Psychophysical Parallelism *
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Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry Jaap van Brakel Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso- phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur- rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri- bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics. Keywords : philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, making stuff, variety of substances . 1. Introduction Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with respect to three broad issues: • A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). • A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical reaction or phase transition (Section 6). • The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as yet , are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci- ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im- portant in revising the philosophy of science. -
Mind Body Problem and Brandom's Analytic Pragmatism
The Mind-Body Problem and Brandom’s Analytic Pragmatism François-Igor Pris [email protected] Erfurt University (Nordhäuserstraße 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany) Abstract. I propose to solve the hard problem in the philosophy of mind by means of Brandom‟s notion of the pragmatically mediated semantic relation. The explanatory gap between a phenomenal concept and the corresponding theoretical concept is a gap in the pragmatically mediated semantic relation between them. It is closed if we do not neglect the pragmatics. 1 Introduction In the second section, I will formulate the hard problem. In the third section, I will describe a pragmatic approach to the problem and propose to replace the classical non-normative physicalism/naturalism with a normative physicalism/naturalism of Wittgensteinian language games. In subsection 3.1, I will give a definition of a normative naturalism. In subsection 3.2, I will make some suggestions concerning an analytic interpretation of the second philosophy of Wittgenstein. In the fourth section, I will propose a solution to the hard problem within Brandom‟s analytic pragmatism by using the notion of the pragmatically mediated semantic relation. In the fifth section, I will make some suggestions about possible combinatorics related to pragmatically mediated semantic relations. In the sixth section, I will consider pragmatic and discursive versions of the mind-body identity M=B. In the last section, I will conclude that the explanatory gap is a gap in a pragmatically mediated semantic relation between B and M. It is closed if we do not neglect pragmatics. 2 The Hard Problem The hard problem in the philosophy of mind can be formulated as follows. -
Wilhelm Wundt & Herman Ebbinghaus Wilhelm Wundt & Herman
1 2 Wilhelm Wundt & Herman Ebbinghaus Wilhelm Wundt & Herman Ebbinghaus 1. Wundt 2. Ebbinghaus A. Biographical details A. Biographical details B. Career history B. Career history C. Psychological theories C. Psychological theories D. Impact on Psychology D. Impact on Psychology Setting the Scene… 3 4 (After Darwin, Descartes (d. 1650) – psychologists William James (1890) – we consist of a preferred the study we are not automata; material body & of learning to that of consciousness selects immaterial soul consciousness) (Newton) Copernicus (1543): J.-O. la Mettrie (1748) Charles Darwin (1859) Wilhelm Wundt Sigmund Freud heliocentric theory of the L’Homme Machine – (On the Origin of Species) (1879) established (1899) – unconscious universe – Earth, and humans are just more – evolution by common first lab for study of more important than human race, are not the complex animals descent of all creatures human psychology consciousness centre of the universe Opposing views… 5 6 Humans are special. We’re not just smarter monkeys. Reflective self- consciousness (subjective experience) is unique to humans. It is too Wilhelm Wundt remarkable to have evolved for no reason. It permits selection. It creates (1832-1920) our experience of the world. It makes us care whether we live or die. William James Wilhelm Wundt Humans are not special – we are not the center of the universe. We’re just more complex animals on a little planet in an uncaring universe. Consciousness is not special (in any useful way) – it doesn’t produce our behavior; our behavior issues from unconscious processes shared with animals and generated by brains. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon. -
Is Human Information Processing Conscious?
