, 10 principally around constructivism (ranging from , new social movement and risk , finalization theory, autopoiesis and the and theory) and critical realism. It be argued that constructivism and critical realism share a common concern with the of a critical social science. of Chapter 7 attempts to access the contemporary situation of social science in light of the constructivist debate. It is argued that science and are the two great systems of and can be brought together around a of critical social science as discursive practice. Introduction: defining positivism

Philosophical debates on the and self- of social science have been, for the greater part, shaped by the posi- tivist dispute. Therefore a good place to begin is with positivism itself. This will inevitably involve looking at disputes on the mean- ing of science more generally, since positivism, broadly understood, is a philosophy that argues for the application of the methods of the natural to the social sciences and thereby presupposes the unity of the sciences. Underlying positivism more fundamentally is the naturalistic notion that science is the study of an objectively existing that lies outside the discourse of science. Positivism has been under attack throughout the twentieth century from a variety of different standpoints. It is customary to contrast positivism to hermeneutical or interpretative social sci- ence, or to the more Marxist-inspired, critical social science, but positivism, which makes certain assumptions about the of , has also been undermined by developments within natural science itself, which cannot be considered positivistic. Thus positivism, in both natural and social sciences, has been very much in question, particularly since the 1950s. Firstly let us be clear on exactly what positivism is. In the most general terms positivism can be defined by the following five tenets, which, for the purpose of illustration, may be somewhat stylized: 12 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 13 1 or the unity of the . For positivism, 5 Instrumental knowledge. In general the of science as a there is no essential difference between the methods of natural in modern society has favoured the pursuit of techni- science and social science. In arguing for the unity of the cally useful knowledge, although this can take a variety of scientific method, the natural sciences are generally taken to be political forms. Positivism has taken three political forms: (a) the the model for all the sciences. This entails scientism: the view classical positivistic of scientific politics, as represented that the of knowledge is defiled by naturalistic science by Henri Saint-Simon and and by scientific alone. socialists; (b) science as instrumentally useful knowledge but 2 or . Not only is there a unity of without overt political significance, as represented by reform method, but there is also a unity in the of science. movements particularly in Britain and the USA; and (c) instru- Science is the study of reality, which is external to science itself. mental, bureaucratic social science associated with the pro- This reality can be reduced to observable units or naturalistic fessionalization of social science in the twentieth century. In the phenomena. Positivistic naturalism generally entails (a) reduc- case of (c), which proclaims itself to be unpolitical, such tionism or (that everything :an be reduced to atomic as C. Wright Mills (1970) argue that the political nature units), (b) a correspondence theory of (that there is a of positivistic empirical is disguised by its claims to correspondence between the of science and the nature of scientific . reality) and (c) phenomenalism or (an objectifying attitude to nature by which nature is seen as existing outside It is important to appreciate, as this chapter will illustrate, that science and can be neutrally observed). not all of these criteria were embodied in any one positivist 3 . The foundation of scienceis . Positivistic philosophy or scientific practice. Positivism, strictly speaking, in its science is based entirely on that which is positively given to classic form, was largely a nineteenth-century French ideology of , in words only that which can be subject to the unity of scientific method, which was held to have a radical observation and verification. For positivists is made political mission. Thus 'positive science' and the 'positive polity' from observation to verification by rreans of the experimental formed a unity. This conception of positivism is best associated with method: the carries out in order to uncover Saint-Simon and Comte. A second form it took was the more objectively existing, general from which hypotheses can be formalistic social science of the Vienna , where the idea of the made that can be used to predict what can happen. In general, the positive polity was abandoned in favour of the purity of science. kinds of laws positivism seeks to uncover are causal laws and have Aside from these two classical forms positivism is often, thirdly, the power of . used to describe, in somewhat disparaging terms, modern, empiri- 4 Value . Science does not make judgements on its subject cal social science in general. matter; it is a neutral activity free of social and ethical values. In what follows I shall outline the changing forms that positivism Positivists therefore insist on a dualism of and values. took from the New of the late , through Values, it is claimed, cannot be derived from facts. For positiv- seventeenth-century and empiricism, Enlightenment istic social science there are only social facts, which can be thinking, and the emergence of modern social science in the examined. Positivism involves a commitment to the pursuit of nineteenth century to, finally, its twentieth-century proponents and scientific truth, which is arrived at independently of ethical critics. Though often criticized for being a conservative doctrine self-reflection or personal subjective elements since truth is a asserting the superiority of science over other forms of knowledge verifiable and explanatory about an objectively exist- and driven by a relentless instrumental striving to gain ing reality. Thus scientific knowledge is different from all other intellectual mastery over nature and society, positivism, along with kinds of knowledge since it can be verified and therefore empirical science, has historically, in , been related to liberal- can be said to be universally true. ism, and its changing forms have reflected the transformation of 14 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 15 from early modern anti-authoritarianism and anti- modern inductive and deductive methodology: knowledge pro- , through Enlightenment , to liberal re- gresses inductively from observation of facts to general explanatory formism and the rise of the modern state and its need for principles from which can be deduced to explain the specific instrumental knowledge. While positivism can also be seen as facts. , however, gained influence in medieval scholas- related to the rise of the modern state and science as an institution, ticism only since the thirteenth century, when the dominant concep- in general positivists and empiricists have been liberals, ranging tion of knowledge, which lasted until the advent of the Scientific from (who was a Whig of Stuart absolutism), , was a Christianized version of known through the enlightened reconstructionism of Cohdorcet (who was as , developed by St . Aristotelianism an ancien regime official), the scientific utopianism of Comte, and degenerated from a concern with the inductive-deductive approach the reformism of and to the to an emphasis on first principles. With the rejection of scholas- anti-obscurantist radicalism of the and the ticism, Aristotelianism fell into disrepute. of . Any account of positivism will have to take Positivism in the sense of modern rationalism did not emerge account of the rise, transformation and decline of liberalism. In the until the development of the"experimental method in the Renais- twentieth century the most important development in positivism sance, which witnessed the and the rise of was the decline in the of the intellectual and the rise in the rationalism. While Platonic (or theory of knowledge) culture of the professional and institutionalized systems. was metaphysical and idealistic (oriented towards the pursuit of transcendental , or 'ideals', to be uncovered by philosophi- cal knowledge), modern positivism was empirical: based on the observation of