The Dutch Renewable Electricity Market in 2003
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Trends in Electricity Prices During the Transition Away from Coal by William B
May 2021 | Vol. 10 / No. 10 PRICES AND SPENDING Trends in electricity prices during the transition away from coal By William B. McClain The electric power sector of the United States has undergone several major shifts since the deregulation of wholesale electricity markets began in the 1990s. One interesting shift is the transition away from coal-powered plants toward a greater mix of natural gas and renewable sources. This transition has been spurred by three major factors: rising costs of prepared coal for use in power generation, a significant expansion of economical domestic natural gas production coupled with a corresponding decline in prices, and rapid advances in technology for renewable power generation.1 The transition from coal, which included the early retirement of coal plants, has affected major price-determining factors within the electric power sector such as operation and maintenance costs, 1 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS capital investment, and fuel costs. Through these effects, the decline of coal as the primary fuel source in American electricity production has affected both wholesale and retail electricity prices. Identifying specific price effects from the transition away from coal is challenging; however the producer price indexes (PPIs) for electric power can be used to compare general trends in price development across generator types and regions, and can be used to learn valuable insights into the early effects of fuel switching in the electric power sector from coal to natural gas and renewable sources. The PPI program measures the average change in prices for industries based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). -
United States Code: the Tariff Commission, 19 USC §§ 91-107
TITLE 19.-CUSTOM, 1 DUTIES § 123a station to another for duty may be allowed, within tihe discre- 96. Invcstigatios as to customs.-- Supersedecd.l tion and under written orders of the Secretary of the Treasury, This section mast5uperseded by I 1332 (a) of this title. the expenses incurred for packing, crating, freight, and dray- 97. Information to President and Congress.--[ SUplerseded.I age in the transfer of their household effects and other per- This section was superseded sonal property. (Mar. 4, 1923, c. 251, § 5, -12 Stat. 145; June by J 1332 (g) of this tillO. 17, 1930, c. 497, Title IV, § G-15(b), 46 Stat. 701.) 98. Investigating tnmiff relations with foreign countries.-- This section was in part repealed by 1 015 (b) of Act June 17, [Sulerseded. 1 1930, cited thereto, which read its follows: "So much of the Act This section was superseded by 1 1132 (b) of lihs titl. entitied 'An Act to provide the necessary organization of the Customs Service for an udequate administration and enforcement 100. Documents and copies for investigations; teltimony; of the Tariff Act of 1922 and all other customs revenue laws,' ip. compelling production of books or papers; freedom of wit- proved M[arch 4, 1923, as anitided, as limits the amount of house. nesses from prosecution.-[SUlitrsededI. hold effects and other personal property of customs officers nl employees for which expenses may be allowed upon transfer from This section wits suprsedeld hy 111313(a) itn (e) of this tlil, one oflehil station to another, is hereby retlied." and the auendatory set of Selpt. -
Jesus on Tithing 17
www.Tithing.com 1 CHAPTER INDEX PREFACE 3 INTRODUCTION 5 FIRST FRUITS 8 ABRAHAM & JACOB 11 JESUS ON TITHING 17 ETERNAL PRINCIPLE 21 THE MINIMUM STANDARD 29 THE LOCAL STOREHOUSE 33 THE BURDEN OF TITHING 38 GREATER GIVING 43 CLOSING THOUGHTS 51 www.Tithing.com 2 PREFACE The preface may be the most important portion to read in this whole book. This will define some terms and clear up some preconceived notions before we proceed to more controversial issues. If you do not believe the tithe is commanded, and are giving through freewill, Spirit-led giving, this resource is written in support of your view of giving; but if you read this only gaining support for the tithing debate, then you will have missed greater intentions that the Spirit of God has. If you support tithing (a minimum requirement of 10%), this resource is not written in total support of your view, but if you feel that this resource will make attempts to excuse selfishness, greed, and disobedience, then you will have missed the greater intentions of giving written here. The challenge for all is to gain knowledge and experience of the greater call and higher guilt led by the Holy Spirit. Whether you give beyond the tithe with limitless offerings, or you give freely, you already exercise the tool used to define "Spirit-led giving". This book will challenge you to give sacrificially. First, let’s explain and compare two types of givers. 1. Cheerful tither - They follow the examples in scripture about tithing, while cheerfully and willingly committing themselves to give a 10% minimum. -
Best Electricity Market Design Practices
