2009. direction of the official website. In a contemporaneous interview with a Brotherhood ac- 26 “Al-Raya Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Dep- 20 Personal interview, Muslim Brotherhood activist, fall tivist, he conceded that on the group’s outer edges and uty Chairman over Gaza Crisis,” Ikhwanweb, February 2008. A senior official, however, recently stated that the among sympathizers al-Zawahiri’s attempt to poach 2, 2009. Importantly, other actors were also subjected to Brotherhood was planning to contest the 2010 parlia- “could be effective.” a harsh regime response, including the Islamist-oriented mentary elections. For more, see Abdel Moneim Mah- 24 In some instances, however, old fault lines proved Labor Party leader Magdy Hussein and prominent blog- moud, “Habib: Gaza is our Opportunity for Reconcilia- hard to overcome. Reflecting longstanding disagree- ger and activist Philip Rizk. tion and we Will Participate in the 2010 (Parliamentary) ments between the Brotherhood and the Salafists, popu- 27 “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integra- Elections,” www.IslamOnline.net, February 8, 2009. lar Salafist shaykh Mohamed Yaqob initially criticized tion?” p. 3. 21 For a pietist Salafist critique of the Muslim Brother- Hamas for provoking the conflict. He, in turn, was cen- 28 This should not be taken as an argument that the hood, see “The Historical Influences and Effects of the sured by his compatriot Mohamed Hassan. For more, see Brotherhood’s popular and respected position in Egyp- Methodologies of al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimoon Upon the Abd al-Muna’im Muneeb, “Mohammed Hasan Yamta- tian society is due to some sort of clever triangulation or Salaf,” Salafi Publications, March 2003, available at dah Hamas wa Suwareekh al-Muqawama radan a’alee exploitation of Egyptian popular opinion. Beyond ideol- www.thenoblequran.com/sps/sp.cfm?secID=MNJ&sub Sakhraya Muhammed Hussein Yacoub min al-Haraka,” ogy, many support the group because of its effective de- secID=MNJ18&loadpage=displaysubsection.cfm. al-Dustor, January 14, 2009. livery of social services at local levels, as well as the re-

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A strategy that slowly and peacefully improvised explosive was tossed into a The Current State of grows and consolidates the Cairo metro station, although it failed Brotherhood’s position is in line with to explode.31 the Moroccan Islamic the organization’s goals as well as its Combatant Group methodology. A potential problem, Conclusion however, is that the disconnect between The Brotherhood’s powerful religious By Carlos Echeverría Jesús the Brotherhood’s calculated, Fabian message, defined organizational approach and the urgency and emotion boundaries and demanding criteria for on may 16, 2003, suicide bombers killed unleashed by Israel’s war on Gaza will membership ensure that activists remain 45 people in Casablanca, the biggest be so jarring that the Brotherhood’s committed to the group, even during terrorist attack suffered by Morocco to non-violent orientation will seem times of stress and confrontation. As date. Authorities blamed the Moroccan insufficient. While a large-scale cleavage such, a Salafist current wary of politics Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) for the of Muslim Brothers from the broader or a cadre of youths frustrated with attacks.1 Members of the Salafi-jihadi- organization is highly unlikely, the an out-of-touch leadership are each oriented GICM were also connected to effect on individuals, particularly those manageable within the confines of the the al-Qaìda-inspired group of North already disenchanted and frustrated organization. Likewise, the Brotherhood Africans who executed the March 11, with developments of the last few has an unfortunate familiarity with state 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid that years, is less clear. A similar dynamic repression and competing for ideological killed 191 people. In addition to these may echo in broader society, whereby hegemony with various other religious incidents, the GICM has been active the Brotherhood’s studied approach elements. Individually, these factors in Western Europe, primarily with detracts from the organization’s ability pose little challenge to a movement as document forgery, gunrunning and to draw new members and compete storied, adaptable, and inclusive as the drug trafficking. These European-based among an increasingly diverse religious Muslim Brotherhood. cells have alarmed EU counterterrorism landscape. authorities, who have launched a Taken in the aggregate, however, number of operations against the GICM As individuals spin out of the increasing disincentives for political partially out of concern that these Brotherhood’s orbit, or as the group’s action, rising conservatism, and cells could collaborate with hostile ideology and behavior becomes less potential frustration with the groups such as al-Qaìda in the Islamic attractive to a society beset by a series of Brotherhood’s calculated approach Maghreb (AQIM). radicalizing influences, there is a risk of to domestic and regional crises all violence. Specifically, the fracturing of exacerbate the normal centrifugal Today, however, the GICM is a shell of Egyptian socio-religious authority opens tendencies in an organization as diverse its former self. Successive Moroccan new opportunity structures, especially as the Muslim Brotherhood. Just like the and European counterterrorist for the type of “individualized jihad” Egyptian society it inhabits, the internal operations targeting the group have left as envisioned by al-Qaìda theorist dynamics of the Muslim Brotherhood it fractured. Its remaining members