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Sense data
Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
Brsq #142-144
Alfred Jules Ayer 1910–1989
THE CONCEPT of the SENSE-DATUM in the PERCEPTUAL ESSAYS of GE MOORE. the Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1966 Philosophy
Reading Heidegger on Science
Reichenbach, Russell and the Metaphysics of Induction
Whitehead and Hume on Induction
Is the Sense-Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?
The Basic Elements of the Philosophy of Alfred J. Ayer
Carnap Ponders Canberra: Creating a Theory of Meaning Based on Carnap’S Criteria of Cognitive Significance and the Canberra Plan
Carnap Visits Canberra: Updating the Logical Positivist Criteria of Cognitive Significance
Sense Data: the Sensible Approach
Verificationism
An Introduction to Research 3
Gettier and the Problem of Induction by Ean Maloney
Russell on Sense Data and the Material World
KARL POPPER's DEBT to LEONARD NELSON Nikolay
The Community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and Public
Top View
Four Central Issues in Popper's Theory of Science
IMPRESSIONS of EMPIRICISM in the Same Series
Chapter 3. Science and Its Critics
Sense-Data and the Philosophy of Mind: Russell, James and Mach
John Jacob Kaag Pragmatism & the Lessons Ofexperience
Pragmatism: an Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking? Author(S): James T
Dennett's Verificationism
A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia by Nicolas Santi Gabriel Quartermaine-Bragg
Federal Philosophy of Science: a Deconstruction- and a Reconstruction Susan Haack University of Miami School of Law,
[email protected]
Karl Jaspers and Karl Popper: the Shared Legacy
Chapter 7 Logical Positivism
The Emergence of Russell's Logical Construction of Physical Objects by Sajahan M Iah
Sense-Data in Russell's Theories of Knowledge
"Empty Ideas": Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Ayer on the Argument from Illusion
Colour and the Argument from Illusion 14 Stance Volume 12 / April 2019 Directly (I.E
The Realist Challenge to Conceptual Pragmatism Introduction When