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LaGuardia Community College Philosophy Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2012 The Philosophy Program and Philosophy Club of LaGuardia Community College and The Student Advisory Council of LaGuardia Community College proudly presents the third annual issue of: THE GADFLY Dying for the truth since 399 BC Editors in Chief Joheiry Pereya and Jonathan Lucas-Sacta Managing Editor E.J. Lee A Note from the Editors It has been a remarkable two years since the first issue of The Gadfly was published. In that time, the seed of LaGuardia Philosophy has flourished into the sensational curriculum of awe and wisdom it is today. We have expanded and developed to open the doors that allow more inquisitive minds to discover the wonders embedded in the world of Philosophy. If you do not believe us, look around our campus and listen to your peers. LaGuardia Philosophy is on the map and it is here to stay. It is already in route to becoming one of the largest philosophy programs in CUNY. Due to the wild success of the of the previous CUNY Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, LaGuardia Philosophy sponsored a Second Annual CUNY Undergraduate Philosophy Conference on April 20, 2012 at LaGuardia Community College. This issue of The Gadfly is uniquely notable as it showcases the work of four students and commentators who presented at the conference and one of a LaGuardia student who captured the attention of our staff. Therefore, it is a pleasure to present to you the papers of five outstanding undergraduates representing Brooklyn College, City College, Hunter College, and LaGuardia Community College We hope you enjoy the third issue of The Gadfly LaGuardia Community College’s Philosophy Journal. 1 LaGuardia Community College Philosophy Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2012 Special Thanks to: LaGuardia Philosophy Program Faculty, for all your hard work and dedication, but more importantly, your nonstop support and guidance. The Student Advisory Council of LaGuardia Community College, for funding the printing of this journal. The LaGuardia Philosophy Program and Philosophy Club for sponsoring this journal. all the students who submitted their original work. Karl Azizi at Neko Print and Document Imaging, for your high quality service and the printing of the journal. Joheiry Pereya for the design of the front cover. Mirian Tellez for your unique insights, marvelous ingenuity and unrivaled favor. LaGuardia Community College Philosophy THE GADFLY Spring 2012 [email protected] 2 LaGuardia Community College Philosophy Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Special Thanks 2 Table of Contents 3 _____________________________________________________ The Buddhism Objection to Pascal’s Wager 5 Joshua Liveris – City College Commentary on The Buddhism Objection to Pascal’s Wager 9 David Seiple – LaGuardia Community College _____________________________________________________ Spectrum Inversion and The Nature of Color 12 Said Achmiz – Brooklyn College Commentary on Spectrum Inversion and The Nature of Color 23 Roberto Ruiz – LaGuardia Community College _____________________________________________________ The Problem of Not Perceiving Art 42 Nickolas Calabrese – Hunter College Commentary on The Problem of Not Perceiving Art 54 Mateo Duque – CUNY Graduate Center _____________________________________________________ Life, Liberty, and Property: 56 The Right Wing Neglect of Happiness Reuben Fuller-Bennett – Brooklyn College Commentary on Life, Liberty, and Property: 65 The Right Wing Neglect of Happiness Anna Gotlib – Brooklyn College _____________________________________________________ Law of the Flies: 66 Restrictive Measures on Cyber Bullying Adrienn Miklos – LaGuardia Community College 3 LaGuardia Community College Philosophy Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2012 Read Issue I & II of The Gadfly here: http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/philosophy/gadfly/ If you would like to submit a paper for publication in the next issue of The Gadfly, send it to: [email protected] with your name and “Gadfly submission” in the subject line. Please include your name and school in the body of the email. Philosophy at LaGuardia Community College [email protected] Become a fan on Facebook and Google Groups! Find us on the web at: http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/philosophy Philosophy Program – Humanities Department LaGuardia Community College 3110 Thomson Ave E202 Long Island City, NY 11101 4 LaGuardia Community College Philosophy Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2012 The Buddhism Objection to Pascal’s Wager By Joshua Liveris City College, CUNY Blaise Pascal presents an argument for believing in God that is commonly referred to as Pascal’s Wager. Pascal assumes that human reason is incapable of deciding whether or not God exists, therefore one must wager on whether or not believing in God will maximize one’s happiness given that God exists or God does not exist. Pascal argues that believing in God is the reasonable belief to have rather than not, and his conclusion can be