In My View Best Electricity Market Design Practices William W. Hogan (forthcoming in IEEE Power & Energy) Organized wholesale electricity markets in the United States follow the principles of bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with locational marginal prices. The basic elements build on analyses done when large thermal generators dominated the structure of the electricity market in most countries. Notable exceptions were countries like Brazil that utilized large-scale pondage hydro systems. For such systems, the critical problem centered on managing a multi- year inventory of stored water. But for most developed electricity systems, the dominance of thermal generation implied that the major interactions in unit commitment decisions would be measured in hours to days, and the interactions in operating decisions would occur over minutes to hours. As a result, single period economic dispatch became the dominant model for analyzing the underlying basic principles. The structure of this analysis Figure 1: Spot Market integrated the terminology of economics and engineering. As shown in SHORT-RUN ELECTRICITY MARKET Figure 1: Spot Market, the Energy Price Short-Run (¢/kWh) Marginal increasing short-run Cost Price at marginal cost of generation 7-7:30 p.m. defined the dispatch stack or supply curve. Thermal Demand efficiencies and fuel cost 7-7:30 p.m. Price at were the primary sources 9-9:30 a.m. of short-run generation cost Price at Demand differences. The 2-2:30 a.m. 9-9:30 a.m. introduction of markets Demand 2-2:30 a.m. added the demand Q1 Q2 Qmax perspective, where lower MW prices induced higher loads. -
New Experimental Electricity Tariff Systems for Household End Use
Panel 2 - ID 54 - p1 Wols i n k New experimental electricity tariff systems for household end Use Ma a r ten Wol s i n k De p a r tment of Environmental Science, University of Amster da m Abstract A significant tool in Demand Side Management is the structure of tariffs. Price incentives can be directed at dif- ferent parts of the efficiency-concept: efficiency in capacity planning, efficiency in total electricity consumption, efficiency in total fossil fuel use, efficiency in total energy demand. The tariff system, which is currently used in the Netherlands, does not give proper price incentives for end-user efficiency. In particular total electricity demand is rather stimulated, which is somewhat dampened by the introduction of the eco-tax. In the Netherlands field experiments with tariff systems directed at influencing household electricity demand were carried out by five utilities. In the experiments differentiated tariff-variants were introduced, replacing the old tariff-system. The experiments included voluntary price differentiation, which introduced a free-rider prob- lem in combination with the chosen price levels. Furthermore remote-monitoring, feedback, special peak-pricing etc. were implemented in the experiments. Some interesting options, in particular those influencing total demand, were not implemented by utilities. The reasons for it should be categorized as ‘strategic’ and part of the utilities’ policy. 1. Reasons for tariff experimentation In 1989 the electricity sector in the Netherlands was reorganized. Part of it was the separation by law of produc- tion companies and distribution utilities. A series of changes in purchase-rates from producers in which flexibility and capacity-cost became more important urged utilities to pay more attention to load patterns. -
U.S. Power Sector Outlook 2021 Rapid Transition Continues to Reshape Country’S Electricity Generation
Dennis Wamsted, IEEFA Energy Analyst 1 Seth Feaster, IEEFA Data Analyst David Schlissel, IEEFA Director of Resource Planning Analysis March 2021 U.S. Power Sector Outlook 2021 Rapid Transition Continues To Reshape Country’s Electricity Generation Executive Summary The scope and speed of the transition away from fossil fuels, particularly coal, has been building for the past decade. That transition, driven by the increasing adoption of renewable energy and battery storage, is now nearing exponential growth, particularly for solar. The impact in the next two to three years is going to be transformative. In recognition of this growth, IEEFA’s 2021 outlook has been expanded to include separate sections covering wind and solar, battery storage, coal, and gas— interrelated segments of the power generation sector that are marked by vastly different trajectories: • Wind and solar technology improvements and the resulting price declines have made these two generation resources the least-cost option across much of the U.S. IEEFA expects wind and solar capacity installations to continue their rapid rise for the foreseeable future, driven not only by their cost advantage but also by their superior environmental characteristics. • Coal generation capacity has fallen 32% from its peak 10 years ago—and its share of the U.S. electricity market has fallen even faster, to less than 20% in 2020. IEEFA expects the coal industry’s decline to accelerate as the economic competition from renewables and storage intensifies; operational experience with higher levels of wind and solar grows; and public concern about climate change rises. • Gas benefitted in the 2010s from the fracking revolution and the assumption that it offered a bridge to cleaner generation. -
