LLookingooking BBackack iinn HHistory:istory: TThehe BBattleattle ooff SSaigonaigon FFortyorty YYearsears AAgogo By Mr. William A. Oberholtzer

Military police from the 716th Military Police Battalion monitor Vietcong activity across the street from the U.S. Embassy, 31 January 1968.

On 31 January 1968, members of the Military Police Corps would face one of their most diffi cult trials. Coordinated attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and other areas throughout the city exacted a harsh toll on military police and infantry security units. There were numerous casualties; but despite the adversity, the embassy would be recaptured and the Vietcong defeated. Steps toward changing the military police from a service branch to a combat support branch were fi nalized. After witnessing the courage and determined actions of the military police, Army leaders were convinced of their abilities in frontline combat. The battles for the U.S. Embassy and Saigon have been and should remain constant topics of study within the U.S. Army Military Police School. The heroism, tactics and above all, sacrifi ce of these Soldiers should not be forgotten. —Andy Watson, Historian, U.S. Army Military Police School On 31 January 2008, we marked the 40th Offensive to fruition, he made errors in judgment Anniversary of the Tet Offensive and the Battle of when selecting his targets in Saigon. According to Saigon. The Battle of Saigon was the direct result Colonel Richard E. George (Retired), who served as of a well-planned terrorist attack that called for Saigon’s Provost Marshal in 1968, “The two major violent, widespread, and simultaneous military action Vietcong errors were their failure to attack and throughout the city by Vietcong units and their eliminate both the provost marshal compound and sympathizers. The North Vietnam Defense Minister, the 716th Military Police Battalion Headquarters.” Vo Nguyen Giap (the master planner), was possibly Due to these mistakes, the military police were able one of the best tactical commanders of the 20th to blunt an all-out assault on Saigon and defeat the century. Only he had the skills to supervise the enemy. By not attacking the 716th Headquarters, elaborate synchronization necessary to strike at the the Vietcong allowed the military police to continue heart of the South Vietnam government and the as the eyes and ears of the command and to swiftly American military nerve center in Saigon. For all respond with reaction forces to fi refi ghts throughout of Giap’s intricate planning to bring the 1968 Tet the city. When captured Vietcong were asked about