CommentaryfVelmans: Consciousness The resistance against a natural-science approach to conscious consciousness is required for it. He considers semantic analysis experience reminds one also of the great debate a century ago of novel word combinations, on-line analysis of speech, learn- between Darwinians and creationists. Darwin's opponents ing, memory, identification, planning and control of complex clearly believed they were attacking not a mere scientific hy- novel action, and others, arguing in each case that these things pothesis, but a conception of human nature that would tear away can be done without consciousnessp. (This survey is the bulk of the last remaining shreds of human dignity. The contemporary his paper.) He concludes that there is no type of information resistance by Velmans and others to a straightforward natural- processing for which consciousnessp is required, and therefore science approach to conscious experience may be driven by a that consciousness plays no causal role in and does not "enter similar anxiety. But Darwin did not deprive us of human into" information processing, and is in that sense dignity; treating conscious experience as a normal topic of epiphenomenal.1 psychology and neuroscience will not do so either. The fallacy of this argument is equally simple. Even if Indeed, one can make the opposite argument: that denial of Velmans is right that consciousnessp is not required for any first-person conscious experience in other people may lead to a particular sort of information processing, it does not follow that profound kind of dehumanization. It comes down to saying that consciousness does not causally enter into information process- other people are not capable of joy or suffering, that as far as the ing. -
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020 Santayana’S Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered 2
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy XII-2 | 2020 Democracy as a Form of Life Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered Robin Weiss Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2138 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.2138 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Robin Weiss, « Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XII-2 | 2020, Online since 14 December 2020, connection on 15 December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2138 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ ejpap.2138 This text was automatically generated on 15 December 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered 1 Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered Robin Weiss 1 Recently, it has become increasingly common to question the extent to which Santayana’s philosophy of mind can and should be identified as a kind of epiphenomenalism, as has traditionally been the case. Most scholars take Santayana’s epiphenomenalism for granted, and either assert or deny that he gives an argument to support it.1 However, others have questioned whether the evident similarities between Santayana’s own views and those of modern-day epiphenomenalists obscure more significant differences. I will argue that, indeed, Santayana’s views are potentially inaccurately captured by the term “epiphenomenalism.” However, I shall argue that this is true for reasons other than other scholars have given for this view. 2 The issue turns on what Santayana means by a “cause” when he denies that ideas are causes of action. -
The ('('Orthodox" View of Theories: Remarks in Defense As Well As Critique
-----HERBERT FEIGL----- The ('('Orthodox" View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as well as Critique The purpose of the following remarks is to present in outline some of the more important features of scientific theories. I shall discuss the "standard" or "orthodox" view, mainly in order to set up a target for criticisms, some of which I shall briefly sketch by way of anticipation. The standard account of the structure of scientific theories was given quite explicitly by Norman R. Campbell [7], as well as independently in a little-known article by R. Carnap [12]. A large part of the voluminous literature in the philosophy of science of the logical empiricists and re lated thinkers contains, though with a great many variations, develop ments, modifications, and terminological diversities, essentially similar analyses of the logical structure and the empirical foundations of the theories of physics, biology, psychology, and some of the social sciences. Anticipating to some extent Campbell and Carnap, Moritz Schlick, in his epoch-making AIIgemeine Erkenntnisiehre [38], championed the doc trine of "implicit definition." In this he was influenced by David Hil bert's axiomatization of geometry, as well as by Henri Poincare's and Albert Einstein's conceptions of theoretical physics and the role of ge ometry in physics. These matters were then developed more fully and precisely in the work of H. Reichenbach, R. Carnap, C. G. Hempel, R. B. Braithwaite, E. Nagel, and many other logicians and methodolo gists of science. In order to understand the aim of this important approach in the philosophy of science it is essential to distinguish it from historical, so ciological, or psychological studies of scientific theories. -
Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy Ofscience Oflogical Empiricism