are Abu Musàb al-Suri in The Global Islamic have become increasingly tumultuous active in similar terrorist organizations, Resistance Call. For instance, in his January and contentious in recent years. Coupled but no longer conducting attacks under 2009 audiotape, Ayman al-Zawahiri with the way Salafi-jihadis stalk the the GICM’s name. This article identifies encouraged individualized action, organization’s periphery, creating the GICM’s known history and past telling Egyptian Muslims specifically and expanding ways to express both operations, its organizational structure, “it is your duty to lift the siege, you local and international grievances, the and its current role in the larger Salafi- must take this responsibility.”29 Brotherhood—and Egyptian society—is jihadi movement. Moreover, while the investigation is facing a potent challenge. ongoing, it appears that February’s The History of the GICM bombing in Cairo—which killed one Steven Brooke is an independent academic Details on the history of the GICM and injured dozens—was carried out by based in Washington, D.C. He specializes remain obscure. The GICM emerged individuals operating along these lines. in the study of both violent and non-violent shortly after 1998 and comprises A similar “individualized” stabbing of Islamic social movements. His most recent Moroccan recruits who trained in an American in Cairo’s Khan al-Khalili article is “Jihadist Strategic Debates before camps in Afghanistan. A number of market by an Egyptian motivated by 9/11,” which appeared in the Spring 2008 leaders, such as Abdelkarim el-Mejjati his “hatred for foreigners because of (31:3) issue of Studies in Conflict and and Nourredine Nafia, were involved in the Israeli offensive in Gaza” took place Terrorism. creating the group. El-Mejjati became days later.30 A few days after that, an a leader in al-Qaìda in Saudi Arabia, where he was killed by police in 2004. sponsiveness of elected Brotherhood officials on issues of Nafia, a Moroccan convicted and everyday concern. See, for instance, Samer Shehata and sentenced to 20 years in prison for his Joshua Stacher, “The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament,” role in the 2003 Casablanca attacks, was Middle East Report Fall (2006). 31 “Cairo Metro Incendiary Bottle Fails to Explode,” an important contributor in the early 29 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Gaza Massacre and the Agence France-Presse, March 1, 2009. These attacks Traitor’s Seige,” al-Sahab, January 6, 2009. resembled other small-scale, “individualized” attacks 30 “American Teacher Knifed in Cairo Bazaar,” Arab in Egypt in 2005. See Jailan Halawi, “Racing Against 1 Recent trials, however, have failed to prove undoubt- Times [Kuwait City], February 28, 2009. Time,” al-Ahram Weekly, May 3, 2005. edly that the GICM was behind the Casablanca attacks.

22 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 years of the group.2 When creating the The GICM’s Volatile Structure signs are that Mohamed el-Guerbouzi, GICM, Nafia supposedly drafted a 33- GICM members interact with other North nicknamed Abou Aissa, became the page GICM doctrinal charter.3 African Salafi-jihadis, particularly in leader of the organisation” after 2002.12 Europe, where they have been engaged El-Guerbouzi, however, has repeatedly When the GICM was founded, it absorbed in transporting falsified documents, denied any association with terrorism. a number of supporting cells such as the gunrunning, and drug trafficking. One He became a British citizen two decades group responsible for assassinating two example of this interaction is the case ago and remains living in London. Spanish tourists at the Atlas Asni Hotel in of Jamal Ahmidan, one of the authors Nevertheless, in 2003 the Interpol Marrakech in August 1994.4 At the end of the 2004 Madrid bombings who office in Rabat issued a warrant for of the 1990s, the GICM and the “Salafiyah- blew himself up on April 3, 2004 in his arrest.13 On December 19, 2003, he Jihadiya”5 were the two known major Leganés, Spain; Ahmidan had links was sentenced to 20 years in prison in terrorist groups active in Morocco. In to GICM members such as Hassan el- absentia by a court in Rabat “for his 2002, when the Saudi members of a sleeper Haski. Criminal activity abroad seems alleged involvement in the Casablanca cell were arrested in Morocco for plotting to finance the GICM, and according bombings.”14 attacks against naval units in the Strait to a variety of sources the group has of Gibraltar, a wave of arrests of Salafi- sleeper cells in a number of European The GICM has become marginalized on jihadi militants began.6 One year later, countries.9 The GICM’s experience has the physical battlefield. It has suffered a the GICM was one of the actors believed shown a capacity for recruitment, and loss of operational control to the extent involved in planning the 2003 Casablanca it has assisted with the assimilation that it is not even mentioned in analyses suicide bombings. The Casablanca attacks of al-Qaìda operatives into Moroccan on Salafi-jihadi terrorism in Morocco. killed 45 people, including 12 suicide and European society. One example of Demonstrating the GICM’s lack of bombers. Although the GICM, among this is a 2002 plot in Morocco involving current capability, factions within the other groups, was blamed for the attacks, three Saudis who married Moroccan Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching recent trials have failed to prove this link women through GICM support. and Combat and the Libyan Islamic with certainty.7 The 2004 bombings in Another example involved three Fighting Group have merged with al- Madrid that killed 191 people were carried terrorists involved in the 2004 Madrid