CEU eTD Collection
CONSOLIDATION In partial In fulfillment THE Supervisor: Professor
of of therequirements for the degreeof Departmentof Political Science
Central European University FAILURE Budapest,Hungary Ruta MazgelyteRuta Submitted to
IN 1990 20
By IVORY
14
OF
Andras Bozoki
REGIME
COAST
Masterof Arts
AFTER
CEU eTD Collection appropriate acknowledgement the ismadein bibliographical form of reference. where except person, other any by published and/or written previously materials no accepted I, Ruta Mazgelyte, hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials no contains dissertation this that declare hereby Mazgelyte, Ruta I, for any other degrees, in any other institutions. The dissertation contains dissertation The institutions. other any in degrees, other any for
Copyright notice Copyright i
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Bibliography Appendices CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER4 ADAPTATIONFOR AFRICAN C CHAPTER3 UNIFIEDELITE FORMATION CHAPTER2 CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION ofList abbreviations ofList tables 1.1. AppendixTablesA. 4.2.Tensions within politicalelite andstatedisintegration 4.1.Historical peculiarities of Ivory Coast between 1960 2.6.I 2.5.Implications of regime openingscenarios for elite unity 2.4.Insights on elite differentiation after regimeopening 2.3.Implications of regime openingscenarios for elite differentiation 2.2.Insig 2.1.Implications of regime openingscenarios for elite circulation 1.2.
Amodelof consensually unifiednational elite Approaches to regimeconsolidation nsightson elite unityafter regime opening htson classic elite circulationafter regime opening
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THE CASETHE OF IVORY COAST CONSENCUALLYUNIFIED ELITE FORMATION: THEORETIC REGIMEOPENING SCENARIOS: TOWARDSCONSENSUALLY DEFENIN
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CEU eTD Collection (starting fromthe pre Table 11Persistence ofincumbent Government memberswithin Governmentcabinets (starting fromthe pre Table 10Persistence ofincumbent National Assembly memberswithin Government cabinets pre Table 9Persistence ofincumbents within 2011 pre Table 8Persistence ofincumbents within 2000 pre Table 7Persistence ofincumbents within 1996 NationalAssembly Table 6Persistence ofincumbents previousfrom National Assembly within 1990 Table 5 Transitionscenarios and theirimplications elite for unity Table 4 Transitionscenarios and theirimplications elite for differentiation Table 3 Transitionscenarios and theirimplications fo sustainingthose configurations. Table 2Model explaining possible elite Table 1 - - - openingNational Assembly) openingNational Assembly) openingNational Assembly) Dynamicsof formerFrench African West political regimes after independence.
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CEU eTD Collection D UDPCI d'Ivoire UDCY MFA d JPDCI ECOWAS PIT RDR PDCI FPI e la Côte la e d’Ivoire émocratie et la émocratie et
– -
–
- Ivorian Front( Popular - Ivorian Party ( Workers
Rally of theRepublicans ( Rally of ) – Movementof Future Forces( Democratic Party of Ivory PartyDemocratic ( of Coast –
–
Youth of Democratic Party of Ivory Coast ( Coast Ivory of Party Democratic of Youth
C - no fr h Dmcay n Pae n vr Cat ( Coast Ivory in Peace and Democracy the for Union
Economic African of Community States West tzn' eortc Union Democratic itizens' P ) aix aix Côte d’Ivoireen
Front Front Ivoirien Populaire Parti Ivoirien des Ivoirien Parti Travailleurs List ofList Rassemblement Républicainsdes Mouvement Forcesdes de l'Avenir ) abbreviations
Parti Parti Côte d’Ivoire deDémocratique la ( Union vi
D émocratique ) Jeunesse du Parti Démocratique Parti du Jeunesse
)
C tyne e Côte de itoyenne )
no pu la pour Union )
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CEU eTD Collection of monopolytheir rulin former that means attempt Such regime. to demands accept to had elite limits its reached had Boigny H. F. of dominance the Ivorian origin. to due 1995 since elections presidential in participation from deprived was was who Ouattara, A. power presidential challenges these and 2002 of in wars civil culmination two in manifested The legitimacy. regime to challenges the of death reforms. and opening regime for advocate to Gbagbo L. of leadership the under opposition evoked 80’s in country the were which plantations), specifically, (more activities related agriculture to outlook liberal via and party centralizing via elites local from P single stable most the and longest the display to managed it democratization of wave third the to prior case: interesting puzzling we is once indeed question this to answer The democratization? of wave third the after colony African West French resident of Ivory of resident This very concise review gives u gives review concise very This question a answer to attempt will research This After the electoral refor electoral the After p
eiet . . Boigny H. F. resident briefly take a look at some historic nuances of th of nuances historic some at look a take briefly
political, Coast Coast
F. H. Boigny H. F. the backbone of Ivorian economy. The economic crisis economic The economy. Ivorian of backbone the economic and military power. As a result they entered intoentered they result a As power. economic andmilitary a
– the dissatisfaction
was failing to consolidate legitimate and stable regime stable and legitimate consolidate to failing was
rmto o cliaig n aqiig ad for land acquiring and cultivating of promotion I emergence of of emergence m in 1990, which legalized political parties, and the and parties, political legalized which 1990, in m NTRODUCTION t ake -
party regime in French West Africa. Africa. West French in regime party n 1993 in
had managed to build the loyalty and support and loyalty the build to managed had an initial step step initial an s few clues. On the one hand, it is clear that clear is it hand, one the On clues. few s 1
in of population and population of ,
g elites and their supporters had lost had supporters their and elites g 2010. 2010. h country the Ivorian
h ls cii hs ruh to brought has crisis last The
with economic crisis economic with and identity
why Ivory Coast Coast Ivory why
o pn p undemocratic up open to a eprecd w big two experienced had crisis and crisis paved the way for for way the paved e
country. It is an is It country.
his –
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CEU eTD Collection 2002,13)(Carothers politics Caroth contradict patterns T legitimacy. regime of problems new to leads again which configurations, elite change to attempt an and issue unity elite unresolved as interpreted be then might challenge subsequent each of emergence the Moreover, regimes. new of legitimacy to challenges in resulted failure This process. the of not beginning very were the at elites unified national because failed, have could regime democratic towards political game.of acknowledged not have and satisfied not were elites within fractions some by challenged yet democracy electoral “par to free” “not from moved it for support rough a provide House Freedom by circulated opening regime after tendencies authoritarian displayed self to tendency a have elites political where elements, democratic and dictatorial of amalgam of kind sub of number to symptomatic was which zone”, “gray called elite of positions some preserve have led could opening the regime other hand, the to On members. time potential same the the at decompress and to threat mean revolutionary a as serve formally could opening regime with provided non insufficiently with influence and status power, for competition These brief observations suggest that regime opening and attempt and opening regime that suggest observations brief These
have some stability. Once in them, countries do not move out of them easily” them of out move not do countries them, in Once stability. some have a successful successful a
-
slt fo citizenry from isolate .
(Puddington 2013, 3; Puddington 2014, 19) 2014, Puddington 3; 2013, (Puddington
r’ bevto ta “ that observation ers’ the benefits benefits the coup d’état lead by lead d’état coup tially free” status free” tially Crtes 02 15) 2002, (Carothers of 2
single , although it cannot be considered as considered be cannot it although , General - ekes lrls ad dominant and pluralism feckless party regime. regime. party
- R. Guei R. uig lts excluded elites, ruling – .
- since 2012 Ivory Coast 2012 since h ls to reports two last The Saharan countries Saharan . n u cs regime case our In
n hs epc, the respect, this In Ivory Coast into so into Coast Ivory , which , . In 1999 In . meant meant s to transit to s
new rules rules new
it was it hese that
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a - - CEU eTD Collection members elite countries. African of experience Habdank and semi systems party elites ruling communist Europ contributed society civil of involvement active the where story, success Eastern Central in Countries consolidation. regime new of failures to consolidation democracy successful of stories from vary results However Latin becomesjustification clearit once we historical into put broader The colony? African West French former a with ourselves bother should we why But self into deeper bit little a dig to help could question this to answer Indeed legitimacy? regime challenges to and opening regime to due changed were elite national of configurations how question: supplementing secondary a answer to help could it also but Coast, Ivory transitional”, “post i.e. contemporary, in issues elite national about understanding study. this of object mai the be will elites national respect, this In Coast). Ivory in reform electoral 1990 after (i.e. democratization of wave third the after disunity elite’s national of formation legit regime to challenges of impacts the and unity elite’s national on opening regime of impacts issuesthe such be address as: should investigation historicallyand sensitive mc o ntoa eies nt. hs h mi rsac ga sol cne on center should goal research main the Thus unity. elite’s national on imacy -
democratic regimes now dominate in Central in dominate now regimes democratic America tended to retreat from single party single from retreat to tended America Between 1974 and 1990 countries in Central Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia andAsia Europe, Africa, CentralEastern in countries 1990 and 1974 Between our consolidation regime of failure the understand to order in that clear is It -
Kolaczkowska 2012) Kolaczkowska (Bernhard and Kaya 2012, 4 2012, Kaya and (Bernhard ofte n The value of the research is that it could provide not only deeperonly not provide could it that is research the of value The
consolidate
( Karklins and Petersen 1993, 588) 1993, Petersen and Karklins D d uring the third wave of wave third the uring .
hi pwr y co by power their A
completely different picture emerges emerges picture different completely 3
– - 5) perpetuation of national elite’s di elite’s national of perpetuation . In result, consolidated democratic or democratic consolidated result, In . Eastern European region European Eastern systems - pe tasto o through or transition opted
democratization
and installation of installation and Hnigo 19, 579) 1991, (Huntington - regional context.regional - colonial”, “post colonial”, rpeet a represent e
impor to removal to
old ruling old
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CEU eTD Collection democracy phenomena single longest the and stable countries these fluctuations regime from prevented not has sharing, power promote and elite ruling the to channels open to supposed which democratization, t in presented political stable achieve to struggled regimes. colonies French former the all practically and 101 2013, were members elite local selected Only power. political much have not did and administration territorial of means “Western” l very encountered democratization a at the failure authoritarian ocal elites were excluded from the governance, were not not were governance, the from excluded were elites ocal were pcfc c specific recruited F ormer French colonies in Africa are particularly worth attention worth particularly are Africa in colonies French ormer
Dynamics of political regimes in former French West African colonies are colonies African West French former in regimes political of Dynamics – o scaie it Fr into socialized not . 3)
of of . reaction
lna eprec cmae t British to compared experience olonial The education The e figure he
no h lwr ak o clna amnsrto system administration colonial of ranks lower the into (with exception of Senegal) of exception (with failed
eie consolidation regime Shadr 94 80 1994, (Schraeder
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system created a gap between local elites local between gap a created system nh culture ench - party , who were trained trained were who , regime, . 4
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overtly points that the third wave of of wave third the that points overtly Ivory Coa Ivory – after 1)
had It . an at impli
also st, which displayed the most the displayed which st, colonies colonist’s education system, education colonist’s tep to attempt attempt toattempt transit es xeine te same the experienced
n h vs mjrt of majority vast the in ht hs countries these that . fully In French French In
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CEU eTD Collection 60. pp. Heinemann, and UNESCO California: 1935", since Africa VII: Africa of history "General (ed.), A. Mazrui Ali 1945", equat and "Tropical et 1993, al., http://africanelections.tripod.com 1 Table Country
Ivory Coast Mauritania This table is created by me. Source: African Elections Database, 2012, 2012, Database, Elections African Source: me. by table is created This Burkina Senegal Guinea Benin The time second democratic restricted emerging practice, introduced as in the country. democracy democracy or w Niger democracy or democracy w as introduced as in the country. democracy democracy or w Faso Mali The first Thetime first democratic restricted emerging practice, 1 Dates fallthey into if S. Huntington's III of ave w
Dynamics of former DynamicsWest African former of politicalFrench after regimes independence 1960-1966 democracy emerginig 1960-1961 practice democratic restricted 1960-1961 democracy emerginig 1960-1963 state one party 1960-1974 Political since independenceregimes and period of duration democratization interval (1974-1990) one party state one state party one state party one state party 1960-1968 1958-1984 1960-1990 pracrtce democratic restricted 1963-1966 regime military 1974-1989 regime military 1966-1970 state one party de-facto 1961-1963
one state party 1961-1978
practice democratic restricted 1970-1974 regime military 1963-1964 regime military 1968-1976 1966-1974 regime military 1984-1990 transition multiparty state one party 1989-1991 one party state 1990 orial Africa under French, Portuguese and Spanish domination, 1935 domination, Spanish and Portuguese French, under Africa orial
. Former French West African colonies were indentified from Diop M. from wereindentified colonies African French . Former West multiparty 1990-1993 transition multiparty 1991-1993 regime military 1974-1977 state one party de-facto 1964-1965 state one party de facto regime + military 1976-1979 regime military 1978-1991 practice democratic restricted 1974-1978 transition restricted democraticrestricted practice democracy 1993-1996 transition multiparty 1977-1978 regime military 1965-1968 state one party 1979-1991 transition multiparty 1991-1992 practice democratic restricted 1974-1978 1990-1999
5 democracy 1978-1980 practice democratic restricted 1969 1968 - regime military transitional government
+ multiparty transition democraticrestricted restricted democraticrestricted practice 1996 1991-1992 1992-2005 practice regime military 1980-1991 regime military 1969-1970 practice democratic restricted 1996-1999 1993-2008 emerging democracy 1978-2000 transition multiparty practice democratic restricted 1970-1972 regime military 2005-2007 regime military 1999-2000 government transitional 1991 1999 democracy 1992-2012 regime military 1972-1975 democracy 2007-2008 democracy 1999-2009 restricted democraticrestricted 1991-2002 practice restricted democraticrestricted practice 1 state one party 1975-1990 regime military 2008-2009 regime military 2008-2010 practice democratic restricted 2009-2010 .
00tl o 2000-till(2012) now 2000- (2012) till now transition multiparty 1990-1991 regime military government transitional regime military 2010-2011 democracy emerging democracy emerging democracy 2002- (2012) till now 2010- (2012) till now 2012 2009 democracy (2012) now 1991 till - government transitional (2012) now 2012- till practice democratic restricted (2012) now 2009- till democracy (2012) now 2011-till -
CEU eTD Collection regime political stable for conditions transition, of outcome on theillegibilityconsensus authoritarian regime of genuin a and outlook optimistic of tendency next. happening is what preoccupied very not is and opening transition of nature key among balance power political opposition elements Schmitte and (O’Donnell 1991) are tradition this of authors prominent most the Among more and incumbents between happening is what and collapse regimes authoritarian which under conditions the understand to p until itself process the process, the of beginning the with concerned more are transitions of Researchers context elite after because olitical actors olitical 1.1. CHAPTER1 - centered theories. There are two research traditions related to elite issues in the in issuestorelated elite traditions research twoare There theories.centered , D. A. Rustow A. D. , driven by strategic undertones to facilitate dissolution of authoritarian regimes. authoritarian of dissolution facilitate to undertones strategic by driven enhl te osldto rsac taiin s oe ocre wt the with concerned more is tradition research consolidation the Meanwhile achieved, not was consolidation regime that states thesis working the Since
Approaches toregimeApproaches consolidation f eie changes regime of a itrcin ewe ky actors key between interaction a) : –
n h wy rm uhrtra t dmcai rgms n b shifted b) and regimes democratic to authoritarian from way the on ; regime opening regime
b) b) free elections are held. are elections free . –
o rniooy rdto epaie te motne f regime of importance the emphasizes tradition transitology So (Rustow 1970) (Rustow I N DEFENSEOFELITE :
1986) r a) a) h dmcai rgm i fral acpe b major by accepted formally is regime democratic the –
national elites were not unified, we should focus on focus should we unified, not were elites national
. rniooy n consolidology and transitology
n hr, the short, In actors
and G. O’Donnell toge O’Donnell G. and their opponents. opponents. their
, which determines the emergence and the and emergence the determines which , 6 At the heart of such research are attempts are research such of heart the At
e belief in belief e
e authors se – -
. CENTEREDAPPROACH
rcin wti rln eie and elite ruling within fractions actors’ ability to reach a final final a reach to ability actors’ hs uh research such Thus
S. S. ocnrt on concentrate ther with P. C. P. with ther .
Huntington o eape JJ L J.J. example, For Its basic logic has a has logic basic Its
Shitr 1995) (Schmitter
(Huntington
Schmitte w main two s are es
inz r .
CEU eTD Collection important are design institutional to meanwhile stability, promote argues Linz regime. democratic of stability determine institutions that claim authors Both democracies. stable about Horowitz nature sociological explanations consolidology suitable. approach ismore th that is problem the but transitology), of concern major (the democratization of wave third and initiated already was regime goal. research to closer is it because on second the be should point starting a However other. each complement could f that tells to promotepoint starting efforts further for final a and end an not signifies opening regime consolidology 2000) Higley and Lengyel 1998; Dogan and Higley 1997; elite Low 1992; national Burton and Gunther, Higley, 1987; Higley and of peculiarities and elites element crucial as configurations national within building consensus 15) 1996, Stepan and components important most the as regulations legislative and attitudes public actors, national key emphasize which insights, relevant proposed Stepan A. and
perform well too too well perform uey y hoig elite choosing by Surely i mind, in consolidology and transitology of peculiarities the Having s e regime new is r u ivsiain oh elite both investigation our or wih r nt o oue o ntoa elites national on focused so not are which , .
The example could be a discussion between J. J. Linz and D. L. D. and Linz J. J. between discussion a be could example The Ln 19, 1; ooiz 92 204) 1992, Horowitz 119; 1992, (Linz
e O . ncountered ncountered hr authors ther Horowitz claims that presidential systems systems presidential that claims Horowitz - retd prah e hud o inr alternative ignore not should we approach oriented s the country the for access to power and and power to access for
for regime success failureconsolidation regime or for hlegs o t legitimacy its to challenges n u cs te pnn o te single the of opening the case our In -
etrd prahs ih b ueu and useful be might approaches centered , to build 7 u a ra epai o poess of processes on emphasis great a put
adopted adopted that a stableregime. alaetr syste parliamentary a multi ell Field, Higley, and Burton and Higley, Field, ell . for for Ide pclaiis of peculiarities Indeed . Thus for the tradition of tradition the for Thus - party regime during the during regime party destination
power sharing among sharing power n nt f clear of not and . In this respect, respect, this In .