EC Commission V. Ireland (Case 288/83)
Re Imports of Cyprus Potatoes: E.C. Commission v. Ireland (Case 288/83) Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities ECJ (Presiding, Lord Mackenzie Stuart C.J.; Bosco, Due and Kakouris PP.C.; Pescatore, Koopmans, Everling, Bahlmann and Galmot JJ.) M. Marco Darmon Advocate General. 11 June 1985 Application under Article 169 EEC. Imports. Quantitative restrictions. Article 30 EEC prohibits, in trade between member-States, all public bans on imports and all other restrictive measures in the form of import licences or other similar procedures. [20] Constitutional law. Community law and national law. The E.C. Commission cannot, even by approving expressly or by implication a measure adopted unilaterally by a member-State and whether or not there has been prior consultation, confer on such State the right to maintain in force provisions which are objectively contrary to Community law. [22] Agriculture. Common organisation of markets. Inter-State trade. Agricultural products (in casu potatoes) in respect of which a common organisation of the market has not been established are subject to the general rules of the Common Market with regard to import, export and movement within the Community. A member-State may not, therefore, rely on the special rules of Article 39 et seq. to derogate from those rules in respect of such a product. [23] Imports. Free circulation. Articles 9, 10 and 30 EECapply without distinction to products originating in the member-States and to those coming from non-member countries and put into 'free circulation' within the Community. Once the latter have been duly imported into the Community they are definitively and wholly assimilated to products originating in member-States. -
Energy Pricing Policy in Iran Politika Određivanja Cijena
Davood Manzoor Ministry of Energy Teheran, Iran HR9600065 ENERGY PRICING POLICY IN IRAN Abstract: Low energy prices in Iran do not reflect economic costs. Further distortions exist in the tariff structures of most energy sources and in their relative prices. Price reform is a key policy element for achieving increased energy conservation and economic substitution. Subsidies should be made transparent and explained by the Government, and, when eliminated, they could be compensated by target measures or direct subsidies for low income households. Price reforms are under way, with some caution though, because of possible political and inflationary consequences. In order to better understand the need for price reforms a brief analysis of the current energy pricing policy is provided here. POLITIKA ODREĐIVANJA CIJENA ENERGENATA U IRANU Sažetak: Niske cijene energije u Iranu ne odražavaju stvarne njene troškove. Nadalje, postoje deformacije u tarifnoj strukturi za većinu energetskih izvora, kao i u njihovim relativnim cijenama. Reforma cijena je ključni element politike usmjeren na postizanje boljeg čuvanja energije i gospodarske zamjene. Vlada treba u potpunosti predstaviti i objasniti subvencije, a nakon što ih ukine treba ih nadomjestiti ciljanim mjerama ili izravnim subvencijama za kućanstva s niskim prihodima. Reforme cijena su u tijeku, premda uz veliki oprez zbog mogućih političkih i posljedica inflacije. Da bi se bolje razumjela potreba za reformom cijena, ovdje se daje kratka analiza sadašnje politike njihovog određivanja. 1. The price Fixing Procedures in Iran Proposals for tariff increases are submitted to the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) by the Ministry of Energy (MOE) for electricity and by the Ministry of Petroleum for oil products and natural gas. -
Challenges Facing Combined Heat and Power Today: a State-By-State Assessment
Challenges Facing Combined Heat and Power Today: A State-by-State Assessment Anna Chittum and Nate Kaufman September 2011 Report Number IE111 © American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 529 14th Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20045 (202) 507-4000 phone, (202) 429-2248 fax, www.aceee.org Challenges Facing Combined Heat and Power Today, © ACEEE CONTENTS Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................................... v Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................ vi Introduction.................................................................................................................................................... 1 Combined Heat and Power Today ........................................................................................................... 1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................................. 5 Part I: General Findings ................................................................................................................................ 6 Economics ............................................................................................................................................... -