MILITARY POLICE 19-08-1 51 the fi rst defensive resistance, they replied without of the Monkey. Due to fears of a massive aerial hesitation, “The military police.” retaliation by the United States on North Vietnam During the Battle of Saigon, the Military Police after the start of the Tet Offensive, Ho Chi Minh, Corps lost a staggering number of personnel— president of North Vietnam, allowed his people to 27 killed in action and 44 wounded. Most of the celebrate the holy day on 29 January. casualties occurred when a military police reaction Giap planned a feint attack in hopes of further force, responding to an attack on Bachelor Offi cer overextending American assets. Early in January Quarters (BOQ) 3, was ambushed in an alley. Another 1968, 20,000 communist troops surrounded the location with a high concentration of casualties was Marine fi re base at Khe Sanh, outnumbering the the U.S. Embassy. Marines four to one. Some observers believed this Military police, in an instant, switched from the was a replay of Dien Bien Phu, a major French defeat role of “cop” to “combat Soldier.” They quickly in their war with the Vietminh. Giap knew that he adapted to street and house-to-house fi ghting. They could not defeat the Americans in a head-to-head did this with ease, skill, and determination—much confrontation; therefore, Khe Sanh was staged as a to the dismay of the Vietcong. General William decoy. Other attacks took place along the Cambodian Westmoreland, commander of the American Military border, drawing American attention away from Forces in South Vietnam, said some years later, Giap’s principal targets—Saigon and Hue. “Members of the Military Police Corps were called While the Americans and South Vietnamese were upon to fi ght numerous skirmishes in Saigon, each preoccupied with the defense of Khe Sanh, Vietcong of which had a direct bearing on the rapid defeat of units began to slip into Saigon in fi nal preparation the enemy. Though usually outnumbered, they were of the forthcoming attack. After their failed attempt victorious.” Brigadier General Albin F. Irzyk, Saigon to capture Saigon in 1967, Vietcong units stockpiled area commander, remarked, “Their performances as arms, ammunition, high explosives, and men in combat troopers can be described in only the most Saigon and other towns and cities. They slipped glowing of superlatives.” Colonel Richard E. George, many of the weapons and ammunition into the city the Saigon area provost marshal stated, “These brave under the guise of funeral processions, even going as men won a costly change of image for the military far as to bury the weapons in coffi ns, only to unearth police, one for which all past, present, and future them hours before the attack. Lieutenant General members of the Military Police Corps can justifi ably Fred Weyand, commander of II Corps, became point to with pride and humility—for this was uneasy with reports of large enemy troop movement, indeed the Corps’ fi nest hour.” During an awards the fl ow of Vietcong deserters drying up, and talk ceremony honoring military police who defended from captured infi ltrators of “something big” about Saigon, General Creighton W. Abrams, Deputy U.S. to happen. Lieutenant General Weyand expressed his Commander in Vietnam, commented, “When raw concerns to General Westmoreland, who then ordered courage, capability, and will to fi ght are required, 15 maneuver battalions to fall back near Saigon. military police will meet the standards.” The fi rst night of Tet was quiet, except for the usual The most sacred Vietnamese holiday is Tet, celebrations taking place throughout Saigon and a lunar holiday. If the American people were to the country. No one expected the enemy to break the celebrate Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year’s Day, truce because the Vietcong had hinted that if all went and Independence Day in one week, it might com- well, the truce (which began 27 January) might be pare to the sacred feelings that the Vietnamese extended beyond 3 February and a permanent armis- hold for Tet. It is a time of celebrations, family tice could be established. This fi nal deception by the gatherings, forgiveness of enemies, and preparation enemy caused feelings of euphoria for South Viet- for the coming year. Tradition called for a truce namese and American diplomats. But that euphoria during Tet, allowing Soldiers on both sides to stand was shattered on the morning of 31 January. down for the duration of the holiday and enjoy Three days into the truce, Brigadier General time with family and friends. In 1968, the holiest Irzyk summoned Colonel George and Lieutenant day of Tet fell on 30 January, ushering in the Year Colonel Gordon Rowe, commander of the 716th “These brave men won a costly change of image for the military police, one for which all past, present, and future members of the Military Police Corps can justifi ably point to with pride and humility—for this was indeed the Corps’ fi nest hour.” —Colonel Richard E. George