, but more a butmore , ms are capable are
ed to tend (Burton ntuition
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CEU eTD Collection relation regime in approach and explanation to consolidation. Thus issues. unity elite national discuss not do also They research. deeper on much that 2010) Plattner and is Plattner F. M. countries and Diamond African L. by provided various in challenges democratization to related essays of collection informative An power. political of monopoly elite’s ruling former of problem Ishiyama T. J. mention democratization. of wave third the after Eastern Central on researches Basically, attention. lacks It well. as mentioned be should countries importa to i scope as broader such in present still that means It completely approach peculiarities anthropological the grasp to capable not is and ignores attention of center the into institutions political formal integrate, to fails it andelites, within political tensions possible detect to suitable more is it i.e. only,level political to limited is scope its that is approach this with problem The elites. political this e rmrs n h cret iuto o elite of situation current the on remarks Few
an investigation on electoral success of former dominant parties in Africa by Africa in parties dominant former of success electoral on investigation an
nt role nt of military, a it supports better consolidology suitability of approach. research informal
n J J Quinn J. J. and uoe have Europe t can cope with other national actors. with national other actors. cant cope . However they are rather based on general observations and not and observations general on based rather are they However . is societies, o example, for
making a a making political institutions like traditional chiefs traditional like institutions political
are vrhdwd h rsac o Arcn experiences African on research the overshadowed
cont Ihym ad un 2006) Quinn and (Ishiyama
left left military or or military ribution out of sight. of out mn te xsig literature existing the Among 8
to the existing literature with a different a with literature existing the to (Diamond and Plattner 1999; Diamond 1999; Plattner and (Diamond cnmc level. economic
Insights from consolidology offer a offer consolidology from Insights - etrd eerh n African on research centered Since
wih addresse which , our case overtlyour points Moreover
or or of of leaders, who are are who leaders, societies. African t is it ,
as as worth t puts it the s to
CEU eTD Collection 7. pp. Publishers, Littlefield and Rowman “ (ed.), Lengyel G. andJ. 2 diff elite national consensual the For unity. elite and differentiation configurations Table elite unity.national of type ideal an representing model, the of quadrant blue the on concentrate will consolidated achieve to struggling to concerned is study the As configurations. 2) 2000, Higley and Lengyel 296; 1987, secto various in positions leadership top holding 2 figure (the Lengyel and Higley by proposed is consolidation regime and elite national Mode: sudden and coerced and sudden Mode: deep wideScope: and peaceful and gradual Mode: deep wideScope: and
Adapted from: Higley J. and Lengyel G. (2000) “Elite configuratio “Elite (2000) G. Lengyel and Higley J. from: Adapted
REPLACEMENT CIRCULATION REPLACEMENT eo) Tee uhr ad tes ee t ntoa eie a pros wo are who persons, as elites national to refer others and authors These below). 1.2. CLASSIC CIRCULATION 2
Model explainingModel possibleregime elite configurations, those meansoutcomes and sustaining h nto o cnesa ntoa eie et o to iesos elite dimensions: two on rests elite national consensual of notion The comprehensive very A
A model A model 2 .
Elite differentiation o
f consensuallyunified national elite Narrow
Wide Elite configurations after state socialism socialism state after configurations Elite Regime: totalitarian, post-totalitarian Regime: totalitarian, movement. or lized party centra- highly through networks run single belief system; Regime: democracy consolidated interconnected. netwoks dense and compromise; norms partisanship, restrained of diversity"; in ethos "unity of
CONSENSUAL ELITE: CONSENSUAL IDEOCRATIC ELITE theoretic theoretic Strong
regime, because because regime, Elite unity Elite Te oe dpcs aiu ntoa elite national various depicts model The . oe rpeetn itreain between interrelation representing model 9
Regime: authoritarian or sultanistic or Regime: authoritarian dominates. which of one camps, opposing to networks confined beliefs; opposed deeply democracy Regime: unconsolidated segmented.networks dense and suspicion; and distrust reciprocal ethos; shared no weak or prove FRAGMENTED ELITE FRAGMENTED rs of the country the of rs DIVIDED ELITE DIVIDED Weak
its h thesis the – ns after state socialism”, in Higley socialism”, state after ns
theories and analysis and theories
ainleie ak nt, we unity, lack elite national
that (Burton and Higley and (Burton erentiation means erentiation Mode: sudden and coerced and sudden Mode: shallow and narrow Scope: peaceful and gradual Mode: shallow and narrow Scope: QUASI-REPLACEMENT CIRCULATIONQUASI-REPLACEMENT vr Cat is Coast Ivory REPRODUCTION CIRCULATION ”, Lanham: Lanham: ”,
CEU eTD Collection key as centers 3 discussed be will It countries. African in peculiarities democratization with it connect rev a have will we opening, regime of context the in formation elite national united consensually of discussion the After unity. elite and differentiation elite to relation in logic same the follow will be is circulation classic how insightswithsupplemented will be circulation.It implications elite their for discuss will we Then scenarios. opening regime possible discuss will we Firstly issue. this with context of the in elite this stati bit little national consensual of peculiarities understand to necessary positions members elite new i.e. mobility, social of level high a on based is process The sector. restricted tha rather sectors, elite all within happening is replacement The manner. peaceful regular a in replaced be can elites national present, is process this When circulation. classic of process the is elite consensual the for element supplementing decision key to access an get to elites allow which 2) 2000, Higley and (Lengyel partisanship restrained and competition, access, political about <…> norms specific “ encompasses level unity Elite elites. functional different between overlapping of lack a suggests Autonomy society. within sectors various from elites of it iscomposed autonomous,i.e. and isheterogeneous elite that
Authors have not clearly defined what are those key are those what defined not clearly have Authors
model does not explicitly not does model T i mdl s opeesv ad nlds sfl core useful includes and comprehensive is model his
(Lengyel and Higley 2000, (Lengyel3) andHigley 2000, - c political institutions like President, Parliament and Government. Parliament President, like institutions political
in a sense, that it provides possible “diagnosis” of national elites national of “diagnosis” possible provides it that sense, a in o not do
regime opening regime oe rm lt isl, u rte fo mr dsat social distant more from rather but itself, elite from come
ing achieved after regime opening. regime after achieved ing .
sd hoei epaain I te et tp e will we step next the In explanation. theoretic ised explain the the explain Also the same level includes channels and networks, and channels includes level same the Also . Thus the following few chapters will be dealing be will chapters fewthe following Thus . .
10 formation
- decision making cent making decision shared beliefs and beliefs shared
of of - aig centers making consensually
ers. I interpret these these I interpret ers. elite. - concepts, which are are which concepts,
The next two parts parts two next The values as well as well as values However 3 unified national unified .
n important An within n it , but , is a ”
CEU eTD Collection willweAfrican have more explanation. theoretic revised of frame the within manner comparative a in - sens
itive explanation. 11
Finally, CEU eTD Collection we that is suggest reformers of supporters reformers of saboteurs their into oriented is standpatters with interaction opening 590 1991, ruling reformers and opening) crystallizes attitudes of fragmentation regim towards attitudes of terms in shifts tectonic internal experiences elite from emerges opening since innovation transition, cooperative conversion, intervention foreign and distinguishes collapse and Huntington S. on builds to useful is it Also replacement and transplacement transformation, into transitions Huntington S. to refer to useful is it specification clear groups and actors major into looking by distinguished be can (types) scenarios opening regime possible The ways. of of sake the for game the of rules authoritarian
CHAPTER2 elite is also present, but it is not capable to lead regime opening regime lead to capable not is it but present, also is elite The scenario of of scenario The the When type . The second way is to is way second The . – 0; taito n Go 00 17 2010, Guo and Stradiotto 601; the CONSENSUALLYUNIFIED ELITE FORMATION lies e r attempts are re Huntington. reform include
in have – reformers’
. One of the ways to achieve that is to attract them to to them attract to is that achieve to waysthe of One . initiative of the ruling elite. ruling the of initiative R
’
an (in favor of regime opening). opening). regime of favor (in EGIME OPENINGSCENARIOS: TOWARDS rnfrain r conversion or transformation more recent insights proposed by proposed insights recent more fraction
internal
replac neato wt sadatr ad opposition. and standpatters with interaction o open to
Srdot ad u 2010) Guo and (Stradiotto Hnigo 199 (Huntington qualitative
involved into involved e
fraction 12 them in top elite positions with positions elite top in them - up
a democratic, it democratic,
reconfiguration not only within ruling within only not reconfiguration regime – o sadatr (gis regime (against standpatters of s 18) neutralization
It is possible, because the ruling the because possible, is It , 599) 1, this dynamic process. dynamic this .
h sces f uh regime such of success The
f h country the of h opsto otie the outside opposition The ’s
. classical Stradiotto and Guo and Stradiotto rsms that presumes can happen in a a in happen can W . The latter latter The .
hat as competitors as
(Huntington 1991) (Huntington hs processes these lsiiain o classification
n abandon and
members or members (Huntington type
For more For support regime e. variety
, who , or as or s an is The The f .
CEU eTD Collection ci from support military from support on losing are relies standpatters elite ruling the to opposition The 18 2010, Guo and antagonism internal removing allows which and standpatters into fragmented well, be as reformers might elite ruling transformation in Like opposition strong when ofpositionspreservation other within and ruling elites. conversion the result, incumbentputasideelite might of and change reformers into inclusion standpatters’ of success a elites other and ruling within positions better preserve and reduce entering reformers into inclusion standpatters’ of failure à is transformation about alliance facilitati a as acts opposition of involvement the hand, other opening. regime the of framework final the shape to influence more much as However for opposition of involvement the is strategy this terminology Mills Wright within also but positions, elite - vis standpatters or or standpatters vis h scn seai is scenario second The s , which ,
th no oe nes itrcin ih poiin A te ae ie t slightly it time same the At opposition. with interaction intense more into e possibility for reformers to shape shape to reformers for possibility ovrin rsms marginal a presumes conversion
support – nevertheless 19) opposition theoretically may theoretically opposition . s the possibility of interactive variation. interactive of possibility the contributes to the collapse of the ruling elite or o or elite ruling the of collapse the to contributes The success of replacement lies on two on lies replacement of success The s ul udr eomr cnrl and control reformers under fully is ) regime opening regime
ro t te eie opening regime the to prior other other
elcmn o collapse or replacement standpatters are stronger and suppress reformers, reformers, suppress and stronger are standpatters key - . elite sectors sectors elite
13 An important detail, w detail, important An
s (Huntington 1991, 602 1991, (Huntington , exclude ,
the whole process of regime opening regime of process whole the Srdot ad u 21, 19) 2010, Guo and (Stradiotto role fraction cooperative fraction lean towards one or another or one towards lean
(
f poiin rfres have reformers opposition, of i.e. i.e. .
interaction with opposition. interaction with opposition. nte iprat set of aspect important Another
marks a total or nearly total nearly or total a marks
power elite power ass h iprac of importance the raises .
Reformers Replacement actions with reformers. with actions hich hich ng t a cnrbt to contribute can it fter distinct interactions. distinct ies Meanwhile tizens.
force force . could – , if we used Ch. used we if , enhl the Meanwhile 607; Stradiotto 607; ’ relation vis relation ’ verthrow for
be
emerges
broader noticed n the On .
. The . This s it s In - .
CEU eTD Collection opening regime after threatened s structures’ on depends realization the scenario opening regime enough weak not latter are the and enough opening regime initiate to prepared not are reformers opposition elite’s ruling opposition. and elite ruling by lead is opening regime The any fraction with cooperate not opposition might elite other military the Or excluding opening. regime to by contributed form could elite military and 606) 1991, (Huntington replacement after we if outcome complicated positions. their to threat possible to due tensions hand, other the On and incumbents hold opposition way this In cooperate. and alliance an form to possibility a have hand, one the On opposition. and military between dynamics interaction and elites military between break configurations elite opening regime ing rnpaeet r oprtv transition cooperative or Transplacement
of opposition opposition of and takeregime the lead of regime opening. regime of lead the . upport for the ruling elite. ruling the for upport
oee te euirt o taslcmn i ta opsto and opposition that is transplacement of peculiarity the However rgetto it sadatr ad reformers and standpatters into fragmentation scenario Hnigo 19, 608 1991, (Huntington acknowledgement of new ruling elite’s legitimacy by military elites. military by legitimacy elite’s ruling new of acknowledgement , because all incumbents are ousted are incumbents all because , opposition .
In In shows that it that shows this situation this take
between opposition and military elites could also form also could elites military and opposition between becomes divided over the rules of the new regime regime new the of rules the over divided becomes
into consideration a remark by Huntington that Huntington by remark a consideration into Srdot ad u 21, 18) 2010, Guo and (Stradiotto nubn elites incumbent It
under under Moreover, ruling elites are expected not to be to not expected are elites ruling Moreover, is bringing is mig – citizens’ support for opposition and force force and opposition for support citizens’
1; taito n Go 00 18) 2010, Guo and Stradiotto 615; an alliance between alliance an 14 ht .
Fin Such situation is resolved by neg resolvedby is situation Such its own
result in total subsequent exclusion of exclusion subsequent total in result ly tee ih b a ee more even an be might there ally, major
control.
is , it might might it , .
– Moreover, a Moreover, the qualitative
h fre ae o strong not are former the
hr psil scenario. possible third gi, h cniin is condition the Again,
fraction n te rsne of presence the and e rca fr the for crucial be changes in ruling in changes fraction s i s . s of opposition of s t uh regime Such indicates the indicates they might might they , which s, .
otiating n this In is right still
CEU eTD Collection interventio the legitimate was it if because power, to accession from excluded be all might clear we since But elite. opening regime a perform not is itself which one, the be should actor might intervention of it. by country shaped the within processes further the opening, regime power from Guo and incumbents (Stradiotto remove to intervenes military foreign the standpatters, it. in part take does opposition neither f different completely is opening prevail. peculiarity could elites other for newcomers. As and incumbents of mixture become a might configurations.elitein qualitativechanges partial means option. acceptable strong. be not could tensions repressions of context the in even prevails opposition are protests citizens of repression in involves it because standpatters, towards fraction general, in elite ruling suggests scenario opening expressing expressing
ht i that Finally, the fourth scenario involves scenario fourth the Finally, Nevertheless, .
within military elite. military within sc stain h fre rln eie s osdrd s leiiae and illegitimate as considered is elite ruling former the situation such n
The scenario and regime opening concept presumes that the foreign foreign the that presumes concept opening regime and scenario The their their The fact that regime opening should not should opening regime that fact The hold
For this reason negotiations with opposition could emerge as an as emerge could opposition with negotiations reason this For 00 19 2010, disco as hoeial we theoretically
n would not have occurred. have not would n
on to an to on
authors do not specify relation to a particular incumbents’ particular a to relation specify not do authors –
tn with ntent
In result, if military elite is in alliance with standpatters, itstandpatters, with alliance in is militaryif elite result, In h srnt o te line ewe mltr eie and elite military between alliance the of strength the it would be more an installation of a new authoritarian new a of installation an more be would it – 20)
o te is tre bcue ete lcl elite, local neither because three, first the rom assumption about assumption .
s h frin onr i te eta pae of player central the is country foreign the As
Since there are no reformers or opposition to opposition or reformers no are there Since regime might 15 foreign intervention foreign
authoritarian.
. sue ht iiay lt i leaning is elite military that assume u because But
As in replacement scenario, this scenario, replacement in As intentions to open regime, it is it regime, open to intentions
In result, the new ruling elite new ruling result,the In ,
it f t a s, t ol not could it so, was it If exclude might
iies spot for support citizens’ . This type of regime of type This .
aiiae internal facilitate incumbent osdrd as considered the samethe which ,
elites
CEU eTD Collection of politicalparties. members top Parliament, of members elite, ruling to the belonging those encompasses which term, a broader as elite political interpret I Meanwhile Parliament. polit official top at the those as elite define ruling 4 regime that is suggests example this because indications were there reg to prior positions bureaucratic top held who those, with from recruitment and Easter postcommunist the also is sectors various from because important, composed entity an as elite of understanding the the circulation elite to related is which systemic consideration opening. regime pre i.e. elites, new and old between distinction categorical withinof otherechelons sectors. elite and discontent their raise could it because radical, very be not might elites other of Reconfiguration suppress from representatives become non were opposition one
I use these terms not as synonyms, although both are based on positional elite understanding. I understanding. elite on positional based are both although not synonyms, as terms these I use 2.1. uig and ruling sharply Regime opening scenarios presented and discussed above implies the major the implies above discussed and presented scenarios opening Regime
Implications of regime opening of opening Implications regime scenarios forelite circulation
of “ pool
privatization
eofgrs uig lt. ic i i peue ta rfres and reformers that presumed is it Since elite. ruling reconfigures ht observation that ” wih s eerd n lt rpouto the reproduction elite in referred is which , norg tnin wt newcomers with tensions encourage the hs we tlig abo talking when Thus,
regime opening firstly and most importantly affect importantly most and firstly opening regime - oiia elite political xset ro t rgm opening, regime to prior existent upper layers of of layers upper n about persistence about
Europe demonstrated the retreat tendencies of incumbents of tendencies retreat the demonstrated Europe Seéy ad zlni 95 622 1995, Szelényi and (Szelényi
T . he recruitment recruitment he 4 .
ned t Indeed sis non
ical institutions like Presidency, Government, and and Government, Presidency, like institutions ical pnn indeed opening
and migration and 16 (Szelényi a (Szelényi d noml poiin o standpatters. to opposition informal ed - elite. t lt cruain e hud ae into take should we circulation elite ut
e evidence he The same same The in o lt my cu fo te old the from occur may elite to nd Szelényi 1995, 616) 1995, Szelényi nd a) :
of old elites old of
ed t cnrbt t elite to contribute to tends h nw uig lt might elite ruling new the
within ruling elite and and elite ruling within sis retreating – - n elite on 2, 636) 623, ime eie pnn, post opening, regime , or or - pnn. However opening. from from to
s economic
a observed was
iclto in circulation . circulation of circulation
nw one new a hs what Thus, .