Qaìda, but no such al-Qaìda merger out by an al-Qaìda-inspired group train bombings, who traveled to Iraq has been announced with the GICM. of North Africans, mostly Moroccan through Belgium with the support of a residents in Spain. A number of them cell founded by Abdeladim Okoudad, a The GICM’s Role in the Salafi-Jihad were connected to the GICM.8 GICM coordinator in Europe.10 Historically, GICM members have been active in Morocco and Europe. A 2 Sebastian Rotella, “Libyans Advance in Al Qaeda Net- After each terrorist incident or number of arrests in Belgium, France, work,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2008. uncovered plot, the Moroccan and Spain in recent years have disrupted 11 3 Nafia spoke about this charter after he was arrested. government has made scores of arrests. the group’s ability to operate in Europe. See “Moroccan Group ‘Derivative Structure’ of Al-Qae- The government’s campaign against the On November 13, 2005, for example, da,” Middle East Online, April 20, 2004. GICM and related groups has affected members of a suspected Belgian GICM 4 Carlos Jesús Echeverría, “Radical Islam in the the GICM’s operational ability and has cell led by Abdelkader Hakimi and Maghreb,” Orbis 48:2 (2004): p. 358. almost destroyed it. It is likely that the Lahoussine el-Haski—the latter the 5 The Moroccan government often attributes terrorist remaining members no longer operate brother of GICM member Hassan el- incidents or plots to a group it identifies as “Salafiyah- on behalf of the GICM. During the Haski—went on trial in Brussels for Jihadiya.” As explained by researcher Alison Pargeter, current decade, much of the GICM’s allegedly providing material support to however, “this appears to be a label put upon these leadership in Morocco and Europe has the GICM. Hakimi was considered one militants reflecting the fact that they do not belong to any been imprisoned or is awaiting trial. of the GICM’s leaders in Europe and particular formalized group. As such, ‘Salafiyah-Jihadi- It is not clear if the group currently had been arrested in Brussels on March ya’ would seem to be a label invented by the Moroccan has a leader. In 2004, the Moroccan 19, 2004. authorities to describe an ideological current.” For more expert Mohamed Darif claimed “all the on this, see Alison Pargeter, “Uncovering Extremist Vio- In recent years, a number of recruitment lence in Morocco,” CTC Sentinel 1:8 (2008). top leader of the GICM in Europe according to Spanish networks for suicide bombers destined 6 The Saudis were able to integrate into society because investigations later confirmed by the judicial process on for Iraq have been dismantled in Morocco 15 they married Moroccan women through GICM support. the Madrid bombings. and in Europe. The 27-member Tetouan 7 Hassan el-Haski, who was condemned in 2007 in 9 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report TE-SAT 2008 Spain for participating in the 2004 Madrid bombings, (The Hague: European Police Office, 2008), pp. 24-25. 12 Mohamed Darif, “The Moroccan Combatant Group,” was extradited to Morocco for six months to face trial for Chapter five of this report lists a number of EU states Real Instituto Elcano, March 30, 2004. his alleged involvement in the 2003 Casablanca attacks. where Moroccan terrorists have been arrested. 13 Anneli Botha, “North African Involvement in Although he was acquitted by the terrorist court of Salé 10 Jorge A. Rodríguez, “Doce detenidos por ayudar a es- Transnational Terror Networks” in “Terrorism in the on February 5, 2009 of involvement in those attacks, he capar a autores del 11-M y enviar suicidas a Irak,” El País, Maghreb: The Transnationalization of Domestic Terror- received a 10 year sentence in the aftermath of the Royal October 17, 2008. ism,” African Institute for Security Studies Monograph Attorney’s reaction. He will return to Spain to serve a 14 11 These incidents include the foiled Strait of Gibraltar #144, June 2008. year sentence before returning to Morocco to serve his terrorist plot in 2002, the 2003 Casablanca attacks, the 14 Ibid.; “Four More Suspects Charged in Madrid Blasts,” sentence there. See “Marruecos condena a 10 años a Has- 2004 Madrid bombings, successive domestic counter- Associated Press, March 22, 2004. ki tras el recurso del fiscal,”El Mundo, March 3, 2009. terrorist operations since 2005, and the suicide attacks 15 Two GICM-connected networks operating from Cata- 8 El-Haski is a veteran of Afghan training camps and a in Casablanca and Meknes in 2007. lonia, Spain—the Rabet Group and the Nakcha Group—

23 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 cell apprehended in January 2007 There is concern that AQIM could tap Recent Highlights in had logistical and financial links with into dormant or former GICM cells AQIM and with the GICM, according in Europe for the purpose of striking Terrorist Activity to the sentence released on June 10, targets in the West. It is believed 2008. Abu Qaswarah, a Moroccan that GICM elements based in Europe February 1, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): native who was the second-in-command have mutated into a more autonomous A Taliban suicide car bomber attacked of al-Qaìda in Iraq, was killed by U.S. phenomenon consisting of groups of a convoy of foreign troops in Kabul, forces on October 5, 2008 in Mosul.16 alienated, “homegrown” radicals who injuring two civilians and a French He was at one point a member of the are using the language of the Salafi- soldier. – Reuters, February 1 GICM and was even put in charge of jihad but largely act on their own.19 A the GICM’s magazine, Sada al-Maghrabi.17 number of Moroccans were connected to February 1, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): More