reality with the help of experimental science. Pla- The rise of modern science as a cognitive and institution tonic knowledge, in contrast, rejected knowledge derived from sense experience as being inferior to knowledge of the 'eternal Positivism is primarily a nineteenth-century post-Enlightenment forms'. Despite being post-metaphysical and anti-idealist, positiv- ideology, but its lie deep in . The pursuit of ism can be seen as a continuation of the Platonic quest for truth and scientific truth as an absolute form of knowledge can be traced back objective knowledge. to 's philosophy, which argued that the highest kind of An early exponent of positivism was the thirteenth-century pre- knowledge that can be aspired to is the pure contemplation of the decessor of the Renaissance, , who stressed the im- natural forms of the . The Platonic conception of knowledge portance of observable as the basis of knowledge, and William has had an enduring appeal throughout the of philosophy, of Ockham, who also argued that knowledge must proceed in a bequeathing a legacy of rationalistic in the quest for 'razor' like manner from an examination of empirical cases in order objective truth. This survived through antiquity and the Middle to exclude the superfluous. Thus evolved the notion of 'Ockham's Ages in Aristotelian philosophy and Christian , which Razor', which states that the simplest explanation is to be preferred. posited as the aims of human inquiry the study of the natural laws of From the Renaissance thinkers and , such as Leonardo da the and the search for first principles. Vinci to those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as Although Aristotle was responsible for the emphasis on first Giordano Bruno, , Desiderius Erasmus, Michel de principles, he had earlier established the basis of an empirical Montaigne, , , Nicolas Copernicus, inductive science in his Politics which stressed not the quest for and , the experimental method de- absolute ideals, but a classification of empirically observable veloped along with the progress of modern science. phenomena into categories, such as his famous classification of the The experimental method was epitomized in the writings of Fran- three kinds of states: monarchies, aristocracies and . In cis Bacon, who advanced an inductive methodology of observation* his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle provided the foundations of without philosophical : theory is arrived at frortt 16 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 17 presuppositionless observation and not the other way around. The basis for knowledge, beyond clerical-autocratic . Objective Renaissance artists, but most of all Leonardo da Vinci, gave and presuppositionless observation was a means of emancipation expression to the new by evolving new techniques in from the past and from and metaphysics. the representation of reality that allowed the object to appear in its The New Learning, or New Science, of the Scientific Revolution natural form. , such as Galileo, replaced the principle and the pietistic of the period was ac- of clerical with the experimental method, which was to be companied by programmes for radical social reform, of which the demarcation of science from non-science. In this way, modern More's Utopia [1516] was a famous example, and one that can be science began with a gradual attack on clerical authority, which read as one of the first works on modern social . The provision asserted that knowledge derives from the ancient authority of the of health care, universal and the abolition of poverty Church. This attack, however, it must also be pointed out, was were among the aims of new conception of a Utopian polity and more implicit than outright, for the Renaissance thinkers were not were also central to the Baconian . Francis Bacon always anti-Christian; many such as Thomas More and Erasmus himself wrote about the advancement of learning and defended the sought to reconcile their to the prevailing Catholicism, and the intellectual resistance of science against the canons of antiquity seventeenth-century pietistic proponents of rationalism, such as (such as Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas) and, like More, Francis Bacon, were also ardent Protestant reformers who argued wrote one of the early Utopias: New Atlantis [1627]. Other examples for a separation of divine laws from natural laws in order to make of early social Utopias are James Harrington's Oceana [1656] and science possible. In this way the Reformation greatly facilitated the Campanella's City of the Sun [1602]. The New Learning was not rise of modern science, since it gave theological justification to the then only about philosophical ; it was also about the freedom of science, which could also be used to provide justifi- emancipation of knowledge from the old monopolies exercised by cations for the existence of . This was the 'paradox of the corporate in the . The movement can be modernity' that Weber believed marked the entry of the modern described as an early Enlightenment, for it strove to further the age. This paradox can be explained by the fact that both the pietistic cause of universal enlightenment through knowledge emancipated Reformation and rationalistic science were expressions of the from the past. Creative or constructivist utopianism was part of the modern turn to radical subjectivity that brought about the de- early conceptions of science. This period, too, saw the emergence of centring of consciousness and established the self-confidence of the radical scientific currents (such as Paracelsian , al- individual as the bearer of knowledge. chemists, mystical-hermetic thinkers and ) from outside the By the mid-seventeenth century rationalism had finally replaced mainstream New Learning, which were later suppressed with the Aristotelian scholasticism and the Platonic legacy of metaphysics as institutionalization of science by the absolute state (van den Daele well at the unitary Christian world-view of the . 1977:32-3). Modern rationalism was born in the de-centring of consciousness It is important to see that modern science emerges at a when from the divinely ordained laws of the universe to those that the of the Middle Ages, such as the Church, the modern science is capable of uncovering. Classic statements of the universities and the established professions of , new spirit of rationalism were Copernicus's De Revolutionibus and , were collapsing but when the social and Orbium Coelestium [1543], Francis Bacon's political order of modern society had not yet consolidated. It was in [1620], Rene Descartes's Discourse on Method [1637], Newton's this period of transition and upheaval that modern science emerges Mathematical Principles of [1687]. As Stephen as part of a project of social reconstruction. Of course the Toulmin (1992) has argued, the seventeenth-century quest for distinctions between the modern disciplines had not been clarified; must be seen in the context of the Thirty Years War, which more significantly, the distinctions between the sciences were not plunged into war fought over religious doctrine and strongly pronounced. Modern natural experimental science begins political legitimacy. Rationalism was an attempt to find a certain as anti-authoritarian, progressive, anti-elitist and based on *fc 18 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 19 programme of educational and social reform. The New Learning, science underwent its own path of development as an autonomous accelerated by the Puritan reform movement (Hill 1988), implied expert system linked to the administrative state. In place of social nothing less than social reconstruction involving the universal science, , in particular in since the Restoration, availability of knowledge and its for the public good took over the role of social science. The relationship between (van den Daele 1977:36). The radicals of the English Revolution knowledge and its public utility fell apart. It was in this spirit of the wanted to end the dominance of Greek and and to drive the differentiation of the sciences that modern rationalism developed: scholastic theologians out of the universities. Such radicals as the subversive elements and the project of social reconstruction Gerrard Winstanley and the Levellers wanted to end the were abandoned and became the concern of intellectuals who were between lay and professional knowledge by enlisting science in the isolated from the culture of science and a depoliticized cultural of society. The