Finally, elite b) - - ,
CEU eTD Collection parties political formed newly and opposition of origins qualitativ of determinant The elite. ruling the of circulation a for inputs qualitative visible less or visible more have might elite ruling the to channels argument key for members democratic key within positions reshuffle and opposition opposition of weakness presumed the is reason The key in circulation new reproduction of reversion of acts prevent and support a get to observation it in degree limited very and elite ruling the of composition the change could circulation of than reproduction from occurring is ex fully not do but standpatters, from power take internal the inclusion, may elites and standpatters to relation f reformers paragraphs transitio of modes to reference a made not have authors Since reproduction elite for space leave still can it but circulation, Conversion.
assuring support assuring
r is weak, it could not manage to manage not could it weak, is , that reformers are replacing are reformers that , action of ruling elite is elite ruling of action ae ltl bt ifrn consequences. different bit little a have we will to somemake t have
ih dooia adjustments ideological with h rln eie itself elite ruling the The The ideological - lt sectors elite .
icsin o discussion and intentions intentions and oevr i w to it consideration into took we if Moreover, to to - lt pstos te poiin is opposition the positions, elite .
poiin the opposition Under these circumstances regime opening indeed opening regime circumstances these Under regrouping a
- central player. central fe rgm opening regime after lt sectors elite heoretic f
17 members of other key other of members , for changes for
conversion
nltcly e hud pa mr of more speak should we analytically overshadow reformers overshadow
within ruling elite emerge elite ruling within . , I
t
we could speak about a continuation a about speak could we
erimn t te uig n other and ruling the to recruitment clude converters. clude considerations. ol nt eesrl ma ta a that mean necessarily not would .
Subsequently, A s
. ol idct circulation indicate could
reformers : scenario n h cs o standpatters’ of case the In The emergence of alternative of emergence The
the less conne less the
in ol flo immediately follow would
conversion in specific elite sectors elite specific in -
elite se elite a rvae that revealed had depending on their on depending are n ipt cud be could inputs e As As ’ provided with an an with provided
, within ruling elite ruling within n h following the in this s
select
cted they are they cted ctors in order in ctors h previous the as scenario
regrouping regrouping
reformers ing
of a of pro .
If - . .
CEU eTD Collection be might element elite ruling former consideration into opposition. by determined is elite ruling new the of composition ofstandpatters’ case inclusion wou circulation the elite ruling the for inc to due occur might changes qualitative some limited, be changes. for intentions reformers’ recruiting reformers. reformers of role leading the facilitate key them Granting reformers. for key into not elite of that possible with cooperate weakness vis elite ruling within circulation a offering counter with
Collapse. Collapse. remembered we if Finally, to guarantee support for reformers for support guarantee to
their n elcmn scenario) replacement in determined by opposition. If the opposition delegitimizes incumbent’s party incumbent’s delegitimizes opposition the If opposition. by determined members of opposition to other elite sectors sectors elite other to opposition of members
in gi, selecti Again, reproduction - to - elite sectors, because the opposition the because sectors, elite elite elite it could follow withcouldit follow -
à strengthening and and strengthening key - vis incumbent party vis incumbent a
- – and b) b) and elite sectors prior to regime opening regime to prior sectors elite h rpaeet scenario replacement The ek pro weak
two h process the h mr vsbe iclto cud emerge. could circulation visible more the
parameters: parameters: ng n key in military elite support for opposition for support elite military
reformers , -
eortc opposition democratic – because of of because -
a lt sectors elite I ti rset the respect, this In . plausibly visible, more non but ekn eomr. n eut rfres ol lose could reformers result, In reformers. weaken
selection of opposition members into some sectorssomeinto opposition members ofselection In result, the circulation in key in circulation the result, In . . -
lt pstos ro t rgm oeig could opening regime to prior positions elite
n alternative an Firstly
a) d e hpd in shaped be ld from from
18 poiin vis opposition .
te xet f uig elite’s ruling of extent the , It might be It might
recognition the
n mr visible more and uig elite ruling removes is not very strong and strong very not is
ht reformers that
that recruitment could be done couldbe recruitment that eoe eie opening regime before
rep is more favorable favorable is more h sm anrlk i the in like manner same the f oiia pris n their and parties political of - sue te poiin with opposition the assures à - roduction
i psil icuin of inclusion possible vis
o key to
uig elite ruling lusion of opposition of lusion (as it was a was it (as - extensive circulation , but but , Here we should take should we Here hs cneso is conversion Thus, - elite sectors might sectors elite - lt scos and sectors elite
n h bs of base the on ih hv to have might o extensive, not tu the thus , n recruitment strategy not important crucial i is it , . As . for .
CEU eTD Collection emerge Finally, limited. be might elite elite ruling the of circulation extensively within tensions internal emerging incumbents support their get could regime key in replacement initiate by filled elite ruling new the opening regroup conversion the from Differently well. as elite from jeopardize to want opposit extreme an regime. open significant elite. ruling Another elite. ruling the to channels new of base social the by determined be could again then elite, ruling new the to recruited being of possibility from incumbents excludes and circulation is extensive.is circulation a h seai o collapse of scenario The . possible entrance ruling elite. to
. ing
Bearing in mind that military elites were opposing incumbents, opposing were elites military that mind in Bearing option of of option elites of of elites
taking into consideration demonstrated citizens’ support for opposition to opposition for support citizens’ demonstrated consideration into taking . in key in ,
n result In hs h clas seai gvs s e hns bu circulation. about hints few us gives scenario collapse the Thus h collapse the S uch type of option might be constrained if military elite is expressing is elite military if constrained be might option of type uch - elite sectors elite the the opposition is to allow incumbents incumbents allow to is opposition the ion towards incumbents. Due to Due incumbents. towards ion itself itself ,
omr regime. former h cruain ih b a ite i ls extensive less bit little a be might circulation the as .
might might -
lt sectors elite oevr bcue f iiay lts opposition elites’ military of because Moreover, potential could be extensive; meanwhile circulation within military within circulation meanwhile extensive; be could However the the However
enters prior to regime opening regime to prior the the ie sm hns n iclto outside circulation on hints some gives not , iclto in circulation
no niomn, hr key where environment, into ruling elite and choose to exclude incumbents exclude to choose and elite ruling t could it contribute ne sc crusacs ecmr might newcomers circumstances such Under
19 s hy ih b aligned be might they as qualitative changes due to such circulation such to due changes qualitative
contribute contribute
, to
other other h clas de nt presume not does collapse the this their .
Thus Thus
key tension opposition might might opposition tension circulation to to to their circulation circulation their to - lt sector elite be recruited to the new the to recruited be in the context of context the in - I te ae of case the In . lt scos a sectors elite with the former former the with migh s
such option such
h ruling the bt still but ,
regime also t
non T
not he re to -
CEU eTD Collection it to attempts for buffer participants both for positions of preservation the guarantee base elite’s me It sectors. elite for agree might elite ruling the and opposition and regime open to order in that possible non a ofopposition)recruitment(because from reformer from recruitment of (because opening regime respect, this In still regime new a and standpatters between tension elite. ruling new the in positions standpatters, and reformers elites ruling former of representatives that means it Also form the destroy not might opening regime that means it threatened, not is elite ruling that assumption an sides. both between sharing power about hints clear gives it opening, and sides both opposition the and elite - all game) by the new ruling elite after elite ruling new the by game) all
have to undergo conversi undergo to have - threat to to threat If we would try to look into other key other into look to try would we If transition. Cooperative
s el s iclto o te poiin base opposition the on circulation as well as ruling elites after regime opening as an important an as opening regime elitesruling after . it would contribute to a a to contribute would it
lo oees non a foresees also Thus we could speak about the the about speak could we Thus ans that that ans er channel channel er quickly reconfigure key reconfigure quickly who , these sectors might experience reproduction on the ruling ruling the on reproduction experience might sectors these
might not be excluded from a possibility to compete for compete to possibility a from excluded be not might on in order to order in on are are
per se se per T However he center of transplacement scenario is the ruling the is scenario transplacement of center he lead s’ and converted standpatters’) converted and s’ and actually leave it as as it leave actually and - ing hetnn o te uig lt atr regime after elite ruling the of threatening
within ruling elite 20 regime opening regime
new there is a problem a is there t together it
enter enter - elite sectors elite to to - elites (i.e. to involve in a winner a in involve to (i.e. elites a oselto o te uig elite ruling the of constellation nue o am o icmet the incumbents for harm no ensure . For this reason this For . a pre competition after regime opening. regime after competition - opening reconfiguration opening .
nemnln o rep of intermingling s t novs eoitos of negotiations involves it As
analytically , which include fractions of fractions include which , . .
Thus the regime opening regime the Thus . Also it could could it Also .
– a .
a built a element legitimate uh pin could option Such this fraction might fraction this , we should should we ,
and circulation and - Since there is there Since in conceptual in .
It might be might It serve as a as serve
entrance roduction
- in key in takes
after take - - .
CEU eTD Collection elite ruling the from incumbents remove to capable is intervention foreign the only since Firstly, considerations. analytical few make can explicitly not does an accession, theoretical from deprived are incumbents the As opening. regime to prior reconfigurations foresee not does scenario The opening. regime during opposition positions. claim to able not is it country, other in opening elite. ruling the of removal regimeopening and thesame but not extensive opening.after tendencies opening conversion ideological reproduc might transition cooperative of participants contribute not would opening regime new they positions their preserve To allies. as centrality the lose would elites military that mean would it sectors, elite opening regime before that as appeared ofthe buffer because crea a mean might
extensive T Foreign a take should we Finally,
e uig lt i a rmr tre o frin intervention foreign of target primary a is elite ruling he and c and e
o ti re this For n te key other in
circulation or or important ould contribute to to contribute ould
combination of reproduction and circulation, but not very extensive extensive very not but circulation, and reproduction of combination intervention could xli itreto i ohr key other in intervention explain sn h psil rcutet s apnn fo suppressed from happening is recruitment possible the ason . tep t tk oe rgm opening regime over take to attempt
possible allies of standpatters’ f standpatters’ of allies possible - These two options could again be buffers to secure regime secure to buffers be again could options two These might lt sectors elite ted before ted before opening. uig lts ih rpoue hmevs n othe in themselves reproduce might elites ruling ic i i a oeg fre wih s ntaig regime initiating is which force, foreign a is it Since .
could could to c haracterize the new ruling eliteharacterize thenew after ruling opening. regime h seai o frin nevnin oue on focuses intervention foreign of scenario The
circulation and reproduction at the same time before time same the at reproduction and circulation their brief brief convert to supporters to convert
circulation or or ty and stay hoeia lo a mltr eie a they as elites military at look theoretical 21
ev a oto fr hs eie to elites these for option an leave .
I n order to secure regime opening regime secure to order n t representatives its erdc wti mltr eie b elite military within reproduce - lt sectors. elite w cn sue ht military that assume can we , r action. ’
of regime opening and of and opening regime of . Since we considered considered we Since As a result, result, a As bt this but , Nevertheless, o rln elite ruling for
scenario regime key r
we y
- ,
CEU eTD Collection 5 Conversion scenario Transition Table fo and of combination A elites. military except elites, in circulation favors ideologically. themselves adjust who those only but elites, former circulation elite for scenarios who supportedthe elites, key within circulation th of accession key other in reproduction Secondly have might elites military made being is opening reproduce there and sectors elite other transferinto to option an granted regime m force military a with incumbents of return the block regime new a secure to elite military in changes by accompanied be could alliance strong a have might elites ruling and elites
Table is created by me is created Table ilitaryelites reign interventionreign scenario elite 3 f elite of
Transition Transition theirscenarios for implications and o u u ti scin e a se ifrn ipiain of implications different see can we section this up sum To n rmi i ter oiin ad reproduce and positions their in remain and w sol tk it consideration into take should we ,
circulation might
nw uig elite ruling new e
have a possibility to to possibility a have
based on analysis of transition scenarios. transition of analysis on based - elite sectors elite eie opening regime k Other elite Military circulation elite Ruling circulation elite for Implications
in order to prevent a possible use of force from them from force of use possible a prevent to order in can can former regim former -
lt sectors. elite osblte fr gadd rgltd reproduction. (regulated) guarded a for possibilities per n oprtv tasto seai. scenario. transition cooperative in appear
ey tbe 3) (table . -
lt sectors elite
– circulation
– no clear implication. no clear in order to block a block to order in ie atr eie opening, regime after i.e. ,
erdcin fe rgm opening regime after reproduction f tnptes oprt wt reformers with cooperate standpatters if e .
. convert themselves to new supporters new to themselves convert
Conversion
22 e a mk a asmto ta after that assumption an make can We
elite circulation – might evolvemight
dooial ajse rpouto pir to prior reproduction adjusted ideologically
da poes f iclto and circulation of process dual a .
Thus a removal of of removal a Thus scenario . Al . continuation of continuation ie n oprtv transition cooperative in Like
5
, except inexcept , military elites. o iiay lts ih be might elites military so aos erdcin of reproduction favors
it
Collapse scenario Collapse can eli
and more visible visible more and te te reproduction
the ruling the norg a encourage . Reproduction Reproduction .
reproduction after regime ial, in Finally, transition transition
n to and .
of the of T elite hus
of
CEU eTD Collection sudden transfer. power the during tensions mobility a in replacement elites, national of replacement important before paragraphs should opening intervention Foreign transition Cooperative Collapse 2.2. h frt lmn epaie the emphasizes element first The O
, it means that means it , Insights on Insights circulation eliteclassic opening after regime
ee t te concept the to refer (Lengyel and (Lengyel Higley7) 2000, r an neet s osblte fr lsi eie iclto atr regime after circulation elite classic for possibilities is interest main ur and its’ interrelation with transition scenarios. For comparative purposes purposes comparative For scenarios. transition with interrelation its’ and elements
when se 1.2) (see opening k Other elite Military Ru opening. regime after of Combination opening. regime k Other opening. regime of Combination opening. elite Military opening. elite Ruling k Other elite Military reproduction some and opening regime circulation mostly compete; to restricted elite Ruling with cooperate opposition. reformers if opening regime after circulation limited and opposition. with cooperate reformers if opening regime to repro adjusted Ideologically reformers. opening regime after circulation limited and the replacement of old members and the recruitment of new of recruitment the and members old of replacement the ling elite ling explaining ey ey . ey
. - - - elite elite sectors elite
oe broadly more
lt sectors elite
–
– – ilys n Lengyel’s and Higley’s – –
extensive circulatio extensive
reproduction (due to conversion) and circulation after regime regime after circulation and conversion) to (due reproduction extensive guarded (regulated) guarded circulation limited or very no – sectors
if incumbents are not restricted to compete. restricted arenot incumbents if As As
. classi buffered circulation and reproduction before regime regime before reproduction and circulation buffered
changes within national elites cannot be very be cannot elites national within changes
23
–
rcs o cniut ad h asne of absence the and continuity of process –
circulation c elite c circulation after regime opening. regime after circulation
– circulation and limited reproduction limited and circulation a small scale scale small a
atog i ws rsne i few in presented was it although , buffered circulation and reproduction before before reproduction and circulation buffered ll elite sectors and high level of social of level high and sectors elite ll
circulation n a small scale small a
after regime opening. regime after
reproduction after regime opening. regime after reproduction after regime opening regime after duction and limited circulation prior prior circulation limited and duction circulation and reproduction after after reproduction and circulation
after regime opening regime after model model
if standpatters cooperate with with cooperate standpatters if : a peaceful a : circulation and reproduction reproduction and circulation emphasizes
if
incumbents are are incumbents
and gradual gradual and Reproduction Reproduction
after regime regime after .
three
after after we
CEU eTD Collection higher is elite to distance whose society, in layers those from rather but themselves, elites from not are who elites national to people new of recruitment to refers then mobility of structure social the understands element conceptual ofpotential tensions decompression counter of formation a sector elite particular a within clique sector. elite particular consideration into that take we If other. each from distinguished be can and specialized are elites national sector all elite in occur replacementto of requirement elites.national the of acceptance threaten not person new accepts incumbent the when person, new a to position a re important another as appears power of happening be should it but event, time single a as not appear should replacement that hints continuity for implication gra ensureprocesses both because only circulation, reproduction and of degree a allows be should members cruitment of national elite members is happening and there are no tensions to give to tensions no are there and happening is members elite national of cruitment ul elcmn. Moreover, replacement. dual , i.e. they are are they i.e. , h tid lmn rfr t a ih ee o sca mobility. social of level high a to refers element third The replacem of scope the encompasses element second The
an and it and
incumbent to incumbent
is not not legitima
without any threatening attempts threatening any without non In this respect, it would be difficult be would it respect, this In te elcmn o eie sol nt e restrict be not should elites of replacement the , - recruited from the closest the from recruited elite elite - extensive. y f the of cy leave vis - à with the gradual nature of elite replacement replacement elite of nature gradual the - vis the position, then position, the
and attempts imposeand attempts to extensivean circulation to emerge to
Thus, the essence of this this of essence the Thus, some level of regularity. of level some specific elcmn b oton ad y incoming by and outgoing by replacement 24
at f h frt element. first the of part
. lt sco cud otiue o the to contribute could sector elite At the same time it would mean that mean would it time same the At
layers to elite. to layers
s is built on the assumption that assumption the on s isbuilt we can speak about the mutual the about speak can we ,
few social layers. The social The layers. social few when the new person does person new the when
for the transfer of power to a to power of transfer the
specialized and narrow and specialized The peaceful transfer peaceful The
It means that social that means It conceptualization Basically, this this Basically,
hn the When ed with a a with ed ent. The The ent. n its and .