52 MILITARY POLICE 19-08-1 Military Police Battalion, to his offi ce for a situational killed two Vietcong soldiers crawling through the briefi ng. They discussed the possible infi ltration of opening. Specialist Daniel radioed, “They’re coming Vietcong sapper units in Saigon. Brigadier General in! They’re coming in!” While focusing their attention Irzyk instructed them to prepare for possible enemy on the wall, Specialist Daniel and Private Sebast were action. While Colonel George and Lieutenant Col- shot in their backs by other attacking Vietcong. Due onel Rowe were meeting with Brigadier General to their valiant stand and sacrifi ce, Marine Sergeant Irzyk, an alert message was sent to all units under Ronald Harper had time to race to the main embassy Irzyk’s command. As a result of the briefi ng and the building and close and secure the large teak doors. alert notifi cation, they changed duty commitments— This action prevented the sappers from entering the all walking patrols were switched to motorized embassy as they had planned. Although the doors patrols, selected headquarters and communications were the target of rocket-propelled grenades, they centers were assigned extra guard posts, all Viet- remained intact and locked. namese personnel were removed from U.S. military Meanwhile, calls for help began to pour into police patrols, radios were placed on continuous military police headquarters by phone and radio. One dispatch, and all personnel were ordered to wear fl ak offi cer commented, “The calls for help came in by jackets and steel helmets. Military police reaction radio and phone faster than we could handle them. We teams were organized and placed on standby. have maybe half, maybe only one-third of the calls on In the late evening hours of 30 January, com- the log.” The following is a sample of the staff duty munist infi ltrators left their hiding places and mixed log for the 716th Military Police Battalion: with the celebrating crowds of South Vietnamese 0300: BOQ 3 reports enemy action. citizens. Recently unearthed weapons were test-fi red, 0315: U.S. Embassy under attack. being masked by the sound of fi reworks. By the early morning hours of 31 January, the enemy was 0317: Explosion at Townhouse BOQ. ready. A command post was established in the 0318: BOQ 1 under attack. Quang Buddhist Pagoda by the Vietcong, and groups 0319: McArthur BOQ under attack. of communist soldiers were in place near their 0321: Report of hostile attack at Rex BOQ. targets, having been led there by local communist 0325: Explosion at BOQ 2. agents and sympathizers. 0340: Automatic-weapon fi re and attack at With clouds low in the sky, 20 members of a BOQ 3. Vietcong sapper unit began loading a small truck 0341: Military police at U.S. Embassy request and an old taxicab with high explosives and urgent ammo resupply. weapons. Their target—the U.S. Embassy—was only a few blocks away. The air was fi lled with tension The area provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel and anticipation as the 23 men of Vietcong C-10 George, was briefed at 0300 hours about the Sapper Battalion quickly and quietly fi nished loading developing situation, especially the situation at the the vehicles. At 0245 hours, the men climbed into the U.S. Embassy. He ordered a reaction force led by truck and taxicab for the short ride to the embassy. First Lieutenant Frank Ribich and Sergeant Arthur Each man was deep in thought as he contemplated Rivera to be dispatched to the compound. The force his assignment and chances of survival, which were was on the road 17 minutes after being notifi ed. slim. Nguyen Van Muoi drove one of the vehicles Before the reaction team’s arrival, Sergeant Jonnie by the U.S. Embassy on Thong Nhut Boulevard. As Thomas and Specialist Owen Mebast responded to he rounded the embassy a second time, mortar fi re Specialist Daniel’s call for assistance. Sadly, they began to drop on the city. Leaning out the win dow were ambushed by a Vietcong sniper as they arrived of his vehicle, Muoi yelled, “Tien!” (which means at the main gate of the embassy. forward). The Peugeot truck and taxi parked next to Approaching the embassy, Lieutenant Ribich the south wall of the 4-acre U.S. Embassy compound, and Sergeant Rivera assessed the situation. Heavy and the sappers began to unload the vehicles. automatic-weapon fi re was coming from an apart- At this time, Specialist Charles Daniel and ment building opposite the embassy, so Lieutenant Private First Class William Sebast, members of Ribich sent Sergeant Rivera and his team to secure Charlie Company, 527th Military Police Company, the building and street. In a matter of minutes, were on guard duty at the Mac Dinh Chi entrance of Sergeant Rivera’s team had secured the area. While the U.S. Embassy compound. All was quiet, until an Rivera was securing the apartment building, Ribich explosion breached a hole in the compound wall near made contact with Marine Sergeant Leroy Banks and the military police guard post. Turning their attention they established a joint command, allowing Banks to toward the wall, Specialist Daniel and Private Sebast continue to direct the Marine portion of the embassy

MILITARY POLICE 19-08-1 53 Hong Thap Tu

Ba Trung Vietnamese police Mac Dinh Chi compound

French Embassy compound

Offi ce building Generator building Servants’ quarters Mission coordinator quarters