connection between science and its humanism flourished in the universities. The incorporation of public commitment to society was firmly established in the forma- science into the state apparatus and the suppression of alternative tive period of modern science and cannot be explained by the notion forms of knowledge occurred at a time when the modern of positivism, which was a later development. We can say, then, system had not yet emerged'as an institution capable of sustaining a that modern science in its formative period involved the creation of permanent structure of social scientific knowledge. a new cognitive system (or system of knowledge), which sought to link scientific knowledge to social and political goals. Rationalism, empiricism and the Enlightenment However, this was all to change by the late seventeenth century when the Age of Absolutism reaches its zenith. In England the Beginning with the sceptical humanism of writers such as Erasmus Restoration in 1660 marked the end of radical science and the and de Montaigne, rationalism reached its apogee in the Cartesian association of science with social reconstruction. The Restoration method of Descartes, who established the foundation of a rationa- purged the reformed universities of the adherents of listic conception of science as the search for absolute truths based on the new experimental natural philosophy and re-established the first principles. The Cartesian method consists of a in the authority of the Church and state censorship. In this period the of the 'clear and distinct ' of the solitary institutionalization of science under the auspices of the absolute individual sceptically contemplating an external reality. Everything state and its mercantilist economy commences. This was marked by else is to be treated with scepticism. For Descartes the path to the foundation of the Royal Society in in 1662 by Charles II certain knowledge consists in putting everything into doubt so that and the Academic des Sciences in in 1666 by Louis XIV (van only those things that can be clearly and distinctively perceived den Daele 1977:29). In science in the ancien regime had an remain. Knowledge thus consists of the pure objects of and institutional role since the foundation of the Acadimie Francaise in presupposes psychologism or : reason is a of the 1635, but one subordinate to the court (Heilbron 1995). By the end of the of the individual and can in principle be of the century this state control was much strengthened. The practised by anyone who casts systematic doubt on the objects political incorporation of science by royal edicts into the state perceived by the mind. compromised its radical function, which henceforth became one of The Cartesian method exemplified the spirit of modern rational- social administration led by expert systems. At about this time ism but did not quite encapsulate the core tenets of positivism, alternative challenges to modern experimental science, such as which was closer to the doctrine of empiricism. It was a precursor of hermeticism, had all but disappeared and a state sponsored positivism in that it established that the demarcation between positivistic Baconism became the dominant framework for science. rational knowledge (knowledge of what is true) and false know- The consequence of these developments was that the possibility of a ledge is determined by the sceptical power of the mind. Cartesian radical social science, the first intimations of which were in the dualism also laid the basis of one of the tenets of modernity: the Utopias of More and Francis Bacon, was aborted and natural dualism of body and mind, spirit and nature, mind and matter. This 20 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 21 distinction, which parallels the bifurcation of the sciences, stipu- context of its time, for in effect it amounts to a defence of the lated an absolute demarcation between knowledge of the world of democratic nature of knowledge against clerical and state cen- nature and the subjective world of society and its psychological sorship: all human beings can have access to scientific knowledge, constructions. which cannot be reduced to the pronouncements of clerical or While Descartes had established the foundation of true know- political elites. Locke's empiricism was a liberal and anti-dogmatic ledge to be the inquiring and sceptical power of the mind, positivism conception of science: valid knowledge is that which can be put to has been mostly inductive rather than deductive. Descartes advo- the of experience. In this sense, both rationalism and empiri- cated a deductive approach from first principles, while most cism were expressions of the turn to radical subjectivity, which empiricists argue for an inductive approach: observing data and characterized the modern world-view. conducting experiments can lead us to general laws. In other words, In embracing rationalism and empiricism, the philosophers of the Descartes was able to conduct the quest for knowledge seated by sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought about a major revol- the fireside, simply by proceeding from the universal to the ution in the conception of science. However, rationalism and particular, while the empiricists (such as Newton and Francis empiricism in this period did not automatically imply a genuinely Bacon) advocated the gathering of observable data in order to see modern understanding of science. In the case of , what universal laws they revealed. The main difference between empiricism was a critique of science and defended theocratic ideas rationalists and empiricists is that the former regard knowledge as and Descartes believed it was incumbent on him to provide of depending on a priori logical structures while the latter emphasize the . The modern scientific outlook did not occur sensory , or experience, as the criterion of valid know- until the eighteenth century in the period known as the Enlighten- ledge. ment, when many of the earlier ideas were radicalized. Two of the classical exponents of empiricism were Thomas From the mid-eighteenth century several schools of Hobbes and Locke. It is important to see a difference between developed around the leitmotif of reason. The philosophers of the Cartesian rationalism and English empiricism. The latter is more Scottish Enlightenment, in particular and Adam illustrative of positivism in the conventional sense of the word. Smith, were important figures in the history of modern social According to Hobbes in his famous Leviathan [1651], which can be science. In his three volume A Treatise of Human Nature [1739 and said to have laid the foundations of modern , 1740] and the later Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding scientific knowledge is based on the search for causal laws. The data [1748], Hume advocated an extreme scepticism, which brought the scientist examines are meaningful only as laws. One of the laws empiricism beyond the limits of natural laws to which it had for which Hobbes is famous is the principle of methodological previously been bound. He defended Locke's empiricism to the , which was the basis of his political theory, and extent that all knowledge derives from sensory experience but drew became the foundation of modern liberalism, influencing in particu- different conclusions. The empiricism of Locke was reconciled with lar the disciplines of politics, and psychology. This a belief in the natural laws of morality ('life, and property'), claimed that social action can be explained by the behaviour of but for Hume scepticism must be extended to everything, including isolated individuals, the sum of whose action is society. Society is science itself. Thus the knowledge science produces is an uncertain thus reduced to the behaviour, in Hobbes quite literally, of the knowledge and can undermine itself. Hume thus not only rejects the psychological motives of rationally acting individuals seeking to deductive rationalism of Descartes, but also casts doubt on the realize their interests. Locke was also an exponent of empiricism. inductive approach of Lockian empiricism. Hume argues that our His Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690] argued for a knowledge derives from the actual forms of our mental perception theory of knowledge in which science severs all and may not therefore correspond to an objective reality. His connections with . The sole criterion for valid knowledge is objection to induction was that we cannot generalize from cases of determined by sensory experience. This view must be seen in the which we have experience to those that are unknown to us. In this 22 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 23 way Hume questions the correspondence theory of truth character- Utopia [1516]. With the Enlightenment intellectuals, society as istic of much of rationalism. 