recently, on February 26, 2009, the al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg,20 the Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group-linked the terrorism court of Salé in Morocco Islamic Cultural Centre in Milan, and militants kidnapped a nine-year-old sentenced Saad Houssaini (also known the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, boy on Basilan Island in the southern as “The Chemist”) to 15 years in jail for which all became associated with the Philippines. – AFP, February 1 his alleged involvement in the 2003 propagation of radical Islamism. Casablanca bombings. He was arrested February 2, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): in March 2007 for alleged participation Conclusion A Taliban suicide bomber in a police in the GICM.18 Years of investigation, several trials and uniform killed 21 police in Tirin Kot, numerous court convictions do not Uruzgan Province. The bomber entered There are a number of other cases in provide a complete picture of the the police compound before detonating Morocco that have not been linked to the GICM. In Morocco and in Europe, his explosives. – Reuters, February 2 GICM. It is possible that links will develop the GICM is today defined by the as the cases proceed. On February 21, fragmentation of different cells. It February 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): John 2008, authorities broke up a 36-member appears that former members of the Solecki, an American and the head of the cell called the “Belliraj Cell.” In May group have been absorbed by other UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2008, an 11-member cell connected jihadist organizations, or are operating was abducted by unidentified gunmen with networks involved in sending on an independent basis. Government while on his way to his office in Quetta, combatants to Iraq and to training prosecutors have tried with difficulty Balochistan Province. The assailants camps in Algeria was dismantled in Nador to persuade juries that alleged terrorists shot and killed his driver during the and Fes in Morocco; a large number of connected to the GICM have conspired kidnapping. It was not immediately light weapons and ammunition were against the Moroccan government and clear whether the abductors were confiscated. The cell was also allegedly society. The sheer number of plots with Islamist militants, criminals, or Baloch planning terrorist attacks in Morocco and ties to the GICM raises concern that the separatists. – Guardian, February 3 Belgium. On July 2, 2008, a 35-member group could recover if authorities give it cell, charged with sending combatants breathing space. February 2, 2009 (SAUDI ARABIA): to Iraq and to Algeria, was dismantled in The Saudi government issued a list of a number of Moroccan cities. On August Dr. Carlos Echeverría Jesús is Professor 85 wanted militants based outside of the 29, 2008, a 15-member cell called Fatah of International Relations at the Spanish country. Authorities said the men had al-Andalus that plotted terrorist attacks National Open University. As Analyst, “adopted the straying ideology,” which in Morocco was dismantled in a number he is in charge of studying Salafi-jihadi signifies that they are suspected of al- of cities in the country and important terrorism at the Spanish Grupo de Estudios Qaìda involvement. The government electronic and chemical materials were Estratégicos, and he is also Associate Scholar called on the men to turn themselves in seized. On December 12, 2008, the at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy overseas to “return to a normal life.” Out Moroccan minister of the interior, Chakib Research Institute. In the 1990s, he worked of the group, 83 are Saudis and two are Benmoussa, announced the arrests of a for the Western European Union and the Yemenis. Saudi officials also announced number of suspected terrorists in Fes, European Union and was Lecturer at the that 11 Saudis who were released from Rabat, and Berkane who had links to NATO Defense College. Between 2003 and Guantanamo Bay and subsequently AQIM. 2004, he coordinated the “Understanding passed through the Saudi rehabilitation Terrorism” Project in Spain, financed by program for former jihadists have left the country and joined terrorist groups were dismantled by the Spanish security forces in 2005 the U.S. Defense Department through the abroad. – Reuters, February 2; New York Times, and 2006. Both focused their activities on sending com- Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). February 3 batants to Iraq. 16 “Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity,” CTC Sentinel February 2, 2009 (SOMALIA): A 1:12 (2008). 19 In fact, this trend is applicable to most of the jihadist roadside bomb exploded next to an 17 Pascale Combelles Siegel, “Coalition Attack Brings an cells acting in Europe. For more, see Peter R. Neumann: African Union peacekeeping vehicle End to the Career of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s Second-in-Com- Joining Al-Qaeda. Jihadist Recruitment in Europe (London: in Mogadishu. The blast, and the mand,” Terrorism Monitor 6:21 (2008). Routledge-IISS, 2008), p. 17. subsequent return gunfire from African 18 “Rabat condena a un terrorista al que Del Olmo inter- 20 Mohamed Fizazi, who was sentenced to 30 years in Union soldiers, left at least 18 people rogó por el 11-M,” El Mundo, February 27, 2009; “French prison in Morocco for his involvement in the 2003 Casa- dead. – New York Times, February 2; Voice of Court Convicts 8 of Helping 2003 Casablanca Suicide blanca attacks, preached at the same al-Quds Mosque as America, February 2 Bombers,” International Herald Tribune, July 11, 2007. the leader of the 9/11 terrorists, Muhammad Àtta.

