Written evidence submitted by Professor Stefan Wolff (MUO0003)

Executive Summary 1. The OSCE is a collective security organisation with 57 participating States spanning three continents and including, or bordering, regions of strategic national interest for the . 2. The UK’s exit from the European Union has changed the constraints and opportunities HMG must project its national interests in these regions and in and through multilateral organisations the UK is a member of. 3. The OSCE represents an opportunity for the projection of UK national interests while simultaneously taking a leading role in reinvigorating the multilateral approach to regional and global problem solving and strengthening the very international organisations that are a pillar of this multilateral approach. 4. A more proactive role in and through the OSCE can further enhance the UK’s capacity to remain a globally and regionally relevant leader with the ability to set agendas and shape policies in line with the national interest. This will require reinforcing existing partnerships within the OSCE and forging new ones with likeminded participating States. 5. Investment of resources and time will be required to achieve such outcomes. In addition, HMG needs to acquire a clear understanding of the challenges it will encounter in pursuit of these objectives in the OSCE context and of the time and effort required to overcome them.

Background 6. I am Professor of International Security at the with an extensive background of research on the OSCE and in the post-Soviet space of the OSCE region. Among other relevant activities, I have contributed to two reports of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions (on Innovative Approaches for Co- Operation in the Protracted Conflict Zones in the OSCE Area in 2016 and on OSCE Confidence Building in the Economic and Environmental Dimension in 2017) and am currently leading a project on the Geopolitical and Geo-economic Implications for the OSCE of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. I have also written a report on The Role of the OSCE in Economic Connectivity and Diplomacy in 2018. In addition, I have more than a decade of experience in working with HMG, the OSCE, the EU, and UNDP on conflict settlement efforts in the protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space, primarily in Moldova and more recently in Ukraine, as well as in Georgia and Azerbaijan/Armenia. The following comments are based on this experience, as well as on a workshop I co- hosted with Dr Matthew Preston of FCO Research Analysts in November 2017 on post- Brexit UK policy towards the OSCE. The Context 7. The key question I seek to address in this submission is how UK policy vis-à-vis the OSCE can help deliver on the objectives of HMG’s broader European, transatlantic, and security policy. This entails an analysis of what success would look like and how it can be achieved, specifically at what cost (primarily financial and in terms of relations with the UK’s main foreign policy partners) and within which timeframe. 8. Understanding the broader context of the UK’s position and role within the OSCE institutional, policy, and geographic space is the foundation for this analysis. Here, it is important to bear in mind that the different dimensions of the OSCE space are deeply contested, and increasingly so: a) Within the OSCE as an institution: among participating States with their individual and ‘alliance’ interests (e.g., EU, NATO, EEU, SCO) and within the OSCE’s own institutions and structures (e.g., protracted negotiations over key offices, annual budgets, and the continuation and establishment of field missions and their mandates); b) Across OSCE policy areas: primarily within the three dimensions of the OSCE (the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions) where participating States have been deadlocked on many issues and where past agreements and joint understandings have begun to unravel, particularly over the past several years in the context of the crisis in Ukraine; c) In the OSCE area as a geographic space: as a consequence of the persistence of protracted conflicts within and between participating States and the fact that other regional and international organisations also pursue their own interests within this geographic space, which, in turn, presents a challenge to the relevance of the OSCE not only as a forum for discussion and negotiation but also regarding its effectiveness as a comprehensive security organisation. 9. These contestations are further complicated (and, indeed, exacerbated) by an increased Chinese presence that has been growing since the inception of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in late 2013. a) China now competes for influence across 27 of the OSCE’s participating States are part of the BRI (as part of the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China—Mongolia— Russia, and the China—Central Asia—West Asia corridors) with Russia (and the EEU) and the West (NATO, EU), particularly in contested spaces like Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Western CIS, and the Western . b) China’s activities may be couched primarily in terms of enhancing economic connectivity and boosting domestic growth in China and in the countries involved in the BRI, yet it also has clear social, political, environmental, and potentially military implications. This is because China uses its presence to project its own interests, models of social, political, and economic development, and acquires soft power and increasingly hard political and economic power to influence the domestic and foreign policy choices of countries participating in the BRI. 10. From the perspective of HMG, this is further complicated by the fact that the OSCE as an international organisation has very little political exposure and traction among key stakeholders in the UK; thus, its limitations and potential for contributing to the implementation of the UK’s European, transatlantic, and security policy objectives are insufficiently understood.