-----HERBERT FEIGL----- Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy ofScience ofLogical Empiricism AsouT twenty-five years ago a small group of philosophically minded scientists and scientifically trained philosophers in Vienna formulated their declaration of independence from traditional philosophy. The pamphlet Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (1929) contained the first succinct statement of the outlook which soon after became known as "logical positivism." In the first flush of enthusiasm we Viennese felt we had attained a philosophy to end all philosophies. Schlick spoke of a "Wende der Philosophie" (a decisive turning point of philosophy). Neurath and Frank declared "school philosophy" as obsolete and even suggested that our outlook drop the word "philoso phy" altogether, and replace it by "Einheitswissenschaft" or by "scien· tific empiricism." The notable impact of Alfred Ayer's first book in England, and my own efforts ~oward a propagation of Logical Positiv ism in the United States during the early thirties, and then the immi· gration of Carnap, Frank, von Mises, Reichenbach, Hempel and Berg mann created a powerful movement, but it elicited also sharp opposition nncl criticism. Through the discussions within the movement and its own production and progressive work, as well as in response to the NO'l'F.: This essay is a revised and considerably expanded .version of a lecture given in plenary session at the International Congress for Philosophy of Science, Zurich, /\ngust 25, 1954. It was first- published in Proceedi11gs of the Secono International Congress of the International Union for tl1e Philosophy ot Science (Neuchatel, Switzerland, 19 55). In the cordial letter of invitation I received from Professor Ferdinand Gonseth, president of the Congress, he asked me to discuss "I'empirisme logi<\ue,-ce qu'il fut, et ce qu'il est clevenu." Much as I appreciated the honor of t 1is ambitious assignment, I realized of course that the limitations of time would permit me to deal onJy with some selected topics within this larger frame. -
Trends in Philosophy of Mind and in Philosophy of Neuroscience
Trends in Philosophy of Mind and in Philosophy of Neuroscience Juan José Sanguineti School of Philosophy, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, Italy Published with permission of Springer Science + Business Media, 2015 In P. A. Gargiulo, H. L. Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update. Bridging the Divide, Springer, Heidelberg 2015, pp. 23-37. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-17103-6 Abstract. This paper presents current trends in philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience, with a special focus on neuroscientists dealing with some topics usually discussed by philosophers of mind. The aim is to detect the philosophical views of those scientists, such as Eccles, Gazzaniga, Damasio, Changeux, and others, which are not easy to classify according to the standard divisions of dualism, functionalism, emergentism, and others. As the variety of opinions in these fields is sometimes a source of confusion, it is worth the effort to obtain an overall panorama of the topic. A general conclusion on epistemological and ontological issues, concerning the relationship between neurobiology and philosophy and the multi-level account of the embodied mind, is proposed. Key words: Dualism, monism, behaviorism, functionalism, reductionism, emergentism, enactivism, mind, mental acts, self, body, soul, person. 1. Introduction Philosophical questions concerning the nature of the mind and its relationship with the body are usually addressed by philosophy of mind. This area of philosophy inherits the traditional issue of the relationship between the soul and the body, interpreted in modern terms as the mind and the brain. Whereas the classical view of the problem was thoroughly ontological, going back to ancient philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, philosophy of mind, born in the twentieth century, is generally more epistemological, posing its object of inquiry within a scientific framework. -
The Positivist Repudiation of Wundt Kurt Danziger
Jouml of the History ofthe Behuvioral Sciences 15 (1979): 205-230. THE POSITIVIST REPUDIATION OF WUNDT KURT DANZIGER Near the turn of the century, younger psychologists like KUlpe, Titchener, and Eb- binghaus began to base their definition of psychology on the positivist philosophy of science represented by Mach and Avenarius, a development that was strongly op- posed by Wundt. Psychology was redefined as a natural science concerned with phenomena in their dependence on a physical organism. Wundt’s central concepts of voluntarism, value, and psychic causality were rejected as metaphysical, For psy- chological theory this resulted in a turn away from Wundt’s emphasis on the dynamic and central nature of psychological processes toward sensationalism and processes anchored in the observable peripher of the organism. Behaviorism represents a logical development of this point orview. I. PSYCHOLOGYAS SCIENCE What makes the early years in the history of experimental psychology of more than antiquarian interest are the fundamental disagreements that quickly separated its prac- titioners. These disagreements frequently concerned issues that are not entirely dead even today because they involve basic commitments about the nature of the discipline which had to be repeated by successive generations, either explicitly, or, with increasing fre- quency, implicitly. In the long run it is those historical divisions which involve fundamental questions about the nature of psychology as a scientific discipline that are most likely to prove il- luminating. Such questions acquired great urgency during the last decade of the nineteenth and the first few years of the present century, for it was during this period that psychologists began to claim the status of a separate scientific discipline for their subject. -