24 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3

February 2, 2009 (THAILAND): Suspected assassinated in that city by unknown Shaykh Ahmad arrived in Mogadishu Muslim separatists killed and then gunmen. He was killed in Mogadishu’s to hold consultations to form a broad beheaded two Thai paramilitary rangers Bakara Market. Al-Shabab spokesman coalition government. On January 31, in southern Thailand. – Reuters, February Shaykh Ali Mohamed Hussein Shaykh Sharif was elected Somalia’s 2 denied that the group was behind the new president by lawmakers in nearby assassination. – Shabelle Media Network, Djibouti. – AFP, February 7 February 3, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda February 4 second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri February 8, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): released a new audio message, in which February 5, 2009 (FRANCE): A French Speaking at a security conference in he condemned Israel for its recent court sentenced Christian Ganczarski Munich, Afghan President Hamid actions in the Gaza Strip. Al-Zawahiri to 18 years in jail for his role in a 2002 Karzai said, “We will invite all those called on Muslims around the world to attack that killed 21 people at a Tunisian Taliban, who are not part of al-Qaida, target U.S. interests to avenge American synagogue in Djerba. Ganczarski, a who are not part of terrorist networks, support for Israel’s offensive in Gaza. German convert to Islam, was arrested who want to return to their country, The message referenced President in France in 2003. Walid Nouar, the who want to live by the constitution Barack Obama’s inaugural speech. brother of the suicide bomber, was also of Afghanistan, and who want to have – CNN, February 3; AP, February 3 sentenced by the court to 12 years in peace in the country and live a normal jail. The Djerba bombing—which was life to participate, to come back to their February 3, 2009 (SPAIN): Spanish claimed by al-Qaìda—killed 14 German country.” – Voice of America, February 8 officials arrested 13 people in the cities tourists, five Tunisians and two French of Barcelona and Valencia for allegedly nationals. – BBC, February 5 February 8, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): forging passports and other documents A bomb killed two U.S. nationals, an for criminal and terrorist groups. The February 5, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide Afghan interpreter and a policeman detainees include 11 Pakistanis, one bomber killed 16 people at a crowded in Helmand Province. – Sydney Morning Nigerian and one Indian. – RTTNews, restaurant in Khanaqin, Diyala Herald, February 8 February 3; AP, February 3 Province. – Los Angeles Times, February 6 February 8, 2009 (YEMEN): A Yemeni February 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban February 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A security official told reporters that militants blew up a highway bridge in suicide bomber killed 30 people after authorities have decided to release 176 the Khyber Pass region, halting the detonating his explosives outside a people suspected of having ties to al- transportation of supplies to NATO Shià mosque in Dera Ghazi Khan Qaìda. Of the group, 95 were freed forces in Afghanistan. Approximately district of Punjab Province. – Bloomberg, on February 6. According to the BBC, 80% of supplies for U.S. and coalition February 5 “The ruling excludes those convicted of forces in Afghanistan pass through terrorism, unless they have completed Pakistan. – New York Times, February 3 February 6, 2009 (GERMANY): A their sentence.” – AFP, February 8; BBC, 30-year-old German citizen was arrested February 8 February 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): at Stuttgart airport on charges of being A roadside bomb ripped through a an al-Qaìda member. Authorities also February 9, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car vehicle carrying the guards for Mullah allege that the man supplied range bomber detonated his explosives near Salam, the district chief of Musa Qala finders, night vision equipment and a U.S. Army patrol in Mosul, Ninawa in Helmand Province. Six of his guards cash to al-Qaìda. – AP, February 7 Province, killing four U.S. soldiers and were killed. – AP, February 5 their Iraqi interpreter. – Los Angeles Times, February 6, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A February 10 February 4, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban suicide car bomber wounded six people militants set fire to 10 supply trucks at a checkpoint on the Khyber Pass February 9, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A returning from Afghanistan to Pakistan. in Khyber Agency of the Federally suicide car bomber attacked a police – Los Angeles Times, February 5 Administered Tribal Areas. – BBC, and Frontier Corps checkpoint in North February 6 Waziristan Agency of the Federally February 4, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Administered Tribal Areas. Five Taliban released 29 paramilitary soldiers February 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): policemen were killed. – AFP, February 8 and policemen in the Swat Valley of the The Taliban said that it had killed North-West Frontier Province. Taliban and beheaded Polish engineer Piotr February 9, 2009 (PAKISTAN): spokesman Muslim Khan said that the Stanczak who was kidnapped in Pakistani Taliban commander Noor men were released on the promise that Pakistan on September 28, 2008. On Syed Mehsud was injured when a they would quit their jobs and not act February 8, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan remote-controlled bomb exploded near against the Taliban. The men were released a videotape showing Stanczak’s his vehicle in South Waziristan Agency initially captured only 24-hours earlier. beheading. The authenticity of the of the Federally Administered Tribal – Reuters, February 4 videotape was later confirmed. – AFP, Areas. His driver was killed in the February 7; AFP, February 9 blast. Noor Syed Mehsud is a key aide to February 4, 2009 (SOMALIA): Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. The director of Horn Afrik radio in February 7, 2009 (SOMALIA): New – AFP, February 9 Mogadishu, Said Tahliil Ahmed, was Somali President Shaykh Sharif