'civil society' is seen as a sovereign domain autonomous of the state, Another enduring legacy of Hume was his that the which was still absolutist. It was fateful for the subsequent history of realm of facts and the sphere of values cannot be crossed: we cannot social science that this sense of society as a domain against the state infer values from facts. Hume's importance for the social sciences is was subordinated to a conception of science that reflected a statist evident in his rejection of the methodological individualism of view. 'Social science' was a term that was coined by Condorcet in Hobbes. Like many thinkers of the age, such as Giambattista Vico, the initial stages of the and introduced to the in his cyclical theory of history, Charles , in his quest English language via his writings (Heilbron 1995:110). Social for the 'spirit of the laws', or Jean Rousseau, who demonstrated science, which replaced the older idea of moral science, rapidly that equality is social and not natural, Hume offered an essentially became conceived as an of state reform policy, associated social view of human action that cannot be reduced to Hobbes's with the reform politics of A. R. J. Turgot, and was institutionally methodological individualism and its model of self-interest. His modelled on the natural sciences, in particular . As a approach can be contrasted to the epistemological individualism of positivistic inquiry, social science*first developed in France during Locke and Descartes for whom nothing social enters questions the Restoration after the fall of , who had supported the concerning the nature of knowledge (Manicas 1987:11/12). Hume's natural sciences, and it was very much in the spirit of the natural social view of human beings was reflected in his attempt to find sciences that the social sciences became institutionalized as a general laws of human nature that demonstrate that society is more state-centred knowledge culture in France. Positivism became than the sum of its parts. A famous example of this was the work of associated with 'useful' or technically exploitable knowledge for the Hume's contemporary, Smith, who wrote An Inquiry into the purpose of social by the administrators of the state. Nature and Causes of the Wealth of [1776], a work that This was the sense Comte used for the methodology of '', a exhibited the experimental method and empiricism advocated by term he coined, to describe the science of industrial society. The Hume and became a classic example of the new moral sciences. social precondition of social science as positivistic inquiry was the Scotland played a leading role in the formation of modern social administrative modern state, which required the systematization science, which flourished in the secular universities. In France the and coding of knowledge. Social science as a positivistic institution Enlightenment emerged out of the court society and developed in thus became tied to policy making and state administration. the rapidly developing civil society, which provided new for Moreover, the beginnings of national differences in the conception public discourse. The rationalism of the Enlightenment was charac- of science began to emerge from the 1790s onwards. terized by a strong attack on religion, with thephilosophes such as Against this tradition, which equated scientific knowledge with Francois and Paul D'Holbach and the encyloptdistes such natural science and the needs of the state for a form of knowledge to as engaging in empiricist tirades against theology. be used in social administration, the intellectuals of the Enlighten- While many of these salon intellectuals, took the individual as the ment stood for a more radical kind of knowledge that could be used cornerstone of knowledge, others began from the perspective of in programmes of social reconstruction. This conception of science society. From a positivistic outlook, the physiocrats, who were a can be seen as the continuation of the original ambitions of the New group of political economists including Francois Quesnay, rep- Learning and had a major roJe to play in the formation of social resented the view that society is determined by laws similar to those science. The Enlightenment writers did not simply glorify science operative in nature. for its own sake but were critical of the intolerance of the French Rousseau and Montesquieu had a stronger of society as state and its knowledge politics. During the Revolutionary period the object of study sui generis. Rousseau was one of the first to use there was the possibility that an emancipatory new science of social the word 'society', as in The [1762] as a key concept, reconstruction might emerge, but this hope was shattered by the although an earlier use of the word goes back to Thomas More's aftermath of the Revolution with the formation of the modern 24 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 25

French state. Both under the absolute ancien regime and the science and literature, and Weber was influenced by the romantics, modern post-Revolutionary state, the Enlightenment was isolated but was critical of romantic quests of poets aspiring to scientific from institutionalized science, which was forced to retreat from a knowledge. Even American empirical sociology was not untouched political role, and was thereby compelled to take up an oppositional by literature: Robert Lynd, one of the principal figures of the position. This oppositional role had a major role in the formation of Chicago School, was influenced by the writings of Lawrence, whose social science as a form of and critical reflection on theme also was the impact of modern industrialism on traditional society. Thus, from the beginning of the modern period, social communities (Lepenies 1988:186). •- science was divided between occupying an institutional role as part The foundation of the modern university system in the nineteenth of the state apparatus and being an extra-institutional discourse. century opened up new possibilities for social science to develop as Until social science became institutionalized in the universities from a competing form of knowledge to both natural science and the late nineteenth century it remained bifurcated between intellec- literature. tual critical culture and expert systems. The former largely existed in the literary public sphere and the latter within the institutions of The emergence of nineteenth-century positivism the state. This bifurcation was not always an impediment to the formation The classic proponent of positivism was Comte, who also coined the of a mature social science. Wolfgang Lepenies (1988) writes of the word 'sociology'. In his Course of Positive Philosophy [1830-42] he borrowing of social science, in particular sociology, from literature, outlined the basic ideas of positivism. For Comte, 'positive' science which in the Enlightenment period had a social role. Honore de was useful and certain knowledge and a contrast to imaginary Balzac, for instance, first intended to call his work, not Comidie knowledge in its reliance on empirical methodology. With Comte, Humaine but Etudes Sociales, Emile Zola spoke of a 'sociologie empiricism in the tradition from Locke to Hume is transformed pratique', and with Gustave Flaubert literature and social critique from pure epistemology to the actual practice of empirical method- were indistinguishable. According to Lepenies, sociology emerged ology. Knowledge no longer has to prove itself merely through a as a 'third culture' between natural science, on the one side, and critique of sensory perception, but must submit itself before literature and the on the other. Isolated from the official methodological investigation: there can be no truth without obser- expert culture fostered by the state, sociology found itself with not vation. The empirical henceforth refers to the domain of objectively only natural science as a rival but also literature. Fearing that existing facts and science is the observation of those facts. With the association with literature might ruin its aspiration to scientific identification of the empirical with the factual, rationality too shifts status, sociology preferred to model itself on