Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2021; 2(1): 21–45 Brigitte Falkenburg* Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2020-0038 Published online April 26, 2021 Abstract: The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increas- ingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed. Keywords: cosmological antinomy, experiment, metaphysics, Edgar wind, embodiment 1 Introduction Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (Wind 1934, 2001) is a neglected work in the philosophy of science. When it was published, Wind, like Cassirer and many other scholars, had already left Germany. In the preface, that was written in great bitterness shortly before emigration, Wind sharply differentiates “elucidatory This article is based on Falkenburg (2001), which was translated, abridged, and substantially revised for the present volume. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on a previous version of this paper that helped to improve it. *Corresponding author: Brigitte Falkenburg, Department of Philosophy and Political Science, TU Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, Germany, E-mail: [email protected] 22 B. Falkenburg analysis” from the “declamatory broodings” of German philosophy of the time and attacks the “most prominent representatives” of Neo-Kantian “idealism” (like Heinrich Rickert and Bruno Bauch) who did not oppose to the Ungeist which made the rise of the National Socialist regime possible (2001, 2). Experiment and Metaphysics shared the fate of lacking reception with several Neo-Kantian writings on the philosophy of physics from the 1930s. Cassirer’s book on quantum mechanics, written in Gothenburg (Cassirer 1936), has finally received increasing attention in the last two decades (Schmitz-Rigal 2002). Grete Hermann’s work, which contains an early refutation of von Neumann’s proof against hidden parameters of quantum mechanics (Hermann 1935), has only recently been re- edited and received (see Crull and Bacciagaluppi 2016; Hermann 1996; Herrmann 2019). The philosophy of science in American emigration, represented primarily by Carnap and Reichenbach, had no access to these Neo-Kantian writings until the post-war period, and the further development of the philosophy of science bypassed them. This was particularly true for Wind’s habilitation thesis, completed in 1929, which however broke with Neo-Kantianism under the influence of American pragmatism. Cassirer, Panofsky, and the other members of the habilitation com- mittee appreciated its originality and analytical rigour but were critical of the results (Buschendorf 2001, 223–229). Due to the economic crisis, the publication of the book was delayed, and when it finally appeared after Wind’s emigration, it was silenced and forgotten. After his emigration, Wind turned back to the topics of art history. Experiment and metaphysics remained his only work in the philosophy of physics, and its singular position in Wind’s œuvre certainly contributed to its being forgotten. For Wind himself, this work marked the decisive turning point in his explo- ration of art and its history. In it, he developed a concept of symbolic representa- tion,orembodiment, which aimed at establishing a bridge between the methods of natural science and history and played a key role in his later writings on art history (see below Section 4). But Experiment and Metaphysics also deserves attention independently of this methodological bridge function. The work outlines a theory of experiment that is much more precise than Cassirer’s remarks on measurement and it takes the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics as an impulse to examine Kant’s doctrine of antinomy. With this thrust, it runs counter to all approaches of philosophy of science or Kant research of the time. The book title links experiment and metaphysics, against the positivist tendency to demand that the empirical and metaphysics be strictly separated. Wind claims that the theories and experimental results of twentieth century physics provide new answers to traditional cosmological questions, which demonstrate that Kant’s doctrine of the antinomies needs to be revised. This thesis Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics 23 stands in sharp contrast to the views of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism. For Natorp non-Euclidean geometry is only a useful mathematical tool of physics that does not change the role of Euclidean geometry as an indispensable precondition of physical knowledge (1910, 312–318), quite in the sense of Kant. Cassirer was also convinced that general relativity did not deprive Euclidean geometry of its meth- odological supremacy, and he relativized it to make it compatible with special and general relativity (1921, 85 and 97). Both views stood against re-examining Kant’s doctrine of antinomy in the light of modern physics. In Kant research and philosophy of science, the relation between the theories of modern physics and Kant’s doctrine of the antinomy also remained neglected for a long time. Empiricist philosophy of science turned away from Kant’s episte- mology in view of relativity and quantum theory, and when it finally turned back to Kant and the Neo-Kantian background of logical empiricism (Friedman 1992, 1999), it did so from a historical point of view. Kant scholars analysed the structure of Kant’s doctrine of the antinomy. They criticized or defended Kant’s proofs, but paid little attention to the question of how the cosmological antinomies and their resolution relate to the theories of physics. The approach and thematic range of Wind’s work thus differs strongly from the predominant traditions in the philos- ophy of science and Kant research. Therefore, I will present this approach here in its philosophical pretensions, without going into the details of Wind’s Kant interpretation.1 I will also make no effort to compare Wind’s approach to more recent work on the relations between twentieth century physics and Kant’s antinomy doctrine. Instead, I will attempt to situate it relative to important posi- tions of twentieth century philosophy of science, which is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the work beyond Wind’s œuvre. 2 The Approach of the Book During his stay in the United States from 1924–1927, Wind became familiar with American pragmatism. Taking up above all the writing How to make our ideas clear (Peirce 1878), he asked for standards of clear philosophical argumentation. The preface of 1933 strongly opposes an intellectual climate in which philosophy, instead of complying with its critical obligations, capitulates betraying the Enlightenment ideas (Wind 2001, 1–2). Explicitly referring to Heidegger and Jas- pers, he criticizes forms of philosophy in which the art of argumentation has fallen into decline. We may compare Wind’s pleas for conceptual clarity with Carnap’s 1 The way in which Wind reads Kant’s doctrine of the antinomy seems to agree with Cohen’s interpretation in Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Cohen 1871, 527–550). 24 B. Falkenburg merciless syntactic and semantic analysis of some of Heidegger’s phrases exposing them as pseudo-propositions that feign meaning where none exists (Carnap 1931). In contrast to Carnap, Wind is not interested in establishing meaning criteria to distinguish between scientific propositions and metaphysics. But his criticism also aims at philosophical terms lacking clarity. He is above all concerned with the cosmological foundation of the idealistic conception of freedom. The request to clarify it and to find out whether it has been shaken by modern physics leads him to examine Kant’s cosmological antinomy. By the “idealistic concept of freedom” Wind means the Kantian concept, which according to him had been criticized of being “too vacuous and shallow in its impotent universality” (2001, 2). He calls for getting to its roots in theoretical philosophy and for removing its grounds by a naturalistic criticism of the cosmological concept of freedom, which is based on the refutation of Kant’s third cosmological antinomy. According to Kant, causality of freedom and causality of nature are in conflict, a conflict which he resolved in terms of his dualism of phenomena and noumena. To criticize the antinomy and Kant’s resolution, Wind attacks Kant’s tacit assumptions about the structure of nature on a large and on a small scale, which turned out to be inadequate in view of twentieth century physics. Wind is particularly interested in the claim that all processes in nature are completely determined, an assumption that is challenged by the probabilistic interpretation of quantum theory. Around 1930, Wind was not the only one who connected the possibility of human freedom with the limitations of determinism resulting from quantum theory. Jaspers (1932, 190) also discussed this connection but warned against exaggerating the analogy between the missing determination of human actions and the missing determination of subatomic processes. In view of Wind’s claim of analytical rigour, one will therefore ask for his arguments in favour of connecting the idea of human freedom and the contingency of microscopic events in quantum processes.