25 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3

February 9, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Al- people. – New York Times, February 12 compounds were targeted in the attacks. Qaìda’s commander for Afghanistan, – Reuters, February 14; New York Times, February Shaykh Saìd Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid, February 12, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A 14 appeared in a new video warning India suicide bomber detonated his explosives against attacking Pakistan. “India outside the entrance to the provincial February 14, 2009 (PAKISTAN): The should know that it will have to pay a security headquarters in Paktika Taliban in the Swat Valley of the North- heavy price if it attacks Pakistan,” he Province, killing one police officer. West Frontier Province released a said. “The mujahidin will sunder your – Reuters, February 12 Chinese engineer, Long Xiaowei, who armies into the ground, like they did to had been held captive since August the Russians in Afghanistan.” Al-Yazid February 13, 2009 (IRAQ): A female 29, 2008. Taliban spokesman Muslim also called on Pakistanis to overthrow suicide bomber dressed in a black abaya Khan said he was released as a goodwill their government and president. – BBC, killed at least 30 Shià pilgrims as they gesture. – AP, February 15 February 9 traveled on foot along the route from Baghdad to the holy city of Karbala. Most February 15, 2009 (IRAQ): Mosul February 10, 2009 (GLOBAL): Interpol of the dead were women and children. politician Talib Muhsen, a member of issued a rare “orange” global security – Sydney Morning Herald, February 14 the al-Hadbaa electoral list, was injured alert for 85 suspected al-Qaìda-linked after a bomb attached to his vehicle terrorists wanted by Saudi Arabia. February 13, 2009 (SOMALIA): Al- exploded. – CNN, February 15 On February 2, the Saudi government Qaìda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi issued a list of 85 wanted militants released a new video statement in which February 15, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): based outside of the country. – CNN, he called on Somali militants to increase A coalition airstrike killed Ghulam February 11 their attacks against the country’s new Dastagir, a powerful Taliban government. “Aim your arrows towards commander, in Badghis Province. Eight February 10, 2009 (YEMEN): The them...direct your battles against them other militants were also killed in the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C., and intensify your campaign against strike. According to the former police released a statement denying a February them,” he said. “Prepare to fight against chief of the province, Dastagir “was like 8 report which claimed it released more the campaign of conspiracies illustrated the shadow governor of Badghis.” – AP, than 170 al-Qaìda suspects from its by the recent farcical presidential February 16 prisons. The new statement said that election [in Somalia]…which America— authorities have released 108 prisoners, the world leader of infidels—was the February 15, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban but they were “not affiliated in any way first to welcome.” – Reuters, February 13 spokesman Muslim Khan announced a to al Qaeda.” – CNN, February 10 10-day cease-fire with the government February 13, 2009 (MALAYSIA): in the Swat Valley of the North-West February 11, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): According to a Malaysian newspaper, Frontier Province. – AP, February 15 Taliban militants attacked three authorities in the country released government buildings in Kabul, killing at from jail three men suspected of ties February 16, 2009 (PAKISTAN): least 20 people. The near-simultaneous to Jemaah Islamiya. One of the men Pakistani officials announced that they attacks targeted the prisons directorate, allegedly released, Zaini Zakaria, was had struck a peace deal with the Taliban the Justice Ministry and the Education suspected of involvement in the so- in the Swat region of the North-West Ministry. The attack involved multiple called “second wave” of attacks on the Frontier Province. In exchange for suicide bombers and gunmen. A total United States following September 11, peace, the government said that they of at least seven militants were killed. 2001. According to Reuters, “The U.S. would accept a legal system compatible – Daily Telegraph, February 11; Canberra Times, government had said Zaini was one of with Sharià law. According to the New February 12; New York Times, February 11 three potential pilots recruited by the York Times, “Government officials said on al Qaeda to carry out a Sept.11-style Monday that the agreement was struck February 11, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A attack on the U.S. west coast in 2002.” with Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who provincial minister, Alam Zeb, was – Reuters, February 14 has long pressed for Shariah law to be killed in a bomb attack in the North- restored in Swat and who had pledged West Frontier Province. – CNN, February February 14, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): to persuade Taliban fighters in Swat to 11 Suspected Taliban militants assassinated lay down their arms.” The government the chief of Nadir Shah Kot district will apparently recognize Sharià for February 12, 2009 (IRAQ): Abdul-Karim in Khost Province. He was killed by a the entire Malakand Division, which al-Sharabi, a high level Mosul official roadside bomb. – AFP, February 14 includes Swat District of the NWFP. – with the Sunni Arab National Dialogue New York Times, February 16; CNN, February 18 Front, was assassinated by gunmen as February 14, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A he drove to his office in the morning. He suspected U.S. missile strike by an February 16, 2009 (PAKISTAN): was killed in Mosul, Ninawa Province. aerial drone killed at least 25 alleged A suspected U.S. aerial drone fired – New York Times, February 12 al-Qaìda-linked militants in South missiles at a building in Kurram Waziristan Agency of the Federally Agency of the Federally Administered February 12, 2009 (IRAQ): A bomb Administered Tribal Areas. A Taliban Tribal Areas, killing approximately 30 exploded amidst a crowd of Shià official claimed that most of the dead people. If verified, the attack would pilgrims in Karbala, killing at least eight were Uzbek fighters. Three separate mark the “first suspected drone attack