OSA building Vehicle gate

Dog run Parking lot Military Chancery police building Helipad post

Norodom Locked U.S. Embassy compound gate compound Post 12

Trong Nhat

Norodom Main gate Hole blown in British compound embassy wall Embassy gates

Drawing of the U.S. Embassy compound and surrounding area. reaction force while coordinating with Lieutenant Across Saigon, near Tan Son Nhut Airport, a Ribich. This arrangement proved to be effective. 25-man military police reaction force was approach- Private First Class Paul V. Healey, 716th Military ing BOQ 3 in response to a reported enemy attack. Police Battalion, was on patrol about 0300 hours Members of the force were riding in a 2½-ton truck and two jeeps. Circling the block once, the when the calls for assistance came across the military lead jeep pulled into an alley near the BOQ. police radio net. His patrol responded to enemy Well into the alley, the convoy began to slow down, activity near the Philippine Embassy, where Healey and then all hell broke loose. Military policeman engaged a Vietcong in a fi refi ght and eliminated John R. Van Wagner recalls, “Suddenly there were him. Hearing that the U.S. Embassy was under two loud explosions and bright fl ashes of light attack, Healey’s patrol raced to the area to help. behind me. Automatic-weapon fi re swept the alley, Healey would later earn the Distinguished Service and we ran for the BOQ. We knew it was bad in Cross for extraordinary heroism during the battle. there, but we didn’t know how bad until almost At 0420 hours, General Westmoreland ordered the noon.” 716th Military Police Battalion to clear the embassy A company-size force of Vietcong was preparing and grounds, explaining that it was their fi rst priority. to hurl an attack at the Vietnamese Joint General Meanwhile, a resupply of ammunition had arrived Staff Headquarters when the American convoy and a 50-man reaction force was enroute. When appeared in the alley. The last two vehicles absorbed everything was in place, the force waited. Lieutenant the full force of the attack. At a range of less than Ribich made contact with the military police net 10 feet, the Vietcong poured their maximum fi re- control station and was connected directly to General power into the convoy. They killed 16 military police Westmoreland. Westmoreland ordered Ribich to Soldiers and wounded 21 others in the ambush and initiate the attack as soon as possible since the security subsequent rescue attempts. Finally, after 14 hours of the embassy was a fi rst priority. Lieutenant Ribich of heavy fi ghting, military police and infantry (with responded with, “Airborne.” The attack began well armor support) were able to secure the area and before dawn. recover the dead and wounded.

54 MILITARY POLICE 19-08-1 Soldiers advance into the alley behind BOQ 3 in Saigon, 31 January 1968.

Back at the embassy, Ribich signaled his men than 300 military police; however by dawn, the that it was time to attack and clear the embassy 716th Military Police Battalion would have 800 men grounds of the enemy. Ribich’s team entered the in action. How could such a small, vastly outnumbered front compound, while Sergeant Rivera—with his force of military police hold and defeat an enemy of team and the Marine contingent—entered the parking superior strength? area through the Norodom compound. The American The answer to that question is found in the Forces entered the compound and began to systema- comments of the U.S. mission coordinator, who tically clear the embassy grounds with grenades and stated, “I saw raw courage tonight on the part of the small arms fi re. Marine guards and military police. I saw them advance During the assault, the Marines and military straight into the direction of enemy fi re and silence police killed 21 Vietcong sappers. Lieutenant Ribich that fi re. If you want to be braver than that, I would killed the twenty-second Vietcong, who attempted to rather not be around.” Lieutenant Colonel Gordon join the fi ght while driving a taxi. The fi nal sapper D. Rowe, commander of the 716th Military Police was severely wounded and captured. In the assault to Battalion, said, concerning the performance of his retake the embassy, one Marine was killed and several military police, “We delayed their plans long enough military police and Marines were wounded. As the to upset their mission. We converted from a military military police were completing their operation, police battalion to a tactical infantry battalion in less a platoon of 101st Airborne Soldiers landed on the than 3 hours, and in essence, we were unassisted for embassy roof and General Westmoreland arrived the fi rst 12 to 18 hours.” by car. After a thorough search, the embassy was declared secure. A force of 2,000 to 3,000 Vietcong had slipped Mr. Oberholtzer is the chief of the U.S. Army Military Police School Officer Education System/Warrant Officer into the city with the intent of toppling the Saigon Education System Branch. He served with the 1st Infantry government and its American allies. The only U.S. Division during the 1968 Tet Offensive as a medic with Forces instantly available for combat were fewer Battery A, 2/33 Field Artillery.

MILITARY POLICE 19-08-1 55