Benefits of Demand Response in Electricity Markets and Recommendations for Achieving Them
BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1252 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 Price of Demand Electricity Supply Supply DemandDR P PDR QDR Q Quantity of Electricity February 2006 . U.S. Department of Energy ii U.S. Department of Energy Benefits of Demand Response and Recommendations The Secretary [of Energy] shall be responsible for… not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, providing Congress with a report that identifies and quantifies the national benefits of demand response and makes a recommendation on achieving specific levels of such benefits by January 1, 2007. --Sec. 1252(d), the Energy Policy Act of 2005, August 8, 2005 U.S. Department of Energy Benefits of Demand Response and Recommendations iii iv U.S. Department of Energy Benefits of Demand Response and Recommendations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sections 1252(e) and (f) of the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT)1 state that it is the policy of the United States to encourage “time-based pricing and other forms of demand response” and encourage States to coordinate, on a regional basis, State energy policies to provide reliable and affordable demand response services to the public. The law also requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a report to Congress, not later than 180 days after its enactment, which “identifies and quantifies the national benefits of demand response and makes a recommendation on achieving specific levels of such benefits by January 1, 2007” (EPACT, Sec. -
Modernizing the U.S. Electrical Grid
Transmission Innovation Symposium Modernizing the U.S. Electrical Grid Chen-Ching Liu Electricity Transmission Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State System Research University and Development: Emma M. Stewart Distribution Integrated Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory with Transmission Operations Prepared for the Transmission Reliability and Renewable Integration Program Advanced Grid R&D, Office of Electricity US Department of Energy April 2021 Electricity Transmission System Research and Development: Distribution Integrated with Transmission Operations Transmission Innovation Symposium: Modernizing the U.S. Electric Grid 2021 White Papers Prepared for the Office of Electricity U.S. Department of Energy Principal Authors Chen-Ching Liu Power and Energy Center Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Emma M. Stewart Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory April 2021 The work described in this study has been authored by authors at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, under a subcontract from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract No. DE-AC52-07NA27344 with the U.S. Department of Energy. Disclaimer This work was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party’s use or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. -
The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy∗
The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy∗ Joseph S. Shapiro UC Berkeley and NBER [email protected] May 2019 Abstract This paper documents a new fact, then analyzes its causes and consequences: in most countries, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers are substantially lower on dirty than on clean industries, where an industry's \dirtiness" is defined as its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per dollar of output. This difference in trade policy creates a global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions in internationally traded goods and so contributes to climate change. This global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions totals several hundred billion dollars annually. The greater protection of downstream industries, which are relatively clean, substantially accounts for this pattern. The downstream pattern can be explained by theories where industries lobby for low tariffs on their inputs but final consumers are poorly organized. A quantitative general equilibrium model suggests that if countries applied similar trade policies to clean and dirty goods, global CO2 emissions would decrease by several percent annually, and global real income would not change. JEL: Q50, Q56, F6, F13, F18, H23 ∗I thank Costas Arkolakis, Tim Armstrong, Kyle Bagwell, Brian Copeland, Arnaud Costinot, Thibault Fally, Penny Goldberg, Edgar Hertwich, Sam Kortum, Arik Levinson, Giovanni Maggi, Guillermo Noguera, Bill Nordhaus, Michael Peters, Steve Puller, Andr´esRodr´ıguez-Clare,Nick Ryan, Bob Staiger, Reed Walker, Marty Weitzman, and seminar participants at AEA, Columbia, Dartmouth, the Environmental Defense Fund, Georgetown, Harvard Kennedy School, IDB, NTA, Stanford, UBC, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Barbara, U Mass Amherst, and Yale for useful discussions, Matt Fiedler and Ralph Ossa for sharing code, Elyse Adamic, Kenneth Lai, Eva Lyubich, Daisy Chen Sun, and Katherine Wagner for excellent research assistance, and the Alfred P.