26 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3 in Kurram.” – Voice of America, February 16; recently scored military successes each month to and from Afghanistan.” Reuters, February 16 against al-Shabab in central Galgaduud – AP, February 20 region. – Voice of America, February 18 February 17, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): February 20, 2009 (THAILAND): U.S. President Barack Obama announced February 19, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A Suspected Muslim separatist fighters that he will send 17,000 more troops to suicide bomber attacked a Shià funeral killed and then beheaded two Thai Afghanistan in the spring and summer. procession in Dera Ismail Khan of the soldiers in Yala Province in southern Currently, approximately 36,000 U.S. North-West Frontier Province. At least Thailand. – Reuters, February 20 troops are deployed to the country. 20 people were killed. – AFP, February 19 – New York Times, February 17 February 21, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A February 19, 2009 (SAUDI ARABIA): senior government official told reporters February 17, 2009 (SAUDI ARABIA): Alleged al-Qaìda operative and Saudi that Taliban fighters have agreed to Muhammad al-Awfi, a former detainee national Ahmed Owaidan al-Harbi was a “permanent cease-fire” in the Swat at Guantanamo Bay who became an al- handed over to Saudi authorities after Valley of the North-West Frontier Qaìda commander after his release, he was arrested in eastern Yemen. – AP, Province. – Reuters, February 21 turned himself in to Saudi authorities. February 19 Last month, al-Awfi appeared in an February 22, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al- al-Qaìda video claiming that he had February 19, 2009 (YEMEN): Al- Qaìda second-in-command Ayman al- joined al-Qaìda in Yemen. He allegedly Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Zawahiri released a new audiotape on turned himself in to Yemeni authorities Nasir al-Wahayshi released a new audio Islamist web forums, titled “From Kabul after securing his repatriation to Saudi message urging Yemenis to rise up to Mogadishu.” During the message, al- Arabia. – Reuters, February 17 against the government. – AP, February 19 Zawahiri spoke about Somalia, Yemen, Gaza, Afghanistan and Pakistan. – CNN, February 18, 2009 (UNITED KINGDOM): February 20, 2009 (UNITED STATES): February 23 Britain’s highest court ruled that Federal agents arrested Ahmadullah Abu Qatada, an extremist Muslim Sais Niazi, a naturalized U.S. citizen February 22, 2009 (EGYPT): A bomb preacher accused of having links to al- from Afghanistan, at his home in Tustin, exploded in the popular Khan al-Khalili Qaìda, could be deported to Jordan California. Authorities allege that Niazi bazaar in Cairo, killing a Frenchwoman despite fears that he could face torture lied about his ties to terrorist groups and wounding 17 people. Police quickly there. His deportation will not occur, on citizenship and passport papers. discovered a second bomb, but managed however, until the European Court According to CBS News, the indictment to detonate it safely. The bazaar is of Human Rights hears his expected reads that Niazi lied about his ties to al- popular among tourists. – AP, February appeal. British Home Secretary Jacqui Qaìda, the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami. 22 Smith said, “I am keen to deport this The news report states that Niazi “faces dangerous individual as soon as I can.” charges of perjury, naturalization February 22, 2009 (PAKISTAN): – AP, February 18 fraud, procuring a passport by fraud Taliban militants abducted Khushal and making a false statement,” charges Khan, a senior Pakistani official, and February 18, 2009 (NORTH AFRICA): that could carry a sentence of up to 35 six of his guards in the Swat Valley of Al-Jazira broadcast an audiotape from years. – CBS News, February 20 the North-West Frontier Province. The a purported member of al-Qaìda in Taliban spokesman for Swat, Muslim the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) who February 20, 2009 (UNITED STATES): Khan, said that the official “is our guest. claimed to be holding captive two Authorities announced that Guantanamo We have to discuss some issues with Canadian diplomats and four European Bay inmate Binyam Mohamed will soon him. We will serve him with tea and tourists who were kidnapped from be released and sent back to the United then free him.” – Reuters, February 22 Niger on December 14 and January Kingdom. Mohamed is a former UK 22, respectively. The two Canadian resident who was accused of conspiring February 22, 2009 (PAKISTAN): In diplomats include the UN envoy to Niger, to participate in a dirty bomb attack. a new statement, Pakistan’s North- Robert Fowler, and his colleague, Louis He was also accused of training in al- West Frontier Province government Guay. In the statement, the purported Qaìda camps in Afghanistan. Charges announced that it will provide 30,000 AQIM member said, “We announce to against him, however, were dropped in rifles to rural area residents in an the general public that the mujahidin October 2008. – AP, February 20 attempt to counter Taliban militants. reserve the right to deal with the six The initiative is called the “Village kidnapped according to Islamic Sharià February 20, 2009 (KYRGYZSTAN): Defense Rifle” program. – AFP, February law.” – BBC, February 18; AP, February 18 Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev 22 signed a bill to close a key U.S. airbase February 18, 2009 (SOMALIA): Sufi used to stage military operations in February 22, 2009 (SOMALIA): Al- clerics in Somalia declared their support neighboring Afghanistan. The signing Shabab took responsibility for a suicide for the new government of Shaykh of the bill marked the final step before car bomb attack in Mogadishu that Sharif Shaykh Ahmad. The country’s authorities issue a 180-day eviction killed 11 African Union peacekeepers Sufi clerics have thrown their support notice. According to the Associated from Burundi. Al-Shabab leader Muktar behind a newly armed Sufi group Press, Manas airbase is “a transit point Robow warned AU troops after the known as Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama, which for 15,000 troops and 500 tons of cargo attack to “go home, otherwise you will