Richard Swinburne's Arguments for Substance Dualism
Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. MA by Research in Theology and Religion David Horner September 2018 Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. Submitted by David Horner to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of MA by Research in Theology and Religion in September 2018 This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 1 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Jonathan Hill and Dr Joel Krueger for their support and encouragement in the writing of this dissertation and for their patience in trying to keep me on the straight and narrow. I want to acknowledge the many conversations, on this and other topics, I have had with my friend and philosopher, Dr Chris Boyne, who sadly died in June of this year. I thank all my other chums at The Bull, Ditchling, for listening to my metaphysical ramblings. And finally, I thank my wife, Linda, for once more putting up with this kind of thing. 2 Abstract This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013). -
Cultivating an “Ideal Body” in Taijiquan and Neigong
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health Article “Hang the Flesh off the Bones”: Cultivating an “Ideal Body” in Taijiquan and Neigong Xiujie Ma 1,2 and George Jennings 3,* 1 Chinese Guoshu Academy, Chengdu Sport University, Chengdu 610041, China; [email protected] 2 School of Wushu, Chengdu Sport University, Chengdu 610041, China 3 Cardiff School of Sport and Health Sciences, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Cardiff CF23 6XD, Wales, UK * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +44-(0)2-920-416-155 Abstract: In a globalized, media-driven society, people are being exposed to different cultural and philosophical ideas. In Europe, the School of Internal Arts (pseudonym) follows key principles of the ancient Chinese text The Yijinjing (The Muscle-Tendon Change Classic) “Skeleton up, flesh down”, in its online and offline pedagogy. This article draws on an ongoing ethnographic, netnographic and cross-cultural investigation of the transmission of knowledge in this atypical association that combines Taijiquan with a range of practices such as Qigong, body loosening exercises and meditation. Exploring the ideal body cultivated by the students, we describe and illustrate key (and often overlooked) body areas—namely the spine, scapula, Kua and feet, which are continually worked on in the School of Internal Arts’ exercise-based pedagogy. We argue that Neigong and Taijiquan, rather than being forms of physical education, are vehicles for adult physical re-education. This re-education offers space in which mind-body tension built over the life course are systematically Citation: Ma, X.; Jennings, G. “Hang released through specific forms of attentive, meditative exercise to lay the foundations for a strong, the Flesh off the Bones”: Cultivating powerful body for martial artistry and health. -
Alberto J. L. Carrillo Canán Mcluhan, Flusser and the Mediatic Approach to Mind
FLUSSER STUDIES 06 1 Alberto J. L. Carrillo Canán McLuhan, Flusser and the Mediatic Approach to Mind All the alphabets in use in the Western world, from that of Russia to that of the Basques, from that of Portugal to that of Peru, are derivatives of the Graeco-Roman letters. Their unique separation of sight and sound from semantic and verbal content made them a most radical technology for the translation and homogeneization of cultures. All other forms of writing had served merely one culture, and had served to separate that culture from others. Marshall McLuhan Nowadays there are at least three main theoretical paradigms about mind. One is traditional philosophy about the mind-body problem, which is increasingly influenced by cognitive science. This paradigm presupposes the mind as trans-historical entity. Another paradigm lies implicit in semiotics and narratology: mind becomes dissolved in symbolic systems; accordingly, mind is not trans-historical, but it neither changes historically, it changes as symbolic systems do – and they do not change following some historical thread but in a merely contingent way. For the semiotic paradigm, thus, mind is as contingent as are the different semiotic systems. Finally, mediatic theory is rapidly becoming a new paradigm for the humanities in general, as semiotics was before it. Mediatic theory historicizes mind to the extent in which it is possible to reach an historical explanation of technological change and development, for this change is somehow mirrored by the structure of mind. Furthermore, technology is not clearly linked to any ethnical ground, on the contrary, it possesses structures that permeate any ethnical community, thus, mind structures related to technology structures can be both historical and more or less universal.