Challenges and opportunities for the UK 11. The UK’s exit from the European Union constitutes an important factor of change and hence an opportunity to reassess HMG’s policy towards the OSCE. 12. At the same time, however, the OSCE remains important in its own right as a vehicle for setting out UK positions on critical policy issues, such as the crisis in Ukraine, deteriorating relations with Russia, the growing assertiveness of China, climate change, and the impact of the Corona virus pandemic, and to identify and work together with like-minded partners in pursuing UK interests. 13. Having exited from the EU, the UK remains part of both the NATO coordination group among OSCE participating States and thus has clear opportunities to shape the positions of a powerful set of participating States. 14. Exit from the EU, has come at the cost of not having a UK national voice in EU discussions, but offers an opportunity to regain such a national voice, at least in part. However, this is likely to face several challenges, including: a) The EU, and to a lesser extent NATO, have taken on and financed several OSCE functions, and this ‘expansionism’ has squeezed the OSCE out of some of its traditional space. With the UK leaving the EU, a traditional ‘brake’ on further EEAS expansionism will cease to exist, which will further increase pressure on the OSCE. b) As the UK has always been quite forward-leaning in EU coordination, EU positions might become more timid, and the UK might find itself more isolated with a forward- leaning position among its traditional allies. 15. Projecting UK interests within and through the OSCE is also constrained by: a) The OSCE being very process-heavy institution and short on deliverables; b) The proliferation and consequent fragmentation of more and more processes created at great cost to deal with issues that could not be dealt with by institutions and mechanisms originally set up to deal with them; c) The dependency on (small) participating States’ agendas because of the consensus rule in OSCE decision-making; d) The constraints that the broader geopolitical and geo-economic environment— currently characterised by very low levels of trust and cooperation between Russia and the West and uncertainty concerning the role of the US, as well as a growing, but not yet fully understood presence of China within the OSCE region—places on the potential of the OSCE to accomplish anything. 16. In light of this, one key priority for HMG in the now post-BREXIT context should be to defend and protect the current role and capacities of the OSCE and to do so also by identifying new like-minded international partners outside the traditional circles of EU (and NATO) member countries. This should also include taking recourse to the OSCE’s agenda-setting role and its convening power (of 57 participating States across three continents) and capitalising on the respect the organisation engenders as a neutral actor and one of the last remaining fora of institutionalised interaction and communication between Russia and the West. 17. As a continuing member of NATO, (i.e., a critical part of the OSCE geographical space) will remain a key theatre for HMG, and the UK will continue to share many threat perceptions with the EU and will hence need to be able to continue working with the EU to manage them. 18. A shift in the UK approach to the OSCE will also affect the UK’s relations with its traditional (EU and NATO) partners. For example, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have lost interest in the OSCE as a comprehensive security organisation, and this may pose a problem for any increased UK effort within the OSCE because of the perception that it might create among the Central and Eastern European EU and NATO members that a strengthened OSCE will lead to a reduction of the (security) role of the EU and NATO. 19. Thus, HMG will need to tread a fine line between utilising the OSCE for its potential to contribute to the projection and realisation of the UK’s European, transatlantic, and security interests within the post-BREXIT European and transatlantic security architecture and allowing the UK to retain relevance as a key partner for its traditional (Western) allies among OSCE participating States. 20. Consequently, HMG should work on increasing the UK’s profile and reputation within the organisation by: a) Offering more support for OSCE field missions, including by using extra-budgetary contributions; b) Using the agility provided by BREXIT (i.e., the regaining of a UK national voice) to offer thought leadership and policy leadership within the OSCE, including capitalising on a first-mover’s advantage to encourage others to follow a UK lead on a range of critical issues (e.g., how to adapt existing institutions to current security challenges); c) Simultaneously continuing its role in the NATO coordination group at the OSCE and exploring ways in which high levels of coordination with the EU can also be retained and/or realised in new institutional formats (such as an EU+1 coordination framework in the context of the EaP). 21. This will also require a commitment to retain, and, where necessary, increase, resources within the newly formed FCDO and UKDEL to the OSCE and, in turn, to increase the organisation’s salience and traction among key stakeholders in the UK, especially across Whitehall and Westminster. 22. One potential avenue of doing this might be to emphasise more prominently the role and potential of the OSCE in realising some of the more ‘established’ interests of the UK at bilateral and sub-regional/multilateral levels of engagement with other OSCE participating States, including in the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus, the Western CIS, and Central Asia. A critical role that the UK could play here would be: a) Increasing investment in OSCE capacity both at headquarter and mission level—the former, for example, through financing more secondees, the latter also through extra-budgetary contributions and in-country project funding. b) Setting agendas on issues close to UK interests across all three dimensions, building on recent very successful work in the Human Dimension, and thereby preventing agendas being hijacked by those with interests contrary to those of the UK (for example in the Structured Dialogue). c) Connecting issues across all three Dimensions in the spirit of the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security and increasing the speed and quality with which work at OSCE Secretariat level translates into impact at the level of beneficiary participating States in sub-regions where the UK has particular interests. Recommendations 23. HMG needs to be realistic about what the expectations are of what can be achieved in what timeframe and at what cost. 24. It is important to take a long-term perspective on what success means, including being less focused on ‘deliverables’ and accepting the value of process. 25. Managing conflict and preventing a further deterioration of the current security situation would be a critical hallmark of success, not least because it does not foreclose future opportunities for improving security and stability in the post-BREXIT multilateral security environment in Europe and beyond. 26. Another objective for HMG’s policy should be to increase the UK’s role in championing certain positions that reflect UK interests and are in line with, and help deliver, transatlantic alliance positions in and through the OSCE. 27. Utilising the opportunities offered by a more agile UK role post-BEXIT, HMG should consider increasing the UK personnel footprint in the OSCE, both at Secretariat and mission levels, in order to make the OSCE think and act in a more British way. 28. In practical terms, achieving the above would include, among others: a) Sending high-level officials, including the Foreign Secretary to relevant OSCE events. b) Raising awareness of the OSCE within the UK and of its potentially critical role in delivering on the vision of a global Britain post-BREXIT. c) Funding projects for the OSCE through extra-budgetary allocations. d) Showing more flexibility in the OSCE budgeting process (in line with a less efficiency/deliverables-driven long-term perspective on UK profile and reputation within the organisation). e) Paying the salaries of more UK secondees to the OSCE. f) Considering a bid for the OSCE Chair.

July 2020