the natural sciences from the epistemological to the scientific and becomes equated with rather than on literature and the humanities, from which it methodology. In this way Comtean positivism inherits the tra- distanced itself. This was exacerbated by the fact that on the whole ditions of empiricism and rationalism. While for Condorcet social the counter-Enlightenment was allied on the side of a literary social science was modelled on mathematics, for Comte it was to be science, with reactionary and romantic thinkers looking more to modelled on ; it was to be a value free, explanatory, literature than science for an orientation for social science. In descriptive and comparative science of general social laws. The England, where since the Restoration the educational estab- themes that defined social science were those of stability and lishment lay greater stress on literature than on science, : '' was the study of social stability and 'dynamics' the science was often equated with literature, as is evidenced by the study of change or . This concern with stability and change literary-social scientific writings of , H. G. Wells, can be seen in the context of the aftermath of the French Revolution D. H. Lawrence and Julian Huxley. In Germany, the circle around and the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy in 1830, events that the poet Stefan George had an important role in the shaping of shaped Comte's thought. As a reformer Comte was, like most sociology. , for instance, was a mediator between liberals, not a revolutionary and feared social disorder, but did not 26 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 27 stand for Restoration reactionism. This experience with crisis led social science to physics, Spencer took as the paradigmatic him to believe that was the natural condition of society. science. Under the influence of , Spencer developed For sociology this had the consequence that it became more a functionalist-evolutionary social science, which had considerable concerned with the question of order than of change. impact on the subsequent history of the social sciences. The basic Social science or 'social physics' thus began its uncertain career in ideas of this approach are that social structures are explained in the mirror image of natural science and came to be the expression of terms of the functions they perform and social change is the result of modernity itself. The doctrine of positivism was outlined in the functional . His Social Statics [1850] clearly shows the context of a that Comte, under the influence influence of Comte and a concern with social order typical of of the industrial utopianism of Saint-Simon, developed from Victorian social thought. Spencer also linked theory construction to Turgot. The basic idea was that the evolution of human society empirical analysis, compiling vast quantities of data for the building through the ages culminated in the modern epoch of positivism in of general theory. Darwin himself was influenced by Spencer, who which science was itself the secular spiritualism of industrial society. formulated the notion of 'the survival of the fittest', a term that In this Comtean world-view, positivism was the highest expression found its most famous expression in On tfte Origin of by of scientism: the idea that the of Science, which alone has Means of [1859]. access to true and objective knowledge, can provide political and Comte's influence in shaping the positivist self-understanding of moral leadership for society. the social sciences extended largely through Spencer in England In Britain, positivism was reflected in the writings of the and Durkheim in France, who both established the foundations of Victorian utilitarians, such as Mill, and in the rise of social modern empirical sociology and functionalist theory. Durkheim's as represented in the thought of Spencer. Mill, conception of social sciences was out in 1895 in the Rules for the however, was greatly influenced by Comte, about whom he wrote a Sociological Method, which argued for a model of social science book in 1865. In his A System of [1843] he defended very much based on natural science, but that discarded the empiricism as an inductive science of general causal laws. While philosophy of history. His approach was also opposed to psycholo- recognizing differences between the study of nature and the study of gism, the attempt to explain society by reference to the conscious- society, he stood for the unity of the scientific method. Mill was very ness of the individual. Society for Durkheim is a reality in itself and critical of the idea of scientific politics and stood for a model of sociology is a realist and inductive science of social facts. The object useful knowledge. The principal difference between French and domain of social science is a reality that is composed of facts and British positivism was that in Britain science was not itself seen as laws between those facts. All of can be broken down capable of providing political leadership. This was a reflection of the into facts and analysed in specific case studies, of which Durkheim fact that while England had taken the lead in science in the was the first major modern exponent. His approach was an seventeenth century, the centre of shifted to France, as was anti-naturalist realism since he held that social facts were different to be the case in the following century when it once again shifted to from natural facts. Social facts differ from natural facts in that they Germany. The Victorians tended to link science to the idea of moral are social representations, but they are none the less facts and can improvement. Sociology was, from the beginning, caught in the be examined without recourse to prior theoretical constructions. bind between the postivisitic heritage of moralistic reformism and While facts are the raw data, the aim of social science is the search administrative knowledge. for causal laws. Theory for Durkheim is subsequent to observation, For Mill, all have the same logical structure and which proceeds inductively from facts through hypotheses to society can be explained by the laws governing nature. More general causal laws. These general laws are conceived in terms of important for social science was Spencer, who helped to popularize their functions: social phenomena are explained by their social the word 'sociology' in England as a new science of society based on functions. Durkheim insisted on the priority of as the the method of the natural sciences. While Comtean positivism tied proper subject matter of sociology. 28 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 29

Politically a liberal reformer and a believer in modern liberal closely linked in the combination of quantitative individualism, Durkheim was no radical and feared the breakdown within an evolutionary conception of society based on moderniza- of French society, which was threatened not only by the spectre of tion and functionalist theory. Paul F. Lazarsfeld's sociology is an the Paris Commune and the Dreyfus Affair but also by German example of the use of a mathematically based empirical social aggression, as witnessed by the Franco-Prussian war. His concep- science, which co-operated with the functionalism of Merton and tion of social science was a conservative one in that it stressed social Parsons. cohesion through cultural consensus as the normal condition of The positivistic conception of science, I have suggested, has society and social change was identified with disorder or dysfunc- traditionally been linked to liberal reformism, if not radicalism, tion. The role of the social scientist was confined to the neutral reacting to historical crisis. The great historical crises that marked observation of an objectively existing reality, over which he or she the path of modern positivistic and rationalistic science were the had no control. 