27 march 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 3

meet our hell.” – Los Angeles Times, February February 27, 2009 (UNITED STATES): CTC Sentinel Staff 23 The indictment against Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri was unsealed, one day Editor-in-Chief February 23, 2009 (UNITED STATES): after being filed. A federal grand jury Erich Marquardt FBI Director Robert Mueller said that a in Peoria, Illinois has charged al-Marri Senior Editor, CTC Somali-American man from Minnesota, with two counts of providing material Shirwa Ahmed, became the first known support to al-Qaìda. Al-Marri, the last Editorial Board suicide bomber with U.S. citizenship. enemy combatant held on U.S. soil, will COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Ahmed, who was recruited into now be released from military custody Department Head Somalia’s al-Shabab militant group, and transferred into the criminal justice Department of Social Sciences (West Point) blew up an explosives-laden vehicle system. The U.S. government alleges in northern Somalia in October 2008. that al-Marri was a “sleeper agent” COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. According to Mueller, “It appears that waiting to take part in a second wave Deputy Department Head this individual was radicalized in his of September 11-style attacks on the Department of Social Sciences (West Point) hometown in Minnesota.” – Minneapolis United States. He was arrested in the Star Tribune, February 24 United States in December 2001. – ABC MAJ Reid Sawyer News, February 27 Director, CTC February 23, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Two suicide bombers targeted an anti- February 28, 2009 (IRAQ): Authorities Brian Fishman drug police station in Zaranj, Nimroz announced the arrest of al-Qaìda’s Director of Research, CTC Province. One police officer was killed. so-called “Oil Minister” for Iraq. – AP, February 23 The minister was identified as Ali Christopher Heffelfinger Mahmud Mohammed. According to FBI Fellow, CTC February 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): the AFP, “Mohammed was known for Tehrik-i-Taliban deputy chief Maulvi his involvement in hijacking tanker Faqir Muhammad declared a unilateral shipments of crude oil and petrol for Al- cease-fire in Bajaur Agency of the Qaeda and abducting the drivers.” He Contact Federally Administered Tribal Areas. was detained north of Ba`quba, Diyala Combating Terrorism Center – AFP, February 23 Province. – AFP, February 28 U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall February 24, 2009 (IRAQ): Two Iraqi February 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): The West Point, NY 10996 policemen opened fire on U.S. troops Pakistani military claimed that it had Phone: (845) 667-6383 at a police outpost in Mosul. One U.S. forced Taliban militants out of Bajaur Email: [email protected] soldier and an interpreter were killed. Agency in the Federally Administered Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ According to the Associated Press, “It Tribal Areas (FATA). “We think that we was the fourth attack in the region since have secured this agency,” said Major * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 late 2007 with suspected links to Iraqi General Tariq Khan, the commander of security units.” – AP, February 24 military forces in Bajaur. “They have lost. They have lost their cohesion out February 26, 2009 (UNITED STATES): here.” Separately, Colonel Saif Ullah, U.S.-born Christopher Paul was a commander in Mohmand Agency of support sentenced to 20 years in prison for a FATA, told reporters that Pakistani The Combating Terrorism Center would terrorism conspiracy in which he joined forces repelled the insurgency in his like to express its gratitude to its financial al-Qaìda to help plan bombings in the agency and that it is now “under the supporters, for without their support and United States and abroad. Paul, who control of law enforcement agencies.” shared vision of the Center products like also went by the names Abdul Malek – AFP, February 28 the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If and Paul Kenyatta Laws, was accused you are interested in learning more about by the Justice Department of discussing February 28, 2009 (SOMALIA): Somali how to support the Combating Terrorism terrorist attacks during an August President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. 2002 meeting with two other men at Ahmad agreed to a truce with his clan edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at a suburban coffee shop. According opponents—which have influence West Point’s Association of Graduates at to acting Assistant Attorney General over al-Shabab—in exchange for the 845-446-1553. Matthew Olsen, Paul’s sentencing ended introduction of Sharià in Somalia. “The “the long, militant career of Christopher mediators asked me to introduce Islamic Paul, an Ohio native who joined Al- Sharia in the country and I agreed,” Qaeda in the early 1990s, fought in Shaykh Sharif told reporters. Despite Afghanistan and Bosnia and conspired the statement, it is not expected that clan with others to target Americans both at militias and factions from al-Shabab The views expressed in this report are those of home and abroad.” – Fox News, February 26; will stop fighting his government. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, AFP, February 26 – BBC, February 28 the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.