CEU eTD Collection partners autonomous of united elites keep to means reflected is differentiation elite about retreate have process differentiation the of indication the privatization of because o observation Szelényi and Szelényi specialized it make and configurations the sectors, some or all in overlapping 1.2) in model society within sectors various from differentiation, sectors. view, of point analytical characterized conception circulation elite that concluding allows opening regime “migrate” from one layeranother to where society of layers social particularly and system 2.3. 2.3. f e at o ak bu regim about talk to want we If analysis The onais f aes lo dfuin n tee r n src boundaries strict no are there and diffusion allow layers of boundaries Implications of regime opening of opening Implications regime scenarios forelite differentiation
fo peiu sco ad ete i aohr sector. another in settled and sector previous from d Bscly it Basically, .
we should take into consideration that differentiated elite is composed composed is elite differentiated that consideration into take should we by a obnto o rpouto ad circulation and reproduction of combination scenarios transition of . This interpretation This . (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995, 622 1995, Szelényi and (Szelényi it
implies implies bcue l because , in Eastern Europe. Basically, he observes that it is madeit that observes Basically,he Europe. Eastern in has the greatest potential for for potential greatest the has .
wih o o oelp ih ah other each with overlap not do which , that that
n
n aks dsuso o Gad Coalition Grand on discussion Hankiss in
cooperative transition is closest to the classic the to closest is transition cooperative regime opening regime l eli old k i casc lt cruain t ol be could it circulation elite classic in ike f ro rgm oeig ainl lts were elites national opening regime prior if n distinguishable. and 25 oeig n is ipiain fr elite for implications its’ and opening e
, because it clearly states that old elites old that states clearly it because ,
’ presupposes the necessity of separate of necessity the presupposes
e’ rnfrain o cnmc elites economic to transformation tes’ mlctos o eie iclto after circulation elite for implications are supposed to be to supposed are should change should – 623, 636) 623, re
Earlier lcmn i al elite all in placement Also . form
. We can notice can We . h sm idea same The e eerd to referred we national elite national ed fo the from ,
in a way, a in se the (see
as to
CEU eTD Collection the about could might base reformers’ the around evolve might sectors cooperation key new replacedbe with tendencies new overlapping openin regime after players new between overlapping of promotion ensure to line dividing make and doing standpatters incumbent between an interconnectedness the dissolve to trying are reformers that means reversion key other consideration into conclusions. vis relationship extent transitionscenariosour implying sectors elite
this prepare develop Secondly, take to have we standpatters, and reformers about talking are we if Firstly, Conversion of elite elite of -
lt sco mmes slcin We rfres ae o om a form to have reformers When selection. members’ sector elite
- by standpatters. This logic of replacement of members in key in members of replacement of logic This standpatters. by they the lt scos n re t gt spot and support a get to order in sectors elite edny f uooy rm incumbent from autonomy of tendency
with opposition with to form a coalition under new regime new under coalition a form to
propositio analytical the followed weIf differentiation. support
elites for for elites do contribute autonomy to do - rud h opsto base opposition the around à - if we are talking about reformers and opposition and reformers about talking are we if i sadatr ad poiin w sol cm t to distinct two to come should we opposition, and standpatters vis previous observations observations previous .
g n eea, t general, In elite differentiation might be limited be might differentiation elite
for between sides between a
reformers is again a creation of creation a again is reformers partial for
counterbalanc for elite differentiationfor
and elite members in those other key other those in members elite and differentiation. e cnro f conversion of scenario he
clearer 26 of other elites from incumbent standpatters incumbent from elites ofother ht eomr ae repl are reformers that
. . . However, .
ing hs two This
and recruited ones recruited and
On the one hand, we could could we hand, one the On
and changes in other elite sectors elite other in changes and standpatters, changes in key in changes standpatters, (Hankiss 1990, 234) 1990, (Hankiss
standpatters ? -
a rpaeet technique replacement way Let’s Let’s discu a selection a to
and old overlap old and interconnectedness and a and interconnectedness prevent acts of of acts prevent
ol ofr limited a offer could
n key in , acing members members acing we should refer to refer should we ss of them. each n about reformers about n .
of new members new of For this reason, this For . - d lt sectors elite - But what are what But - elite sectors elite overlapping sectors ping might ping
internal id of kind speak - elite elite .
By in
.
CEU eTD Collection between overlapping of break observe could we then only, base opposition the on replaced not are members key into remain) (or enter to possibility the from from key of openness between interplay clearly elites military of autonomy th For elite. military with tensions replacement autonomous. be might opening regime before sector. key in opposition and reformers’ base. elite ruling the in we should time be opening regime after that conclusion a make could are recruited. being opposition members best evolve could autonomy for possibilities However, players new between overlapping of possibilities the On partial: limited in key in limited partial: possibil - When we are talking about about talking are we When Collapse. lt scos and sectors elite manifested. ic mltr eie s xrsig cer poiin oad incumbents towards opposition clear a expressing is elite military Since other hand, hand, other
ities to enter the ruling elite, elite, ruling the enter to ities in
order highlight - , This scenario offers a variety of possibilities for elite differentiation elite for possibilities of variety a offers scenario This elite sectors for replacement for sectors elite
we could speak about speak could we
two
to safeguard safeguard to e ol rfr o omto o nw necnetdes and interconnectedness new of formation to refer could we , When the opposition opens regime opens opposition the When
elements
- it already hints that this elite sector is getting detached and detached getting is sector elite this that hints already it the the fact elite sectors, but clearer in other elite sectors. At the same the At sectors. elite other in clearer but sectors, elite a wih en ta mltr eie ifrnito mgt be might differentiation elite military that means which , la ipiain o eie ifrnito i mltr elite military in differentiation elite for implication clear
lt sectors elite
that a ecuin f nubns rm uig lt; b) elite; ruling from incumbents of exclusion a) : autonomy in autonomy their own positions and positions own their ese
if
after regime opening after regimeopening
reason Taking these aspects into aspects these consideration Taking 27
if if t he possibility of possibility he the
. n hs epc, e ol sek about speak could we respect, this In
opposition does not marginalize them marginalize not does opposition s process
key , the opposition opposition the , - and elite sectors elite - elite differentiation indeed might indeed differentiation elite elite sectors elite recruited . in those elite sectors, where sectors, elite those in
If incumbents are excluded are incumbents If , likely, ,
in order in clustered overlapping on overlapping clustered opposition takes a share a opposition takes
and ones , we should should we , it it might if if
to to does no does in these sectors these in key avoid possible avoid
- sustain elite sector elite t impose t refer to refer ,
the we a .
CEU eTD Collection might and fraction standpatters’ of allies differentiation. elite to contribution potential sectors elite of possibility the about key other in while time same the at and incumbents with overlap opening regime after Thus, opposition. such of peculiarity elite key in reconfiguration opening that fact the consideration into take we If incumbents. becaus problematic, be might appear get incumbents allowed toare elitesome enterand ruling possibilities to into even if from excluded not are incumbents if even Finally, form. might interconnectedness and then from incumbents excluding full overlap then allowed, also are incumbents some while only, base opposition the on differentiation elite of degree high expressed. y r ean n key in remain or , then it becomes clear that indeed indeed that clear becomes it then , possibilities for elite differentiation might be constrained constrained be might differentiation elite for possibilities aim to to aim transition. Cooperative , while, overlapping on incumbent basebe very might limited ig n poiin ae ih apa ad lt dfeetain ih nt be not might differentiation elite and appear might base opposition on ping Howe
right after right openingafter regime ver, if we if ver, leave an option for for option an leave
u if But - elite sectors the contrary might appear. might contrary the sectors elite vra i ta i might it that is overlap - lt pstos sil h oelpig n poiin ae might base opposition on overlapping the still positions, elite ecmr iiit rpaeet n key in replacement initiate newcomers referred to military elites in this scenario, we could identify a identify could we scenario, this in elites military to referred clearly competition for ruling elite elite ruling for competition
- clustered overlapping overlapping clustered elite sectors and after and sectors elite
In cooperative transition scenario transition cooperative In the members the . However if key if However . o pwr hrn bten poiin and opposition between sharing power of e because .
in some key some in 28
lt oelpig ih cniu. The continue. might overlapping elite
eas mltr eie ae important are elites military Because e eae t both to related be atcpns f oprtv transition cooperative of participants to stay to - ifrnito vis differentiation elite sector members are replaced are members sector elite - and regime opening regime elite sectors there might be an be might there sectors elite within military elite military within both sides might initiate pre initiate might sides both and of of
In short, we could speak could we short, In partial autonomy of key of autonomy partial for for – -
lt scos n are and sectors elite the new overlapping new the key icmet and incumbents :
. the differentiation the
-
à
- - enter the ruling the enter elite elite i opposition, vis , they could they , positions, positions, some - - CEU eTD Collection in entrance from deprived not are incumbents if and elites military of exception with expect could we opening regime after scenario collapse In overlapping. results c we differentiation, elite for and sectors about speak couldwe again then them, to given is sectors differentiation their about speak could they then positions, their possibi a with left are the identify could differentiation from overlapping members consequence a opening. regime after them replacing are newcomers and removed are elites ruling incumbent overlapping and differentiation of combination overlappingclustered about and partial autonomy. overlapping s key other enter to option an given are elites these if hand, other the On autonomous. partially become peak about about peak
Since we discussed all four possible transition scenarios and their and transition implica scenarios possible all we four Since discussed we if Secondly, intervention. Foreign se al 4) table (see The
and could show could and overlapping. of signs
the in military elite military in n key in
replacement of key of replacement the th , prevention ofoverlapping on thenew base. elite ruling ir - contribution to to contribution elite sectors instead of staying within military elites, then we could we then elites, military within staying of instead sectors elite -
the elite poes f elcmn mgt e lsl lne wt these with linked closely be might replacement of process e potential contribution to to contribution potential lity to declare their support for a new regime and and regime new a for support their declare to lity incumbent elite incumbent referred
.
n bs o te e rln eie and elite ruling new the of base a on ovrin cnro favors scenario Conversion
on the new elite base elite new the on an state that these scenarios indeed hint for for hint indeed scenarios these that state an
The scenario of of scenario The
. to military elites elites military to remain autonomous from newcomers from autonomous remain If an option to transfer to option an If - elite might occur due to mem to due occur might elite differentiation .
29
increase Thus, what we Thus, c
in foreign intervention scenario, we scenario, intervention foreign in . in other other in oeg interventio foreign
Frty w sol rcl that recall should we Firstly, . Thus, again we could speak about speak could we again Thus, differentiation.
their positions their vrapn o clustered or overlapping key the - differentiation of theseof differentiation lt sectors elite bers ould have then is ould then have the of of n
detachment, f iiay elites military If
into other elite other into
ne ih ofr a offer might and we could we and
to to overlapping w elites w remain i remain
diverg and tions .
the the the ing As n
CEU eTD Collection 6 heterogeneityassumes autonomy of and all of scenario transition which evaluate, discussed to order in manner detailed more a diff elite and scenarios opening regime intervention Foreign transition Cooperative Collapse Conversion scenario Transition Table there. enter allowed to happen could key in occur might overlapping intervention, foreign by changed is regime former the if Finally, base. opposition key in overlapping clustered key other
Table is created by me based on analysis of transition scenarios. transition of analysis on based by me is created Table 2.4. 2.4. 4
Transition Transition theirscenarios for implications and elite differentiation In the section the In
Insights on Insights after regime elite differentiation -
elites. is
the in other elite sectors and sectors elite other in
The latter contributes to differentiation. to contributes latter The
ot favorable most
above
might be manifested in military elites. military in be manifested might Differentiation there. positions their transfer to option an has elite military opening base elite ruling new the on Overlapping the to transfer to contribution and elite military key basis opposition in overlapping Clustered h ruling elite. but mostly, allow are base incumbents opposition on Overlapping key sectors). elite other (in base opposition and on sectors) (in base reformers on overlapping clustered or base reformers tendencies overlapping of Continuation differentiation elite for Implications
we were trying to find find to trying were we bt ifrnito mgt cu i ohr lt scos f former if sectors elite other in occur might differentiation but , - - lt ad iiay lt scos n in on sectors elite military and elite
elite sectors sectors elite Autonomy of militaryelites. of Autonomy
ir positions to other key to ir positions o differentiation. for
and partial autonomy in general. in autonomy partial and erentiation. in d o ne key enter to ed 30 elites the
on newcomers’ newcomers’ on military elite elite military
(Lengyel and Higley 2000, 7) Higley (Lengyel 2000, and differentiation - lt scos on sectors elite However it is useful to look at it in it at look to useful is it However
the the
- Lengyel’s and Higley’s model model Higley’s and Lengyel’s elite sectors elite
opening -
elites interconnectedness between interconnectedness Cooperative transition favors transition Cooperative
in key in
if former m former if 6 n key in
, if military elite has an option option an has elite military if , and are excluded from from excluded are and base -
elite sectors after after sectors elite
. Clustered overlapping in in overlapping Clustered
-
lt sectors elite nubns and incumbents and g dfeetain if differentiation igh
ilitary elites are elites ilitary ubn and cumbent differentiation . Thus if. Thus
u on but regime -
elite the the on
CEU eTD Collection scenarios key other and elite military in differentiation to contribute elite for opening scenario regime transition after favorable differentiation most the about speaking when players elite opposition) (i.e. elite ruling the to newcomers the elite, ruling incumbent elite encourage and differentiation elites. of members new for niches more clique elite narrow from power of dissolution means differentiation dependency direct without sectors conditions such Under sector. elite thatanother in present not means are sector elites it particular a of Basically, members elites. functional different between overlapping of lack with understanding close then which fields, specific in specialization as distinction this call could other each from distinct are elites these that sectors various from elites from formation a as rather and singular a as not perceived be should elites that twothese elements. s we opening, regime after elites differentiated about talk to want we
vis autonomy. autonomy. In all our transition scenarios the process the scenarios transition our all In Firstly, resemblance of of resemblance - à - ’ analysis we we analysis ’ vis other key other vis the heterogeneity of national elites refers to the plurality, which means which plurality, the to refers elites national of heterogeneity the
of eody te a the Secondly,
e ol sek bu th about speak could we elites
- as can observe that two scenarios, which come closest to elite to closest come which scenarios, two that observe can elite sectors elite
specialized and specialized . Pareto V. tnm o eie sget ta tee hud e a be should there that suggests elites of utonomy abandoning on other other on . which , Thus, we have to take into consideration these consideration into take to have we Thus,
nepeain f e of interpretation 31
as
elite elite e possibility of maintaining these these maintaining of possibility e
h reg The heterogenous, makes a very clear link clear very a makes heterogenous,
en ta rgm oeig should opening regime that means
tendencies n ucinl n atvt level. activity and functional on sector. of changes of m oeig s upsd to supposed is opening ime within society. It also implies implies also It society. within
At the same time the fact of fact the time same the At a
ofoverlapping ooihc omto, but formation, monolithic - lt sectors. elite lites.
is evolv
The The and also means also and ing hould consider hould comes to the to comes ,
.
and military and around the around conceptual
rm our From elite We We
CEU eTD Collection circulation) the for and or distinction functional elite united offer theoretically than differentiation more could interventionthe scenari foreign scenario collapse the that note should we differentiation, elite for scenarios transition but differentiation, on the intervention scenario sectors.Thus, foreign elite other enter to sect elite. ruling the of members new by there stay autonomy their maintain can casewinner istheopposition. this in winner from prevents condition this time same the At key in differentiation have we result, could In positions t able are but elite, ruling the from deprived are incumbents opposition the with overlapping t from deprived are incumbents because autonomy, these of each However issuitable scenarios if some are modifications.there intervention. foreign and collapse are differentiation, 2.5. 2.5. ors besides military elites might be realized be might elites military besides ors We have reached the final component of of component final the reached have We two of suitability potential the about speak could we since up, sum To interventionscenario foreign the In elites military scenario collapse the In Implications of regime opening of opening Implications regime scenarios forelite unity
and safeexit positions haveformer and a from . lt uiy s o rltd o tutrl lmns f elite of elements structural to related not is unity Elite a , but is more a reflection a more is but , more limited extentmore limited the collapse than modified social composition social too .
However the real contribution to differentiation is differentiation to contribution real the However if they support the new regime and if are allowed to allowed are if and regime new the support they if
32 ,
like in like (which was the case for the differentiation the for case the was (which
- elite sectors after after sectors elite , but only but , the of cultural commonalities among its among commonalities cultural of the
can h dfeetain n te elite other in differentiation The ,
theoretic model on consensually on model theoretic butstill maintain the
collapse scenario collapse - takes
e uig elite ruling he hoeial miti their maintain theoretically if military elites are allowed are elites military if - it - all situation, where the where situation, all etr te key other enter o the couldcontribute to regime is opened. isopened. regime
scenario. ,
military elites elites military n ae not are and e se per
elite
status like: ,
o.
- elite
, if .
CEU eTD Collection words other in opening regime the to proximity close a in evolving processes the towards oriented 111 1992, liberation national a as cooperation round the and ideology settlement. elite to way alternative values and for solidarity the and elites of importance the to refer Pakulski and Higley by accepted fractions fractions is disagreeing and divided eli of concept the to linked the on observations few to refer to worth is it unity, elite for scenarios opening regime of aspects. these about agreement opening. regime of context partisanship restrained and competition,access, political about <…>normsspecific as well values as and beliefs descri which elements, common The members.
rslto o tee iiin b a udn opoie among compromise sudden a by divisions these of resolution a
issue
utn n Higley and Burton al discu table Te eut s witn gemn o nw ue o pltcl rule political of rules new on agreement written a is result The . .
s mean a as –
114) ’
cohesion l priiat o negotiations of participants all – .
Both ways of value and norms cohesion outlined by the authors areauthors the byoutlined cohesion norms and value of ways Both these are short are these consensus on values and values on consensus ssions
. to resolve a political crisis and a deadlock between between deadlock a and crisis political a resolve to e sae f mind. of state a be
beliefs, values related to the functioning of the state are the are state the of functioning the to related values beliefs, h sm atos eto drc tasomto a an as transformation direct mention authors same The about the peculiarities of peculiarities the about
are talking about elite settlement, which is very closely closely very is which settlement, elite about talking are te unity. The main idea is that elites are presumed to be to presumed are elites that is idea main The unity. te mn te key the among the the ” aial i mas ht lts hud ae common a have should elites that means it Basically Lnyl n Hge 20, 2) 2000, Higley and (Lengyel national interest national - Before moving to discussing theoretic implications theoretic discussing to moving Before term related. However for the continuation of elite of continuation the for However related. term
from the foreign hegemony foreign the from It
mhszs that emphasizes 33
-
on lt ad hn elites when and elite
n u cs te concern the case our In Bro ad ily 97 295 1987, Higley and (Burton the political norms might be achieved achieved be might norms political
as important facilitators for beliefs for facilitators important as pro the -
Western orientation among all among orientation Western proper h bek rm h single the from break the ruling. Elite settlement Elite ruling.
mn elites among (Higley and Pakulski and (Higley ecie their perceive disputing disputing are are wih is which , “
shared – n the in 300) elite elite in , . ’
CEU eTD Collection key in members to attempt the consensus. value simulate to attempt forced indication an again is it supporters, with elites reformers because Also fraction. new the a more of but regime, rules and values of vision negotiated and common a less is process is su regime the of vision norms and persuade to trying are reformers and deliberations for attempt might political fractions standpatters’ and reformers’ openingscenariosregime elite unity. for t will a had elites the shared elites that habitu by reforms vision by changed regime. new the of rules the on and values fundamental unity elite opening regime the at that is idea weunity can
is articulated Conversion .
ue Thus rule. F ating the rules of the regime regime the of rules the ating h wliges o bno peiu rgm ad t and regime previous abandon to willingness the inally, elite of consolidation of elite inally, of
take a look at elite classification elite by lookprovided take a at Wasilewski. lt o transformation of elite
political regime. political - engineer
elite o y lt o transition of elite by , .
nlso, t en ta bt opsn sds r ivlig in involving are sides opposing both that means it inclusion,
ofr t etbihd rules. established to conform replacement of the old values with the new values of reformers of values new the with values old the of replacement hr i a ak f lt uiy We w rfre ta reformers that referred we When unity. elite of lack a is there h seai o cneso ietfe te nenl split internal the identifies conversion of scenario The
s commitment not only to open the regime, but also but regime, the open to only not commitment
eoe h rgm opening, regime the before perior to standpatters’ vision. Thus, the final outcome of this of outcome final the Thus, vision. standpatters’ to perior
h eie f tra of elite the
As reformers are stronger than standpatters, formers’ standpatters, than stronger are reformers As
ih atmt o elc sm mmes n key in members some replace to attempt might wh , within ruling elites on fundamental rules of the of rules fundamental on elites ruling within ensures the stability of the established regime established the of stability the ensures I i achieved is It . (Wasilewski 2001, 135) 2001, (Wasilewski
ose of transition is operating is transition of 34
sto. ic rfres r replacing are reformers Since nsition.
unity is kept together by following following by together kept is unity
The process we could identify here is here identify could we process The of lack of negotiations and more of a of more and negotiations of lack of
o lts e te mlctos of implications the see let’s Now to it also also it
accept their promoted values promoted their accept during during
A fter regime opening it is it opening regime fter might the .