'general crisis' of the seventeenth century, the French Revolution Functionalism combined with empirical social science had its and its aftermath, and the First World War and the rise of fascism. most important success in North American universities, where The last provided the context for the return to an extreme form of social science as a profession was established rapidly from the late positivism in the 1920s, when many intellectuals of a liberal and left nineteenth century onwards, culminating in the Chicago School, disposition (such as , , Carl Hempel and which was the leading school in sociology in the 1920s. While the Otto Neurath) reacted to the of ideology as well as research of the Chicago School went beyond positivism, embracing, obscurantist metaphysics, which were creeping into academia in the for instance, under the influence of Simmel social interactionism, its period preceding and following the war. The '' of self-understanding was radical social criticism. was an the Vienna Circle demanded a conception of science based on the important influence in the Chicago School (Joas 1993). Works such natural sciences, in particular physics, which was to be the model for as 's The Public and its Problems [1927] were important all the sciences. in mediating empirical research and theory. One of Dewey's Logical positivism was inspired by the new developments in concerns was the link between democracy and knowledge, a physics, such as 's theory of relativity and relationship that he believed must be rescued by a policy oriented , and stood for the of a unified science based on the science. American pragmatism exemplified a tradition of social certain knowledge of mathematical logic. A second influence was science that was characterized by the priority of positivistic . One of the key ideas was that there are only two kinds of empirical research with theory serving an applied role. Thus knowledge: empirical knowledge (knowledge derived from experi- empirical micro-case studies using statistical methodology became ence) and logical knowledge (which is derived from logical analy- the hallmark of American sociology. However, research was guided sis). Mach offered one of the classic formulations of logical more by government policy and social administration than by positivism as the methodological objectification of reality in the intellectual critique. In time the influence of pragmatism declined. analysis of laws governing facts. 's The Logical Existing somewhat uneasily alongside of empirical sociology was Structure of the World [1928] became one of the enduring treatises the more theoretical sociology of Merton and Parsons, which had of logical positivism. Undoubtedly the most famous statement of also inherited the positivistic conception of social science as the school was 's correspondence theory of value-free inquiry. The Parsonian conception of social science can truth in the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus [1922], a work that be seen as the expression of the core values of America society - Wittgenstein later refuted when he moved towards a relationist liberal democratic consensus within the egalitarian market struc- theory of truth. Logical positivism radicalized this view by propos- tures of - and as an historical alternative to European ing that the only valid kind of knowledge is observable and fascism and . Functionalism and positivism became verifiable knowledge. Neurath, himself a Marxist, applied logical 30 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 31 positivism to sociology in his advocation of a 'physicalist' science of theory dependency in observation was confirmed in work as diverse society. Hempel likewise applied logical positivism to history in the as Jules Poincare, Einstein, Popper, Kuhn and Toulmin (1953). search for general historical laws that could be used for : In the remainder of this chapter I shall confine the discussion to explanations must have the power of . This school was the most important critics of positivism who are writing from the very influential in Anglo-American conceptions of science, such as perspective of the , namely Popper and Kuhn. the realist and analytical traditions associated with Bertrand (The implications of STS and SSK will not be taken up until Chapter Russell, A. J. Ayer, Ernest Nagel, and William Quine. 6.) Popper's theory of science can be viewed as a critique of positivism, in particular of logical positivism, which he'aimed to The break-up of positivism: Popper and Kuhn refute, but his was a critique that did not abandon all aspects of In the inter-wars years positivism appeared to be the dominant positivism. For critics of positivism as a methodology of science, influence in the philosophy of science. Logical positivism and positivism in its inductive empiricist form is unable to, explain the professional empirical social science were in ascendancy since the principled rejection of . In The Logic of Scientific Dis- death of Durkheim, and it seemed that only Weberian sociology (to covery (1959 [1934]) Popper outlined the basic tenets of the method be considered in Chapter 2) was capable of offering an alternative. he advocated, . The main in this revo- The critique of positivism can be viewed from two angles. One lutionary work in the philosophy of science is that the principle of angle is to trace the revolt of the social sciences against the verification must be replaced by the principle of falsification, hegemony of the natural sciences. This involves looking at the sometimes called the hypothetico-deductive method. The logic of hermeneutical-interpretative revolt from the neo-Kantians to science, he argued, does not proceed inductively as in Baconism, Weber and modern (the subject of Chapter 2), and that is, from the observation of data to the construction of the Marxist and revolt from Marx through the or hypotheses. Science does not prove anything by conducting to neo-Marxism (the subject of Chapter 3). The experiments, no matter how numerous, for the very reason that no other angle is to look at the internal undermining of positivism from matter how often a theory is tested there is always the possibility such developments as Quine's critique, to the revival of Science and that it can be falsified. Popper's argument against verification, or Studies (STS) and the Sociology of Scientific Know- justificationism, is illustrated by his famous example that 'no matter ledge (SSK). This will involve shifting the perspective to the how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does philosophy of science more generally for positivism has not been not justify the conclusion that all swans are white' (1959:27). merely attacked by social science: it has been far more pervasively Popper instead proposes the principle of falsification, or the 'trial and effectively criticized by modern conceptions of natural science and error' theory. Instead of proceeding inductively, science itself that have sought to rescue realism from positivism. Ironically, progresses deductively through attempts to falsify the results of then, the result is that many positivists operating in the social previous theories. Rather than proceeding from the particular to sciences hold to a conception of science that has been abandoned by the universal, Popper argues science proceeds from the universal modern natural science itself. One of the most important early (i.e. scientific hypotheses) to the particular, but from hypotheses. developments in the internal breakdown of positivism was the Popper thus demolishes one of the beliefs of positivism, namely Duhem-Quine thesis of the of scientific theo- that science proceeds from the observation of data by means of ries by evidence. Quine had established a relationist theory of truth and the indeterminacy of reference, which undermined the in- experiments, which when repeated are verified allowing us to infer ductionist and foundationalist basis of classical positivism. For general laws about the nature of reality. Popper shows that the logic Quine, truth is a function of the relationship between words, and of science is determined not by a path to absolute verifiable not of the correspondence between words and reality. The idea of knowledge but by attempts to falsify the results of other theories and therefore the theories science provides are only ones that have 32 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 33 withstood falsification. The scientist does not gather facts or data in strove for is not possible yet admitting that knowledge of reality is order to a theory, but rather accumulates data to falsify possible, however imperfect it may be. He believed in the unity of prevailing theories: 'Knowledge does not start from perception or the scientific knowledge, arguing that the principle of falsification or the collection of data or facts, but it starts, rather, also applies to the social sciences, and moreover held to a from problems' (Popper 1976:88). The result is that scientific correspondence theory of truth. While severely criticizing naive knowledge is uncertain knowledge, but is nevertheless the most scientism he nevertheless