shown by constructing a decision table: (Table 1) God exists God does not exist Believe in God Heaven (+ ) Status quo (f 1) Don’t believe in God Hell (-) Status quo (f 2) As Table 1 shows, believing in God has a far greater potential pay off when you die if God really does exist. But, if God does not exist and you believe in his existence, then you simply break even and you neither gain nor lose anything. However, if God exists and you do not believe in him, the potential consequences are far greater than if you believe in God and he really does not exist. Therefore, by believing in God you have everything to gain and nothing to lose, whereas if you don’t believe in God you have nothing to gain and potentially everything to lose. Pascal argues that the belief in God is a dominating option and will maximize your expected utility. De cision theory tells us to always choose dominating options; therefore, Pascal’s conclusion seems correct (Weatherson). However, although it appears that wagering for the existence of God seems like the proper decision to make, I shall argue that Pascal’s W ager is not a good argument by presenting the Buddhism objection to Pascal’s wager. I shall now argue that Pascal’s Wager is undermined by what I have termed the Buddhism objection to Pascal’s Wager. Pascal argues that if God exists and you believe in him then you will gain eternal bliss in heaven (+ ), but if God exists and you do not believe in him then you will gain eternal misery in hell (-). Now, let’s suppose the opposite: if God doesn’t exist and you don’t believe in him you gain eternal bliss ( +), and if God doesn’t exist and you believe in him you gain eternal misery (-). Such an argument would serve to undermine Pascal’s Wager and the Buddhism objection provides such an argument. While there are many versions of Buddhism, I shall stick to Buddhism as defined in Saka’s paper Pascal’s Wager and the Many God’s Objection. Saka states, “Buddhism teaches that existence is suffering and that suffering, because of reincarnation, is eternal unless the soul attains the beatific release of nirvana . nirvana is attained by emptying the mind of all desires and attachments (including love for God) and all thoughts (including belief in God)” (Saka 331). Therefore, according to Buddhism, Buddhist practice rather than a belief in God is what will end suf fering in one’s life, leading to the attainment of eternal happiness. If one chooses to believe in God and not believe in Buddhism, then the result is reincarnation and eternal suffering. A decision table comparing Buddhism and Pascalian theism would look something like this: 5 LaGuardia Community College Philosophy Presents The Gadfly – Spring 2012 (Table 2) God exists Nirvana exists (Nirvana doesn’t exist) (God doesn’t exist) Believe in God Heaven (+ ) Reincarnation (-) (You worship God) Believe in Buddhism Hell (-) Nirvana (+ ) (You empty your mind) *A similar table appears in Saka’s paper, Pascal’s Wager and the Many God’s Objection , this is a modified version (331). According to this table, believing in God does not maximize your expected utility any more than believing in Buddhism, therefore neither option is a dominating option. So, because both options have equally good maximum expected utilities, and “since there is no reason to exclude this possibility [that Buddhism is correct], there is no decision-theoretic reason to believe in God” (Saka 331). Furthermore, Buddhism is endorsed by tradition and is a genuine religion supported by millions of people; therefore, Buddhism “should be considered a genuine option” (Saka 331). Therefore, Pascal’s conclusion is undermined by the Buddhism objection to Pascal’s wager. Pascal might respond to the Buddhism objection by stating that nirvana in Buddhism is not as great as eternity in Heaven. Therefore, because reason cannot be used to decide whether or not Heaven exists or nirvana exists, we must try to maximize our expected utility and choose the option with the greatest potential payoff, which is Heaven. Pascal might reach this conclusion by stating that the bliss of nirvana is something that can only be experienced in a finite human body, whereas Heaven is infinite bliss for the eternal soul. However, the Buddhist response would be that the utility of the Buddhist nirvana can be compared to the utility of the Christian Heaven by taking into account parinirvana in Buddhism. Parinirvana is the realm of eternal and pure bliss where those who have attained nirvana go after death. Therefore, when parinirvana is taken into account Buddhist nirvana seems much more desirable than the Christian Heaven. Not only does Buddhism promise eternal bliss in this life, it also promises eternal bliss in the afterlife. As a result, if one truly wanted to maximize their expected utility they would choose to believe in Buddhism rather than believe in God. Another response that Pascal might have to the Buddhism objection is by saying that when making our wager of whether or not to believe in God we must also take into account the consequences of being wrong and try to minimize our expected loss if we are wrong.
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