Thus, it is important is it Thus, . The The . e gemn on agreement he
mlmnain of implementation contribut
The veryThe basic source of th of source
subsequent e
among o the to the e -
CEU eTD Collection the on accepts later new rule members opposition other and standpatters that condition the under consolidation of kin a indentify also could we then opening, regime by followed new the concerning values similar pretty share about speak could we Although transformation of elite towards step a be might elites supporters fraction creating are opposition some among degre a involve should still key taking are reformers fraction replacem the about speak could we again respect, this In reformers. as norms and values different very regime. involved is becomes opposition with for partners which fraction, reformers actor single a of result a more is simple opening regime a the because to reason: due problematic be might rules the of habituation the consolidation, during reformers by set norms and values transformation of elite of creation However if standpatters’ inclusion into reformers fraction fails, the interaction the fails, fraction reformers into inclusion standpatters’ if However
oh sides. both Moreover, it can involve the opposition, who already support already who opposition, the involve can it Moreover, side ,
deliberation . eomr sil ae oe egt n icsin o rls f h new the of rules on discussions in weight more have still reformers A te ae ie h poes ih b ls spro, eas if because superior, less be might process the time same the t ’
n o te l vle wt te e values new the with values old the of ent hs pir eie pnn rfres ih h ivleet of involvement the with reformers opening regime prior Thus, n key in .
-
a matter of of matter a elite sectors and gives other elite sectors to opposition, it opposition, to sectors elite other gives and sectors elite seems to seems - lts n inclus and elites o ngtain ad omn consensus common and negotiations of e s for political conduct s for the a sense of of sense a who , lt o transit of elite disregard importance. could 35
unequal cooperation unequal o o pro of ion
standpatters and opposi and standpatters the the mlmn rfrs codn t the to according reforms implement
A . eie n are n t wih is which it, on agree and regime o. h paeet f reformers of placement The ion. lthough
regime regime -
reform opposition into other other into opposition reform fe te eie s opened. is regime the after in this scenario this in opening. d , but if both sides do sides both if but ,
from of potential for elite for potential of
s o eie of elite for As s the
tion tion similar or not or similar
decisions o sharing for opposition reformers as equal as
– ’
CEU eTD Collection ol cnrbt t bidn o te rnfrain lts A fr h eie of elite the for As elites. transformation the of building to contribute could the positions. elite from ruling the for values competition new the of acceptance side. of incumbents’ kind a was there that conclude incumbents. enter to incumbents the for possibility the leaves and replacement the towards liberal more is opposition o guidance the under engineered be with key new regime the of consensus towards of lack acould reflect it supporters,with sectors elite that then. only emerge means it opened, is regime the after only occur and characterized operate transition as elites building. consensus to have should it but values, its impose not could opposition the that mean would it result, In too. regime new the on military with deliberate to have oppo the incumbents from detachment elite military’s of context the in regime. new the of elements basic very the on consensus visopposition the of the it regime. about elite ruling the and opposition between differences co
same understanding same uld be sharing not only the desire to install a new regime, but also it also but regime, new a install to desire the only not sharing be uld As the replacement with the new regime supporters in key in supporters regime new the with replacement the As Collapse
Since it is opposition, who is leading regime opening, it means that internally that means it opening, regime leading is who opposition, is it Since iial, f e considered we if Similarly, .
This scenario builds on the assumption that there are fundamental are there that assumption the on builds scenario This
On the one hand, hand, one the On h sm apis f nubns r nt xldd rm the from excluded not are incumbents if applies same The - à key hs a te eoa o icmet, t incumbents, of removal the at Thus, - vis incumbents might also be a result of prior negotiations and negotiations prior of result a be also might visincumbents
- and elite positions, it could be a result of negotiations with the with negotiations of result a be could it positions, elite - elite sectors. sectors. elite
same beliefs concerning the new regime new the concerning beliefs same if te opposition. the f opposition needs to replace members in key in members replace to needs opposition In this way, the elite of transformation would of elite way,the this In
36
t s rsl o dsusos w should we discussions, of result a as it n eut w cud say could we result, In
.
n h ohr ad i hand, other the On rnfrain lt might elite transformation It is important to note that note to important is It the hey prpit political appropriate -
elite sectors might sectors elite
undergo a kind of kind a undergo ol alread could that .
The strength The uh moves such peculiarities iin could sition might have might the f be y - CEU eTD Collection the block and elite transformation whole the threat could they standpatters, of side the on remain they and opening regime after norms and values the share to accept building elite consolidation and transformation to regime fractio reformers’ the with together standpatters to relation their denounce elites military If scenario. transition cooperative about talking are we when element, important additional an as norms.and vision initial the again. eliteruling the enter their of possibility the and standpatters of existence opening regime the challenges some face might of result a is regime involve process the that representatives opening. regime as opposition the and elite ruling the involves scenario new valuesof the and regime the incumbents rules for habituate to help indeed could it regime, the concerning values and beliefs same the succeede they If force. facilitating a as elites military the and opposition the between alliance the of strength the consider carefully should we consolidation Moreover, we should take into co into take should we Moreover, transition Cooperative , then we could speak about about speak could we then ,
In result,consolidation theemergence of also elite might problematic. be
are if standpatters remain unconverted unconverted remain standpatters if Since the regime opening is negotiated by them, it them, by negotiated is opening regime the Since
bcue h seai o coeaie rniin rsms the presumes transition cooperative of scenario the because , novd n adj in involved the s mutual effort mutual
rltvl bod e o interests. of set broad relatively a
Thus, it Thus, in implementation of the fundamental rules agreed uponagreed rules fundamental the implementation of .
e led mnind ht oprtv transition cooperative that mentioned already We might be difficult be might gt ter upr ad cetne f h new the of acceptance and support their gets n smns f e rgm’ vso. lo t means it Also vision. regime’s new of ustments the broader consensus broader the
and consensus and nsideration military elites elites military nsideration 37
. oee i mltr eie d not do elites military if However for transformative elites transformativeelites for . However . n d nt cet e values new accept not do and . novmn i cmeiin to competition in involvement the
principal actors during the during actors principal .
Also it could contribute could it Also n hs epc, new a respect, this In the ,
and the opposition the and since
elite of transition of elite means that both both that means d to maintain to d
they appear appear they to follow
CEU eTD Collection same into entering but presence country’s foreign the under even convert to willing not are incumbents if regime new the of vision the from deviation of case in intervention foreign the of possibility the and norms. and values regime’s new of acceptance of facilitation the implementatio further a secure or discussing later. elite former the although base, local the c regime. new the concerning norms and values their with comply to have could guide main the opposition the with negotiations have might forces foreign that mean could it Also consensus. However held. been have incumbents with deliberations and negotiations made, being is intervention incumbents the to prior regime political and norms values, proper the of understanding concerning differences essential about another co we result, In regime. new the of rules of habituation ould observe then is that transition elite could be composed on the foreign and foreign the on composed be could elite transition that is then observe ould aae o anan h spot f h mltr elites military the of support the maintain to manage outlook towards the regime as the incumbents. the as regime towardsthe outlook fe te eie s opened is regime the After intervention Foreign
attempt to regime. change a
to polish the polish to
( an tews te oeg itreto wud o happen not would intervention foreign the otherwise in could alliance with alliance oioig h pors o te lt o transformation of elite the of progress the monitoring
also also be vision of the new regime. It is possible that in this process this in that possible is It regime. new the of vision
h for the we can assume that both sides were not able to reach a reach to able not were sides both that assume can we contribute to incumbents’ conversion. On the other hand, other the On conversion. incumbents’ to contribute
. another foreign force, which has similar values and and values similar has which force, foreign another
n of the framework the of n n h frin nevnin cnro e a speak can we scenario intervention foreign the In regime opening regime in onr. n hs epc, h opsto could opposition the respect, this In country. eign ,
the foreign force might be indirectly involved in in involved indirectly be might force foreign the is not directly becoming becoming directly not is
38
. between the foreign force and the and force foreign the between Thus, we could speak then a then speak could we Thus,
In result, we could speak about could weresult, In uld ,
refer to the possibility of possibility the to refer hr i a osblt of possibility a is there a part of the new ruling new the of part The very presence presence very The ) .
eoe the Before n re to order in ht we What
might bout the on , CEU eTD Collection 7 Collapse Conversion scenario Transition Table formation of el elites. intervention military the allying by reached regime. new actors the on of consensus a base reaching broad a involves it because emerges, unity elite for potential big formation the for opposition the and collapse of scenario reformers. and opposition the between cooperation in happening are building achieve to potential best unity elite for implies scenario each what and transformation elites of values, its and theymilitary and elites regime. the potential the
Table is created by me based on analysis of transition scenarios. transition of analysis on based by me is created Table 5
Transition Transition theirscenarios for implications and elite unit Following
However, if However,if – threat to the realization of reforms and to the habituation of new rules of rules new of habituation the to and reforms of realization the to threat
ite unity after regime unityite opening. after ed te novmn ad oioig f h frin oc i the in force foreign the of monitoring and involvement the needs they expand the base of regime supporters. As an outcome an As supporters. regime of base the expand they
the discussion of all transition scenarios, we can can we scenarios, transition all of discussion the
raises the importance of of importance the raises elites of transformation are engineered under the guidance of the the of guidance the under engineered are transformation of elites opposition the with consensus value moderate standpatters with consensus value forced a for attempt Reformers unity elite for Implications Elites of tra of Elites building consensus the to contribute elites military the with Deliberations opposition. within consensus Broad values. similar share cooperation b consolidation, of negotiations. of partners equal not are standpatters opposition. retreat from the incumbents and theincumbents acknowledgenewand the retreat from regime th elite uni elite e foreign force and opposition the and force foreign e
consolidation could have better possibilitiesto develop. nsformation are guided by the the by guided are nsformation ty aiuto i problematic is Habituation is if regime opening and further processes of elite of processes and further opening regime if is of elite unity. In cooperative transition scenario a transition cooperative unity.In elite of ecause ecause 39
(see table 5). table (see h ls tasto scenario transition last The
h mitnne f h ute nt is unity further the of maintenance The consensus between the military elites military the between consensus reformers and the opposition chosen for for chosen opposition the and reformers
y 7
and the operation of transition elites. transition of operation the and
,
opposition. The alliance between between alliance The opposition. In c In because the opposition and and opposition the because
reach an agreement with an agreement reach onversion scenario onversion .
Elites of transition and and transition of Elites
The potential for elites elites for potential The briefly – , elites of elites , conclude conclude
foreign
or the the or
The the
CEU eTD Collection the of habituation subsequent and values new of diffusion the about speak to difficult o extent and outlook different with outsiders involving directly not is it Since negotiations. narrow to limited is standpatters, and reformers different see then practice. could in we observations, rules these these consideration of following and transmission the b) regime the v close share participants if of only possible rules fundamental among the base polishing supporting in the is actors broad participating how a) analysis: the from clear become regime norms and values common opening. regime after unity, elite for intervention Foreign transition Cooperative 2.6. 2.6. isl, t s la ta cneso srcl o te nubns bs, i.e. base, incumbents’ the on strictly conversion that clear is it Firstly, finished have we Since Insights on Insights openingafter regime elite unity n change and value f possibilities challenges and for
we can now can we ’ norms’ s’,
t tee r fw motn apcs o e etoe, which mentioned, be to aspects important few are there it, development of transformation and consolidation elites. consolidation and transformation of development transformation. base force. foreign elite the Transition by guided is framework The opposition. local the and foreign the between negotiations of result the is regime new The elites. consolidation and transformation elites consensus reformers mutual of result a as regime New facilitates opposition the and elites the military Previously it was emphasized that elite unity is manifested in manifested is unity elite that emphasized was it Previously
ovrin ih b lmtd s well. as limited be might conversion . ’
refer to the final point final the to refer contributes about The monitoring monitoring The . Bro . the the
ad base for for base ad s discussion o discussion the regime. When there is an attempt to open a open to attempt an is there When regime. the
An agreement with military elites elites military with agreement An are
to the support base extension and extension base support the to
composed on the foreign and on the local opposition local the on and foreign the on composed elite elite unity. 40 isions and are able to reach a consensus); a reach to able are and isions
by the foreign force facilitates elites of of elites facilitates force foreign the by elite of transition of elite rfre norms preferred n implications of of implications n about the possibilities of elite unity elite of possibilities the about
ht cnro ipy o a for imply scenarios that .
Gaining support from military military from support Gaining elites of consolidation. of elites
between opposition and and opposition between oad regime towards n hs epc, t is it respect, this In transition scenarios’ transition
to the development of of development the to f e ok into took we If
contributes to the the to contributes
wih is (which forces forces
the ,
CEU eTD Collection about speaking are we if Moreover, which values, impose can it value involve can it Although itself. intervention foreign the of fact the is scenario this of risk major the process, whole the dominates support the the from military. will the signal clear a be reformersmight and opposition the between alliance sides. beginning process. and values’ adjustment different norms’ of result a as emerges regime new a that and participants adjustment. b broader only not means of creation emerges importance great a as scenario this in However, problems. habituation oppositi the by regime new the of crafting the respect, this In ones. subordinated the be would incumbents case this In conversion. in as problem wouldlimited and itresult problematic in habituation. vis position subordinated opp some involve opposition. by regime new For this reason, for them it can be easier to habituate it. habituate to easier be can it them for reason, this For Fourthly, as the foreign inter foreign the as Fourthly, T Secondly, ingness hirdly, we can see that cooperative transition involves a a involves transition cooperative that see can we hirdly, in
an
eoitos i st a acpal vso t flo fr l participating all for follow to vision acceptable an sets it negotiations,
line ih h mltr elites. military the with alliance and the unity for a new regime. Thus regime. new a for unity the and if we referred to the collapse scenario, collapse the to referred we if sto, u w hv t rmme ta sil h opsto i i a in is opposition the still that remember to have we but osition, on would disregard the incumbents the disregard would on - ase of consensus, but also a degree of values’ and norms’ and values’ of degree a also but consensus, of ase à -
vis reformers. For this reason, reason, this For reformers. vis
might be very contradicting to the country in question. question. in country the to contradicting very be might f ore e ol rmme ta rfres might reformers that remember could we course Of Sinc ti ajsmn poes s oe t h very the at done is process adjustment this e vention scenario involves an outside force outside an involves scenario vention the source would be the opposition and the and opposition the be would source the the monitoring monitoring the 41
s’ hs i i i scesul cetd it created, successfully is it if Thus,
negotiation with the opposition, but opposition, the with negotiation
, subsequently, ,
we could identify the same the identify could we and could contribute to the to contribute could and of of ute implementation further h dfuin ol be would diffusion the At the same time, the time, same the At
it could facilitate could it rae st of set broader for them aboutthem for , which , a
CEU eTD Collection positions their transfer to allowed are regime former the from elites military if sectors, elite base opposition the and incumbents the on overlapping of reduction and differentiation exclude not does it if Even favorable. most that conclude should we transition, cooperative scenario transition other no that be could differentiation unity elite for favorable is scenario transition same The transition. cooperative through achieved best be could circulation classic that learned have model. whole the of realization the to closest comes scenario transition which s we that means it unity, elite and differentiation elite circulation, classic elite. should the of point final the at arrived have we observation this facilitate to consensus this of potential the and actors of set broad transition cooperative can we unity, agenda. migh intervention foreign other of possibility the and jeopardized colonialism opening regimeafter processes
Since e for scenarios transition of implications the all consideration into Taking try to connect transition scenarios with the formation of consensually united united consensually of formation the with scenarios transition connect to try In result, it In result, we have a could new of the rupture regime. .
In this respect, we can we respect, this In
r hegemony or
the model of consensually united elite consists of three main elemen main three of consists elite united consensually of model the make a make bcue f h raos ulnd bv: osnu among consensus above: outlined reasons the of because , conclu best
is not not is
might emerge. emerge. might encouraged by the collapse. the by encouraged sion
is being madebeing is the most most the as such. We noted that noted We such. as
take this observation as partially sufficient for elite for sufficient partially as observation this take that the most favorable scenario for elite unity is unity elite for scenario favorable most the that oe coe t cnesal uie eie than elite united consensually to closer comes 42 favorable scenario for differentiation for scenario favorable
That , the controversy of independence andindependencecontroversy the of
oprtv transition cooperative s why is
it could foster could it h nw eie ih be might regime new the whole Taking into consideration into Taking
chapter habituation. b put be t
formation. formation.
differentiation could be the be could wee we where , ol look hould
n other in o , it still it , the n
With With
We We But lite ts:
CEU eTD Collection consensuallyformation of elites. united transition cooperative that conclude and differentiation
43
is the most favorable for the for favorable most the is CEU eTD Collection social other encompasses and wider is network if But reproduction. about speak social layers society.into of is point main the Thus, recruitment. network personal the on depends everything and circulation elite between line members b determined is selection members’ elite as Moreover, elite core the to related is appointee the overlapping, lacked they relationships personal of logic the within programmed is which dependency, the transcend to able differentiation this Nevertheless elites. of differentiation formal some neopatr under that means relations elite of core. the protecting is which zone, buffer a of kind a create and elite) regime th recruiters the to connected personally relations. personal by together bonded are members elite conditions such u that imply could we elites, on discussion the to observation this transferred relationships pre African of Walle by made observation an consideration into take should we
C . The authors claim that neopatrimonial practice is a distinguishing a is practice neopatrimonial that claim authors The . HAPTER3 If the network is narrow and does not go outside elites, then indeed we could we indeed then elites, outside go not does and narrow is network the If elites African for consequences its’ and opening regime about talking When .
T THEORETIC hese , i.e. ev i.e. , within political structures structures political within - pnn rgms Te an etr o sc rgms s personal is regimes such of feature main The regimes. opening lt members elite – en if various elite elite various if en
CONSENCUALLY ADAPTATIONAFRICANFOR CONTEXTS
y nice key encircle
still
how widely and deeply and widely how ol nt e ul atnmu, eas the because autonomous, fully be not could elite sectors could be identified and on the surface the on and identified be could sectors (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 459) 1994, Walle de Van and (Bratton 44 y ev a spotr o te established the of supporters as serve ey erdcin eoe blurred becomes reproduction imonial conditions there might actually be actually might there conditions imonial -
lt mmes te eries te ruling the recruiters, (the members elite
UNIFIED ELITEFORMATION:
of the elite member, who is performing is who member, elite the of wo efre te selection the performed who , y belonging to the network the to belonging y that rto ad a de Van and Bratton network
Such structure Such ol nt be not could
penetrates because , peculiarity By being By
. If we If nder
the the .
CEU eTD Collection appointees i.e. should elite. verythe of core enter to possibility the from deprived be might elite to appointee because tensions, appointees of dependence the hand, regime established complicated. members from fractions elites. incumbent involve to needs transition cooperative fractions, elite incumbent some make specifications should here. formation elite unified consensually for possibility a is there that b might alike scenarios that imply look incumbent structure and relationshipsbetween 461) 1994, Walle networksestablished outside emerge to opening regime for potential a implies structure the of peculiarity about neopatrimonial in speak happening could we that means it layers, ed
If collapse and foreign intervention might be driven without any involvement of involvement any without driven be might intervention foreign and collapse If of outsiders the to relates potential opening regime the since Moreover, refer to refer at previous scenarios, which we discussed in the chapter before, we could could we before, chapter the in discussed we which scenarios, previous at
on personal relationship basis, basis, relationship personal on lts te poiin eoe oe f h ky lyr i change. in players key the of one becomes opposition the elites, oprtv tasto, olpe r oeg itreto seais or scenarios intervention foreign or collapse transition, cooperative On the one hand, the hand, one the On . distinction between the core of elite and the outer circle of this elite, this of circle outer the and elite of core the between distinction h ls o bns ih h oe lt cetsafvrbe theoretic favorable a creates elite core the with bonds of loss The . Since core elite members maintain their positions by selecting elite selecting by positions their maintain members elite core Since
s rsl, t result, a As and by doing this will preserve their elite position elite their preserve will this doing by and . Bratton and Van de Walle claim the same the claim de Van Walle and Bratton . Thus, if we wantThus, to e possible in African contexts African in possible African African e eie opening regime he incumbent selects selects incumbent incumbent regimes before before regimes ih e nepee a a ore f potential of source a as interpreted be might
speak about 45
h eegne f fractions of emergence the elite members
the is a a is the emergence of the emergence of fr
appointee the the then biased biased challenge opening .
Subsequently, i Subsequently, .
circulation
as well as s (Bratton and Van de Van and (Bratton , which will support support will which , . for for uh monolithic Such . On the other the On . .
uh ye of type such However we However actions, weactions, wih is which , within t
means
f we If is
CEU eTD Collection might seems it and elite with only concerned is opening the be might there opening into enter to opposition the letting incumbents. with of competition itself fact the is opening regime such of wit made is opening negotiations broad conference or national no is i.e. there is created, oppositionmembers and elite ruling the and opposition the by again initiated new of positions, their in opening regime after sides, opposing the between favor. elites, incumbent constitute not does opposition the since However conference national the at set are game new the of rules The elite. ruling the and opposition organized loosely oppressed by systems. party one plebiscitary qualify could Walle de Van and transition to opportunity
be difficult difficult be By observing four types of neopatrimonial regimes in African countries Africanin regimes neopatrimonial typesof four observing By Subsequently, regime regime , whichprovides a way plausible consensually elite unified to formation
Batn n Vn e al 19, 483 1994, Walle de Van and (Bratton
rules. for the cooperative transition transition cooperative the for nov wt oties f nubn eie ad p for opt and elites incumbent of outsiders with involve For the first case the authors outline that regime opening is initiat is opening regime that outline authors the case first the For - party systems and regime openings performed in competitive one competitive in performed openings regime and systems party
maintain continuation of previous practices and protract habituation protract and practices previousof continuation maintain h otoe o te ainl ofrne ih b a te rulers the at be might conference national the of outcomes the f not to be concerned with the general vision general the with concerned be to not or distinguished four patterns of of patterns four distinguished hout deliberation on the rules of the new regime. The single aim single The regime. new the of rules the on deliberation hout
For the second case the authors outline that regime opening is opening regime that outline authors the case second the For
elites elites vn f h rgm oeig a md atr negotiations after made was opening regime the if even difficulties i difficulties later on on later
In this respect, we could could we respect, this In n formation of consensually unifi consensually of formation n eaiain f diinlcanl o h ruling the to channels additional of legalization to to (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 477 1994, Walle de Van and (Bratton agree 46
elite, however no common space for space common no however elite, on – regime openings regime
the incumbents might still might incumbents the eie pnns efre in performed openings regime rules, rules,
h uiid oc vis force unified the – claim that after such regime such after that claim 484) eom ad follow and reforms .
n result, In
of the rules the of .
ed elite ed The two of them of two The
cooperative h regime the - , because , à . - Thus, it Thus, Bratton vis the the vis remain
– them. . 478)
ed - .
CEU eTD Collection regimes might established offace attempts su in elite unified consensually of formation challenges these between deliberations deeper without case second realize fully case first the In problems. Indeed fact operated rules other 1994, 484) de Walle opening regime after is it although competition, of process note They Walle. one competitive de Van and Bratton of observation the consideration Nevertheless ,
r problematic are What these these What i w rfr o oe details, some to refer we if ,
in African contexts and contexts African in .
its ,
–
potential
hr mgt e oe pc fr aiuto, f e ok into took we if habituation, for space some be might there it is the is it - party systems the ruling elites are familiar and habituated with the with habituated and familiar are elites ruling the systems party
result in result highlights suggest is that indeed that is suggest highlights .
it m it But again it does not it does Butagain
n challenging and
in national conference national in “quick shock” “quick ight non –
it is the is it
be easier to habituate the competition competition the habituate to easier be - fully cooperative fully which
dispersion of the opposition, which is not able to able not is which opposition, the of dispersion h rgm oeig scenarios opening regime the happening parties participating in regime opening. regime in participating parties
to the to appear to resemble to appear o omto o cnesal uiid elites unified consensually of formation to 47 guarantee the
being changed
system, when elections are organized are elections when system, , h contexts ch unlike if it was it if unlike transitions, which also mean also which transitions, within regime opening opening regime
single single definition definition and .
cooperative is party boundaries party
cohesive within cohesive stuck (Bratton an (Bratton
oe w major two pose
patterns and habituation habituation of transition, ht new that
that the that , which , Both ofBoth . that . Thus . d Van d In the In
in in .
CEU eTD Collection unifie be to chances better had have could elites where case, a select we reason this For opening. regime during unified not were elites because the of explanation the 210) 2008, Porta legitimate as selection of way this acknowledges Porta della in D. appropriate. and qualitatively more a is it since had emerged.opening, disagreements unsolved discuss will we which developments, interpret could we also but suggests t after events of development the However operating was principle bonding a time, the of course the during unified consensually not were t in emerged opening regime the disunity 90’s in opening regime wars civil two d’état, general the reflects it region the of countries democratization. of wave third the after consolidation unsuccessful countr y The selection of casevariable, on dependent based of the selection the isindeed howeverThe investigation empirical For
, because its single its because , is , which prevented the ruling elite from being being from elite ruling the prevented which , not only a lack of of lack a only not
hsn eas i Fec Ws Arcn region African West French in because chosen CHAPTER4 .
As our research considers theoretic model a very integral part for part integral very a model theoretic considers research our As . A ). phenomena under investigation under phenomena
te ae ie t mle ta drn te ore f post of course the during that implies it time same the t it ihn elite within
- ol hv be have could it party system managed to keep the regime stable before stable regime the keep to managed system party agreement and habituation on the rules of a new game, new a of rules the on habituation and agreement
in the light of light the in –
THECASE OFIVORY COAST the e agenda he
hn h “idw f potnt” ie regime i.e. opportunity”, of “window the when case of Ivory Coast Coast Ivory of case
n the in 48 - come et oine suy sc slcin is selection such study, oriented depth he
a non a .
regime opening regime t en ta, lhuh vra elites Ivorian although that, means It
chapter rbe o rgm legitimacy regime of problem h most the - fully cooperative transition. The transition. cooperative fully , i.e. that consolidation failed, consolidation that i.e. ,
later
is successful to tackle elite elite tackle to successful challenged
selected. Th selected. ae h otoe of outcomes the are , it , especially after 1993, after especially ,
represent d, but were not. We We not. were but d,
or ihn other Within is s
removed. particular h least the
(Della (coup se -
CEU eTD Collection 9 8 accessed; issues. legitimacy regime disagree elite of roots selection, elite French. covered mostly in Interviews were rest the English, in were interviews Some hours. 3 and minutes elites political of sections various sociol political in experts civil local organizations, local society from representatives institutions, international of representatives with: unstructured accessible wasduringthe members period not ofthe fieldwork. information other 1990, since reproduction Each members. Government and Assemblydata National on databases to 2 used were create Documents development. elite Ivorian of peculiarities concerning Assembly National composition on documents from sources, secondary part theoretic in mentioned dimensions guided section each since in development discussion subsequent with continue and 1990 in opening presentedinexactly the reasons case for the first the paragraph li most on selection our base
Exact list o listExact in 10 Table ae a ue t gnrt ifrain bu mmesi cruain and circulation membership about information generate to used was base secondar and documents to addition In information of source factual additional as used were sources Secondary regime to prior background historical with investigation case our begin will We f interviewed people and their affiliations could be provided only by request. request. by only provided be could affiliations their and people interviewed f
howeverwith interviews issue. counterbalance experts this appendices
since since 19 interviews were organized in Abidjan between 2014 05 2014 06 between Abidjan in wereinterviews organized
.
90
until 201
e hud oe ht o al nedd nomns were informants intended all not that note should We kely single case design design case single kely 2, from interviews. 2, from 9 .
y nomto collected information by h drto o itriw ws ewe 40 between was interviews of duration The 49 8
Te nomto ws olce from collected was information The . –
ie tnct o sca bcgon of background social or ethnicity like sucs 10 sources, y
(Levy 2008, 12) 2008, (Levy g, n rpeettvs from representatives and ogy,
.
ments, conflicts and conflicts ments, in relation to to relation in
and noml in informal . Ivory Coast is Coast Ivory .
– Government
2014 05 29 2014 90 The 1990. - depth three
CEU eTD Collection anti the PDCI. into parties and leaders emerging with PDCI was it however France. thems organize to elites political local rising for opportunity the was it parliament, colonists’ in representation political for 101 2013, clichés, colonists were the on based were principles management colonial French management. state of principles administration. colonists’ elite Ivorian local of member a being and governments French several in minister he Coast Ivory independent of leader a becoming Before administration. state of center the ( Coast Ivory of Party Democratic later on. and and elites local of configuration Coast 4.1. 4.1. Ivorian independence from France in 1960 in France from independence Ivorian to order In da f oe cnrlzto ad concentration. and centralization power of idea eoe 1990 before Historical ofIvorypeculiarities Coast between 1960 was included into the lower ranks of local colonial administration administration colonial local of ranks lower the into included was - t ht ie in time that At ooit, ieain platform liberation colonists, – 103) F political political . The . ew key . When When solve Ivorian puzzle we should not ignore historical context of of context historical ignore not should we puzzle Ivorian solve
local elite, who elite, local Te eid f 1960 of period The . - poin arena before the collapse of colonialism French had opened gates opened had French colonialism of collapse the before
It was there where he was able to learn and habituate the habituate and learn to able was he where there was It
Ivory Coast Coast Ivory ts F. H. Boigny, who Boigny, H. F. .
should . . Boigny H. F. to better understand their understand better to at éortqe e a ôe d’Ivoire Côte la de Démocratique Parti se members se be mentioned
le ad demand and elves hr wr fw mrig oiia parties, political emerging few were there
(Tiabas 2009, 13) 2009, (Tiabas
n peetd h psiiiy f ethnic of possibility the prevented and 50 By doing this he this doing By
a nt nwoe o oiis n the and politics to newcomer a not was e a ivle i te ihs lvl of level highest the in involved was he - 90 il nbe s o oae the locate to us enable will 1990 took the the took
were assimilated into French cultural intoFrench assimilated were
brought F. H. Boigny H. F. brought here . central position central
t h tp f hs hierarchy this of top the At
. starting positions in 1990 in positions starting
unified the opposition on opposition the unified Coming from the colony the from Coming the - 1990
needne from independence
and and his party his and (Mazgelytė PDCI) , co - was a was opted Ivory to to
CEU eTD Collection 12 11 10 were which parties, political of leaders the for positions granting regime new the for support PDCI from K memb of list a below from deliberations by value party autonomy much not party the figu 264) 1963, principle PDCI. through was elite ruling the existence ignored were parties political Other party.political recognized one only the was PDCI where system, party position within domination the highest echelons the of elite. ruling of period long a begun Such groups) ethnic 60 got has Coast (Ivory independence after right secessionism
ey Informant no. 3 and no. 9. no. 3 and no. Informant 8. no. Informant 4. no. Informant re of decision making within making decision of re - elit . But a But .
if we considered considered we if a of way F. H. Boigny concentrated the power into his hands and became the central the became and hands his into power the concentrated Boigny H. F. leading preservetheir to aimed PDCIindependent, became Ivory Coast When e members of the state the of members e s cnrlzto ad tnc inclusiveness ethnic and centralization : , which w which , 11
. . as well as t the same time time same the t
n hswy th way this In
ers for the National Assemblies, which made made whichAssemblies, National the for ers DI nrne no oiia aea f needn Ioy Co Ivory independent of arena political into entrance PDCI
ere 12
.
As for the for As
gained during pre during gained t
or hat hat their
poiin a sprse adte ige nrne to entrance single the and suppressed was opposition e imse, although dismissed,
. Moreover, . positions within party were assigned assigned were party within positions being a a being
and was left left was President President – Ivorian Government Ivorian the the
like managers of state companies state of managers like Akan h pclaiy f hs at ws t organizing its was party this of peculiarity The party and the state. the and party loyal for for the same principle was employed byemployedwas principle same the -
independence. It did so by creating a single a creating byso did It independence. (Ivorian . . Boigny H. F. 51 a number of number a member of the of member
osiuin omly loe the allowed formally constitution
southeastern Shctr 91 3032 Kilson 300,302; 1961, (Schachter , during the first years first the during , lower units lower formed
Due to the centralization of centralization the to Due party became a matter of matter a became party elections only a formality. a onlyelections
ethno the from above and not and above from ’ leaders ’ – Government -
utrl group) cultural were co - opted
to get the get to within
selected creating ast ast
has into the by 10 ir - .
CEU eTD Collection 14 13 F. refer Boigny’sto to H. on economic outlook the country.of course well.as elites other of support the be should there However opposition ruling them granting by groups ethnic other of loyalty the built who centralized that power. much have not did these elite, ruling the into negotiations broader managed be should it way the of vision the and group) Dyoula by followed then Government Akan was himself (he rule Boigny’s F.H. of beginning very the tendencies favoritism ethnic 20 removing deprived were PDCI
Informant no. 9. no. Informant 4. no. Informant – 21) F. H. Boigny’s way of the state management was management state the of way Boigny’s H. F.
13 and political elite political and ethno , which had never outnumbered outnumbered never had which , ept te at that fact the Despite .
.
is the dominant the is
Any we should not forget that that forget not should we hm rm oiin, upesn oiin r incarceration or opinion suppressing positions, from them
was one of the reasons why such system system such why reasons the of one was ooil administration colonial - te ae edny a peaet ihn ainl Assembly National within prevalent was tendency same the ; utrl group) cultural rising
from Malinke Malinke
esos ewe te edr n hs appointees his and leader the between tensions
position ih others with .
among others) among The mechanism mechanism The (northern ethno (northern
when it came to distribution to came it when Akan PDCI i te uig lt o i key in or elite ruling the in s .
lhuhohrehi rus ee lo recruited also were groups ethnic other Although
– a a stable a had a bsd n tnc inclusiveness, ethnic on based was besides besides
n hs ae ooit wr rpae by replaced were colonists case this in
and later on by on later and Akan 52 of centralized party and measures against measures and party centralized of - cultural group, where the ethnic group of group ethnic the where group, cultural
the the 14 .
hs h mngmn o te state the of management the Thus political and political majority For this reason it is very importantvery is it reason this For were W of ethnic favoritism favoritism ethnic of hat we could observe here is here observe could we hat like Krou Krou
of political positions political of
Baoule
shaped mn mmes of members among a - lts wr sle by solved were elites, ( the transformed western ethno western
oe pc within space some ruling elite elite ruling , which belongs to belongs which , by
r hs, who those, or Taa 2009, (Tiabas Akan
could work. could hr were there
version of version
I was It . - support cultural without .
Akan Since
the ,
CEU eTD Collection but locals to only not economy Ivorian of openness the supported fragmentation of possibility elite political and ruling preserved resources and access to political happen could elite economic elites. economic within tensions possible 11 2004, elite political the or ruling the and elite economic the between overlapping state Thirdly in other elite become of sector. to a was this it sense In elite. economic the of emergence the for niche a created business export 110) from southeast shifting was plantations of development the politics plantations from profit to aim an with migration labor international and Africa in colonies former influenced ideas socialist of context to outlook liberal a employed Boigny H. F. working and profitable business this keep To times. plantations Akan . companies were companies This kind agriculturalopeningkind has s This of , to possibility the Firstly, coffe and cocoa of exploitation continued President the independence After
, but , in paralel to to paralel in circles – 12) land cultivation and purchasing, which was a distinguishing feature in the in feature distinguishing a was which purchasing, and cultivation land and
for the export, which export, the for Krou .
n alternative n O te te hand, other the On . If we took this observation into consideration, we could speak about speak could we consideration, into observation this took we If to
regions as well, it enabled an ethnic mixing of the economic elite. economic the of mixing ethnic an enabled it well, as regions Krou h lbrl ces o h pattos n epo bsns the business exprot and plantations the to access liberal the
involved in it as well, which resulted in the emergence of the of emergence the in resulted which well, as it in involved
ein n h west the in region and limit limit and
possibility for those, who did not become the ruling elite, ruling the become not did who those, for possibility
ihn cnmc elites economic within autonomously Secondly, as plantations could be developed not onlySecondly,be not could developed as plantations nov it poial plantation profitable into involve were its , which would enable to preserve the power of the powerto preserveenable the which of , would
circulation. vrapn tendencies overlapping
profitable source profitable 53
ome importantome elites. implications for
and could not necessarily be linked linked be necessarily not could and Aids 04 8 2004, (Akindes n h oe ad te omto of formation the hand, one the On
In result we could speak about the about speak could we result In .
Fourthly s
of revenue during colonial during revenue of
. This enabled internal enabled This . ol poie better a provide could – sne . . Boigny H. F. since , Akan 1 Mzeyė 2013, Mazgelytė 11; s
also to to also n rw material raw and
ein i the in regions . Due to such to Due . foreigners
(Akindes with
e
CEU eTD Collection 16 15 automaticallywasdismissed. overlapping of the problem group, ethnic particular a elites. ruling and economic military, we society of framework such Within country. the rule to experienced politically most the be to themselves proclaimed be to argued Malinke and tradition kingdom have succession with leadership clear that understandingin rooted was were were Below rulers. be to appropriate as considered society. Ivorian within idea main structure social society Ivorian of PDCI thecloseoutside circles to or elites economic country power elite ruling the to buffer a as interpreted be could it and elites, in placed were sphere, political with elite. economic for – especially those coming especiallythose
Informant no. 7. no. Informant 3. no. 1 and no. Informant traders and the latter were soldiers were latter the and traders . Finally, we should refer to another very peculiar peculiar very another to refer should we Finally,
Thus, the way F. H. Boigny has designed the economic management of the of management economic the designed has Boigny H. F. way the Thus, , although , has created created has
is that is o wti Ioy Coast Ivory within not
. ,
I Akan t provided an alternative an provided t hc jsiid h acietr o idpnet vr Coast. Ivory independent of architecture the justified which
they
This means that the local economic elites, which did not have ties have not did which elites, economic local the that means This –
h heacy f ethno of hierarchy the , atal atnmu ad t h sm time same the at and autonomous partially
had Malinke Akan from France from
a tradition of kingdom, of tradition a because
were
and .
their traditional society was organized organized wassociety traditional their Meanwhile
to As the person could be regarded as belonging tobelonging as regarded be could person the As n h tp f h pwr yai. hy were They pyramid. power the of top the on - Krou between the foreig the between 16
Akan. hi laes ee lce i councils. in elected were leaders their (Akindes 2004, 12) 2004, (Akindes ol cery e te ifrnito between differentiation the see clearly could . o ti rao i were it reason this For 54
15
ethno and .
The eligibility of of eligibility The - Krou utrl rus n ter lc within place their and groups cultural
constrained - cultural groups have their own place own their have groups cultural
was not eligible, eligible, because was not t he origins of their kingdom kingdom their of origins he Malinke n and the political the and n and important and
–
channel for aspiring elites aspiring for channel
it created a new channel newa created it Akan
and
and accumulation of accumulation and Akan
to be the leaders the be to Krou
characteristic
into kingdom into epe who people, : overlapping h former the - economic
it did it did not
As for for As
were The
At
CEU eTD Collection 18 17 not were PDCI of sections office mayor’s to Assembly, National the to selection members’ economy fact the by fostered been have could opposition within stay to key co to attempted Boigny H. F. FPI of emergence the After competition ( Front Popular Boiny H. F. criticize to started arena. questionable. th reason source accumulation power elites economic to also but population, ordinary crisi economic experienced 1980. until it made more subtle societywasthe partially realized reveal, country the of course economic Boigny F.H. recruitment e limited structure such time same the
Informant no. 4 and no. 8. no. 4 and no. Informant 4. no. Informant - opponents)
In 1980 PDCI started the dissolution of centralizing power centralizing of dissolution the started PDCI 1980 In elites Ivorian of context structural the was This I 1982 n
touched and also by i support eir
u i 8’ de o elnd rcs n oo market cocoa in prices declined to due 80’s in But o h rln elites ruling the to and
The The
, but L. Gbagbo stayed Gbagbo L. but , Front a . bgo ( Gbagbo L.
H . by shift from shift
opposition used the the used opposition
and so not owever internal reforms internal reforms P o the for
plie Ivoirien opulaire
s
vis France . . ogy remained Boigny H. F. 17
Krou withinPDCI It . . ’s eiiay f the of legitimacy radical -
à s h peiu osrain o PC tcis and tactics PDCI on observations previous the As
with -
eie n etbihd pltcl party political a established and regime vis
ol b itrrtd as interpreted be could ethno favoring relations favoring
some some and h rln eie wr traee o. o this For too. threatened were elites ruling the . lite circulation by narrowing down the circle for circle the down narrowing by circulation lite
in the in
crisis FPI) , 55 -
. utrl ru) oehr ih intellectuals with together group) cultural Akan
modifications
opposition as
o demand to
managed to preserve the major the preserve to managed the opportunity to to opportunity the bcue hy s n alternative an as they because , uig elit ruling the conceptual understanding of understanding conceptual the at leader party
, which seemed to be working be to seemed which , to defending to
to regime to
on ethnic superiority, on ethnic which - opt L. Gbagbo L. opt
a tra nt ny o the to only not threat a e
eaiain f political of legalization ol esl become easily could of
and liberalization of liberalization and
18
te onr had country the , collapsing Ivorian collapsing and his his and
s step into political into step . Ivorian interests Ivorian
The confidence The n t certain to and (and – positions
Ivorian
other ity in ity .
CEU eTD Collection 19 changing and PDCI to only funds state from support financial electoral granting campaigns, of disruptions included which parties, political new against repressions recognition official were parties political 83 because opposition, within unity strong opening power in remain o elections about opening regime The elites. ruling smooth organized were Assembly National the to elections countries French like other African African of conference Baule La reforms and for opportunity an gave crisis economic and challengers elite leadership party, the of liberalization themselves sections by of leaders determine to possibility candidates. multiple from choosing of composition final the decided voters Assembly, National Governement the
Informant no. 2 and no. 6. no. 2 and no. Informant 4.2. 4.2. was challenged from within and and within from challenged was In 1990 In Tensions within elite political . and transparent political game between the incumbent and the new aspiring new the and incumbent the between game political transparent and ned e ol osre that observe could we Indeed
in the party and the Governement the and party the in
. and The violent The
political parties were parties political
b) b) and key r .
(Tiabas 2009, 47) 2009, (Tiabas
to remain in control of control in remain to In result, although PDCI remained as a single channel to to channel single a as remained PDCI although result, In was stronger than opposition than stronger was -
eom wti te state the within reforms
mass protests in protests mass the the
promotion of renewal of promotion state leaders and France had pushed pushed had France and leaders state was done was to to up theregime open . officially recognized officially For this reason reason this For h mmes f h pry ee rne a granted were party the of members The it and stateand disintegration was 56 the state the culy hr was there actually Abidjan
without deliberations with the opposition the with deliberations without , shows that F. H. Boigny H. F. that shows , response a the the wih en that means which ,
opposition to demand demand to opposition , however it however , in 1990 in at the same time same the at
, but , (including FPI) (including PDCI was successful in taking in successful was PDCI 19 the preservation of the top the of preservation the , a) : (Tiabas 2009, 35 2009,(Tiabas .
presidential elections and elections presidential
(Reyntjens 1991, 48) 1991, (Reyntjens the National Assembly by Assembly National the
o el with deal to rgetto and fragmentation has registered after
to to a guaranteed not .
T DI ie to aimed PDCI
control regime control
hese changes hese and the ruling ruling the and 1 990 vr Coast Ivory recognition
– after their after emerging
38) .
The a the nd no -
CEU eTD Collection 22 21 20 pre previous the from Assembly Table was group cultural the numbers in highest H theythat sense a in new Assembly National within circulation of signs changes no made opening regime that mean not withinNationalchanges AssemblyGovernment and the for favorable were incumbents. Assembly National the and Presidency were the to (elections elections commission electoral Ministry) Affairs independent Internal by administered no was there because elect during support their capitalize to expected he policy, economic his of members cards because important, very was change last The election. of rules Total Party
wvr hs iclto ad eea dd o chang not did renewal and circulation this owever Informant no. 9. no. Informant 7. no. Informant 8. no. 7 and no. Informant 6
Persistence incumbents from of National previous Assembly 1990 within o oeges n alwd hm o vote to them allowed and foreigners to The majority of the of majority The positions, their preserve to succeeded PDCI and Boigny H. F. Although
UND PIT PDCI FPI
PDCI
Howev
,
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) could vote could er there are are there er
-
pnn Gvrmn, ete fo te rvos National previous the from neither Government, opening were not members of previous National Assembly National previous of members not were
new
100.00% (1) (111) 68.50% (8) 88.90% No in Assembly National Was 69.90% (121) 69.90% 100.00% (1) 20
Government members Government . As F. H. Boigny was liberal towards foreigners with foreigners towards liberal was Boigny H. F. As few
motn pit t b md i rfrne to reference in made be to points important
30.10% (52) 30.10% 0.00% (0) 0.00% (0) (51) 31.50% (1) 11.10% Yes 57 21 22
.
and
–
the majority of parliamentarians were parliamentarians of majority the – poiin a nt tog enough, strong not was opposition
eoe ht ny hs, who those, only that before
within political elites. political within
after elections
d h fc that fact the ed in 1990 in
were recruited neither recruited were –
1995 National1995 t sud electoral issued it in 1990 in Akan Akan
There were There . ions.
(table 6) (table ethno it did it were And - .
CEU eTD Collection 25 24 23 Presidential the before years two Faso) because populatio organized was foreigners from cards electoral and pay highest amount. had to ECOWAS the more paid States) African West of Community Economic origin the to to collection citizens Boigny. emerged which tensions, of continuation and renewal between positions. leadership force state and PDCI, Assembly, Minister, Prime in allies his with himself surrounded Boiny H. unchallenged. remained field political in superiority from coming were mostly still they members, majority hand, other the On elite. political elite. political the and ruling Assembly
Informant no. 7. no. Informant 9. no. Informant appendices. in 11 and 10 Table has .
still Coast Ivory Since The second source of tensions emerged when the President has President sourceof has second died when the emerged The tensions 24
a introduced was put put n . 23 unms ol be could surnames
wih en ta te cud e oig usd te ey oe f the of core very the outside coming be could they that means which , – new of entrance the allowed opening regime although Thus,
Ivorian
foreigners f Ivorian of i ws ifcl t distinguish to difficult was t
budget. ’
support for PDCI for support resident y rm Mnse A Ouattara A. Minister Prime by together with the economic reform and the death of F. H. F. of death the and reform economic the with together
It The main idea was the differentiation of taxes according according taxes of differentiation the was idea main The
also indicates also had similar . Ivorians rbes n cnm, h nw a reform tax new the economy, in problems n Ntoa Assembly National and tnc aoiim remained favoritism ethnic 25
fr xml, hs cmn fo Burkina from coming those example, (for 58
tnc oate hs o peetd from prevented not has loyalties ethnic
The The in ad es rsdns rm CWS (i.e. ECOWAS from residents less, paid
f rsdn i a oege o Ivorian, or foreigner a is resident a if a lack of continuity of the of continuity of lack a danger reform reform has . n eut i result, In Akan
. Subse . In order to remain on the top F. top the on remain to order In
in order order in ethno
notreached goals initial its
cetd esos within tensions created t ohr cmn outside coming others , quently, the collection of collection the quently, oee te balancing the However elections - utrl group cultural pae o National of Speaker to increase increase to –
Akan
. ruling and the and ruling h country The
was
in 1993in . money
PDCI Akan
the for for
CEU eTD Collection 27 26 a also was issue identity national of emergence the power, to access from Ouattara elites ruling become to “unsuitability” and “impurity” their about groups ethnic northern to given sign the time same the At origin. questionable to due elections presidential in resulted It elections. in participate ( identity Ivorian of question a escalate started to to due emerged tensions of opportunity the image, groups’ forces co to enough strong not was it opening regime of Coast Ivory of parts western in expansion plantation the during architecture elite ruling (especially group lines ethnic ( groups ethnic and with associated members party the from support received President temporary a as declared be to wanted and rules constitution temporaryPresident a become to had Bedie Assembly). National the of (Speaker Bedie K. Ouat A. between crisis succession leader a experienced Rassemblement des Républicains des Rassemblement
Infornant 8. no. 7 and no. 5, 4, no.no. Informant gain he
h ehi laae ihn oiia lt wr deee we H K Bedie K. H. when deepened were elite political within cleavages ethnic The
support and counterbalance PDCI. PDCI. counterbalance and a banned has
no. 4 and no. 7. no. 4 and no. 27 within . i.e ,
lhuh t Although in 1995in elections could become a real threat for PDCI and and PDCI for threat real a become could
. Bete Bete elite. political
Malinke A.
and was more able to accumulate power as economic elites economic as power accumulate to able more was and tnc group) ethnic utaas upres ersnig oty norther mostly representing supporters Ouattara’s his move of H. K. Bedie was a a was Bedie K. H. of move his
.
s result a As FPI was already associated with associated already was FPI .
, RDR) emerged. RDR) , oee RDR However It . A. A.
59 a kn o a otie i FH Boigny’s F.H. in outsider an of kind was , utaas xlso fo priiain in participation from exclusion Ouattara’s
nw at Rly f h Republicans the of Rally party new a , however A. Ouattara however A. , tax reform and electoral cards collectio cards electoral and reform tax According to Ivorian constitution H. K. H. constitution Ivorian to According Ivoirite - , opt the support of all opposition all of support the opt
A split of PDCI then drew clear drew then PDCI of split A ) and eligibility of candidates to candidates of eligibility and ) hc hd nrhr ethnic northern a had which tara (Prime Minister) and H. and Minister) (Prime tara Akan Akan targeted to deprive A. A. deprive to targeted , .
because it could use could it because
ethno Even in th in Even Krou
did not agree with agree not did - 26
cultural group cultural ethno . H. K. Bedie K. H. e context e Ivorian n - cultural l was al n
CEU eTD Collection 29 28 RDR and FPI in members Assembly National former of number increased an party,PDCIbecause elites politicalfrom emigrationpossible of speakabout could me in majority the as havenot did to and PDCI ofescalation no is there and theoretic is observation for reassurance it 1990, after crisis economic continued of context the within hand, other the “ under classified be could which elites, economic the for threat a ci valuable less and marginal became population of part significant “ as Ivoirity of concept Mali and Faso Burkina from agricult father or “ as exclusiv to managed had citizenship Ivorian of understanding and policy economic President former although that is reason ideology Boiny’s H. F. with point breaking
Informant no. 7 and no. 8. no. 7 and no. Informant 4. no. 3 and no. Infornant br ee ecmr ie n h previous the in like newcomers were mbers ou ” (“or”), which meant that to be Ivorian is to be a descendant of Ivorian mother Ivorian of descendant a be to is Ivorian be to that meant which (“or”), ” In 1995 1995 In ure was favorable for foreigners and was a source of attraction of source a was and foreigners for favorable was ure ity not so visible. so not ity 28 .
aig no osdrto te at ht i lbrl cnmc ulo to outlook economic liberal his that fact the consideration into Taking
a Ivoirite oct eetos o ainlAsml ad Presidency and Assembly National to elections boycott fundamental RDR and FPI created Republican Front to Front Republican created FPI and RDR “ et
”
was inruling reflected elites. political and economic elites economic the
et
ainl Assembly National Under (ad, .. ohr n fte ae vras mat that meant Ivorians) are father and mother i.e. (“and”, ”
impac Aids 04 10) 2004, (Akindes F. H. Boigny H. F. t: H. K. Bedie remained as the President and PDCI and President the as remained Bedie H. K. t:
on preservation of their their of preservation on empirical 60
of diversity of
.
the concept of Ivorian was understood understood was Ivorian of concept the rcie ehi ecuiiy bt his but exclusivity, ethnic practiced h mjrt o Ntoa Assembly National of majority The National National
justification, we can look how the how look can we justification, H K Bedie’s K. H. , acceptance acceptance Assembly
destroy positions.
within country within tizens
ou . the monopoly of of monopoly the
upr fr the for support enhl, we Meanwhile, ”
29
of immigrants of category. Although this Although . .
However Also it was it Also make this make
could be could was . The On
a it it CEU eTD Collection 32 31 30 soldiers’ and officers’ military deteriorating of improvement at aimed representatives the against ethno of escalation that observe could one exception this with even But r of reproduction demonstrated which 1999, in Government the be could exception The elites. ruling and political within circulation of terms in changes radical that is reveal Government the and Assembly National the of dynamics of 1993 during members Government who 30, of out Ministers 2 only had 10 August 1999 in created cabinet Government the percent, 40 around pre the with starting members members 1999 Assembly) National Table aboutevidence observed Total Party
Informant no. 9. no. Informant appendices. in 11 and 10 Table 9. no. Informant Malinke 7 , we could could we ,
-
Persistence incumbents of 1996 within cultural compositioncultural unchallenged. t h ed f 99 eoe the before 1999 of end the At patterns recruitment into look we If but , RDR PDCI JPDCI FPI (table 7) (table , h cud e upsd o e hetnd by threatened be to supposed be could who
rsdn ad h Government the and President
the hr ws n nraig edny o eet omr Government former select to tendency increasing an was there see that again selection occurred not from former National Assembly National former from not occurred selection again that see
. % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
persistence persistence of Speaking in terms of ethno of terms in Speaking
were
70.70% (123) 70.70% (9) 69.20% (101) 71.60% 100.00% (1) 63 No in Assembly National Was
.
2
0% - o Gove not pnn Government opening
Akan (12 - 1999 were 1999
) –
2000 National Assembly2000 National pre the from (starting as theas majority scheduled elections in 2000 a a 2000 in elections scheduled
29.30% (51) 29.30% (4) 30.80% (40) 28.40% 0.00% (0) 36 Yes net member rnment 61
.
8
to 0%
Akan h Government the
(7 - cultural composition cultural
)
a made. was
– .
30 there was no sharp reduction sharp no was there oevr i i 19 i was it 1993 in if Moreover, . s
Ivoirite before
ewe 19 and 1993 between 31 32 fiily m Officially, . .
, there is some is there , h mjrt of majority The hs wa the what Thus, Ivoirite there were no were there op d’état coup uling elites. uling - opening a left has ilitary
CEU eTD Collection 35 34 33 National Assemblyformer remained base members’ FPI was Assembly National the of composition Government the outside recruit RDR,either FPI.either from from PDCI remove ethno or parties political with former with members Government former more However members. Government professionalizing of removal and renewal Government’s at increased also has Government the in members Assembly National former of share the Also the to L. FPI. by overthrown was Gbagbo became thePresident shortly but winner, a himself declared he elections Gbagbo L. candidate FPI only ca PDCI and RDR restricted Guei R. general military the Government. within monopoly PDCI dissolve between cleavages were there that means leader PDCI from power a took elite military that conditions
Table 10 and 11 in appendices. in 11 and 10 Table appendices. in 11 and 10 Table 5. no. 3 and no. Informant first first When L. Gbagbo became Gbagbo L. When recruitment in changes radical made has indeed Guei R. rule short his During the the in 2000 May 18 he he 18 May 2000 in
a little a Governme n rlae f oiia pioes rm opposition from prisoners political of release and
ruling elites.Although ruling ruling and ruling from the ruling elite ruling the from , if compared to previous ones. previous to compared if ,
nt
in 2000 January 4 4 January 2000 in the
military elite military - reshuffled cultural groups, cultural 33
.
a alwd o participate to allowed was
the currently .
This means that he could have could he that means This 34 n otie h Ntoa Assembly National the outside and
, which means that he entered into agreement into entered he that means which , President the
62 and the real aim of the of aim real the and – we are not able to identify their affiliationsidentify totheir notable are we
cabinet of the Government the of cabinet only one member was a Minister before Minister a was member one only we could refer to to refer could we In the following the In , his first Government was tending to tending was Government first his ,
This means that that means This dominated, but the reproduction on reproduction the but dominated, too – ndidates from participation from ndidates
because (table PDCI of 8)
s an as II 1999) (IRIN Presidential coup d’état’s coup R. Guei R. coup d’état coup
chosen chosen opponent and
was aiming aiming was . ministers elections h fact The included 35
was to to was . . aim to to aim After The The . . ,
CEU eTD Collection 37 36 Ivorian conflicting political elites. for supporters of pool a became it market, labor to either military, to either combatants t Liberi from Forces Armed National mercenaries issues legitimate as regime disintegr only not indicates disunity. elite military and political Ivorian in point Gbagbo L. to loyal Forces Armed name rebels by controlled part northern the into country the split and war civil into developed which organized, of attempt another 2002 in but Government, the to into members Ouattara A. allowed which elections, participate new for protests organize to trying Asse National Table ee onre tesle dd o hv a ouin o nert ter w ex own their integrate to solution a have not did themselves countries hese Total Party
Informant no. 4 and no. 5. no. 4 and no. Informant Informant 8
Persistence incumbents of 2000 within . oee RR ee o stsid ih h eeto o L Gab ad were and Gbagbo L. of election the with satisfied not were RDR However
There are some observations made that made observations some are There UDPCI UDCY RDR PIT PDCI MFA candidate Independent FPI no. 4. no. 36
mbly) Wti te otx o rsn tnin wt RR e nldd their included he RDR with tensions rising of context the Within . : New Forces Forces New :
bt lo t s rfeto of reflection a is it also but ,
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
d New Forces and the southern part controlled by National by controlled part southern the and Forces New d
from from to f vra military Ivorian of ation
Burkina Faso and Faso Burkina Was in Assembly National Was 69.4% (68) 90.6% (87) 37 69.2% (9)
100% (1) 100% (4) 100% (1) a .
80% (4) 40% (2) No This split could be interpreted as a culminating a as interpreted be could split This 78.9% Scrt Cucl omte 01 15) 2011, Committee Council (Security – (176)
2010 National Assembly2010 National pre the from (starting 63
21.1% (47) 30.6% (30) 30.8% (4) 9.4% (9) Yes 20% (1) 60% (3)
0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) both fighting sides were recruiting were sides fighting both
Liberia unresolved and
The fact of two military camps camps military two of fact The
its (Skogseth 2006, 18) 2006, (Skogseth nblt t rcgie the recognize to inability regional regional op d’état coup post - opening - . conflict Since
was and - CEU eTD Collection 39 38 Ouattara finally Presidency the to candidate a as participate to 2010 2007, 4,6Committee 2005 in delayed were which elections, Presidential for preparation aim agreement 4. March 2007 in agreement Ouagadougou sign and negotiations new enter to Gbagbo L. President the and Soro K. G. Forces New of representative The jeopardized was Government transitional implement to will of lack disarmament and Forces New to related members Government of implementation the made, Assembly National elites ruling of before, but Government was Government the in never transitional military all of representatives 23 January in resulted it deliberations, for space rebels and key parties Ivorian political from representatives involved which table, round in resulted It elite.
Informant no. 6. no. Informant appendices. in 11 and 10 Table , although disarmament was not fully executed fully not was disarmament although , E conflict armed The allowed
lection n t disarm to and has not prevented from post electoral crisis electoral post from prevented not has Te ate are t om tastoa oenet wih include which Government, transitional a form to agreed parties The .
Scrt Cucl omte 20, 6 2003, Committee Council (Security s to the Presidency and to the National Assembly were confirmed were Assembly National the to and Presidency the to s
ed to encourage disarmament, identification of Ivorian population and population Ivorian of identification disarmament, encourage to ed to to remained ne te competition the enter , were selected were ,
– Round Table participants Table Round 7) . (Linas
was problematic, because there was a lack of recognition of lack a was there because problematic, was
n f and a amd o e eovd by resolved be to aimed was .
ic i ivle al ofitn sds n poie a provided and sides conflicting all involved it Since - acuss gemn 2003) Agreement Marcoussis w ebr fo fre pltcl lt, .. from i.e. elite, political former from members ew 38 .
Despite the fact that a pact between e between pact a that fact the Despite Linas .
64 oee te pnn o te ae fr A. for gates the of opening the However Scrt Cucl omte 20, 3 2004, Committee Council (Security
- acuss peac Marcoussis
, to organize new elections, elections, new organize to , since the death of F. H. Boigny H. F. of death the since 39 – .
– A. A. after th after 7) Ouattara, who was denied was who Ouattara, . eito o international of mediation
In result, the work of of work the result, In .
e second round of the of round second e agreement e h mjrt o new of majority The some reproductionsome (Security Council Council (Security to
lites was lites had had had n 2003 in
reform , was , This – 4)
in d - .
CEU eTD Collection 41 40 Assembly) National Table Government opting former members co of tendency the observe can we Ouattara, A. under Governments three within changes. internal experiencing be might party PDCI pre the from starting Assemblies members Assembly National of circulation high very is change real the However majority. a has RDR when elites. ruling and political within changes Gbagbo of removal L. and Forces I victory. their claimed commission. electoral Ouattara A. Gbagbo L. by constituencies court Constitutional to given of was announcement results The time. on results election deliver to failed has commission run Presidential Party
Table 11 in appendices. in 11 Table 7. no. Informant 9
Persistence incumbents of 201within e ok t h cmoiin f ainl Assembly National of composition the at look we The entrance of A. Ouattara Ouattara A. of entrance The RDR PDCI ESPERANCE candidate Independent DIALOGUE
backed by western and African community African and western by backed e Force New
- f bten . utaa n L Gab Idpnet electoral Independent Gbagbo L. and Ouattara A. between off
ee PC dlgts ee o rpoue fo National from reproduced not were delegates PDCI even ,
t provoked provoked t (Mazgelytė 2013, 114 (Mazgelytė 2013, n eut a aum f oe emerged power of vacuum a result, In , hc rsle i ehi treig f ii pplto and population civil of targeting ethnic in resulted which s, % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
’s
request and announced him as a winner a as him announced and request Was in Assembly National Was 86.2% (75 97% (130 open armed conflict conflict armed open - 81.8% (9) 100% (8 10 pnn Ntoa Assembly National opening
1 No and limitingcirculation
0% ( –
2015 National Assembly2015 National pre the from (starting to
5 65
Firstly, FPI boycotted elections. Secondly, elections. boycotted FPI Firstly, ) ) ) ) , which annulled votes from 6 6 from votes annulled which ,
the Presidency has brought brought has Presidency the
– 115) 13.8 18.2% (2) Yes % ( 3% (4 0% (0) 0% (0) .
12
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between the National Armed National the between
was announced a winner by winner a announced was
tbe ) e a se that see can we 9) (table 41 .
,
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ah f winners of each 40 . Meanwhile significant - n opening orther n -
CEU eTD Collection 43 42 margins if case a indeed superiority a is then see we could emphasized, de them recognize career the of growth steady a without about these about perception ethno northern This emerging is loyalties administration ethnic to relation in discourse should we patterns, Total
Informant no. 5. no. Informant 9 no. 8 and no. 5, 3, no.no. Informant - lts ad epr iclto. n h ohr h other the On circulation. deeper and elitism
elite recruitment. They seem to be to seem They recruitment. elite lhuh e o o hv srn eprcl vdne bu ethno about evidence empirical strong have not do we Although
and PDCI with coalition maintains a RDR UDPCI , i.e. what could be happening is happening be could what i.e. ,
ethnic favoritism and patrimonialism could be building up. building be could patrimonialism and favoritism ethnic
positions 43
. It means that means It e ok no osdrto te at ht P i o te political the on is FPI that fact the consideration into took we
- cultural group is considered as RDR supporters RDR as considered is group cultural make make
new appointee new % (N) % (N) are are transformed
oe observations. some
being being on the one hand, there might be some tendencies of tendencies some be might there hand, one the on .
88.9% (8 taken 92.5% s is diverging from the common understandingcommon the from diverging is s
(235 eso of version bcue oiia eie ae o al to able not are elites political because , 66
selected not from elites from not selected ) ) by
Malinke aik ( Malinke 7.5% (19 11.1
. t s biu, ht t es a new a least at that obvious, is It
% ( F. H. Boingny’s cultivated cultivated Boingny’s H. F.
and 1 and, as ethnic ethnic as and, ) )
oe specifically, more Akan –
key
swap
- or reach positions reach or elites . .
Moreover, This might be might This links
Thus, what Thus, n state and Dyoula)
- cultural are Akan
the so 42 .
CEU eTD Collection for threat conceptual PDCI of transformation and challenge. ethno ( which course, functional single in of vision ethno Akan ethno to reference strong a make should we peculiarities, development i However cris legitimacy Regime elite). (ruling Government the in Assemblyprevalent more was reproduction but elite), (political National of circulation in resulted itself opening regime The positions. deliberation on based not was opening regime indeed that is reveals Coast Ivory of case the What 1990 after regime stable and legitimate consolidate to failing Malinke Malink
- - - and utrl groups cultural had groups cultural cultural groups. The period after 1990 could be considered as a break of “pact” between “pact” of break a as considered be could 1990 after period The fo discussion Our part,have answer to a question where reached We the ). the rule was alike, thus the centralization and persistence of the ruling elite ruling the of persistence and centralization the thus alike, was rule the -
party regime regime party
differentiation of of differentiation The The
f e Malink and e okd t pre at looked we aiiae te itnto bten uig ( ruling between distinction the facilitated economic crisis in 80’s was a challenge to functional differentiation of differentiation functional to challenge a was 80’s in crisis economic ad ahr t a a atmt f nubns o rsre their preserve to incumbents of attempt an was it rather and s
e a struggle a
e xisted ,
Malinke s ae o rdcly hne rcutet atrs there. patterns recruitment changed radically not have es while wih erae fo spot f diversity of support from retreated which , could have been acceptable; b) b) acceptable; been have could 1960 of period the r kingdom tradition, which means that means which tradition, kingdom It . ethno to to
nenl ieaiain f DI a a was PDCI of liberalization internal could claim power. The “pact” was broken with ideological with broken was “pact” The power. claim C n fr ucinl ifrnito o ethno of differentiation functional for and - - eie pnn ad post and opening regime cultural groups was reinforced by reinforced was groups cultural ONCLUSIONS have 67
be en - 1990 reveals that that reveals 1990
okn fr w raos a both a) reasons: two for working
Akan - – the eie pnn elite opening regime ad cnmc elites economic and ) –
why Ivory Coast waswhy Coast Ivory their conception and conception their should be provided. be should nesadn of understanding a
liberal economic liberal pc” between “pact” “pact”
n ws a was and conceptual between - cultural Akan
CEU eTD Collection concerning beliefs and values These ideology. whic values, and beliefs different completely sharing be might power, maintain to struggling are who or regimes stable ethno within rule the of emerge might legitimacy regime challenges tosubsequent and opening Regimecountries. African other in challenges not neces the of understanding hybrid of kind well. as rule the would regime waslegitimacy there. Malinke democratic different fundamentally regime) regim opened of context conceptual the with incompatible is It rule. the of understanding swapped the of transformation parties “pact” s that groups. e ubsequent r hs isgt cud lo e sd hn icsig eie legitimacy regime discussing when used be also could insights These open really a maintain to prospects the “pact” such of consequence a As , thus again there might be problems with power transfer. power with problems be might there again thus ,
equire
(in terms of (in termsof
is more favorable for for favorable more is h tasomto ddnt offer not did transformation The and
places sarily compliance in be regime. Akan .
finding a way to accommodate accommodate to way a finding What is happen What .
crises In this respect it would mean a creation of an alternative, maybe a maybe alternative, an of creation a mean would it respect this In However there there However
will be able to maintain a a maintain to able be will
Krou Thus, the further regime stability might be determined if indeed if determined be might stability regime further the Thus, old
of regime legitimacy were attempts to to attempts were legitimacy regime of from from -
cultural groups. Elites then, who are struggling to establish to struggling are who then, Elites groups. cultural involvement) “pact” between between “pact” Akan Kro ing nowcould Ivory in Coast also because of of because also is with other h are not directl not are h u ,
and a problem here, if we referred to their conceptual their to referred we if here, problem a because their traditional conception of the rule is rule the of conception traditional their because appropriate regime for Ivory Coast Ivory for regime appropriate
might again be again limited. might
Malinke Akan 68 Malinke
democratic regimes. “ pact
Krou and
and is actually more compatible with compatible more actually is and the way of ruling might be a cultural a be might ruling of way the more deeply rooted understandings rooted deeply more ” y connected to a particular political particular a to connected y
, because the root of challenges to challenges of root the because ,
ntig n return in anything Malinke and their traditional conception of conception traditional their and , probably,, ,
because The way it overcome The to claim power claim
Rather it Rather .
they
be We can argue argue can We , which would which , labeled labeled might might
by one of one by (opened have a s a - -
CEU eTD Collection unsuccessful problematic been have could openings regime cooperative and “pacts” broader considered be might alternative of acceptance peculiarity . If such peculiarity such If .
is encompassing a particular ethno particular a encompassing is 69
s tra t iett. ht s why is That identity. to threat a as - cultural group, the group, cultural
and
CEU eTD Collection Table Elite differentiation Elite Classic circulation Appendix A. Tables A. Appendix Elite unity unity Elite Concept 10
Identification consensuallyof elite united Peaceful circulation circulation Gradual Deep circulation circulation Wide channels. centers making networks viaor The access decision- key to game. political rules of valuesShared about Concept dimensions Concept
The transfer of elite positions does not involve The transferof violence. elitedoesnot positions once. at all not Members but elite of regularly, are replaced elites.within present are non-elite background New elite membersselected from not are elite. Members with accross membershipElite variouselite occur sectors. changes elites. national with communication Key decision-makingcenters maintain country. their regime ideal transfer; the power towards for rules political of elites; rulesaccession political current towards for current to possibilites politics various towards actors; in for participation elites towards same havethe value orientation National sector. other within elite position simultaneusly hold not sectordo - elite members other each overlap with fromone sectors not do DifferentElites elite fromdistinct identified. be sectors could Appendices Description dimension of
70
(by elite sector).(by members transferof the positions elite of during new or old acts violenttowards of Incidence elitereplacement sector).(by new of elite members the The after proportion elite sector). (by elite background new of elite members non- The with proportion elite sectors.important new of elite members most the The in proportion elites. national meeting common of spaces,Incidence events for elitevision sector). (by future sameforthe country support of incidence The electoral constitution. a) towards: law; b) elite sector)(by support of The proportion elite sector).(by elite of positions coincidence of The proportion Indicators
CEU eTD Collection Total Cabinet pre the from Table
11
Persistence of AssemblyNational incumbent Government within (starting members cabinets 22 2012 M 2012 2011 2010 2010 05 2010 M 2007 16 2006 28 2005 2003 2001 2000 2000 2000 1999 A 1998 15 1993 30 1990
- opening Nationalopening Assembly)
November June M February December September December January January October M January August December November ugust 11 ugust arch 13 arch 04 arch 04 arch 18 ay
1
10
25 24 27 4
23
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
Was in Assembly National Was 84.4% (27) 84.6% (33) 92.6% (25) 82.6% (19) 76.2% (16) 87.1% (27) 92.9% (26) 96.6% (28) 86.1% (31) 96.4% (27) 100% (13) 100% (31) 100% (31) 100% (30) 100% (19) 100% (37) 100% (28) 88% (22) No 92.6% (473) 71
15.6% (5) 15.4% (6) 17.4% (4) (5) 23.8% 12.9% (4) 7.4% (38) 13.9% (5) Yes 7.4% (2) 7.1% (2) 3.4% (1) 3.6% (1) 12% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)
CEU eTD Collection Total Cabinet pre Table
- opening Government)opening
12
Persistence of Government incumbent members Government cabinets thewithin (starting from 22 November 2012 13 March 2012 1 June 2011 04 March 2010 23 February 2010 05 December 2010 04 March 2007 16 September 2006 28 December 2005 25 January 2003 24 January 2001 27 October 2000 18 May 2000 4 January 2000 10 August 1999 11 August 1998 15 December 1993 30 November 1990
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
66.7% (26) 73.9% (17) 95.2% (20) 51.6% (16) 60.7% (17) 78.9% (15) 53.1%(17) 38.5% (5) 20.6% (7) 12.9% (4) 22.2% (6) 17.2% (5) 21.4% (6) 10.7% (3) 52% (13) 50% (18) 6.7% (2) 5.4% (2) Was in Was No 38.9% (199) 72
Government
61.1% (312) 79.4% (27) 87.1% (27) 46.9% (15) 33.3% (13) 93.3% (28) 48.4% (15) 39.3% (11) 82.8% (24) 94.6% (35) 78.6% (22) 89.3% (25) 61.5% (8) 77.8% (2) 26.1% (6) 21.1% (4) 48% (12) 50% (18) Yes 4.8% (1)
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