stood for a scientistic concept of science as certain kind of knowledge human beings can aspire to: its certainty the bearer of the most perfect form of knowledge. *- consists of its . The objectivity of science is the In sum, the importance of Popper's critical rationalism is that he objectivity of its method. The theories of science are ultimately only rejects the naturalistic of positivism not just in social science tentative to solve problems and cannot be verified by but primarily in natural science. In striking a major blow against the , no matter how weighty it may be. Scientific positivistic conception of natural science as a theory of how natural statements are, then, statements that are in principle open to science operates, Popper undermined the possibility of a positivistic falsification, ones whose truth content can be tested empirically. social science, which has always required the*alibi of positivism in Scientific truths can only be 'corroborated'; they cannot be verified. the natural sciences. Popper, it must be mentioned, was not the only Tautological or metaphorical statements cannot therefore be critic of induction. Other leading critics, were Nagel, who wrote scientific since they cannot be falsified. Popper believed this also [1961], Hans Zetterberg who wrote On applied to Marxism, which he regard as historicist (i.e. a metaphysi- Theory and Verification in Sociology [1966] and Hempel and Paul cal philosophy of history) and based on the positivist illusion of Oppenheim who advanced a 'deductive nomologicaF approach. historical laws. Marxists, he argued, always stressed the evidence in Popper's theory of science has been the subject of great con- favour of their theories while ignoring evidence that could falsify troversy and Popper himself modified some of his earlier extreme them. and somewhat simple claims. It will suffice to mention here that the Critical rationalism breaks certain defining tenets of positivism. It most important revision he made in face of massive criticism was rejects the naive inductionist notion that the scientist observes that the logic of science does not only depend on the principle of reality without theoretical predispositions, for the scientist always falsifiability, for a theory is discarded not once it has been falsified operates from a theory that has withstood attempts to falsify it. but only when a new theory is there to replace it. At this point we Science, Popper contends, does not criticize reality. In this sense it can consider the work of Kuhn, whose place in the history of the is value free for the scientist may not make judgements on the philosophy of science is as revolutionary as the importance he subject matter of science. The critical task refers entirely to the accords to the logic of scientific itself. Like Popper he scientific method, which, Popper argues against scientistic positiv- accepted the unity of the scientific method of deduction. ism, must reflect on itself for science is fallible, always potentially in Kuhn in his classic work The Structure of Scientific need of improvement and correction: the best theory is always the (1970 [1962]) has offered the most sophisticated alternative to best tested one. While upholding the unity of the scientific method Popper. His main thesis is that science proceeds neither inductively for all the sciences, Popper concedes that the subject matter of the as positivists maintained (from observation to theory) nor by the social sciences differs from that of the natural sciences. The nature falsification of theory (as Popper argued). The most important of causality in society, where it is contingent, cannot be compared factor in science is the shift from to revolutionary with natural causality, where it is always invariable. Moreover, it is science. He claimed, with many of Popper's critics, that scientific the aim of the natural sciences to make prediction possible, while in progress is not dependent on falsification to bring about a change in the social sciences predictions can be self-fulfilling prophesies. a . Scientists, he firmly believed, do not learn from Popper stands ultimately in the empiricist tradition of Hume in the mistakes, particularly if these errors are going to have very recognition that the absolute certainty that Cartesian rationalism far-reaching consequences for the way science is conducted. Kuhn, 34 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 35 in effect, reduces Popper's principle of falsifiability to problem Neither the accumulation of evidence nor the ability to falsify a solving within normal science. In the course of 'normal science' theory explain how science works, for these criteria fail to take scientists attempt to resolve problems or puzzles whose solutions account of the role of revolutions in science. These revolutions are contained within the paradigm they operate, for also involve the intrusion into science of non-scientific elements, such as influence the questions as well as the answers. Kuhn argued that cultural values, which make some scientists blind to the implications normal science does not look for anomalies for it is content to of an anomaly and open the eyes of others. By admitting the role of remain with the problems the paradigm is capable of solving. a 'revolutionary transformation of vision' in the logic of science and However, when an anomaly occurs this 'puzzle solving' may not be the importance of historical and social contexts, Kuhn contributed enough as the limits of the paradigm may be challenged. In general, to demolishing the scientistic self-confidence of positivism in its scientists, Kuhn argues, are reluctant to break from a paradigm that identification of science with the holistic discourse of perfect offers them security. Scientists in the course of normaJ science do knowledge, and, moreover, casts doubt on the role of progress in not look for anomalies and use the paradigm to impose the science in so far as this was cumulative. Scientific paradigms cannot prevailing consensus. Thus the concept of truth that prevails is more be judged because they are themselves the* basis of judgement: one of consensus than correspondence. Very often it takes a new science as a cognitive system is ultimately shaped by the institution generation to make the break, as it may require a fundamental shift of science. in cultural values. If an anomaly persists it may lead to a period of Nevertheless, Kuhn was not a relativist and believed in scientific crisis in which 'extraordinary science' occurs, which is characterized progress. While the incommensurability thesis claimed that para- by a plurality of views, and debate on the fundamentals of the digms are frequently incommensurable, progress may still be paradigm begins. A new paradigm is then ready to emerge in order possible in one paradigm but not necessarily across paradigms. to solve the anomaly. The new paradigm subsequently comes to be Since Kuhn rejects not only absolute proof but also the principle of accepted as normal science and a new consensus is established. falsification, the only criterion left in his model is the prevailing However, a paradigm is rejected only when a new one is consensus. In this sense Kuhn remained ultimately in the positivist available, for without a paradigm there can be no meaningful camp since he denied the possibility of critical and rational science. This may take a considerable length of time (so that consensus (Bernstein 1979:93). However, one of the most import- extraordinary science may be more 'normal' than 'normal science'). ant consequences of Kuhn's work derived from the importance he Kuhn maintained Popper's break with positivism was incomplete gave to the role of the '' in the construction of for his principle of falsification only applied to normal science and science. Kuhn revitalized the empirical study of science in the turn could not explain the great scientific . In normal science away from an ideal methodology to the study of science by scientific researchers are not in fact trying to refute a theory, but are merely means; moreover his work was followed by the naturalization of looking for a solution to a puzzle, rather like a chess player who is epistemology - a wide-ranging movement today, the core of which not normally questioning the rules of the game. He also finally is neo-empiricist, conventionalistic and naturalistic study of scien- refuted positivism on the grounds that verification may be possible tific practice. In the context it may be said that Kuhn within one paradigm, but the same set of facts could imply a hastened the demise of positivism, which was breaking down different outcome in a different paradigm: evidence can be used in internally and criticized from without in various ways by a whole different ways depending on one's paradigm. new generation of social studies of science. Some eminent examples Kuhn's importance in the post-empiricist conception of science are Fuller (1993) and Rorty (1979). consists of his that progress in science depends It would not be possible here to enter into a discussion on the neither on induction nor on deduction, but on revolutionary breaks debates to which Kuhn has given rise. I shall merely comment on in paradigms: observation does not lead to theory. His starting 's critique, which is generally considered the most point is not reality but scientific constructions (Trigg 1985:14). important attempt to place the post-empiricist theory of science 36 Social Science Positivism, Science and the Politics of Knowledge 37 somewhere between Popper and Kuhn, briefly introduce Paul possibility of a democratic society. In Science in a Free Society Feyerabend's anarchistic theory, and finally discuss the implications (1978) he argued for the disestablishment of science in society, of Kuhn specifically for social science. which he demanded should be reduced to the status of just one Lakatos's critique of Kuhn revolves around the central critical belief system among others. Science, in his view, should not be argument made against Kuhn, namely that his concept of a supported by the state since state sponsored science is undemocratic revolution is irrationalist and too general as is the notion of a single, and is mostly conducted without the consultation of the public (see dominating paradigm governing normal science. Instead Lakatos Chapter 7). (1970,1978) proposes that normal science be considered more as a The implications for the social sciences of post-empiricism in the research programme that survives falsification for reasons of its theory of science have been ambivalent. On the one hand, Kuhn general acceptability. This situation cannot be regarded as a succeeded in demolishing the scientistic self-understanding of paradigm since it does not have the general status that Kuhn positivism in the history of the natural sciences, and therefore attributed to it. The transition from one research programme to struck a blow against positivism in the social sciences. On the other, another is not always revolutionary in the irrational manner implied his theory of science is primarily a theory of natural science and by Kuhn, but is the product of rational exploration of rival cannot be applied so easily to social science, which is characterized . The situational logic, such as cultural values and more by a multi-paradigm status. The Kuhnian paradigms, even historical milieu, is thus less important than Kuhn believed. The when reduced to Lakatos's research programmes, seem more like result of Lakatos's intervention was a levelling of Kuhnian theory disciplines themselves in the social and human sciences. Social down to critical rationalism. However, he goes beyond Popper in scientists are too divided to accept paradigms and it is therefore arguing that the progress of science does not occur merely through questionable if something like 'normal science' characterizes the attempts to falsify theory by new evidence, but in Kuhnian terms social sciences, where there is a plurality of competing paradigms whole research programmes can be falsified. He modified Popper's available. There is also another problem with the reception of Kuhn principle of falsification to what he called 'sophisticated falsifi- in social science. The consensus theory of science that Kuhn cationism': it is not single theories that are falsified but entire proposed has had an oddly conservative reception, often confirming programmes and this occurs only when there is an alternative positivism rather than undermining it. Kuhn himself rejected most available. In other words, refutation does not automatically lead to of the radical implications of his breakthrough and denies the rejection. Moreover, he tried to accommodate a degree of con- possibility of an external critical rationality that is independent of firmation of theories. The is the process by which the epistemic practices of the time (Fuller 1992:251). The idea of a increasingly more progressive programmes replace less adequate cognitive consensus model within the scientific community had ones, but all of which, including programmes subsequently proven more appeal to conservative positivists than to more radical and to be false, are important in the progress of science. critical conceptions of social science (Martins 1972:52). Indeed, the Feyerabend in Against Method (1975) represents one of the final actual empirical conducting of positivistic social science within figures in the relativization of science. His 'anarchistic theory of 'normal science' is not in fact challenged by the Kuhnian approach, knowledge' argued for a pluralistic view of science that did not which primarily emphasizes the role of revolutions in the break- elevate science above other kinds of human knowledge, such as down of paradigms. religion. Feyerabend generalized Kuhn's extraordinary science to be the nature of all of science and argues, in Wittgensteinian manner, that the meaning of science derives from its social Conclusion: constructivism and realism application. The result of Feyerabend's critique is radical relativ- In order to take the post-empiricist critique of positivism to its ism. Feyerabend was a controversial and provocative figure who logical conclusion a consideration of other positions would be believed that science should be organized so as to enhance the appropriate. These positions fall into two broad groups, namely 38 Social Science realism and constructivism. The former is principally represented by the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar, who rejects positivism in favour of an emancipatory theory of science that is both explanatory and interpretative. This critical realism seeks to rescue the sciences from . One of the aims of realism is to retain the claims of Hermeneutics and science to objectivity and truth without conceding anything to scientism and the absolute unity of the scientific method. Critical realism can be seen as a way of rescuing realism and the emanci- Interpretation: The patory promises of science from positivism and relativism. Con- structivism, on the other hand, is a more diffuse term to describe different post-empiricist approaches. In their most sophisticated Search for Meaning forms, constructivist schools are best represented by the recon- structive-pragmatic social science of Habermas and Apel, post- , various other positions such as interventionism, , utilization research and 's critical practice. However, to enter into a discussion on the critical realism and constructivist schools would be to jump ahead. In the Introduction: defining the hermeneutical approach next chapter the historical alternative to positivism is discussed: the hermeneutic and interpretative approaches. In the previous chapter the critique of positivism was looked at from a point that broadly accepted the unity of the scientific method, even though it saw the subject matter of social science as being different from that of the natural sciences. Positivism evolved from its origins in radical liberalism to become the dominant form that the institution of science took in modern society. With the institutionalization of science under state control, the radical challenge to positivism was mostly represented by Marxism, which will be looked at in Chapter 3. In this chapter the hermeneutical tradition, predominantly associated with nineteenth-century Ger- man thought, is examined from its origins in the counter- Enlightenment of Vico and Rousseau, through eighteenth-century philology to the neo-Kantian school, phenomenology and its evolution into the interpretative social science of Weber and the psychoanalysis of . Finally, modern hermeneutical approaches are briefly considered in order to provide a full picture of the anti-positivist tradition. While a discourse of realism pervades positivism, a discourse of constructivism runs through the hermeneutical tradition: social reality is seen as a meaningful construction and not as an objective reality. The hermeneutical approach is characterized by the follow- ing dominant tendencies: